The Merton Thesis - Oetinger and German Pietism, A Significant Negative Case

The Merton Thesis: Oetinger and German Pietism, a Significant Negative Case
Author(s): George Becker

Source: Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 641-660
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Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1992
The Merton Thesis: Oetinger and German

Pietism, A Significant Negative Casel
George Becker2
The Merton thesis identifies two movements -English Puritanism and

German Pietism -as causally significant in the development of the scientific
revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries. It attributes this connection to a
strong compatibility between the values of ascetic Protestantism and those
associated with modem science. This article questions Merton's conclusion
regarding one of these movements, German Pietism, by arguing that the Pietist
ethos stood in sharp conflict with what Merton has called the normative
structure of science. One manifestation of this conflict involves Friedrich
Oetinger's articulation of a contending "religious-mystical" conception of
science, which assigned a central place to feeling, intuition, the role of the
divine, and a qualitative approach to nature. This conception of science, it is
argued, provides the clearest indication of the conceptual and valuative
distance that tended to separate Pietists from the "new science" of the 17th
and 18th centuries.
KEY WORDS: Merton thesis; Pietism-science thesis; Pietism; science; Oetinger.
INTRODUCTION
In an argument widely known as the Merton thesis, Robert K. Merton

(1936/1968a, 1938/1970) identifies ascetic Protestantism as causally signifi-
cant in the development of the scientific revolution of the 17th and 18th
centuries. He attributes this connection -on the basis of his examination of two
1An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1990 meeting of the Society for the
Scientific Study of Religion, in Virginia Beach.
2Department of Sociology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee 37235.
641
0884-8971/92/1200-0641$06.50/0 ? 1992 Plenum Publishing Corporation
642 Becker
historical cases - 17th-century English Puritanism and 18th-century

German Pietism - to a strong compatibility between the values of ascetic
Protestantism and those associated with the modern enterprise of science.
While noting that Pietism differed from Puritanism by its "greater 'en-
thusiasm"' (1968a:643) and its opposition to rationalism, Merton
(1984:1099) stresses the fundamental similarity between the two move-
ments, a similarity he believes entailed Pietism's sharing of "all but one
of the elements of the Puritan ethos. . . ." Among the six ostensibly
shared elements that he identifies as conducive to the development of
modern science are utilitarianism, empiricism, and the duty to challenge
certain forms of authority.
Even though the Merton thesis is primarily focused on English
Puritanism rather than German Pietism, this difference in emphasis does
not diminish the critical importance of the latter movement for the
author's inclusive ascetic Protestantism-science thesis. It is Merton's al-
leged demonstration of a Pietism-science connection, under political and
economic conditions quite different from those of Puritan England, that
lends credence to the larger thesis (Patel, 1975). In the absence of such
a demonstrated connection, we are left not with a general sociological
theory that links ascetic Protestantism and science, but with a historically
specific account, or single case study, regarding the Puritans' contribution
to the development of English science. It is the case of Pietism, in other
words, that provides the critical referent that transforms a historically nar-
row thesis regarding Puritanism and science into the broader, generic
Merton thesis.3
From the time of its formulation in 1936, the Merton thesis has
been the subject of extensive criticism and debate. Unfortunately, while
this debate has produced a substantial body of literature dealing with
Puritanism (e.g., Carroll, 1954; Cohen, 1990; Feldhay and Elkana, 1989;
Feuer, 1963; Hall, 1963; Mulligan, 1973; Shapiro, 1983; Webster, 1975),
Merton's argument linking German Pietism and science has not yet be-
come the subject of searching examination. This omission was rectified
in part by two critiques of mine (see Becker, 1984, 1991). The first of
these articles faults Merton for distortion of the Pietists' contribution to
science on grounds of factual inaccuracies and misreading of secondary
sources. It suggests that instead of providing a thoroughly supportive
3The extent to which Merton himself assigns a position of prominence to Pietism in the context
of the larger thesis is clearly revealed by chapter 6 of his Science, Technology anld Society in
Seventeenth Century England. This chapter, which is revealingly entitled "Puritanism, Pietism
and Science: Testing an Hypothesis" (Merton, 1970 [italics mine]), conceives of Pietism as a
critical part of an empirical test that ostensibly confirms the generic Merton thesis.
The Merton Thesis 643
environment for the teaching of science at secondary schools and univer-

