MACEDA VS.

VASQUEZ, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner
RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of
service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have
been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no
decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under
Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious
act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over
all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it
is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

PNB VS. UY TENG PIAO, 57 PHIL. 337 (1932)

Topic: a lawyer shall avoid being a witness for a client

Facts:

On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine
National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per
annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the
defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in
case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264 and 8274
should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.

Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of
land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.

On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the
property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to
Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net

Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700,
because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the
defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land.

The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent
per annum from August 1, 1930.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in
Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it.

Issue: Whether or not lawyers shall avoid being a witness for a client

Held:

Yes. With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the law does not
forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not
testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case.
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:

When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an
instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of
justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.

IN Re De Vera, 385 SCRA 285 (2003)

Facts:

Quoted hereunder is a newspaper article with contemptuous statements attributed to Atty. Leonard De Vera concerning
the Plunder Law case while the same was still pending before the Court.

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estradas lawyers to
declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

Atty. Leonard De Vera also argued that he was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of
speech when he said that a decision by the Court declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional, would trigger mass
actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II. While Atty.

Leonard De Vera admitted to having uttered the fore cited statements, respondent denied having made the same to
degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.

Issue:

WON Atty. Leonard De Vera is liable for indirect contempt of court for uttering statements aimed at influencing and
threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

Held:

Yes, after a careful consideration of respondents arguments, the Court finds his explanation unsatisfactory and hereby
finds him guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering statements aimed at influencing and threatening the Court in
deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for criminal contempt a person
guilty of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority of the court, or of an act obstructing the administration
of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.
 Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such right does not cover
statements aimed at undermining the Courts integrity and authority, and interfering with the administration of justice.
Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important
public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice.

Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is
an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the
exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence andefficiency of courts or public respect therefore and
confidence therein. In People vs. Godoy, this Court explained that while a citizen may comment upon the proceedings
and decisions of the court and discuss their correctness, and even express his opinions on the fitness or unfitness of the
judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important public trusts reposed in them, he has no
right to attempt to degrade the court, destroy public confidence in it, and encourage the people to disregard and set
naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are said to be an abuse of the liberty of speech and of the
press, for they tend to destroy the very foundation of good order and well-being in society by obstructing the course of
justice.

Clearly, respondents utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law or risk
another series of mass actions by the public cannot be construed as falling within the ambit of constitutionally-protected
speech, because such statements are not fair criticisms of any decision of the Court, but obviously are threats made
against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the public.

Such statements show disrespect not only for the Court but also for the judicial system as a whole, tend to promote
distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to
resolve cases impartially and violate the right of the parties to have their case tried fairly by an independent tribunal,
uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous influences.

MAGLASANG VS. PEOPLE, 190 SCRA 306 (1990)

Facts: Khalyxto Maglasang was convicted in the court in San Carlos, Negros Occidental. His counsel, Atty. Castellano,
filed for a petition for certiorari through registered mail. Due to non-compliance with the requirements, the court
dismissed the petition and a motion for reconsideration. Atty. Castellano then sent a complaint to the Office of the
President where he accused the five justices of the 2nd division, with biases and ignorance of the law or knowingly
rendering unjust judgments. He accused the court of sabotaging the Aquino administration for being Marcos
appointees, and robbing the Filipino people genuine justice and democracy. He also said that the SC is doing this to
protect the judge who was impleaded in the petition and for money reasons. He alleges further that the court is too
expensive to be reached by ordinary men. The court is also inconsiderate and overly strict and meticulous. When asked
to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, Castellano said that the complaint was constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the justices concerned. He also said that the
justices have no jurisdiction over his act and that they should just answer the complaint. The SC found him guilty of
contempt and improper conduct and ordered to pay P1, 000 or imprisonment of 15 days, and to suffer six months
suspension.

Issue: Whether or not the Atty. Castellanos acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Held: Yes. The court found his comments scurrilous and contumacious. He went beyond the bounds of constructive
criticism. What he said are not relevant to the cause of his client. They cast aspersion on the Courts integrity as a
neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies before it.

The explanation of Castellano in his negligence in the filing of the petition for certiorari did not render his negligence
excusable. It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members
of the Court, but his inexcusable negligence and incompetence.
As an officer of the court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep
the confidence of his client.

