Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55

www.elsevier.com/locate/sigpro

Review
Explosives detection systems (EDS) for
aviation security
Sameer Singh , Maneesha Singh
PANN Research, Department of Computer Science, University of Exeter, Prince of Wales Road, Exeter, Devon EX4 4PT, UK
Received 21 January 2002; received in revised form 3 June 2002

Abstract

The detection of explosives and illicit material for the purposes of aviation security is an important area for preventing
terrorism and smuggling. A number of di-erent methods of explosive detection have been developed in the past that can
detect such material from a very small up to a very large quantity. For the purposes of aviation security, the checks are
performed on passengers, their carry on luggage, checked baggage, and cargo containers. Similar technology is used in
post-o2ces for detecting dangerous substances in mail. In this paper we review some of these technologies and in particular
discuss the application of computers for the analysis of data and images generated from security equipment.
? 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Explosives; Security; Screening; Signal processing; Pattern recognition

1. Aviation security The 9rst line of defence is based on police intelli-

The aviation security programmes are based on
three principles [88]: (i) Every reasonable e-ort
should be made to deny the terrorist access to civil avi-
ation facilities. (ii) In the event that the terrorist pen-
etrate the 9rst line of defence, they should encounter
a system of explosivesweapons detection devices
and procedures that will prevent further penetration
into aviation facilities. (iii) If a device evades the step
two, then the aircraft structure and systems must be
hardened to the maximum extent feasible to negate a
blast and minimise damage providing a higher prob-
ability of survivability of passengers and property.
Corresponding author. Department of Computer Science,
School of Engineering and Computer Science, Harrison Build-
ing, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX4 4QF, UK. Tel.:
+44-1392-264061; fax: +44-1392-264-053.
E-mail address: s.singh@exeter.ac.uk (S. Singh).
gence to deny suspected terrorists from using aviation
facilities. The second barrier of security inspection
is the most important guard against the carrying of
dangerous materials on board a plane whereas the
third barrier is simply a damage control mechanism.
In this paper we discuss the prevention mechanism
denying explosive materials getting on board a plane
through security screening. In particular, we discuss
the various techniques that are available or being re-
searched to detect explosives and drugs. In addition,
we also discuss the research into signal process-
ing of data collected from di-erent methods espe-
cially using pattern recognition and image processing
techniques.
The large number of airline bombings shows the
real threat to the air passenger travel. From 1985 to
1997, eight commercial aircrafts were lost or damaged
due to suspected terrorist bombings and about 1100
people died in these tragedies [83]. The following

0165-1684/03/$ - see front matter ? 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 1 6 5 - 1 6 8 4 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 3 9 1 - 2
32 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
incidents were caused as a result of explosions within
aircrafts.
1. On June 23, 1985, Air India Boeing 747 crashed
into the sea as a result of the explosion in the cargo
hold.
2. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air Jight 858
was destroyed in Jight from an explosive device inside
the cabin.
3. On December 21, 1988, PanAm Jight 103 was
destroyed by a 12 ounce bomb hidden in a portable
radio over Lockerbie, Scotland.
4. On September 19, 1989 an UTA Jight was de-
stroyed over the Sahara from an explosion in the for-
ward cargo component of a DC-10 aircraft.
5. On November 27, 1989, an Avianca Boeing 727
was destroyed by an explosive device in the cabin.
6. On July 17, 1984, an Alas Chiricanas Airline
EMB-110 crashed from a bomb explosion in the cabin
during a Jight from Colon City to Panama City.
7. On December 11, 1994 a Philippine Airlines
Boeing 727 was attacked in Jight from a bomb explo-
sion in the cabin.
8. On July 9, 1997, an explosive device in the
passenger cabin detonated on a Transporte Aereo Mer-
cosur Fokker 100 during the Jight.
In addition, on the morning of September 11, 2001,
in a mission allegedly masterminded by Al-Qaida
network, terrorists hijacked four commercial US air-
planes. The hijackers crashed two of the planes into
the 110-story twin towers of the World Trade Center
in New York City, destroying the towers; another into
the Pentagon in Washington, DC; and the fourth plane
into a 9eld in Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania.
Nearly 3500 people died as a result of this attack.
As a result of serious breaches of security in the
recent past, research into advanced screening equip-
ment and associated technologies has become a pri-
ority. Of most concern is detecting explosives in both
checked and early-on baggage [24,78]. Other tech-
niques relate to monitoring passengers for weapons as
they transit the terminal building, especially crowds
gathered at the metal detectors and X-ray machines.
As the technology has become smarter at detect-
ing illegal objects, so have the methods to disguise
such material. Following the September 11th attack,
Dillinghams testimony [22] was provided before the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion, US Senate to discuss security concerns with: (i)
aviation-related computer systems; (ii) airport access
controls and (iii) passenger and carry-on luggage
screening including how the USA di-ers from other
countries.
This committee had earlier reported in the year 2000
that there were several weaknesses found with screen-
ers in tests in the USA. In 1987, screeners missed 20%
of potentially dangerous objects and recent tests ap-
proximating real threats showed that the performance
degrades even further. The main problem is because
of less experienced sta-, large turnover because of
low wages, limited bene9ts, and repetitive nature of
the work. In addition, the amount of work at airports
makes it impossible to check every bag (over 2 mil-
lion passengers and their bags must be checked per
day in USA alone).
Air carriers can use their own employees to con-
duct screening activities but mostly they hire security
companies to perform screening. In the USA, Fed-
eral Aviation Authority (FAA) monitors the perfor-
mance of screeners by periodically testing them with
FAA special agents posing as passengers. Two impor-
tant reasons explain why screeners fail: rapid screener
turnover and inadequate attention to human factors.
From May 1998 to April 1999, screener turnover av-
eraged 126% in 19 major airports in the USA, 200%
at 9ve airports and one with a turnover of 416%. This
is attributed to low wages and minimal bene9ts for
screeners. Generally, screeners are paid at the minimal
wage with a starting salary of $6.00/h or lessactually
wages at fast food restaurants are much higher. The
demands of the job also a-ect performance. The du-
ties are repetitive and too little attention is given to
factors such as: (a) improving individuals aptitudes
for e-ectively performing screener duties; (b) the suf-
9ciency of the training provided to screeners and how
well they comprehend it; and (c) the monotony of the
job and distractions that reduce screeners vigilance.
FAA has been recommended to use threat-projection
systems that place images of dangerous objects on the
monitors of X-ray machines to keep scanners alert and
monitor their performanceand a certi9cation pro-
gram to make screening companies accountable for
the training and performance of the screeners that
they employ. The threat-projection systems are useful
as they monitor screener performance, and help train
them to identify more di2cult objects for the future.
It is expected that FAA will deploy this technology in
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
airports by 2003 and also more FAA security screen-
ers will be used.
Dillingham [22] also compares the di-erences in
screening between USA and 9ve other countries
(Belgium, Canada, France, Netherlands and UK).
The main conclusions were: (a) Screening operations
in most countries, Belgium, Netherlands and UK,
were more stringent, where they routinely touch or
pat down passengers in response to metal detector
alarms. In these countries only ticketed passengers go
through the screening checkpoints thereby reducing
the number of people checked. Also countries such
as UK and Belgium have higher police presence at
airports. (ii) Screener quali9cations are more inten-
sive. For example, Belgium requires that screeners
be citizens, France requires them to be EC citizens,
Netherlands requires them to be a resident for at least
5 years. Also the amount of training is more in some
European countries. For example, FAA requires only
12 h of classroom training but Belgium, Canada,
France and the Netherlands require more. France re-
quires 60 h of training and Belgium requires at least
40 h of training with an additional 16 24 h for each
activity. (iii) Screeners get more bene9ts in other
countries. In Netherlands they get a minimum of
$7.50 (30% higher than fast food shop wages in that
country), in Belgium they get $14/h. The turnover
rates in these countries are 50% or lower in these
countries. (iv) The screening responsibility rests with
airport authority or with the government. The airports
can in turn hire screening companies to perform se-
curity checks. Out of 102 countries with international
airports, except for Canada and Bermuda, every other
country places screening responsibility with the air-
port or government. From these 9ndings, it is clear
that much more needs to be done both on research
and on training of personnel.
There is no doubt that security screening provides
a barrier in the 9ght against terrorism and smuggling.
The recent tragedies have provided a new impetus
for renewed and more intensive research in the area
of using computers and advanced security screening
equipment for human and luggage checking. In this re-
view we present recent technologies in this vital area.
This paper is laid out as follows. First we discuss the
security screening technologies used at airports and
those under research. The issues related to the use of
computers for security screening and the training of
33
screeners is discussed next. Finally, we discuss some
of the research issues for the future of aviation se-
curity, in particular the automation of the screening
process.
2. Security screening technologies
Security screening technologies are used to either
inspect passengers or their luggage. Screening of
people walking through portals requires sophisticated
technology. A screening solution must not only be ac-
curate, but also publicly acceptable [84]. In terms of
what should be reported by a screening system and its
performance characteristics, certain guidelines have
been set by aviation authority [42]. In particular, the
screening equipment should report the following [82]:
(i) Type of illicit material.
(ii) The minimum quantity (mass).
(iii) The object shape (bulk, sheet, thickness, etc.).
(iv) The location of the illicit material in the bag.
Hallowell [46] discusses a number of research issues
related to screening airline passengers. It is quite com-
mon for explosives, weapons or drugs to be concealed
with the passenger. Unfortunately, a number of tech-
nologies that can be used for scanning luggage cannot
be used for screening passengers for health reasons.
