RULE 117 - Motion to Quash

Case Facts Issue Ruling

SECTION 1. Time to Move to State prosecutor Tolentino filed an information charging Tecklo for violation if sec 22 WON Tolentino has the authority to file the 1.No.
Quash. and 28 of sss act (failing to remit employee premiums) info Respondent judge quashed the Information based on Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
1. Tolentino v. Criminal Procedure in relation to the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Paqueo, G.R. No. Criminal Procedure, thus:
The case was raffled to the RTC of Naga City, Branch 23, presided by respondent WON accused substantially complied with
Judge Pablo M. Paqueo the rules re filing of MTQ Rule 112. Sec 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. x x x
150606. June 7, No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
2007. written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
ALO Accused filed an MTQ upon the sole ground that State Prosecutor Romulo SJ Ombudsman or his deputy.[9]
Tolentino, not being the City Prosecutor nor the Provincial Prosecutor, has no legal
personality nor is he legally clothed with the authority to commence prosecution by the Rule 117. Sec. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
filing of the Information and thus prosecute the case. the following grounds:

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
Tolentino argued that he was designated by the Regional State Prosecutor to handle
SSS cases
Clearly, Tolentino has no authority to file the info
RTC issued an order to quash info
2.Yes.
SECTION 1. Time to move to quash.At any time before entering his plea, the accused may
move to quash the complaint or information.
The Court finds that there is substantial compliance by private respondent with the rule above
quoted, as it was satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum[13] that his counsel orally moved
to quash the Information before the arraignment on August 7, 2001. In an Order issued on the
same date, respondent Judge required private respondents counsel to file a motion to quash
within five days from the issuance of the Order. Accordingly, the motion was filed on August
10, 2001.

SECTION 2. Form and Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of Corrections, a random
Contents. drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison wherein the urine samples of 38
1. People v. inmates were collected and subjected to drug testing. Out of that number, 21 samples
Andrade, G.R. tested positive. They were charged with violation of Sec. 15, Art 2 of R.A. 9165.
No.
All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment.
Respondents then filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts
187000. alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Sec. 15 of RA 9165.
November 24, A strict reading of the provisions of Section 15, Article II, RA 9165 reveals that the
2014 accused did not commit the offense charged. Under RA 9165, the offense of Violation
BANAS
of Section 15 thereof is committed by a person apprehended or arrested for using
dangerous drug. In the case at bar, the accused were never apprehended or arrested
for using a dangerous drug or for violating the provisions of RA 9165 but were merely
called to undergo drug testing.
Whether the CA erred in upholding the
RTC's grant of respondents' motion and
eventually dismissing the case based on
lack of probable cause.
YES. The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the cases based on lack of
probable cause and not on the ground raised by respondents. Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a motion to quash, the court shall not consider any
ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. In
the present case, what the respondents claim in their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the
Informations do not constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled by the RTC judge.
The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been only limited prior to the issuance
of a warrant of arrest and not after the arraignment. Thus, the RTC should not have ruled on whether
or not there is probable cause to hold respondents liable for the crime committed since its duty is
limited only to the determination of whether the material averments in the complaint or information are
sufficient to hold respondents for trial

RTC: It is clear from the foregoing facts that the inmates were not apprehended nor
arrested for violation of any provision of R.A. 9165. Dismissed the case; finding no
probable cause for the offense charged in the information.
CA: Affirmed the trial court's Order
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied the motion to
quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be
filed by respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the Information and in the
meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment of the Information without dismissing the
case.

Petition for Review on Certiorari is Granted. The Decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
reversed and set aside.

same facts above SEC. 2. Form and contents. The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or his
counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no grounds
2. Tolentino v. Paqueo, Id. other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Moreover, there was no need to submit any evidence to support the ground for quashing the
Information, since it was apparent and within judicial notice that petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino
was not the City Prosecutor or the Provincial Prosecutor.
As regards the allegation of willful miscitation of the ground for quashing the Information, the Court
finds that respondent Judge failed to cite in his Order the correct paragraph under Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court where the ground relied upon for quashing the Information is enumerated. What is
important, however, is that he correctly cited the ground for quashing the Information.

