Gonzales Vs.

Comelec Case Digest

Gonzales Vs. Comelec

27 SCRA 835
G.R. L-27833
April 18, 1969

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination
of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity
was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free
speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to
nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent
councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967;
petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the
City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation
that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are
matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate
or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or
agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the
police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M.
Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of
assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and
present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for
national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning,
excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil
Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were
requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the
police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an
acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the
clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger
to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the
advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established.
The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is
not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness
be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices
prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a
valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada
clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and
parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present
danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably
marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for
redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of

interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the
prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against
the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign
literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a
constitutional command.