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To deem that law is imperative, now expectedly leads one to ask whom the law is
imperative to. However, Professor Hart submits that this question is unnecessary in
finding a definition for law since law becomes complete even before individuals are made
aware of it a view contrary to that of John Austins. Nonetheless, he posits that law and
legal control should primarily be general, as normally is the case in modern states. To
separately inform each citizen of the law and to give face-to-face directives would be a
tiresome endeavor. But, he adds, this generality of law is only a primary descriptor.
Official and individuated directives secondarily come into play once general laws are not
made. As in the case, for example, of tax collectors who may officially and individually
identify and record an erring citizen for compliance or punishment.
Now, taking a review on the previous gunman example, we could note that the
order (Hand over the money or I will shoot) might be enough for the gunmans purpose.
The gunmans order, once satisfied, would die with the occasion. For the purpose of law,
however, such a fleeting quality might not be enough since laws are followed time after
time. Laws are standing orders which need be enduring. In most legal systems, such
short-term coercive power as the gunman employed would even amount to a criminal
offence.
In summary, in this initial attempt to define law, Professor Hart has introduced to
us that law is forwarded by authority, primarily general in applicability, and followed
time after time. While these ideas are seemingly detached, Professor Hart strings them
together with the concept of a sovereign. True enough, and as John Austin shows,
societies show its members to have a general habit of obedience or a tendency to follow
laws. But this general habit is a vague one and still, a sovereign is necessary. The
sovereign would stand as the respected authority, ensure the laws applicability, and
legislate for its endurance. To accomplish this, he furthers that a sovereign must be
internally supreme (as to its subjects) and externally independent (as to other
sovereigns).