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Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
G.R. No. 157802. October 13, 2010
As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or other
employee of a private employer is properly cognizable by
the LA. This is pursuant to Article 217 (a) 2 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which provides as follows:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
Commission.
a. Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without
extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural
or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those
cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this
Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social
Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims
arising from employer-employee relations, including those
of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
b. The Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
c. Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation
of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by
referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said
agreements. (As amended by Section 9, Republic Act No.
6715, March 21, 1989)
G.R. No. 157802. October 13, 2010
In this case, respondent was appointed vice president for
nationwide expansion by MMM, petitioner's general
manager, not by the board of directors of petitioner. It was
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also MMM who determined the compensation package of
respondent. Thus, respondent was an employee, not a
"corporate officer." The CA was therefore correct in ruling
that jurisdiction over the case was properly with the NLRC,
not the SEC (now the RTC).
G.R. No. 157802. October 13, 2010
The criteria for distinguishing between corporate officers
who may be ousted from office at will, on one hand, and
ordinary corporate employees who may only be terminated
for just cause, on the other hand, do not depend on the
nature of the services performed, but on the manner of
creation of the office. In the respondent's case, he was
supposedly at once an employee, a stockholder, and a
Director of Matling.
The circumstances surrounding his appointment to office
must be fully considered to determine whether the
dismissal constituted an intra-corporate controversy or a
labor termination dispute. We must also consider whether
his status as Director and stockholder had any relation at all
to his appointment and subsequent dismissal as Vice
President for Finance and Administration.
G.R. No. 160302. September 27, 2010
Conformably with the long honored principle of a fair day's
wage for a fair day's labor, employees dismissed for joining
an illegal strike are not entitled to backwages for the period
of the strike even if they are reinstated by virtue of their
being merely members of the striking union who did not
commit any illegal act during the strike.
G.R. No. 160302. September 27, 2010.
Art. 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services
of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of his actual reinstatement. (As amended by Section
34, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
By its use of the phrase unjustly dismissed, Article 279
refers to a dismissal that is unjustly done, that is, the
employer dismisses the employee without observing due
process, either substantive or procedural. Substantive due
process requires the attendance of any of the just or
authorized causes for terminating an employee as provided
under Article 278 (termination by employer), or Article 283
(closure of establishment and reduction of personnel), or
Article 284 (disease as ground for termination), all of the
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Labor Code; while procedural due process demands
compliance with the twin-notice requirement.
In contrast, the third paragraph of Article 264 (a) states:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.
a work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed
xxx xxx xxx
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission
of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, That mere participation
of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such
lawful strike.
Contemplating two causes for the dismissal of an
employee, that is: (a) unlawful lockout; and (b) participation
in an illegal strike, the third paragraph of Article 264 (a)
authorizes the award of full backwages only when the
termination of employment is a consequence of an
unlawful lockout. On the consequences of an illegal strike,
the provision distinguishes between a union officer and a
union member participating in an illegal strike. A union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike is
deemed to have lost his employment status, but a union
member who is merely instigated or induced to participate
in the illegal strike is more benignly treated. Part of the
explanation for the benign consideration for the union
member is the policy of reinstating rank-and-le workers
who are misled into supporting illegal strikes, absent any
finding that such workers committed illegal acts during the
period of the illegal strikes.
G.R. No. 160302. September 27, 2010.
As a general rule, backwages are granted to indemnify a
dismissed employee for his loss of earnings during the
whole period that he is out of his job. Considering that an
illegally dismissed employee is not deemed to have left his
employment, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges
that accrue to him from the employment. The grant of
backwages to him is in furtherance and effectuation of the
public objectives of the Labor Code, and is in the nature of
a command to the employer to make a public reparation
for his illegal dismissal of the employee in violation of the
Labor Code.
That backwages are not granted to employees participating
in an illegal strike simply accords with the reality that they
do not render work for the employer during the period of
the illegal strike.
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G.R. No. 160302. September 27, 2010.
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair day's
wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor in
determining the award thereof. If there is no work
performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay
unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to
or otherwise illegally prevented from working.
The Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is
required that the strike be legal, a situation that does not
obtain in the case at bar.
G.R. No. 160302. September 27, 2010.
Under the principle of a fair day's wage for a fair day's
labor, the petitioners were not entitled to the wages during
the period of the strike (even if the strike might be legal),
because they performed no work during the strike. Verily, it
was neither fair nor just that the dismissed employees
should litigate against their employer on the latter's time.
Thus, the Court deleted the award of backwages and held
that the striking workers were entitled only to
reinstatement considering that the striking employees did
not render work for the employer during the strike.
G.R. No. 160302. September 27, 2010.
To safeguard the spirit of social justice that the Court has
advocated in favor of the working man, therefore, the right
to reinstatement is to be considered renounced or waived
only when the employee unjustifiably or unreasonably
refuses to return to work upon being so ordered or after
the employer has offered to reinstate him.
G.R. No. 160302. September 27, 2010.
Separation pay is made an alternative relief in lieu of
reinstatement in certain circumstances, like:
(a) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of
the passage of a long period of time or because of the
realities of the situation;
(b) reinstatement is inimical to the employer's interest;
(c) reinstatement is no longer feasible;
(d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the
parties involved;
(e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment;
(f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have
supervened; or
(g) strained relations between the employer and employee.
Here, PINA manifested that the reinstatement of the
petitioners would not be feasible because: (a) it would
"inflict disruption and oppression upon the employer"; (b)
"petitioners [had] stayed away" for more than 15 years; (c)
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its machines had depreciated and had been replaced with
newer, better ones; and (d) it now sold goods through
independent distributors, thereby abolishing the positions
related to sales and distribution.
Under the circumstances, the grant of separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement of the petitioners was proper. It is not
disputable that the grant of separation pay or some other
financial assistance to an employee is based on equity,
which has been defined as justice outside law, or as being
ethical rather than jural and as belonging to the sphere of
morals than of law. This Court has granted separation pay
as a measure of social justice even when an employee has
been validly dismissed, as long as the dismissal has not
been due to serious misconduct or reflective of personal
integrity or morality.
G.R. No. 153511
There is no longer any doubt that a petition for certiorari
brought to assail the decision of the NLRC may raise factual
issues, and the CA may then review the decision of the
NLRC and pass upon such factual issues in the process. The
power of the CA to review factual issues in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is based on
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which pertinently
provides that the CA "shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings."
G.R. No. 153511
The issue of whether or not an employer-employee
relationship existed between petitioner and respondent is
essentially a question of fact. The factors that determine
the issue include who has the power to select the
e plo ee, ho pa s the e plo ees ages, ho has the
power to dismiss the employee, and who exercises control
of the methods and results by which the work of the
employee is accomplished. Although no particular form of
evidence is required to prove the existence of the
relationship, and any competent and relevant evidence to
prove the relationship may be admitted, a finding that the
relationship exists must nonetheless rest on substantial
evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
G.R. No. 153511
Petitioner could not seek refuge behind the service
contract entered into with respondent. It is the law that
defines and governs an employment relationship, whose
terms are not restricted to those fixed in the written
contract, for other factors, like the nature of the work the