While strip-searching is one of the best methods, it
is not always possible to search everywhere. Popular
methods to date include walk-through metal detectors,
metal detector hand wands and pat down searches.
An ideal portal would be able to screen a person for
weapons, drugs or explosives in real time without im-
peding the tra2c Jow. The current research on portal
development focuses on: (i) enhancing the e2ciency
of metal detectors in portals; (ii) development of posi-
tion discrimination capability of concealed weapons;
and (iii) expansion of portal detection capabilities
to include explosives and/or drugs. The emerging
technologies are based on either imaging or trace
detection. Imaging technologies can see through
the clothing and produce an image of the human body
and concealed items underneath. The images can be
manipulated for improving their quality to assist
human operators. Some examples of imaging tech-
nologies used include X-ray systems, millemetre
wave systems, and dielectric portal development (mi-
crowave). Anomaly detectors can be used to give
34 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
information on the presence of an object, its size and
location without producing an image. Trace detec-
tion, on the other hand, samples air or material from
the clothing or bodies of people to perform a chemi-
cal analysis of the sample to detect target substance.
Trace detection technologies include ion mobility
spectrometry, chemiluminescence, electron capture
detection, electrochemistry and olfaction.
For luggage inspection, the two major subprograms
in the aviation security are bulk detection and vapour
detection. Unlike bulk detection that aim to detect
large quantities of explosives, vapour detectors look
for very small quantities, less than a microgram. Hy-
drogen, nitrogen, carbon and oxygen are the main
components in an explosive. Even a small quantity of
vapours escaping from these explosives in small quan-
tities can be detected using techniques including ion
mobility, electron capture, mass spectroscopy, olfac-
tion, bio-technology and surface acoustic waves.
In order to detect contraband, it is important to
understand their characteristics. Gozani [40] lists the
properties that are of greatest interest in identifying
both drugs and explosives. For example, drugs have
following constituents: carbon (high), oxygen (low),
chlorine (moderate), and density (moderate). On the
other hand for explosives we get: carbon (moderate),
nitrogen (high/moderate), oxygen (very high/high)
and density (very high) [35]. Nitrogen-based explo-
sives, rich in nitrogen (bonding agent) and oxygen
(oxidising agent), are commonly used due to their
high power. The explosives also contain carbon and
sometimes hydrogen as fuel. Usually, explosive de-
vices consist of two main components: an explosive
agent and a detonating system. The blasting material
consists primarily of inorganic nitrates and carbona-
ceous fuels and the detonators are made of metallic
tubes or shells with an initiating explosive. In the
case of plastic explosives, they can self-detonate due
to their unstable nature. There are more than 100
types of military and civilian explosives and around
20 commonly used drugs. A number of explosive
characteristics can be used for their detection [52].
(i) Geometry: The presence of a metallic detonator
and associated wires can be detected using image
shape analysis.
(ii) Material density: Explosive material is more
dense than most organic material but not as
dense as metals.
(iii) Elemental composition: It was originally pro-
posed that the presence of high concentrations
of nitrogen is necessary to indicate the presence
of a nitrogen-based explosive. However, it has
been realised that multi-element analysis is the
best way to lower false alarm rates. Its presence
combined with high oxygen concentration can be
used to determine explosives. Some explosives
can be picked up by analysing high concentra-
tions of chlorine. Also, narcotics such as hero-
ine or cocaine are in chloride form. Narcotics are
poor in nitrogen and oxygen but rich in carbon
and hydrogen. Their density is not much di-erent
from other organic material and vapour emission
analysis can be used to detect them.
(iv) Vapour emissions: Nitrogen can be detected in
a vapour sample.
There are a number of methods used in the detec-
tion of explosives in airport luggage including X-ray
techniques including scatter, dual energy and trans-
mission imaging, X-ray-based computed tomography
[94], vapour detection [17], quadrupole resonance
analysis [89], and nuclear techniques [39]. The fol-
lowing sections detail a number of technologies used
for explosives detection. Considering the overwhelm-
ing use of X-ray and neutron technology for aviation
security, our review presents them in more detail. In
our discussion we assume that the luggage can be
imaged thoroughlyfor a review of techniques
where luggage is available from only one side, e.g.
an unattended bag against the wall, please see
Hussein and [52].
2.1. Bulk detection systems
A number of techniques based on X-rays, gamma
rays, electromagnetic 9eld, and millimetre waves have
been employed for detecting weapons and explosives
[10]. The techniques for explosive detection are de-
tailed below.
2.1.1. X-ray-based screening
The physical principles of X-ray interactions can
be used to interpret the results to deduce the type of
materials present [96]. X-ray detection methods are
the most common means to inspect luggage at the
airport for the following reasons: (i) X-ray tech-
nology can help to provide information on the object
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
density d and the e-ective atomic number Ze- . The
e-ective atomic number is the estimate of the hypo-
thetical single element that will give the same X-ray
attenuation as the substance being evaluated. Theo-
retically, an objects material type can be uniquely
determined using its density and Ze- [27]; (ii) X-ray
technology has been developed for over a century;
(iii) X-ray technology is safer to human beings and
contents inside the luggage than for example nuclear
magnetic resonance; (iv) X-ray physics is well un-
derstood; and (v) they are less expensive and easy to
operate than neutron-based methods.
The following are important considerations for the
deployment of X-ray technology at airports [37].
(i) The devices vary in their ability to detect types,
quantities and shapes of explosives. Nowadays
explosives can be hidden and modi9ed in a vari-
ety of ways so a simple analysis of shape or type
is not very productive.
(ii) Explosive detection devices typically produce a
number of false alarms that must be resolved
either by human intervention or technical means.
Given that there are millions of bags processed
every day, even modest false alarm rates could
lead to thousands of items requiring additional
security.
(iii) The devices depend on human operators to re-
solve alarms. It can require for the operators to
either inspect computer images more closely or
actually hand search the item. The higher the
false alarm rate, the more the system depends on
human operators. This has consequences for op-
erator training.
(iv) Laboratory test performances of several equip-
ment is much better than their real life perfor-
mances [103]. For example, the FAA certi9ed
CTX5000 did not perform as well in operational
testing at two airports [37].
A number of di-erent X-ray techniques are used
for security screening. Amongst the most popular
methods are conventional transmission imaging, dual
energy X-ray, scatter imaging and 3D imaging. The
principles behind these methods are described below.
Conventional transmission X-ray. X-ray technol-
ogy is extensively used in the aviation industry for
contraband detection [79]. In standard transmission
X-ray, the equipment measures how many X-ray pho-
tons were removed from an illuminating beam at each
35
location of the bag. It does not matter how the X-ray
is removed from the pencil beam. Hence, the atomic
cross-section determines the attenuation at any loca-
tion in the transmission image and is the total X-ray
interactive cross-sectionthe sum of the photoelectric
and the scattering cross-section. Conventional X-ray
screening systems measure the attenuated X-ray en-
ergy after it has passed through a scanned object [61].
The standard airport hand-baggage scanner has a
fan shaped or scanning X-ray beam whose absorption
is measured by a line of detectors, and a high-quality
image derived from the degree of absorption is pro-
duced. These devices cannot distinguish between a
thin sheet of strong absorber and a thick slab of weak
absorber. Fig. 1 shows some example images.
Dual-energy X-ray. Early security systems used
high-energy X-ray for the detection of weapons. At
higher energy levels, over 100 kV, the absorbed en-
ergy depends primarily on the density of the material.
The higher the density, the more the energy absorbed
by the object and therefore the darker the image. Ob-
jects such as metal or weapons would appear very
dark in the transmission image. However, the prob-
lem of an explosive object behind a denser material
remained unsolved. In order to resolve the problem,
luggage is scanned at two energy levels (lower energy
around 80 kV). At lower energies the absorption de-
pends mainly on the e-ective atomic number as well as
the thickness of the material. The higher energy view
su-ers less absorption. While areas of heavy metal are
dark in both views, areas of light elements are darker
in lower energy view. Light elements such as carbon,
nitrogen and oxygen can be detected by comparing
both views. A system that uses two X-ray energy lev-
els is called a dual-energy system (multi-energy sys-
tems are essentially the same as above except that they
have a single X-ray tube that transmits a broad spec-
trum of energies and di-erent detectors are used to se-
lect speci9c energy regions). Several techniques exist
for the collection of multi-energy images, including
varying the input energy of the X-ray source [28], 9l-
tering the energy at the X-ray sensor [27] and using
multiple sensors with di-erent spectral responses [77].
Some commercial systems at airports feature
dual-energy analysis to estimate the atomic numbers
of the materials in luggage bags [27,64,112]. For a
single energy system, a thin, high Z (atomic number)
material will have the same attenuation as a thick,
36 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55

Fig. 1. Some example images of the conventional X-ray of luggage at airports.

low Z material. However, in a dual-energy system, Zeff

the measurements obtained at di-erent energies can
separate these two cases. The dual-energy method ap-
plied to a simple object yields an area density that in
turn gives a measure of density and thickness by us- Inorganic
materials
ing a priori information between atomic number and
density. The main limitation of the method is that the
real density of objects is poorly known for real lug-
gage items and the system only generates an estimate Organic
Drugs Explosives
of atomic number, i.e. e-ective atomic number. materials
Using dual-energy transmission technology, infor-
mation related to Ze- is obtained. Organic material
Density
(low Z) can theoretically be distinguished from in-
organic materials and metals (high Z). It should be Fig. 2. The role of the e-ective atomic number and density in
remembered that X-ray intensities for each object are separating explosives from other materials.
not only related to its material composition which
reJects the intrinsic property, but also some extrinsic
parameters such as position, orientation and thickness. better than single energy can be easily confused with-
In the real-world, simple dual-energy analysis which is out the knowledge of material density (see Fig. 2).
