Morabito, Guillaume, Coherence is not everything: the Impact of the EU crisis management in

Georgia, MA, Political Science, August 2013.

The status of the European Union (EU) as a security provider is increasing. Researchers

recognized that if the EU wants to have more impact, coherence should be ensured between the

EU actors. My research takes both concepts of impact and coherence and applies them to a case

study of Georgia. Precisely, focusing on pre and post Lisbon treaty eras, this study analyzes the

impact of coherence on the impact of EU crisis management in Georgia. Through the use of

interviews and document analysis, this paper determines that more coherence in the EU action

does not increase the impact of the EU crisis management in Georgia.

1
COHERENCE IS NOT EVERYTHING: THE IMPACT OF THE EU CRISIS
MANAGEMENT IN GEORGIA.

By

Guillaume Morabito

A thesis submitted to the Political Science Department

and the University of Wyoming

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTERS OF ARTS

in

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Laramie, Wyoming

August 2013
 UMI Number: 1545136

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UMI 1545136
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
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2013, Guillaume Morabito

ii.
I dedicate this thesis to the love of my life, Siri.

iii.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To begin, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Stephanie B. Anderson, for providing

inestimable advice and pushing me above and beyond my limits. Without her advice and

criticisms, this thesis would be lacking to a great degree. Thanks are also in order to my other

committee members, Dr. Andrew D. Garner and David A. Messenger.

I am deeply indebted to Carl Hartzell. In addition to being a mentor, he greatly helped me in

getting contacts and interviews. I would like to express my gratitude to him.

I am also grateful to those who helped me finance my research, notably the Cheney Study

Abroad Grants.

I would like to thank the Political Science Department faculty and staff for guiding me through

my graduate expereince.

Finally, thanks to all my friends I made in Laramie during these two years. Thanks to all of you,

I feel culturally rich. I will never forget you.

iv.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Does capacity trump coherence? ...................................................................................4

Chapter 2: Literature Review.10

Chapter 3: The role of CSDP in Georgia...22

Chapter 4: Does the EU need more coherence to have more impact? ..........................................55

Thesis Conclusion: Contact between individuals: the key to a successful crisis management ....86

References..92

v.
Chapter 1: Does capacity trump coherence?

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external

activities of the individual member states.1

Acting together is acting stronger. Such is the essence of the European Security Strategy

designed in 2003. Coherence in European Union (EU) affairs, and especially in foreign policy, is

a recurrent issue. Coherence, or more often the lack of thereof, is one of the most bemoaned

aspects in EUs performance.2 The multilayered nature of the EU makes coherence the main

challenge to overcome. Drawing on the extensive but often contradictory literature, coherence is

commonly understood as the absence of contradictions between EU policies, EU bodies, and EU

member states.3 Although some authors reject this negative definition,4 this study adopts a three-

dimensional conception which consists of horizontal, vertical, and institutional coherences.5

In a report to the European Council entitled Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness

of the European Union Action, Javier Solana called for more coherent action to increase the

1
European Council, European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World, 2003, 13. Accessible at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
2
Carmen Gebhard, Coherence, in International relations and the European Union, ed. Christopher Hill and
Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 102.
3
Simon Nuttall, Consistency and the CFSP: A Categorisation and its Consequences, LSE European Foreign
Policy Unit Working Paper No. 2001/3 (2001); Antonio Missiroli, et al., Coherence for Security Policy: Debates
Cases Assessments, Occasional Papers 27, EUISS (May 2001); Pascal Gauttier, Horizontal Coherence and the
External Competences of the European Union, European Law Journal, Volume 10, Issue 1 (January 2004): 2341;
Simon Duke, Peculiarities in the institutionalization of CFSP and ESDP, in: EU Crisis Management, ed. Steven
Blockmans (The Hague: Asser Press, 2008), 75106; Gebhard, (2011).
4
Christopher Hillion, Tous pour un, Un pour tous! Coherence in the External relations of the European
Union, in Developments in EU External Relations Law, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, ed.
Marise Cremona, , (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 10-36.
5
Horizontal coherence refers to the degree to which EU policies mutually reinforce each other; vertical
coherence is defined as the congruence between policy positions and actions of the member states with EU foreign
policy statements and implementation of policy; institutional coherence is concerned with the relation between EU
institutions.

1
efficiency of the EU in tackling conflict situations.6 In other words, by bolstering coherence

regarding its foreign policy, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the

EU hopes to increase its impact on the ground. The study of the EU impact as a security provider

has grown exponentially since the operationalization of the Common Security and Defence

Policy, the operations arm7 of the EU foreign and security policy, in 2003.8 Because most of

the literature on impact remains descriptive and prescriptive but does not tackle the theoretical

explanations behind the EUs impact, this study draws on a brand-new conceptualization of the

EU impact designed by Ginsberg and Penksa.9 In their book, the scholars define the EU impact

as encompassing four dimensions.10

The scholarship has not recognized the link between EU coherence and impact since each

notion has been analyzed, admittedly in an extensive fashion, but always separately from each

other. Unlike scholars, the EU recognizes the crucial relationship between coherence and impact.

The 2003 European Security Strategy stated that the challenge now is to bring together the

different instruments and capabilities and that all of these [coherent policies and capabilities

such as civilian capabilities] can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries.11

Since this statement, the EU has sought to increase its coherence with institutional reforms. The

Treaty of Lisbon marks the most recent effort to bolster coherence in EU foreign policy, and thus

in the CSDP. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force with the primary objective of abolishing

6
European Council, Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of the European Union Action in the Field of
Conflict Prevention, Report Presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary General/High Representative
and the Commission Nice, 7 - 8 and 9 December 2000, 3. Accessible at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/98328.pdf
7
Derek Mix, The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy, Congressional Research Service, (April 8,
2013): 10. Accessible at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41959.pdf
8
Roy Ginsebrg and Susan E. Penksa, The European Union in global security: the politics of impact,
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1.
9
Ibid.
10
Functional, political, societal, and unintended impact, in Ginsberg and Penksa, 98.
11
European Council, 2003.

2
the inter-pillar divide and increasing foreign-policy coherence through the creation of the

European External Action Service (EEAS), the timing of the implementation of these provisions,

as well as their impact on EU crisis management.12 The EU has also developed a rich crisis

management framework, including military and civilian resources, but has failed to put these

capacities in one integrated operation.13 A comprehensive institutional set-up was created over

the past ten years, and lately by the Lisbon Treaty in the aim of fostering coherence which would

increase the impact of EU crisis management.

Behind the concerns of coherence and impact lies a crucial question: does the EU matter

in global security? With the emergence of CSDP and its crisis management wing, the EU is

expected to intervene increasingly in conflict situations, especially in its Neighborhood,14 to

protect its borders and own interests. Assessing the impact of the EU crisis management is

crucial. If coherence is intended to increase the impact of the EU, it is time to examine the

relation between these two concepts. For these reasons, this paper sets the following hypothesis:

H1 : Using the EU monitoring mission in Georgia as a case thus, this study argues that

the EEAS and Lisbon Treaty increased the EUs coherence in Georgia, and yet did not change

the EUs impact in this case because the EUMM did not and still does possess sufficient physical

capabilities to overcome the major challenges on the ground.

A review of the literature will reveal the divided aspect of the scholarship on both notions

of coherence and impact.

12
Eva Gross, EU and the Comprehensive Approach, DIIS Report, (2008:13): 3-4.
13
Cedric de Coning and Karsten Kriis, Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive
Approach, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15 (2001): 248.
14
The European Union Neighborhood refers to countries surrounding the European Union territory. These
countries Algeria, Israel, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Armenia, Jordan, Syria, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Tunisia,
Belarus, Libya, Ukraine, Egypt, Moldova, Georgia, Morocco are participants to the EU Neighborhood Policy.
Created in 2004, the ENP aims at providing [the EU] with a coherent approach that ensures that the whole of the
EU is committed to deeper relations with all our neighbours. At the same time, it allows [the EU] to develop tailor-
made relations with each country. (tefan Fle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood
Policy, ENP website. Accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm)

3
Coherence and Impact: determinants of EU crisis management.

Coherence is one of the challenges the EU has attempted to overcome since its creation.

The EU vertical and horizontal multilayered nature makes it a highly complex system of

institutional structures. In this paper, the analysis relies on the commonly accepted three faces of

coherence. Institutional coherence is concerned with the relation between EU institutions.15

Regarding EU foreign policy, institutional coherence refers to turf-wars between the

Commission, the Council, the High representative, and to a lesser extent, the European

Parliament.16 Finally, institutional coherence also roots in the ability of EU officials to weave

together an increasingly complicated network of institutions across pillars.17 Vertical

coherence consists in the congruence between policy positions and actions of the member

states.18 Vertical coherence also refers to the willingness of member states to contribute

appropriate resources to match common EU foreign policy aims.19 Horizontal coherence

constitutes the degree to which EU policies mutually reinforce one another.20

As the 2000 report of Solana to the European Council recalled,21 coherence is intended to

increase the European Union external actions impact. Using this yardstick, this study will

exclusively focus on the external dimension of EUs impact utilizing a brand-new

comprehensive framework designed by Ginsberg and Penksa. Defined as the impact on host

states and societies: the government authorities and populations whom CSDP is designed to

15
Nuttall, (2001), 6-8.
16
Reinhardt Rummel and Jrg Wiedemann, Identifying institutional paradoxes of CFSP (Florence: European
University Institute, 1998), 54-59.
17
Simon Duke, The EU and Crisis Management: Development and Prospects (European Institute of Public
Administration, 2002), xix-xx.
18
Nuttall, (2001): 8-10.
19
Duke, (2002), 192.
20
Bosse, 133.
21
European Council, (2000): 10.

4
assist, the conception of impact adopted by Ginsberg and Penksa encompasses four aspects.22

The functional impact refers to the technical effects of an operation often with regard to

enhancing security and human welfare. Political impact consists in the effects of a CSDP

operation on the domestic politics and foreign policies of the host country and the degree of

support among domestic political leaders and society. Societal impact constitutes the effects of

an operation on host societies, particularly with regard to human, gender, and minority rights.

Finally, unintended impact refers to the unintended outcomes and consequences of operations.

By coupling both concepts of coherence and impact and applying them to a single case-

study over two institutional periods, this study measures the impact of coherence on EU crisis

management impact in Georgia.

Significance of research

Aside from adding a missing case to the literature, this paper encompasses EU coherence

and impact within the same study. Issues of EU coherence and impact are crucial in answering

the question: does the EU matter in global security? If it is demonstrated that the EU has a weak

impact despite reforms pertaining to coherence, it means that the EU must stop seeking to

improve its coherence and rather focus on identifying the root causes of its incapacity. Finally,

examining the impact of coherence on the EU crisis management impact will be helpful in

providing policy recommendations for future missions in order for the EU to increase its

efficiency and impact as an international security provider.

This author researches the impact of coherence on the EU crisis management impact

using the case-study of Georgia. In 2008, in the aftermath of the 8 August war, the EU mediated

the conflict between Russia and Georgia. Besides being a missing case in the literature, the

22
Ginsebrg and Penksa, 98.

5
instance of EU intervention Georgia is useful in the sense that it occurs right before the

implementation of the Lisbon Treaty dispositions aimed at increasing coherence. Thus, an

analyze of coherence and impact of the EU in Georgia before and after the entry into force of the

Reform Treaty sheds light on the relation between coherence and impact as regards the EU crisis

management. The paper looks at coherence and impact of the EU action in Georgia before and

after the implementation of the Lisbon novelties.

Format

Chapter 2 reviews the literature pertaining to concepts of coherence and impact.

Highlighting the flaws of the literature, Chapter 2 concludes that there is a need for both notions

to be studied together in a more comprehensive way.

Chapter 3 exposes the data used by this study. The importance of coherence within EU

civilian crisis management institutional set-up will be demonstrated before highlighting what

happened when the EU met Georgia.

Chapter 4 represents the analytical core of the study. After providing the analytical

elements to look at for coherence and impact, the chapter demonstrates that more coherence in

EU crisis management did not change a lot to the EU efficiency of ameliorating the situation on

the ground.

The study concludes that an increased coherence in the EU actions does not improve

automatically the impact of the EU in Georgia. In other words, capacity trumps coherence.

6
Chapter 2: Literature Review

The notion of coherence is one of the most overused and misinterpreted concepts in EU

foreign policy.23 The European Union is the multilayered organization par excellence given its

highly complex, intertwined system of institutions. Thus, the greatest challenge that the EU must

overcome is coherence24. This challenge is even more crucial to overcome when the EU

intervenes abroad to resolve a crisis situation. The EU Common Security and Defense Policy and

its civilian crisis management dimension could thus reflect the degree of coherence or

incoherence within the EU.

The debate over the issue of coherence in the CSDP emerged at the beginning of the

2000s. Interestingly enough, the discussion was launched by the European Commissioner for

External Relations, Chris Patten. The Commissioner stated, in 2000, that he would plead for the

indivisibility of European foreign policy, which cannot be confined to one pillar of the Treaty.

The Commission needs to be fully associated with all of CFSP.25 While concerns over

coherence within the Community were already raised at the entry into force of the Single

European Act in 1987, Pattens declaration illustrated the institutionalization of the coherence

problem and was leading the path for repeated and continuous studies on the EU CFSP/CSDP

coherence.

23
Gebhard, 123.
24
Ibid. 101.
25
Chris Patten, CH European Commissioner responsible for External Relations a European Foreign Policy:
Ambition and Reality Institut Franais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris, (15 June 2000). Accessible at:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-219_en.htm

7
 Article 28.1 of the Treaty on the European Union lays down the relationship between the

Commission and the Council.26 When the EU was created as such by the Treaty of Maastricht, its

structure was designed around three separate pillars. In the first pillar, or the European

Community pillar, member states gave up some of their sovereignty to EU institutions which

they did not do concerning the two other pillars. CFSP/CSDP consisted in the second pillar,

meaning that only member states, and thus the Council, were competent in adopting decisions.

Coordination between the Commission and the Council was not natural. Over the years, the pillar

architecture faded away and was finally terminated with the Lisbon treaty. Instead, they are

different competences which involve different EU decision-makers. Regarding CSDP, the EU

has competence but may not adopt legislative acts in this field.

The question of coherence is crucial. The EU hopes to improve the effectiveness of its

external policies by achieving greater coherence.27 In order words, coherence has an impact on

the impact of the EU external actions. A review of the literature is thus necessary and must

pertain to both concepts of coherence and impact. The literature highlights different flaws behind

the conceptualization of coherence and impact. Interestingly, the concept of coherence has

mostly been examined separately and rarely in relation to the concept of impact. The notion of

impact, for its part, lacks of comprehensiveness and rarely takes into account the sui generis

nature of the European Union.

26
Article 28.1 of the Treaty on the European Union: Where the international situation requires operational
action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the
means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation. If
there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to such a decision, the Council
shall review the principles and objectives of that decision and take the necessary decisions.
27
Mix, 2.

8
 This chapter structures analytically the literature review pertaining to the EU coherence

and impact into three distinctive sections. It concludes that there is a need for assembling both

concepts of coherence and impact and applying it to a case-study.

The redundant ambiguity surrounding coherence.

The significant attention paid to the notion of coherence leads the literature to be divided

on the definition of the concept as well as on what analytical elements to consider.

Contending definitions

The examination of coherence regarding EU policies has always been a recurrent object

of study since the emergence of the Single European Act (1987) and later the pillar structure.28

The study of coherence can be structured into two waves. During the years 2000, scholars set out

to define the concept of coherence and its analytical components. Around the end of the decade,

a revival of studies on coherence occurred due to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Both

analytical periods are however tinted with ambiguity.

To begin, ambiguity describes the best the literature regarding the notion of coherence.

Although coherence has emerged as a concern for decades, scholars did not really agree on a

unique conceptualization of coherence. Ambiguity first concerns the EU legislation. Terms such

as coherence and consistency are often used interchangeably which increases ambiguity.

Translations into EU languages further clouds the concept. The French coherence has been

translated into the English consistency and not coherence while it remained Kohrenz in German,

28
Cf. above.

9
coherencia in Spanish and coerenza in Italian. Moreover, the English term consistency has been

translated into the Swedish, Danish, and Dutch equivalents of continuity.29

In addition to the lack of clarity in European legislation, scholars adopted conflicting

views on whether or not the conceptual difference between coherence and consistency mattered.

Nuttall qualified this debate as linguistic pedantry.30 However, there is a clear consensus on the

conceptual differentiation between coherence and consistency.31 Coherence is considered as

embracing the notion of consistency. Coherence is perceived as a superior concept which

presupposes requirements and conditions such as comprehensiveness, completeness, continuity,

and consistency.32 In this sense, consistency refers to the absence of contradictions. On the other

hand, coherence is defined as a desirable plus that involves positive connections between

several factors.33 Coherence encompasses both the absence of contradictions within the

external activity in different areas of foreign policy, and the establishment of a synergy between

these aspects.34 In fine, consistency mainly refers to the character of an outcome or state

while coherence rather specifies the quality of a process.35 The author concludes that the

notion of coherence is more appropriate to the study of EU impact because coherence refers to

the quality of interaction between the different actors while consistency is only part of the

equation.

29
See for instance Articles 1, 3, and 13(3) TEU Nice.
30
Nuttall (2005), 91-112.
31
See Christian Tietje, The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 2 (1997): 211233; Marise Cremona, External
Relations And External Competence: The Emergence Of An Integrated External Policy For The European Union in
EU Law: An Evolutionary Perspective, ed. P Craig and G de Burca, (Oxford University Press, 1999); Antonio
Missiroli (2001); Stephano Bertea, Looking for Coherence within the European Community, European Law
Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2 (March 2005).
32
Bertea, 154172.
33
Missiroli, 5.
34
Gauttier, 2341.
35
Gebhard, 106.

10
 Besides the issue of translation, scholars have had a hard time reaching an understanding

of which elements to look for regarding coherence.

What to look for in coherence?

Pioneers in this field are Christopher Hill and Simon Nuttall. The former pointed the

EUs capabilities-expectations gap as soon as the creation of the CFSP and decided to investigate

the lack of coherence as one of the reasons for this gap.36 The latter is one of the first authors to

have attempted defining coherence. His findings were focusing on three main components:

institutional between community and intergovernmental processes , horizontal between the

three EU pillars and EU policies , and vertical coherence between the EU and the member

states- policies .37 Nevertheless, not one author adopts the same conceptual basis than his

predecessors. Some authors will add the dimension of geographical coherence.38 Gebhard keeps

the horizontal and vertical dimensions to which she adds internal within each of these two

foreign policies domains and external aspects between the EU and third actors .39 Another

divergence within the literature is that not every author gives an equal importance to each

dimension of coherence. Gauttier, for instance, considers that regarding EU external

competences, it is possible to only focus on horizontal coherence.40

Reaching a semblance of definition, the literature slowed down on coherence until the

ratification of the Lisbon Treaty appeared as an opportunity for scholars to expand the body of

knowledge.

