5 Chinas cultural diplomacy

Going for soft power

Hongyi Lai*

Introduction: cultural diplomacy as a tool for soft power

Culture is Chinas new tool in diplomacy. It has also been one of the major tools
used by China to project soft power in the recent years. Taking advantage of its
unique culture and utilizing platforms for cultural exchange, China has actively
promoted cultural exchange programs, festivals, movies, music, religious
forums, sports, and tourism with the outside world in the 2000s. Its aim has been
to enhance its soft power and project its image of peaceful rise.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the rationale for the Chinese use of cul-
tural diplomacy to project its soft power and to document the main forms of cul-
tural diplomacy encouraged and even sponsored by the state for that purpose. In
the first part, the Chinese view of soft power and the relevance of cultural diplo-
macy will be discussed. In the main part, the growing Chinese use of cultural
programs to polish Chinas image will be analyzed. The last part offers a tenta-
tive assessment of the effectiveness and limits of Chinas cultural diplomacy.
It is argued in this chapter that Chinese leaders have been aware of the
growing relevance and importance of cultural diplomacy and have made exten-
sive use of cultural platforms to project Chinas peaceful rise image and soft
power. They have also introduced new initiatives, such as Confucius Institutes,
exports of Chinese cultural products, and, recently, efforts to make the Chinese
media global players. China has seen its cultural profile in the world growing.
Nevertheless, Chinas cultural diplomacy is limited by its economic resources
and defects in its political system.

Chinese view of soft power

Recently, Chinese leaders and analysts have paid greater attention to soft power
for political and intellectual reasons. First and most importantly, Chinas
growing international influence has aroused deep uneasiness among segments of
the elites, the establishment, and the public in a number of countries. Some elites
in the United States and Japan, however, are concerned with Chinas possible
rivalry in Asia-Pacific and even in the world, and have sounded the alarm over
Chinas threat. The China threat argument was initially manifest in military and
84 H. Lai
national security circles, as well as in analyses within these circles. A sensational
book entitled The Coming Conict with China even proclaimed in 1997 that
China and the United States, as two arch rivals, would clash militarily.1 In recent
years the Pentagon has been questioning Chinas military build-up and the trans-
parency of its military spending and programs. The United States sees Chinas
rise as a potential challenge to its hegemony. In later years the China threat argu-
ment seemed to spill over into economic affairs. This is reflected in the US Con-
gress and the European Union (EU)s complaints about the ballooning trade
deficits with China; US political accusations against the Chinese exports disrupt-
ing local productions and driving out local business; and, in recent years, against
the Chinese manipulation of its currency.2 Therefore, Chinese elites realize the
imperative to ease the discomfort from the West and the rest of the world with
regard to Chinas rapidly rising trading, economic, and political power.3
During 20032008, the United States was widely perceived to have failed to
utilize its political, cultural, and material resources and to have mishandled the
anti-terror war. As a result, its image around the world became increasingly
unfavorable. This negative lesson also reminded the Chinese elites of the impor-
tance of soft power for cultivating a favorable image of China.
Meanwhile, the arrival and popularity of the theory and concept of soft power
also provided the intellectual base and logic for China to cultivate its soft power.
In 1988 Joseph Nye pointed out in his popular article that soft power is a key
ingredient for great power. According to him, soft power refers to the ability to
get what one wants through attraction and co-option rather than coercion or
payment.4 The concept of soft power works in contrast to the conventional
emphasis on hard power, such as military, political, and economic might. It
encompasses a nations ideology, image, conduct of foreign policy, political per-
suasion, and, more importantly, its cultural appeal in the world. As early as
2001, Nyes theory of soft power was introduced by scholars in China.5 One year
after Joseph Nyes main book on soft power (Soft Power: The Means to Success
in World Politics) was published in English, it was translated and published in
Chinese.6
As early as 2003, Chinese scholars started to investigate the sources of
Chinas soft power and its approach to augmenting it.7 Chinese analysts sug-
gested that China should also endeavor to develop and project its own soft
power. They suggested that China could enhance its popular appeal in the world
through acting as a responsible great power on the world stage; advocating a
harmonious world and peaceful rise; demonstrating the virtues of the Chinese
path of economic development; expanding its foreign assistance; and developing
its own discourse in world affairs.8 These views echo those of the Chinese
government.

The Chinese view on cultural diplomacy

In recent years, the Chinese elites have come to believe that Chinas rise should
rest not only on its economic, scientific, technological, and military power, but
 Chinas cultural diplomacy 85
also on its soft power. Culture has been regarded as an important tool for China
to augment its soft power. Through cultural exchange, China hopes to assure the
world that China is a civilized, responsible, and trustworthy nation. Wu Jianmin,
president of the College of Foreign Affairs, declared in 2006, Many westerners
biases toward China result from their lack of understanding of the essence of the
Chinese culture. . . . As a matter of fact promotion of the Chinese culture is a
good remedy for dissolving the China threat argument.9At a forum sponsored
by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, scholars of international affairs in
Shanghai proposed that China could expand its soft power by taking advantage
of the appeal of its culture and utilizing cultural exchange programs. For
example, China should revitalize its traditional culture, especially its traditional
emphasis on social harmony, attract international students, and continue to set
up Confucius Institutes abroad.10
The Chinese government appears to have taken advantage of the internation-
ally perceived uniqueness of Chinese culture to cultivate soft power. Interna-
tional public opinion surveys suggest that China has been viewed as a rising
economic power in recent years (though not during the late 1990s) and that
culture was viewed as a unique feature of the nation. A survey conducted in the
United States, Japan and South Korea, as well as in the capital cities of China,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, in 1999 revealed contradictory popular
perceptions about China. China was regarded primarily as a nation with a unique
culture but not as a major economic or military power.11 The findings of a survey
on 10,250 people worldwide around 2006 suggested that 55 percent of respond-
ents expected China to be a world power in the year 2020.12 Therefore, it is
imperative for the Chinese leadership to lessen external concerns with a rising
China, and China should thus take advantage of its cultural uniqueness for easing
negative external impressions.
In addition, Chinas trade disputes with developed and developing countries
(such as Latin American nations in the developing world) have been increasing,
leading to the fear that someday Chinas mighty economic force could become a
formidable source of conflict. Chinas elites thus sense that China should lay a
heavier emphasis on the cultural dimension of its peaceful rise. A healthy
domestic culture can also convey a better image of China abroad. Chinas posit-
ive cultural products abroad can help soften Chinas image as a rising power.
Thus, the Chinese elites began to conceive of Chinas rise in not only political
and economic terms but increasingly also along a cultural dimension. What
China has to offer to the world is not just manufacturing goods, but also distinc-
tive and attractive cultural values and products. For them, Chinas cultural rise
(wenhua jueqi) and cultural soft power (wenhua ruan liliang) can help increase
the global attraction of China and undermine the negative image of a menacing
China.13
The Chinese elites have also realized that China could tap into the growing
global interest in Chinese traditional and contemporary culture in the wake of
Chinas rise. Todays China possesses multifaceted cultural resources ranging
from natural wonders, cuisines, and traditional medicine to literature, arts,
86 H. Lai
philosophies, and folk religions. In recent years, interest in China and its culture
has surged worldwide. This trend results naturally from Chinas meteoric eco-
nomic rise and worldwide media attention toward China. For example, official
statistics show that in 2005, about 141,000 overseas students came to China to
study, a 27.3 percent increase over the previous year, with 86,679 studying Man-
darin.14 Furthermore, China also finds that it has a good number of areas for con-
ducting its cultural exchanges and cultural diplomacy. For example, Africa,
Southeast Asia, Latin America, Central Asia, and Russia can accept Chinas cul-
tural diplomacy on the merits of the Chinese culture. Although Southeast Asia
may be sensitive to Chinas excessive efforts due to ethnic Chinese in the region,
it is receptive to Chinas cultural diplomacy. For these reasons, China finds its
culture a convenient and desirable platform to showcase its peaceful rise.
Chinas cultural diplomatic efforts can be divided into the following categor-
ies. First, formal official programs aiming to improve the international image of
China and its cultural influence. They include programs or policies that guide
long-term development and the export of cultural products, aim to enhance the
global influence of the Chinese media, and strive to provide a positive perspec-
tive of China. Second, international cultural exchange programs and the promo-
tion of cultural exports such as arts, entertainment (i.e. movies, TV series, and
sports), cuisine, and medicine. Third, promotion of learning the Chinese lan-
guage and of studies of China. These efforts will be analyzed by categories in
the following sections.