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
Several approaches for its e-ective use in complex
images have been pursued including transmission
plus scattering and computed tomography [43] so that
information on the e-ective atomic number as well
as the density is available. The false alarm rate of
dual-energy systems are roughly 20% [114].
One of the limitations of the dual-energy systems
is that unless they are combined with volume imag-
ing, e.g. CT or stereoscopic imaging, they only pro-
vide an indication of the e-ective atomic number as an
integrated e-ect throughout the scanned object. Even
when used with volume imaging, the sensitivity and
speci9city are low and at best only allow materials to
be characterised broadly as inorganic or organic. An-
other problem encountered with dual-energy systems
is that the computation of Ze- depends on the mate-
rial and objects that it overlapscalled background
overlapping e8ect. One of the algorithms developed
to tackle this problem by Krug et al. [66] and Krug
and Stein [65] calculates a characteristic value KMAT
for each illicit material from the attenuation coe2-
cients. The algorithm examines each image pixel in
turn whose corresponding characteristic value is cal-
culated as KTB . If KMAT = KTB , then a counter is in-
cremented. If the counter exceeds a threshold then the
pixel comes from an illicit material. This algorithm,
however, does not work very well and a better method
is proposed by Krug et al. [63]. In this method, two
images of low- and high-energy X-ray beams are ob-
tained with no reference material present. Then two
images with the reference material are obtained. On
the basis of these four images, a measure k is calcu-
lated as the ratio of the attenuation coe2cients and a
new image is generated by calculating new pixel val-
ues on the basis of k. The new image is di-erent from
the original image because the objects that have the
same Ze- as reference material are no longer present.
Scatter imaging. Explosives are typically mixed
with common harmless materials, which makes their
detection very di2cult. Two characteristics of plas-
tic explosives make them unique in terms of their
interaction with the X-rays. First, they consist of
elements having low atomic numbers. Second, they
have a physical density that is 30 50% higher than
common plastics and about 9ve to eight times higher
than typical packed clothing [2]. While dual-energy
methods attempt to exploit the 9rst of these charac-
teristics, a scatter image exploits both the low-Z and
37
high-density characteristics of plastic explosives. This
makes the scatter imaging techniques more speci9c.
Scatter imaging has been proposed by a number
of studies as an e-ective way of luggage inspection
[2,43,52,96]. Image data is collected from scattered
X-ray energy that is reJected back towards the X-ray
source or scattered X-ray energy that passed forward
through the scanned object, called the back scatter-
ing and forward scattering images, respectively. For
scatter images, each location along the pencil beam
in the objects adds to the amount of scatter seen in
scatter image. The amount depends on the number of
X-ray photons reaching the location, the electron den-
sity at that location, the scattering cross-section, and
attenuation that the scattered photons undergo while
exiting the bag. In this way, two di-erent materials
with the same transmission characteristics would still
produce two very di-erent sets of scatter images (e.g.
aluminium and plastic).
The transmitted beam produces a typical X-ray im-
age showing the absorption of heavy metals. In addi-
tion, the backscatter signal intensity depends on how
much of the transmitted beam has been absorbed, how
much is backscattered, and how many backscattered
X-rays reach the backscatter detectors. The back-
scatter signal depends on the competition between
photoelectric absorption and Compton scattering.
The photoelectric cross-section increases with the
atomic number of the object, Z while the Comp-
ton cross-section is relatively independent of the
atomic number. Hence, the resulting backscatter sig-
nal favours low Z elements of high density, such
as plastic explosives and provides a direct measure
of the density of elements with low atomic number.
Backscatter information has been used for explosives
detection. A system based on the Jying spot technol-
ogy was built as a prototype by Swift [117,118] for
the inspection of vehicles and cargo.
Image scatter can be characterised as coherent (elas-
tic) or incoherent (inelastic or Compton scattering).
Forward scatter in the region of 310 contains pre-
dominantly coherently scattered photons and at large
angles the scattered beam is dominated by incoher-
ently scattered photons. Measurements of both of these
is quite useful. Coherent scatter leads to di-raction
e-ects whose intensity gives information on atomic
number and physical density. Incoherent scatters in-
tensity is dependent on density and hence both of these
38 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
techniques can be combined to isolate atomic num-
ber information. An advantage of using scatter tech-
niques is that their measurements depend on particular
volumes within an object and hence allow a form of
volume imaging. Scatter methods are highly speci9c
and localised allowing detection of sheet explosives
[73]. Details of coherent and incoherent X-ray scatter
are available in Speller [110].
The position of an object relative to X-ray source
and the detector has a strong inJuence on the de-
tected forward and backward scatter signals resulting
in an input error to the classi9cation system. Forward
and backward scatter systems measure the incoherent
scattering e-ect. A single-energy system using back
scatter images for explosives was developed by the
American Science and Engineering [96]. The Jying
spot technology developed by American Science and
Engineering in 1996, can obtain very high-quality
scatter images (see [4] for details). This eliminates
the need for an expensive sensor array by using
a concentrated beam of X-rays and a few large
photo-multipliers for detection. The primary source
of information is back scatter images where forward
scatter images are included as an option. With good
transmission and scatter qualities, materials charac-
terisation is greatly improved. This technology has
been shown to perform well on car and truck (cargo)
where explosives can be present in large quantities
[97]; airport luggage presents a more serious problem
with small quantities of explosives. None of the im-
plemented systems has fully explored the high-quality
forward and backward scatter images provided using
the Jying-spot technology for automated explosives
detection. Since this technology is cheaper and faster
than CT, the analysis of scatter images could lead to a
smater system. In addition, dual-energy transmission
technology can be combined with scatter technology
to improve results [25].
Coherent scattering has been used in a number of
studies considering its advantages over dual-energy
and CAT scanners. Strecker et al. [115] investigated
high-energy (30 100 keV) Coherent X-ray scattering
CXRS (see Harding and Shreiber [47] for more details
of the technology). The study deals with an alternative
approach to X-ray di-raction, X-ray scatter. The mea-
sured di-raction patterns contain material-speci9c in-
formation. This information is used as a 9ngerprint to
identify explosives. Strecker [113] researched CXRS
methods for the detection of explosives. The main cri-
teria for the acceptance will be: (a) classi9cation per-
formance in terms of detection rate vs. false alarm rate;
(b) inspection time or throughput of the system. Three
areas that need to be improved for the advancement
of CSRS are: (a) the total photon Jux in the scatter
spectrum, which determines its noise; (b) the mixing
of substance of interest with others; and (c) the atten-
uation of primary and scatter reduction. The results of
the experiments in this study showed near 100% de-
tection rates and less than 1% false alarm rate. Speller
et al. [111] studied X-ray scattering at low angles.
X-ray scattering at low angles shows di-raction e-ects
that can be used to characterise materials. This tech-
nique is successful in 9nding explosives that may be
shielded by other matter. This paper details the impor-
tant features of scattering that can be used as unique
signatures. Luggar et al. [72] study the elastic scat-
tered photons for the rapid identi9cation of material
with low atomic number. Luggar et al. [75] developed
a low angle X-ray scattering machine called the sheet
explosive X-ray imager (SEXI). The optimisation of
the geometry for such a system in terms of scatter an-
gle, collimation and X-ray distribution are discussed
in Luggar et al. [74]. This system attempts to detect
minimum amounts of explosive material in an item of
luggage in the range of 150 300 cc. The low attenua-
tion in conventional X-ray system through explosives
yields little natural contrast. SEXI identi9es materi-
als with image molecular structure and di-erentiates
between explosive materials and other objects. SEXI
can be used in conjunction with normal X-ray systems
with little disruption to security procedures. Low-level
X-rays have also been used with digital image pro-
cessing for explosives detection by Smith [107]. The
new technology is called subambient explosive com-
puter utilised reJected energy (SECURE) which uses
a range of image processing algorithms before the im-
age is presented to the operator. Strecker [114] de-
scribes the use of elastic X-ray scatter for the purpose
of automatic detection of explosives. A recent pro-
totype was produced by Philips for Hamburg airport
[50]. The in-elastic or Compton scatter radiation pro-
vides a measure of the number of electrons involved
in the scatter process. However, in the case, of elas-
tic scatter, material testing is strongly oriented in the
forward direction due to its short wavelength. In this
case, the polychromatic bremsstrahlung spectrum of
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
the X-ray tube serves as a source and the scatter radia-
tion is measured at a small 9xed angle using an energy
resolving detectors. The resulting scatter spectra pro-
vide information on the crystallographic structure of
the scattering materials. For security application, the
scatter spectra of dangerous substances are stored in
a library and retrieved for comparison and automatic
detection of suspicious material. The trials at Ham-
burg airport show a false alarm rate of 1%.
Bla-ert [9] tried to prove that peak detection and
spectra identi9cation techniques developed for X-ray
di-raction and IR spectroscopy can be used for explo-
sives detection provided that good quality noise 9lters
are used to clean the spectra to a reasonable level.
