SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149375. November 26, 2002]

MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark

Vasques and Enrile Bertumen, was charged with and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538
or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for which he and his co-accused
were sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.[1]
The case before us concerns only the petition for review of accused Marvin
Mercado where he assails his conviction, and arguing that the Court of Appeals having
increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified the case to this
Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the
last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124,[2] of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the Court of Appeals.
In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the
provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon by petitioner, was applicable only when the
penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty, i.e.,
the penalty was at least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by the
appellate court on the accused was clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA
6538,[3] which is not considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.[4]
The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People v. Omotoy[5] where
the Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of arson and sentenced him to
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to reclusion perpetua. The case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In Footnote
16 of the decision, it was observed -

The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no doubt that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is involved, albeit joined to prision mayor in its maximum
period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, the appeal
should have gone to the Court of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains
appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the penalty is at least
reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse will be
overlooked so as not to delay the disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed on the accused, and causes
no prejudice whatsoever to any party.

Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the instant case considering that the
penalty imposed was seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.
Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. While the
thirty (30)-year period falls within that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a single
indivisible penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty (30)-year
period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of sentence
under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal Code.[6]
More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one penalized under RA
6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The
Revised Penal Code. Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal law imposes such
penalty, it is error to designate it with terms provided for in The Revised Penal
Code since those terms apply only to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code, and not
to the penalty in special penal laws.[7] This is because generally, special laws provide
their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties are not taken
from nor refer to those in The Revised Penal Code.[8]
The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under RA 6538 is
essentially within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal. However, such
technical term under The Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or applied to the
penalty for carnapping. Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstance of violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, i.e.,
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, does not correspond to
that in The Revised Penal Code.[9] But it is different when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof, since this is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death.[10]
Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of x x x imprisonment of
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and
FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum.[11] For these reasons the use of
the term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its decision is not proper. Besides,
we see no basis for the trial court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and
one (1) day since RA 6538 sets the minimum penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.
We see no error by the appellate court in relying on a Footnote in Omotoy[12] to affirm
the conviction of the accused. The substance of theFootnote may not be the ratio
decidendi of the case, but it still constitutes an important part of the decision since it
enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this rule is
stated in a Footnote to a decision is of no consequence as it is merely a matter of style.
It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the instant case since the
former involves an appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while the
case at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. As
enunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis for this doctrine is
the Constitution itself which empowers this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments of lower
courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.[13]
Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case
brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it
should impose such penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case
and elevate the entire records to this Court for review.[14] This will obviate the
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between this Court
and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case
from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully
completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.[15]
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less
than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may be had only by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45[16] where only errors or questions of law may be raised.
Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of whether there was indeed a
violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act. This issue is factual, as we shall find hereunder.
In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani parked the subject Isuzu
Trooper in front of his house at No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato St., Makati City, Metro Manila.
The vehicle was owned by Augustus Zamora but was used by Bhagwani as a service
vehicle in their joint venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was nowhere to be
found prompting Bhagwani to report its disappearance to the Makati Police Station and
the Anti-Carnapping (ANCAR) Division which immediately issued an Alarm Sheet.[17]
On 31 May 1996 Bhagwanis neighbor, fireman Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that he
learned from his daughter, a common-law wife of accused Michael Cummins, that the
accused Rommel Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael Cummins
himself stole the Isuzu Trooper. Alvarezs daughter however refused to issue any
statement regarding the incident.[18]
In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 Miling Flores brought to his house Michael
Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen, Rommel Flores, and complaining witness
Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen and Flores admitted that they
took the vehicle and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and Baguio. [19] They claimed
however that it was with the knowledge and consent of Bhagwani. They alleged that on
the night they took the vehicle, they invited Bhagwani to join them in their outing to
Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they asked him instead if they could borrow the
Isuzu Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed and even turned over the keys to them. [20]
 Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during that confrontasi in the house of SPO3
Miling Flores but his co-accused narrated his participation in the crime.[21]
The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but increased the penalty imposed on
the four (4) accused from a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.[22]
Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated by fun rather than theft in
taking the Isuzu Trooper, and that they merely took the vehicle for a joyride with no
intention of stealing it. If they were really thieves, according to petitioner, they would
have sold the vehicle outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio. [23]
Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition for review on certiorari
where only questions of law, and not questions of fact, may be raised. The issue before
us being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may not be entertained in
this appeal. Besides, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court.[24] This rule may be disregarded only
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on record. But there
is no ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This Court will not assess all
over again the evidence adduced by the parties particularly where as in this case the
findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.[25]
However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its imposition of the penalty.
Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The evidence in this
case shows that the accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain
access to it, thus demonstrating that force was used upon the vehicle; nonetheless, we
believe that this does not merit the imposition of the full penalty. With the application
of The Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed may be reduced to an
indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two
(22) years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the Motion
and Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to an indeterminate prison
term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Decision penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr., RTC-Br. 138, Makati City; Original Records, pp. 160-172;
CA Rollo, pp. 32-45.
[2]
Sec. 13. Quorum of the court; certification of appeal of cases to Supreme Court. -x x x
Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the
law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment
and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for
review.
[3]
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined
in Section Two of this Act, shall irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen
years and four months, when thecarnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is
killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof (as
amended by RA 7659).
[4]
Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 7 August 2001 penned by Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., and
concurred in by Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Alicia L.Santos, Former Fifth Division;
CA Rollo, pp. 342-343; Rollo, pp. 111-112.
[5]
G.R. No. 112719, 29 January 1997, 267 SCRA 143, 152.
[6]
People v. Quitorio, G.R. No. 116765, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 196, 219.
[7]
People v. Canoy and Gabucan, 92 Phil 1076 (1953).
[8]
People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555, 573.
[9]
Id., p. 576.
[10]
See Note 3.
[11]
Original Records, p. 303; CA Rollo, p. 44.
[12]
See Note 5.
[13]
Sec. 5, par. (d), 1987 Constitution.
[14]
Last paragraph, Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; see Note 2.
[15]
People v. Daniel, No. L-40330, 20 November 1978, 86 SCRA 511, 540, reiterated in People v. Ramos,
No. L-49818, 20 February 1979, 86 SCRA 511; People v. Traya, No. L-48065, 30 March 1979,
89 SCRA 274; and People v. Centeno, et al., No. L-48744, 30 October 1981, 108 SCRA 710.
[16]
Id., Sec. 3 (e), Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure: Except as provided in the last
paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
[17]
TSN, 22 October 1996, pp. 10-24.
[18]
Id., pp. 35-43.
[19]
Id., pp. 47-65.
[20]
TSN, 10 June 1997, pp. 4-13; 14 July 1997, p. 2; 17 July 1997, pp. 6-8; 29 July 1997, pp. 6-9.
[21]
Id., pp. 62-63.
[22]
See Notes 1 and 4.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 158-159.
[24]
Gloria Changco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128033, 20 March 2002.
[25]
Ibid.