Official programs for global cultural inuence

In recent years, China has devised a program and taken numerous initiatives to
promote Chinese culture overseas. These plans aim to improve Chinese cultural
appeal in its immediate neighbors, in European countries, and in the United
States, as well as Third World nations. Sun Jiazheng ( ), the Chinese
Minister of Culture, declared in 2006 that culture had become the third pillar of
Chinas diplomacy, after economy and politics. Li Changchun ( ), a
member of the Politburo Standing Committee in charge of cultural affairs, stated
in 2006 that China should aim to establish brand names in external cultural
exchange and reduce huge deficits in the trading of cultural products.15 The
Chinese Communist Partys Eleventh Five-year Plan called for a larger presence
for China at international cultural markets over the period of 20052010.16 It
designed a comprehensive approach to popularizing Chinese culture worldwide
through cultural exchanges, such as the Chinese culture year, Chinese culture
week, Chinese movies week, and Chinese arts week on the anniversaries of the
founding of the Peoples Republic of China, the Chinese New Year, and the
establishment of diplomatic ties. It also called for the use of various cultural plat-
forms, including book exhibits, movies festivals, arts exhibits, expos, scholarly
exchanges, tourism, and sports, to enhance Chinas image. In addition, it
emphasizes the development of commercial networks and Chinese cultural brand
names to assist with Chinas culture going out (zouchuqu) to the outside
 Chinas cultural diplomacy 87
world. It also emphasizes the growth and exports of Chinese arts and artistic
products, including movies, Tv dramas, publications, music, animated films,
electronic games, dance and acrobatics.17 In 2007, in his keynote speech to the
Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Jintao
called on the Party state to enhance the appeal of Chinese culture and hence the
countrys soft power.18
Since late 2008 China has embarked upon a going-out (zouchuqu) media-
program to enhance the profile and popularity of its media and to present China
in a more positive light. This move is a response to the Western-media-
dominated negative global news coverage of China in the wake of the riots in
Tibetan areas in spring 2008. At several work conferences between November
2008 and January 2009 that it hosted, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD)
of the Chinese Communist Party called on the nation to develop Chinas media
around the world and establish a favorable image of the nation. The theme was
to seize rights to discourse (hua yu quan) and undertake initiatives (zhudong
quan). Liu Yunshan, the Director of the CPD, declared in a forum of the heads
of media outlets and institutions in december 2008, Influence is determined by
capability for publicity (quanbo li jueding yingxiang li). Back in December
2008, when inspecting the China Central Television (CCTV), President Hu
wrote an instruction: Strive to build the CCTv into a first-class international
media outlet with advanced technology, a huge amount of information, wide
coverage, and strong influence. For the first time, from 31 december 2008 the
CCTV broadcast the New Year gala of 2009 in its Chinese, English, French, and
Spanish channels around the world. The CCTV will also launch Russian and
Arabic channels. The Chinese ambition is to transform its official Xinhua (New
China) news agency into Chinas CNN or Al Jazeera Arabic TV station, provid-
ing 24-hour English news coverage in the United States, Europe, Australia, and
Africa. To reach this goal, one change that was contemplated was to reduce cen-
sorship of Chinese news reports in foreign languages.19 The eventual objectives
of the media going out program, according to Li Changchun, who was re-
elected as a Politburo Standing Committee member after the Seventeenth Party
Congress in 2007, was to enhance Chinas cultural soft power and improve
Chinas international image. For this aim, the national external publicity work
conference was held in Beijing in January 2009. The conference called for
efforts to actively influence international public opinion and create an amicable
external environment for China.20
Chinas leaders also employed cultural diplomacy in their interaction with
world leaders, as well as with elite members from Vietnam, Myanmar, North
Korea, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and even India.21 First, through warmly receiving
elites from these nations and showcasing the rapid Chinese economic trans-
formation, as well as relevant policies, China subtly affirms to the outside world
its model of state-led development based on incremental economic reform.
China rejects the Western model (or the Washington Consensus) that emphas-
izes all-out marketization and extensive privatization, as well as democracy and
public participation. Nevertheless, up to the present China has not explicitly
88 H. Lai
promoted its model of development. Apparently, China has learned a lesson
from Maos aggressive efforts to promote world revolution, which resulted in
suspicion from its Southeast Asian neighbors and African elites. Furthermore,
the Chinese government entertains foreign dignitaries with Chinese cultural per-
formances. For example, President Jiang Zemin invited Russian President
Putins two daughters to visit China in 2002. They were fascinated with Chinese
culture. Both learned wushu (Kung Fu in Cantonese, referring to Chinese martial
arts), and one even studied Chinese. Putin himself favors stronger ties with
China and is a fan of martial arts. On his recent visit to China he visited the
famed Shaolin Temple and watched a wushu performance by Shaolin monks.22