Similarly, Jupp et al. [55,56] used angular dispersive
X-ray di-raction to provide chemically speci9c detec-
tion of explosives from benign materials using char-
acteristic Bragg features seen in coherently scattered
X-rays. To implement this technique in a prototype
screening system, a detector has been designed which,
when coupled with the appropriate analysis algorithm,
provides chemically speci9c material identi9cation.
Even though the X-ray technology is the preferred
method of explosives screening, it is by no means the
best option. It continues to be preferred as it is safer
to humans and luggage, cheap to buy and operate,
and it is well understood. However, one of the main
disadvantage of using X-ray technology is the high
false alarm rate (when the system alarms frequently
on harmless objects). There are several reasons for
these false alarms:
(i) Some materials are non-separable to systems
based on X-attenuation methods designed to
distinguish material based on their physical
density and e-ective atomic number. This is
because several materials possess similar atten-
uation pro9les as explosives. For example in the
(Ze- ; d) domain, some plastics and rubbers fall
in the black powder area, and the others fall in
the smokeless powder area [62]. This can lead
to plastics and rubber substances causing false
alarms.
(ii) The characterisation for a certain material may
spread into a wider range in feature space due
to the method actually used. In a simple setting,
most explosives can be separated from harmless
materials using 2D information (Ze- ; d). How-
ever, in order to accurately determine these two
39
parameters one needs to know exact material
composition, weight fractions, and geometry in-
formation for all objects in the luggage. It is not
possible to get this information using dual-energy
luggage X-ray system to date. Hence, some ex-
trinsic parameters such as thickness and orienta-
tion of the material would negatively a-ect the
material characterisation.
(iii) The error and uncertainty change the statistical
distribution of classes; this has a negative e-ect
on object classi9cation.
Related techniques. A number of recent studies
have investigated novel X-ray technologies for se-
curity screening. Bjorkholm and Wang [8] detail an
improved X-ray detector such that maximum possible
information about physical characteristics of the ob-
jects can be gained. Z-scan is an X-ray system that
gives two views with dual energy. By scanning ob-
jects from orthogonal angles, organic materials in the
object are turned into 3D models. The model is then
divided into regions that are searched for explosives
using density information. Any threat objects are high-
lighted. The system can work at a rate of 10 pieces/min
and the system is currently used at Heathrow airport.
A new X-ray detection system is described by
Bernbach and Vey [6]. An L-shaped X-ray beam is
used to eliminate blind-spots. For detection, X-rays
are converted to visible light that is detected using
photo-diodes. The object has to be moved through the
beam for complete scanning. The system can scan 10
pieces/min.
Shi [104] introduces a new model of prototype
X-ray scanning system developed at Virginia Tech.
In addition, an algorithm is developed to correct the
non-uniformity of transmission detectors in the pro-
totype scanning system. The X-ray source output is
not monochromatic which leads to the problem of
spectrum overlap and output signal imbalance be-
tween high- and low-energy levels which degrades
the performance of the dual energy X-ray sensing. A
copper 9lter is introduced and a numerical optimisa-
tion method to remove thickness e-ects of objects has
been developed to improve the system performance.
Armstrong et al. [3] detail how materials can be
characterised based on the interaction of X-ray and
gamma ray radiation using a high-intensity monochro-
matic source. The design and properties of the
new Juorescent X-ray tube are described. The tube
40 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
generates a quasi-monochromatic output. The out-
put is compared with those of radioisotope sources
in terms of purity, stability and radiance and it is
shown that the new technology is a good method for
materials characterisation.
The SYCOSCAN developed by Schlumberger is
a radioscopic control system developed based on
X-ray detection using multiwire proportional cham-
ber (MWPC) technology [116]. This study presents
the working principle behind this equipment and
compares it to conventional scintillator/photodiode
combinations.
Direct imaging of explosives using a nitrogen cam-
era has been suggested by Knapp et al. [60]. The basic
idea is to capture images of nitrogen concentrations
on the basis of which robust screening technology can
be developed. It is well known that when high-energy
photons interact with chemical elements in an ex-
plosive they generate unique signatures that can be
used for identi9cation. When a high-intensity pulse
of high-energy photons from an accelerator source is
Jashed on an object, a variety of isotopes are pro-
duced, almost all of which decay with half-lives of
seconds or longer. However, if nitrogen, carbon or
oxygen are present, radioisotopes decay very quickly
with very short half-lives of the order of 10 20 ms.
On the basis of this principle, images are generated
that gives an indication of the presence of nitrogen
that can be analysed by the operator.
A novel technique has been developed by Habiger
et al. [44] for detecting explosives using RF linac.
The patented EXDEP technology uses an intense
X-ray beam to photo-activate the nitrogen component
present in most explosives. Activated nitrogen decays
emitting a positron that annihilates and produces two
photons that are detected. The EXDEP technique mea-
sures the nitrogen concentration on a matter per unit
volume basis together with 3D tomography (CTX)
scanner that measures the physical density. The de-
termination of whether or not there is an explosive
present is based on two factors: (i) the count rate for
each volume element and (ii) the number of volume
elements that have the appropriate count rate. The
probability of detection for the EXDEP/CTX system
should be over 99% with a false alarm probability
substantially less than 1%.
3D X-ray imaging. 3D image modelling can lead to
an improved explosives detection system [59]. Evans
et al. [32,33] describe four types of 3D transmission
X-ray imaging that is appropriate for security screen-
ing. This includes:
(a) Computed tomography [98]: Computed tomog-
raphy initially developed for 3D medical imaging
applications has been applied for luggage screening
[94,95,105,108]. The X-ray transmission through an
object is a function of its e-ective atomic number,
density and thickness. For a given X-ray path, the
linear attenuation coe2cient is the sum of attenua-
tion coe2cients of each element in the path and CT
produces cross-section images of the object by recon-
structing the X-ray attenuation coe2cients matrix.
These cross-section images can be used to generate
3D images of the objects. The 9nal aim is to deter-
mine the objects density and e-ective atomic num-
ber. This is achieved in the following manner. First,
in the volume rendered image, the reconstruction
algorithm determines the attenuation coe2cient for
each volume element. Second, given the knowledge
of the volume element dimension from the scanning
equipment geometry, the attenuation coe2cient is
mapped as a direct function of the atomic number
and density. This gives two unknown quantities and
by taking measurements at two di-erent energies, it
leaves two equations with two unknowns that are
solved for atomic number and density. Thus, the vol-
ume elements can be mapped according to Ze- and
density, and the correlation of these variables can
provide both feature and material discrimination [23].
The CT system is based on the principle of syn-
chronous movement of the object/source and X-ray
detector. The system produces images as a result of
intensity summation recorded over a period of time in
which the objects overlying and underlying the planes
of interest cause blurring on the 9lm. The CT method-
ology generates a stack of contiguous slice images or
tomograms that help 3D image reconstruction to pro-
duce volumetric views of the object. The objects can
be viewed as solid or transparent models [93] that
are enhanced using depth cues such as hidden sur-
face removal, perspective transformation, rotation and
depth-weighted shading. This technology is now avail-
able for security screening [48,94] but the operational
cost remains quite high.
For security applications, the CT system 9rst pro-
duces an X-ray scan similar to the conventional airport
X-ray scanner. An automated inspection algorithm
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
determines the locations within the baggage where the
absorption indicates a suspicious area. Cross-section
CT slices are then used to determine the density, tex-
ture, mass and shape of the object. Since the CT scan
produces cross-section slices, it can identify objects
that are surrounded by other objects and hidden. The
operator can also make further slices to detect other
object properties.
CT requires of the order of 100 views from a 1024
element linear X-ray detector to produce a 10001000
pixel slice image of the object under consideration.
The technology requires high signal-to-noise ratio and
hence very high X-ray source levels. As a result, the
high level of radiation requires substantial radiation
screening. In addition, in order to achieve a high spa-
tial resolution, the helical-scan CT system needs high
rotational speed, e.g. for an object moving at 0:25 m=s
requires the X-ray sensor to rotate at 15; 000 rpm to
achieve an axial resolution of 1 mm. CTX5000 is
the only FAA approved system based on CT tech-
nique which was developed by InVision Technologies
and has been installed in a number of airports in the
USA. Heiskanen and Roder [49] discuss what can be
gained from the experience of such technology in the
real-world since its implementation.
(b) Multi-source/sensor imaging. In this technol-
ogy, a number of di-erent X-ray sources and sensors
are used. For example Benjamin and Prakoonwit [5]
discuss the use of 15 fan-beam sources. The main dif-
9culty with this approach is the high system cost, and
high complexity of the mechanical equipment and dif-
9culty in collimation alignment.
(c) Twin orthogonal views. Bjorkholm and Wang
[8] generate two orthogonal views using a pair of
X-ray sources and linear arrays.
(d) Stereoscopic tomography. Evans et al. [32]
illustrate a 3D image modelling technique utilis-
ing line-scan X-ray equipment called stereoscopic
tomography [92]. The resultant images have sim-
ilar properties to volume rendered X-ray computed
tomography system. Earlier research by these re-
searchers with HM Customs and Excise in the UK
was based on line-scan technology [29,91]. More re-
cent work with Police Scienti9c Development Branch
in UK is based on dual-energy line scanners which
provide materials identi9cation capability. The cur-
rent research focuses on the automatic extraction of
3D information from the stereoscopic pair of images.
