Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CHARLES STPANOFF
ABSTRACT
ANTHROPOPHAGOUS SPIRITS
One of the most stable ideas about spirits in North Asia is that they are endowed
with a huge appetite. The Chukchi description of kly3 spirits as gaping mouths
in the Arctic (Bogoras 19041910: 295) strongly reminds one of the exclamation
of a Mongolian Darkhat woman about an ongon spirit: what a big mouth you
have! (Potanin 1883: 889). Humankind is supposed to become the ordinary
victim of this appetite. At the beginning of the twentieth century, most of diseases
and deaths in Siberia were ascribed to the appetite of the spirits. According to
Koryaks, the spirit called kala likes human liver particularly well (Jochelson
19051908: 102), while the Chukchi kly is fond of liver (Bogoras 19041910:
295). Yukaghir harmful spirits had the same reputation: They enter men and eat
their internal organs, thus causing all kinds of diseases (Jochelson 1926: 237).
Far in the South, Altaians said about an ill person that a krms spirit is eating
him (Anokhin 1924: 6). It is worth noticing that eating people is not ascribed to a
particular variety of evil spirits: both Chukchi kly and Altaian krms also usu-
ally designate shamans auxiliary spirits. On the victims side, what is eaten is a
vital element, like an organ or the soul. Sometimes the bites of spirits leave more
external marks: such as swellings and sores for Koryaks (Jochelson 19051908:
28), or wounds for Altaians (one said a spirit bit him, Anokhin 1924: 6).
Among North Siberian peoples, the spirits anthropophagy is specifically
described in terms of a hunt where spirits are hunters and humans are game.
Hamayon (1990) explains these representations as a feature of what she calls
hunting shamanism, where the relationship between humans and the superna-
ture is founded on reciprocity in the exchange of meat. As Hamayon puts it: this
circulation of flesh between worlds throws light on the idea that humans are the
spoils of spirits hunting as reindeer are the spoils of humans (1990: 414).
Reciprocity in exchange implies the reversibility of positions in hunting.
CANNIBAL SHAMANS
It is difficult not to connect representations about spirits eating people with can-
nibal tendencies frequently ascribed to shamans. Tuvans often told me that
shamans can bite and eat people(kizhini yzyryptar chipter). These are not myths
about a remote past: a shaman proudly claimed to me to have himself eaten sev-
eral people, but not yet enough, he recognized, to be called a great shaman. Of
course this is an invisible kind of cannibalism: shamans are suspected, for
example, after an unexpected death difficult to explain otherwise. In Tuvan
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ONTOLOGISING RELATIONS
To resolve the first point, let us come back to prey/predator relations, since
Viveiros de Castro insists that one of the central dimensions, possibly even the
fundamental dimension, of perspectival inversions refers to the relative and rela-
tional statuses of predator and prey (1998: 471). I do not think that Siberian
narratives about non-human perspectives aim to express a contradiction between
a human point of view in which humans are predators and a spirits point of view
where humans are prey. Siberians do consider that they are spirits prey from any
point of view, for death is not a perspective-dependent event. The fact that
Siberians are also predators does not express a different standpoint but describes
another empirical relation: the interaction between humans and game-animals.
Here it is important clearly to distinguish a point of view and a position in a rela-
tion. The notions of PREY and PREDATOR are relational (one is not a prey per se but
in relation to a predator, and reciprocally), but this does not mean that the posi-
tions of prey and predator in the relation are perspective-dependent. My predator
sees me as prey as I see myself as its prey.
The accumulation of relations implies an addition of roles assumed by one
and the same being. A man can be both father (of his son) and son (of his father):
these relations do not contradict each other. It would be rather strange to claim
that, as my son sees me as a father and my father as a son, it remains undecidable
whether I am a father or a son. Obviously the mistake of such a reasoning is to
take relational terms as ontological predicates. My impression is that perspec-
tivist theory is not exempt from such an ontologisation. In this regard, the
predilection for the term ontology is revealing of a tendency to focus on onto-
logical representations (what things are in themselves), and to ignore relational
conceptions (how things are related). This ontological shift leads perspectivist
theory to reconcile the being-father and the being-son by postulating the exis-
tence of two separate worlds, one where I am a father, and another where I am a
son. Beyond these opposite universes no common reality is expected to be found:
this is the principal metaphysical claim of multinaturalism made by Viveiros de
Castro.