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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employee has been called upon to perform, are also
considered. The law affords protection to an employee, and
does not countenance any attempt to subvert its spirit and
intent. Any stipulation in writing can be ignored when the
employer utilizes the stipulation to deprive the employee of
his security of tenure. The inequality that characterizes
employer-employee relations generally tips the scales in
favor of the employer, such that the employee is often
scarcely provided real and better options.
G.R. No. 153511
Respo de ts e u e atio , al eit de o i ated as tale t
fees, was still considered as included in the term wage in
the sense and context of the Labor Code, regardless of how
petitioner chose to designate the remuneration. Anent this,
Article 97(f) of the Labor Code clearly states:
xxx wage paid to any employee shall mean the
remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of
being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or
other method of calculating the same, which is payable by
an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten
contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for
services rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair
and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of
Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily
furnished by the employer to the employee.
Clearly, respondent received compensation for the services
he e de ed as a pia ist i petitio e s hotel. Petitio e
cannot use the service contract to rid itself of the
consequences of its employment of respondent. There is no
denying that whatever amounts he received for his
performance, howsoever designated by petitioner, were his
wages.
G.R. No. 153511
That respondent worked for less than eight hours/day was
of o o se ue e a d did ot det a t f o the CAs
finding on the existence of the employer-employee
relationship. In providing that the " normal hours of work of
any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day,"
Article 83 of the Labor Code only set a maximum of number
of hours as "normal hours of work" but did not prohibit
work of less than eight hours.
G.R. No. 153511
The power of the employer to control the work of the
employee is considered the most significant determinant of
the existence of an employer-employee relationship. This is
the so-called control test, and is premised on whether the
person for whom the services are performed reserves the
right to control both the end achieved and the manner and
means used to achieve that end.
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G.R. No. 153511
Retrenchment is one of the authorized causes for the
dismissal of employees recognized by the Labor Code. It is a
management prerogative resorted to by employers to avoid
or to minimize business losses. On this matter, Article 283
of the Labor Code states:
Article 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel. The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. xxx. In case of retrenchment to
prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months
shall be considered one (1) whole year.
G.R. No. 153511
The Court has laid down the following standards that an
employer should meet to justify retrenchment and to foil
abuse, namely:
(a) The expected losses should be substantial and not
merely de minimis in extent;
(b) The substantial losses apprehended must be reasonably
imminent;
(c) The retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and
likely to effectively prevent the expected losses; and
(d) The alleged losses, if already incurred, and the expected
imminent losses sought to be forestalled must be proved by
sufficient and convincing evidence.
Anent the last standard of sufficient and convincing
evidence, it ought to be pointed out that a less exacting
standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of
retrenchment as a ground for termination of services of
employees.
G.R. No. 153511
In termination cases, the burden of proving that the
dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause rests upon the
employer. Here, petitioner did not submit evidence of the
losses to its business operations and the economic havoc it
would thereby imminently sustain. It only claimed that
espo de ts te i atio as due to its "p ese t
business/financial condition." This bare statement fell short
of the norm to show a valid retrenchment. Hence, we hold
that there was no valid cause for the retrenchment of
respondent.
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Indeed, not every loss incurred or expected to be incurred
by an employer can justify retrenchment. The employer
must prove, among others, that the losses are substantial
and that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary to avert
such losses. Thus, by its failure to present sufficient and
convincing evidence to prove that retrenchment was
e essa , espo de ts te i atio due to et e h e t
is not allowed.
G.R. No. 153511
The Court realizes that the lapse of time since the
retrenchment might have rendered respondent's
reinstatement to his former job no longer feasible. If that
should be true, then petitioner should instead pay to him
separation pay at the rate of one. month pay for every year
of service computed from September 1992 (when he
commenced to work for the petitioners) until the finality of
this decision, and full backwages from the time his
compensation was withheld until the finality of this
decision.
G.R. No. 160444
The employment of seafarers, and its incidents, including
claims for death benefits, are governed by the contracts
they sign every time they are hired or rehired. Such
contracts have the force of law between the parties as long
as their stipulations are not contrary to law, morals, public
order or public policy. While the seafarers and their
employers are governed by their mutual agreements, the
POEA rules and regulations require that the POEA SEC,
which contains the standard terms and conditions of the
seafa e s e plo e t i fo eig o ea -going vessels, be
i teg ated i e e seafa e s o t a t.
G.R. No. 160444
The one tasked to determine whether the seafarer suffers
from any disability or is fit to work is the company-
designated physician. As such, the seafarer must submit
himself to the company-designated physician for a post
employment medical examination within three days from
his repatriation. But the assessment of the company-
designated physician is not final, binding or conclusive on
the seafarer, the labor tribunals, or the courts. The seafarer
may request a second opinion and consult a physician of his
choice regarding his ailment or injury, and the medical
report issued by the physician of his choice shall also be
evaluated on its inherent merit by the labor tribunal and
the court.
G.R. No. 163700
The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a
question of fact. Generally, a re-examination of factual
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findings cannot be done by the Court acting on a petition
for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of
facts but reviews only questions of law. Nor may the Court
be bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence adduced
and considered in the proceedings below. This rule is not
absolute, however, and admits of exceptions. For one, the
Court may look into factual issues in labor cases when the
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA
are conflicting.
G.R. No. 163700
Moreover, in determining the presence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship, the Court has consistently
looked for the following incidents, to wit:
(a) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) the payment of wages;
(c) the power of dismissal; and
d the e plo e s po e to o t ol the e plo ee o the
means and methods by which the work is accomplished.
The last element, the so-called control test, is the most
important element.
G.R. No. 157086
In a petition filed by a legitimate labor organization
involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter
shall, pursuant to Article 257 of the Code, automatically
order the conduct of certification election after
determining that the petition has complied with all
requirements under Section 1, 2 and 4 of the same rules
and that none of the grounds for dismissal thereof exists,
the order for the conduct of a certification election is
proper.
G.R. No. 157900
The cessation of business was not a bona fide closure to be
regarded as a valid ground for the termination of
employment within the ambit of Article 283 of the Labor
Code. The provision pertinently reads:
Article 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel. The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. x x x.
G.R. No. 159371
Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
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the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary and desirable to the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or service to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration
of the season.
xxxx
A project employee is, therefore, one who is hired for a
specific project or undertaking, and the completion or
termination of such project or undertaking has been
determined at the time of engagement of the employee. In
the context of the law, Bello was a project employee of
DMCI at the beginning of their employer-employee
relationship. The project employment contract they then
entered into clearly gave notice to him at the time of his
engagement about his employment being for a specific
project or phase of work. He was also thereby notified of
the duration of the project, and the determinable
completion date of the project.
Ho e e , the histo of BBBs appoi t e t a d
employment showed that he performed his tasks as a
aso i DDDs various constructions projects. Bello
acquired in time the status of a regular employee by virtue
of his continuous work as a mason of DDD. The work of a
mason like him a skilled workman working with stone or
similar material was really related to building or
constructing, and was undoubtedly a function necessary
and desirable to the business or trade of one engaged in
the construction industry like DDD. His being hired as a
mason by DDD in not one, but several of its projects
revealed his necessity and desirability to its construction
business.
G.R. No. 159371
It is settled that the extension of the employment of a
project employee long after the supposed project has been
completed removes the employee from the scope of a
project employee and makes him a regular employee. In
this ega d, the le gth of ti e of the e plo ees se i e,
while not a controlling determinant of project employment,
is a strong factor in determining whether he was hired for a
specific undertaking or in fact tasked to perform functions
vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer.
It is settled that the extension of the employment of a
project employee long after the supposed project has been
completed removes the employee from the scope of a
project employee and makes him a regular employee. In
this ega d, the le gth of ti e of the e plo ees se i e,
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while not a controlling determinant of project employment,
is a strong factor in determining whether he was hired for a
specific undertaking or in fact tasked to perform functions
vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer.
G.R. No. 159371
It is axiomatic in labor law that the employer who
interposes the defense of voluntary resignation of the
employee in an illegal dismissal case must prove by clear,
positive and convincing evidence that the resignation was
voluntary; and that the employer cannot rely on the
weakness of the defense of the employee. The requirement
rests on the need to resolve any doubt in favor of the
working man.
The o ke s lai that he had ee led to elie e that the
letter would serve only as the means of extending his sick
leave from work should have alerted DDD to the task of
proving the voluntariness of the resignation. It was obvious
that, if his claim was true, then he did not fully comprehend
the import of the letter, rendering the resignation farcical.
The doubt would then be justifiably raised against the letter
being at all intended to end his employment. Under the
circumstances, DDD became burdened with the obligation
to prove the due execution and genuineness of the
document as a letter of resignation.
G.R. No. 160982
The valid termination of an employee may either be for just
causes under Article 282 or for authorized causes under
Article 283 and Article 284, all of the Labor Code.
Spe ifi all , loss of the e plo e s t ust a d o fide e is a
just cause under Article 282 (c), a provision that ideally
applies only to cases involving an employee occupying a
position of trust and confidence, or to a situation where the
employee has been routinely charged with the care and
ustod of the e plo e s o e o p ope t . But the loss
of trust and confidence, to be a valid ground for dismissal,
must be based on a willful breach of trust and confidence
founded on clearly established facts. "A breach is willful, if it
is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It
ust est o su sta tial g ou ds a d ot o the e plo e s
arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the
employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the
employer." An ordinary breach is not enough.
Moreover, the loss of trust and confidence must be related
to the e plo ees pe fo a e of duties.
G.R. No. 160982
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Loss of confidence, as a just cause for termination of
employment, is premised on the fact that the employee
concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and
confidence. He must be invested with confidence on
delicate matters such as the custody, handling, care and
p ote tio of the e plo e s p ope t a d/o fu ds. But i
order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be "work-related" such as would show
the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working
for the employer.
As a selling teller, TTT held a position of trust and
confidence. The nature of her employment required her to
handle and keep in custody the tickets issued and the bets
made in her assigned selling station. The bets were funds
belonging to her employer. Although the act complained of
the unauthorized cancellation of the ticket (i.e.,
unauthorized because it was done without the consent of
the bettor) was related to her work as a selling teller,
MMM did not establish that the cancellation of the ticket
was intentional, knowing and purposeful on her part in
order for her to have breached the trust and confidence
reposed in her by MMM, instead of being only out of an
honest mistake.
G.R. No. 160982
In this regard, we have to stress that the loss of trust and
confidence as a ground for the dismissal of an employee
must also be shown to be genuine, for, as the Court has
aptly pointed out: "x x x loss of confidence should not be
simulated in order to justify what would otherwise be,
under the provisions of law, an illegal dismissal. It should
not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal,
improper and unjustified. It must be genuine, not a mere
afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith."
G.R. No. 160982
The procedure to be followed in the termination of
employment based on just causes is laid down in Section 2
(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor
Code, to wit:
Section 2. Security of Tenure. --
xxxx
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the
ground or grounds for termination, and giving said
employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is
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given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the
employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination. In case of termination, the foregoing notices
shall be served on the employee's last known address.
G.R. No. 160982
Confrontation of witnesses is required only in adversarial
criminal prosecutions, and not in company investigations
for the administrative liability of the employee.
Additionally, actual adversarial proceedings become
necessary only for clarification, or when there is a need to
propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies. This is not an inherent right, and in company
investigations, summary proceedings may be conducted.
G.R. No. 160982
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to her
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges, and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.
In case the reinstatement is no longer possible, however,
an award of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, will be
justified. The Court has ruled that reinstatement is no
longer possible: (a) when the former position of the illegally
dismissed employee no longer exists; or (b) when the
e plo e s usi ess has losed do ; o he the
employer-employee relationship has already been strained
as to render the reinstatement impossible. The Court
likewise considered reinstatement to be non-feasible
because a "considerable time" has lapsed between the
dismissal and the resolution of the case. In that regard, a
lag of eight years or ten years is sufficient to justify an
award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
G.R. No. 161596
Although the decision of the DOLE Secretary dated
December 5, 1991 had required employer to reinstate the
affected workers to their former positions with full
backwages reckoned from December 8, 1989 until actually
reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other
benefits, the reinstatement thus decreed was no longer
possible. Hence, separation pay was instead paid to them.
This alternative was sustained in law and jurisprudence, for
"separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if
reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest
of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may
likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be
reinstated."
G.R. No. 161596
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The computation of separation pay and backwages due to
illegally dismissed employees should not go beyond the
date when they were deemed to have been actually
separated from their employment, or beyond the date
when their reinstatement was rendered impossible. Anent
this, the Court has observed:
The basis for the payment of backwages is different from
that for the award of separation pay. Separation pay is
granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable
because of strained relations between the employee and
the employer. Backwages represent compensation that
should have been earned but were not collected because of
the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is
usuall the le gth of the e plo ees se i e hile that fo
separation pay is the actual period when the employee was
unlawfully prevented from working.
G.R. No. 161596
[T]he award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding
that there was no illegal dismissal, for under Article 279 of
the Labor Code and as held in a catena of cases, an
employee who is dismissed without just cause and without
due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or
payment of separation pay in lieu thereof:
Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two
reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs
provided are separate and distinct. In instances where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained
relations between the employee and the employer,
separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and
backwages.
The o al o se ue es of espo de ts illegal dismissal,
then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and
payment of backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the date of actual
reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as
an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
salary for every year of service should be awarded as
an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition
to payment of backwages.
G.R. No. 162385
The onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed
or, if dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests on
the employer, and the failure to discharge the onus would
mean that the dismissal was not justified and was illegal.
Employer tendered no showing outside of his mere
allegations to substantiate his averment of abandonment
by employee. Moreover, although employee had
undoubtedly stopped working, his doing so had been for a
justifiable reason, consisting in the non-payment of his
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Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
salary since November and his being forced to stop working
to enable him to seek employment elsewhere, albeit
temporarily, in order to survive.
G.R. No. 162385
Under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, an employer may
te i ate a e plo ees e plo e t o the g ou d of the
latte s f aud o illful ea h of the t ust a d o fidence
reposed in him. For loss of trust and confidence to
constitute a sufficient ground for termination, the employer
must have a reasonable ground to believe, if not to
entertain the moral conviction, that the employee was
responsible for the misconduct, and that the nature of his
participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of
the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
We note that AAA was a managerial employee whom BBB
had vested with confidence on delicate matters, such as the