41
In some respects this data can be compared with the
X-ray CT. The main di-erence is that in the case of
CT, each slice of information is called a tomogram
whereas in stereoscopic imaging it is called a depth
plane. The main advantage they cite for the stereo-
scopic system is that CT systems are data hungry
and require several views for image reconstruction,
whereas stereoscopic system uses the geometric re-
lationship between a pair of perspective images in
order to represent the 3D image data.
Evans et al. [31,32] describe how this works. The
raw image data is produced in the form of a left and
right perspective image. These are acquired within 5 s
and stored in 1024 648 digital format. The folded
array sensor modules utilise linear arrays consisting
of a pair of discrete 9bre-optic cables to optically cou-
ple the low- and high-energy signals produced by the
scintillation process directly onto the faceplate of a
three-stage intensi9ed coupled device camera (ICCD).
The 2D images are formed by cyclically storing the
individual signal outputs of each 9bre optic via the
ICCD in digital memory. The image is therefore accu-
mulated strip by strip over a time interval determined
by the scan frequency of the scintillation signals and
the translation speed of the object. A 3D modelling
stage using these images then generates the 9nal im-
ages to be viewed. The identi9cation of depth planes
or slices in stereoscopic images is presented in Robin-
son et al. [93].
Evans et al. [32] argue the case for the 3D analysis
as, for image interpretation, 2D view cannot generate
physiological cues. According to Okoshi [85], an ob-
server has up to a total of 10 cues for depth perception
including psychological cues (occlusion, shadows and
shading, linear perspective, texture gradient, retinal
image size and arial perspective), and physiological
cues (binocular parallax, monocular movement paral-
lax, accommodation and convergence). The psycho-
logical cues can be induced from the 2D image but
the physiological cues cannot be. A fully operational
prototype of stereoscopic system has been constructed
for Police Scienti9c Development Branch, UK. Re-
cently, Evans and Hon [30] extended the stereoscopic
system by introducing the concept of motion parallax
in addition to binocular parallax as a powerful depth
cue to better interpret 3D images.
At present, each of the above discussed X-ray
technology is used separately; however, there is a
42 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
strong case for using a combination of systems, e.g.
multi-sensor X-ray approach using data fusion tech-
niques [1,18,19,65]. For example, Zou [129] details
a system that uses both dual-energy and scatter tech-
nology such that this information is derived from
the object simultaneously. In this study a quantity R
that is related to Ze- (e-ective atomic number), and
a quantity L that is density related are used together
by identifying illicit objects in the RL plane. Using
this technique, illicit materials can be separated from
metal, inorganic materials, and other harmless organic
materials. Since practical X-ray sources are poly-
chromatic rather than ideally monochromatic, Monte
Carlo N particle (MNCP) simulations can be used
to study the relationship between R and Ze- [127].
Tumer et al. [120] detail how the use of two di-erent
3D imaging techniques simultaneously can be used
for screening. In their study they use 3D images based
on neutrons and gamma rays simultaneously.
2.1.2. Laser-based explosives detection
Haley and Hallowell [45] describe explosive detec-
tion using lasers. This technique involves the use of
laser-generated infrared radiation to scan the surface
of objects. The interaction of the laser radiation with
any residual explosive on the surface of the object will
initiate micro bursts. The resulting light generated
by these bursts can be detected and is characteristic of
the explosive involved. Temporal and spectral analy-
ses of the emitted light reveal unique signal patterns
that are used to di-erentiate the micro bursts. The
results are preliminary, however, the technique o-ers
the potential for detecting explosives in near-real time.
Thus, the technique could be used to scan carry-on
baggage as the individual pieces of luggage travel on
the X-ray systems conveyer belt.
2.1.3. Nuclear-based explosives detection
Nuclear-based explosive detection techniques use
neutrons instead of photons and have been shown to
generate better results however at a higher cost and
slow speed. The main modes of analysis include ther-
mal neutron analysis (TNA), fast neutron analysis
(FNA), pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA), pulsed
fast thermal neutron analysis (PFTNA) and Nuclear
Resonance absorption (NRA) of gamma rays. A re-
view of detecting explosive material using nuclear
radiation is available in Hussein [51] and Gozani [41]
and the basic principle is explained in Speller [110].
Thermal neutron analysis (TNA). The main aim
of this analysis is to identify nitrogen in explosives.
A neutron striking a nucleus is absorbed with a cer-
tain probability and the process is accompanied by the
emission of gamma rays with the energy that is char-
acteristics of the nucleus. The type of element present
can be inferred from the analysis of neutron radiation
for gamma ray intensity and energy. The luggage is
moved through a bath of thermal (slow) neutrons
generated by a radioactive source. The capture of neu-
trons in nitrogen results in a high-energy gamma ray.
The signals from gamma ray detectors are analysed to
generate a spatial distribution for nitrogen. The cur-
rent TNA equipment have been designed to detect a
limited range of plastic explosives, with the ability to
detect nitrogen but not oxygen or carbon; although
hydrogen, chlorine and some other elements could be
detected to enhance the performance. One of the main
di2culties is the systems inability to di-erentiate be-
tween nitrogen in explosives and the nitrogen back-
ground from innocent materials, thereby leading to a
high false alarm rate. Also, the sensitivity (probability
of detection for a given quantity of explosives) is lim-
ited. In addition, the equipment can be very expensive
($.75 $1.0 million).
Using thermal neutrons, tomographic images can
be reconstructed that have been shown to perform
better than X-ray tomography. Da Silva and Crispim
[21] conducted an experiment with lead and iron tubes
with phantom inserts. For X-ray tomography, cocaine
and explosives detection was not possible, since lead
and iron possess high linear attenuation coe2cients
for photons at high energy levels. As such, dense ma-
terials like iron or lead, at photon energies of 120 keV,
give rise to low penetration power and cannot be
inspected using tomography with X-rays and thus
cannot be used for detecting explosives or drugs.
However, the images reconstructed using thermal
neutrons clearly show cocaine and explosive samples
concealed by iron and lead.
Thermal neutron analysis was originally developed
to 9nd concealed explosives for the airline industry in
1980s but it is currently being used for a number of
other applications. Brown and Gozani [13] discuss the
use of TNA for the detection of drugs in passenger
luggage, detection of explosives and drugs in small
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
packages, detection of liquid explosives in bottles, de-
tection of buried landmines and unexploded ordnance.
Fast neutron analysis (FNA). This technique is
an improvement on TNA using high-energy neutrons.
The use of high-energy neutrons results in gamma rays
at di-erent energies, characteristics of the elements,
that can be detected and distinguished. Common ex-
plosives display a unique range of nitrogen density
to oxygen density. FNA is able to measure these two
quantities as well as carbon and hydrogen density,
which allows it to be more sensitive and produces less
number of false alarms. On the other hand, the main
shortcoming is that fast high-energy neutrons create a
signi9cant background in gamma ray detectors, mak-
ing it di2cult to extract the information.
Pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA). The con-
cept behind PFNA is similar to that of FNA except
that a pulsed beam of neutrons is utilised. A focussed
collimated beam is passed through the object and the
gamma rays emitted at certain energies are analysed.
The method uses penetrating neutrons at lower ener-
gies than FNA. The gamma rays are detected by scin-
tillators that provide gamma ray energy information.
The neutron beam pro9le provides the 2D position
information required to determine the spatial dis-
tribution. The third dimension, derived by timing
and image reconstruction, constitutes a major im-
provement over the basic FNA technique. The main
advantage of using PFNA is that it unambiguously
determines the elemental composition of explosives
and the spatial location of these elemental concentra-
tions. The main challenges in developing PFNA into
a practical system is the tedious process of construct-
ing a practical, collimated, pulsed energetic neutron
beam that makes the operation safe and operationally
acceptable and cost e-ective. This technology is still
in research stage. Recently Brown et al. [12] describe
a cargo inspection system based on this principle
aimed at screening 9ve trucks/h.
Pulsed fast thermal neutron analysis (PFTNA).
This technique provides a bulk analysis of the chem-
ical present. Compared to PFNA which uses 2 ns
pulsing, PFTNA uses 10 ms pulsing and has the
main advantage of being portable. PFTNA allows the
neutrons to be moderated and it can provide thermal
neutron information like TNA but in addition it also
measures fast neutron reactions (C, O and N) and its
advantage over PFNA is that it can measure thermal
43
neutron capture gamma rays. A detailed discussion
is available in Vourvopoulos [122], Vourvopoulos
and Womble [123] and Womble et al. [125]. Also,
Womble et al. [126] recently discussed the current
status of the PELAN portable detection system that
woks on this principle.
Nuclear resonance absorption (NRA) of gamma
rays. This technique is derived from the narrow state
of excitation energy in nitrogen atom resulting in a
sharp resonance of the cross-section for the reaction
14
N(y; p)13 C producing a proton and a carbon nu-
cleus. The gamma ray transition state from the ground
state of nitrogen atom to the excited state is extraordi-
narily large. The gamma rays of exactly the resonant
energy are therefore very strongly absorbed by ordi-
nary nitrogen nuclei, thus providing a unique and clear
signature for the presence of nitrogen, as opposed to
other elements. The inverse reaction (protons on the
target of 13 C nuclei) can be used to generate the prob-
ing beam of gamma rays, resulting in gamma rays of
just the right energy. The e-ective size of the source of
these gamma rays can be made very small, allowing an
imaging capability. This technique has been demon-
strated to work extremely well on detecting nitrogen.