In Siberia, such a tendency to onto-idealist climbing is not encountered: it is
not a problem to be both father and son, or to be both prey and predator. Chukchi
narratives rather constitute a reflection about relations, namely relations of rela-
tions, which a classical structural formula suffices to note:
Which means: the relation between man and seal is comparable to the relation
between spirit and man. Likewise, if we take a famous Amazonian perspectivist
exemplum:
The relation between jaguar and blood is comparable to the relation between man
and beer.
A general formulation of these perspectivist stories would be:
[man : mans prey] :: [mans predator : man]
poetry. Why shall we do it with Tungus? (1935: 73) Among Tungus, hunting
techniques and story telling are different pragmatic contexts which involve het-
erogeneous kinds of knowledge.
Conscious that it is counter-intuitive, let us imagine what could be a non-
essentialist, a relational apprehension of species. Viveiros de Castro has opened
the road, demonstrating the existence in Amazonia of a relational understanding
of a particular species, humankind. For that, he provided a powerful tool, the idea
of cosmological deixis which seems to have remained less commentated upon
than the perspectivist aspect of his theory.
Viveiros de Castro notices that Amazonian self-ethnonyms, usually trans-
lated as humans, are pragmatically used as pronouns rather than nouns. These
names are not a designation of humankind as a species; their signification is
rather we, people/us. Thus the animic attribution of this self-designation to ani-
mals is not anthropocentrism, but the recognition of their position as subjects. He
goes further: even the human bodily form, by which non-humans are said to
apprehend themselves, functions as a deictic, for it is the form by which any
subject apprehends himself (1998: 4767).
However, Viveiros de Castro does not extend this compelling analysis to non-
human species, and his general definition of the body remains a non-relational
one: a bundle of affects and capacities (1998: 478). Indeed it is necessary to
keep a minimally substantial and closed notion of the body for the crucial per-
spectivist axiom the point of view is in the body to make any sense.
Here I would suggest that it is logically possible to understand animal bodies
in the same way as human ones: as deictics, i.e. indications about a contextual sit-
uation. For example, what would it mean when being seal-bodied refers to a
context? In the Maritime Chukchi culture, a seal is a prey belonging to another
world than its predator (i.e. to the sea) and constituting the most important part of
this predators diet (see Bogoras 19041910: 115). Such a definition exactly
applies to the situation of humans with respect to kly, so there is no longer any
need to be surprised, with this relational definition, that kly call humans seal.
This radically relational understanding of species and their bodies is out-
standingly exemplified in the tradition of the Nivkhs, a people inhabiting
Northern Sakhalin and the Amur River estuary. Their self-designation is a perfect
illustration of Viveiros de Castros deictical theory: nivkh, usually glossed in
ethnography as human, is in fact composed from ni [I] and vo [village], so that
a literal translation would be those of my village. These who have their villages
in the mountain are consequently called pal nivkh [people of the mountain],
which is par excellence the designation of bears (Beffa 1982: 1617). A Nivkh
tale reports the adventures of a man who, travelling among unknown countries, is
caught by spirits, bound and taken away to their home. He is held on the platform
where Nivkhs usually keep a bear they will kill. The spirits chief orders:
Servant, tease the bear. Everything in the spirits attitude indicates that the man
will be killed in the ritual fashion by which Nivkhs, kill bears. The man himself
growls and stands up as a bear. There is no information in this tale about the
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characters perceptions, but only description of their gestures and words (Beffa
1982: 213).
The object of the tale is not the content of the spirits perception in contrast to
that of the humans (it is not said that they see the man as a big hairy animal), but
the very fact that, because of the position he reached, in his relation with spirits
and in the home space (the bear platform), the traveller literally becomes a bear,
if only we understand BEAR in a relational sense. This episode shows that a gloss
of BEAR among Nivkhs could be something like: a respected prey captured and
kept alive at home, for whom the predators make a collective ritual play before
killing him. The fact that the hero is a bear, in this particular meaning, is not
perspective-dependent, for he is not less perceived as such by himself than by
spirits. On the contrary, this positional definition presupposes a common inde-
pendent background which the players fit into: the home space.
We will see that the positional approach is widely applied to spirits in Siberia.
When I asked a Tuvan hunter of the St-Khl region about the harmful spirits
called aza, usually considered as man killers, he gave me a quite disconcerting
answer: he said that they are not dangerous at all (khora chok). The aza fear
humans. Being blind, they try not to step on simple people like us. They flee
themselves (Aza kizhiden korgar. Bis yshkash bdn kizhilerni sogur azalar
kizhi-daa bazyp kaaptain. Bisten bottary dezip manazhyp). This is the first time
I had heard such statements: usually, on the contrary, it is said that humans fear
aza, because they cannot see them.
In fact, I presume now that this hunter was thinking about very specific kinds
of relations between aza and humans: those which take place in the aza realm.
One of the most beautiful expressions of Siberian concern for non-human per-
spectives is the widespread tale about a human going into the spirits world.
Different versions have been identified among every linguistic family in Siberia
from Nganasan in the Arctic to Dukha living in Mongolia (for an overview, see
Nekliudov & Novik, forthcoming). The framework of the tale is impressively
stable: one man comes by chance in the world of spirits (inferior, superior, or
other) through a hole or a cave. He encounters a camp where people can not see
him and step on him, just as my Tuvan informant said. Only dogs notice him and
bark. When the man touches people and when he teases girls, they fall ill. He
gradually understands that he is among spirits and that he is a spirit for them.
Suspecting the presence of the man, which they call an harmful spirit, spirits
invite their shaman who performs a ritual and expels the man toward the humans
hearth.
This narrative proposes a purely non-essentialist and positional interpretation
of what it can mean to be a spirit. Here the hero becomes an harmful spirit not
by a change of his intrinsic nature, nor because of his evil intentions, but by a
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mere moving in the space. In this context to be a spirit means to find oneself in a
radically foreign environment. This definition is consistent with Vats detailed
analysis of the notion of kly in the Chukchi representations: she convincingly
argues that kly are not, strictly speaking, malevolent beings, but represent a cer-
tain kind of otherness. They are the nonhumans par excellence as being outside
human or domestic fire areas (2007: 229). The tale radicalises this positional
apprehension in showing that an inversion of positions in space entails an inver-
sion of roles in relations and, therefore, of identities.
We have seen that prey and predator are not mutually exclusive ontological
predications. It appears now that, in particular mythical Siberian discourses, cate-
gories such as animal species and spirits are understood as position- or
relation-dependent (for a position is a relation to an external space). This radi-
calised version of cosmological deixis suppresses the taxonomic contradiction
implied by the attribution of several species identities to the same being: I can be
both a human (with respect to myself) and a seal (with respect to a predator-spirit)
and a spirit (when I visit spirits camp), if HUMAN, SEAL and SPIRIT are relational
notions. The position-dependency of identities in Siberian myths and tales was
clearly noticed by Lot-Falck: While animal is a man in his domain, man appears
as an animal, outside of his home (1953: 21). Perspectival changes appear
now to be nothing but consequences of a primordial positional movement. This
secondary character of perception is observed by Pedersen, Empson &
Humphrey when they describe in Inner Asia some instances of movement,
which allow people to jump in and out of new positions that allow them to see
the world from different axes (2007: 150, my emphasis).
There is an important theoretical consequence of all this. We have suggested
that the perspectivist formula there are different perspectives that are rigidly
rooted in bodies entails a contradiction, for it is refuted each time it is enunci-
ated by a bodied being (how may he know that other bodies perspectives are
different?). However, this objection seemed to be invalidated by Viveiros de
Castros distinction between intellectual representation and perception. Now if
species terms in the formula spirits see humans as animal/peccaries/seal/etc. are
understood as relational, this see as cannot be, as Viveiros de Castro claimed, a
mere perception. The fact that a spirit sees me as a seal (and not as flower or a
cloud) is information about our (fairly worrying) prey-predator relation rather
than about its optical organs. A relation, no matter whether it is causal or inten-
tional, is never perceived by the senses; it can only be inferred by a mind from
perceptions. If the relation is intersubjective, as hunting is understood in Siberia
and Amazonia, the idea of this relation must necessarily be shared by the subjects
involved in it.
The perspectivist contradiction is definite; however, rather than an illustration
of this paradox, mythical Siberian discourses seem to express a kind of tautology.
It states that a being who is put in a position usually proper to a species becomes,
in a positional sense, a member of this species.
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Leibniz sums it up, the result of each view of the universe as seen from a dif-
ferent position is a substance which expresses the universe conformably to this
view () it follows from what we have just said that each substance is a world by
itself, independent of everything else excepting God. 6 If each view is inde-
pendent from others and, therefore, from its own objects, how can perceptions be
relevant and how can interaction between viewers be possible? Leibnizs answer
is theological: what ensures that miraculously all monadic worlds can cooperate,
or to take Leibnizs suggestive metaphor, that all clocks are in time, is the
almighty action of the Great Clockmaker, God. In Leibnizian perspectivism,
God is the unique perceiving subject of all perspectives. However, Siberian
nomads do not see themselves as monads: there is no Great Clockmaker in their
cosmologies, so that perspectivism will be difficult to acclimatize there.
Our departure point was: why are shamans regularly ascribed a tendency to
cannibalism? The hypothesis that shamans see people as prey animals is not
explicative since this vision can only be the expression of a pre-existing pred-
ator/prey relation which remains to be explained. Another approach to
shamans relation with their environment can be found in Caroline Humphreys
important suggestion that religious specialists are a corollary of the native appre-
hension of causal processes pertaining to beings, or kinds of existence, in the
world(Humphrey & Onon 2003 [1996]: 51). Objects like mountains, Humphrey
argues, exemplify particular processes which require their own rituals and spe-
cialists. I would like to underline that causal processes are particular relations that
cannot be understood without exploring the properties of the terms involved in
them. Hence Humphreys stress on natural beings own kinds of causal force or
energy (Humphrey & Onon 2003 [1996]: 52).
Such a causal approach may spare us the tautologies of the above-mentioned
myths that explain peculiar relations by the peculiarity of relations. We will thus
consider which intrinsic properties ascribed to some humans called shamans
causally lead them, unlike laymen, to be involved in cannibal relations.
MULTIDIRECTIONAL FLOWS
In Siberia, shamans cannibal practices are not seen as a bad habit of a particular
category of evil or black shamans, or as a lapse contradicting their benevolent
mission of healing. Rather, it looks like an inevitable expression of what makes
them shamans. Humans are just one of the numerous objects of their appetite,
besides hostile spirits and simple presents of meat and alcohol (many old
proverbs in Altai-Sayan compare shamans greed to dogs hunger). Indeed, a
devouring power is required in shamans ritual practices against evil forces.
Swallowing is a technique integrated in shamanic healings throughout Siberia. A
Tozhu shaman described the treatment he reserved for a spirit causing disease:
Your black liver, your bloody heart, I ate (Vainshtein 1961: 190). There are
many descriptions of shamans sucking the skin of the patient in order to catch the
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At the second stage, when the child begins to speak, his relatives will notice
his unusual perceptual capacities indicating a special relational quality. This
quality is implemented only in the third stage, when the adolescent falls under the
pressure of spirits. Among Turkic and Tungus peoples, this is indicated by
epilepsy, yawns, meteorism (abdominal distension), cramps, tendency to
swallow metallic objects (Verbickii 1893: 45; Delaby 1976: 40). All these strange
features tend to represent the novices body as an object without closed bound-
aries, a spongy being. Then the visions begin in which the novice sees himself
eaten by spirits. He is dismembered, his flesh is eaten and his bones are checked
by spirits (to my knowledge, the most ancient report of this theme dates back to
the 1860s: Khudiakov 1969: 309). This vision is found in all Turkic traditions in
Siberia, but not only there: according to some narratives, young Tungus shamans
of Angara are dismembered, their flesh is chopped, skewered and eaten by spirits
who drink their blood. Likewise, it is precisely the smell of his flesh and blood
which leads the helping spirits to attack the Nanai novice and compel him to
become a shaman (Smoliak 1991).
It is understood that eating and being eaten are connected by a causal relation,
for the latter is the material condition of the former. The dreamed devouring
engages the mechanics of circulation in which the shamans body will be
involved throughout his life.
A Yakut explained to Ksenofontov (1998 [1928]: 86) that a shaman has no
healing powers unless the spirit originating the disease has received his part of
his flesh after the cutting up. In other words, the shamans therapeutic power is
derived from the very processes that are supposed to occur in his body. The speci-
ficity of the shamans body is not assigned to his position in an interaction with
spirits; on the contrary, his particular body is the necessary condition for the
establishment of such relations. In his dream, devouring is usually connected
with the checking of the presence of the supplementary bone (among Evenks
see Delaby 1976: 45; among Turkic peoples, Stpanoff 2007a.). Thus, spirits do
not make the novice become a shaman, they verify that he is a genuine one.
These conceptions suggest that the cited peoples share an essentialist under-
standing of the shamans status, which is even more clear in the practical logic of
relations between laymen and shamans.
shamans are not true, they are mere impostors (1883: 68). Shamans themselves
are the best promoters of these suspicions. A Chukchi shaman said to Bogoras
that he was not like modern shamans, but he was the equal of the ancient gen-
uine shamans (19041910: 421). This claim is still frequently heard among
contemporary Tuvan shamans, who denounce each other as charlatans.
In Altai-Sayan possessing a drum and a costume is a typical feature of the
common definition of a shaman. However 1) there are recognized shamans
without costume and drum, and 2) people would consider it excessively nave to
suppose that all shamanic costume wearers are genuine shamans. Thus, visible
criteria defining a shaman are neither necessary nor sufficient, which reveals an
essentialist understanding (on essentialist understanding of ritual specialists, see
Boyer 1994). The idea that paraphernalia is insufficient is notably circulated
through a series of narratives known in Southern Siberia since the end of the
nineteenth century: the story of a non-flammable shaman.7 In its schematic struc-
ture, the narrative begins with the decision of a ruler (Chinese emperor,
Mongolian khan, Russian tsarina or KGB officer) to sort out genuine and false
shamans. For that purpose, he organises a test: he gathers all shamans to a stake
and burns them while they are beating their drums. All shamans wear their para-
phernalia, but only one survives by flying up: he is recognised by that power as
the genuine shaman. If the narrator is a shaman, he ordinarily claims to be a
descendant of this non-flammable shaman.
If we try to take into account the hypotheses and expectations of natives that
permit the regular appearance of shamans, it is striking to notice that they are not
concerned with the scholars demand for contextualisation. I have been surprised
several times in Tuva by the fact that, unlike urban Tuvan intellectuals, who con-
sider shamans as a product of the Tuvan cultural heritage, herdsmen expected
that shamans would appear in France as well as in Tuva. They met my denials
with scepticism and polite irony. For them, the birth of shamans was a phenom-
enon obviously independent from cultural diversity and historical change. They
interpret their social function as derived from bodily peculiarities.
Among other peoples of Siberia, it is also frequent that some atypical phys-
ical features noticed in childhood are associated with a shamanic fate. Kets
recognise turning over in the cradle as a sign of shamanhood and a mole-like spot
on the skin as a sign of witchcraft (Donner 1933); Selkups notice curly hair, a
large forehead, a piercing gaze (Prokofeva 1981: 46); for Nenecs, a birth-mark
or a pellicle at the crown of his head are significant (Khomich 1996: 43, note 4);
and such two distant peoples as Nganasans and Nanais consider that children
born in the caul are future shamans (Popov 1936: 83; Smoliak 1991: 35). These
features are generally innate, so that, adopting the definition of nature elabo-
rated by Humphrey about Daur shamanism as what is uncreated, spontaneous or
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innate (Humphrey & Onon 2003 [1996]: 52), we can conclude that shamanic
status is understood as a natural fact.
Of course, these innate peculiarities on their own are never considered as the
only criteria for becoming a shaman; they are treated as visible indices of a bodily
quality which is invisible. I call it an essence, i.e. a non-obvious feature which
causally determines a cluster of other features, in particular visible ones. The
internal essence of shamans, embedded in a special bone or another invisible fea-
ture, is understood to cause the complete constitution of their bodies. Considered
as the condition for the establishment of relations with spirits, the quality of the
shamans body has to be ascertained by laymen.
In Siberia there is a type of disturbing performance which seems specifically
devoted to the public checking of the shamans body. However, although fre-
quently described in the ethnography of Siberia, these shamanic tricks have not
given rise to theoretical interpretations.
In Tuva, I was often told stories about shamans from earlier generations who
stabbed themselves in the heart or fired at themselves with a gun, and, unharmed,
could then drink their cup of tea. Such narratives are common in Siberia; they are
as ancient as the first records about Siberian shamans. Russian chronicles about
Ermaks expedition around 1581 report that Cossacks attended a ritual where a
shaman (called shaitanshchik), on being stabbed, drank his own blood (Miller
1999: 2467). From the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, reliable travellers
and scholars such as J. Bell, J.G. Gmelin and S.P. Krasheninikov have observed
in Siberia shamans stabbing themselves. Lastly, Bogoras has given a detailed
description of such techniques used by Chukchi shamans (19041910: 447). The
purpose of all these strange spectacles becomes clear if we understand that they
are a way of checking the intrinsic penetrability of the shamanic body.
In this respect, Yakuts have explicitly developed an interesting theory about
the shamans body. It was considered among Yakuts that a good shaman had to
be able to make a knife pass from one side to the other of his body (Seroshevskii
1993 [1896]: 607). Such feats are permitted by bodily differences of the
shaman: his body has holes (oibon) under the skin and this is the very sign that
he is not a charlatan but a genuine shaman (Popov 1949: 289). The best
shamans are supposed to have nine holes. In a Yakut narrative, a man becomes a
shaman, without any intervention of spirits, after having remarked that his
shadow has holes. Some shamans were also said to have a pocket in their
stomach called a kieli in which swallowed spirits were conserved (Popov 1949:
28990). Applied to the human body, the name kieli usually refers to the female
womb; therefore the shamanic kieli should certainly be connected with the
capacity ascribed to certain male shamans to give birth to animals (Seroshevskii
1993 [1896]: 609). Similar conceptions appear in the name contemporary Yakuts
give to a person somehow connected with spirits: a man with an open body
(ahagas ttkh kihi).
Thus, for Yakuts, the transference capacities of shamans are deeply embodied
in their anatomy. If these holes in the body help the shaman to eat spirits, obvi-
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ously shamanic cannibalism also finds its way there. This kind of embodied can-
nibalism is explicitly suggested by Nganasans: their shamans are believed to
possess special mouths in their bodies through which they eat peoples souls
(Lambert 20022003: 234).
Porosity is a condition for being the locus of circulation through consump-
tion. Healing rituals use the devouring capacities of the shaman by turning them
in a convenient direction. Rituals and paraphernalia aim to help the shaman both
to develop and to control this capacity. But it can happen that the shaman loses his
mastery and makes his relatives his meal instead of spirits or enemies. At the
beginning of the twentieth century when they approached death, Tuvan shamans
were bound and abandoned by their relatives because in the last minutes of his
life the Tuvan shaman becomes crazy and devours all that fall under his gaze,
he kills cattle and people, he does not recognize anybody any more
(Turchaninov 2003 [19151916]: 183).
In this essentialist scheme, which is frequent in Siberia though not exclusive,
the shamans body is from birth (as opposed to by will) an active channel, and
that is why, traditionally, devouring is not precisely understood as a bad action
from an ethical point of view. Cannibal shamans are killed or abandoned in order
to preserve lay people rather than as a kind of punishment.
In this essentialist context, what status should be given to the constant concern of
Siberian peoples for non-human perspectives? If anthropology is not only a his-
tory of ideas, but a social science, indigenous theories should interest us by their
implementation in practice. Here I will try to follow Willerslevs wise proposi-
tion to bring perspectivism down to earth, recognizing that perspectivist
theory remains an abstract model, detached from the real experiences of people
in a lifeworld (Willerslev 2007: 945). First, it should be noticed that knowing
others perspective gives a serious advantage in interaction. In this way,
describing the nonhumans point of view is not a contemplation but an action
that moves the balance of power on behalf of humans. Though they seem to pos-
tulate a symmetry between human and nonhuman, perspectivist narratives
create de facto an asymmetrical situation. For example, the Chukchi, although
claiming to know the klys perspective, consider that these spirits do not know
the human perspective. In a Chukchi tale, we see a kly incapable of feeding his
human wife because when she asks for seal meat he gives her sea worm and so
on. The disgusted wife soon leaves this unsympathetic husband (Bogoras 1913:
89).
Therefore I would not apply to Siberia the definition of spirits as a view from
everywhere, which implies the world seen in totally clear and unambiguous
visibility proposed by Holbraad & Willerslev (2007: 3345). It is well known
that spirits are understood in North Asia as having limited perceptions and faulty
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Generally when a fairly traditional Tuvan shaman wants to expel a harmful spirit
from the body of a patient, his ritual action employs two kinds of technique: 1) a
manipulation of the spirits perspective, i.e. an attempt to convince or to deceive
him; and 2) an elimination of the spirit either by removing him or by eating him.
In the first stage, one can say the spirits perspective is shifted, in the second it is
devoured.
The shaman Kh. K. often uses a little anthropomorphic figure made from
dough. After having untied the spirit from the body of the patient, she makes the
gesture to put it with her drumstick in the figurine. The spirit is supposed to see
the figurine as a real human in whom he will settle, however the figurine is imme-
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diately thrown in the street by the patient. Kh. K. explains that the figurine is then
eaten by dogs that will die later. The devourer and its perspective are thus eventu-
ally devoured.
The effect of ritual deception on a spirit is colourfully expressed in the tale
cited above about the man visiting the spirits country. This story explains how
it is possible to act on a spirit (in the tale: a man in the position of a spirit with
respect to spirits) in order to expel him. In the Dukha variant, the spirits lama-
exorcist offers to the visitor a horse skull and a grass doll. Laypeople see that it is
mere bone and grass, but thanks to the magic of the exorcist the visitor sees these
objects as a magnificent mount and a beautiful woman. Only back in his own
country does he realise the extent of his mistake, discovering under him the skull
and the grass (Chagdarsrng 1994: 15964). This lure is found elsewhere in
North Asia: in a Nganasan variant, the shaman gives a wooden figure to the vis-
itor who required a reindeer. The shaman forces the visitor to see the figure as a
real reindeer and to accept it. Back in his country, the piqued man eventually
recognises that this shaman has been powerful and cunning (Dolgikh 1976: 33).
If shamanic practice turns to deception in order to expel enemies, it means
that there is a difference between perspectives which correctly describe facts and
illusions which lead to defeat. Instead of the idealist postulates of Western meta-
physics, in Siberia the competition between beings implies a common reality
beyond their perspectives. The existence of the real, as defined at the beginning
of this study, is demonstrated.
CONCLUSION
are endowed with different anatomies and powers. The theme of shamans canni-
balism both expresses and impressively contributes to spreading implicit
hypotheses about channelling properties of the shamanic body, which place it in
the centre of multidirectional flows. In rituals, thanks to these capacities and to
their knowledge of nonhuman visions, realist Siberian shamans voraciously
devour idealist spirits and their perspectives.
NOTES
REFERENCES
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Willerslev, R. 2007. Soul hunters. Hunting, animism, and personhood among the
Siberian Yukaghirs. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
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