sities, as Merton (1968a:643-645) pointedly argues, the Pietists more typi-
cally reacted to the subject matter of science with circumspection,
distrust, and outright hostility. (For subsequent commentary and debate,
see Merton, 1984, and Becker, 1986.) My 1991 article expands on this
earlier critique by arguing that German Pietism, despite some congruence
of its religious goals and ethos with those of English Puritanism, proved
far less receptive to the "new science" than its English counterpart. The
article traces this difference to the variations in time, place, and the at-
tendant sociocultural realities and institutional challenges that confronted
these movements.
This article seeks to build on my previous critiques by examining
the religious ethos of Pietism and its relationship to the normative struc-
ture of science. It addresses this concern by focusing on the ideas of a
foremost spokesman for the Pietist position on science, the 18th-century
theologian Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782). The purpose is to
identify those elements of 18th-century science most troubling to Pietists
and to show how these became the impetus with Oetinger for arriving
at a conception of science consistent with the religious precepts and val-
ues of Pietism - a conception, as we shall see, that was seriously at odds
with the value orientation of what Merton calls the new science. It is this
new science that Merton regards as the critical divide between nonscien-
tific and scientific approaches to nature, and as a development that has
its continuity with our modern practices of science (Feldhay and Elkana,
1989:5).
Friedrich Oetinger merits our special attention on a variety of
grounds. As one who conducted chemical experiments, corresponded with
some of the leading scientists of his age, and published books on such sub-
jects as electricity (1765), salt (1770/1979), and chemistry (1771), he dis-
played a keen understanding of many of the latest scientific developments
and therefore speaks to us as an authority on science. His views are of
particular interest, for they are the observations of a Pietist who, despite
serious reservations, was a genuine enthusiast of science. Moreover, it is
in his writings that we encounter not only the clearest and most compre-
hensive exposition of what can only be described as the Pietists' profound
distrust for the then latest developments in science, but also the deliberate
attempt to forge a reconciliation between the new science and theology by
articulation of a contending, religious-mystical conception of science. It is
this very conception, more than anything else perhaps, that provides us with
the sharpest delineation of the conceptual and valuative differences that
separated German Pietists from the modern, 18th-century orientation to-
ward science.
644 Becker
THE TRANSGRESSIONS OF THE NEW SCIENCE
The German Pietist movement arose in the period of economic and

social dislocation following the Thirty Years' War as an attempt to reform
and revitalize a Lutheran Church that had grown complacent (McNeill,
1968; Schmidt, 1972; Stoeffler, 1973). Rejecting what they saw as ostenta-
tiousness, excessive intellectualism, and sterile adherence to dogma on the
part of Lutheranism, Pietists stressed the concept of Herzensreligion, or
heartfelt religiosity, an inward and intensely emotional state of mind that
frequently carried over into enthusiastic and mystical religious expression
(McNeill, 1968; Schmidt, 1972; Tholuck, 1865). Unlike English Puritanism,
which viewed all emotional and mystical displays with considerable suspi-
cion, and insisted that faith was to be measured by objective results, Pietism
valued the intensity of religious feeling as a sign of its genuineness and as
an indication of the grace of God (Weber, 1958). Augmenting the emo-
tional and mystical elements within Pietism were the related concepts of
Busskampf and Wiedergeburt. The former, which referred to a time of spiri-
tual "battling," torment, and repentance, was a stage of inner confrontation
that, if successfully resolved, culminated in the sudden Wiedergeburt, a re-
ligious "rebirth" or "conversion" that distinguished the true believer from
all others (Pinson, 1934; Stoeffler, 1973). In addition to displays of sincerity
of feeling and reliance on spiritual intuition, the manifestation of the "born-
again" state involved unquestioned obedience to the Bible as the inerrant
word of God, along with the attempt to apply systematically the principles
of Christianity to everyday life.
The Pietist system of values, while it entailed a disposition potentially
favorable to science, also contained elements that stood in conflict with
this disposition. The emphasis on the systematic reordering of life did give
Pietism a distinctly practical, dynamic, and rational orientation toward so-
cial problems and the conception of good works - an orientation that,
since it was compatible with empirical and utilitarian values, tended to in-
cline the movement toward a potentially positive valuation of science. Sig-
nificantly, however, strongly emotional and, to a lesser extent, mystical
elements within Pietism undermined and seriously weakened this poten-
tially favorable disposition (Becker, 1984, 1991). The emphasis on Her-
zensreligion, combined with reliance on spiritual intuition and the display
of enthusiasm (Begeisterung) as an integral component of prayer, the ser-
mon, and the individual's relationship to God and fellow humans, diverted
the disposition to confront worldly activity by rational means and raised
an important obstacle to an unqualified endorsement of science. Among
the manifestations of the departure from rational activity was the tendency
on the part of certain Pietists to employ such chance proceedings as the use
of the lot and the random opening of the Bible as divine directives in de-
cision making (Weber, 1958; McNeill, 1968; Nelson, 1979). It was the en-
counter with modern science and its evolving normative structure that
forced Pietism to confront its conflicting system of values (Becker, 1991).
As the example of Friedrich Oetinger will show, even though Pietism failed
to resolve this conflict unequivocally, it was to adopt a stance fundamentally
inhospitable to the value orientation of the new science.
Oetinger's enthusiasm for chemical experimentation and for science
more generally cannot obscure the fact that he, like other Pietist spokes-
men, felt a deep sense of despair for the science of the 17th and 18th
centuries (see Oetinger, 1762, 11:35). His criticisms, accordingly, are not
of the same order as those frequently encountered disagreements in the
community of science that focus on the best interpretation of a given set
of data or the like; rather, they speak to a fundamental disapproval of
the very premises, tools, and methods associated with modern science. Re-
peatedly, we encounter pronouncements in his writings that caution
against the use of microscopes and telescopes (e.g., Oetinger, 1762, 11:33),
measurement and quantification (e.g., Oetinger, 1762, 11:35), and speciali-
zation in science (e.g., Oetinger, 1762, 1:4-5 [intro.]). The degree to which
his views were at odds with the generality of scientists of his age is to be
seen in his valuation of the scientific knowledge of the "ancients" as su-
perior to that of the "moderns," and in his lifelong concern for how the
new science had fallen from grace and the conditions it would have to
meet for its reconstitution as a Christian discipline (e.g., Oetinger, 1762,
I and II). As shall be seen, Oetinger's plan for a reconstituted science
involves the deliberate attempt to rediscover the "philosophy of the an-
cients" as a precondition of a religious-mystical science that would assign
a central place to feeling, intuition, the role of the divine, and a qualitative
approach to nature.
In keeping with the Pietists' belief in the inviolability of the Scriptures,
Oetinger's confrontation with what he variously calls the "geometrical,"
"mathematical," or "mechanistic" approach to science is motivated far more
by religious than scientific considerations. In all matters pertaining to sci-
ence and secular knowledge, the critical referent is always compatibility
with biblical truth (Grossmann, 1979). As Oetinger (1762, 11:170) pointedly
argues, no philosophy or system of knowledge merits acceptance "that does
not fit like the key to the lock of the Holy Scriptures."
Central to Oetinger's disaffection from modern science is his displeas-
ure with the then-recent change in the relationship between science and
theology. In accordance with the medieval dictum philosophia ancilla theolo-
giae, science, along with the other disciplines governed by the principles of
rationality, had traditionally been assigned a decidedly secondary place
646 Becker
in the hierarchy of intellectual endeavors. Consistent with this allocation