Selling the Chinese culture: religions, movies, sports, and

tourism
Other than the aforementioned official cultural programs and media initiatives,
China has also sponsored international cultural forums and dialogues and has
promoted the export of and international interest in its cultural elements.
Initiatives have been taken to meet these goals and enhance the global appeal
of Chinese culture. In 2006, China undertook 1,360 cultural exchanges a year, a
five-fold increase compared to the previous decade. Specifically, China signed
agreements on cultural cooperation and made 752 executive plans for cultural
exchange with 145 countries. It also had cultural exchange with 1,000 interna-
tional cultural organizations. Chinas 80 embassies overseas contained 95 cul-
tural sections. China has set up Chinese cultural centers in France, South Korea,
egypt, and Japan (Tokyo); by 2009 it had reached agreements with five coun-
tries, namely Russia, Mongolia, Romania, and Singapore, to set up Chinese cul-
tural centers.23 China has sponsored the Year of Chinese culture, the Chinese
cultural festival, and Chinese New Year celebrations in New York, Paris,
London, Sydney, and Bangkok. In 2006, over 200,000 people attended the cele-
bration of the Chinese New Year in London, the largest outside China, testifying
to the growing appeal of Chinese culture. China organized the Year of Chinese
Culture in France and sponsored a Chinese Cultural Festival in the United
States. Both events attracted public attention. China also organizes arts exhibits,
arts performance, speeches by celebrities, exhibits on social customs, and movie
weeks overseas to showcase the uniqueness of Chinese culture and to arouse
public interest.24 In 2009 alone, Chinese cultural centers abroad sponsored 440
events including seminars, cultural festivals (or cultural weeks), competitions,
and movie screenings; recruited 4,500 students for over 100 classes related to
aspects of Chinese culture, such as languages, calligraphy, painting, tea drink-
ing, tai chi, and er hu; received 7,800 visitors to their libraries; and recruited
3,000 members to the centers.25
Among the Chinese religions, Buddhism is known for its peaceful orientation
and thus becomes a favorite platform for the state to project its peaceful image.
endorsed by the Chinese government, the first international Buddhist forum in
China since 1949 was held in Hangzhou in April 2006. In late March and early
 Chinas cultural diplomacy 89
April 2009 the second forum was held in Wuxi City of east Chinas Jiangsu
Province and in Taipei. The first forum attracted over 1,000 prominent Buddhist
monks, experts, and politicians from 34 countries and areas. The second forum
was attended by over 1,200 prominent monks, experts, and scholars from over
50 countries and regions. A common theme at the forums has been Buddhisms
peaceful mission and its building of a peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious
world. The forum highlights Chinas use of Buddhism to showcase its peaceful
cultural lineage.26
In addition, China also promotes the export of its movies. Chinese movies
have won prestigious international awards and nominations. Chinese actors and
directors have become international superstars. Chinese movies and actors have
won a good number of international movie awards and nominations, such as
those at the venice, Cannes, and Berlin film festivals, as well as Oscars and
Golden Globes. Chinese movies have gained a global audience. Some of these
acclaimed movies, such as Qiu Ju, Raise the Red Lantern, Red Sorghum, Fare-
well My Concubine, and Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, are accepted by the
Chinese government, whereas others, such as To Live, raised eyebrows. Famed
actors, such as Zhang Ziyi () and Gong Li, as well as famed directors,
such as Zhang Yimou, Chen kaige, and Feng Xiaogang, act as cultural envoys
for China.
In January 2011, during President Hu Jintaos visit to the United States, a
China national image film was broadcast on the giant screen in New Yorks
Time Square, which has an estimated 1.7 million people passing through the
iconic square every day, 15 times an hour for 20 hours. Featuring some of the
best-known Chinese celebrities such as the National Basketball Association bas-
ketball star Yao Ming, pianist Lang Lang, film directors John Woo and Cheng
Kaige, hybrid rice scientist Yuan Longping, and the internet giant Alibaba
founder Jack Ma, the short national image film presented visually artistic images
of a rapidly transforming China. The use of the film to promote Chinas image
represented a bold step for the Chinese state away from the usual conservative
mentality on public diplomacy. Yet the featuring of seven of these Chinese
celebrities that reportedly have US permanent residency and several of which
have American citizenship evoked criticism from Chinese internet users that
they did not represent the Chinese people.27 An extra-long version of the film
with an English voiceover available on Youtube also contained the standard
Chinese propaganda line that the rule of law and democracy were progressing at
a decent pace in China, which could easily invite skepticism among the Western
audience.
In recent years a number of artists of the mainland Chinese descent have
gained international acclaim and have been promoted by the state to varying
extents. They perform outside China regularly and serve as de factor artistic
envoys for China. They include the flamboyant pianists Lang Lang and Yundi
Li, the ballerina Yuanyuan Tan (who has been the lead performer of the San
Francisco troupe for years), and recently the female singer Zuying Song. Never-
theless, controversial acts by certain artistic envoys could invite negative
90 H. Lai
publicity and could do more harm than good for Chinas image. At the state
banquet hosted by President Obama for the visiting President Hu Jintao at the
White House in January 2011, Lang Lang played a piece entitled My Mother-
land, a song made famous in a Chinese Korean War movie describing the hard-
won victory of the Chinese army over the American troops on the Shanggan
Peak in Korea. It stirred up a political controversy in the United States, as some
Americans viewed the choice of the music by Lang Lang as inappropriate.
Shortly after the event, Lang Lang had to reschedule a concert in Buffalo, New
York in July, originally booked for January, possibly due to the negative public
reaction against him.28
On the other hand, China has made much progress in increasing its soft power
through sports. A number of world-class Chinese athletes are acting as de facto
sports envoys for China. They include the NBA star Yao Ming in the Houston
Rockets, the world record smasher and hurdle sprinter Liu Xiang (until his injury
in 2008), as well as female tennis players, Yan Zi and Zheng Jie, who won the
Australian Open and Wimbledon women doubles titles in 2006. This list also
includes divers, such as Guo Jingjing, gymnasts, such as Li Xiaopeng and Liu
Xuan, table tennis players such as deng Yaping, tennis players such as Zheng
Jie and Peng Shuai, and figure skaters such as the 2009 World Champion Shen
Xue and Zhao Hongbo.
Fueled by the movies by Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan, and Jet Li, wushu, or
martial arts, is attracting practitioners and audiences worldwide. The Interna-
tional Wushu Federation, recognized in 1995 by the International Olympic Com-
mittee, has members in more than 78 countries and in all inhabitable continents.
Following the strong lobbying from China, wushu was instituted as a sport in the
2008 Beijing Olympic Games.29
In addition, Chinese traditional arts, cuisines, medicine, and philosophies
have also long been recognized to contain perennial charm and hold much fasci-
nation to foreigners worldwide. Take Chinese cuisine, for example. There are
about 41,000 Chinese restaurants and $17 billion in annual sales in the United
States alone.30
China has been utilizing major international events to showcase its image
around the world. Two of these biggest events in the recent years included the
Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010. In many
ways, the grand and magnificent opening and closing ceremonies of the Beijing
Olympic Games in August 2008 marked unprecedented Chinese efforts to show-
case its economic development success and its culture. Directed by the famed
Chinese director Zhang Yimou and involving 15,000 performers, the Games
opening ceremony provided a visual feast of technological innovations, expendi-
ture, architecture, costumes, and the philosophy of ancient China, and demon-
strated Chinas strong capability for mass mobilization and coordination. The
Beijing Olympic Games, especially the opening ceremonies, attracted an estim-
ate 4.7 billion Tv viewers around the world, one-fifth more than the 3.9 billion
TV viewers of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. The 2008 Olympics even
became the most-viewed event in American television history.31
 Chinas cultural diplomacy 91
From May through October, the 2010 World Expo was held in Shanghai, the
most modernized and international city in mainland China, dotted by iconic sky-
scrapers. It attracted 73 million visitors, surpassing the past World Expo record
of 70 million. A total of 250 countries and international organizations partici-
pated in the Expo. The Expo venue was well organized, and a number of the
pavilions, including several by the Chinese sponsors, featured eye-opening
advanced new technology, or amazing examples of cultural heritage.32 Neverthe-
less, there were reports of badly behaved Chinese visitors at the Expo, partly due
to the long lines for some of the pavilions. In addition, only about 4.8 percent of
the visitors (3.5 million in total) were international visitors.33
With the Chinese governments endorsement, Chinas national and local
agencies apply for the classification of Chinese World Heritage sites. By March
2009 the United Nations educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization had
designated 37 World Heritage sites in China, the third largest after Italys 43 and
Spains 40 sites, and ahead of Frances 33 sites. China has 26 cultural sites, such
as the Great Wall and the Imperial Palace, seven natural sites, such as the breath-
taking Jiuzhaigou Valley in Sichuan, and four mixed sites, such as Mount
Huangshan.34
Attracted by Chinas rich cultural history and stunning landscape, the number
of international tourists visiting China is growing rapidly, a sign that interna-
tional interest in China is surging. In 2007 foreign visitors to mainland China
(the highest percentage of whom were presumably tourists) totaled 26 million,
up 17 percent from 2006 and 4.4 times that in 1995 (5.9 million). Between 1995
and 2007, foreign visitors to mainland China grew on average by 13 percent
each year. The leading regions of origins of visitors to mainland China were, in
a descending order, Asia, Europe, Americas, Oceania, Africa, and Latin
America. Other than Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao (which may not be
regarded as independent countries), the primary origins of visitors to mainland
China are South Korea (4.8 million in 2007), Japan (nearly four millions), Russia
(three million), and the United States (1.9 million). The leading source of visi-
tors to China from Oceania was Australia (600,000) (Table 5.1). In 2008, due to
the financial crisis, the total number of foreign visitors to China declined by
nearly 7 percent to 24 million. However, in 2010 the number of foreign visitors
recovered to 26 million.

