Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ion of witnesses and of the Solicitor General. While the rule of lex loci celebrationis generally governs
forms and solemnities of contracts under Article 17 of the Civil Code (Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and
EH 502 Jurisprudence, 1986 First ed., p. 11), the principle of lex rei sitae generally applies with respect to formalities for
the acquisition, encumbrance, and alienation of real and personal property.
Neither does the absence of the Solicitor General's participation render the agreement invalid since under both
Under the compromise agreement, Benedicto and his group-controlled corporations ceded to the government Executive Order No. 2 and Executive Order No. 14-A, it is the PCGG which has been "primarily charged" with the
certain pieces of property listed in Annex A of the agreement and assigned or transferred whatever rights he may responsibility of recovering illegally acquired or misappropriated assets. It should perhaps be recalled at this
have, if any, to the government over all corporate assets listed in Annex B of the agreement (pp. 115-125, Rollo juncture that it was during this period that the OSG withdrew as counsel in PCGG cases, compelling the latter to
in G.R. No. 108292).The PCGG in turn, lifted the sequestrations over the property listed in Annex C (p. 125, hire high-priced and supposedly competent lawyers of its own. Indeed, these events were the backdrop of the
Rollo) as well as other assets mentioned in the agreement. The Government also extended absolute immunity to widely acclaimed and erudite decision penned byJustice Flerida Ruth P. Romero wherein the OSG was advised of
Benedicto,members of his family, and officers and employees of the listed corporations such that there would be its duties, the scope of its authority, the mandate of its office, and thence ordered to re-enter its appearance in
no criminal investigation or prosecution for acts or omissions prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to PCGG cases. In fine, the OSG is the least qualified agency to raise the argument that it had no participation in the
have violated penal laws, including Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of the assets under the agreement. agreement.
However, later on, the PCGG opined that the court was wrong in granting the agreement containing provisions 2. Laurel vs. Garcial
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, and public order. The PCGG contends that its consent was
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation; that it is not in estoppel to question the validity of the agreement; From: PB
and that the respondent court was wrong in passing upon the PCGG's inability to return what was ceded to it
should the agreement be disapproved.
Facts: The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:
Note: third case in a series of global settlement:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku,
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20)
years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
2. cases involving Benedicto's bank deposits were settled in Switzerland governments
(4) The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government. The Roppongi property consists of the
land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy". As intended, it became the site of the Philippine
Issues: W/N the compromise agreement was validly entered into because it was not authenticated before the Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai ,when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to
consular officials abroad and without the participation of the witnesses and of the SG? the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped
since that time.
Then President Corazon Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
Held: It is equally puerile for the PCGG to contend that the agreement is congenitally defective from the mere properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders
happenstance that the agreement was not authenticated before the consular officials abroad and without the Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" in From: KB
paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by anyone can
attach to it, not even by the State. The petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a necessary
service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an opportune use. Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is
outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter FACTS: Petitioners (family of 3) purchased 3 airline tickets from Manila agent of Transworld Airlines for a flight
of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi from New York to LA. They received reconfirmation of their flight 2 days prior to flight. On the date of the flight,
property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property of public dominion so long as the when they checked-in they were on waiting list because all the seats had already been taken. When spouses
government has not used it for other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its original bought tickets at 75% discount while the daughters ticket was full fare ticket. On the wait list, the daughters
purpose or use. name was placed on the 13th while the spouses are on the 34th. Only 22 were allowed to board the flight out of
42. The husband was allowed to fly only to discover that he was holding the ticket of his daughter. Whilst the
The respondents Contentions: For their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject mother and daughter were denied boarding who were holding discounted tickets. Even on the next flight, they
property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They rely were not accommodated because it was fully-booked. They were constrained to buy another ticket that cost
upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and $918.00. When they came back to the Philippines, they filed an action for damages on breach of contract of air
devolution of the title to a property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of carriage before RTC Makati. RTC in favor of petitioners. CA changed the award of damages removing moral and
the Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a exemplary damages and reimbursement of the fare of the ticket due to absence of bad faith. Since it is a matter
property situated in Japan. of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the US and allowed under
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property by insisting that the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.
Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply.
In short, a passenger denied boarding by an airline because of overbooking is only entitled to compensation if
the passenger has complied with the checking and reconfirmation requirements. It is equally important to prove
Facts: This involves a contract of carriage between an airline and airline passengers. The passengers there, that the passenger has complied with the requirements before boarding.
Anecito Fontanilla and his family bought plane tickets for United Airlines from the airline ticketing agency in the
Philippines for their trip from the Philippines to the US to visit the cities of DC, Chicago, and Los Angeles.
According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into
governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to
All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines. Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be
Washington Dulles Airport, Aniceto changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the
issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words: Check-in-required. They were then set to passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
leave but were denied boarding because the flight was overbooked. airline. Therefore, although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were
purchased
through petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C., however, such fact did not
United Airlines alleged that the Fontanillas did not initially go to the check-in counter to get their seat change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.
assignments for UA Flight 1108. They instead proceeded to join the queue boarding the aircraft without first
securing their seat assignments as required in their ticket and boarding passes. Having no seat assignments, the
stewardess at the door of the plane instructed them to go to the check-in counter. When the Fontanillas
proceeded to the check-in counter, Linda Allen, the United Airlines Customer Representative at the counter Also, there was no bad faith in the overbooking on the part of the airline carrier. The law clearly states that
informed them that the flight was overbooked. She booked them on the next available flight and offered them when the overbooking does not exceed ten percent (10%), it is not considered as deliberate and therefore does
denied boarding compensation. not amount to bad faith. While there may have been overbooking in this case, private respondents were not able
to prove that the overbooking on United Airlines Flight 1108 exceeded ten percent.
Issue: Whether or not the arbitration clause in the contract of the parties should govern.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the RTC of Makati City, to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that
in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Held: Yes. Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place where the contract is made
governs. Lex loci contractus. The contract in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, our laws
ought to govern. Nonetheless, Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the validity of mutually agreed arbitral clause
or the finality and binding effect of an arbitral award. Art. 2044 provides, Any stipulation that the arbitrators Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois
award or decision shall be final, is valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040. courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree. The RTC sustained respondents motion and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The arbitration clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. It has not been shown to be
contrary to any law, or against morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. There has been no showing Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is
that the parties have not dealt with each other on equal footing. We find no reason why the arbitration clause void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
should not be respected and complied with by both parties. In Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd., we held that
submission to arbitration is a contract and that a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute
between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract. Again in Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of
Appeals, we likewise ruled that [t]he provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the ISSUE: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement
relationship of the parties is part of that contract and is itself a contract. on the joint custody of the parties child.
Having said that the instant arbitration clause is not against public policy, we come to the question on what RULING: The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is
governs an arbitration clause specifying that in case of any dispute arising from the contract, an arbitral panel will void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioners suit and call for the
be constituted in a foreign country and the arbitration rules of the foreign country would govern and its award remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanies custody.
shall be final and binding.
Thus, it can be gleaned that the concept of a final and binding arbitral award is similar to judgments or awards Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law
given by some of our quasi-judicial bodies, like the National Labor Relations Commission and Mines Adjudication vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Board, whose final judgments are stipulated to be final and binding, but not immediately executory in the sense An action for specific performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,
that they may still be judicially reviewed, upon the instance of any party. Therefore, the final foreign arbitral belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
awards are similarly situated in that they need first to be confirmed by the RTC.
From: DC
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, Inc., a local contractor engaged in construction business,
was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were entered into a joint venture agreement with Ayjal wherein the former undertook the execution of the entire a
no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law project, while the latter would be entitled to a commission of 4%.
on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code) is also undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. (This statutory
awarding of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject
only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.) 3-Plex not accredited by the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB) assigned and transferred all its rights
and interests to VPECI.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law; it has also been repudiated by the mother
when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not The SOB required the contractors to submit a performance bond representing 5% of the total contract price, an
divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. advance payment bond representing 10% of the advance payment to be released upon signing of the contract.
To comply with these requirements 3-Plex and VPECI applied for a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government
financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors.
Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of
children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral,
habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child But what SOB required was a guarantee from the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad so Rafidain Bank issued a
under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal performance bond in favor of SOB on the condition that another foreign bank (not Phil Guarantee) would issue
custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213. the counter-guarantee. Hence, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was chosen to provide the counter guarantee.
Afterwards, SOB and the joint venture of VPECI and Ayjal executed the service contract. Under the contract, the
joint venture would supply manpower and materials, SOB would refund 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial and 75% in US dollars at an exchange rate of 1 Dinar to $3.37.
custodial agreements based on its text that No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. To limit this provisions enforceability to
court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard
The project was not completed. Upon seeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline, the joint venture worked
in custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents.
for the renewal or extension (12x) of the performance bond up to December 1986.
Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in
In October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-
this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.
guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister Fadhi Hussein to recall
the telex for being in contravention of its mutual agreement that the penalty will be held in abeyance until
completion of the project. It also wrote SOB protesting the telex since the Iraqi government lacks foreign
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we remand the exchange to pay VPECI and the non-compliance with the 75% billings in US dollars.
case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie's custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus
removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing
it within coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings the best interest of the child.
Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain Bank. The Central Bank
authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment of the performance counter-guarantee for
VPECI's project in Iraq.
Philguarantee sent letters to respondents demanding the full payment of the surety bond. Respondents failed to
7. Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc. pay so petitioner filed a civil case for collection of sum of money.
From: JJ
On October 12, 1982, Audrey's will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. As
Issue: What law should be applied in determining whether or not contractor (joint venture) has defaulted? administrator of Audrey's estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following
properties: (1) Audrey's conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park,
Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) Audrey's current account of P12,417.97; and
(3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.
Held: The question of whether there is a breach of the agreement which includes default pertains to the
INTRINSIC validity of the contract.
Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most Orphan's Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who
legal systems is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by lex contractus (proper law of the in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law
contract). This may be the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by Offices, as ancillary administrator.
them either expressly or implicitly (lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied from factors such as
substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts adopt
this: to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, SUBJECT to the limitation that it is not
against the law, morals, public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship Richard's will was then submitted for probate before the RTC of Makati. Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary
to the transaction. administrator.
In the case, the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of law. The laws of Iraq
bear substantial connection to the transaction and one of the parties is the Iraqi government. The place of
performance is also in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether VPECI defaulted may be determined by the laws of Iraq. As administrator, petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of
partition of Audrey's estate, with Richard being apportioned the 3/4 and Kyle, the 1/4. This was granted and
proper actions were done.
BUT! Since foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, processual presumption will apply.
According to Art 1169 of the Civil Code: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party Subsequently, petitioner also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard's 3/4 undivided interest in the
does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner what is incumbent upon him. Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard's three children. This
was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
As found by the lower courts: the delay or non-completion of the project was caused by factors not imputable to legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire
the Joint Venture, it was rather due to the persistent violations of SOB, particularly its failure to pay 75% of the estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire 3/4
accomplished work in US dollars. Hence, the joint venture does not incur in delay if the other party(SOB) fails to undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. This was granted but she subsequently
perform the obligation incumbent upon him. filed an amended complaint where she argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the
Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely 3/4 thereof, and since Richard left his entire
estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to respondent.
8. Alonzo Ancheta vs. Candelaria Guersay-Dalaygon
From: MM
Petitioner alleged that he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland and believed that it is to
the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares."
FACTS: Spouses Audrey O'Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died,
leaving a will where she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. The will ISSUE: WON the entire estate of Audrey should go to Richard then respondent except for the A/G shares
was admitted to probate before the Orphan's Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips
as executor due to Richard's renunciation of his appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.
RULING: It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the
reprobate of her will, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey's death, she was residing in the
Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament was executed and probated before
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey's will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is
governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to 9. Palaganas vs. Palaganas
wit:
From: JM
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
Facts: On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States
(U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated
her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount and in the U.S.
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, a
petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. Petitioners
Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she
the decedent." As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is
the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states: invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testators full understanding of the
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate. RTC
issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or of Special Administration to Ernesto. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to Issue: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has
persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
Petitioner invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law in the Ruling: YES. CA decision affirmed.
absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law. In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing
principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary
administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O'Neill Guersey.
Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and
citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty- allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. But our laws do not prohibit the probate
bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter. of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil
Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial country. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent
notice of them; however, in this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in settlement of such estate.
disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard's estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other
interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey's and
Richard's estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of
partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent. In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners
Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here.
Notably, the assailed RTC order is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the
petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special
administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the Tristan and Lilys marriage on May 16, 1968 was governed by the Civil Code which took effect on August 30,
testators state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the 1950. The SC held in Tenchavez v. Escano that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed
laws of California. This explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of after the effectivity of the present Civil Code, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither
Rupertas will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California. is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in the country. Thus, petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their
marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon
which her motion for intervention is based. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
10. Elmar Perez vs. Court of Appeals
From: SO
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar in the United States and both lived as husband and wife until
October 2001. Petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which
"dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as a consequence thereof, he
Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of suffered a broken/sprained ankle on his left foot. A request for medical examination was flatly denied by the
nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC Quezon City. Here, petitioners complaint-in-intervention was admitted. captain of the vessel. On August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel
The CA declared as null and void the order of the RTC granting the motion for leave to file intervention and using a life jacket and swam to shore.
admitting the complaint-in-intervention. Hence, this petition.
He was brought to a hospital where he was confined for 8 days. On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched
ISSUE: WON petitioner acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based. Rusel from the hospital and was required to board a plane bound for the Philippines. On September 26, 1996,
Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick
leave pay and damages against PCL Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In
their answer, the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the vessel.
HELD: No.
Labor Arbiter held that respondent is liable for the unjust repatriation of the complainant. NLRC affirmed the
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the requisite finding of the Labor Arbiter.
legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules of Court. Petitioners claim lacks merit. Under the
law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her claim of legal interest has no basis.
Issue: Whether or not respondent was guilty of desertion to justify his dismissal.
For a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be evidence to prove that if he Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law, including those on
leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to perform a voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.
his duty and of not returning to the ship or vessel. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to present
clear and convincing proof to show that when private respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of
returning. The fact alone that he jumped off the ship where he was stationed, swam to shore and sought medical
assistance for the injury he sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude that he had the intention However, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
of deserting his post. judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Applicable law
As for succession, the "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to the general
American law. Each State has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It therefore
12. Llorente vs. Llorente refers to the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident and there was also no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine was called for or required by New York State law.
From: MM
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.
From: JJ
The case is remanded to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law. Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. We consider the recording to be legally
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas,
a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover Cancellation of the entry in the civil registry requirements:
that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for (1) verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located
divorce on December 8, 2005. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. (2) civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings
(3) time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation
(1) RTC: Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
RULING: Yes. Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an
incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable
against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The General Rule is that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision. FACTS: In 1947, Atty. Luna married his first wife Eugenia tin the Philippines. They begot 7 children. After almost
2 decades of marriage, they agreed to live apart from each other and entered into an Agreement for Separation
and Property Settlement whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property. On January 12, 1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition in Dominican Republic. On the same date, he contracted another marriage with petitioner Soledad Thereafter,
for its recognition in this jurisdiction. BUT - direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is Atty. Luna and petitioner returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture
and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by petitioner alleging that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between her and Atty. Luna. The RTC ruled against her, and
awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage, except for the law books, which were
ordered turned over to her. Both parties appealed to the CA which modified the RTC judgment by awarding all
the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
ISSUES:
1. WON the divorce decree had validly dissolved the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia.
2. WON the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to
any rights in property.
HELD:
1. No. The divorce decree, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death.
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines
on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule. Pursuant to the nationality
rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos. From
the time of the celebration of the first marriage until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has
not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two
types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.
Here, the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court approval. The
mere execution of the said Agreement did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains.
The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under the Civil Code. But was not the
approval of the Agreement by the CFI of the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the
conjugal partnership of gains? The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took
place only as an incident of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce.
With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine
law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their
marriage.