Hernandez vs NPC
Facts
Sometime in 1996, National Power Corporation (Napocor)
began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or
towers in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-
Balintawak Power Transmission Project. Said transmission
line passes through the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio and
Dasmarias Village proximate to where petitioners homes
are (Forbes Park).
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners
researched and found out through internet sources that
exposure to electromagnetic fields could cause diseases
ranging from cancer to leukemia. Thus, petitioners had
various meetings with Napocor about the infrastructure
project but such meetings remained futile because both
parties never reached an agreement.
Hence, on 9 March 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO and/or
preliminary injunction against Napocor. The complaint was
granted by the court.
Napocor filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO
and Preliminary Injunction with the CA, on the ground that
Sec. 1 of PD 1818 provides that no court of the Philippines
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an
infrastructure project
In the interregnum, by order dated 3 April 2000, the trial
court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against Napocor. The trial court articulated that an
injunction was necessary to stay Napocors activation of its
power lines due to the possible health risks posed to the
petitioners. The trial court was of the view that Presidential
Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence proscribing injunctions
against infrastructure projects do not find application in the
case at bar because of the health risks involved.
Napocor amended its petition filed before the CA to to
include the prayer for the nullification and injunction of the
Order dated 3 April 2000 of the trial court.
On 3 May 2000, the CA reversed the trial courts order,
ruling that the proscription on injunctions against
infrastructure projects of the government is clearly
mandated by the Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Issue
Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the
construction and operation of the 29 decagon-shaped steel
poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding
Presidential Decree No. 1818
Held
Yes, petition is granted.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits courts from issuing
injunctions against government infrastructure projects.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts
from issuing an injunction against any infrastructure project
in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential
government projects or frustrate the economic development
effort of the nation.
However, although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits
any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the
issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly
outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this
Court declared that courts could not be prevented from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative
acts.
In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a
preliminary injunction on the ground that the Napocor
project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in the
Constitution and for violation of Sec. 27 of the Local
Government Code for Napocors failure to conduct prior
consultation with them.
Whether is a violation of petitioners constitutionally
protected right to health and whether Napocor had indeed
violated the Local Government Code provision on prior
consultation with the affected communities are veritable
questions of law that invested the trial court with jurisdiction
to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction.
As such, these questions of law divest the case from the
protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary
injunction finds legal support in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court. The rule on preliminary injunction merely
requires that unless restrained, the act complained of will
probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment
ineffectual. Here, there is adequate evidence on record to
justify the conclusion that the project of Napocor probably
imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so as to
justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
It has been consistently held by the Supreme Court, in a long
line of cases, that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of a courts intervention is fatal to
ones cause of action as aptly explained by the Supreme Court
in the case of University of the Philippines v. Catungal,
Jr., et al., (G.R. No. 121863, May 5, 1997), to wit:
The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the
administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass
upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both
legal and practical reasons for the principle. The administrative
process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy
solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a
procedure for administrative review and provides a system of
administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts for
reasons of law, comity, and convenience will not entertain a
case unless the available administrative remedies have been
resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum.
In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Clinton Apparelle, Inc., we
held:
While the matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court, this discretion must be exercised based upon the
grounds and in the manner provided by law. The exercise of
discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters is generally
not interfered with save in cases of manifest abuse. And to
determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion, a
scrutiny must be made of the bases, if any, considered by the
trial court in granting injunctive relief. Be it stressed that
injunction is the strong arm of equity which must be issued
with great caution and deliberation, and only in cases of great
injury where there is no commensurate remedy in damages