custod , ha dli g, a e a d p ote tio of SMs p ope ties
and funds, as well as its operations and transactions in
Region VIII. AAA was shown to have failed to account for
a d to tu o e his sales olle tio s. I that ega d, BBBs
filing of the criminal case against AAA and the public
p ose uto s fi di g of a p i a fa ie ase fo the offe se
charged after preliminary investigation amounted to
su sta tial e ide e of AAAs ea h of the t ust a d
confidence reposed in him, a just cause to terminate the
employment based on loss of trust and confidence.
G.R. No. 162385
The employer had the obligation to send two written
notices before finally dismissing AAA. Article 277 of the
Labor Code, as amended, enunciated this requirement of
two written notices, viz:
Article 277. Miscellaneous provisions. x x x
xxxx
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security
of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of
this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for termination and
shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if
he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken
by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of
the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal
by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of
proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment may suspend the
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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effects of the termination pending resolution of the dispute
in the event of a prima facie finding by the appropriate
official of the Department of Labor and Employment before
whom such dispute is pending that the termination may
cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a
mass lay-off.
The requirement was also imposed in the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code.
The first written notice would inform AAA of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal was being sought.
The second written notice would notify him of the
e plo e s de isio to dis iss hi . But the se o d itte
notice must not be made until after he was given a
reasonable period after receiving the first written notice
within which to answer the charge, and after he was given
the ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative, if he so desired.
The requirement was mandatory.
AAAs e eipt of the de a d lette f o SM to etu the
money was certainly not even a substantial compliance
with the twin-notice requirement, because the purpose of
the demand letter was different from those defined for the
sending of the required notices. Nor was he thereby
allowed a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to be
notified of his impending termination.
G.R. No. 163431
Willful disobedience to the lawful orders of an employer is
one of the valid grounds to terminate an employee under
Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code.
For willful disobedience to be a ground, it is required that:
(a) the conduct of the employee must be willful or
intentional; and
(b) the order the employee violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must
pertain to the duties that he had been engaged to
discharge.
Willfulness must be attended by a wrongful and perverse
mental attitude rendering the employees a t i o siste t
with proper subordination. In any case, the conduct of the
employee that is a valid ground for dismissal under the
Labor Code constitutes harmful behavior against the
business interest or person of his employer. It is implied
that in every act of willful disobedience, the erring
employee obtains undue advantage detrimental to the
business interest of the employer.
G.R. No. 163431
The spirit of our Constitution and laws is to lean over
backwards in favor of the working class, and with the
mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their favor.
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Although we recognize the inherent right of the employer
to discipline its employees, we should still ensure that the
employer exercises the prerogative to discipline humanely
and considerately, and that the sanction imposed is
commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of
the infraction. The discipline exacted by the employer
should fu the o side the e plo ees le gth of se i e
and the number of infractions during his employment. The
employer should never forget that always at stake in
disciplining its employee are not only his position but also
his livelihood, and that he may also have a family entirely
dependent on his earnings.
G.R. No. 164662
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes by
which the employer may validly terminate the employment
of the employee, viz:
Article 282.Termination by employer. - An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The CA rightly observed that proof beyond reasonable
doubt of her violation of the trust was not required, for it
was sufficient that the employer had "reasonable grounds
to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for
the misconduct as to be unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by [her] position."
G.R. No. 164662
The evidence on record is bereft of any indicia that the two
written notices were furnished to DJ prior to her dismissal.
The various memoranda given her were not the same
notices required by law, as they were mere internal
correspondences intended to remind DJ of her outstanding
accountabilities to the company. Assuming for the sake of
argument that the memoranda furnished to DJ may have
satisfied the minimum requirements of due process, still,
the same did not satisfy the notice requirement under the
Labo Code e ause the i te tio to se e the e plo ees
services must be made clear in the notice. Such was not
apparent from the memoranda.
As the Supreme Court held in Serrano, the violation of the
notice requirement is not strictly a denial of due process.
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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This is because such notice is precisely intended to enable
the employee not only to prepare himself for the legal
battle to protect his tenure of employment, but also to find
other means of employment and ease the impact of the
loss of his job and, necessarily, his income.
G.R. No. 164662
With respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if it is
shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the just
causes mentioned in said Art. 282, then, in accordance with
that article, he should not be reinstated. However, he must
be paid backwages from the time his employment was
terminated until it is determined that the termination of
employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear
him before he is dismissed renders the termination of his
employment without legal effect.
G.R. No. 164662
Under Agabon, the new doctrine is that the failure of the
employer to observe the requirements of due process in
favor of the dismissed employee (that is, the two-written
notices rule) should not invalidate or render ineffectual the
dismissal for just or authorized cause. The Agabon Court
plainly saw the likelihood of Serrano producing unfair but
far-reaching consequences, such as, but not limited to,
encouraging frivolous suits where even the most notorious
violators of company policies would be rewarded by
invoking due process; to having the constitutional policy of
providing protection to labor be used as a sword to oppress
the employers; and to compelling the employers to
continue employing persons who were admittedly guilty of
misfeasance or malfeasance and whose continued
employment would be patently inimical to the interest of
employers.
G.R. No. 187854
The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied
to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and
easo a le oppo tu it to e plai o es side, o a
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in
the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always
necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied.
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always
and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges
and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute
the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of
due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
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ad i ist ati e p o eedi gs, a oppo tu it to e plai o es
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
G.R. No. 187854
"To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has
been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to
actual or constructive notice of the institution of
p o eedi gs hi h a affe t a espo de ts legal ights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
o es fa o , a d to defe d o es ights; 3 a t i u al ested
with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford
a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee
of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.
G.R. No. 192601
A collective bargaining agreement (or CBA) refers to the
negotiated contract between a legitimate labor
organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of
work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a
bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes
the law between the parties and compliance therewith is
mandated by the express policy of the law.
Accordingly, the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
of the CBA, being the law between the parties, must be
complied with by them. The literal meaning of the
stipulations of the CBA, as with every other contract,
control if they are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties.
G.R. No. 192601
Social legislations contemporaneous with the execution of
the CBA have given a meaning to the term legal dependent.
First of all, Section 8(e) of the Social Security Law provides
that a dependent shall be the following, namely: (a) the
legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member; (b) the legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted,
and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
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employed and has not reached 21 of age, or, if over 21
years of age, is congenitally or while still a minor has been
permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally; and (c) the parent who is receiving
regular support from the member.
Secondly, Section 4(f) of R.A. No. 7875, as amended by R.A.
No. 9241, enumerates who are the legal dependents, to
wit: (a) the legitimate spouse who is not a member; (b) the
unmarried and unemployed legitimate, legitimated,
illegitimate, acknowledged children as appearing in the
birth certificate; legally adopted or step-children below 21
years of age; (c) children who are 21 years old and order
but suffering from congenital disability, either physical or
mental, or any disability acquired that renders them totally
dependent on the member of our support; and (d) the
parents who are 60 years old or older whose monthly
income is below an amount to be determined by the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation in accordance with
the guiding principles set forth in Article I of R.A. No. 7875.
And, thirdly, Section 2(f) of Presidential Decree No. 1146, as
amended by R.A. No. 8291,dependent for support upon the
member or pensioner; (b) the legitimate, legitimated,
legally adopted child, including the illegitimate child, who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, not over the age of
majority, or is over the age of majority but incapacitated
and incapable of self-support due to a mental or physical
defect acquired prior to age of majority; and (c) the parents
dependent upon the member for support.
It is clear from these statutory definitions of dependent
that the civil status of the employee as either married or
single is not the controlling consideration in order that a
pe so a ualif as the e plo ees legal depe de t.
What is rather decidedly controlling is the fact that the
spouse, child, or parent is actually dependent for support
upon the employee.
G.R. No. 192601
Pursuant to Article 100 of the Labor Code, petitioner as the
employer could not reduce, diminish, discontinue or
eliminate any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by or
granted to its employees. This prohibition against the
diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional
mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote
their welfare and to afford labor full protection. The
application of the prohibition against the diminution of
benefits presupposes that a company practice, policy or
tradition favorable to the employees has been clearly
established; and that the payments made by the employer
pursuant to the practice, policy, or tradition have ripened
into benefits enjoyed by them.
G.R. No. 192601
To be considered as a practice, policy or tradition, however,
the giving of the benefits should have been done over a
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long period of time, and must be shown to have been
consistent and deliberate. It is relevant to mention that we
have not yet settled on the specific minimum number of
years as the length of time sufficient to ripen the practice,
policy or tradition into a benefit that the employer cannot
unilaterally withdraw.
G.R. No. 157633
As provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employer
may terminate an employee for a just cause, to wit:
Art. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER
An employer may terminate an employee for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative;
and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
G.R. No. 157633
Misconduct refers to the improper or wrong conduct that
transgresses some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
But misconduct or improper behavior, to be a just cause for
termination of employment, must:
(a) be serious;
elate to the pe fo a e ofthe e plo ees duties; a d
(c) show that the employee has become unfit to continue
working for the employer.
G.R. No. 158583
The just and valid causes for the dismissal of an employee,
as enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, include:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with her work;
(b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of her
duties;
(c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in her by her employer or duly authorized
representative;
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(d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of her employer or any immediate
member of her family or her duly authorized
representative; and
(e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
G.R. No. 158583
The dishonesty imputed to the petitioner included the
making of double entries in the production reports and
thereby enriching herself by pocketing the extra cash
generated from the double entries.
Dishonest act(s) committed by the complainant logically
triggers an erosion of the trust reposed upon him by his
employer and jurisprudence is explicit on the point that
when an employee has been guilty of breach of trust or his
employer has ample reason to distrust him, a labor tribunal
cannot deny the employer the authority to dismiss him.
G.R. No. 160107
Separation pay may [also] be awarded to an illegally
dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement.
Section 4(b), Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book VI of
the Labor Code provides the following instances when the
award of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement to an
illegally dismissed employee, is proper:
(a) when reinstatement is no longer possible, in cases
where the dismissed employee s position is no longer
available;
(b) the continued relationship between the employer and
the employee is no longer viable due to the strained
relations between them; and
(c) when the dismissed employee opted not to be
reinstated, or the payment of separation benefits would be
for the best interest of the parties involved.
In these instances, separation pay is the alternative remedy
to reinstatement in addition to the award of backwages.
The payment of separation pay and reinstatement are
exclusive remedies. The payment of separation pay
replaces the legal consequences of reinstatement to an
employee who was illegally dismissed.
G.R. No. 160827
The principle of non-diminution of benefits, which has been
incorporated in Article 100 of the Labor Code, forbade N
Inc. from unilaterally reducing, diminishing, discontinuing or
eliminating the practice. Verily, the phrase "supplements,
or other employee benefits" in Article 100 is construed to
mean the compensation and privileges received by an
employee aside from regular salaries or wages.
With regard to the length of time the company practice
should have been observed to constitute a voluntary
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employer practice that cannot be unilaterally reduced,
diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer,
we find that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule
requiring a specific minimum number of years.
G.R. No. 162021
The grant of a bonus or special incentive, being a
management prerogative, is not a demandable and
enforceable obligation, except when the bonus or special
incentive is made part of the wage, salary or compensation
of the employee, or is promised by the employer and
expressly agreed upon by the parties. By its very definition,
bonus is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver, and
a ot e o side ed pa t of a e plo ees ages if it is
paid only when profits are realized or a certain amount of
productivity is achieved. If the desired goal of production or
actual work is not accomplished, the bonus does not
accrue.
G.R. No. 172132
Basic in the realm of labor union rights is that the
certification election is the sole concern of the workers, and
the employer is deemed an intruder as far as the
certification election is concerned. Thus, the petitioner
lacked the legal personality to assail the proceedings for the
certification election, and should stand aside as a mere
bystander who could not oppose the petition, or even
appeal the Med-A ite s o de s elati e to the o du t of
the certification election.
G.R. No. 172132
Article 238-A of the Labor Code, as amended, reads:c
Article 238-A. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration. A petition for cancellation of union
registration shall not suspend the proceedings for
certification election nor shall it prevent the filing of a
petition for certification election.
xxxx
G.R. No. 175293
The employer is obliged to reinstate and to pay the wages
of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until
its reversal by the higher Court; and that because he was
not reinstated either actually or by payroll, he should be
held entitled to the accrued salaries.
G.R. No. 175293
Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, entitles an
illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement. Article 223
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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of the Labor Code requires the reinstatement to be
immediately executory even pending appeal. With its intent
being ostensibly to promote the benefit of the employee,
Article 223 cannot be the source of any right of the
employer to remove the employee should he fail to
immediately comply with the order of reinstatement.
G.R. No. 175293
The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the
dismissed employee would entitle the latter to the payment
of his salaries effective from the time when the employer
failed to reinstate him; thus, it became the ministerial duty
of the LA to implement the order of reinstatement. The
law mandates the prompt reinstatement of the dismissed
or separated employee, without need of any writ of
execution.
G.R. No. 175293
The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for
reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending
appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not
stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent
is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement
immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require
the application for and issuance of a wit of execution as
prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award
v10uld certainly betray and run counter to the very object
and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a
reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application
for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for
numerous reasons. Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts
in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws
should be resolved in favor of labor.
G.R. No. 195668
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in
large scale are:
(1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and
placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article 34
of the same Code;
(2) that the accused had not complied with the guidelines
issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment with
respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority
to recruit and deploy workers; and
(3) that the accused committed the unlawful acts against 3
or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal recruitment is
committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power
to send workers abroad for employment purposes.
G.R. No. 153569
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To dismiss an employee, the law requires the existence of a
just and valid cause. Article 282 of the Labor Code
enumerates the just causes for termination by the
employer:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the
latte s ep ese tati e i o e tio ith the e plo ees
work;
(b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties;
(c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized
representative;
(d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative;
and
(e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
G.R. No. 153569
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant
case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However,
the employer should indemnify the employee for the
violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity to be
imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent
practice of "dismiss now, pay later." The sanction should be
in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should
depend on the facts of each case, taking into special
consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the
employer.
G.R. No. 153569
Fraud or willful breach of trust reposed upon an employee
by his employer is a recognized cause for termination of
employment and it is not necessary that the employer
should a ait the e plo ees fi al o i tio i the i i al
case involving such fraud or breach of trust before it can
te i ate the e plo ees se i es. In fact, even the
dropping of the charges or an acquittal of the employee
therefrom does not preclude the dismissal of an employee
for acts inimical to the interests of the employer.
To our mind, the criminal charges initiated by the company
against private respondents and the finding after
preliminary investigation of their prima facie guilt of the
offense charged constitute substantial evidence sufficient
to warrant a finding by the Labor Tribunal of the
existence of a just cause for their termination based on loss
of trust and confidence. The Labor Tribunal need not have
go e fu the as to e ui e p i ate espo de ts o i tio
of the crime charged, or inferred innocence on their part
from their release from detention, which was mainly due to
their posting of bail.
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
13
Indeed, the employer is not expected to be as strict and
rigorous as a judge in a criminal trial in weighing all the
probabilities of guilt before terminating the employee.
G.R. No. 160123
It is fundamental that in the interpretation of contracts of
employment, doubts are generally resolved in favor of the
worker. It is imperative to uphold this rule herein. Hence,
any doubt or vagueness in the provisions of the contract of
employment should have been interpreted and resolved in
favor of NNN.
G.R. No. 156635
The right to strike is a constitutional and legal right of all
workers because the strike, which seeks to advance their
right to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment, is recognized as an effective weapon of labor
in their struggle for a decent existence. However, the right
to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is
never meant to oppress or destroy the employers. Thus,
the law prescribes limits on the exercise of the right to
strike.
Article 263 of the Labor Code specifies the limitations on
the exercise of the right to strike, viz.:
Article 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts, x x x
xxxx
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or
recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or
the employers may file a notice of lockout with the
[Department] at least 30 days before the intended date
thereof. In cases of unfair labor practices, the period of
notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly
certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike
may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf
of its members. However, in case of dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in accordance
with the union constitution and by-laws, which may
constitute union busting, where the existence of the union
is threatened, the 15-day cooling off period shall not apply
and the union may take action immediately.
(d) The notice must be in accordance with such
implementing rules and regulations as the [Secretary] of
Labor and Employment may promulgate.
(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the
[Department] to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the
dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of clays from the mandatory filing of the notice,
the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a
lockout.
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(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a
majority of the total union membership in the bargaining
unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or
referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a
lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of
directors of the corporation or association or of the
partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid
for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the
same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote
was taken. The [Department] may, at its own initiative or
upon request of any affected party, supervise the conduct
of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the
employer shall furnish the [Department] the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike or
lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
xxxx
G.R. No. 156635
The procedural requirements for a valid strike are,
therefore, the following, to wit:
(1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE at least 30 days
before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of ULP;
(2) a strike vote approved by the majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and
(3) a notice of the results of the voting at least seven days
before the intended strike given to the DOLE. These
requirements are mandatory, such that non-compliance
therewith by the union will render the strike illegal.
G.R. No. 156635
The evident intention of the requirements for the strike-
notice and the strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate
the right to strike for the attainment of the legitimate policy
objectives embodied in the law.
G.R. No. 156635
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labor organization or
employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of
this Book or without first having filed the notice required in
the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or
lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
[Department],
xxxx
G.R. No. 156635
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code expressly enjoined the
striking workers engaged in picketing from committing any
act of violence, coercion or intimidation, or from
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
14
obstructing the free ingress into or egress from the
employer's premises for lawful purposes, or from
obstructing public thoroughfares. The employment of
prohibited means in carrying out concerted actions
injurious to the right to property of others could only
render their strike illegal. Moreover, their strike was
rendered unlawful because their picketing which
constituted an obstruction to the free use of the employer's
property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,
when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and
coercion as to constitute nuisance, should be regulated. In
fine, the strike, even if justified as to its ends, could become
illegal because of the means employed, especially when the
means came within the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of
the Labor Code.
G.R. No. 156635
As a general rule, the mere finding of the illegality of the
strike does not justify the wholesale termination of the
strikers from their employment. To avoid rendering the
recognition of the workers' right to strike illusory, the
responsibility for the illegal strike is individual instead of
collective. The last paragraph of Article 264(a) of the Labor
Codedefines the norm for terminating the workers
participating in an illegal strike, viz.:
Article 264. Prohibited Activities -xxx
xxxx
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission
of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, That mere participation
of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such
lawful strike.
G.R. No. 156635
Conformably with Article 264, we need to distinguish
between the officers and the members of the union who
participate in an illegal strike. The officers may be deemed
terminated from their employment upon a finding of
their knowing participation in the illegal strike, but the
members of the union shall suffer the same fate only if they
are shown to have knowingly participated in the
commission of illegal acts during the strike. Article 264
expressly requires that the officer must have knowingly
participated in the illegal strike.
G.R. No. 156635
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Employees' right to exercise their right to concerted
activities should not be defeated by the directive of HHH
Inc. for them to report back to work. Any worker who
joined the strike did so precisely to assert or improve the
terms and conditions of his work. Otherwise, the mere
expediency of issuing the return to work memorandum
could suffice to stifle the constitutional right of labor to
concerted actions. Such practice would vest in the
employer the functions of a strike breaker, which is
prohibited under Article 264(c) of the Labor Code.
G.R. No. 156635
For insubordination to exist, the order must be:
(1) reasonable and lawful;
(2) sufficiently known to the employee; and
(3) in connection to his duties.
G.R. No. 156635
As to abandonment, two requirements need to be
established, namely:
(1) the failure to report for work or absence must be
without valid or justifiable reason; and
(2) there must be a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship. The second element is the more
decisive factor and must be manifested by overt acts.
In that regard, the employer carries the burden of proof to
show the employee's deliberate and unjustified refusal to
resume his employment without any intention of returning.
However, the petitioners unquestionably had no intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship because they
would not have gone to the trouble of joining the strike had
their purpose been to abandon their employment.
G.R. No. 156635
Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code mandates compliance with
the twin-notice requirement in terminating an
employee, viz.:
Article 277. Miscellaneous Provisions.
xxxx
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security
of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of
this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for termination and
shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if