Section 3. Grounds OCP-Makati issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Girlie Quisay for WON Quisays contention that the officer YES. ACP Dela Cruz has no authority to file the Information.
1. Quisay v. People, violation of Sec. 10, RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, who filed the information has no authority
G.R. No. 216920, Exploitation & Discrimination Act). Then, Information) was filed before the RTC. to do so, is correct. Section 3(d), Rule 117 provides:
January 13, 2016

ACP - Asst. City Prosecutor
SACP - Senior Asst City
Prosecutor
Sec.4, Rule 112
Sec. 3(d), Rule 117
2. Enrile v. People,
G.R. No. 213455. August 11,
2015
3. In Re: Salibo v. Warden,
G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015
Sec.5, Rule 113
Quisay moved to quash the Information on the ground of lack of authority of the
person who filed such information. She argued that the Resolution was penned by
ACP Dela Cruz and approved by SACP Hirang, while the Information was penned by
ACP De La Cruz, without any approval from any higher authority, albeit with a
Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from
the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information.
RTC. Denied the motion to quash. Denied the MR. The Certification attached in the
information has sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112.
CA. Affirmed RTC. Denied the MR. Pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071 (Prosecution
Service Act of 2010) and OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, the City Prosecutor of
Makati authorized SACP Hirang to approve the issuance of resolutions finding
probable cause and the filing of Information.
PDAF Scam. Information for Plunder was filed by Ombudsman against Enrile, Reyes,
Napoles, Lim, and De Asis in the Sandiganbayan for unlawfully acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the amount of Php 172 Million by repeatedly receiving from Napoles and/or
her representatives, kickbacks or commissions.
Enrile filed 2 motions before Sandiganbayan:
1. Urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to
establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail) Note: Ad Cautelam means
with caution or for safetys sake.
2. A supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
Information.
Sandiganbayan DENIED both motions. It ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest on
the plunder case.
Enrile then received a Notice of Hearing informing him that his hearing will be held
before Sandiganbayan. On the same day, Enrile filed his motion for bill of particulars
as well as motion for deferment of arraignment. Sandiganbayan DENIED the motion
for bill of particulars on 2 grounds:
1. That the details desired are substantial reiterations of the arguments he raised in
his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information.
2. Details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
(Note that SC ruled in favor of Enrile to partially granting him the Motion for Bill of
Particulars)
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57
counts of murder in the Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest.
Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) learned that police officers suspected him to be
Butukan S. Malang. Salibo presented himself before the police officers explained that
he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia at the time of the
massacre. The police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his
passport evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on the time the massacre
happened.
CA returned to RTC. Salibo filed before the CA the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus
questioning the legality of his detention. CA issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making
the Writ returnable to the RTC, Pasig City. RTC granted Salibos Petition and ordered
immediate release from detention.
Only a discussion of the difference
between Motion for Bill of Particulars and
Motion to Quash.
elements. In civil procedure, the term ultimate facts means the essential facts constituting the
WON petitioner Salibos proper remedy is
to file a Motion to Quash.
SECTION 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
Although the Resolution finding probable cause to indict Quisay of the crime charged, was validly
made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP
Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein, the same could not be said in the Information.
Aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was
authorized to file the Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that
the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior written
authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati.
People v. Garfin firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite
authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver,
acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.
HELD: The Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case against
her is DISMISSED.
Motion for Bill of Particulars
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a
motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply
vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to properly plead and
prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are
only formal amendments to the complaint or Information.Of course, an Information may be sufficient to
withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details of the
alleged offenses. In such instances, the
Rules of Court allow the accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to
prepare for trial.
Motion to Quash
The remedy against an insufficient Information in that it fails to allege the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense is a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of
the Information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, under Section
3(a), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Its civil case counterpart is a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause
of action. Note that when the rules speak of the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense, they actually pertain to the ultimate facts that comprise the alleged crimes component
plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of
the cause of action insufficient.
In dealing with a motion for a bill of particulars in a criminal case, judges should observe that:
(a)the remedy is distinct from a motion to quash in the sense that it presupposes that the acts or
offenses constituting the offense (or the ultimate facts that comprise the crimes component elements)
are already stated in the Information, albeit may be couched in vague language;
(b) the remedy is, as mentioned, not meant to supply evidential information (or evidentiary facts); and
(c) the particulars to be allowed are only those details that would allow a man of ordinary intelligence,
as may be reasonable under the circumstances, to, again, properly plead during his arraignment and
to prepare his defense for trial. Accordingly, the analysis involved in motion for bill of particulars should
go beyond a simple ultimate facts-evidentiary facts dichotomy.
NO. Petitioner Salibos proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him.
Sec. 3, Rule 117:
SEC. 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
 CA. Warden appealed to the CA. CA granted. It reversed and set aside the RTCs
decision. It ruled that Salibos arrest and subsequent detention were made under a
valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. According to CA, Salibos proper remedy was
a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
MR by Salibo was denied by CA. Hence, this petition.
Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by
mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused
appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from Butukan S. Malang to Datukan Malang
Salibo will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information
and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang
Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these
processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo.