36
Christopher Hill, The CapabilityExpectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe`s International Role,
Journal for Common Market Studies, 31 (1993): 305328.
37
Nuttall, (2005): 97.
38
Elsa Tulemts, The European Neighborood Policy: A Flavour of Coherence in the EUs External Relations?,
Hamburg Review of Social Sciences, Volume 3, Issue 1 (June 2008): 111.
39
Gebhard, 107.
40
Gauttier, 23.

11
The revival of study after the Lisbon Treaty.

The Treaty of Lisbon reiterated the need to enhance consistency in the EU external

action. The Article 21(3) stipulates that:

The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between

these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative

of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall

cooperate to that effect.

The most important institutional innovation brought by the Lisbon Treaty is the creation of the

position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The

HR shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of

the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities

incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external

action.41 In addition to the HR, Article 27(3) provides the legal justification for the creation of a

diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS). Both innovations aim at

fostering the EU external policies coherence by putting the majority of the EU CFSP/CSDP

under the responsibility of one institution.

Authors legitimately began to address the contribution of both institutional additions.

Yet, criticism did not disappear. Trauner argued that the EU can address the institutional and

political challenges by strengthening existing coordination mechanisms and fully exploiting the

possibilities which the Lisbon Treaty offers.42 The author advocates for a more comprehensive

approach to coherence that could allow the EU to overcome the lack of coherence regarding the

internal-external security nexus.

41
Article 18(4) Treaty of Lisbon.
42
Florian Trauner, The internal-external security nexus: more coherence under Lisbon?, EUISS Occasional
Paper, 89 (March 2011): 5.

12
 Blockmans and Laatsit agree on the fact that the Lisbon Treaty is aimed at creating

greater coherence but notice that this is not enough if common objectives and an understanding

on how to attain coordination is not reached by member states.43 De Coning and Friis firmly

condemn the conception of comprehensive coherence. They indicate that unlike common beliefs,

there is much less room for coherence than what we want to believe and advocate for a more

realistic conception where coherence should be understood as a scale of relationships, and the

most appropriate and realistic level of coherence that can be achieved will depend on the exact

constellation of organizations in an independent relationship in that specific operational

context.44 Based on this conception, they design four levels of coherence45 that they couple with

six different types of relationships highlighting the degree of coordination among international

actors.46 The post Lisbon era did not allow scholars to adopt a common understanding of what

coherence what consisting in but rather expanded discrepancies between scholars.

Finally, the literature began to develop case-studies. Coherence was applied to concrete

EU policies. Koenig utilizes the concept of coherence to address the EU reaction to the Libyan

crisis.47 The author concludes that even if vertical coherence was ensured, the EEAS did not

prevent inter-institutional incoherence. Besides, the absence of strategy led to an incoherent

crisis reaction in the short term.48 Bosse applies coherence to the EU policies in Georgia.

43
Steven Blockmans, and Marja-Liisa Laatsit, The EEAS: Enhancing Coherence in EU External Action?,
156-157, in EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era, ed. Cardwell, P., Springer (2012).
44
Coning and Kriis, 244.
45
Ibid. Intra-agency, whole of government, inter-agency, international-local agency coherence, 254.
46
Ibid. Actors are united, actors are integrated, actors cooperate, actors coordinate, actors coexist, and actors
compete, 254.
47
Nicole Koenig, The EU and the Libyan Crisis In Quest of Coherence?, The International Spectator:
Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:4 (2011): 11-30.
48
Ibid., 28.

13
Focusing on the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, the author

concludes that the overall EU approach in Georgia is tinted with numerous inconsistencies.49

As concluding remarks, the concept of coherence is the most overused and misinterpreted

in EU foreign policy.50 Yet, it remains a crucial element of analysis but not by itself. For

coherence to have any significance, it has to be coupled with the concept of impact. A flaw of the

literature is that coherence has always been analyzed separately from other conceptual notions,

especially from the impact of the EU policies. The aim of this paper is to gather both concepts of

coherence and impact and analyze the impact of coherence on the EU impact. For this purpose, it

is necessary to reiterate the literature on the EU impact.

As well as regarding coherence, the body of literature shows how the conception of

impact elaborated so far does not match the reality of the EU nature.

The need for a new analytical framework of impact

The evaluation of the EU crisis management impact is a predominant topic among the

scholarship. Putting aside many publications from think tanks such as the EUISS51 or issued by

EU Presidencies52, the rest of the literature remains descriptive and not representative of the EU

institutional nature.

A descriptive and narrow nature of impact.

49
Bosse, 144.
50
Carmen Gebhard, 101.
51
Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, European Security and Defence Policy: The first ten
years (1999-2009), European Union Institute for Security Studies (October 2009): 379-390.
52
Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, Guide to the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP), (November 2008). Accessible at:
http://www.rpfrance.eu/IMG/pdf/Guide_to_the_ESDP_nov._2008_EN.pdf

14
 Regarding the impact of the EU crisis management, the main issue is to find an efficient

and common theoretical framework. Pardo Sierra focuses on the EU impact on domestic policies

and defines it as the extent to which a state adopts the bilateral agenda of reforms, policies, and

cooperation with the EU.53 In order to evaluate the EU impact, Tocci utilizes other components

of analysis such as conditionality, social learning and passive enforcement.54 Whitman and Wolff

prefer to pay attention to EU capabilities and the conflict context as analytical components of

impact.55 A commonality within the literature however is that the study of the EU impact is

generally divided into internal and external aspects.

The internal dimension of impact helps understand the effects of CSDP missions on the

EU itself. Biscop and Anderson explore the underlying concepts and statements of the European

Security Strategy as a judging tool of all the EUs external actions.56 Their conclusion is that the

ESS has had an impact on the EU, not by providing a new orientation, but as a codification of

EU foreign policy guidelines established over years of collaboration.57 Gross shows that EU

member states do not automatically consider the EU as the appropriate framework for crisis

responses. Looking at three international crisis, Lebanon, Macedonia, and Afghanistan, Gross

concludes that there is only a slow moving towards Europeanized crisis decision-making.58

Gourlay focuses on the internal aspects of CSDP, particularly decision-making process,

53
Oscar B. Pardo Sierra, Shaping the Neighbourhood? The EU's Impact on Georgia, Europe-Asia Studies,
63:8 (2011): 1379.
54
Nathalie Tocci, The EU and conflict resolution: promoting peace in the backyard (London: Routledge, 2007),
18.
55
Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, The EU as a conflict manager? The case of Georgia and its
implications, International Affairs, 86 (2010): 1.
56
Sven Biscop, and Jan Joel Andersson, The EU and the European security strategy: forging a global Europe
(London: Routledge, 2008).
57
Ginsberg, and Penksa, 7.
58
Eva Gross, The Europeanization of national foreign policy: continuity and change in European crisis
management. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

15
procedures, planning, and financing issues.59 A significant amount of work has focused on the

civilian and military bodies within the CSDP. Grevi provides an analysis of the civil and military

capabilities issues in CSDP.60 The EUMC and CIVCOMs work has been examined by Cross.61

Cross finds that both bodies have formed a true esprit de corps and have significant influence on

the PSC. Meyer notice the establishment of a similar esprit de corps within the PSC, committed

to defense cooperation amongst member states. Turf wars between the Commission and the

Council have also been examined.62 Simon looks at the performance of three CSDP missions

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Chad and

recognizes that the weak EU capacity for planning and conducting military operations is a major

obstacle to the development of CSDP.63 Korski and Gowan provide a critique of the unions

civilian capacities. While the authors conclude that the EU became a significant and autonomous

actor, the unions future as an international security provider will depend on the member states

ability to discharge what they refer to as the policies of assurance, protection, prevention, and

compelence, give the persistent barriers to such roles posed by distinct and divergent national

political and legal cultures.64

The second dimension of the EU crisis management impact is external. It consists in the

perception of CSDP operations by hosting societies but also by other international security

providers. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite conclude that the Unions efforts are positively perceived
59
Catriona Gourlay, Partners Apart: Enhancing Cooperation Between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis
Management in the Framework of ESDP, Finnish UN Association (2006).
60
Grevi.
61
Maia K. Davis Cross, Cooperation by Committee: The EU Military Committee and the Committee for
Civilian Crisis Management, EUISS Occasional Paper, (February 2010): 82.
62
Xymena Kurowska, The Role of ESDP Operations, 25-42, in European security and defence policy: an
implementation perspective, ed. Merlingen, M., and Ostrauskaite, R. (Routledge advances in European politics. New
York: Routledge, 2008).
63
Luis Simn, Command and control? Planning for EU military operations, EUISS Occasional Paper,
(January 2010): 81.
64
Daniel Korski & Richard Gowan, Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europes Civilian
Capacities, European Council on Foreign relations (2009). Accessible at:
http://ecfr.3cdn.net/3af9563db3c7ab2036_ecm6buqyw.pdf

16
in BiH and Macedonia. Martin, Kaldor, and Serra focus on the impact of the EU in enhancing

human security. The authors find that the EU has a different approach than the rest of

international security providers and thus could make contributions.65 Part of it is to adopt a

comprehensive approach of the notion of security close to a social constructivist approach

which would encompass reducing poverty, Weapons of Massive Destructions, developing

humanitarian aids and fighting human rights violations. According to the authors, the EU has the

resources to do so. The EU, via its foreign actions, also impacts other security providers.

Casarini and Musu cover the CSDP-US issues66 while Major depicts the EU-UN cooperation in

DRC.67

The review of the literature on impact shows mixed results. Case-studies are flourishing

and provide an empirical understanding of CSDP in practice. On the other hand, authors must

test theoretical explanations to CSDP missions in order to understand why and how CSDP

missions start and what effects do they have on a conflict situation. The conceptions of impact

usually adopted by scholars appear too narrow. A more comprehensive understanding of the EU

impact must be designed. Also, foreign policy theorists tend to evaluate the EU impact the same

way they would with a nation-state. However, the EU is not a state; and if it is not, several

scholars will argue it has no foreign policy, but it does. Where the EU lies is in a grey area

between nation-state and international organizations. The European Union is a sui generis entity

that does not fit in a predetermined framework of analysis, so does its foreign and security

65
Mary Martin, Mary Kaldor, and Narcs Serra. National, European and human security: from co-existence to
convergence. (London: Routledge, 2013).
66
Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu, European foreign policy in an evolving international system: the road
towards convergence, (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
67
Claudia Major, EU-UN Cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD CONGO
in 2006, EUISS Occasional Paper (September 2008): 72.

17
policy. If one wants to analyze the EU CSDP impact, specific criteria to the EU itself shall be

used.

In conclusion, the literature review sheds light on the problems surrounding the use of

coherence and impact. The major obstacle is that both concepts are rarely used together within

the same study. Coherence and impact have been studied separately from each other without

being put into practice altogether. One can conclude there is a need to evaluate both concepts of

coherence and impact in a simultaneously fashion.

18
Chapter 3: The role of CSDP in Georgia
The European Union, a civilian power.

European countries need to make more of a contribution in terms of defence

capabilities. It is not fair to keep turning to our ally in the United States to

contribute military forces to problems which involve our own security. - Geoff

Hoon, British Defence Secretary, 2004

[ESDP] wastes already meagre continental European defence budgets on EU

structures that mirror proven NATO institutions. - Geoffrey van Orden, British

Conservative MEP, 2003

The European Union external action structures itself around several policies. One of

which includes the CSDP which took longer to be put into practice because of the member

states unwillingness to give up some of their sovereignty. However, the civilian aspect of

CSDP appeared as the EUs spearhead.

The significance of CSDP and civilian crisis management.

The development of the CSDP enabled the EU to increase its status as a security

provider. However, this status did not build from one day to another.

CSDP: a means for the EU to hold sway on the global scene.

19
 A Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) among European countries is an ancient

desire. In the 1950s, the Cold War raised the issue of Europes security and the possible German

rearmament. Ren Pleven, Frances Prime Minister, submitted a plan, the European Defence

Community (EDC), that should have been the first step of an integrated military force financed

by a common budget and led by a supranational political authority.68 However, the failure of

France to ratify the EDC put a stop to the construction of an European defence.69 The WEU

Ministerial Council stated in October 1987 that the construction of an integrated Europe will be

incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.70 With the collapse of

communism in Eastern Europe and the prospect, European member states interests gathered

around the project of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).71 It is however not until

1999 and the ground-breaking Saint-Malo Summit that actions followed words. Indeed, the

usually reluctant UK agreed under the initiative of France to enhance cooperation between EU

member states in the field of security and defence. The European Security and Defence Policy

(ESDP) came into existence with the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, where the

EU expressed its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where

NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response

to international crises.72 The Treaty of Lisbon rebranded ESDP the Common Security and

68
Cf. CSDP Main Steps, Ministre de la Dfense, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/das/international-
relations/european-defense/csdp-main-steps/csdp-main-steps
69
Petar Petrov, Introducing governance arrangements for EU conflict prevention and crisis management
operations: a historical institutionalist perspective, 52, in EU conflict prevention and crisis management: roles,
institutions and policies, ed. Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncos (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011).
70
Joylon Howorth, The EUs Security and Defence Policy: Towards a Strategic Approach, 199, in
International Relations and the European Union, ed. Christopher Hill, and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011).
71
Cf. Preambule of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Member States declared that they were resolved to implement
a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in
time lead to a common defence.
72
European Council, Helsinki 10 and 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 27. Accessible at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm

20
Defence Policy (CSDP) and changed the institutional structure and decision-making of the

policy:

The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of

foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing

of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence. (Consolidated version of the

Treaty of Lisbon, Article 11.1)

Since 2003 and the launch of the first mission, the EU has deployed twenty eight civilian

and military operations where the EU acted either in cooperation with other international security

providers or independently. The Berlin Plus Agreement allows the EU to borrow NATOs assets

in order to carry out CSDP operations and illustrates the close relationship between the EU and

the US in regards to security and defence.

The emergence of a CSDP is the matter of a significant literature. International relations

theorists have debated on the motives behind such a phenomenon. Traditional theories such as

(neo)realism advocates that the EU CSDP balances against US dominance73, and NATO74.

Neoliberal emphasize institutions and thus consider CSDP to be the next logical stage of

European integration. The results of cooperation between states would showcase the shared

benefits.75 Finally, social constructivists focus on the power of norms and identity.76

Constructivist authors argue that CSDP is an illustration of the Europeanization of state

73
Stephen Walt, Taming American power: the global response to U.S. primacy (New York: Norton, 2005);
Barry Posen, European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?, Security studies, 15(2),
(2006): 149.
74
Jon Weston, Foreign and Defence Policy, in New Europe Seminar on the Future of the European Union,
(London, New Europe Research Trust, 2001); Anand Menon, Why ESDP is Misguided and Dangerous for the
Alliance, in Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and The Quest for European Autonomy, ed. Jolyon Howorth and
John Keeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 203-218; Jeffrey Cimbalo, Saving NATO from Europe,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6 (November/December 2004): 111-120.
75
Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht,
(Cornell University Press, European edition with London: Routledge/UCL Press, 1998).
76
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, (1992): 391-425; Peter Katzenstein, The culture of national security:
norms and identity in world politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

21
identities [and thus of security identities],77 while other scholars will emphasis the emergence of

a European security community.78 A final constructivist argument is that, CSDP is a tool for

enhancing Nation-building in Europe. In other words, the EU pursues its own security and

defense policy as a way to increase its stature on the world stage and among its people at home

[] the ESDP is for nation-building purposes and not for defense itself.79

All previous explanations provide valid insights. In the end, the CSDP denotes the EUs

international role to a global stage. The EU increasingly impacts security in the world in order to

protect its interests and project its values. The EU appeared as a crucial global actor to rely on,

especially as a niche security provider, when other international organizations such as the UN

or NATO are not willing or capable to step in during a conflict situation.80 The EU action abroad

revealed itself as being primordially civilian.

Civilian crisis management: an essential feature of EU external actions.

After the reiteration to develop and reinforce the Union's external action through the

development of a civilian crisis management capability81, the definition of threats to the EU in

the 2003 European Security Strategy remained a key step towards the development of civilian

crisis management capabilities. While issues regarding member states national interests and

allocations of resources hindered the development of military capabilities, the civilian domain

gained more appetency. In 2004, the European Council adopted an Action Plan for civilian

aspects of ESDP followed by a Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in November

77
Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe rules and rhetoric (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 84.
78
Ole Waever, Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Nan-War Community, 69-118, in
Security communities, ed. Adler, E., and Barnett M., (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
79
Stephanie Anderson, Crafting EU security policy: in pursuit of a European identity (Boulder, Colo: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2008), 46.
80
Ginsberg and Penksa, 235-6.
81
European Council, Feira, 19 and 20 June 2000, paragraph 6. Accessible at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm#V

22
2004. The 2004 June Council endorsed the Headline Goal 2010 which set up guidelines for the

development of civilian capabilities. The EU developed civilian aspects of crisis management in

four priority areas: police; strengthening the rule of law; strengthening civilian administration;

and civil protection.82 The development of civilian capabilities is a learning process opened to

lessons learned. In November 2008, the Council of the EU adopted a document entitled

Guidelines for the Identification and Implementation of Lessons and Best Practices in Civilian

ESDP Missions aimed at identifying and implementing lessons and best practices.83 In general,

civilian CSDP missions have achieved significant results even though they remain critically

underdeveloped in comparison to military CSDP operations.84

The record so far.

With the Treaty of Maastricht and successive reforms, the EU created the necessary

institutions to the functioning of a CSDP and crisis management. The operational phase however

did not begin before 2003 when the EU deployed its first CSDP mission. Since, the EU has

launched twenty-eight civilian and military operations in diverse regions of the world. The latest

instances are EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali, deployed on March 22, 2013, and EU

Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya, decided on May 22, 2013. The majority of EU

missions are civilian (eighteen out of twenty-eight). EU member states have deployed over

15,000 military personnel.85 Among the member states, the largest contributors are France

82
European Union, European security and defence policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management, Factsheet
August 2009. Accessible at:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090702%20Civilian%20aspects%20of%20crisis%20managem
ent%20-%20version%203_EN.pdf
83
Council of the European Union, Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best
practices in civilian ESDP missions, Brussels, 19 November 2008, 15987/08.
84
Nicoletta Pirozzi, EU performance in civilian crisis management, 199, in The European Union as a Global
Conflict Manager, ed. Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012).
85
Grevi, 415.