Promoting the Chinese language and studies of China

As China is rising, global interest in China and the Chinese language are also
surging. Foreign students also illustrate a growing fascination with China.
Increasingly, mastery of the Chinese language is seen as an indispensable tool
for understanding China, conducting commerce and business transactions, and
landing a good and new career for people around the world.
In response to the growing interest in learning the Chinese language
around the world, China has made one of its biggest and most-watched efforts
in building its cultural soft power, i.e. setting up the Confucius Institutes
92 H. Lai
Table 5.1 International tourists to China (from outside mainland China) (1,000)

Region 1995 2000 2007

Total 5,887 10,160 26,110

Asia 3,383 6,102 16,061
Japan 1,305 2,202 3,978
Malaysia 252 441 1,062
Republic of Korea 530 1,345 4,777
Europe 1,591 2,489 6,217
United Kingdom 185 284 605
Germany 167 239 557
Russia 489 1,080 3,004
North America 644 1,133 2,562
United States 515 896 1,901
Oceanic and Pacific Islands 159 282 729
Australia 129 234 607
Africa 41 66 379
Latin America 54 83 243
Others 17 7 3

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) 2009, Table 18-5.

(). The institutes are the Chinese versions of the Goethe-Institut or

Alliance Francaise, and aim to promote learning of Chinese language and
culture to the world. Created as recently as 2004, these institutes have been
reported in the New York Times, The Economist, and in other leading foreign
news media.
The first Confucian Institute was inaugurated in Seoul, South korea in
November 2004,35 and in July 2006 the first Confucius Institute conference
was held. Some 200 representatives from 38 countries met in Beijing to discuss
the Institutes charter to facilitate its expansion around the world.36 In July
2006, 80 Confucius Institutes had been or were being set up in 36 countries
and areas; 99 institutions in 38 countries had applied to set up the institutes.37
The number of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms rose to 140 by
April 2007. By October 2010 the number of Confucius Institutes and Confu-
cius Classrooms rose to 322 and 369 respectively, and they could be found in
96 countries and areas (Table 5.2). With a total of 71 Confucius Institutes, the
United States has one of the largest concentrations of institutes, accounting for
22 percent of the global total. In addition, as of late 2009 about 250 institu-
tions from over 50 countries expressed an interest in establishing Confucius
Institutes or Classrooms.38
In 2009, Confucius Institutes and Classrooms worldwide offered 9,000
Chinese courses, with a total enrollment of 260,000, doubling that of the previ-
ous year. They organized over 7,500 cultural exchange activities where over
three million people participated, again doubling the number of participants from
the previous year.39
 Chinas cultural diplomacy 93
Table 5.2 Confucius institutes/classrooms (CIs/CCs) worldwide, 20042010

Date November July April February December October

2004 2006 2007 2009 2009 2010

Number of CIs and CCs 1 80 140 314 554 691

Number of Nations or 1 36 52 81 88 96
Territories with CIs

Sources: Various news reports on Confucius Institute (kongzi xueyuan) from http://baike.baidu.com,
www.confuciusinstitute.net (accessed 27 March 2009) and http://english.hanban.edu.cn (accessed 8
June 2011).