HELD: Petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be
granted. Respondent Warden is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Malang
Salibo from detention.

4. Estrada v. Office of the
Ombudsman,
G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January
21, 2015
On the complaint filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod, the Ombudsman conducted a
preliminary investigation against Estrada, et. al. for violation of Republic Act (RA) No.
7080 (Anti-Plunder Law).
On a subsequent complaint filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman
(FIO), the Ombudsman conducted another preliminary investigation against Estrada
for violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Estrada received his copy of each of the two complaints. In compliance with the
Ombudsmans directive, Estrada filed his Counter-Affidavits. Estradas co-
respondents, on the other hand, filed their respective counter-affidavits.
Meanwhile, Estrada received information that his co-respondents affidavits and
submissions made reference to his purported participation in the so-called "PDAF
Scam." Thus, he filed a motion fully allow him to refute the allegations against him, if
needed. Here, Estrada particularly requested the copy of the counter-affidavits of co-
respondents. The Ombudsman denied Estradas Request (27 March 2014 Order).
Estrada is not entitled, as a matter of right, to copies of his co-respondents counter-
affidavits. Without any MR, Estrada submitted a petition for Certiorari (this petition).
Ombudsman issued a joint Resolution finding probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada
and other respondents with 1 count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of RA 3019.
Sen. Estrada filed a MR.
On May 2014, the Ombudsman issued in Joint Order furnishing Sen. Estrada with the
counter-affidavits of Tuason, Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Francisco Figura,
Gregoria Buenaventura, and Alexis Sevidal, and directing him to comment thereon
within a non-extendible period of five days from receipt of the order.
On May 2014, Sen. Estrada filed before the Ombudsman a motion to suspend
proceedings because the denial of his Request to be furnished copies of counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents deprived him of his right to procedural due process.
Discussion on Motion to Quash is found in J. Brion:
the opinions of Justice Brion and Justice Doromal v. Sandiganbayan - the absence of the preliminary investigation is not a ground to
Velasco quash the complaint or Information.
Nowhere in Section 3 is the "lack of preliminary investigation" mentioned as a ground for a motion to
quash. In a number of cases, the Court dismissed the criminal cases/information against the accused
not only because of the grave irregularity amounting to the complete absence of preliminary
investigation and resulting in the violation of the accuseds due process rights. More importantly, a
dismissal was ordered because of the presence of the other clearly valid and legal grounds or
compelling factors that, together with other constitutional rights violations, justified the dismissal of the
criminal case/information., i.e., unreasonable delay in the conduct and termination of the preliminary
investigation resulting in the violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases; and refusal of the
arresting officers to inform the accused of the charges and to allow him access to his counsel in
violation of his right to information and to counsel during an arrest., substantial amendment to the
Information subsequent to the accuseds arraignment; multiple charges in the Information; and
absolute lack of legal and Constitutional authority of the public officer that filed the information before
the lower court or the Sandiganbayan, the absence of probable cause as found by the Court; and
obvious political motivations that actively played and propelled the institution of the criminal
prosecution against the accused.
Compared with these cases, I find that Estradas situation does not involve any clearly valid and legal
grounds or compelling factors other than the grave irregularity that affected his right to due process in
the preliminary investigation.
J. Velasco:
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan- The lack of jurisdiction contemplated in Section 3(b), Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Court refers to the lack of any law conferring upon the court the power to inquire into
the facts, to apply the law and to declare the punishment for an offense in a regular course of judicial
proceeding. When the court has jurisdiction, as in this case, any irregularity in the exercise of that
power is not a ground for a motion to quash.

Note: The Court DISMISSED this petition. There is no law or rule which requires the Finally, as to petitioners prayer that the Amended Information be quashed and dismissed, the same
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
cannot be ordered.
respondents.

Torralba v. Sandiganbayan - he incomplete preliminary investigation in this case, however, does not
warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the proceedings already had. Neither is
the court's jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely affected by deficiencies in the
preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings
therein and to remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary
investigation, the outcome of which shall then be indorsed to Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action.