23
(5,470), Germany (2,045), Italy (1,274), the UK (805), Poland (774), Spain (708), the

Netherlands (504), and Ireland (500). Concerning civilian missions, the largest contributors are

Italy (9282), France (275), Germany (259), Romania (230), Sweden (143), and the UK (125).

France is the only member state to have contributed to each twenty-eight operations. 86 Most of

the missions are deployed in strict cooperation with other international security providers. Strong

coordination is enforced between the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (BiH, Kosovo),

the UN (DRC, Chad, and Somalia), the African Union (Sudan), Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (Indonesia), and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (Georgia).87

The EU has launched a variety of CSDP missions, civilian, military and a mix of both

which can vary in their mandate and tasks. Police missions have played a significant role in

perceiving the EU as an international security provider. The EU has deployed more police

missions than any other type of CSDP operations. They consistently reflect the EU values and its

priority in reforming police and rule of law in fragile societies, especially in neighboring regions

where the absence of such values may threaten European security.

The three EU Rule of Law missions were deployed in Georgia, Iraq, and Kosovo. The

European Union launched on 16 July 2004 an EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST

THEMIS). The mission was set up after the 2003 Rose Revolution in order to assist Georgia in

its process of democratization. Through its mission, the EU assisted the Georgia government to

reform judicial and prison systems. The missions tasks were undermined by the lack of interest

from the Georgian leadership88, but the main value of the mission remains its fast deployment at

a critical moment in Georgias political evolution, and thereby provided the EU with additional

86
Ginsberg and Penksa, 32-33.
87
Ibid. 31.
88
Christopher Chivvis, EU civilian crisis management: the record so far (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010).

24
political leverage89. The ongoing mission EULEX in Kosovo is the largest civilian mission ever

launched under the CSDP. The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in

enacting the rule of law, with a specific focus on the judiciary90. The mission is conceived as a

joint effort between the EU and local authorities through monitoring, mentoring and advising

whilst retaining some executive responsibilities, with its mandate expiring on 14 June 2014. The

EU also launched a rule of law mission in Iraq EUJUST/LEX-Iraq in July 2005. The

operation is aimed at improving the rule of law in Iraq and promoting a culture for human rights

by providing professional development opportunities for high and mid-level Iraqi officials from

the criminal justice systems.91

EU Civil administration missions are, less well known, because of their smaller scale, but

are not of less importance. They involve EU military and civilian personnel serving in advisory

tasks in the national administration of hosting countries (eg. EU advisory and assistance mission

for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo EUSEC RD CONGO). The mission

helped the EU and other international actors such as the UN to have a clearer idea of the issues

the Congolese Defence Ministry could encounter.92

The EU deployed ten missions concentrating on Security Sector Reform. EU mission in

support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is a good

illustration of a SSR mission. The main purposes of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau are to advise on the

restructuring of the Guinean police and armed forces and police, as well as contributing to

Interpol efforts to combat drug trafficking.93

89
Damien Helly, EUJUST Themis in Georgia: an ambitious bet on rule of law, 87-102, in Civilian Crisis
Management: the EU Way, ed. Agnieszka Nowak, EUISS Chaillot Paper, No. 90 (June 2006).
90
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eulex-kosovo?lang=en
91
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eujust-lex?lang=en
92
Chivvis, 14.
93
Ibid.

25
 Finally, EU Civilian Response Teams are supposed to increase the rapid reaction

capacity and also contribute to the adequacy and effectiveness of an EU crisis management

response, as well as remain coherent with other actors.94 Their main goal is to assess crisis

situations and provide an overview of the situation. Thus they support the deployment of CSDP

missions by providing all elements necessary to the smooth start-up of EU operations.

The deployment of the twenty-eight CSDP missions has steered scholars to assess the

state of things. Ten years of practice has given birth to insights of lessons learned. While the

achievements appear impressive, difficulties emerged in a redundant fashion. As Christopher

Chivvis recalled, the major thorn in the EUs side is staffing problems. In mid-2009, around

1,800 out of the 5,000 police staff were deployed while missions in Kosovo or Afghanistan

lacked sufficient and necessary staff. On the other side, the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia is

one of the only operations in which more personnel were employed than needed for the

deployment. This gap between resources and commitment draws from the fact that the EU

member states do not need to commit to resources individually although they agree on missions

collectively. Thus, when the bill comes, fewer states are ready to provide resources.95

In the next sections, this paper recalls the institutional framework surrounding the launch

of civilian CSDP missions. Due to the plethora of actors, coherence is more needed than ever.

The civilian crisis management institutional architecture: the ultimate goal of

coherence.

The Common and Security Defence Policy is part of the EU foreign policy and thus

utilizes the decision-making system common to the EU foreign policy.

94
Council of the European Union, Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 10462/05, Brussels, 23 June 2005, 4.
Accessible at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st10/st10462.en05.pdf
95
Chivvis, 44.

26
The key players.

The CSDP is designed and implemented by the European Council and the Council

acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.96 The European Council is

composed of Heads of State and governments, the President of the European Council and the

President of the European Commission. The European Council determines the political and

strategic direction of the CSDP.97 At the end of their meetings, Heads of State and governments

can adopt Council Decisions. These Council Decisions provides the legal and political mandate

that decides on the launch of CSDP missions. The Council Decisions provide the what-who-

when-where of CSDP missions. A Council Decision answers the who by rendering explicitly

the chain of command, appoints one to head the mission, its staff, and the participation of third

actors. The what is provided by articles mentioning the mission tasks, structure, and statement.

The when and where are logically specified and highly dependent on a case-by-case basis.

The when especially varies. Some EU missions are the result of a long decision-making

process while others must be deployed very quickly. The geopolitical context is of course the

variable conditioning the speed of deployment. The where can finally be a source of trouble.

While appearing as a simple task, determining the territorial authority of a CSDP mission can be

difficult. The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia is an instance where the mission has a different

territorial competence than the one planned during the negotiations. Indeed, the EUMM monitors

are not allowed to enter the two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while this

condition was agreed on by the different parties during the August negotiations.

The Council of the European Union is the legislative body of the EU jointly with the

European Parliament. The Council of the EU consists of member states representatives at the

96
Treaty of Lisbon, Article 24.
97
Treaty of Lisbon, Article 26.1

27
ministerial level and takes decisions on the basis of guidelines designed by the European

Council.98 Concerning CSDP, the Council of the EU meets under the configurations of the FAC

(Foreign Affairs Council) and the GAC (General Affairs Council). The FAC comprises the

twenty-eight Foreign Affairs ministers and is chaired by the High representative for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy. The FAC elaborates the Unions external action on the basis of

strategic guidelines provided by the European Council and ensures consistency across the EUs

external action instruments together with the GAC.99

The European Commission remains an important player in the EU CSDP despite the fact

that the Treaty of Lisbon reduced, at least on paper, its influence over CFSP.100 The

Commission is not fully associated with CFSP as the Maastricht Treaty formulated and the

Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX) merged with the EEAS. However, the

HR, also Vice-President of the Commission ensures that the Commission plays a role in the

CFSP/CSDP framework. The Commission is notably responsible for the CFSP/CSDP budget

thus fueling EU policies such as the European Neighborhood Policy or development and

humanitarian assistance. The Commission is finally in charge of the Instrument for Stability

(IfS), a short-term crisis response mechanism which can finance CSDP missions between 12-18

months with a financial ceiling of 20 million.101

The European Parliament is generally of a lesser importance regarding CSDP but the

Treaty of Lisbon strengthened its role. The Treaty makes sure that the Parliament is consulted

regularly and that its views are taken into account. The Parliament can adopt non-binding

98
Treaty of Lisbon, Article 26.2
99
Treaty of Lisbon, Article 16.6
100
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, Common Foreign and Security Policy structures and instruments
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EPLO Briefing Paper, (April 2012): 7. Accessible at:
http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Working%20Groups/CSDP/EPLO_Briefing_Paper_1-
2012_CFSP_After_Lisbon.pdf
101
Margriet Drent, and Dick Zandee, Breaking pillars: toward a civil-military security approach for the
European Union (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2010), 47.

28
resolutions or recommendations that will influence the CSDP decision-making mechanism.

Committees within the Parliament such as the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the

sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) have specific responsibilities for CSDP.102 The

European Parliament is not officially included in the CSDP decision-making architecture but

retains the last word concerning the funding of civilian CSDP operations.103

Besides the interplay between the usual EU decision-making bodies, civilian CSDP

missions are the outcomes of an interaction between entities specifically designed for this

purpose.

The institutional set-up for civilian crisis management.

A plethora of actors play a role in shaping decisions pertaining to external policies such

as the European Council, Foreign Affairs Council, the EEAS, the European Commission, the

HRVP, the President of the European Council, and also individual member states and their

Foreign Ministers.

When it comes to CSDP, the quintessential intergovernentalist policy, member states have

the power to suggest CSDP actions. The relationship between the FAC and the Political and

Security Committee (PSC) is crucial. The PSC constantly provides recommendations to the

FAC. If the FAC decides to act, it will delegate to the PSC the authority for action and strategic

direction.104 In the case of civilian crisis management operations, a crisis management concept

(CMC) is designed by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). If adopted, the

PSC will demand the CIVCOM to draft civilian strategies. The draft will be sent to COREPER

for discussion, and from there it will be sent to the Council for approval. The approved draft will
102
Ibid. supra note 96, 9.
103
Cf. Key Players, Ministre de la Dfense, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/das/international-
relations/european-defense/how-does-csdp-work/how-does-csdp-work
104
Ginsberg and Penksa, 37.

29
be returned to the PSC which will ask CIVCOM to develop Civilian Strategic Options (CSO)

with the help of CIVOM. Having considered the CSO and the Commission views, the Council

will finally decide on a Council Decision which will provide the legal and political mandate of

the CSDP mission. The Council will then mandate the PSC, the CIVCOM and the CPCC to draft

the Concept for Operation (CONOPS). The Council approves the CONOPS and tasks PSC to

draft the final Operation Plan (OPLAN). The Council approves OPLAN and officially launches

the CSDP mission.105 Behind the specific institutional set-up, CSDP missions are influenced by

multiple inputs.

The inputs behind the deployment of CSDP missions.

The inputs of the EU foreign policy decision-making process, especially in relation to

the CSDP, are numerous. While member state governments and EU institutions are legitimately

the most influential actors, other protagonists also play a role in the EU foreign policy system

such as domestic, national, and international entities.106

Member states are the predominant inputs in the EU foreign policy system. In 2006, the

EU was willing to launch a battlegroup in DRC. However, Germany was reluctant to do so

because of domestic political considerations. Germanys reluctance was drawing from the fact

that most of the battlegroup would consist of German troops. Germany then influenced the

decision-making process and finally convinced the other member states to deploy a military

crisis management operation instead of a battlegroup.107

105
Korski and Gowan, 77.
106
Ginsberg and Penksa, 37, Figure 1.1.
107
Ginsberg and Penksa, 38.

30
 In the case of the EU intervention in Georgia in 2008, individual inputs were important.

Indeed, French President and President of the European Council Nicolas Sarkozy proposed and

obtained support from the Council in order to mediate the Russo-Georgian conflict.

Lobby groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and political parties can also be

influential within the Union. Sometimes, the best way to pursue their interests is to act at the EU

level. The German Green Party, for instance, urges the Union to take decisions at each

international conference on global climate.108

International organizations are also actors that shall be taken into account when

evaluating the inputs of the EUFP. Often, the EU has been asked by the UN to intervene in

different regions of the globe. A trend is the regionalization of conflicts and thus of crisis

management. In many cases, an efficient crisis management is more easily reached by a regional

organization than a global actor such as the UN. Attentive to this phenomenon, the UN regularly

asks the EU or other regional security providers to intervene. Individual foreign governments

also influence the EU foreign policy system. The US constantly pushes the EU to intervene in its

zone of influence, and not rely too much on US forces. The recent case of Libya is one

illustration. In the case of the EUs role in Georgia, it is Russia that is constantly slowing down

the crisis management process in Georgia by preventing EUMM patrols from entering both

breakaway regions.

Another input into CSDP decision-making process is the Committee of Contributors

(CoC). The CoC is a group of EU and non-EU contributors who lend significant personnel to a

crisis management operation and who consult as plans are drawn up for deployment.109

Norway, Turkey and the US are frequently part of this group of contributors.

108
Ibid.
109
Ginsberg and Penksa, 39.

31
 CSDP missions are the outcome of interplay between multiple actors. Coherence therefore

appears as a fundamental condition for successful deployments.

More coherence with Lisbon

The preceding sections illustrate how multilayered the EU decision-making process is

when it comes to CSDP. Even though the Council stated the need for a coherent crisis

management,110 the reality was different and member states were still calling for strengthening

coherence between ESDP missions and other European Union instruments.111 The Treaty of

Lisbon aims at enhancing coherence regarding CSDP by introducing new entities.

First, the Lisbon treaty introduced the position of President of the European Council. This

replaces the member states Presidencies of the Council when an EU member states would take

over the presidency of the Council every six months. The President of the Council works to

facilitate cohesion and consensus within the Council.112 The position is currently held by Herman

Van Rompuy for one more year.

The greatest contribution of Lisbon to EU crisis management is undeniably the creation

of the European External Action Service (EEAS) headed by the High Representative for CFSP

(HR). The HR, who also is the vice-president of the Commission, embodies the CSDP, ensures

the consistency in the EUs external actions, and is responsible for crisis management

activities.113 The HR is assisted in her mission by the EEAS. The new service gathers all the

110
See Council of the European Union, Civilian Headline Goal 2010, paragraph 3: the CHG 2010 should help
to enable the EU to establish a coherent civilian presence on the ground where crisis situations require it to do so.
Accessible at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf
111
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Civilian Capabilities (Extract from the 2903rd
External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 10 and 11 November 2008), 2008, 2.
112
Cf. Key Players, Ministre de la Dfense, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/das/international-
relations/european-defense/how-does-csdp-work/how-does-csdp-work
113
Treaty of Lisbon, Article 18.2: The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and
security policy.

32
military and civilian crisis management entities. The EEAS is still a new entity finding its feet.

The ongoing review of the EEAS two years after its implementation will probably reveal flaws.

However, the EEAS contributions to the enhancement of EU coherence proved to be

significant.114

This study utilizes the case study of Georgia. The selection of this case is not innocent.

The EU has a long relationship with its Georgian neighbors.

The EU meets Georgia.

The long relationship between Georgian and the EU pushed the latter to intervene after

the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.

Why select Georgia as the case-study

The EU launched CSDP missions in many regions of the globe. While the first operations

were concentrated in Eastern Europe, the EU progressively expanded the geographical range of

its crisis management action. Since 2003, missions were deployed in Africa, the Middle East,

and South East Asia. This paper could have selected a number of other case studies. However,

attention was given to the case of EU crisis management in Georgia. Besides the fact that it is a

114
Authors interviews; Niklas Helwig, Paul Ivan, Hrant Kostanyan, The New EU Foreign Policy
Architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS, EU Foreign Policy, CEPS Paperbacks (10 February
2013); Chiara Cellerino, The New European External Action Service And The Lisbon Call For Coherence Of
European External Action: Issues Of Accountability And Scope, Columbia Journal of European Law (2011); F.
Mauri with G. Gya, The EEAS: Laying the Basis for a More Coherent EU Foreign Policy?, ISIS Europe, No. 47
(December 2009); Simon Duke, The Lisbon Treaty Benchmarks and the European External Action Service:
Coherence, efficiency and visibility and the EEAS, European Union Studies Association Conference (2011);
Steven Blockmans and Marjua-Liisa Laatsit, The EEAS: Enhancing Coherence in EU External Action?, (2012):
156-157.

33
missing instance in the literature, Georgia is a formidable test case for the role and impact [of

the EU] on conflict and crisis management115 for different reasons.

First, the presence of Russia enables one to perceive more clearly the discrepancies

between EU member states. Since EU member states did not agree on a position towards Russia,

the presence of Russia as a third actor exacerbated the tensions and contradicting positions that

can exist among the EU member states.

Moreover, enough time has passed to allow for an evaluation of the Georgia mission. The

EUMM is entering its fifth year of functioning. It allows a more accurate examination of the

impact of the EU in Georgia. Also, because this study analyzes the concept of coherence in the

EU crisis management, the case of Georgia is pertinent because it overlaps two different

institutional periods. Indeed, the EUMM was deployed before the coming into force of the

Lisbon Treaty. The treaty brought several contributions in enhancing coherence of the EU

external action such as the creation of the EEAS and the position of HRVP. Thus it will be

interesting to see the impact of institutional reforms on the EU crisis management in Georgia.

Finally, the case-study of Georgia was selected because of the numerous EU actors

involved in the crisis management. Two EUSRs, one for the South Caucasus and another for the

crisis in Georgia, were present as well as the EU has a Delegation in Tbilisi and the EUMM,

which was launched in October 2008. Furthermore, the EU is active via the Eastern

Neighborhood Policy, and the Eastern Partnership framework.

The sole issue concerning the case study of the EU crisis management in Georgia is that

it has not come to an end. The EUMM mandate was extended until September 2014. Given the

geopolitical context, it is predictable that the EUMM will be needed for a longer time. This

115
Bosse, 132.

34
means that a complete evaluation of the missions impact will not be possible until its final

completion.

The EU was able to intervene in Georgia in part because it already developed links with

the Caucasian country. However, none of the undertaken EU policies were able to prevent the

2008 conflict.

Georgia and the EU: a long relationship made of missed opportunities for crisis management.

The relations between the European Union and Georgia date prior to before the

deployment of the EUMM in 2008. The EU and Georgia have shared relations since 1992 just

after the accession of Georgia to its sovereignty, following the implosion of the USSR. During

the process of democratization of Georgia, the EU was one of the first players to grant assistance

to the country. The European Commission opened its Delegation to Georgia in 1995. Relations

strengthened after the 2003 Rose Revolution. Basically, the EU assistance concerns economic,

social, and political reforms.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

The EU efforts in Georgia started with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

(PCA). Signed in 1996, this agreement between the EU and Georgia offered the optimal

framework for the support of Georgias transformation.116 The pursued objectives were the

following:

to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the

Parties allowing the development of political relations;

116
Dov Lynch, Why Georgia matters, EUISS Chaillot Paper, No. 86 (February 2006), 61.

35
 to support Georgias effort to consolidate its democracy and to develop its

economy and to complete the transition into a market economy;

to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between

the Parties, and so to foster their sustainable economic development;

to provide a basis for legislative, economic, social, financial, civil, scientific,

technological, and cultural cooperation. (Article 1 of the PCA)

In 2001, the European Commission published a Country Strategy Paper concerning Georgia.117

Its conclusions were pessimistic. The political and economic situations were gloomy. Moreover,

the Commission qualified both conflicts regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazia as major

impediments to development in Georgia contribut[ing] to regional instability.118 This negative

report and the EU feeling of commitment to look for further ways in which it could support

efforts to prevent and resolve conflict119 pushed the union to integrate Georgia as a participant

to the EUs European Neighborhood Policy.