Since the signature is unique (gamma rays are very
penetrating), the technique works well with shielded
explosives. The main advantage of NRA is its high
sensitivity, adequate spatial resolution, and unambigu-
ous measurement of nitrogen. The main limitation is
that it only measures nitrogen and nothing else. This
technology is still in research stage.
A number of studies have used nuclear techniques
for the detection of explosives and drugs. Burnett and
McKay [14] have developed a method for screening
liquid explosives in unopened bottles. The system can
detect speci9c explosives or verify the labelling on the
bottle. NMR technology is used for this with param-
eters signal amplitude, spin lattice, relaxation time,
spinspin coupling constant and the di-usion constant.
Unique NMR signatures for liquids can be obtained
by setting radiofrequency (RF) pulses to respond to
one or more parameters.
Vartsky et al. [121] developed an explosive detec-
tion system based on nuclear resonance absorption
of gamma rays, 14 N. Explosives generally contain ni-
trogen as a nitrate salt or in organic form. The rel-
atively high nitrogen density of most explosives can
be exploited as a means of distinguishing them from
44 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
a host of other materials. The study shows that a
high-nitrogen region of a suitcase can be scanned by
high-energy gamma rays and a measurement can be
taken from the transmission pro9le of photons.
Seed and Zahrt [99] develop a resonance
absorption-based explosive detection system as a vir-
tual prototype (on the computer only). The following
processes are modelled: RF quadrupole proton beam,
resonant-energy gamma ray production, gamma ray
transport through injected objects, individual detector
response, throughput of tomographic detector array
and tomographic image construction.
Gokhale and Hussein [38] propose a technique for
explosive detection that uses characteristic variations
in the elemental cross-sections with energy to iden-
tify explosives. Transmitted neutrons are analysed by
the changes in their energy spectrum. Pattern recogni-
tion techniques are used for material recognition and
identi9cation.
KirWaly et al. [58] describe the use of elastically
backscattered neutrons combined with thermal neu-
tron reJection method for the identi9cation of illicit
material by detecting hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen and
oxygen elements. Di-erent materials have di-erent
spectra (net spectral yield plotted against neutron
energy) and these di-erent signatures can be distin-
guished using pattern recognition techniques.
An excellent summary of the performance abilities
of the various neutron-based systems built to date is
available in Speller [110]. PFNA shows the least false
alarm rate of 5% or less. TNA on the other hand is the
most sensitive of up to 200 g of material. However,
it should be noted here that due to security reasons
it is not possible to quote sensitivity results for other
techniques.
2.1.4. Electromagnetic detection of metals and
weapons
The two major categories of RF electromagnetic
methods used for screening include inductive methods
(used by metal detectors at airports), and reJectome-
try including dielectrometry and short-range imaging
radar. The 9rst class of methods detect the changes
in mutual inductance caused by additional presence
of metal in the portal or detecting eddy currents pro-
duced in the metal within the portal by a RF pulse.
The amount of magnetic 9eld to which public can
be exposed is limited to 1 G. Radio reJectometry is
the measurement of radiofrequency electromagnetic
(RFEM) waves reJected by an object. Firearms,
knives and other metallic weapons can be detected
by low-power radar. More recently, it is seen that
millimetre wave radar systems can display TV-like
radar imagery of weapons concealed under clothing.
Non-metallic objects also reJect radio waves and can
be detected and imaged by radio reJectometrythis
is called dielectometry and can be used for explosives
detection [100].
Sheen et al. [102] describe various millimetre wave
imaging systems that are capable of detection through
clothing. One of the advantages of these methods over
X-ray is that they are not known to cause any health
hazard. High-resolution images of concealed weapons
can be obtained using 2D holographic scanning. Using
the holographic wavefront technique, data is converted
into a high-resolution image for inspection by an oper-
ator. In order to overcome the drawbacks of an earlier
design, Sheen et al. [101] developed a circular imag-
ing system that moves around the target for a complete
360 scan. McMakin et al. [76] developed a 3D volu-
metric hologram using wideband millimetre imaging.
This system allows for higher resolution by showing
contours in the persons body. The person still needs
to turn left, right and back to get a complete scan.
2.2. Vapour detection systems
The following techniques are used for vapour de-
tection systems [54].
2.2.1. Gas chromatography with chemiluminescence
These devices use gas chromatography to sepa-
rate a sample of molecules from a carrier gas and to
isolate molecules of di-erent chemical compounds
from each other. The samples can be taken with a
portable hand-held collection unit that heats up the
sampled surface with infrared lamps and sucks air
from near the surface. The sample is then injected
into chromatographic columns, which consist of thin
tubes lined with a material to absorb molecules of
interest. Di-erent molecules are dissolved to di-er-
ent extends and the material with the least a2nity
for the column substrate goes fastest. Since di-erent
materials are released from the column at di-erent
times, mixtures of materials can be identi9ed. At
the termination of the separation process, column
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
contents are heated to pyrolyse the explosive com-
pounds into fragments, among them nitric oxide.
The chemiluminescent reaction of nitric oxide with
ozone yields photons that are detected using con-
ventional means. This signal is then analysed by a
microprocessor to determine whether it comes from a
dangerous substance. The timing of photon detection
is used for this as di-erent compounds have di-erent
speeds of migration through the column. Through a
proprietary combination of column lengths and tem-
perature cycles, plastic explosives can be quickly
detected.
2.2.2. Gas chromatography with electron capture
detector (GC/ECD)
This technology tests for low volatility, high
electro-negativity substances. Similar to the previous
method, this technique also uses the chromatographic
column as a 9rst step to separate explosive molecules
from other components in a gas stream. The main
di-erence is the detector. A small radioactive source
ionises a gas mixture to form free electrons that Jow
towards the anode thereby creating a constant current.
Molecules emerging from the column are mixed with
these electrons and since the explosive molecules
are electro-negative, they grab some of the electrons.
Fewer electrons now migrate to the anode and this
results in a decreased current. Microprocessors anal-
yse this change for 9nding explosives. This technol-
ogy is quite good at detecting high-vapour-pressure
compounds but fails to detect plastics and very low
volatility materials.
2.2.3. Ion mobility spectrometry (IMS)
The vapours or stream of airborne particles for test
are 9rst sampled. Air and explosive molecules di-use
through a membrane or a 9lter into a chamber where
sealed 63 Ni radioactive source ionises the sample. At a
high frequency (e.g. 50 times a second), small bursts
of ions are released into a separation region by an elec-
tronic gating grid. Under the inJuence of the electric
9eld, these ions drift against the Jow of a separation
gas. The speed with which the ions move through the
tube is a function of their mass, charge, physical shape
and the amount of di-usion. Heavier ions of explo-
sive compounds travel slowly than lighter ones. The
drift region terminates in a collector electrode. The
45
position in time and magnitude of the peaks is anal-
ysed by the microprocessor to identify the concentra-
tion of the vapour being detected. Previous tests with
this technology have shown that it works well in de-
tecting high-vapour-pressure explosives but fails on
low-vapour-pressure materials such as TNT or RDX.
A critical review is available in Ewing et al. [34].
2.2.4. Two-stage mass spectrometry
(MS/MSlow pressure glow discharge ionisation)
The main theory behind this technique is that
explosive molecules are unique in terms of their
electro-negativity in their propensity to attract and
capture an extra electron to become negative ions.
Once ionised, they can be accelerated and analysed by
subjecting them to electric and/or magnetic 9elds. The
mass-to-charge ratios of the ions can be determined by
a variety of methods referred to collectively as mass
spectrometry. As a 9rst step, the vapours are sampled
into a chamber with electric current that ionises air
and explosive vapours. The ions are injected into the
9rst mass spectrometer that only contains 15% of
the explosive molecules. By capturing the output of
the 9rst-stage mass spectrometer at a given time after
injection or at a predetermined location, usually a slit,
the ions with particular mass-to-charge ratios are sep-
arated from the mixture. Large molecules of explosive
compounds can be fragmented into smaller pieces.
The output of the 9rst stage is brought into collision
with a stream of neutral atoms such as helium and the
impact causes the large molecules to fragment into
smaller ions whose masses can be determined by the
second mass spectrometer. Since it is unlikely that
more than one kind of molecule will both ionise to
the correct mass-to-charge ratio and break down into
proper fragments, this technique is considered very
speci9c in detecting explosive materials with a very
low false alarm rate.
2.2.5. Fluroimmunoassay (antigenantibody
reactions as a test technique)
In this technique a continuous Jow of vapour is
drawn into a preconcentrator at a rate of 2000 l=min
and collected in 1 ml of aqueous solvent. The
output of the preconcentrator is then taken to the
detection unit (200 ml) vial containing immo-
bilised antibodies and Juorescent labelled analogs of
46 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
explosive molecules. The antibody reacts with ex-
treme speci9city to only one particular explosive. If
present in the sample, the explosive antigen will dis-
place its Juorescent labelled analog that is easily de-
tected downstream. Using this method a test takes no
more than 1 min and for minimising false alarms two
columns can be used in parallel with the second col-
umn containing an irrelevant antibody. A substance
that causes an alarm in both columns is obviously
not reacting with the antibody and is a false alarm.
The main advantage of this method is that it is fairly
inexpensive, fast and fully automated. However, the
antibodies of all material likely to be encountered are
needed.
The advances in screening technologies themselves
are not enough for developing robust screening sys-
tems. Recently, it has been realised that an equal
amount of e-ort needs to be put into the computer
analysis of data or images generated by the various
techniques. This is important as computers can help
either to automate the screening systems or help the
understanding of data by assisting human operators.