Confucius Institutes and Classrooms promote learning of the Chinese language

and Chinese culture in primary and secondary schools, communities, and enter-
prises in the host countries. Specifically, they provide Chinese language programs
at various levels, offer training for Chinese teachers, administer exams and tutor
services in Chinese, and organize Chinese competitions. Some of them also
provide consultancy services for studying in China, offer in-person experience
with the Chinese culture, and provide commercial information regarding China.40
Partly funded by China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign
Language (NOCFL, or Hanban ), these institutes are jointly managed by
Chinese universities and foreign parties. Chinese partners include 17 universi-
ties, such as the Beijing Language, Beijing, Fudan, Zhongshan, and Shandong
Universities.41 The size of Confucius Institutes varies, but a small institute has
one to two full-time language teachers, and Hanban could spend over
US$100,000 a year to finance the operation and activities of an institute of an
average size.42 Therefore, given the level of Chinas economic development, this
is quite a generous amount.
In 2009 Hanbans annual budget amounted to US$145 million. Compared to
the $3 billion budget that the British Council spends a year on its programs, this
is not a massive amount. However, despite the meager budget, the Confucius
Institutes receive high global publicity, testifying to their success.43
The Confucius Institutes differ from their foreign counterparts such as the
Japan Foundation, the UKs British Council, Germanys Goethe-Institut and
Frances Alliance Francaise. Sino-foreign joint partnership, instead of sole gov-
ernmental sponsorship, allows Confucius Institutes to have a firmer financial
basis. While the Chinese partner supplies teaching staff and materials, the host
university (or school) houses the institutes. For example, in the United States,
Confucius Institutes have been set up in the University of Maryland, the Chicago
public school system, and in San Francisco State University. These universities
and schools supply staff and funding for the institutes.44
Contracts for foreign partners operating Confucius Institutes also require
them to abide by Beijings one-China policy. They are not supposed to have
similar language arrangements with Taiwanese partners or the Taiwan govern-
ment on terms that Beijing finds politically unacceptable. Nevertheless, given
94 H. Lai
Chinas growing attractiveness for students, foreign universities and departments
within foreign universities compete for hosting the Confucius Institutes.45
Chinese leaders have also given strong backing for these institutes. On his
visit to Tashkent, Uzbekistan in June 2004, President Hu attended the agreement
signing ceremony for the first Confucius Institute in Central Asia. In April 2006,
on his tour to Africa, President Hu stopped by at the first Confucius Institute in
Nairobi, Kenya. He chatted and sang a Chinese song with the students.46
In order to promote Chinese learning around the world, China has also taken
other initiatives. Hanban administers the standard test of proficiency in Chinese,
(KSK), and helps to arrange for Chinese teachers to teach Man-
darin abroad. In April 2004, it rolled out a Program for Chinese Volunteers as
International Chinese Teachers. Since 2002, Hanban has also started to sponsor
Chinese Bridge competitions among foreign college students studying
Chinese. Preliminary competitions were held in individual countries, such as
Latvia.47
In 1978 there were only 1,236 international students studying in China. In
2005, the number of foreign students in China had grown by 27 percent from
2004 and by over 100 times from that of 1978, reaching a record 141,087. Most
of them were self-financed, while scholarship-sponsored students totaled around
6,700. By 2009 the number of international students rose further to 238,000,
despite the financial crisis in the West. Most foreign students in China study the
Chinese language. There is also a growing number studying economics, law, and
medicine. China hosts twice as many Indonesian students than does the United
States.48 By 2010, excluding those from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, foreign
students in China totaled 265,000. They came from 194 countries; about two-
thirds of foreign students came from Asia. The top ten sources included South
Korea, the United States, Japan, Thailand, Vietnam, Russia, Indonesia, Kaza-
khstan, and Pakistan.49
Beijing has also been giving out scholarships to lure foreign students to study
in China. In the academic year 20082009, 6,831 foreign students were awarded
scholarships from the Chinese government, up slightly from 6,700 in 2005.50

Successes and limitations of Chinas cultural diplomacy

By banking on the growing appeal of its culture, China has indeed expanded its
cultural influence. Its language, movies, music, sports, long history, and philo-
sophy are receiving growing attention. This trend has apparently deepened after
the successful conclusion of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and of the 2010
Shanghai World Expo. Chinese popular culture movies, TV dramas, music,
cuisines, and festivals have a massive combined fan-base that transcends cul-
tures, languages, and national boundaries. The number of non-Chinese students
of the Chinese language is a good indicator of the growing global interest in
Chinese culture. In 2006, over 30 million people outside China were studying
the Chinese language.51 It was revealed at the fifth conference of Confucius Insti-
tutes in late 2010 that there were 40 million people learning the Chinese
 Chinas cultural diplomacy 95
language around the world. About 4,000 universities in 100 countries or areas
are now offering Chinese language courses.52
The number of international students in China has also grown rapidly. Foreign
students studying in China totaled 111,000 in 2004 and 265,000 in 2010. By
2009 over 30 China-educated foreign students have served at ministerial-level
posts or above upon returning to their home countries.53
Even Joseph Nye, the architect of the concept of soft power, agreed back in
2004 that by sustaining fast economic growth, emphasizing Chinese culture, and
proclaiming peaceful rise, China had expanded its soft power.54 In Southeast
Asia and Australia, for example, as Joshua Kurlantzick noted in 2006, leaders
and businessmen publicly welcomed Chinas rise, a sharp change from the pre-
vious five years.55
Nevertheless, there are clear limits for Chinas soft power. A survey in the
United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam suggested
that Chinas soft power still trailed the United States, Japan, and even South
Korea (Table 5.3). The survey was conducted in 2008 on the eve of the Beijing
Olympic Games. As far as Chinese cultural influence is concerned, which is
closer to the topic of this chapter, it was viewed as quite significant in Indonesia
and vietnam, moderately significant in Japan, but far less significant in the
United States and even somewhat surprising in South Korea, whose culture was
once heavily influenced by Confucianism. Furthermore, in the United States and
South korea less than half of respondents thought of the Chinese cultural influ-
ence as positive (Table 5.4).
As mentioned earlier, one of the primary goals for Chinas cultural diplomacy
is to project a non-threatening and favorable image of China. A quick glimpse of
the average percentage of world opinion regarding China in Table 5.5 suggests

Table 5.3 Rating and ranking of soft power in Asia

Surveyed US soft power Chinas soft Japans soft South Koreas

country power power soft power

US 0.47 0.67 0.49

China 0.71 0.62 0.65
Japan 0.69 0.51 0.56
South Korea 0.72 0.55 0.65
Indonesia 0.72 0.7 0.72 0.63
Vietnam 0.76 0.74 0.79 0.73
Average 0.72 0.59 0.69 0.61
Rank 1 4 2 3

Source: Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Mul-
tinational Survey of Public Opinion, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs in partnership with
East Asian Institute, 2008.
Note
Data obtained from a survey of the above countries conducted by the Chicago Council on Global
Affairs and the east Asia Institute of South korea (eAI) in 2008. Soft power is defined in the survey
as comprising of economic, human capital, cultural, diplomatic, and political factors.
96 H. Lai
Table 5.4 Perception of influence of Chinese culture in Asia-Pacific

Level of inuence Chinese culture Percentage in each country who

has on each countrys popular think the inuence of Chinese
culture (mean score on a 0 to 10 popular culture on their countrys
scale) popular culture is mainly positive

United States 4.6 48

Japan 5.1 63
South Korea 4.8 44
Indonesia 6.5 50
Vietnam 7.6 80

Source: Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Mul-
tinational Survey of Public Opinion, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs in partnership with
East Asian Institute, 2008.
Note
Data obtained from a survey of the above countries conducted by the Chicago Council on Global
Affairs and the East Asia Institute of South Korea (EAI) in 2008.

