THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V.

CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET AL
G.R. No. L-28379 March 27, 1929

FACTS
Lots 36, 39 and 40, which are subject to cadastral proceeding of the City of Manila were formerly a part of a large parcel of land
belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimants and appellees.

From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said lots
became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state. On 1912, the Government undertook the
dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low
lands which were completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly
and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.

Nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of the claimants
and appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such purpose.

The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a part of a large parcel of land belonging to their
predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in interest having taken possession thereof, said lots belong to
them.

ISSUE

To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land belong to?

RULING

The Government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion, because in letting it remained
submerged, the claimants-appellees may be said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the sea or seashore, it became
property for public use. When the government took steps to make it land again, its status as public dominion remained unchanged. As
provided by Article 5 of the Law of Waters,

ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private
persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the
terms of the grant of authority.

Therefore, the claimants- appellees are not entitled to the land.

 Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene, Inc vs Hon. Pascual Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481

Doctrine: Art. 422 of the New Civil states that property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. Thus, the abandoned part of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City can
be conveyed to a private person or corporation like Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene.

Facts: Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene assailed the judgment of Judge Pascual Bercilles dismissing their application to register the land
once part of M. Borces Street, Mabolo Cebu. It upheld the argument of Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Espeleta that the land belongs to
the government, not an abandoned road or land, and not alienable.

On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal
portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan.
Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed another resolution (Resolution No. 2755) authorizing the Acting
City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. In pursuance to the said resolution, the lot was awarded to Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene, being the highest bidder. Subsequently, a deed of absolute sale was executed on March 3, 1969 by the City of Cebu via its
Acting City Mayor to Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene for a total consideration of P10,800.00.

Issue: Whether Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene can own and register the land in their name?

Held: Yes. Since sec. 31 of RA No. 3857 (The City Charter of Cebu) authorized the Mayor to close any city road, street or alley,
boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed, the petitioners Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene acquired valid
ownership and the land is no longer under public dominion or public use as conveyed by Art. 422 of the New Civil Code.
 SALAS vs JARENCIO
Facts:
City of Manila owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 557 of Cadastral Survey of City of Manila, containing an
area of 9689.80 sqm. On various dates in 1927, City of Manila sold portions of the parcel of land. When the last sale was effected
August 1924, Transfer Certificate of Title 22547 covering the residue of the land 7490.10 sam was issued in the name of City of Manila.
On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requesting the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the
land under Transfer Certificate of Title 25545-25547 as patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of selling these lots to the actual
occupants thereof. The resolution was then transmitted to the Congress. The bill was then passed by Congress and approved by
President, and became Republic Act 4118, converting the land from communal property to disposable and alienable land of State.
To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City of Manila to deliver the Citys TCT 22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the
name of Land Authority. The request was granted with the knowledge and consent of City mayor, cancelling TCT 22547 and issuing
TCT 80876 in the name of Land Authority.
City of Manila, for some reasons, brought an action to restrain, prohibit, and enjoin Land Authority and Register of Deeds from
implementing RA 4118, and praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional.
Trial court declared RA 4118 to be unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it deprived City of its property without due process
of law and payment of just compensation.
Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that the land is a communal land, or a portion of public domain owned by State; that the
land has not been used by City of Manila for any public purpose; that it was originally a communal land not because it was needed in
connection with its organisation as a municipality but rather for the common use of its inhabitants; that the City mayor merely enjoys
the usufruct over said land and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts thereof did not necessarily convert the land into a
patrimonial property of City of Manila nor divert the State of its paramount title.
Issue:
Whether the aforementioned land is a private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
Held:
The land is public property.
As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the land in the possession of municipality, excepting those which it
acquired in its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants,
whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the same if the State itself holds the property and puts it
to a different use.
When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds (the land was
originally given to City by Spain), the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the National
Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the people.
The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. The land was part of the
territory of City of Manila granted by sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City expressly recognised the paramount title of the State
over its land when it requested the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the lot as patrimonial property for selling.
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the
City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it
to remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of
the City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial property.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with the free and untrammeled implementation
of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents. Without costs.
Advertisements
 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL BULACAN
VS
FERNANDEZ
130 SCRA 56