Section 4. Amendment of Castillo was charged with a violation of Section(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, in
Complaint or Information relation to the alleged illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite. According to
the Information, Castillo, while in the performance of his official functions as Mayor of
1. People v. Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits to his co-accused by allowing the latter to operate
Sandiganbayan the Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance
(Fourth), Supra. Certificate (ECC) and permit from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed against
Castillo also in relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite. The Office of the
Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of the administrative charge and imposed the
penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension. On appeal, the Court of
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in
granting the Supplemental Motion to
Quash the Information
YES. Outright quashal of the Information not proper Even assuming for the sake of argument that the
Information was defective on the ground that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense,
outright quashal of the Information is not the proper course of action.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It provides
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect
of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be
 Appeals set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman and ordered the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against Castillo. CAs rationale : It is thus
unfortunate that even as Castillo had taken concrete steps to address a problem that
was not of his own doing or tolerance but merely inherited by him, he was instead
rewarded by an administrative penalty even as the very government agency (DENR)
which issued the Notice of Violation commended him for his efforts. If this is not a
travesty of justice, then We know not what it is.
Office of the Ombudsman, in clear abuse of discretion, ignored and did not take into
account the foregoing reports.
Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the same does not charge an offense.He claimed that a public officer may only
be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 if he caused undue injury to
the government or any private person. Thus, Castillo argued that the undue injury
must not only be mentioned in the Information, its extent must be specified.
Sandiganbayan Special Division granted Castillo's Supplemental Motion.
2. People v. Bayabos, This case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school
G.R. nos authorities under Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.
171222 & averments for the prosecution of the crime
174786, February Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine
18, 2015 Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants
were required to successfully complete the mandatory Indoctrination and Orientation
Period, which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.
PMMA were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing
under the Anti-Hazing Law.
Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against
them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused
and, the failure to include in the Information the material averments required by the
Anti-Hazing Law. In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information
charged no offense, and that the allegations therein were mere conclusions of law.
Special Prosecutors claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the filing
of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of
dismissing the case outright.
3. People v. Andrade, (Case first cited in Section 2)
Id.
Random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison.
All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment on
June 29, 2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial and trial on August 11, 2006.
Respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts
alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165 (DDA).
RTC, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial and trial, issued an Order9
granting respondents' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss.
the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the
Whether the Information filed against
respondents contains all the material
of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-
Hazing Law.
into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of
the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
case outright.
Whether the RTC judge erred in
dismissing the case.
given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if
same defect despite the amendment.1wphi1(Emphasis supplied.)
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and
the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an
Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In
such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant
the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment.This rule allows a case to
proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary
appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As
explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, 34 the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its
day in court.
Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where such
right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme
Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.
Hence, even assuming that the Information was defective, the Sandiganbayan should have first
ordered its amendment and not its quashal. Doing so would have saved the parties from resorting to
an appeal to this Court and this case from remaining in the docket of the Sandiganbayan for a long
period.
NO. The Court affirms the the quashal of the Information against respondents as the Information does
not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing.
The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim.
There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry
Plain reference to a technical term in this case, hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1) a
person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or
psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the persons
admission or entry into an organization.
The Court reject the Special Prosecutors claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the
filing of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the
Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a
chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that
the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash that there was no defect in the
Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section
5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the
eventual dismissal of the case.
YES. Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied the motion to
quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be
filed by respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the Information and in the
meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment of the Information without dismissing the
case.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that if the ground based
upon is that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by the
court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment, thus:
Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged
defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion
shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.alawredChanR
oblesVirtualawlibrary
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall be denied and the
prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended information. 26 Generally, the fact that the allegations in
the information do not constitute an offense, or that the information does not conform substantially to
 the prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. 27 Corollary to this rule, the court should give
the prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.
In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an
opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations.

SECTION 5. Rafael Gonzales filed before the Makati City Prosecutors Office a complaint against WON the order to file another information NO. In cases falling under Section 5 of Rule 117, where the motion to quash is sustained on grounds
Effect of respondent Glen Dale arising from the publication in the January 7, 1999 issue of may be separately issued at any time after other than those stated in Section 6 of the same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to order the
Sustaining the Motion to Today of his article, entitled Glad Tidings for Manila Polo Club members, under the the quashal of the information pursuant to filing of another information within a specified period which is extendible to such further time as the
Quash. pen name Rene Martel. Sec. 5, Rule 117. court may allow for good cause. The order to file another information, if determined to be warranted by
1. the circumstances of the case, must be contained in the same order granting the motion to quash. If
Gonzales May 31, 1999: An Information was filed by Makati RTC against Dale for libel. After Gonzalez Arguments: the order sustaining the motion to quash does not order the filing of another information, and said
v. posting the necessary cash bond for his provisional liberty, Dale filed with the DOJ a 1. Motion was timely filed since the Rules order becomes final and executory, then the court may no longer direct the filing of another
Salvador, Petition for Review challenging the Resolution of the City Prosecutors Office. DOJ allow the filing of a new information within information.
G.R. No. dismissed. such further time as the court may allow
168340. for good cause and the May 29, 2002 It is gathered that Gonzalez never asserted the propriety of amending the Information, he having
December Dale elevated the resolutions to the CA via Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Order failed to provide a period within maintained that the allegations in the Information provided sufficient and adequate bases to confer
5, 2006. prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. CA which the prosecution could file an jurisdiction. When the trial court granted the motion to quash, Gonzalez did not assail the same within
did not grant the orders. Dale was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. amended information. the reglementary period. The order quashing the Information thus became final and executory.
GALARRITA
Dale filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense Sec. 5 denotes no other construction than a plain extension of time. The allowance of additional time
charged, there being no allegation in the Information that the offended party-herein 2. A defective or deficient information qualifies the period of filing a new information pursuant to an order, and not the period of issuing an
petitioner actually resides in Makati or that the allegedly libelous article was printed or cannot be the proper subject of a motion order to file a new information. It presupposes that an order has been previously issued, as signified
first published in Makati. for reconsideration or appeal under the by the prior phrase if having been made. As earlier stated, this order to file another information, if the
Rules, hence, not subject to the trial court finds that circumstances warrant its issuance, must be included in the order granting the
May 29, 2002: RTC granted motion to quash. reglementary periods provided therein; motion to quash. The time limitation in the rule was intended to prevent the accused from being
and that the Amended Information would unnecessarily detained at the whim of the prosecution. Since the order granting the motion to quash
June 25, 2002 (26 days after): Gonzalez filed filed a Motion to Order the Public be filed once the court directed the had attained finality, it had become immutable.
Prosecutor to Amend the Information and to Admit said Amended Information. Dale amendment of the Information.
opposed the motion on the ground that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court
to reconsider or recall its May 29, 2002 Order which became final after the lapse of 15 Dale Arguments:
days. 1. Under Section 4 of Rule 117 the
amendment of a defective information may
December 26, 2002: RTC granted motion of Gonzalez and directed the public be made only before a motion to quash is
prosecutor to amend the Information within ten (10) days from notice, and to forthwith granted and, once quashed, especially in
file the same before the court. Dale filed motion for reconsideration. a case where the unqualified quashal had
become final, the information can no
July 16, 2003: RTC granted motion of Dale. CA affirmed upon appeal. longer be amended.

2. Under Section 5 of Rule 117, the order

to file another information must be
contained in the same order sustaining the
motion to quash since the accused would
have been discharged by the time the new
information is filed.