that between 2002 and 2010 China gained favorable impressions from mostly
African and Southeast Asian nations (such as Kenya, Nigeria and Indonesia), as
well as its allies (such as Pakistan and Russia), certain large countries in the
South (such as Brazil), and a few countries in the North (such as the UK). Its
image in the moderate Middle Eastern nations (such as Egypt and Jordan),
several large neighboring nations (such as South Korea and India), and several
large Western countries, such as the United States, France, and Spain, were mod-
erately positive, ranging from 49 to 43 percent. Its image in some Eastern Euro-
pean and Latin American nations such as Poland, Mexico, Argentina, were fairly
negative (only 38 to 40 percent of respondents had a favorable impression).
Germany, Chinas most developed neighbor Japan, and Turkey had very negat-
ive images of China (26 to 37 percent had a favorable impression).
As suggested in this chapter, in the past decade China has intensified its
efforts to promote its cultural diplomacy and cultivate soft power. Should these
efforts be successful, Chinas image should be improving steadily over the next
few years. However, Pew opinion surveys of major nations around the world
suggest that this is not the case. The average percentage of major nations sur-
veyed that had a favorable view of China (four nations in 2002, 14 in 2005, and
22 in 2010) registered a high of 65 percent in 2002, declined to 58 percent in
2005, and further dropped to 50 percent in 2006. This figure did recover to 52
percent in 2007, but then declined again to 46 percent in 2008, before recovering
to 51 percent in 2009 and 52 percent in 2010 (Figure 5.1). Therefore, Chinas
intensified cultural diplomacy did not appear to be accompanied by its steady
rise in popularity worldwide. In contrast, it displayed an overall trend of decline.
More ironically, in 2008 when China organized a dazzling display of its organ-
izational capacity, impressive infrastructure and smooth completion of the
Olympic Games, its popularity registered lowest level achieved during the
Table 5.5 World view of China, 20022010

Country Average: 20102005: Think China is generally Think China is not Country status Years for data
20022010 (%) change (%) respectful of human rights generally respectful of
(%) human rights (%)

China 94 9 76 15 DC (W) 20052010

Kenya 80 5 67 29 LDC (AF) 2007, 2009, 2010
Pakistan 79 6 91 6 LDC (A) 20052010
Nigeria 75 17 77 16 LDC (AF) 20062010
Indonesia 63 15 63 20 LDC (A) 2002, 20052010
Russia 62 0 34 30 EM (FC) 2002, 20052010
Britain 54 19 8 86 DC (W) 20052010
Brazil 52 N.A. EM (LA) 2010
South Korea 49 14 12 87 DC (A) 2002, 20072010
Egypt 49 11 54 44 LDC (ME) 20062010
Jordan 48 10 LDC (ME) 20052010
United States 46 6 11 86 DC (W) 20052010
France 46 17 7 88 DC (W) 20052010
India 46 22 45 41 LDC (SA) 20052010
Lebanon 45 10 LDC (ME) 2005, 20072010
Spain 43 10 DC (W) 20052010
Poland 40 9 6 80 EM (FC) 2005, 20072010
Mexico 40 4 18 70 LDC (LA) 20072010
Argentina 38 13 LDC (LA) 20072010
Germany 37 16 7 88 DC (W) 20052010
Japan 30 1 DC (A) 2002, 20062010
Turkey 26 20 20 61 EM (A) 20052010
Average 52 4 37 53

Sources: World Opinion of China (PeW Survey), http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24 (accessed 20 October 2010); As Hu Jin Tao, Obama Prepare to
Meet, World Public Gives China, US Low Marks on Climate Change, www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/646.
php?lb=btvoc&pnt=646&nid=&id= (accessed 18 October 2010).
Note
data are percentages, representing the proportion of respondents holding favorable or unfavorable view of China in the survey. dC stands for developed nations; LdC,
less developed nations; ems, emerging market; W, West; A, Asia; AF, Africa; LA, Latin America; and Me, Middle east.
98 H. Lai

70 65

60 58
50 52 51
46 52
Percentage

50
40
30
20
10
0
2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Year

Figure 5.1 World opinion of China (averaged percentage of respondents with favorable
view among nations surveyed) (source: PEW Opinion Survey).

20022010 period. Two developments might have damaged Chinas image. The
first was the bloody and violent riots that broke out in Lhasa, Tibet, early that
year, bringing a negative media spot light onto the issue of Tibet. The second
one concerned reports on the problem of quality in Chinas products. The
Tibetan issue is widely regarded around the world as associated with Chinas
lack of respect for the human rights of ethnic minorities. Thus, cultural diplo-
macy is apparently insufficient to ensure that China enjoys decent levels of pop-
ularity. Chinas records on political rights remain a weakness for Chinas soft
power and pose a formidable challenge for Chinas cultural diplomacy.
Furthermore, Chinas popularity among these surveyed nations also suggested
that some of the tools for cultural diplomacy do not secure a favorable rating.
For example, South Koreans and Japanese were the top two groups of foreign
tourists in China and Germans were the third largest group of European tourists
to China (Table 5.1). However, these three nations were far from being among
those giving Chinas highest favorable ratings. In fact, Japanese and Germans
gave the third and second lowest favorable ratings of China (Figure 5.2). Ten-
sions or disputes over political, historical, and social issues (such as crimes by
Chinese residing in Japan) between China and these two East Asian neighbors
have generated negative impressions of the latter toward China.
It can be argued that the expansion of Chinas soft power is hindered by its
domestic political system and values as well as its moral vacuum. Specifically,
Chinas political regime and political culture have been heavily criticized abroad
for not respecting Chinese human rights, and Chinese economic growth is
accompanied by unequal distribution of wealth, corruption, weak business ethics
and fraudulent products. For example, as Table 5.5 suggests, favorable impres-
sion of Chinas human rights among nations polled in 2009 averaged merely 37
percent, whereas unfavorable impressions reached a high 53 percent. These
problems are widely covered by media around the world. Even the Chinese
 Chinas cultural diplomacy 99

1
2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
Brazil
China
Kenya
Pakistan
Nigeria
Indonesia
Russia
Britain

South Korea
Egypt
Jordan
United States
France
India
Lebanon
Spain
Poland
Mexico
Argentina
Germany
Japan
Turkey
Figure 5.2 Perception of China around the world (percentage of positive view, with 1 on
the scale representing 100%), 20022010 (source: PEW Opinion Survey).

scholars have agreed that Chinese soft power is constrained by a distrust in

Marxism, growing inequalities between the cities and countryside and between
the rich and the poor, a deteriorating ecology, and passive participation in inter-
national organizations.56 In addition, lack of the rule of law at home and eroded
morals (seen in the excessive materialism and limited religious influence) caused
concerns from the Chinese as well as from people abroad (due to the poor quality
of some of Chinas exported products). Improperly behaved, over-nationalistic
Chinese at home and Chinese tourists abroad may easily tarnish Chinas image.
These problems cast a shadow over Chinas international image and constitute
limits to the rise of Chinas soft power. To a significant extent the surging inter-
est in Chinese culture is primarily due to Chinas economic rise, rather than its
cultural soft power. China has yet to offer new cultural values and products
other than its traditional culture, which has been the main source of attraction so
far.
Despite the fact that the public image of the United States in the recent years
has become unfavorable due to its mishandling of the anti-terror war, the
resources of Chinas soft power still pale in comparison with those of the United
States. Despite this short-term decline in soft power, the United States is still
buttressed by its enormous financial strength that enables it to give out a large
sums of foreign assistance; by its worldwide popular cultural products, such as
movies, Tv series, music, and books;57 by its robust press and media such as the
influential New York Times and CNN; and by its liberal political ideology that
emphasizes individual freedom, opportunity, and democracy.
To conclude, China has acknowledged the importance of cultural diplomacy
and launched a variety of cultural programs and policies. Cultural diplomacy has
become a new tool for its cultivation of soft power and the expansion of its
100 H. Lai
influence. Chinas soft power, however, has been constrained by controversies
over its poor record of respecting political and social rights; over a lack of polit-
ical transparency, rule of law, and independence of the media and artists; and
over moral decay. Thus, Chinas soft power can rise moderately at best.

