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2. Dualism is false.
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Against dualism: Split brain cases
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Objection
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Implications of the bundle theory
Teleportation:
• You are scanned at T1 in S1.
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Against the No-Branching Clause
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Summary
• Experiences exist.
• Some are psychologically continuous.
So this is possible:
B C D E
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Operations
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Impossible to find
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We are only bundles
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A short way of looking at it
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Lessons of the Bundle Theory
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Surprising conclusion
Therefore:
In other words:
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Final view: Dualism
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The story of empiricism
1. BODILY THEORY
• Problem: Body gains/loses parts.
2. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY
• Problem: Teleportation/Duplication.
3. BRAIN THEORY
• Problem: Brains can be duplicated as
well.
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Response
Swinburne:
Bodily continuity
Brain continuity
Psychological continuity
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The story of dualism
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The mind-body relation
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Minds are not bodies
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Against verificationism
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The argument for dualism
1. Let:
• P = I am conscious and exist in 2007.
• Q = my body is destroyed in 2007 (end)
• R = I have a soul in 2007
• S = I exist in 2008
• (I.e. ~◊(P&Q&S&~R))
Therefore:
4. R
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The essence of persons
Swinburne:
• If S2 at T2 has the same form (thought,
intention) as that as S1 at T1.
• And S2 is made out of the same stuff as
S1.
• Then S2 = S1.
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Mind-body dualism
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Problems with Dualism
But:
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Problems with the argument
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Appendix: survival and the A-/B-series
debate
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Temporal parts and the A-series
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Objections
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Objection 3: Why not say that I am wholly
present so long as part of me is.
• E.g. W.W.II. is present if one of it’s
battles is; John is present if one of his
parts is.
• Then, as different parts become
present, I (wholly) move in time
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Rejoinder: Because time differs from space.
If one temporal part is present, we have to
say the whole is present—the alternative is
absurd:
• If the whole is past, then no parts are
present. If it is future, then no parts are
present.
• So, if a part is present, the whole is
neither past nor future.
• So, it is present if one part is.
Upshot:
• If perdurance view is right, must adopt
the B-series view.
• To hold to the A-series, one must adopt
the endurance view.
But …
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Can the B-theorist be an endurantist?
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Relational vs. substantive time
• Assume B-time.
• Assume S is an enduring substance.
• For all time, S first thinks of Plato (event
P) then Descartes (event D).
• Assume nothing else exists.
• I.e. all history contains is P followed by
D.
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Reply 1: Each is present at a different time.
Problems:
• Abandons B-series for A-series
• Assumes A-properties occur at different
times, and this time might be
substantive (i.e. how differentiate
them?).
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But there is an objection to this:
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Eternal recurrence
• Time is substantive.
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Joshua Mozersky
Department of Philosophy
Queen’s University
Kingston, ON
K7L 3N6
Canada
Fax: 613-533-6545
joshua.mozersky@queensu.ca
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