Also, with the complaint he filed, the most basic tenet of the system of government separation of power - has been
lost. He should know that not even the President of the Philippines can pass judgment on any of the Courts acts.

QUILBAN VS. ROBINOL, 171 SCRA 768 (1989)

Facts: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative complaint before this Court requesting the
invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75000 and praying that the court exercise its power to discipline
over members of the bar unworthy to practice law. In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by
complainants to appeal their case to the CA after they had lost in the lower court. The agreement as to the attorneys
fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of the decision of the lower Courts decision, they will give him a
portion of the property subject matter of the litigation. There was confusion as to payment and they want the lawyers to
be disciplined for the said actions of the lawyers engaged in their complaint. It is equally true that the Court cannot pass
judgment on complainants pleas that the amount deposited by respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be
ventilated in an ordinary action that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his possession
for himself but he is holding it until the fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its satisfaction because of the
complainants refusal to pay him.

Issue: WON Atty. Robinol is unworthy to practice law.

Held: Atty. Robinol has, in fact been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to
continue in the practice of his profession. After the CA had rendered a decision favorable to his clients and he had
received the latte rs funds, suddenly he had change of mind and decided to convert a portion of the land equivalent to
that of each plaintiffs to P50000 which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no
right to unilaterally appropriate his clients money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also
because under the circumstances it was highly unjust for him to do so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely
eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas per family with which after having seen the
color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them. The principle of quantum merit applies if a lawyer is employed
without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his
services, as much as he has earned. In this case however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of
compensation. The implied assumpsit on quantum merit therefore is inapplicable.

HORNILLA VS. SALUNAT, 405 SCRA 220 (2003)

Benedicto Hornilla and Federico Ricafort were members of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). In
1997, they accused the Board of Directors of PPSTA of unlawfully spending the funds of PPSTA. However, since the
PPSTA was not initiating a complaint against the Board of Directors, the two then filed a suit on behalf of PPSTA against
the Board of PPSTA.

In the said suit, the Board of Directors were represented by Atty. Ernesto Salunat. Hornilla et al were against the legal
representation being made by Salunat for and on behalf of the Board of Directors because of the fact that Salunat is part
of the ASSA Law Offices. And the ASSA Law Offices happen to be the retained law firm of the PPSTA. In short, Hornilla et
al alleged that there is conflict of interests.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is conflict of interest.

HELD: Yes. The suit filed by Hornilla et al against the Board of PPSTA is a derivative suit. Where corporate directors have
committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or
unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder (in this case a member because PPSTA is non-stock) may
sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the
wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders. In such a case, even though it was the
members who filed the case and not the corporation itself, the real party in interest is still the corporation (PPSTA) and
the suing members (Hornilla et al) are only the nominal party.

Therefore, since it is the corporation suing, Salunat cannot represent the Board Members of PPSTA because he is a
member of ASSA Law Office which is the retained law firm of PPSTA. Surely, there is conflict of interest in him
representing the Board while his law office represents the corporation. Salunat was admonished by the Supreme Court.

PACANA VS. PASCUAL LOPEZ, AC No. 8243 (2004)

FACTS

Pacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). Multitel was besieged by demand
letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. Pacana earned the ire of
Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed
as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed
its name to Precedent.

Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization
where Pacana and his wife were also active members. From then on, they constantly communicated, with the former
disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice
to Pacana and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client
relationship was established between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that time.
There was an attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didnt push through.

After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez asking for the return and immediate
settlement of the funds invested by Lopezs clients in Multitel. Lopez explained that she had to send it so that her clients
defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them and assured Pacana that there
was nothing to worry about.

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel
investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts, first 900,000; then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even
when Pacana went to the states, they continued communicating and he continued sending her money for the case.

Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was advised by his family to hire another lawyer.
When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer.

------------

I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen
is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will
sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work.

-----------

Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to
work with your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! ----

Candy
When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing
to give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. This never happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacanas
repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him.

Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred her.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting interests.

HELD: Yes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after full disclosure of the facts.

Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with Pacana, who, at that time, was
beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client
relationship. Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the
assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations," precisely because at the
time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been
referred to her by the SEC.

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have done was either to advise Pacana to
engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting
as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both
because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacanas hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by
soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon Pacana that she had acted with utmost
sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But
simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that
she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel.