You are on page 1of 4

What do Chinese

intrusions across the Line


of Actual Control Tell
India?

Pushpita Das
Dr. Pushpita Das is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses, New Delhi. Click here for details profile
More from the author

Share
Tweet
Email
Linkedin
Print
September 10, 2009
A number of Chinese border intrusions across the Line of Actual Control
have been reported in recent months. One such event near Mount Gya in
the Chumar sector of Ladakh saw Chinese troops intruding 1.5 kilometres
inside Indian territory and writing China on the rocks with red paint. The
intrusion was first noticed by an Indian patrol team on July 31, 2009. An
earlier incident of Chinese intrusion in this area reportedly took place on
June 21st, when two Chinese M1 helicopters violated the Indian airspace
and air dropped canned food at Chumar. While admitting that such an
intrusion has indeed taken place, Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor
played down the episode saying that the intrusion might have taken place
because of navigational error. He also went on to state that such intrusions
are not new and have been taking place for years. Minister of External
Affairs, S. M. Krishna, also said that the border between India and China in
the Ladakh sector is most peaceful and such cases of intrusion would be
sorted out through the inbuilt mechanism.
This inbuilt mechanism is the Border Personnel Meetings/Flag Meetings,
which take place at regular intervals. The establishment of this mechanism
for resolving such border transgressions can be traced to the Agreement
on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual
Control in the China-India Border Areas of 1993. As far as the recent case
of intrusion is concerned, it is reported that the regiment posted in the area
under 14 Corps had taken up the matter with their Chinese counterparts
during such a border meeting in August and had also lodged a formal
protest. The Chinese side, however, denied the charges and maintained
that border patrols by Chinese troops were strictly conducted according to
the law and they had never violated Indias land or air space. Despite
Chinese denials, the fact remains that China has been intruding inside the
Indian territory all along the LAC. The Indian Army has reportedly recorded
270 border violations and nearly 2,300 cases of aggressive border
patrolling by Chinese soldiers last year. The point to note is that earlier
such intrusions were frequently reported from Arunachal Pradesh, while
lately incidences of Chinese border transgression are increasingly being
reported from Sikkim and Ladakh, hitherto considered as peaceful sectors
of the LAC.
The reason behind the heightened Chinese incursions has been falsel y
attributed by many to the on-going strengthening of Indian military
capability along the LAC the deployment of Sukhoi-30 MKI fighter jets in
Tezpur, raising of two additional mountain divisions for the defence of
Arunachal Pradesh, the landing of AN-32 transport plane at Daulat Begh
Oldhi, the proposed deployment of an AWACS (airborne warning and
control systems) plane as force multiplier in the Ladakh sector, and the
construction of 27 strategic roads along the India-China border. It is being
argued that Chinese border intrusions are a reaction to these
developments. The reality is, however, quite different. China does not need
any of these excuses to transgress the LAC. It has been doing so in the
past and will continue to do so in future. The unsettled border and these
incursions are nothing but a manifestation of the uneasy relationship which
the two countries share. The slow and steady emergence of India as a
strong power in Asia is not looked upon favourably by China. And this
sentiment also adversely impacts on the attempts to resolve the border
dispute amicably.
China has had serious border disputes with many of its neighbours, and it
chose to resolve those disputes only when it felt that the concerned
neighbour was weak or when the latter acknowledged Chinas superior
status. In the early 1960s, in a bid to demonstrate to the world that it was a
responsible country and a good neighbour, China concluded border
agreements with Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These countries
were militarily weak neighbours and did not have any serious ideological or
political differences with China. Notably, many of those border agreements
were preceded by Chinese propaganda and border incursions by Chinese
troops. At this time, however, China did not settle its borders with India,
Bhutan, Soviet Union, Vietnam and Laos. It even engaged in wars with
India in 1962, Soviet Union in 1969 and Vietnam in 1979.
As is often said, the best indication of strained relation between two
countries is tensions across their shared borders. In the case of India,
China felt threatened by Indias standing in the international forums and
especially by its leadership role among the third world countries. This
feeling of unease was compounded by the Khampa rebellion in Tibet and
the subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959. The strained
relations between the two countries were manifested by Chinese territorial
claims and increased skirmishes along the border, which culminated in the
border war of 1962. As regards the Soviet Union, the ideological split and
Chinas attempt to supplant the USSR as the leader of the communist
movement led to deteriorating relations, heightened border tensions and
border clashes in 1969. Vietnams closer affinity for the Soviet Union
gradually led to the souring of relations with China, which eventually
culminated in the 1979 border war. China could not settle its borders with
Bhutan and Laos, which chose to be guided by India and Vietnam,
respectively, on the border issue.
The second phase of Chinese border settlements with its neighbours
started with the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Negotiations to settle
the border with Moscow began in 1987, and China and Russia concluded
the border agreement in 1991. China also negotiated separate border
agreements with Tajikistan, Kyrgystan and Kazakhstan. Border
negotiations with Vietnam had resumed almost immediately after the 1979
border war, and a final agreement on their land border was signed on
December 30, 1999. Incidentally, the text of the Land Border Treaty is not
available in the public domain. China also signed a border agreement with
Laos in 1992. The point to note is that all these border settlements resulted
only in minor territorial changes, despite Chinas extravagant territorial
claims.
Now, India and Bhutan are the only two countries with which China is yet
to settle its border. In the case of Bhutan, news reports hinted that during
the border talks in July 2005, Bhutan might have relented to Chinese
pressure tactics and accepted a package deal. In 1996, Beijing had
proposed the exchange of the 495 square kilometre area of Pasamlung
and Jakarlung valleys in the northern borders of central Bhutan (which
China claims) for Sinchulumpa, Dramana and Shakhtoe with an area of
269 sq km in north-west Bhutan. China has also been applying pressure
tactics like large scale intrusions by Tibetan herdsmen and also by the PLA
to keep Bhutanese border guards in tenterhooks and has also resorted to
construction of roads inside Bhutanese territory. It appears that Bhutan is
under pressure both from China and its own people to arrive at a final
solution to the festering border problem, but till now there is no indication
that it has been successful at arriving at an acceptable solution.
Intrusions by Chinese troops into Indian territory are signals meant to
assert Chinas growing political and military stature as well as means to
test Indias resolve. Given Indias gradual emergence as a powerful military
and economic power in Asia, China is unlikely to be keen on settling the
border issue till such time India slumps into a period of weakness. Thus,
for the foreseeable future, the India-China border is likely to be
characterised by tensions, incursions and skirmishes, interspersed with
endless border negotiations. Given this, India needs to be prepared for any
eventuality and calibrate its responses to Chinese intrusions.

You might also like