The European Neighborhood Policy

The ENP was not originally meant to extend to Georgia but the recent 2003 Rose

revolution pushed the EU to consider expanding the geographical range of the ENP. Concluded

in 2004, the ENP was designed to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the

enlarged EU and its closest neighbors. The ENP is not a multilateral agreement but rather

consists of bilateral policies between the EU and each participant. As far as it concerns Georgia,

the ENP Action Plan aims at fulfilling the provisions of the PCA and contributing to a closer

relationship with Georgia, involving a significant degree of economic integration and deepening
117
European Commission, Georgia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, 27 December 2001. Accessible at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/csp/02_06_en.pdf
118
Ibid., 5.
119
Ibid., 3.

36
the political cooperation.120 This agreement marks a rapprochement between the EU and

Georgia. Moreover, it symbolizes a shift in the EU policy towards hard security and crisis

management. Indeed, the ENP Action Plan recognizes both breakaway conflicts as a Priority

Area (Priority no. 6). This shift was motivated by the development of the European Security

Strategy which lists Building Security in our Neighborhood as one of the key challenges for the

Union.121

In 2003, the Council took some further steps towards crisis management in Georgia.

During July, the first Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Heikki Talvitie, was

appointed. A year later, the EU Rule of Law Mission (EUJUST THEMIS) was deployed to

reform the justice and legislative sectors in the country. The EU mission achieved its objectives

and completed its tasks on July 2005. However, there was still a need to strengthen EU efforts in

Georgia.

The Eastern Partnership

The most recent development in the Georgia-EU relations is certainly to be found in the

Eastern Partnership. Initiated by Poland in 2009, this project aims at enhancing relationships

between the EU and its Eastern European and Southern Caucasian neighbors. The stakes are to

promote stability and prosperity in these countries that are brought closer to the EU after the

successive enlargements. These agreements include free trade accords and gradual visa

liberalization while the EU will use it as leverage to promote democracy and good governance.

Created less than one year after the August conflict, the EaP has been subject to criticism

because it does not engage with crisis management and conflict prevention in a proactive

120
European External Action Service website, Georgia. Accessible at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm
121
European Council, European Security Strategy, 2003.

37
fashion. Some scholars saw this as an illustration of a lack of coherence between the different

EU policies in Georgia.

Although the EU was involved in Georgias development and democratization since the

90s, the EU never really considered Georgia as one of its top priorities. The 2008 August war at

least helped to focus the EUs attention back on Georgia.122

The clash with Russia

The 2008 August war is not a sudden event but rather the outcome of decades of tensions

between Russia and Georgia over breakaway regions.

Georgia-Russia: long-time rivals.

Georgia is one of the oldest countries in the world. The origins of the Georgian kingdom

go back to the fourth and fifth centuries BC. After long fights with Turks and Iranians, the

kingdom was placed under Russian protection in 1783. When the Russian revolution failed in

1905, Georgia gained progressively more autonomy until obtaining its independence on April 22,

1918. Georgias autonomy was rapidly restrained when the Red Army invaded Georgia in 1921.

Following this restraint, the future of Georgia became bound to the destiny of the newly formed

USSR until its implosion. The collapse of the UUSR did not stop Russia to interfere with its

former Republic. Russia plans on restoring the old empire, or at least a zone of influence led to

the intrusion of Russia into Georgian domestic politics. For instance, evidence shows Russia

122
Cf. interview of EU diplomat, Until now, nobody cared. Europe looked away and pretended not to see.
When our capitals were called out to, nobody answered. This conflict has had at least one merit, to bring attention
back on Georgia, translated in English from Jusqu' prsent, tout le monde s'en foutait. L'Europe regardait ailleurs
et feignait de ne pas voir. Quand on interpellait nos capitales, personne ne rpondait. Ce conflit a eu au moins un
mrite, ramener l'attention vers la Gorgie in Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Rcit de Gorgie 3: provocations,
responsabilit et puration..., Bruxelles2 (27 November 2008). Accessible at: http://bruxelles2.over-blog.com/45-
categorie-10497749.html

38
backed the coup dtat that ousted Gamsakhurdia, first president of the Georgian Republic,

opponent to the expansion of Russian influence in the South Caucasus. The tensions climaxed

during secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both regions being supported by

various Russian groups, the secession of both regions from Georgia appeared critical. To put an

end to the crisis, the president of Georgia, Shevardnadze, had to accede to the Kremlins

pressures and accept to join the Commonwealth of Independent States and also legitimize the

Russian military bases in Georgia. This illustrates the beginning of the Russian hegemony.123

During the mid-90s however, Georgia drifted apart from Russia, realizing that no benefit could

be taken from these relations. Georgia slowly moved toward the West as symbolizes the active

participation of Georgia in the great synergy project, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.

The Russo-Georgian relations did not improve with the Rose Revolution in 2003. This

movement of democratization led to the ousting of Shevardnadze and the election of Saakashvili.

The number one priority of the regime was the quick reestablishment of Georgias territorial

integrity which meant reasserting Georgian authority over Abkhazia, South Ossetia. The utter

failure of reintegration of South Ossetia drew international attention on the need for conflict

resolution. Georgia sought the active participation of the EU in creating a bordering mission in

vain.

The strengthening of the Georgian states challenged the influence of Russia in the South

Caucasus. Russia gradually increased pressure on Georgia to bring it into the fold but made

Georgia even more certain in its project to drift apart from Russian influence. These tensions

would only escalate to a full-scale conflict.

123
Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia (New York:
M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 35.

39
The path to war

On May 31, 2008, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the deployment of an

additional 400 military personnel to South Ossetia.124 Georgias foreign minister reacted stating

that this was a gross encroachment on Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.125 Clashes

occurred on the night of June 14 when mortar and gunfire were exchanged. The tensions

progressively escalated. In July 2008, Russia conducted a military exercise that proved to be the

dress rehearsal for Russian actions in Georgia.126 The exercise involved more than 8,000 Russian

troops. Russia also conducted aerial incursions into the South Ossetian airspace. On July 25, a

bomb blast in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, killing one person and increasing

tensions. In response of Russian advance, Georgia launched on August 7, an artillery barrage

against Tskhinvali and soon controlled much of South Ossetia.

The five-day Russo-Georgian war.

The war between Russia and Georgia officially started on August 8 when Russian

President Medvedev launched large-scale air attacks in South Ossetia and Georgia. Saakashvili

responded by declaring a 15-day state of war.127 From this moment, the war spread. Russia

expanded its bombing campaign and managed to make Georgian troops retreat from South

Ossetia which was completed on August 11. On August 9, Russia opened a second front in

Abkhazia. On August 10, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a ceasefire. Ignoring

it, Russia intensified its strike and managed to capture three cities located outside South Ossetia,

in Georgia.

124
Ibid., 146.
125
RiaNovosti, Georgia warns Russia against sending more troops to S.Ossetia, (2008/05/15). Accessible at:
http://en.rian.ru/world/20080515/107490144.html
126
Jim Nichol, Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008, Congressional Research Service (2009): 4.
127
Ibid., 5.

40
 When it comes to responsibilities, despite the predetermined Russian attack, the Georgian

government acted irresponsibly by sending troop in South Ossetia on August 7.128 The

humanitarian impact of the war was significant. Human Right Watch noticed the commitment of

serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by both parties.129 So did

Amnesty International.130 850 persons were killed and 2,300-3,000 were wounded. Besides,

approximately 138,000 people were displaced in Georgia.131

The implication of the war for European security

The West and the European Union in particular, have been involved in the geopolitics of

the South Caucasus. Yet, nothing was really done before the August war in order to tackle the

revival of secessionist conflicts. The absence of consensus among EU/NATO member states

prevented both organization to take an steps. Nevertheless, the EU evolved as an international

actor, and with the establishment of the ESDP, the EU had to be concerned with security in the

Caucasus. Several interests were at stake for the EU. First, it was a good opportunity for the EU

to fulfill the expectations it created after the Rose Revolution. The ENP created the path for a

democratic Georgia. The EU had interest in continuing and reinforcing this process. Second,

Georgia is officially in the European Neighborhood. It is in the interest of the EU to guarantee its

stability in order to prevent all sorts of international crimes to find a source in the Georgian

society. Third, Georgia became an important actor in the transport of energy from Azerbaijan

128
Cornell and Starr, 155.
129
BBC News, S Ossetia 'war crimes' condemned, (2009/01/23). Accessible at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7847285.stm
130
Amnesty International, Civilians in the line of fire: The Georgia-Russia conflict, (18 November 2008).
Accessible at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR04/005/2008/en/d9908665-ab55-11dd-a4cd-
bfa0fdea9647/eur040052008eng.pdf
131
Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Report on human rights
issues following the August armed conflict, Council of Europe: Commissioner for Human Rights, (15 May 2009),
paragraph 9. Accessible at: http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4a0d1e6f2

41
with the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The EU considers that by 2030, 50

percent to 70 percent of its energy imports will come from this region of the world.132 Securing

the Caspian Sea region is thus crucial. Fourth, the EU has interest in the resolution of frozen

conflicts in its neighborhood. Escalating to a hot conflict could destabilize the security of the

whole region and potentially of EU candidate countries.

The EU as a mediator: a surprising success

The EU has lived up the expectations it created as an international security provider.

Following the August 2008 crisis, the EU emerged as the only credible security actor and thus

managed to broker a peace agreement.

An efficient shuttle diplomacy

On August 4, three days before the beginning of the war, Estonia asked for EU

peacekeepers to be sent in Georgia.133 While Georgia was not a priority for the EU presidency of

the Union, hold by France from July 1, the events on August 7 changed the focus of the EU.134

Because divisions among EU member states were less important than divisions among NATO

members, and because the EU was already involved with Georgia through the ENP, it appeared

logical that the EU would take the leading role of mediating the Caucasus crisis. The French EU

presidency, represented by French president Nicolas Sarkozy, quickly seized the opportunity. On

August 8, Sarkozy approached Putin in order to be granted two days of mediation but faced a

132
European Commission, Green Paper Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply,
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy-supply/doc/green_paper_energy_supply_en.pdf
133
Philippa Runner, Estonia urges EU peacekeepers for Georgia, EUobserver, (2008/08/05). Accessible at:
http://euobserver.com/foreign/26582
134
Philippa Runner, EU diplomats fly out to mediate in Russia-Georgia war, EUobserver, (2008/08/09).
Accessible at: http://euobserver.com/foreign/26595

42
refusal.135 Nevertheless, The EU delegation led by EUSR Peter Semneby, went on August 9 on a

separate fact-finding mission for the EU. The French EU presidency used its multiple contacts

and liaisons with all the protagonists to try and stop the fighting, while EU top diplomat Javier

Solana was report to have spoken by phone with the Georgian and Russian foreign ministers.136

On August 13, the French EU presidency prepared a snap summit on Russo-Georgian war.137

After the intensive work of French and Finnish Foreign Ministers Kouchner and Stubb, the EU

was able to materialize a peace plan.

The Sarkozy-Medvedev six-point peace plan

The marginal role played by the High Representative Javier Solana left the scene for the

French president who used its good relations with Moscow in order to pull off a diplomatic

coup.138 The six-point peace plan is the outcome of lengthy and turbulent negotiations. The

confessions of the Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb on his blog are quite insightful.139

The Finnish diplomat, OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the time and thus participating to the

negotiations process along with his French counterpart, Mr. Kouchner, reveals the

unpreparedness of the parties to design a plan. Based on Stubbs rough outline, a non paper is

signed by the Georgian president Saakashvili comprising four points referring to the territorial

integrity of Georgia and making no reference to additional security measures or international

135
Ronald Asmus, A little war that shook the world: Georgia, Russia, and the future of the West (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 192.
136
Ibid. supra note 132.
137
Philippa Runner, EU preparing snap summit on Russia-Georgia war, EUobserver, (2008/08/10).
Accessible at: http://euobserver.com/foreign/26596
138
Mark Tran, Enter Sarkozy the peacemaker, The Guardian, (2008/08/12). Accessible at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/12/georgia.russia4
139
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Gorgie. Comment a t labor le plan de paix. Alexander Stubb, Bruxelles2,
(2008/08/21). Accessible at: http://bruxelles2.over-blog.com/article-22105205.html

43
discussion about the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.140 However, in the meantime,

Sarkozy was in Moscow to meet with Medvedev. The outcome of the meeting is a press

conference stating the creation of a six-point plan.141 This plan, unlike the one signed by

Saakashvili, included that the Russian peacekeeping forces would be allowed to take security

measures awaiting an international mechanism (Point Five) and that the future of South Ossetia

and Abkhazia would be discussed during international discussions (Point Six).142 In other words,

Point Five allowed Russians forces to remain in both breakaway regions. Sarkozy went then to

Tbilisi, not to negotiate, but to convince Georgian president to sign the six-point plan.143 Finally,

the EU French Presidency was able to present a six-point agreement on August 13:

(1) Not to resort to force;

(2) To end hostilities definitively;

(3) To provide free access for humanitarian aid;

(4) Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;

(5) Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the

outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-

keeping forces will implement additional security measures;

140
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Le plan en quatre points sign avec le prsident Gorgien. Le texte, Bruxelles2,
(2008/08/21). Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/leplanenquatrepointssigneaveclepresidentgeorgien-letexte.html
141
President of Russia, Press Statement following Negotiations with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, (August
12, 2008). Accessible at:
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/12/2100_type82912type82914type82915_205208.shtml
142
Accessible at:
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2008/08/20080813_GEORGIA_ACCORD.pdf
143
Asmus, 210.

44
 (6) Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in

Abkhazia and South Ossetia.144

In order to enforce this peace agreement, the EU Council Secretariat and the European

Commission with the support of Eurodeputies,145 recommended possible EU contributions

including the deployment of a civilian mission.

The creation of the EUMM in order to implement the peace agreement.

As aforementioned, the launch of CSDP missions is motivated by multiple factors. The

following sections showcase the inputs behind the deployment of the EUMM.

What motivations behind the launch of the EUMM.

In the case of the EU intervention in Georgia in 2008, the EU was primarily motivated by

filling a security gap. Before the August events, the main security providers in Georgia were the

UN with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the OSCE. However,

after the 2008 conflict, both international actors lacked of credibility on the ground. The OSCE

monitors were prevented to go to South Ossetia after the authorities from the breakaway region

stated that the OSCE mission failed in its capacity of providing warnings of the Georgian attack.

The OSCE mission was put to an end in late 2008.146 In mid-June 2008, UNOMIG ceased to

operate after Russia opposed the renewal of its mandate. Due to EU efforts in Georgia creation

144
Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations, Extraordinary meeting, Brussels,
12453/08, 13 August 2008. Accessible at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/102338.pdf
145
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Les eurodputs rclament une force de paix de lUE en Gorgie, Bruxelles2,
2008/05/08). Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/leseurodeputesreclamentuneforcedepaixdel%E2%80%99ueengeorgie.html
146
OSCE Press Release, OSCE Chairman regrets disagreement on OSCE future in Georgia, (December 22,
2008). Accessible at: http://www.osce.org/cio/50525

45
of the Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, a EUSR, EUJUST Themis, ENP the EU

emerged as one of the only international actors capable to resolve the 2008 crisis.

The fact that France did hold the EU Presidency at the time was crucial too. The EU

probably would not have acted if another country was holding the Presidency.147 In public,

Sarkozy appropriated personally the resolution of the conflict. In a 2009 public speech, he

declared : If Georgia was not wiped from the map, if a ceasefire was achieved in Gaza... that's

because France, while it held the presidency of the European Union, shouldered its

responsibilities so that Europe could take action.148

Member states logically played a crucial role in motivating the launch of the EUMM. In

particular, the Baltic States which, due to their past relations with Russia, clearly condemned the

invasion and urged the EU to launch a peacekeeping force.149

The European Parliament also played a role in the inputs. The Green MEP and Chair of

the Delegation to the EU-Armenia, EU-Azerbaijan and EU-Georgia Parliamentary Cooperation

Committees already called to mind the EU executive institutions in May 2008.150 The European

parliament reiterated the need for the EU to commit itself in Georgia.151

The geopolitical context also influenced the decision to launch the EUMM. The EU

mission would not have been agreed upon if Russia had supported the continuation of the OSCE

147
Authors interview, EEAS officials, 8/1/2012.
148
Si la Gorgie n'a pas t raye de la carte, si un cessez-le-feu a pu intervenir Gaza (...), c'est parce que la
France, alors qu'elle exerait la prsidence de l'Union europenne, a pris ses responsabilits pour permettre
l'Europe d'agir. Quoted in Natalie Nougayrde, Nicolas Sarkozy est-il un "faiseur de paix" ?, LeMonde, (3 June
2009). Accessible at : http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2009/06/03/nicolas-sarkozy-est-il-un-faiseur-de-paix-par-
natalie-nougayrede_1201676_3232.html
149
Philippa Runner, Estonia urges EU peacekeepers for Georgia, EUobserver, (2008/08/05); Lucia
Kubosova, Latvian ex-leader frustrated over EU's Georgia reaction, EUobserver, (2008/08/12). Accessible at:
http://euobserver.com/tickers/107656.
150
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Les eurodputs rclament une force de paix de lUE en Gorgie, Bruxelles2,
(2008/05/08). Accessible at : http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/leseurodeputesreclamentuneforcedepaixdel%E2%80%99ueengeorgie.html
151
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, LEurope doit maintenant sengager en Gorgie, dit le PE, Bruxelles2,
(2008/08/24). Accessible at : http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/leuropedoitmaintenantsengagerengeorgieditlepe.html

46
mission.152 The EU presence in Georgia is made of missed opportunities for conflict

management and the 2008 events were another opportunity for the EU to increase its credibility

as an international security provider. In spite of divergences among EU member states, the EU

emerged as the only credible actor that could monitor the conflict between Georgia and Russia.