FACTS:
In civil case No. 604-B the then CFI of Bulacan rendered judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to respondents
Imperio et.al. When the judgment became final, respondents judge issued a writ of execution to satisfy the same. Petitioner
municipality filed a motion to quash the writ on the ground that the municipalitys property or funds are public funds exempt from
execution. The motion was denied. Respondents judge issued another order requiring both the municipal and provincial treasurer to
comply with the money judgment. When the treasurer failed to do so, respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and that they
will be released only upon compliance, hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the funds of the municipality in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel
respectively, are public funds which are exempt from execution.
HELD:
Municipal Funds in possession of municipal and provincial treasurers are Public funds exempt from execution. Well settled is
the rule that public funds are not subject to Levy and execution. The reason for those was explained in the case of municipality of
Paoay versus Manaois. That they are held in the trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishes of the purpose for which
municipal corporations are created and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede, even
defeat and insome instances destroy said purpose. And in Tantoco VS Municipal Council of Iloilo it was held that it is the settled
doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized
under execution against them, either in the treasury or in transit to it. Judgment rendered for taxes and then proceeds of such
judgment in the hands of the officer of the law are not subject to execution unless declared by statue. Thus it is clear that all the
funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the municipal treasurer of San Miguel as well as those in the possession of the
provincial treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution.
Besides PD no. 447 known as the decree of local fiscal administration provide in section 3 (a) that no money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. Otherwise stated, there must be
a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by then Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the
municipality maybe paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this
effect.
Furthermore, sec. 15 rule 39 of the new rule of court, outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money judgment. The
foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar.
 THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,defendants-appellants.
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City.
Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to
another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.
Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high school playgrounds, burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and
Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of
that law provided Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of
Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the
President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that, All
buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.
This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City; that,
among others, Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del Norte of property without due process and
just compensation.
Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.
Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.
Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public property.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the matter involved here
is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is
simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the
property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation.
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted. Now, which of two
norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties
in question?
Civil Code
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial
property; ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be
considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and
the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase public works for public
service for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone,
just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
Law of Municipal Corporations
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50
properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public
education, public health, etc.
Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations State vs. Province than along that of Civil
Law. If municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private property, then that would
mean they can be levied upon and attached; they can even be acquired thru adverse possession all these to the detriment of the
local community. It is wrong to consider those properties as ordinary private property.
Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil
Code is without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of
Municipal Corporations can be considered as special laws. Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly
governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.
VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAEDA, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man
and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:

Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors
stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous
authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition
of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area
as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218.

Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.

Ruling: Petition Dismissed.

It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute
a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and
cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in
dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or
bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not
constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.
FACTS
Petitioners are owners of stalls in a talipapa located in a land owned by the municipal government. They were ed to lease the said land
through a municipal council resolution in 1961.
The municipal government demolished the the stalls and subsequently issued a new resolution revoking the right previously granted to
the vendor. Said resolution indicated that the said area will be a parking space for the town plaza.
Petitioners brought an action against the municipal government alleging that they have the right to use the said lang because the
resolution allowing them to use the area constitutes a contract between them (vendors) and the municipal government.
CFI dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioners to be evicted from the area. But such eviction was not enforced and the number
of stall owners even grew.
After a few years, the municipal again resolved to demolish the stalls
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual rights to the stall owners making them lawful lessees of the land
2. Whether or not the said area are dedicated for public use
HELD:
1. There was no dispute that the land occupied by the petitioners was previously used as a town plaza and being such it is considered
as beyond the commerce of man and cannot be the subject of lease or any contractual undertaking. The petitioners had no right in the
first place to occupy the disputed premises.

2. The proliferation of the stalls caused several repercussions to the area such as
> the makeshift and flammable materials has made the area susceptible of fire endangering public safety
> said stalls have obstructed the way going to the real public market
> the filthy conditions of the stalls has aggravated health and sanitation problems
> the area has contributed to the obstruction of the flow of traffic

3. Assuming that there was a valid contract (and that the land is not for public use), the petitioners must yield to the police power
exercised by the municipal government. It is a well settled rule that any valid contract may be cancelled if it causes danger to the
public.