SECTION 6. Order Sustaining This case is also found in Section 4.
the Motion to Quash Not a Bar
to Another Prosecution; This case is about a prior Hazing case of Balindoy a Philippine Merchant Marine
Exception. Academy(PMMA) student.
Balindoy was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. In order to reach
1. People v. active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory
Bayabos, Id. Indoctrination and Orientation Period which was set from May 2 to June 1, 2001.
Balindoy died on May 3, 2001.
The assistant prosecutor found probable cause to the principals Alvarez, et.al and a
criminal case was then filed against the principals. Then the assistant provincial
prosecutor endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the finding of probable
cause to charge the following school authorities, collectively, respondents. The
ombudsman investigator agreed to the findings. The office of special prosecutor
eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as
accomplices to the crime of hazing.
RTC Zambales - dismissed the information against the principal Alvarez, et. al. The
order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Bayados, et. al the respondents filed a motion to quash the information. With the
following grounds:
a. The info did not contain all the essential elements of the
offense
b. NO allegation that the purported act had been made a
prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially
considering that the victim had already been admitted in
the academy.
c. No allegation that they were given prior written notice of
I. Whether the prosecution of respondents
for the crime of accomplice to hazing can
proceed in spite of the dismissal with
finality of the case against the principal
accused.
II. Whether the Information filed against
respondents contains all the material
averments for the prosecution of the crime
of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-
Hazing Law.
I. Yes. With regard to the first issue, the court agreed with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred
when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case
against the purported principals had already been dismissed.
It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto
dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against
the latter; or even the latters acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact
been established
In People v. Rafael, 343 SCRA 97 (2000), the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: The
corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other.
As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.
Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as
accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged
principal.
II. No, that is why even though the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case on the sole ground
that the case of the principals had already been dismissed is still correct is quashing the information.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act,
they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that:
(1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred;
(2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and
(3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge
thereof.
These were not present in the current case at bar, hence the quashal of information.
IN RELATION TO SECTION 6
 the hazing and that they had permitted the activity
d. They also argued that since the principals had already
been dismissed with finality by the RTC
The SPro opposed the motion of Bayabos et.al. He insisted that the info contains
material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential ingredients
of the crime of accomplice in hazing. The prosecutor was however silent on the issue
of whether the info contained an allegation that hazing has been a prerequisite in the
admission to PMMA and whether PMMA is considered as an organization within the
meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
6 days before Bayabos et. al, were set to be arraigned, the Sandiganbayan
issued the assailed Resolution quashing the information and dismissing the
case.
Grounds of quashing the info: The info charges no offense and the allegations were
conclusions of law.
Grounds for dismissing the case: The information charging the respondents as
accomplices could no longer stand on its own since the principals were dismissed with
finality.
Hence this petition.
SECTION 7. Former (also found in Rule 110)
Conviction or Acquittal; Double
Jeopardy. Jugueta, San Miguel, and Estores were charged with the crimes of Double Murder
1. People v. and Multiple Frustrated Murder. They went to the house of Norberto Divina at around
Jugueta, Supra. 9 PM, where they shot at the family members. This led to the death of two of
Norbertos daughters.
San Miguel moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At these proceedings,
one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement that he saw Jugueta with a certain
Hapon and Estores at the crime scene. However, only Jugueta was carrying a
firearm. Based on Fajarillos statement, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie
case against Estores and San Miguel. Thus, upon motion of the prosecutor, the case
against the two were dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to Jugueta.
RTC convicted Jugueta. CA affirmed.
2. Chiok v. People, (also found in Rule 111)
Supra.
Chiok was charged with the crime of estafa, for allegedly taking Chuas money for
investment purposes and failing to pay her. He also issued checks that were
dishonored, which then led to him being charged for a violation of BP 22 (but our
concern here is the estafa case).
The RTC convicted Chiok. The CA reversed and acquitted Chiok for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The CA also said that the trial
court mistakenly relied on the weakness of Chioks defense, rather than the strength
of the prosecutions evidence.
Chua filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA on the ground
that acquittal is immediately final and re-examination of the case would violate the
guarantee against double jeopardy.
Chua assails the ruling of the CA.
Chua asserts that (1) the appellate court's proceeding is a sham or mock proceeding;
(in relation to double jeopardy only - wala
ni officially gi make ug issue sa SC a.k.a
ako ra nagbuhatbuhat, last na ni na
mention sa case)
Whether a reinvestigation would subject
Estores and San Miguel to double
jeopardy
against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a
Would a re-examination violate Chioks
right against double jeopardy?
Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash would not
bar another prosecution. The court rejected the Special Prosecutors claim that the Sandiganbayan
should just have ordered the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by
amendment, instead of dismissing the case outright.
Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a
chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that
the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash that there was no defect in the
Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 117.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the eventual
dismissal of the case. This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded
from filing another information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a
motion to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to
prove that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already
attached.
Petition denied.
Sandiganbayan resolution affirmed.
NO.
This Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto
Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of
appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering
in his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his
family. More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who
insisted they were not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo
Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause
certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a
firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said
circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may
have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because
the same only attaches if the following requisites are present:
(1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment;
(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned.
Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the
real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.
YES. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.
The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double
jeopardy. Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double
jeopardy to attach:
(1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime
charged;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express
consent.
In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a
judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and