Several other elements come into play. Georgia is a proximate country and participant to the

ENP. The insecurity on the ground was not that high and other international missions

UNOMIG and OSCE were already present. Besides, as it will be developed later, the mandate

of the EUMM is narrow. In other words, the EU had reasonable chance of demonstrating success

for a reasonable cost.

The EUMM: what for?

The EUMM mandate provides the official, legally stipulated objectives of the operation

that delineate the primary purposes of the operation.153

On September 15, 2008, the GAERC approved the Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP and

thus gave the go-ahead for the deployment of the EUMM. The Joint delineates the missions

objective. Thus, the EUMM:

shall provide civilian monitoring of Parties' actions, including full compliance

with the six-point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures throughout

Georgia, working in close coordination with partners, particularly the United

Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE), and consistent with other EU activity, in order to contribute to

152
Ginsberg and Penksa (2012), 65.
153
Ginsberg and Penksa (2012), 59.

47
 stabilisation, normalization and confidence building whilst also contributing to

informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia.

The EUMMs objectives shall also be:

to contribute to long-term stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding

region; and, in the short term, the stabilisation of the situation with a reduced risk

of a resumption of hostilities, in full compliance with the six-point Agreement and

the subsequent implementing measures.

One must notice the careful formulation used by the Council. The term throughout Georgia

was preferred to the more genera term in Georgia. A last-minute meeting, in the morning of

September 15 allowed European ambassadors to agree on the term.154 This refers to the

conception of the Georgian territoriality ad consists in an easy and forced choice from the

Europeans. Four territorial limits were conceivable for the range of action of the EUMM. The

first is the one set up by international law which is the whole Georgia, South Ossetia and

Abkhazia included. The second is Georgia without both breakaway regions being autonomous in

facts since 1992. The third is Georgia without South Ossetia and Abkhazia because they declared

their respective independence which Russia has recognized. The fourth territorial conception is a

military one which conceives Georgia without South Ossetia, Abkhazia and a strip of land few

kilometers wide surrounding both separatist regions.

The importance of financial capabilities: the launch of the fastest CSDP mission.

The EUMM was rendered official on September 15, 2008 and was fully operational on

October 1st. The operation is structured with Headquarters consisting of the Head of Mission and

the HQ staff all located in Tbilisi. The EUMM also consists in three Field Offices located in

154
Authors interview, EEAS officials, 7/5/2012.

48
three different Georgia cities, and a Support Element based in Brussels within the Council

General Secretariat. CSDP panning processes have all suffered from deficits in capacities, slow

procedures, inadequate equipment, shortcomings of personnel and insufficient budget. However,

the EUMM stands out from the crowd. In terms of planning process, the EUMM is the fastest

ESDP/CSD mission deployed. After the August 13 GAERC, the PSC gathered every week as

well as DG-RELEX, CMPD and CPCC in order to accelerate the planning process.155 Informal

meetings were even held during weekends.156 The European Council agreed on the mission on

September 1, 2008.157 On October 1st, the first civilian personnel arrived in Georgia.

Civilian crisis management operations are usually financed by the Instrument for

Stability (IfS). The IfS has a short-term crisis response mechanism which can finance CSDP

missions between 12-18 months with a financial ceiling of 20 million.158 The IfS mechanism

has allowed to deploying the EUMM. It financed urgent support for IDPs.159 However, the IfS

financing process reveals itself too slow to support the urgent start-up that some CSDP missions

sometimes need. A 2007 institutional reforms introduced a complementary preparatory

measures budget line.160 This budget line provides funds for fact-finding missions and the

initial deployment of field resources to launch a CSDP missions.161 The EUMM needed to be

deployed as fast as possible. Among the reasons for this success is the use of preparatory

measures budget line.162 Concretely, this procedure allowed for exploratory and preparatory

155
Authors interviews.
156
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Le mandat dEUMM Gorgie, dtails et texte, Bruxelles2, (2008/09/16).
Accessible at : http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/lemandatdeummgeorgiedetailsettexte.html
157
Council of the European Union, Extraordinary European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, (6
October 2008). Accessible at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/102545.pdf
158
Drent, and Zandee (2010): 47.
159
Ibid., 48.
160
Article 41.3 TEU.
161
Ginsberg and Penksa (2012), 82.
162
Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia

49
work to be conducted several weeks before the Council Joint Action established the legal and

political framework of the EUMM. Thus a Civilian Response Team (CRT) was deployed in

Tbilisi to prepare the deployment of the EUMM. This procedure allowed rapid reaction from the

European community. EU officials agree that the EUMM would not have been deployed as fast

as it did without such a mechanism.163

Concerning the financing of the missions functioning, 31 million have first been

granted for the first year of duration. However, in view of the large contributions from the

member states, the budget had to be upgraded not even one week after the Council Joint Action.

A consensus was found to grant the mission 35 million. Nowadays, the mission runs with an

annual budget of 20.9 million.164

The EUMM was originally designed to encompass 230 personnel. However, the EUMM

currently consists in 266 staffs and even had to refuse offers from member states. Before the

deployment of the mission, European member states were ready to offer a total of 393 staffs.165

Nowadays, the mission encompasses 266 staffs from twenty-five member states. According to

Ginsberg and Penksa, personnel who work for the CSDP mission in Georgia are the best

compensated among CSDP field personnel, and it is one of the easiest missions to recruit and

staff (due to its location and per diem benefits).166 The EUMM is the only CSDP mission that

did not suffer from the capabilities-resources gap and even exceeded expectations in term of

resources and capabilities.

(EUMM Georgia), 12898/08, Brussels, 12 September 2008. Accessible at: http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:248:0026:0031:EN:PDF
163
Authors interview, EEAS officials, 7/26/2012.
164
EUMM website, http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/facts_and_figures
165
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Offres en pagaille pour EUMM Gorgie, Bruxelles2, (2008/09/16). Accessible
at : http://www.bruxelles2.eu/category/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-caucase/page/16
166
Ginsberg and Penksa (2012), 89.

50
 The European Unions status as an international security provider evolved with the

emergence of a specific institutional set-up for civilian crisis management. The operational phase

followed and illustrated the actual capacity of the EU to intervene in conflict situations. In

Georgia, the EU demonstrated its power to impose itself as the most credible actor. Now that the

EU is in charge of crisis management in Georgia, it is time to assess the coherence and impact of

its action. The next chapter will consist in the analytical core of this paper. Chapter 4 sets out to

investigate the impact of an increased EU coherence on the impact of EU crisis management in

Georgia.

51
Chapter 4: Does the EU need more
coherence to have a better impact?

The EU needs to be more active, more coherent and more capable. Drawing on experience to date

of civilian crisis management and lessons learned, the EU is committed to improving its

effectiveness in civilian crisis management. (Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, adopted

by the European Council (17-18 June 2004)

Before applying both concepts of coherence and impact to the case of EU

intervention in Georgia, it is necessary to mention what analytical components this study

will look for.

Coherence and impact: conceptualization of two complementary

concepts.

Drawing on the different flaws pointed at in the literature review, this study adopts an

uncluttered conception of coherence and a comprehensive design of impact.

An encompassing conception of coherence.

Given the multitude of meanings behind the concept of coherence in the literature, this

study will adopt a broad conception which embraces common elements from the majority of

precedent studies. The review of the literature enabled to gather common analytical components

across studies. As a result, this paper adopts a three-dimensional conception of coherence.

Horizontal coherence

52
 Horizontal coherence refers to the degree to which EU policies, including different

policy areas, measures, implementation actions and policy paradigms of each pillar, mutually

reinforce each other.167 This face of coherence relates to coherence between conflict prevention,

civilian crisis management, and development policies. In the case of Georgia, this paper will

emphasize congruence between EU crisis management, represented by EUMM, but also EU

humanitarian policies in favor of IDPs, and regional EU policies such as ENP and EaP.

Vertical coherence

Vertical coherence is defined as the congruence between policy positions and actions of

the member states with EU foreign policy statements and implementation of policy.168 Vertical

coherence also refers to the willingness of member states to contribute appropriate resources to

match common EU foreign policy aims.169 For the purpose of this paper, emphasis will operate

on coherence between EU member states and EU institutions about policies to enforce in

Georgia. Also, coherence among EU member states, especially at the beginning of the crisis, will

be observed.

Institutional coherence

Institutional coherence is concerned with the relation between EU institutions.170

Regarding EU foreign policy, institutional coherence refers to turf-wars between the

Commission, the Council, the High representative, and to a lesser extent, the European

Parliament.171

167
Duke (2002), 192.
168
Nuttall (2001), 8-10.
169
Duke (2002), 192.
170
Nuttall (2001), 6-8.
171
Rummel and Wiedemann, 54-59.

53
 For the purpose of this study, attention will be paid to the relation and interactions

between the different EU actors and entities playing a role in crisis management in Georgia. As

aforementioned, EU crisis management in Georgia was chosen in part because of the multiplicity

of EU actors on the ground impacting Georgia. Thus the analysis of institutional coherence will

have more significance.

What to look for the EU external impact?

Drawing on a recent theoretical framework, the next section lays down the three elements

of analysis for EUs impact.

The technical effects of CSDP operations

As Ginsberg and Penksa suggest, functional impact refers to the technical effects of an

operation.172 Functional effects differ from operations. The mandate of the missions delineates

the mission nature and objectives which will dictate functional effects. Concerning the EU

Monitoring Mission in Georgia, the functional effects draw directly from the mandate which is

monitoring ceasefire. Assessing the functional impact of the EUMM asks to pay attention to the

nature of the operation civilian-, its objectives stabilization, normalization, confidence

building- but also identify obstacles and to which degree the mission objectives are met. The

following sections will illustrate how the EUMM reached its three objectives to a certain degree.

The EUMM helped defusing tensions on the ground and brought Georgia and Russia around the

same table. However, major obstacles subsist such as the non-access to both breakaway regions,

Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EUMM impact on reducing the movement of displaced

persons is also restricted. The functional dimension of impact helps defining whether or not the

172
Ginsberg and Penksa, 101.

54
mission is successful but is not sufficient. The examination of the political and societal impacts is

fundamental to get a comprehensive picture.

The effects of CSDP missions on domestic politics

Political impact refers to the effect of a CSDP operation on the domestic politics and

foreign policies of the host country and the degree of support for the operation among domestic

political leaders and society.173 Civilian crisis management operations have a tendency to be

less political than military missions. Security sector and rule of law reforms for instance are

usually technical and highly specialized thus diminishing the politicization of the EU

intervention174. In the context of crisis management, the Head of Mission is playing a leading

role. He or she is the link between the field headquarters, the Brussels offices, and the host

authorities. The Treaty of Lisbon brought some innovations. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the

Head of Mission would work alongside with EU member states embassies, the Commission

Delegation, the Council Presidency, and other EU actors such as the EU Special

Representatives175. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EEAS and the post of HRVP were created in

order to fix problems of incoherence in the cooperation between the different actors. The High

Representative holds on the political role and dictates the political-strategic decisions to be

implemented by the EU representatives on the ground. While providing some innovations, the

Lisbon Treaty does not specify the degree of political involvement the HRVP should have.

Moreover, it does not provide a framework addressing the relationship between CSDP operations

and host authorities which would have been useful given the fact that CSDP missions are not

173
Ginsberg and Penksa (2012), 108.
174
Susan Penksa, Lessons Identified from BiH: Strategies for Developing Domestic Reform Agendas,
Seminar on Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Security Sector Reform and the Stabilisation and
Association Process, (4-6 June 2008): 27-35. Accessible at:
http://www.eupm.org/FCKeditor/Images/File/CEP%20brosura%20EN.pdf
175
Ginsberg and Penksa, 2012, 112.

55
purely technical. Political impact from CSDP missions requires political leadership and

coherence from the member states. It is only under these conditions that the EU can hope having

an impact on hosting societies.

The effects of an operation on host societies

Societal impact refers to the effects of an operation on host societies, particularly with

regard to human, gender, and minority rights. While political and functional impacts emerge as

the core of operations objectives, CSDP missions also enhance human security in often fragile

countries. Some CSDP missions have an explicit humanitarian function while other may not be

explicitly humanitarian but still impact human security to the extent of whether the EU officials

are sensitive to the situation. The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia for instance is not a

humanitarian mission176. However, its action in providing assistance for internally displaced

populations definitely improves human security of citizens.

Ginsberg and Penksas theoretical framework provides comprehensive elements of analysis

of CSDP operations external impact. The consideration of functional, political, and societal

effects, coupled with unintended consequences, makes Ginsberg and Penksas theory clear,

complete and easy to apply to various case-studies. The theoretical framework offered by both

political scientists reveals the essential need for evaluating how well a mission perform its

primary mandate tasks.

This paper uses Ginsberg and Penksa theory of impact in order to analyze whether or not the

EU impact in Georgia changed after the bolstering of coherence in EU crisis management. To do

so, this study will analyze the impact of the EU in Georgia before and after the implementation

of the Lisbon treaty.

176
EUMM Leaflet, page 1. Accessible at: http://eumm.eu/data/file_db/leaflets/leaflet_eng_2012_ver_3.pdf

56
Coherence and impact in Georgia: mission impossible?

Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the

heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are

essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments,

including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response,

economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management.177

In order to analyze the impact of coherence on EU crisis management impact, this study

will first examine EU coherence and impact in Georgia before the implementation of the Lisbon

Treaty before applying the same methodology post-Lisbon era.

Coherence and impact before the Lisbon contributions.

The next section will mention whether or not the EU intervention in itself was coherent

before moving to the study of the period between August 2008 and the entry into force of the

Lisbon treaty.

Coherence in the 2008 EU intervention.

The EU intervention to the 2008 August war proves to be reactive to events and

incoherent due to inconsistencies between EU institutions.

EU mediation in Georgia, reactive to events rather than part of a well-thought strategy.

EU mediation and crisis management in Georgia following the 2008 brief war with

Russia happens to be the outcome of a sudden reaction rather than the completion of a well-

177
European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a
Changing World, Brussels, (11 December 2008), S407/08, 9. Accessible at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf

57
thought strategy. While EU diplomats are very pleased with the rapidity with which the EUMM

was deployed, the EU could have prevented the conflict or at least anticipated it. Because the EU

was not attentive to its own institutions, the Union failed in preventing the 2008 Georgian-

Russian war.

EU foreign policy institutions had sufficient elements of information to be aware of the

worsening of the situation way before the August clash. Political groups within the European

Parliament called for an intensification of EU presence in Georgia already in early May 2008.

Indeed, Marie-Anne Isler-Bguin, the Green MEP and Chair of the Delegation to the EU-

Armenia, EU-Azerbaijan and EU-Georgia Parliamentary Cooperation Committees called the EU

authorities to deploy a peacekeeping force because the situation was close to the annexation [of

both breakaway regions to Russia] there is no trust on both sides to build something in common,

dialogue has been suspended for two years.178 In an interview, the Green MEP stated that what

happened was not a surprise. Besides the call in May, she personally called out Bernard

Kouchner, the French foreign minister on July 15, but nobody wanted to listen.179 Moreover,

on May 12, 2008, foreign ministers from five EU countries Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,

Slovenia, and Sweden traveled to Tbilisi following Russian claims that Georgia is preparing

to invade Abkhazia.180 Slovene Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dimitrij Rupel, described the

situation on the ground, on behalf of the EU Presidency, as a cause for concerns.181 The

178
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Les eurodputs rclament une force de paix de lUE en Gorgie, Bruxelles2,
(2008/05/08). Accessible at : http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/leseurodeputesreclamentuneforcedepaixdel%E2%80%99ueengeorgie.html
179
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Gorgie: A Gori, il faut un "corridor humanitaire", M.-A. Isler-Bguin,
Bruxelles2, (2008/08/16). Accessible at : http://bruxelles2.over-blog.com/article-22016514.html
180
Renata Goldirova, EU ministers urge peace on Georgia mission, EUobserver, (2008/05/13). Accessible at:
http://euobserver.com/foreign/26122
181
Ibid.

58
Situation Center had also warned the EU about the aggravation of the situation. The PSC even

planned on increasing on-the-ground EU actors capabilities but did not put it into practice.182

The main issue is that the EU possessed the necessary information to act preventively but

member states lacked of motivation. Following the call from MEPs, the High Representative

Solana stated that sending EU crisis management troops fall within member states competences

and that no discussion about this possibility were planned among PSC ambassadors.183

Furthermore, the EUSR for the South Caucasus told the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on

July 8, 2008, that he shall not expect immediate results from Europe [and] that result would take

time.184 Yet, the EU launched its fastest CSDP operation only two months later.

This collection of statements from different EU protagonists illustrates a strong

institutional incoherence. The EU was unable and unwilling to take action despite warnings

issued by several of its entities. Georgian authorities called several times for including into the

negotiations the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, but the EU turned a deaf

ear185. EU member states were not enthusiast to put their noses into the Georgian mire and did

not really care of the situation before the actual clash in August.

The leaked divided European reactions.

The EU intervention in August 2008 is tinted with another institutional coherence: the

division among EU member states on what position to adopt towards Russia. Institutional

coherence between EU member states was weak because of a clear divide between Russia-

182
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Leons du conflit gorgien pour lUE: un drapage prvisible?, Bruxelles2,
(2008/08/22). Accessible at : http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/leconsduconflitgeorgienpourlueunderapageprevisible.html
183
Ibid. supra note 183.
184
Wikileaks Cable, EU Special Representative Semneby Discusses Situation in Abkhazia, (2008)
08TBILISI1182.
185
Ibid. supra note 184.

59
hostile and Russia-friendly EU member states.186 Even though the EU reacted in a quick

fashion, there was no homogeneous Europe in the Caucasus conflict which hindered istitutionnal

coherence. Diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks are particularly useful in observing this line

of division.187 Russia hawks Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Poland and the UK proposed to suspend NATO-Russia Council and to issue a

hostile statement in reaction of the Russian move in Georgia. However, a Russia-friendly group

composed of France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain

opposed. The strategies for both camps were clear. The hawks wanted to balance the Russian

power assertion and somehow punish Russia for its full-scale intervention in Georgia.188 The

core strategy of the Friends of Russia was that lines of communication with Russia should not

be broken off.189

The divided reaction among EU member states showcases institutional and vertical

incoherence. Institutional coherence was hindered because no common position was found, at

first, among member states. Vertical coherence was impeded because disagreements between

member states were contrary to what the EU should do. There was thus a contradiction between

member states positions and the stance the EU should have adopted as a credible security

provider. Latvia's ex-president Vaira Vike-Freiberga has told a Latvian news portal she was

surprised and frustrated at the EU's delay in response to the conflict between Russia and

Georgia and its inability to come up with a united, coordinated, and condemning reaction.190

186
Hans Mouritzen, and Anders Wivel, Explaining foreign policy: international diplomacy and the Russo-
Georgian War (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 113.
187
Wikileaks cable, Nato Allies Lack Cohesion during First Meeting On Georgia Crisis, (2008) USNATO
000281, NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2018; and Wikileaks cable, Allies divided down the
middle, in Andrew Rettman, US cables shed light on EU 'Friends of Russia' in Georgia war, EUobserver,
(2010/01/12).
188
Mouritzen, and Wivel (2012), 120.
189
Ibid.
190
Kubosova.