The investigation of computer-based data analysis
in the context of aviation security is very much an
open-ended research topic as this has not been stud-
ied in enough detail as one might expect. In the next
section, we detail two important areas where signal
processing and pattern recognition can make an
important contribution. These are computer aided
screening and computer-based training of screening
personnel.
3. Computer aided screening
In this paper we discuss two areas where computer
technology is crucial to security screening: automated
detection of explosives [7] and the training of screen-
ers. The role of computers is likely to become crucial
as we move into the age of digital X-ray techniques.
Cowen [20] describes a number of advantages that dig-
ital X-ray technology o-ers over analog X-ray. Digital
X-ray will allow a range of computer-based analysis
to take place in real time, e.g. magnify, enhance, direct
attention to image areas, etc. and o-er high-resolution
images for security purposes. The digital X-ray tech-
nology, though a bit expensive, is already commer-
cially available and portable X-ray imaging devices
for security purposes have been constructed [128]. In
addition, a lot of data from other devices is now col-
lected digitally making its computer analysis quicker.
3.1. Automated screening
Computers can be used for signal processing and
pattern recognition areas for the following purposes:
(i) Improvement of data quality: Images viewed by
human operators can be enhanced by the com-
puter so that contraband appears in stark contrast
to its surroundings so that humans can easily de-
tect it.
(ii) Automated detection of dangerous explosives:
The methodology will depend on the modality of
gathering data. In the case of images, the system
will have to automatically process such data to
enhance its quality, segment objects of interest
and then use some features to characterise the re-
sulting regions. However, if the data for analysis
is a 1D signal (spectra), the task involves tem-
plate matching where test spectra are matched
with known templates. The data could be simply
a measurement (a point in n-dimensional feature
space) that needs to be classi9ed using pattern
recognition techniques.
Improvement of data quality is of major importance
in most systems. In the case of spectra matching with
neutron-based techniques for explosives detection,
peak identi9cation and matching is the most common
technique. If the signal is mixed with noise, the peaks
may occur with varied magnitude and false peaks
could a-ect the similarity measure with templates.
In a number of studies, spectra must be cleaned
(smoothed) to 9nd the true peaks before any match-
ing with stored templates is performed [9] and signals
processed to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. In
recent research, many more advanced pattern recog-
nition techniques are being used for spectra analysis
including neural networks (ANCORE TNA system
developed by Gozani and associates), fuzzy logic sys-
tems (PELAN developed by Womble and associates),
etc. In these approaches, pattern recognition systems
are trained to recognise speci9c signatures during
testing. The generalisation ability of such learning
systems is quoted on test data.
Computers can also be used for modifying the qual-
ity of images or data in a form most suited to human
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
operators for analysis. X-ray images are invariably
degraded by errors of approximation due to discrete
nature of the image, X-ray source, detector and elec-
tronic device noise. This causes random changes to
the grey levels of the image pixels. The image quality
performance speci9cation for X-ray scanners from the
requirements of the US Customs service is detailed
by Khan and Smith [57]. The requirements are stated
in terms of resolution, contrast and penetration for the
detection of contraband in parcels, boxes, suitcases,
crates and cargo containers.
Noise can create problems with the visual inspec-
tion of images or automated image segmentation. In
the case of distinguishing between explosives and
other material on the basis of e-ective atomic num-
ber and density using X-rays, sophisticated classi9ers
need to be used to learn decision boundaries from
training data. A number of outlier removal methods
and noise 9ltering methods are useful in this context
to improve the quality of training data. Image smooth-
ing and enhancement can remove the noise improving
the quality of the images. A number of 9lters have
been developed for noise removal and special empha-
sis has been given in literature to those that preserve
the edge information [81]. In the case of image anal-
ysis, image enhancement methods can be applied to
make the contraband more visible against its back-
ground. To achieve this, one must have a measure of
image quality IQ that correlates well with the human
visual system. Only on the basis of such an objective
measure, one can rank a number of image enhance-
ment algorithms for a given image. Even though
considerable work has been done on image quality
measures in general, e.g. for digital video, there is
hardly any research at developing such measures
to evaluate image enhancement. Recently, Bovis
and Singh [11] presented three new measures of
how separable tumours and their background were
in mammographic X-ray images based on contrast
quanti9cation between tumours and their surround-
ings. However, extending such measures to images
containing explosives and other items of luggage
is quite di2cult. This is because of the large num-
ber of objects present in the security X-ray images
and lack of homogeneity in grey levels within the
same object (tumours in medical images have a
homogeneous structure). In an ideal situation, a
computer-based imaging system will automatically
47
select the appropriate enhancement algorithm on a
per image basis such that this improves the quality of
the image by at least 20% on an objective scale that
correlates well with the human perception.
Burrows et al. [15] discuss how the quality of
images can be improved for visual inspection. Specif-
ically they attempt to locate components, such as a
detonator, wires and (less successfully) plastic ex-
plosive, which would constitute a bomb. Standard
thresholding techniques to extract lead solder, for ex-
ample, do not use any spatial information. By using
prior knowledge, a number of contextual techniques
have been explored. They use a deblurring algorithm
on the image that is convolved with a blurred point
spread function and then deconvolved with a prior
encouraging neighbouring pixels to be alike. The
results obtained always seem to improve the visual
quality of images.
In addition to improving the quality of images, at-
tention direction mechanisms are extremely useful for
screening operators. The issues surrounding e-ective
interface designs and pointing mechanisms have not
been fully researched. Security-based devices present
the overall image or information to a human operator
for decision making. By using software tools to point
attention in the images to certain areas or presenting
the most important part of the information only, the
performance of visual inspection can be improved.
Automated detection of explosives requires that
the computer analysis can automatically di-erenti-
ate between explosives and harmless substances. As
input, the system will have image or n-dimensional
data for analysis. From the images themselves, an
n-dimensional vector of features per object present
needs to be derived in order to characterise them.
This process will involve image enhancement, image
segmentation, feature extraction and classi9cation.
We detail these brieJy.
3.1.1. Image enhancement
Most images are corrupted by noise at di-erent
levels and of di-erent distributions. The current
X-ray images appear either as grey scale or if taken
with a brown 9lter, di-erent shades of brown (light
yellow to black). The images are to be enhanced such
that the edge information should not be lost [81].
The role of the image enhancement algorithm should
be to manipulate the contrast between objects and
48 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
their background, and to clearly present the visual
structures within objects or associated with them. A
variety of simplistic enhancement algorithms such as
histogram equalisation, low-pass and high-pass 9lters
are not suited to this and specialist algorithms are
needed.
3.1.2. Image segmentation
Before any object can be labelled as suspicious,
it must be isolated from all others. Image segmenta-
tion groups pixels into regions that have some form
of homogeneity. There is signi9cant evidence from
radiological research in medicine that conventional
image segmentation algorithms are not suited to im-
ages encountered with unimodal distributions as in
our case. A number of suitable image segmentation
methods have been designed for X-rays and simi-
lar images [106]. The quality of image segmentation
can be further improved by using relaxation labelling
[119].
A image thresholding method has been used by
Paranjape et al. [87] for the segmentation of X-ray im-
ages. In this method, histogram information of grey
levels is used to segment the image. Thresholding
method is only useful where the image contains a few
objects and each object is in strong contrast to the oth-
ers. The method is best suited for solid objects but not
so much for textile objects with considerable variation.
Boundary-based methods are based on the following
principle: the grey level di-erence of two boundary
pixels that belong to two di-erent neighbouring re-
gions is much larger than the di-erence between pixels
of the same region. Region-based methods use homo-
geneity in image regions for their segmentation and
hybrid methods combine the boundary and region in-
formation for e-ective segmentation.
3.1.3. Feature extraction
In X-ray images, the image processing part could
involve the detection of objects with speci9c colour
(dark objects have higher density and a higher chance
of being explosives) or speci9c shape (elongated ob-
jects can be detonators, weapons such as knives, etc.).
In the case of colour analysis, the distribution of grey
levels of illicit objects could be modelled and in test
images each pixel can be evaluated how likely it is
that it comes from an illicit object. Shape analysis can
also play an important part [67,82], however, it has
been suggested recently that such analysis is only of
limited use considering the variety of objects, schemes
to conceal objects and overlapping objects in luggage
[69]. A summary of state-of-the art methods on shape
analysis is available in Loncaric [68]. Additional cues
on depth can be obtained with performing a 3D image
analysis, by studying shape from shading. By observ-
ing the shading e-ects in grey scale and its texture,
cues to the 3D structure of the object can be obtained.
Hardly any work has been done in this area for explo-
sives detection.
3.1.4. Classi>cation
A number of classi9ers are available for the dis-
crimination of data from di-erent classes. In particu-
lar, previous studies in the area of explosives detection
have used both linear methods [104] and non-linear
methods (e.g. [36]).
A number of studies addressed the issue of au-
tomated image analysis. These studies, however,
only apply very basic image processing and pat-
tern recognition tools. Feather et al. [36] describe a
computer-assisted screening system that involves an
image processing stage and an object classi9cation
stage. During the image processing stage, noise is
suppressed, image is restored and distinct regions
corresponding to di-erent objects are located. A neu-
ral network is used for object classi9cation based on
extracted features from the image.