Notes
* Helpful comments from Yiyi Lu are acknowledged. The first draft was written in
2006 and was presented at a conference in 2008. It has been substantially updated and
revised.
1 See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conict with China (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).
2 On 16 September 2004, 500 demonstrators in Elche, Spain shouted the slogan
Chinese out. A group of Spaniards who joined the demonstration set fire to a
Chinese-owned shoe warehouse, causing damages worth over 1 million euros. See
Spanish China-Bashing Must Be Stopped, China Daily, 30 September 2004. For
discussion on the international implication of Chinas rise, refer to Zhang Youwen
and Huang Renwei, Zhongguo guoji diwei baogao (A Report on Chinas International
Status) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2006), pp. 219, 3745, 8196.
3 See David Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US China Relations,
19892000 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 789.
4 For a detailed elaboration of the concept, refer to Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means
to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Joseph Nye, The
Paradox of American Power: Why the Worlds Only Superpower Cant Go It Alone
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
5 See, for example, Liu Debin, Soft Power: Challenges to the US Hegemony and Their
Implications (ruan quanli: Meiguo baquan de tiaozhan yu qishi), Journal of Social
Sciences of Jilin University (Jilin daxue shehui kexue xuebao), 2001, No. 3. Joseph
Nyes main book on soft power was translated and published in Chinese in May 2005.
See Ruan liliang: shijie zhengtan chenggong zhidao (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe,
2005).
6 See Ruan liliang: shijie zhengtan chenggong zhidao (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe,
2005).
7 See, for example, Zhang Zhan and Li Haijun, Three Components of Chinas Soft
Power in International Politics (guoji zhengzhi zhong de Zhongguo ruan shili san
yaosu), Studies of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Zhongguo tese shehui
zhiyi yanjiu), 2003; Pang Zhongyin, Contents of Chinas Soft Power (Zhongguo
ruan liliang de neihan), Outlook (Liaowang), 2005. For an overview of the discus-
sion on soft power in China, refer to Liu Qing and Wang Litao, A Summary of
Domestic Theoretical Studies of the Theory of Soft Power in Recent Years (jinnian
guonei ruan liliang lilun yanjiu zongshu), Journal of Jiangnan Socialism College
(Jiangnan shehui zhuyi xuebao), 2007.
8 See Wang Yanhong, A Summary of Experts Forum on the Construction of Chinas
Soft Power ( Zhongguo de ruan liliang jianshe zhuanjia zuotanhui zongshu), in
Shanghai Shehui Kexue Yuan Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Yanjiu Yuan (Institute of
World Politics and Economy, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences), International
System and Chinas Soft Power (Guoji tixi yu Zhongguo de ruan liliang) (Beijing:
Shishi chubanshe, 2006), pp. 13440.
9 Wu Jianmin: Chinese Culture Is a Good Remedy for Dissolving the China Threat
Argument (Wu Jianmin: Zhonghua wenhua shi huajie Zhongguo weixielun de yi
ji liangfang), 7 August 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/200608/07/
content_4928275.htm, accessed the same day.
10 See A Summary of Experts Forum on Chinas Soft Power, pp. 13440.
 Chinas cultural diplomacy 101
11 Humphrey Taylor, Attitudes to United States, Japan and China in US and Seven Asian
Countries, The Harris Poll #66, 10 November 1999.
12 China to Rival US as World Power by 2020, Reuters report, China Daily, 2 June
2006.
13 Zhao Litao, Lai Hongyi and Tan Soon Heng, Chinas Cultural Rise in the Context of
Its Peaceful Rise (I), EAI Background Brief No. 296 (Singapore: East Asian Institute,
National University of Singapore, 3 August 2006).
14 China Becomes Major Employment Destination, China Daily, 12 June 2006.
15 Minister of Culture Sun Jiazheng: Enhance Ability of Helping the Chinese Culture
to Go Out to the World, www.jxwhsc.com/gzck/show.asp?id=477, accessed 26 May
2006.
16 Ibid.
17 Outline of the Program for Cultural Development during the National Eleventh Five-
year Plan, 13 September 2006, www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-09/13/content_388046_10.
htm, accessed 18 October 2010.
18 Hu Jintao Calls for Enhancing Soft Power of Chinese Culture, 15 October 2007,
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6287138.html, accessed 6 Septem-
ber 2009.
19 Hu Jintao Makes a Major Arrangement for Chinas External Publicity (Hu Jinao
buxu Zhongguo da waixuan geju), 22 January 2009, www.dwnews.com, accessed
the same day.
20 Ibid.
21 For a discussion on the topic, refer to Joshua Kurlantzick, Chinas Charm Offen-
sive, Carnegie Endowment Commentary, October 2006, pp. 368; Joshua kurlantz-
ick, Charm Offensive: How Chinas Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007); and Bates Gill and Yanzhong
Huang, Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power , Survival, Summer 2006,
48(2):1921; Yazhong Huang and Sheng ding, dragons Underbelly: An Analysis
of Chinas Soft Power, East Asia 23(4): 2244.
22 Zhengzhou Wanbao: Pujin ner de Shaolin Qingyuan (Zhengzhou Evening Post:
Putin Daughters Affection for Shaolin), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/200603
24/02009427136.shtml, accessed 10 January 2011.
23 Ibid; An Overview of Achievements of Ministry of Cultures Cultural exchange and
Cooperation with Foreign Countries, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan in 2009 (2009
wenhuabu duiwai ji dui gangaotai wenhua jiaoliu yu hezuo chengguo ganlan),
China Cultural Post (Zhongguo wenhuabao), 13 March 2010.
24 Minister of Culture Sun Jiazheng.
25 An Overview of Achievements of Ministry of Cultures Cultural Exchange and
Cooperation.
26 1st World Buddhist Forum opens in Hangzhou, 13 April 2006, http://english.gov.
cn/200604/13/content_252834.htm; News Background: The Second International
Buddhist Forum (Xinwen beijing: di er jie shijie fojiao luntan), 28 March 09,
www.dwnews.com/gb/MainNews/SocDigest/Culture/
zxs_2009_03_28_12_30_18_622.html, accessed the same day.
27 Jing Gao, Chinas Self-Promotional Ad at Times Square Thumbed Down by Chinese