60
However, discrepancies in the EUs response were overcome due to the active role played by the

French EU Presidency.

The Sarkozy mediation rather than the EU mediation.

The EU mediation in Georgia occurred one month after the French President Nicolas

Sarkozy took over the EU Presidency of the Council of the EU. Several analytical elements lead

this paper to argue that Sarkozy played a crucial role in the EU mediation and by the same token

outshined other EU actors thus undermining EU institutional coherence.

By playing an active role, Sarkozy outshined other EU actors. Using multiple contacts on the

ground191 and his good personal relations with both Georgian and Russian Presidents192, the

French EU presidency led by Sarkozy was able to break the ice between the parties. Sarkozy

personally traveled to Tbilisi and Moscow to design a ceasefire agreement. This proactive

behavior notably outshined the role of Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP. Given the

title of the latter, it is hard to believe that Solana only traveled to Georgia for the first time in

September 2008 to observe the deployment of the EUMM. The fact that the EUs foreign policy

chief played no significant role in the EU mediation and was outshined by the EU Presidency is a

sign of institutional incoherence. More importantly, a diplomat currently working for the EUSR

office told the author that no agreement could have been reached without the role of Sarkozy.

The six-point agreement is indeed still considered as the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement rather

than the EU-Russia-Georgia accord.193 This element sheds the light on vertical incoherence since

the EU mediation is more the result of a specific member states foreign policy conception rather

than the outcome of EU policies and strategies.

191
Asmus, 192.
192
Authors interview, 7/5/2012.
193
Authors interview, 8/1/2012.

61
 The EU intervention in August 2008 consequently suffered from institutional and vertical

incoherence. The EUMM appears more as a frantic194 mission rather than being part of a

coherent strategy. The question is now to see whether or not the EU improved its coherence

during the following years.

Coherence between the EUMM and other EU actors and their impact between 2008 and the
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.

Following the 2008 August intervention, EU crisis management in Georgia keeps lacking

of coherence to some extent while its impact is mitigated.

The overlapping of competences of both EUSRs.

In February 2006 was created the position of EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the

South Caucasus. The mandate of the EUSR for the South Caucasus encompassed assisting

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in carrying out political and economic reforms; preventing

conflicts in the region and contributing to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, including through

promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and encouraging and

supporting further cooperation between states of the region, including on economic, energy and

transport issues.195 Following the 2008 August crisis in Georgia, Pierre Morel was appointed

EU Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia to help prepare for the international talks to

be held under the settlement plan of 12 August 2008 and to help establish and represent the EU's

position at these talks and to facilitate the implementation of the agreement of 8 August 2008

194
Bosse, 138.
195
Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP of 20 February 2006 appointing the
European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus. Accessible at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/l_04920060221en00140016.pdf

62
concluded in Moscow and Tbilisi and of the agreement of 12 August.196 Sarkozy in person

pushed for the creation of this position despite the presence already of the EUSR for the South

Caucasus.197 The existence of two EUSRs created unnecessary overlaps of mandates and

competences, stretched existing resources and complicated operations on the ground.198 The

EUSR for the South Caucasus saw his position critically undermined by the appointment of his

colleague.199 For instance, the EUSR for the crisis in Georgia represented the EU in the Geneva

Talks. The presence of the EUSR for South Caucasus, because of a much longer engagement in

the region, would have maximized EUs coherence and impact. Institutional coherence was then

hindered.

A good cooperation between the EUMM and other EU actors.

On the ground, the EUMM had to deal with the EU Delegation in Tbilisi, the EUSR for

South Caucasus and later the EUSR for the crisis in Georgia. Georgia became a real crowded

theatre.200 While having different mandates, there was a great deal of overlap between the

various EUs instrument in the area.201 However, this overlap did not prevent a positive

cooperation between EU entities. For instance, the cooperation between EUMM and the EU

Delegation worked quite well. It was common that the EUMM and the Commission would be

involved in similar confidence-building operations, the EUMM collecting information and the

196
Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2008/760/CFSP of 25 September 2008 appointing the
European Union Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia. Accessible at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:259:0016:0018:EN:PDF
197
Authors interview, 7/5/2012.
198
Amanda Akakoca, et al., After Georgia: conflict resolution in the EUs Eastern Neighbourhood, EPC
Issue Paper, No. 57 (2009).
199
Ibid.
200
Sabine Fischer, EUMM Georgia, 379-391, in European Security and Defence Policy: The first ten years
(1999-2009), ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, European Union Institute for Security Studies,
(October 2009).
201
Fischer, 389.

63
Commission acting as the implementation agency.202 Via the Confidence Building Early

Response Mechanism (COBERM), strong cooperation is guaranteed.203 In that sense,

institutional and horizontal coherences were ensured.

The hard security dimension of the ENP: the EUMM.

Since 1990s, EU actions in Georgia and its neighborhood in general varied from

humanitarian aid to economic cooperation and capacity building. In 2004, the EU decided to

gather all these actions under one policy: the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The

objective of the ENP is not enlargement but avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines

between the EU and its neighbors by strengthening prosperity, stability and security.204 Since the

ENP was enforced at the time of the EU crisis management in Georgia, this paper looks at

horizontal coherence between EUMM and ENP.

It occurs that the ENP has a hard-security and crisis management dimension.205 The adoption of

the ENP resulted in a shift from soft to hard security and crisis management.

The European Neighbourhood Policy will reinforce existing forms of regional and

subregional cooperation and provide a framework for their further development.

The ENP will reinforce stability and security and contribute to efforts at conflict

resolution. European Commission, 2004.206

202
Authors interview. 7/5/2012.
203
Authors interview, 7/5/2012.
204
European Neighborood Policy website. Accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm
205
Fraser Cameron in collaboration with Rosa Balfour, The European Neighbourhood Policy as a conflict
prevention tool, EPC Issue Paper No.47 (June 2006).
206
European Commission, Communication, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, Brussels,
12.5.2004, COM(2004) 373 final, 2004. Accessible at:
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf

64
While frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not mentioned explicitly, horizontal

coherence was ensured because the EUMM falls in what the ENP started in terms of crisis

management.

In this section, the paper demonstrated the mixed picture of the EU coherence in the early

years of crisis management in Georgia. Horizontal coherence was proved between the EUMM

and other EU policies such as the ENP or confidence-building (COBERM). Institutional

coherence was ensured between the EUMM and the EU Delegation but not between both

EUSRs. The next section will deal with the impact the EU crisis management had on Georgia

before the Lisbon novelties.

A mitigated impact.

The EUMM is a CSDP operation that fills a security gap due to the absence of other

credible security providers in the region. After having been deployed in the fastest fashion the

EU ever did thanks to coordination between different EU bodies,207 the EUMM appears to fulfill

most of its mandate. The EUMM action however remains undermined by major obstacles.

A positive functional impact

First, the EUMM managed to defuse tensions on the ground. As the only crisis

management actor, the EUMM exercised its duties in a way that tensions never reached the scale

of a war. However, the first months were mitigated. As part of the six-point ceasefire agreement,

the EUMM witnessed the withdrawal of Russian troops from a great number of checkpoints in

207
The Deputy Head of EUMM, General Gilles Janvier, admitted that the rapid deployment of the EUMM had
been permitted thanks to coordination between the crisis management team, helped by the preparatory team, both
coordinated by the CPCC, in Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Recit de Georgia 9, Bruxelles2, (2008/12/09). Accessible at:
http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/recitdegeorgie9entretienavecgillesjanvierdirecteuradjointdelamission.html

65
South Ossetia and Abkhazia only seven day after its deployment.208 The EU had however to

reinforce discussions with Russian authorities in order to keep the process moving. In December

2008, the EUMM witnessed the dismantling of one of the last Russian checkpoints in Perevi.209

Moreover, EUMM monitors accessed Abkhazias territory for the first time on November 4,

2008 thus recalling the different parties that EUMMs mandate was Georgia-wide.210

Since the EUMM is on the ground, the number of incidents clearly decreased especially in

comparison with the peak of the 2008 war. One year after the deployment of the EUMM,

Hansjrg Haber, Head of the mission at the time, stated that the situation [was] better than

expected, that the IPRM works well and that progressively the de facto South Ossetian and

Abkhazian authorities had a more relaxed attitude toward the EUMM.211 Confidence-building

with the different parties is notably due to the EUMMs main weapon: the Incident Prevention

and Response Mechanism (IPRM). This forum of discussion created after Geneva Discussions in

February 2009 allows regular meetings between the parties (Georgian, South Ossetian,

Abkhazian, Russian, Europeans, UN, OSCE) in order to resolve specific and urgent issues. A

hotline attached to the mechanism proved to be particularly useful to establish a common

understanding of the situation between the different parties.

Second, the EUMM played its role of impartial monitor by countering propaganda from

Georgia and Russia. For instance, when Russia and South Ossetia claimed that there was a

208
EUMM website, EUMM witnesses withdrawal of Russian troops, (2008/10/08). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/96/?year=2008&month=12
209
EUMM website, EUMM welcomes dismantling of Perevi checkpoint, (2008/12/12). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/526/?year=2008&month=12
210
EUMM website, EUMMs mandate is Georgia-wide, (2008/11/05). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/92/?year=2008&month=12
211
Quoted in Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Haber (EUMM Georgia): laccord Medvedev-Sarkozy toujours pas
respect, Bruxelles2, (2009/09/21). Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-
europe-caucase/habereummgeorgialaccordmedvedev-sarkozytoujourspasrespecte.html

66
massive Georgian build-up around the ABLs, the EUMM Head of Mission refuted these claims

on the basis of EUMM evidence and patrolling data.212

The EUMM also countered a simulated Georgian TV broadcast of an alleged invasion of Russian

troops. The use of the IPRM hotline reassured all parties and the EUMM was able to calm local

populations.213

Third, the EUMM convinced all parties to gather around a negotiations table. The IPRM

is one of the two forums of discussion. Georgian, Abkhaz, Ossetian, Russian, EUMM, and

OSCE gather once every month to discuss topical issues. Each meeting is based on the results of

on-the-ground monitoring carried out 24/7 by EUMM monitors.214 Topics of discussion can vary

from freedom of movement across the ABLs to access to education.215 On several occasions, the

use of the hotline helped reducing tensions following incidents. On December 2, 2012 a shooting

incident occurred near the ABL with South Ossetia. The different parties were all informed in

real-time.216 The use of the hotline also allowed the release of detained minors.217

The second forum of discussion lies in the International Geneva Talks. The Geneva Talks

represents the only international negotiating table where external powers [such as the US] have

the opportunity to play a constructive peace-building role.218 As declared by the former

212
EUMM website, Inspections Show no Build up of Georgian Armed Forces, (2009/02/11). Accessible at:
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/1006
213
EU Neighbourood Info Centre, EUMM concern at security implications of simulated TV broadcast,
(March 17, 2010). Accessible at: http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=21073&id_type=1&lang_id=450
214
Authors interview, EUMM.
215
EU Neighbourood Info Centre, EUMM holds meeting focusing on freedom of movement and access to
education, (October 9, 2009). Accessible at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/maineast.php?id=19785&id_type=1&lang_id=450
216
EUMM website, EUMM welcomes use of the hotline to reduce tension following shooting incident near
Koda, (2012/12/3.) Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/3518/?year=2012&month=12
217
EUMM website, EUMM welcomes the release of minors following activation of the Hotline,
(2013/05/02). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/3818/?year=2013&month=6
218
Nona Mikhelidze, The Geneva Talks over Georgias Territorial Conflicts: Achievements and Challenges,
Istituto Affari Internazionali, DOCUMENTI IAI 10 | 25 (November 2010): 6.

67
Georgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Bokeria: The most important thing is that for

the first time we have a format [providing] talks between Russia and Georgia on the problems

existing between us and here we have respected international organizations. That was our

objective for many years.219

Regarding functional impact, the EUMM has fulfilled most of its mandate and thus had a

positive functional impact.

A positive societal impact

The mission, even though stating that it does not provide humanitarian aid220, has

provided humanitarian assistance to IDPs but also by reporting on human and gender rights

violations. Raising awareness about the IDPs situation is also one the EUMM efforts. In July

2009, the EUMM organized a photo exhibition entitled Photographing Home in Tbilisi.

Hundreds of internally displaced children were able to attend the exhibition.221 This project

illustrates how the EUMM builds confidence with local populations.

The EUMM also developed systematized contacts with NGOs and civil society. Even

though the EUMM is not the protagonist of this initiative, the representatives of the EU

Delegation to Georgia and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched the

Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM), a joint project aimed at enhancing

peace dividends and foster a peaceful transformation of the conflict by supporting confidence

building opportunities and the strengthening of local communities, local NGOs and opinion

makers across Georgia.

219
Civil Georgia, Geneva talks suspended, (15 October 2008), cited in Nona Mikhelidze, (November 2010),
6. Accessible at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19765
220
EUMM Leaflet, page 1. Accessible at: http://eumm.eu/data/file_db/leaflets/leaflet_eng_2012_ver_3.pdf
221
EU Neighbourood Info Centre, EUMM takes childrens photo exhibition to Georgian conflict town, (July
15, 2009). Accessible at: http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=19085&id_type=1&lang_id=450

68
 Besides having a positive functional impact, the EUMM appears to also impact positively

Georgian society.

The positive political impact of EUMM on Georgian authorities

A Memorandum of Understanding between the EUMM and the Georgian Ministry of

Internal Affairs was signed in October 2008 to introduce transparency and restrictions on the

equipment used and the activities of the Georgian police forces in both breakaway regions. In

January 2009, the EUMM signed a similar Memorandum with the Georgian Ministry of Defence

thus limiting the positioning of troops and the heavy equipment of the Georgian armed forces in
222
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The signature of both Memoranda certainly improved

transparency of the activities of Georgian forces and thus contributed to security and stability.223

EUMM indicated several times how satisfied it was with the compliance of Georgian authorities

with the Memoranda.224 Cooperation and military confidence building between the EUMM and

Georgian authorities deepened via the adoption of new agreements.225 Consequently the EUMM

has a positive political impact on Georgian authorities.

The paper, so far, illustrated the positive impact of the EUMM. However, the situation on

the ground is not devoid of obstacles. The EUMM is a civilian monitoring mission with no

executive powers. Thus the EUMM is rather weak when facing unintended consequences.226

222
EUMM website, EUMM and Georgian Ministry of Defense sign Memorandum of Understanding,
(2009/01/26). Accessible at: http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/796/
223
Authors interview.
224
EU Neighbourood Info Centre, Georgia has complied with the Memorandum of Understanding says
EUMM, (May 4, 2009). Accessible at: http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=18355&id_type=1&lang_id=450
225
EUMM website, New EUMM agreement with Georgian MoD increases transparency, (2010/07/02).
Accessible at: http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/2216/
226
As cited in Ginsberg and Penksa, 125. Unintended consequences are a gap between intentions and
outcomes.

69
The EUMM, not welcome where it should be.

Unlike the six-point peace agreement foresaw, EUMM monitors have been restricted the

access to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As aforementioned, EUMM monitors entered

Abkhazia for the first time on November 4, 2008 but never did again. In late 2008, Deputy Head

of EU Monitoring Mission, General Janvier was stating that they hoped being able to go to

Tskhinvali, [the capital of South Ossetia] but that it was so far impossible.227 Head of the

Mission Hansjrg Haber recalled that the EUMM has a Georgia-wide mandate.228 EUMM

monitors have been able to enter South Ossetia exceptionally for the first time in January 2010 in

order to investigate a case. However, the South Ossetian authorities recalled that this situation

could not reiterate.229

The Russians are still there.

One year after the deployment of the EUMM, Russians troops were still present in the

secessionist regions. The Russian military headcount admittedly decreased from half from

3,600 to 1,700 men in each military base but did not withdraw totally as expected during the

2008 negotiations. For instance, they were still occupying the Perevi checkpoint even though
230
they withdrew from it on October 18, 2010. However, in August 2010, the EUMM observed

the build-up of Russia missiles in Abkhazia.231

227
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Rcit de Gorgie 9: entretien avec Gilles Janvier, directeur adjoint de la mission,
Bruxelles2, (2008/12/09).
228
EUMM website, EUMMs mandate is Georgia-wide, (2008/11/05). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/92/?year=2008&month=12
229
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Les observateurs europens en terre sud-osste: exceptionnellement ,
Bruxelles2, (2010/01/11). Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/lesobservateurseuropeensenterresud-osseteexceptionnellement.html
230
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Haber (EUMM Georgia): laccord Medvedev-Sarkozy toujours pas respect,
Bruxelles2, (2009/09/21).
231
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, LUE proccupe par linstallation de missiles russes 300M en Abkhazie,
Bruxelles2, (2010/08/13). Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/lue-preoccupee-missiles-300m-en-abkhazie.html

70
Constant incidents around the ABLs..

The simple fact that the EUMM was deployed did not diminish tensions on the ground

and the feeling of revenge obsessing each party. Logically, incidents were more numerous in the

early times of the mission implementation. At the end of the year 2008, serious incidents

emerged and even multiplied. It generally consisted in exchange of gunfire especially around the

ABLs. Several incidents concern the freedom of movement across the de facto borders.

Sometimes however, violent acts are perpetrated in order to kill. In two instances, a device and a

drone were booby-trapped and caused the death of four people. The situation did not improve

with years. In March 29, 2009, a Georgian policeman was killed after a landmine exploded under

a vehicle.232 Three months later, an ambulance driver was killed by a landmine.233

The increasing de facto recognition of secessionist regions.

The sole presence of EUMM monitors causes Georgia to reconsider any violent

hostilities that could resume conflict. Finally, as aforementioned the EUMM presence and its

incapacity to apply its mandate in both breakaway regions act a de facto recognition of a changed

territorial status.