immediately executory upon its promulgation. This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule.
People v. Velasco: The State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repealed
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
 (2) the People through the OSG, was deprived of the opportunity to be heard and its
"day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and void judgment of acquittal. Chua cites
the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan to bolster her assertions.
3. Morillo v. People, Natividad, Malong and Nanquil, proprietors of RB Custodio Construction, purchased
G.R. No. 198270. construction materials from Morillo (proprietor of Amasea General Merchandise and
December 9, Construction Supplies). Some post-dated checks were issued. However, these checks
2015. were dishonored when Morillo presented them to the bank for deposit. She made
demands on Natividad et. al., and they issued new checks, These new checks were
also dishonored for the reason that the account from which they will be drawn was a
closed account.
Two informations were filed against Natividad et. al. (one for estafa, one for BP 22) in
the MeTC of Makati City. The MeTC found that all the elements of BP 22 were proved
by the prosecution.
Natividad et. al. appealed to the RTC on the ground that the MeTC of Makati had no
jurisdiction over the case, as none of the elements actually occurred in Makati (the
checks were issued, drawn, and delivered in Subic). The RTC affirmed the MeTC
ruling, on the ground that a violation of BP 22 is considered a continuing or transitory
offense.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and MeTC ruling and dismissed the case without
prejudice to its filing in the proper venue, on the ground that all the essential elements
happened in Pampanga.
Whether this appeal to the SC will violate
the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy.
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need
for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability.
There are, however, cases where the SC recognized exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy
and its resultant doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan: The SC remanded a judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding of
mistrial. In declaring the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno
Simeon "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, the SC found
that "the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and
biased [Tanodbayan] under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the
authoritarian [p]resident to assure the carrying out of his instructions." The SC considered the acquittal
as void, and held that no double jeopardy attached.
People v. Uy: The SC held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
The case against Chiok does not fall under any of the exceptions.
We, however, do not see the same evils presented in Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out
by Chua were in a different case (BP 22 case) and when the main basis of the acquittal is not on the
credibility of the physical evidence but of the testimony of Chua herself.
We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of due process in presenting its case. The
OSG, in fact, actively participated in prosecuting the case before the CA. Certainly, no grave abuse of
discretion can be ascribed where both parties had the opportunity to present their case and even
required them to submit memoranda from which its decision is based, as in this case.
Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice. Chua failed to do so.
NO. The Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of
respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused
therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of
the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not
result in his acquittal.
People v. Salico: Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but
dismissal does tint decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal
terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the
evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or
the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. If the prosecution
fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and
the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant
could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in
such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the
issue of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The
appellate court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of
BP 22 was committed within the lower court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the
evidence failed to show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal
did not operate as an acquittal.
SECTION 8. Provisional Atty. Segundo (Bonsubre) filed a criminal case for Estafa against Erwin, Erico and
Dismissal Ritchie (Yerro) before the RTC. During trial, his lawyer, Atty. Norberto Luna
manifested that there is an on-going settlement between the complainant and the
1. Bonsubre, Jr. v. accused, and they would file the necessary motion thereto. Thus, the RTC issued an
Yerro, G.R. No.
205952. February order giving them 10 days to submit the motion and to furnish counsel for the accused
11, 2015. copy of such motion for their comment, after which the case shall be submitted for
resolution. The prosecution failed to furnish a copy of the Compromise Agreement
reached between the parties or the motion thereto, hence the RTC, dismissed the
case.
More than 2 years after the order was issued, Segundos new lawyer, Atty. Bernardito
Malabago, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order averring that he learned of
the order only on June 7, 2004 and believed in good faith that the case was archived
mainly due to the Compromise Agreement between the parties. The RTC denied the
motions, holding that the dismissal grounded on failure to prosecute had long become
final and executory. Segundo thus filed a notice of appeal which the RTC gave due
course with respect to the civil aspect only of the case, but not to the criminal
aspectfor violation of the accused right to speedy trial is an adjudication on the merits.
It directed Segundo to file the appropriate docket fees.
Dissatisfied, Segundo filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the denial of
his appeal on the criminal aspect. The appellate court dismissed the petition, holding
that the lapse of more than 2 years from the dismissal of the case was enough ground
for the RTC to deny due course to the appeal. Segundo cannot deny knowledge of
the dismissal since he should have safeguarded his right being a lawyer himself, and
his inaction was his undoing. His motion for reconsideration denied, Segundo
elevated the case to the Supreme Court. He argues that the finality of the motion for
reconsideration should be counted from its discovery by Atty. Malabago his new
counsel; that he was denied due process when the case was dismissed for failure to
prosecute since the accused themselves did not move for its dismissal and he was
very much interested in prosecuting the case.
2. Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the
Products, G.R. No. 183994. private complainant in criminal for Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed
June 30, 2014. against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49 of
Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were
provisionally dismissed in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules). Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the
Criminal Cases. Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49,
granted the motion 2004 and denied Co's motion for reconsideration. When Co moved
for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling the criminal cases The
cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. Co filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of
Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. It was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit Co's motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied.
Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme
Court but was dismissed. There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the
dismissal became final and executory.
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Cases were re-raffled after the inhibition
of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal. Uy opposed the motion,
contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality. In
spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order granting Co's motion. When
the court subsequently denied Uy's motion for reconsideration, ] Uy filed a petition for
certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition,
annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16,
2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.
Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the
petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with
