2nd batch:

ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY)

G.R. No. 72616-17
March 8, 1989
FRAMANLIS FARMS, INC., ELOISA SYCIP and LINCOLN SYCIP, petitioners vs.HON.
MINISTER OF
LABOR, MANILA, respondent
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS: In 1980, 18 employees of the petitioners filed against their employer, alleging that in
1977 to 1979 they were not paid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) minimum wage,
13th month pay, holiday pay, and service incentive leave pay. In their answer to the amended
complaint, petitioners alleged that the private respondents were not regular workers on their
hacienda but were migratory or pakyaw workers who worked on-and-off and were hired
seasonally, or only during the milling season, to do piece-work on the farms, hence, they were
not entitled to the benefits claimed by them. They also alleged that under the decrees, the living
allowance shall be paid on a monthly, not percentage, basis depending on the total assets or
authorized capital stock of the employer, whichever is higher and applicable. They admitted that
their total assets and authorized capital stock exceeded P2 million. However, in 1977 they had
applied for exemption under PDs 525 and 1123 but no ruling has been issued by the Ministry of
Labor on their application. The claims for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, social
amelioration bonus and underpayment of minimum wage were not controverted. With respect
to
the complainants' other claims, the petitioners submitted only random payrolls which showed
that the women workers were underpaid as they were receiving an average daily wage of P5.94
only, although the male workers received P10 more or less, per day.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employees are entitled to their thirteenth month pay.

HELD: The respondents argued that they substantially complied with the law by giving their
workers a yearly bonus and other non-monetary benefits amounting to not less than 1/12th of
their basic salary, in the form of:1.a weekly subsidy of choice pork meat for only P9.00 per kilo
and later increased to P11 per kilo in March 1980, instead of the market price of P10 to P15 per
kilo; 2.free choice pork meat in May and December of every year; and 3.free light or electricity;
4.all of which were allegedly "the equivalent" of the 13th month pay. Unfortunately, under
Section 3 of PD No. 851, such benefits in the form of food or free electricity, assuming they
were given, were not a proper substitute for the 13th month pay required by law. The failure of
the Minister's decision to identify the pakyaw and non-pakyaw workers does not render said
decision invalid. The workers may be identified or determined in the proceedings for execution
of the judgment. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed with costs against the
petitioners.

PHILIPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS INC VS DRILON

G.R. No. 81958
Date: June 30, 1988
Petitioner: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.,
Respondents: Hon. Franklin M. Drilon as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and Tomas D.
Achacoso,
as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.

FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988,
of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "Guidelines Governing The
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers."
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and
that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing
the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in
the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General
invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Department Order No. 1 in the police power measure is valid under the
Constitution?

HELD:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare."

Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic
policy
to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making
authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the
Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands
because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has
evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such
protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.

The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its
authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain
countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.

The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the
impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief
prayed for.