Besides, on 26 August 2008, President Medvedev gave a speech:

A decision needs to be taken based on the situation on the ground. Considering

the freely expressed will of the Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples and being guided by

the provisions of the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of

232
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Violation des accords Medvedev-Sarkozy prs de lOsstie du Sud, Bruxelles2,
(2009/03/29). Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/violationdesaccordsmedvedev-sarkozypresdelossetiedusud.html
233
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Gorgie: une mine explose au passage dun vhicule des observateurs de lUE.
Bilan: 1 mort, Bruxelles2, (2009/06/21). Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-
russie-europe-caucase/georgieunemineexploseaupassagedunvehiculedesobservateursdelue-bilan1mort.html

71
 International Law Governing Friendly Relations Between States, the CSCE

Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other fundamental international instruments, I

signed Decrees on the recognition by the Russian Federation of South Ossetia's

and Abkhazia's independence. Russia calls on other states to follow its example.

This is not an easy choice to make, but it represents the only possibility to save

human lives.234

This statement introduced the official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetias

independence by Russia.235

In 2010, border demarcation works started along the ABLs, especially in South

Ossetia.236 Concerned with this evolution, the EUMM only could recall the principle of Georgian

territorial integrity supported by the EU.

The weak political leverage against Russia.

Observing the non-compliance of Russian troops to the ceasefire agreement, the EUMM

reacted and called Russian authorities to respect the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement in the briefest

delay.237 However, these calls are symbolic but without real significance. The EUMM owns no

executive powers and thus cannot deal with diplomatic problems. The EUMM must rely on EU

234
President of Russia, Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, (August 26, 2008). Accessible at:
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml
235
Clifford J. Levy, Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves, NY Times, (August 26, 2008).
Accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27russia.html?hp&_r=0; and RiaNovosti, Russia
recognizes Georgia's breakaway republics, (August 26, 2008). Accessible at:
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080826/116291407.html
236
EUMM website, EUMM Expresses Concern about Demarcation Works along Administrative Boundary
Line with South Ossetia, (2010/11/26). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/2470/?year=2010&month=12
237
EUMM website, The EUMM calls on the Russian government to withdraw its units from the Perevi
checkpoint without delay, (2008/12/03). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/529/?year=2008&month=12

72
diplomats to hope accessing both breakaway regions. Instead, the EU keeps pointing its little

finger at Russia without really having any political leverage.238

As concluding remarks, the EU crisis management debuts in Georgia are tinted with

vertical, horizontal, and institutional incoherence. Although the EU launched its fastest CSDP

mission which remains coherent with EU policies in the South Caucasus, the division among

member states regarding Russia, the proactive role of Sarkozy at the expense of Solana, and the

overlapping of competences between both EUSRs hindered EU coherence in Georgia. As a

result, the impact of the EU was diminished. Admittedly tensions were defused and never

reached the scale of the 2008 August war, but the EU crisis management in Georgia faces great

obstacles. The non-access to breakaway regions and the non-withdrawal of Russian troops lead

to the conclusion that, by the time the Lisbon treaty entered into force in 2009, the Sarkozy-

Medvedev agreement was not fully respected in Georgia.239 Finally, the phenomenon of

borderization does not foresee an amelioration of the geopolitical situation.

In the next section, the paper will present the contributions from the Treaty of Lisbon

regarding coherence. An analysis of the EU impact will follow and will determine whether or not

the EU impact positively evolved thanks to more coherence.

EU crisis management coherence and impact in Georgia after the Lisbon

contributions.

238
EUMM website, Javier SOLANA condemns the attack against an EUMM patrol near the Abkhazian
administrative boundary, (2009/06/24). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/1533/?year=2009&month=12; and Nicolas Gros-
Vehreyde, LUE pointe du (petit) doigt la Russie pour la situation en Georgie, Bruxelles2, (2010/07/16).
Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/luepointedupetitdoigtlarussiepourlasituationengeorgie.html
239
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Haber (EUMM Georgia): laccord Medvedev-Sarkozy toujours pas respect,
Bruxelles2, (2009/09/21).

73
 As aforementioned, the Treaty of Lisbon aims at contributing to the enhancement of EU

coherence regarding crisis management. Scholars started to study the effects of these

contributions on coherence. As the majority of academic conclusions states, the Lisbon novelties

have a positive impact on EU coherence.240

The beneficial contributions of the Lisbon Treaty to the EU crisis management in Georgia.

First, the creation of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy for the European Union refocused the attention on Georgia. While member

states had a difficult time keeping the Georgian issue at the top of their priority241, the role of the

new HR allowed speaking of one voice about the EU actions in Georgia. Baroness Ashton

regularly visits Georgian authorities, EUMM Head of mission, and monitors and never misses

the opportunity to issue a statement concerning the last developments in Georgia.

Second, the EEAS brought inconsiderable coherence to the EU action in Georgia. The

structural organization of the agency offers better possibilities to interact, exchange information,

and coordinate the action of the different EU actors focusing on Georgia. Geographical desks

were created within the EEAS. They are composed of personnel working specifically for a

geographical region where the EU has interests. The Georgian Desk was thus created and

comprises EU personnel dealing with crisis management per se but also the different policies

concerning Georgia such as the Eastern Partnership. The Georgian Desk deals with an overview

240
Simon Duke, The Lisbon Treaty and External Relations, EIPAScope, (2008): 1-6; Marise Cremona,
Coherence through Law: What difference will the Treaty of Lisbon make?, Hamburg Review of Social Sciences,
Volume 3, Issue 1 (June 2008); Federico Santopinto, The Lisbon enigma: crisis management and coherence in the
European Union, NOREF Report (7 May 2010); Trauner.
241
See Wikileaks, Cable, French Ambassador's Comments about the European Union's South Caucasus
Policy, 09TBILISI584 (2009). The French ambassador in Tbilisi, Eric Fournier, in March 2009, was remarkably
blunt [] in his own difficulties in getting his ministry in Paris to put Georgia on its priority list.

74
of the country thus guaranteeing coherence of action between the different policies.242

Geographical desks are not duplicated in the Commission or the Council. They are in charge of

the coordination of day-to-day services. They thus ensure institutional, horizontal, and vertical

coherences. The EEAS is an efficient player fostering coherence between EU actors in Georgia.

For instance, a European diplomat was telling the author how before the EUMM had to report to

the CPCC which would report to the Council. 243 Now, everything is in the same house and the

exchange of information is more rapid.

Another contribution from the Lisbon treaty is the merging of both EUSRs for the

South Caucasus and for the crisis in Georgia into one single position: the EUSR for the South

Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. While the position was not a direct consequence of the

Lisbon dispositions, it is the HR Ashton who proposed the merging. In that sense, the creation of

the EUSR position is an indirect consequence of the 2009 Treaty. Philippe Lefort, who thus

replaced Pierre Morel who served as EUSR for the crisis in Georgia and Peter Semneby who

served as EUSR for the South Caucasus, also considerably brought coherence on the Georgian

scene. As aforementioned, both previous EUSRs suffered from an overlapping of their respective

competences thus hindering institutional coherence. Lefort deals with every relevant actor in

Georgia and Brussels. While under the control of member states, the EUSR play a role of

coordinator when member states are not willing to step up their efforts.244

From the different interviews, it was clear that an institutional culture emerged out of the

EEAS structural organization. A diplomat from the EUSR office told the author how strong was

the cooperation between the EUSR office, the Georgian Desk, member states, and the EUMM

242
Authors interview, 5/7/2012.
243
Ibid.
244
Ibid.

75
Offices in Georgia. There is a sense of belonging to the same process.245 Weekly discussions

with Georgian authorities enable continuity in the EU action on the ground. A real esprit de

corps emerged among the different EU actors.

The interviews carried out in Brussels with EEAS personnel shed the light on an

increased institutional coherence after the Lisbon novelties. Future EU policies also increased

horizontal coherence. The Eastern Partnership (EaP), which aims at creating the necessary

conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the

European Union and Georgia246, was launched in 2009, one year after the deployment of the

EUMM in Georgia. The EaP states that:

The Eastern Partnership should further promote stability and multilateral

confidence building. Conflicts impede cooperation activities.247

At first glance, the EaP deals in parts with the EUMM objective of confidence-building.

However, the EaP documents say very little on crisis management and concrete conflicts such as

the ones concerning both breakaway regions are not explicitly mentioned.248 Horizontal

coherence is thus not fully implemented.

As concluding remarks, the crisis management in Georgia gained in overall coherence

after the implementation of the Lisbon treaty contributions. On one hand, vertical and horizontal

coherence subsist. On the other hand, institutional coherence greatly improved thanks to the

emergence of an esprit de corps among EU entities. More importantly, the Treaty of Lisbon

245
Authors interview, 7/26/2012.
246
Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Brussels, 7
May 2009, 8435/09, 6. Accessible at:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.
pdf
247
Ibid.
248
Bosse, 143.

76
enabled closer cooperation between foreign policy and technical assistance and vice versa.249

The EUMM has fruitful cooperation with other EU actors such as the EU Delegation, the EUSR

team and the Embassies of the EU Member States. They are also in daily contact with their

colleagues from the EEAS and the CPCC in Brussels.250 This coordination is particularly

important in the EUMM area of responsibility as the ABLs have a huge impact on local

communities livelihood.

Nevertheless, despite an increased coherence in the EU crisis management in Georgia,

the EU did not manage to positively impact the situation on the ground. Conflicts in Abkhazia

and South Ossetia are more than ever frozen.

Are the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus becoming glacial?

The European Union saw the coherence of its crisis management improving with the

Lisbon treaty. This augurs well if the EU wants to positively impact Georgia and overcome the

major obstacles hindering its crisis management. Nevertheless, regarding several aspects, the

situation worsened after the implementation of the Lisbon treaty.

Tensions are still defused but incidents remain constant.

Regarding the situation on the ground, most tensions remain defused even though

constant thanks to the IPRM mechanism. In March 29, 2009, a Georgian policeman was killed

after a landmine exploded under a vehicle.251 Three months later, an ambulance driver was killed

249
Authors interview, EUMM.
250
Ibid.
251
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Violation des accords Medvedev-Sarkozy prs de lOsstie du Sud, Bruxelles2,
(2009/03/29).

77
by a landmine.252 On May 29, 2012, tensions increased at the border with Abkhazia.253 Two men

entered a pub with Kalashnikovs and killed two policemen and a civil. The EUMM offered its

services to investigate the case. Yet, the EUMM is not allowed to enter Abkhazia. More recently,

on May 10, 2013, twenty Georgian citizens were detained in South Ossetia for having crossed

the border in order to collect Jonjoli flowers. These incidents are neither consequences of the

incoherence of EU crisis management nor illustrations of a revival of tensions. They are rather

isolated incidents highlighting the strong feeling of vengeance still present on both sides of the

ABLs. They tell how difficult it is to enforce confidence-building, which is not of the

responsibility of the EUMM but of the EU Delegation. The IPRM mechanism functions very

well and allowed several times to resolve issues. For instance, five minors were released from

South Ossetia after crossing the ABL. EUMM activated the Hotline without delay upon

receiving the information on 1 May and requested the immediate release of the minors, which

took place on May 2.254 Having noticed an increase in detentions of this kind, the EUMM has

been facilitating dialogue via the Hotline with the different authorities.255

Dialogue and cooperation is also ensured with the government. The Head of the EUMM declared

in a recent interview that cooperation with the Georgian government were very good, open and

transparent. Also, the Memoranda were still in force and that the EUMM was seeking reciprocal

agreements with Russia which would enhance transparency.256

252
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Gorgie: une mine explose au passage dun vhicule des observateurs de lUE.
Bilan: 1 mort, Bruxelles2, (2009/06/21).
253
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, Incident Gali (Abkhazie), la mission europenne inquite, Bruxelles2,
(2012/05/29). Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-europe-caucase/incident-a-
gali-abkhazie-la-mission-europeenne-inquiete.html
254
EUMM website, EUMM welcomes the release of minors following activation of the Hotline,
(2013/05/02).
255
EUMM website, EUMM facilitates dialogue via Hotline to release detainees, (2013/05/08).
256
Civil Georgia, Q&A with Outgoing Head of EU Monitoring Mission, (28 May 2013). Accessible at:
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26122

78
Regarding societal impact, the EUMM keeps cooperating with NGOs from the Georgian civil

society. Last April, eighteen NGOs and organizations took part of an Information Sharing

Meeting organized by the EUMM.257 In July 2013, this initiative repeated with twenty-four

participants.258 Information Sharing Meetings improve the exchange of information and allows

for more confidence building and cooperation with civil society. These meetings are also suitable

forum to start new project such as the opening of crossing points and bridges which would allow

more freedom of movement.259

These developments show the positive functional, political, and societal impact of the EUMM

thanks to coherence, coordination, and dialogue with the different actors on the ground. They

however consist in the only positive evolution since the increasing of the EU crisis management

coherence.

The withdrawal of Abkhazia from IPRM meetings.

The impact of the EUMM action is undermined since Abkhazia de facto representatives

decided not to be part of the IPRM meetings.260 The Abkhazian authorities consider that the

Geneva discussions are the only official forum of discussion. The disruption of IPRM meetings

with Abkhazia significantly decreases the impact of the EUMM since dialogue is the only

resource the EUMM can use. Also, the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the IPRM discussions

weakens the EUMM capacity to resolve issues occurring around the Abkhazian ABL. The IPRM

notably proves efficient in bringing a number of people detained on both sides of the ABLs. The

257
EU Neighbourood Info Centre, Head of EUMM stresses importance of cooperation with civil society,
(April 23, 2013). Accessible at: http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=32806&id_type=1&lang_id=450
258
EUMM website, EUMM Zugdidi hosts 33rd Information Sharing Meeting with NGOs, (2013/07/22).
Accessible at: http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/3931/
259
Ibid.
260
European Union, Statement by the spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the cancelled
meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, Brussels, 27 April 2012, A 200/12. Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EEAS_statement_27.04.2012.PDF

79
cessation of dialogue with Abkhazia weakens the ability of the EUMM to apply its mandate in

the breakaway region. The EUMM has made every effort to resume these meetings and has made

proposals that could overcome this deadlock. The EUMM continues to urge for unconditional

resumption of the IPRM and is ready to re-engage at any time.261

The concretization of borderization between Georgia and both breakaway regions.

Regarding borderization activities, the situation intensifies. On May 30, 2013, the

EUMM witnessed the installation of fences near Ditsi marking the separation between Georgia

and South Ossetia.262 The borderization issue was discussed during the last IPRM meeting, on 21

June, as well as its impact on local populations.263 An EUMM official was telling the author,

borderization activities are likely to continue.

Will the situation of IDPs ever come to normalization?

As aforementioned, the EUMM is not a humanitarian mission but still collaborates with

other EU actors to provide assistance to IDPs in Georgia. Even though this paper observed an

institutional coherence between the EUMM and the EU Delegation in charge with IDPs issues,

the IDPs condition does not ameliorate.

The International Crisis Group reported that Other than the International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC), no international humanitarian, development or monitoring organization operates

in the region; dependent on a single unreliable road to Russia, the inhabitants are isolated.264

261
Authors interview, EUMM.
262
EUMM website, Recent installation of fences near Ditsi is unacceptable, (2013/05/28).
263
EU Neighborood Info Centre, Georgia: borderisation and detentions discussed at EUMM Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanism meeting in Ergneti, (June 6, 2013). Accessible at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/maineast.php?id=33385&id_type=1&lang_id=450
264
International Crisis Group, South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition, Program Report N205 (7 June
2010), i. Accessible at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/205%20South%20Ossetia%20-
%20The%20Burden%20of%20Recognition.ashx

80
Due to the inability of EUMM monitors to access both breakaway regions, it is very difficult to

improve the situation of IDPs. The EUMM concentrates its efforts in gathering with IDPs

representatives to gather information and to identify possible solutions.265 Lately, the EUMM

increased the number of projects concerning IDPs. On June 12, 2012 for instance, the Human

Security Team of the EU Monitoring Mission Field Office Zugdidi delivered a presentation at an

IDP school in Poti in order to provide basic information about the EU in general and the

EUMM.266

In spite of continuous efforts and discussion of issues surrounding IDPs267, the situation remains

stuck and progress is difficult to notice. For instance, regarding Abkhazian IDPs, no

improvement shall be expected unless serious improvements in Russo-Georgian relations.268 The

fact that Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and that both

breakaway regions progressively secede from Georgian authorities undeniably undermine the

EUMM societal impact.

The EUMM, persona non-grata in the more and more Russianized secessionist regions.

The most symbolic illustration of the EUMM incapacity is maybe the reaction of

Abkhazian authorities to the alleged biased leadership of Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, the Head of the

EUMM. On April 25, 2012, Abkhazia issued a statement expressing utmost bewilderment over

confrontational position taken by Head of the EUMM thus declaring him an undesirable

265
EUMM website, EUMM Head of Mission Meets with Internally Displaced Persons from Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, (2009/03/20). Accessible at: http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/1155/
266
EUMM website, Presentation in an IDP School in Poti, (2012/06/14). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/3189/
267
EU Neighborood Info Centre, Danish delegation and EUMM discuss confidence building measures in
Georgia, (2013/07/24). Accessible at: http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id=19735&id_type=1
268
International Crisis Group, Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation, Crisis Group Europe, Report
N224 (10 April 2013), 2. Accessible at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/georgia/224-
abkhazia-the-long-road-to-reconciliation.aspx

81
person on the territory of Abkhazia.269 After this event, IPRM meetings in Gali in Abkhazia

were cancelled. The only prospect for the EUMM to have more impact in Abkhazia is to wait the

nomination of the new Head of EUMM in the coming weeks since Tyszkiewiczs mandate

comes to an end.

As concluding remarks, the EUMM has a positive functional, societal, and political

impact in Georgia but to a minimum degree. Admittedly, the EUMM maintains good relations

with Georgian authorities and the civil society. The EUMM also plays a significant role in

defusing tensions on the ground and easing frictions between parties thanks to the IPRM hotline.

However, even with increased coherence brought by the Lisbon treaty, the EUMM cannot

overcome major obstacles that already present before the implementation of the Treaty because

is mandate does not match the reality on the ground. The EUMM is an unarmed civilian mission

with no executive powers and thus must rely on EU member states to find diplomatic solutions.

269
Civil Georgia, Sokhumi Slams EUMM Head, (April 25, 2012). Accessible at:
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24693

82
Thesis Conclusion: Contact between
individuals: the key to a successful crisis
management

The scholarship elevated coherence as the ultimate goal for the European Union to reach.