prayer for TRO/WPI.
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred
in denying due course to the notice of
appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.
Whether the one-year time bar of their
revival is computed from the issuance of
the Order of Provisional Dismissal.
Under Sec 8 of Rule 117 of the ROC, a case is provisionally dismissed if the following requisites
concur:
(a) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a
provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its
provisional dismissal;
(b) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(c) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
(d) The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional dismissal of the
case.
In the case at bar, none of the foregoing requisites were met. While it may appear that the
respondents consented to a provisional dismissal of the case under the Compromise Agreement, the
prosecution neither presented the same for the courts approval nor filed the required motion to that
effect such that no order was in fact issued granting the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence,
petitioners assertion that the respondents are estopped from invoking their right to speedy trial is
without basis.
Accordingly, the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order grounded on the denial of respondents right to
speedy trial being a final order that cannot be subject of reconsideration or an appeal, no error can be
imputed against the CA in upholding the RTC Ruling denying due course to petitioners notice of
appeal relative to the criminal aspect of the case. That being said, the Court reminds petitioner that
nothing precludes him from preserving his interest over the case but only with respect to its civil aspect
as aptly observed by the courts a quo.
Petition lacks merit, thus denied.
The order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case
having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has
control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot
be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Moreover, if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the reckoning
period should commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually notified of the order of
provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from
the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules
analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be
made upon the latter.
In the case at bar, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the
timeliness of Uy's motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co's categorical
admission that Uy is represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003
Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period
for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the
private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.
3. Los Baos v. Pedro, G.R.
No. 173588. April 22, 2009.
SECTION 9.
Failure to Move to
Quash or to Allege Any Ground
Therefor.
1. People v. Andrade, Id.
2. People v. Asilan, Supra.
Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization
from the COMELEC a day before the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash
after his Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not materialize. The RTC granted the
quashal.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing
Rule 117, Sec. 8 on provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become
permanent.
The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen
the case saying that the provision used applies where both the prosecution and the
accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or
the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation
where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the
objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedros arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTCs
mandated reopening.
The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for
Reconsideration, his argument that a year has passed by from the receipt of the
quashal order, the CA's decision was reversed.
Petitioner now argues using the same argument of the public prosecutor.
This is the case of inmates who were subjected to a mandatory drug testing. After
testing positive, they were charged with violations of RA 9165.
RTC - granted motion to quash of the inmates for finding no probable case for the
offense charged in the information.
CA upheld the RTC
The prosecution asserts that the inmates were already arraigned, thus, they cannot
file a motion to quash.
Inmates/respondents contention is that since the ground they relied on is Section
3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, their motion to quash may be filed even after they
have entered their plea.
Asilan was charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder. PO1
Randy Adovas was handcuffing someone for illegal possession of deadly weapon.
Suddenly, Asilan appeared with intent to kill and stabbed the police officer in the back
repeatedly and then proceeded to shoot the police officer with the latter's service
firearm.
Adovas died. A jeepney barker and a student witnessed the crime. Asilan pleaded not
guilty.
RTC acquitted Asilan of direct assault. The prosecution failed to establish
convincingly that Adovas was in the performance of his duty when he was assaulted
by Asilan.
Instead, RTC convicted Asilan of murder. His defense of denial could not be
accorded more weight than the categorical assertions of the witnesses who positively
identified him as the man who suddenly appeared from behind [Adovas] and stabbed
the latter repeatedly. CA affirmed in toto.
He raised in the SC that claims that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
Whether the rule on provision dismissal is
applicable.
Whether the motion to quash should be
sustained.
the Information do not constitute an offense, is actually one of the grounds provided under a
objections.
Whether Asilan in correct in stating that he
should only be convicted with homicide
because the specific acts of treachery was
not alleged in the information against him.
The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate
concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the
Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional
dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground that
there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of a
motion to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the
basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
Yes. It is of no matter that the motion was filed after arraignment because the ground of the motion is
one of the grounds provided as exception to the general rule that a motion to quash should be
filed before arraignment.
The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss," which is, that the facts alleged in
Motion to Quash in Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after they have been arraigned.
Under ordinary circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed after arraignment because their
failure to raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a waiver of any of their
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. - The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed
a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),(b), (g),
and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the exceptions provided under the
above-provision, the timeliness of the filing is inconsequential. The motion to Quash should be
sustained.
NO.
The SC completely agrees with the Court of Appeals pronouncement that since treachery was
correctly alleged in the Information and duly established by the prosecution, x x x [Asilan]s
conviction for the crime of murder is proper.
In any case, it is now too late for Asilan to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the
ground that there was failure to specifically allege therein how treachery was carried out.
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed
a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g),
and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
Moreover, in People v. Candaza, this Court held that an Information which lacks essential allegations
may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial,
and the deficiency was cured by competent evidence presented therein.
and cause of accusation against him was infringed when he was convicted for Murder,
since the manner by which he carried out the killing with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not alleged in the Information against him. Thus,
he asserts, he was effectively only charged with Homicide.
In this case, Asilan not only failed to question the sufficiency of the Information at any time during the
pendency of his case before the RTC, he also allowed the prosecution to present evidence,
proving the elements of treachery in the commission of the offense. Asilan is thus deemed to
have waived any objections against the sufficiency of the Information.