Reis [90] describes a two-stage X-ray detection sys-
tem. In the 9rst stage, a standard luggage inspection
system is used with improved material inspection abil-
ity. Only those objects that are labelled dangerous at
the 9rst stage are taken to the second stage that uses
X-ray di-raction. This produces a high degree of reli-
ability with less number of false alarms. On average,
one items takes 15 s for the complete system. If the
article is dangerous after the second stage, an alarm
sounds.
Wilder et al. [124] use an X-ray di-raction spec-
tra. Features are extracted from these spectra and used
with a neural tree network to recognise explosives.
Bla-ert [9] tried to prove that peak detection and
spectra identi9cation techniques developed for X-ray
di-raction and IR spectroscopy can be used for ex-
plosive detection. This study used a CXRS luggage
scanner to collect spectral data.
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
The main aim of the study by Liu [67] was to auto-
matically detect elongated objects such as detonator
using Gabor 9lters, Hough transform and information
fusion. This study looks at determining the size of
the detonator by modelling image geometry in terms
of the orientation of the object, angle of X-ray, etc.
To describe the orientation of the detonator, a plane
perpendicular to the conveyor and to the X-ray plane
that passes through the stationary slit will be used as
the reference plane. In this research, the image of a
detonator at orientation of the
=40 and =0 has an further computation can be done. This study also de-
image size of 32 23 pixels. The main steps of the
detection algorithm include: (a) 9rst use three sepa-
rate templates to detect the left, middle and right parts
of the detonator; (b) for all non-zero pixels in the
middle output, Hough transform is used in the middle
window to search for all possible lines; (c) fuse the
information to detect detonator. The 9rst step of tem-
plate matching, a suitable template is required which
will be convolved with the image whose output is
evaluated using a normalised cross-correlation mea-
sure. The drawbacks of template matching include:
(a) as the template is of small size, convolution with
the image is very time consuming; (b) it is di2cult
to distinguish between two objects on the basis of
simple template matching alone; (c) the method is
very sensitive to the orientation of the detonator. The
template is constructed by modelling a mask that will
generate maximum output for cylindrical objects. This
approach was found to be superior to the use of
Gabor 9lters where the real part was used for blob
detection and the imaginary part was used for edge
detection. The threshold for template matching is
determined empirically. The study evaluates the ap-
proach for the e-ects of object overlapping, luggage
position, and orientation variation.
Lu and Conner [70,71] and Lu [69] use both the
dual-energy and the scatter technology for generating
images. Based on the previous work of [129], illicit
materials can be separated from others using the RL
plane, where R is a quantity related to Ze- , and quan-
tity L is density related. These quantities can only be
calculated reliably from the images if the true grey
level of image pixels is known. The true grey level of
an object can be explained as follows: when an object
of interest is placed in air, and there is no background
objects appearing, the grey level measured is called
true grey level for that imaging modality. Lus study
49
develops a procedure to determine this true grey level
to improve the separability of objects in RL plane.
[69] states: Unfortunately, most existing systems
fail to develop very sophisticated image-processing
systems. In fact most research has ignored the need
to 9nd true grey levels.
Lus study also designs an algorithm for spatially
registering images. Image registration is important
since in multi-sensing technologies, objects in di-er-
ent imaging modalities need to be registered before
signs a robust image segmentation method for X-ray
images based on region and boundary methods. In
X-ray images, objects in a bag can be characterised
as textile objects or solid objects. It is not easy to seg-
ment solid objects because textile objects are usually
overlapped with solid objects because of their inherent
large grey level variations [71]. Lu [69] suggests four
approaches to X-ray image segmentation for security
applications: thresholding methods, boundary-based
methods, region-based methods and hybrid methods.
3.2. Computer-based training and assistance
It is well acknowledged that the amount of training
screeners receive is much less than required. A num-
ber of companies provide X-ray interpretation courses.
Participants can bring their own X-ray equipment or
make arrangements with the company to provide the
equipment. The training is usually based on portable
9lm-based, real-time and cabinet-type X-ray systems
and it can be conducted at clients site. Obviously,
training courses cost money. For example, for 1 day,
8 h course with up to eight students the training cost
can be between $3000 and $5000 including the in-
structor fee and travel expenses. The topics covered
by these courses which are based on one-third lectures
and two-thirds hands-on-training include: (i) details of
recent domestic and international incidents; (ii) details
of bombs and improvised explosive devices; (iii) in-
formation on radiation safety; (iv) information on the
operation of X-ray machines; (v) details of standard
operative procedures; (vi) bomb recognition points;
(vii) X-ray interpretation; and (vii) suspicious articles
procedure.
Unfortunately, such training is not regularly pro-
vided to screeners and only a few hours of training is
available considering the high cost. This increases the
50 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
risk of missing to spot dangerous articles as these are
well concealed and appear in a variety of shapes. In
addition, as security screening is monotonous, keep-
ing concentration is not easy.
It has been universally accepted that computers can
be used in a number of ways to improve the training
of screening personnel. First, computers can be used
for generating test pictures that contain objectionable
items to a variety of complexity. These images can
be used in isolation for training purposes or mixed
with on-line images to test whether the operator is
actively e2cient. In May 1998, FAA announced that
it will introduce computer-based security screening
training. This is a module of the screener pro9ciency
evaluation and reporting system (SPEARS) which
has been developed by FAA to train, evaluate, and
monitor the performance of employees who oper-
ate X-ray screening checkpoints. Airlines can use
SPEARS to recruit e2cient candidates. FAA awarded
Safe Passage International $11 million contract to
install the SPEARS computer-based training work-
stations and train instructors. In the year 2000, FAA
along with Rapiscan Security Products and Perkin
Elmer
Instruments received the innovation award for
generating the threat-projection system (TIP). TIP
can randomly project computer generated images of
hundreds of guns, knives and bombs to keep screen-
ers alert and test their skills at detecting dangerous
objects. When the screener detects a threat and pushes
the button, TIP Jashes a congratulations message and
records the screeners performance. TIP also records
missed threat images. The system will help train
screeners and monitor their performance. In July 2000
FAA announced $120 million worth of three contracts
to Rapiscan, PerkinElmer and Heimann Systems to
purchase 800 TIP installed X-ray machines from each
vendor. By 2003, all machines with have the TIP
ability.
4. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed some of the screen-
ing methods to prevent the use of conventional
explosives to threaten aircraft safety. The review of
techniques to prevent biological weapons is outside
the scope of this article but presents a real threat. There
are several problems why e-ective screening con-
tinue to present a challenge for years to come. First,
the terrorists are moving towards non-conventional
explosives that are easy to obtain and synthesize
at home [86] and it makes their detection di2cult.
Obviously, research e-ort is needed to tackle such
non-conventional explosives. Second, because explo-
sive detection systems are used to screen the luggage
of foreign nationals, the acceptance criteria must be
internationally agreed. This process is outlined by
Murray and Riordon [80]. It has been suggested that
from basic research to implementation of technolo-
gies in the real-world, it takes roughly 10 years and
getting agreement from various aviation agencies
and government further delays this process. Third,
not all research can be translated into commercial
products. Approximately 107 pieces of luggage are
checked every year at large international airports such
as Heathrow [110]. This translates into an inspection
time of 6 s/item. Unfortunately the systems that gen-
erate the lowest alarm rates are also the slowest ones
and unable to meet the 6 s inspection window criteria.
As a result of this, multi-level screening is becom-
ing more popular and automatic threat recognition
systems are now in demand.
There are a number of factors that will determine
the popularity of detection methods:
1. Detectors need to be fast so that the travellers are
not inconvenienced and accurate to 9nd any explo-
sives no matter how well hidden.
2. The number of false alarms should be very low.
3. The explosive material should be visually dis-
tinguishable from other material for image-based
methods.
4. The cost of the technology should be low.
5. There should be ways of keeping human operators
alert for systems that need them.
Undoubtedly, research must focus on computational
signal analysis and pattern recognition techniques.
These techniques must have the required sensitivity
and speci9city for the task of detecting explosives.
The basic features of several di-erent technologies
for explosive and narcotics detection which are avail-
able in commercial devices, from the viewpoint of
sensitivity, selectivity, response time, complexity,
cost and health hazards, are listed by Cable [16].
Hyatt et al. [53] advocate stringent methods based
on probability theory to be applied for performance
 S. Singh, M. Singh / Signal Processing 83 (2003) 31 55
characterisation of screening system. Speller [110]
states that in the area of aviation security, much can
be learnt from the experiences of medical computer
aided diagnosis (CAD) systemsautomated systems
have been produced but none is clinically being used
as they do not meet the clinical requirements. Since
most laboratory-based research cannot be conducted
using real explosives, an area of research is the de-
velopment of good quality simulants, as using real
explosives for getting data for analysis can be danger-
ous [26]. Explosive simulants are proper substitutes
for real explosives and inert by nature with accurately
controlled physical properties. They can reliably du-
plicate characteristics such as density and e-ective
atomic number of the explosives [109]. Early simu-
lants were rigid plastics with limited utility. Currently
a number of simulants are in use (see Lu [69] for
details). In addition to simulants, other test objects
are often also considered for studies such as plastic,
aluminium and steel wedges.
We expect that this review will provide a good
background to researchers in signal processing, image
analysis and pattern recognition communities about
explosives detection systems to encourage further
work from the point of view of signal analysis rather
than signal generation. For several years, the com-
mercial companies and other agencies have thought
that better screening performances are only possible
by better quality hardwarewith an increased role
of computers for signal processing, there is no doubt
that much is to be gained from the computational
analysis of data and images from such hardware.
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