This study recalls that coherence is not everything. The EU crisis management can be as

coherent as possible, this will not allow the EU to overcome major obstacles. This paper set the

following hypothesis:

Looking at coherence in Georgia, the EEAS and Lisbon Treaty increased the EU

coherence but this does not change the EU impact in Georgia because the EUMM does not

possess the sufficient capabilities to overcome the major challenges on the ground.

The analysis provided in Chapter 4 confirms the hypothesis and leaves the author with some

observations.

One should not interpret this study inappropriately. The EU is still a predominant actor in

Georgia, in part because it is the only one. The EU crisis management in Georgia is an

illustration of the increasing role of the EU as a global security provider. The EU can be a

credible actor, especially in niche security situation. The case of Georgia is a useful instance in

the sense that the EU filled a security gap since no other security players were ready or able to

step in. After a decade of practice, the EU, is gaining experience and by the same token,

acceding maturity in Georgia. As far as concerning coherence, the EU could hardly be more

unitary. In spite of its multilayered nature, the EU managed to act in a coherent fashion. The EU

reaction to the 2008 August war was admittedly tinted with incoherence. However, the EU crisis

management gained in horizontal, vertical, and institutional coherence with the implementation

83
of the Treaty of Lisbon. The creation of the EEAS notably preceded the emergence of a real

esprit de corps among EU crisis management actors.

In addition, the EUMM proves to be crucial in providing positive impact on the ground

and also on the EU itself. The lessons learned after the deployment of the EUMM are

considerable. Despite technical and logistical problems, the EU mission in Georgia serves as a

model to follow for future rapid deployment.270 Led by a motivated EU Presidency, member

states demonstrated great willingness to act unilaterally and quickly. One improved practice is

that a team of military advisers from the EU Military Staff supported the planning of the

EUMM.271 Another lessons learned is that the Operation Plan of the EUMM Georgia is the

most elaborate one with regard to integrating human rights, and may serve as an example for

planning similar operations or missions in the future.272 Regarding external impact, the EUMM

provides positive functional, political, and societal impact. Tensions are mostly defused. The

EUMM gathered all parties around the same table of negotiations and cooperation is ensured

with Georgian civil society.

This study showcases that coherence does not automatically foster impact. The EU must

still work diplomatically to bring something to the table in order to make Russia give in its

policy of intrusion. Right now, the future is gloomy. Five years after the deployment of the EU

Monitoring Mission in Georgia, the six-point ceasefire agreement is still not respected. The EU,

even with the Lisbon novelties, did not manage to overcome the major obstacles facing the

270
Council of the European Union, 2009 Annual Report on the identification and implementation of lessons
and best practices in civilian ESDP missions, CIVCOM 16927/09, Brussels (7 June 2011): 18. Accessible at:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16927-ex01.en09.pdf
271
European Parliament, CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Processes, SEDE (April 2012):
94. Accessible at:
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20120400_csdp_missions_and_operations_lessons_learned.pdf
272
Council of the European Union, Lessons and best practices of mainstreaming human rights and gender into
CSDP military operations and civilian missions, CIVCOM 17138/1/10, Brussels (30 November 2010): 14.
Accessible at: https://www.civcap.info/fileadmin/user_upload/Working_Group/CIVCOM_LessonsLearned.pdf

84
resolution of the frozen conflicts. Coherence is present, especially institutional coherence but

there is no correlation between increased coherence and more impact. The EU has the same

impact in Georgia than before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, even less regarding

some aspects. Finally, the status quo between Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia will

probably sustain at least until the 2014 Sochi Olympics.273

This study falls in with the literature on the coherence and impact of EU crisis

management by applying both concepts simultaneously to a missing case-study. Chapter 1 laid

the foundational reasoning behind both concepts of coherence and impact in the EU crisis

management. While both notions are crucial in demonstrating whether or not the EU matters in

global security, they are rarely analyzed simultaneously. Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on

coherence and impact of the EU external actions. Regarding coherence, the literature is divided

about the definition and the theoretical components. However, this paper observed similarities

across academic studies and adopted a three-dimensional conception of coherence. When it

comes to the EU impact, the literature is flourishing but remains descriptive without taking into

account the specific nature of the EU. For these reasons, this study adopts Ginsberg and Penksas

theory of impact which appeared the most recent and comprehensive of all. Finally, the literature

review showed the need for the case-study of the EU crisis management in Georgia. Chapter 3

provided the analytical data used by this study. After a recall of the institutional crisis

management set-up, the chapter laid down the roots of EU-Georgian relations and the

motivations behind the deployment of the EUMM. Chapter 4 is the analytical core of this study.

Chapter 4 first looks at the coherence of the EU intervention following the Russo-Georgian war

and then coherence of the first years of EU crisis management in Georgia, before the entry into

force of the Lisbon treaty. Then, the chapter analyzes the impact of EU crisis management before
273
Authors interview.

85
the Treaty. The next sections introduce the contributions of the new Treaty regarding coherence,

examine EU coherence in Georgia after the implementation of the Lisbon novelties, and finally

investigate the impact of coherence on EU crisis management impact in the South Caucasus.

Chapter 4 showcases the confirmation of the studys central hypothesis. The last section of

Chapter 4 showed that the impact of EU crisis management in Georgia did not evolve to the

point of overcoming the major challenges the EU faced already before the Treaty of Lisbon.

This study is not devoid of shortcomings. This paper does not leave room for

generalization. This study is particular to the case of EU crisis management in Georgia. It is

difficult to draw general conclusions from the analysis because it greatly relies on the specific

geopolitical context the EU faces in Georgia. Greater coherence might have helped improving

the EU impact in other regions of the world. A second shortcoming relates to the EUMMs

temporal impact.274 The analysis of the impact of a CSDP mission is not fully accurate until the

CSDP mission in question is not terminated. In the case of the EUMM, the mission is still

running. Although its mandate is supposed to end by September 2013 and that no Council

Decision has decided to extend it, it is highly probable that the mission will be prolonged for a

few years unless EU member states do not agree. Looking at the challenges the mission faces

and given the fact that the EUMM is the only crisis management present in Georgia, the EUMM

will be needed for a long time because a sudden withdrawal could create a dangerous security

vacuum. That would be contrary to the long-term objective of the EUMM which is to leave

Georgia without jeopardizing its stability.275

274
Ginsberg and Penksa defines temporal impact as the evolution and effects of an operation across time,
(2012), 98.
275
Authors interview, EUMM.

86
Personal interaction: the real strength of EU crisis management

This study provides an opportunity for future research. This paper undermines the

preconceived belief that more coherence will automatically lead to more impact. Analyzing the

EU action in Georgia, this correlation did not verify. Through this study, what the author

discovered is the real strength of the EU in improving crisis situations: personal interaction. The

author had the opportunity to be in contact with dedicated persons working in Brussels or on the

ground. EU diplomats are often criticized for being too distant from the reality. The interviews

carried out did not leave the author with this feeling. Personal interaction is also the core of

EUMM monitors work. Thanks to their presence 24/7, EUMM monitors have developed strong

links with locals. A testimony from an IDP illustrates the positive perception of the EUMM by

people in general:

The hard time was in 2008, when we were forced to leave our houses, 15-year-old Nika

Javakhisvili, from the Didi Khurvaleti settlement for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), wrote to

EUMM. The conflict created fear in me. [] But when I see EUMM cars going to the ABL to

check something, I feel safer and I hope that with their help I will be able to return to Qsuisi, my

village.276

By showing the EU flag, observing the situation continuously, and paying particular attention to

the impact of the ABLs on local communities livelihood and freedom of movement,277 the

EUMM positively impacted the lives of locals. Maybe strong personal interactions are the keys

to a positive external impact for the EU. Future research should look at this phenomenon. The

EUMM is currently doing a lot to improve its visibility. A Facebook page was created a year ago

as well as a Radioshow dedicated to the missions activities. Moreover, just a few months ago,

276
EUMM website, When I see EUMM cars, I feel safer - EUMM Gori celebrates Europe Day,
(2013/05/20). Accessible at: http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/3839/
277
Authors interview, EUMM.

87
EUMM launched a monthly TV programme in a regional TV channel.278 Finally, EUMM keeps

organizing public outreach events in order to raise awareness about the EUMM presence and

actions. Local populations do appreciate the presence of EUMM monitors. EUMM must

preserve this positive relationship with local communities to hope changing the situation on the

ground.

The status quo in the South Caucasus appears unchangeable at least until the 2014 Sochi

Olympics.279 The situation will probably remain frozen for a long time. Diplomatic channels are

not fruitful in making the situation evolve, and the EU should be ready to stay stuck in these

frozen conflicts. In this context, the solution can emerge from the bottom, where people lie. A

recent statement from the EUMM narrates how friendship can exist across the ABLs between

people with different ethnicities.280 This is where the EU must concentrate its efforts if the

organization wishes more than having a positive impact in Georgia, in other words, to truly

change the game.

278
Authors interview, EUMM PPIO.
279
Authors interview, EUMM.
280
EUMM website, Friendship across the Administrative Boundary Line, (2013/07/09). Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/3924/

88
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Press release/Blogs/Newspaper articles

BBC News, S Ossetia 'war crimes' condemned, 2009/01/23. Accessible at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7847285.stm

Civil Georgia, Sokhumi Slams EUMM Head, April 25, 2012. Accessible at:
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24693

Civil Georgia, Q&A with Outgoing Head of EU Monitoring Mission, 28 May 2013.
Accessible at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26122

EU Neighbourood Info Centre, Georgia has complied with the Memorandum of Understanding
says EUMM, May 4, 2009. Accessible at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/maineast.php?id=18355&id_type=1&lang_id=450

EU Neighbourood Info Centre, EUMM takes childrens photo exhibition to Georgian conflict
town, July 15, 2009. Accessible at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/maineast.php?id=19085&id_type=1&lang_id=450

EU Neighbourood Info Centre, EUMM holds meeting focusing on freedom of movement and
access to education, October 9, 2009. Accessible at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/maineast.php?id=19785&id_type=1&lang_id=450

EU Neighborood Info Centre, Danish delegation and EUMM discuss confidence building
measures in Georgia, October 10, 2009. Accessible at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/main.php?id=19735&id_type=1

EU Neighbourood Info Centre, EUMM concern at security implications of simulated TV

broadcast, March 17, 2010. Accessible at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/maineast.php?id=21073&id_type=1&lang_id=450

EU Neighbourood Info Centre, Head of EUMM stresses importance of cooperation with civil
society, April 23, 2013. Accessible at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/maineast.php?id=32806&id_type=1&lang_id=450

EU Neighborood Info Centre, Georgia: borderisation and detentions discussed at EUMM

Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meeting in Ergneti, June 6, 2013.
Accessible at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/maineast.php?id=33385&id_type=1&lang_id=450

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EUMM website, EUMM witnesses withdrawal of Russian troops, 2008/10/08. Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/96/?year=2008&month=
12

EUMM website, EUMMs mandate is Georgia-wide, 2008/11/05. Accessible at:

http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/92/?year=2008&month=
12

EUMM website, The EUMM calls on the Russian government to withdraw its units from the
Perevi checkpoint without delay, 2008/12/03. Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/529/?year=2008&month
=12

EUMM website, EUMM welcomes dismantling of Perevi checkpoint, 2008/12/12. Accessible

at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/526/?year=2008&month
=12

EUMM website, EUMM and Georgian Ministry of Defense sign Memorandum of

Understanding, 2009/01/26. Accessible at:
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/796/

EUMM website, Inspections Show no Build up of Georgian Armed Forces, 2009/02/11.

Accessible at:
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/1006

EUMM website, EUMM Head of Mission Meets with Internally Displaced Persons from
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 2009/03/20. Accessible at:
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/1155/

EUMM website, Javier SOLANA condemns the attack against an EUMM patrol near the
Abkhazian administrative boundary, 2009/06/24. Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/1533/?year=2009&mont
h=12

EUMM website, New EUMM agreement with Georgian MoD increases transparency,
2010/07/02. Accessible at:
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/2216/

EUMM website, EUMM Expresses Concern about Demarcation Works along Administrative
Boundary Line with South Ossetia, 2010/11/26. Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/2470/?year=2010&mont
h=12

EUMM website, Presentation in an IDP School in Poti, 2012/06/14. Accessible at:

http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/3189/

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EUMM website, EUMM welcomes use of the hotline to reduce tension following shooting
incident near Koda, 2012/12/3. Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/3518/?year=2012&mont
h=12

EUMM website, EUMM welcomes the release of minors following activation of the Hotline,
2013/05/02. Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/3818/?year=2013&mont
h=6

EUMM website, EUMM facilitates dialogue via Hotline to release detainees, 2013/05/08.
Accessible at: http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/3824/

EUMM website, When I see EUMM cars, I feel safer - EUMM Gori celebrates Europe Day,
2013/05/20. Accessible at:
http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/3839/

EUMM website, Recent installation of fences near Ditsi is unacceptable, 2013/05/28.

Aceessible at:
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/3862/

EUMM website, Friendship across the Administrative Boundary Line, 2013/07/09. Accessible
at: http://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/3924/

EUMM website, EUMM Zugdidi hosts 33rd Information Sharing Meeting with NGOs,
2013/07/22. Accessible at:
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/3931/

Goldirova, Renata, EU ministers urge peace on Georgia mission, EUobserver, 2008/05/13.

Accessible at: http://euobserver.com/foreign/26122

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Les eurodputs rclament une force de paix de lUE en Gorgie,
Bruxelles2, 2008/05/08. Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-
georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/leseurodeputesreclamentuneforcedepaixdel%E2%80%99ueengeorgie.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Gorgie: A Gori, il faut un "corridor humanitaire", M.-A. Isler-

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22105205.html

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100
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georgie-russie-europe-caucase/leconsduconflitgeorgienpourlueunderapageprevisible.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, LEurope doit maintenant sengager en Gorgie, dit le PE,

2008/08/24. Accessible at : http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-
europe-caucase/leuropedoitmaintenantsengagerengeorgieditlepe.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Le mandat dEUMM Gorgie, dtails et texte, 2008/09/16.

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caucase/lemandatdeummgeorgiedetailsettexte.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Offres en pagaille pour EUMM Gorgie, Bruxelles2, 2008/09/16.

Accessible at : http://www.bruxelles2.eu/category/zones/asie-centrale-georgie-russie-
europe-caucase/page/16

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Recit de Georgia 9, : entretien avec Gilles Janvier, directeur adjoint de
la mission, Bruxelles2, 2008/12/09. Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-
centrale-georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/recitdegeorgie9entretienavecgillesjanvierdirecteuradjointdelamission.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Violation des accords Medvedev-Sarkozy prs de lOsstie du Sud,

Bruxelles2, 2009/03/29. Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-
georgie-russie-europe-caucase/violationdesaccordsmedvedev-
sarkozypresdelossetiedusud.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Gorgie: une mine explose au passage dun vhicule des observateurs
de lUE. Bilan: 1 mort, Bruxelles2, 2009/06/21. Accessible at:
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caucase/georgieunemineexploseaupassagedunvehiculedesobservateursdelue-
bilan1mort.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Haber (EUMM Georgia): laccord Medvedev-Sarkozy toujours pas

respect, Bruxelles2, 2009/09/21. Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-
centrale-georgie-russie-europe-caucase/habereummgeorgialaccordmedvedev-
sarkozytoujourspasrespecte.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Les observateurs europens en terre sud-osste: exceptionnellement

, Bruxelles2, 2010/01/11. Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-
georgie-russie-europe-caucase/lesobservateurseuropeensenterresud-
osseteexceptionnellement.html

101
Gros-Vehreyde, Nicolas, LUE pointe du (petit) doigt la Russie pour la situation en Georgie,
Bruxelles2, 2010/07/16. Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-
georgie-russie-europe-
caucase/luepointedupetitdoigtlarussiepourlasituationengeorgie.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, LUE proccupe par linstallation de missiles russes 300M en

Abkhazie, Bruxelles2, 2010/08/13. Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-
centrale-georgie-russie-europe-caucase/lue-preoccupee-missiles-300m-en-abkhazie.html

Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas, Incident Gali (Abkhazie), la mission europenne inquite,

Bruxelles2, 2012/05/29. Accessible at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/asie-centrale-
georgie-russie-europe-caucase/incident-a-gali-abkhazie-la-mission-europeenne-
inquiete.html

Kubosova, Lucia, Latvian ex-leader frustrated over EU's Georgia reaction, EUobserver,
2008/08/12. Accessible at: http://euobserver.com/tickers/107656.

Levy, C. Jeffrey, Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves, NY Times, August 26, 2008.
Accessible at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27russia.html?hp&_r=0

McNicoil, Tracy, How Nicolas Sarkozy Tamed Russia For Now, Newsweek, 20 September
2008. Accessible at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/19/sarko-tackles-
the-bear.html

Nougayrde, Natalie, Nicolas Sarkozy est-il un "faiseur de paix" ?, LeMonde, 3 June 2009.
Accessible at : http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2009/06/03/nicolas-sarkozy-est-il-un-
faiseur-de-paix-par-natalie-nougayrede_1201676_3232.html

OSCE Press Release, OSCE Chairman regrets disagreement on OSCE future in Georgia,
December 22, 2008. Accessible at: http://www.osce.org/cio/50525

RiaNovosti, Georgia warns Russia against sending more troops to S.Ossetia, 2008/05/15.
Accessible at: http://en.rian.ru/world/20080515/107490144.html

RiaNovosti, Russia recognizes Georgia's breakaway republics, August 26, 2008. Accessible at:
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080826/116291407.html

Runner, Philippa, Estonia urges EU peacekeepers for Georgia, EUobserver, 2008/08/05.

Accessible at: http://euobserver.com/foreign/26582

Runner, Philippa, EU diplomats fly out to mediate in Russia-Georgia war, EUobserver,

2008/08/09. Accessible at: http://euobserver.com/foreign/26595

Runner, Philippa, EU preparing snap summit on Russia-Georgia war, EUobserver,

2008/08/10. Accessible at: http://euobserver.com/foreign/26596

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Tran, Mark, Enter Sarkozy the peacemaker, The Guardian, 2008/08/12. Accessible at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/12/georgia.russia4

Wikileaks Cable, EU Special Representative Semneby Discusses Situation in Abkhazia,

(2008) 08TBILISI1182.

Wikileaks cable, Nato Allies Lack Cohesion during First Meeting On Georgia Crisis, (2008)
USNATO 000281, NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2018.

Wikileaks cable, Allies divided down the middle, in Andrew Rettman, US cables shed light
on EU 'Friends of Russia' in Georgia war, EUobserver, 2010/01/12.

Wikileaks, Cable, French Ambassador's Comments about the European Union's South Caucasus
Policy, 09TBILISI584 (2009).

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