he so desires, in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment, x x x
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
15
G.R. No. 156635
the contents of the notices to be served upon an employee
prior to termination, as follows:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees
should contain the specific causes or grounds for
termination against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their
written explanation within a reasonable period.
"Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means
every kind of assistance that management must accord to
the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for
their defense. This should be construed as a period of at
least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to
give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation
against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data
and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise
against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the
employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and
defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of
the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the
charge against the employees. A general description of the
charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically
mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or
which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged
against the employees
xxxx
(3) After determining that termination of employment is
justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written
notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances
involving the charge against the employees have been
considered; and (2) grounds have been established to
justify the severance of their employment.
G.R. No. 159350
Article 280 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. - The provisions
of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed casual if it is not covered
by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee
who has rendered at least one year of service, whether
such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a
regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
employed and his employment shall continue while such
actuallv exists.
The provision contemplates three kinds of employees,
namely:
(a) regular employees;
(b) project employees; and
(c) casuals who are neither regular nor project employees.
The nature of employment of a worker is determined by
the factors provided in Article 280 of the Labor Code,
regardless of any stipulation in the contract to the contrary.
The clause referring to written contracts should be
construed to refer to agreements entered into for the
purpose of circumventing the security of tenure. Obviously,
Article 280 does not preclude an agreement providing for a
fixed term of employment knowingly and voluntarily
executed by the parties.
G.R. No. 159350
A fixed term agreement, to be valid, must strictly conform
with the requirements and conditions provided in Article
280 of the Labor Code. The test to determine whether a
particular employee is engaged as a project or regular
employee is whether or not the employee is assigned to
carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or
scope of which was specified at the time of his
engagement. There must be a determination of, or a clear
agreement on, the completion or termination of the project
at the time the employee is engaged. Otherwise put, the
fixed period of employment must be knowingly and
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without any force,
duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon
the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating
his consent, or it must satisfactorily appear that the
employer and employee dealt with each other on more or
less equal terms with no moral dominance whatsoever
being exercised by the former on the latter.
G.R. No. 168749
Article 223 of the Labor Code pertinently states:
Art. 223. Appeal - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on
the part of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through
fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
16
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which
would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.
xxxx
G.R. No. 168749
In order to warrant the dismissal of the employee for just
cause, Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code requires the
negligence to be gross and habitual. Gross negligence is the
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
Habitual neglect connotes repeated failure to perform
one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances. Obviously, a single or isolated act of
negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal
of the employee.
G.R. No. 170192
Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who: (a)
undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article
13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article
34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a
license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers. It is committed in large scale
when it is committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group.
G.R. No. 175869
Section 4(c), Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code relevantly states as follows:
Section 4. Principles in determining hours worked. The
following general principles shall govern in determining
whether the time spent by an employee is considered
hours worked for purposes of this Rule:
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) If the work performed was necessary, or it benefited the
employer, or the employee could not abandon his work at
the end of his normal working hours because he had no
replacement, all time spent for such work shall be
considered as hours worked, if the work was with the
knowledge of his employer or immediate supervisor. (bold
emphasis supplied)
(d) x x x.
G.R. No. 175869
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of both the
employer and the employee based on
their voluntary agreement that upon reaching a certain age,
the employee agrees to sever his employment. The
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difficulty arises from determining whether the retirement
was voluntary or involuntary. The employee's intent is
decisive. In determining such intent, the relevant
parameters to consider are the fairness of the process
governing the retirement decision, the payment of
stipulated benefits, and the absence of badges of
intimidation or coercion.
In case of early retirement programs, the offer of benefits
must be certain while the acceptance to be retired should
be absolute. The acceptance by the employees
contemplated herein must be explicit, voluntary, free and
uncompelled.
G.R. No. 177680
In cases of unlawful dismissal, the employer bears the
burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause, but before the employer is expected to
discharge its burden of proving that the dismissal was legal,
the employee must first establish by substantial evidence
the fact of her dismissal from employment.
G.R. No. 177680
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to
dismiss an employee for committing fraud, or for willful
breach of the trust reposed by the employer. However, loss
of confidence is never intended to provide the employer
with a blank check for terminating its employee.
For this to be a valid ground for the termination of the
employee, the employer must establish that:
(1) the employee must be holding a position of trust and
confidence; and
(2) the act complained against would justify the loss of trust
and confidence.
G.R. No. 177680
There are two classes of employees vested with trust and
confidence.
To the first class belong the managerial employees or those
vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down
management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or
effectively recommend such managerial actions.
The second class includes those who in the normal and
routine exercise of their functions regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property. Cashiers,
auditors, and property custodians are some of the
employees in the second class.
G.R. No. 177680
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
17
Her position as sales manager did not immediately make
the petitioner a managerial employee. The actual work that
she performed, not her job title, determined whether she
was a managerial employee vested with trust and
confidence.
G.R. No. 177680
We stress that although her supposedly frantic search for
gainful employment opportunities elsewhere should be
considered as inappropriate for being made during office
hours, the same did not constitute willful breach of trust
and confidence of the employer. The loss of trust and
confidence contemplated under Article 282(c) of the Labor
Code is not ordinary but willful breach of trust. Verily, the
breach of trust is willful if it is intentional, knowing,
deliberate and without justifiable excuse, as distinguished
from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently. Most importantly, the cause of the loss of
trust must be work-related as to expose the employee as
unfit to continue working for the employer.
G.R. No. 177875
Administrative due process simply means the
opportunity to be heard or to explain one's side, or to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. For
him to insist on a formal trial-type hearing in which he
could confront his accusers was bereft of legal basis
considering that he had been duly notified of the complaint
against him and of the formal hearings conducted. He had
also filed his answer to the complaint and participated in
the formal hearings. For sure, the trial- type hearing was
not indispensable in administrative cases. The requirements
of administrative due process were satisfied once the
parties were afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their respective sides.
G.R. No. 198968
Permanent and total disability is defined in Article 198(c )(1)
of the Labor Code, to wit:
xxxx
(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and
permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more
than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise
provided for in the Rules.
xxxx
The relevant rule is Section 2, Rule X, of the Rules and
Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code, which
states:
Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be paid
beginning the first day of such disability. If caused by an
injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than J 20
consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still
requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to
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 18

Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman

exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case

benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in
However, the System may declare the total and permanent large scale are:
status at anytime after 120 days of continuous temporary (1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and
total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b ) of the
loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities listed under
determined by the System. Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) that she had not complied with the guidelines issued by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect to the
G.R. No. 198968 requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and
deploy workers; and
While the fact that DDD suffered the disability during the (3) that she committed the unlawful acts against three or
term of his contract was undisputed, it was evident that he more persons.
had filed his complaint for disability benefits before the
company designated physician could determine the nature
and extent of his disability, or before even the lapse of the
initial 120-day period. With DDD still undergoing further
tests, the company-designated physician had no occasion
to determine the nature and extent of his disability upon
which to base DDD's "fit to work" certification or disability
grading. Consequently, the petitioners correctly argued that
DDD had no cause of action for disability pay and sickness
allowance at the time of the filing of his complaint.

G.R. No. 197492

In this case of constructive dismissal, the burden of proof

lies in the petitioner as the employer to prove that the
transfer of the employee from one area of operation to
another was for a valid and legitimate ground, like genuine
business necessity. We are satisfied that the petitioner duly
discharged its burden, and thus established that, contrary
to the claim of the respondents that they had been
constructively dismissed, their transfer had been an
exercise of the petitioner's legitimate management
prerogative.

G.R. No. 197492

The respondents did not show by substantial evidence that

the petitioner was acting in bad faith or had ill-motive in
ordering their transfer. In contrast, the urgency and
genuine business necessity justifying the transfer negated
bad faith on the part of the petitioner.

G.R. No. 197492

The employee who has consented to the company's policy

of hiring sales staff willing to be assigned anywhere in the
Philippines as demanded by the employer's business has no
reason to disobey the transfer order of management.
Verily, the right of the employee to security of tenure does
not give her a vested right to her position as to deprive
management of its authority to transfer or re-assign her
where she will be most useful.

G.R. No. 199497 August 24, 2016

To have knowledge, you must first have reverence for the Lord. (Proverbs 1:7)

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