Netizens, 23 January 2011, www.ministryoftofu.com/2011/01/chinas-self-
promotional-ad-times-square-thumbed-civic-minded-chinese-netizens/#, accessed 6
April 2011.
28 Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra Lang Cancelled, 29 January 2011, www.wgrz.com/
comments/107046/0/Buffalo-Philharmonic-Orchestra-Lang-Cancelled, accessed 6
April 2011.
29 The Long Reach of the Martial Arts, 1 August 2003, www.china.org.cn/
english/2003/Aug/71356.htm, accessed 1 January 2012.
102 H. Lai
30 Chinese Cuisine in the United States, www.lifeintheusa.com/food/chinese.htm;
Chinese Restaurants Abroad, www.flavorandfortune.com/dataaccess/article.
php?ID=87, accessed 16 April 2009.
31 2008 Beijing Olympics Most Viewed Event in US TV History, www.cinemablend.
com/television/2008-Beijing-Olympics-Most-Viewed-Event-In-US-TV-
History-11888.html, accessed 1 April 2009.
32 This was based on the authors two visits to the Shanghai Expo in June and October
2010.
33 Tourism Impact of the Shanghai World Expo 73m Visitors, $12b Revenue, http://
travel-industry.uptake.com/blog/2010/10/31/shanghai-expo-tourism/, accessed 6 April
2011.
34 For detailed information on these sites, see UNESCO World Heritage Center websites
at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list and http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties, accessed 1
April 2009. It is true that local governments in China invest many resources in order
to win UNeSCO heritage sites for local economic benefits from tourism. It is equally
true that the national government does support UNESCO bids, which will help attract
international tourists and help promote a favorable image of China, while offering
protection for Chinese cultural and natural heritage.
35 China Sets Up Confucius Institutes around the World to Popularize the Chinese Lan-
guage, Lianhe Zaobao (United Morning Post), 29 November 2004. A report mistook
the Confucius Institute in Tashkent in Uzbekistan, the first in the former Soviet Union
republics, for the first in the world. See Chinas Confucius Institutes: Selling the
Sage of Qufu, The Economist, 8 July 2006, p. 32.
36 Beijing Held the First Confucius Institute Conference to Discuss Popularizing the
Chinese Language around the World, Lianhe Zaobao (United Morning Post), 7 July
2006.
37 A tally in March 2006 indicated 17 in Asia, 17 in europe, nine in North America, five
in Latin America, and three each in Oceania and Africa. See China Establishes Con-
fucius Institutes Worldwide to Popularise the Chinese Language (Zhongguo quanqiu
ban Kongzi xueyuan tuiguang hanyu), posted at www.zaobao.com/chinese/pages1/
chinese_others291104.html on 29 November 2004, accessed the same date.
38 Information posted at http://english.hanban.edu.cn/node_10971.htm, accessed 16
October 2010.
39 Information posted at http://english.hanban.edu.cn/node_10971.htm, accessed 16
October 2010.
40 Another Chinese Export Is All the Rage: Chinas Language, New York Times, 11
January 2006; Purnendra Jain and Gerry Groot, Beijings Soft Power Offensive,
17 May 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE17Ad01.html, accessed 28 Decem-
ber 2011.
41 China Sets Up Confucius Institutes around the World to Popularize the Chinese
Language.
42 Conversation with two heads of Confucius Institutes in UK, early March 2009.
43 Figures came from Maria Wey-Shen Siow, Chinas Confucius Institutes: Crossing the
River by Felling the Stones, Asia Pacific Bulletin, 6 January 2011, No. 91, Washington:
EastWest Center. For reports on the publicity of the Confucius Institutes, see Another
Chinese export Is All the Rage: Chinas Language; Beijings Soft Power Offensive.
44 Ibid.
45 Jain and Groot, Beijings Soft Power Offensive.
46 Ibid; Hu Jintao Met Teachers and Students at the Confucius Institute in Naroibi and
Sang Jasmine Together (Hu Jintao huijian Neiluobi Kongzi xueyuan shisheng
tongchang muolihua), posted at http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2006-04/29/
content_4491735.htm on 29 April 2006, accessed the same date.
47 Spanish Students Gathered for the Chinese Competition and the Chinese Bridge
Builds Sino-Spanish Friendship (Sibanya xuezi qijiu sai zhongwen, hanyu qiao
 Chinas cultural diplomacy 103
chuanqi zhongxi youyi), posted at http://bridge.chinese.cn/c10/article/2011-05/09/
content_257671.htm on 9 May 2011, accessed 1 January 2012.
48 Last Year International Students in China Surpassed 230,000 (Qunian zaihua liu
xuesheng renshu tupo 23 wan), http://edu.sina.com.cn/a/20090402/1630168552.
shtml, accessed 16 October 2010; express News on Studying Abroad: International
Students in China Surpassed Students Going Abroad (Liuxue kuaibao: qunian zai
hua liu xuesheng chaoguo chuguo liu xuesheng), http://zqb.cyol.com/
content/201003/23/content_3146851.htm, accessed 16 October 2010; Joshua kur-
lantzick, Chinas Charm Offensive, p. 37; China Gets a Flood of Foreign Stu-
dents, Straits Times, 4 July 2006, p. 1.
49 In 2010 Foreign Students in China Surpasses 260,000, www.liuxue86.
com/a/20110307/201155.html, accessed 8 June 2011.
50 China Gets a Flood of Foreign Students, Straits Times, 4 July 2006, p. 1.
51 Beijing Held the First Confucius Institute Conference to Discuss Popularizing the
Chinese Language around the World, Lianhe Zaobao (United Morning Post), 7 July
2006.
52 Haiwai xuexi hanyu renshu da 4000 wan (People Abroad Studying Chinese Total
40 million), http://www.ynql.yn.gov.cn/readinfo.aspx?B1=5992, accessed 13
December 2011.
53 Refer to the sources in Notes 48 and 49.
54 China Increasingly Attractive to Others, China Daily, 8 August 2006.
55 Joshua Kurlantzick, Chinas Charm, Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment, June 2006,
p. 4.
56 Liu Jie, Several Basic Issues in Building of Chinas Soft Power (Zhongguo ruan
liliang jianshe de jige jiben wenti), International System and Chinas Soft Power,
p. 108; Hu Jian, Chinas Soft Power: key elements, Resources and Capacity
(Zhongguo de ruan liliang: yaosu, ziyuan, nengli), International System and
Chinas Soft Power, pp. 126, 130; Wang Yanhong, A Summary of experts Forum
on Chinas Soft Power , International System and Chinas Soft Power, p. 138.
57 Joshua Kurlantzick, Chinas Charm Offensive, p. 38.