of powers, science was conceived as a mere "handmaiden" to theology, the
undisputed "queen of the sciences" (Gay, 1977). During the course of the
17th and 18th centuries, however, this position of subservience was being
successfully challenged by the forces of modern science. This secularization
of science -which entailed the rejection of Christological assumptions and
reference to divine intervention in favor of more objective and universal
standards of proof- Oetinger rejects on theological grounds. As he seeks
to demonstrate in a work that links the study of chemistry to Christian
metaphysics (Die Metaphysic in Connexion ruit der Chemie, 1771), the fore-
most justification of science resides in its ability to elucidate biblical truth.
All intellectual curiosity that loses sight of this critical principle tends to
give rise to knowledge that is both incompatible with established theological
precepts and is of little use to the betterment of humankind. As he
(1765:133) notes in a caution directed to natural scientists, "Whoever stud-
ies electricity and chemistry outside the context of Christ will never acquire
insight into the roots and powers of truth." To Oetinger, the deliberate
Christian approach to science is a mandate derived from biblical authority.
As we are told in regard to the study of physics, for example, "Morality
and physics must be examined together, for the Holy Scriptures, according
to Proverbs 3, verses 19, 20, 21 command us . . .to display these as one
before our eyes" (in Weyer-Menkhoff, 1990:244-245). To Oetinger, there-
fore, in deliberate opposition to the development of science as an autono-
mous intellectual activity, the investigation of nature is illegitimate as an
end in itself. Consistent with the position of August Hermann Francke and
other prominent Pietist predecessors (see Becker, 1991), he locates the jus-
tification for science in God and biblical prophecy.
Tied to the charge that the new science had become subversive of
Christian truth is Oetinger's rejection of the conception of natural laws as
critical components in the operations of the universe. Oetinger, like other
Pietist spokesmen before him (see Becker, 1991), describes this conception
as the language of the "heathen" (Oetinger, 1762, 11:150, 152), which er-
roneously portrays the world in mechanistic terms as a "mere clockwork"
that in its movements cannot be altered by any supernatural forces -nei-
ther "by God, by angels, by satan, [nor] by spirits" (in Hauck, 1947:137).
He judges this portrayal as sinfully deterministic in depriving God of free-
dom of action in the operations of the universe and in casting him as a
victim of the very laws of nature that he had decreed (Oetinger, 1852).
God, Oetinger maintains by reference to biblical authority, is more than
just the first cause, or the creator of the universe; he is simultaneously the
sustainer and director of all its operations. In view of this biblical truth,
Oetinger insists, the hand of God cannot be excluded from the on-going
processes of nature. Oetinger points out that although there are in Scrip-
ture explicit references to the "light of nature" that speak to God's presence
in the universe, there is no comparable mention of any "law of nature"
that might warrant its acceptance as a principle of science (1762, 11:162-
163; see also 1849:343-344).
Consistent with his view of science as a handmaiden to theology, Oet-
inger's position on the scientists' use of instruments of measurement and
magnification was also shaped by religious considerations. He faults these
instruments -which were perceived by the generality of 18th-century sci-
entists as invaluable means to a deeper and more thorough understanding
of nature -for inviting what traditionally is known in Christianity as the
sin of pride, or the unwarranted attitude of confidence in the powers of
human reason. Given humanity's fall from grace, he deems it an inescap-
able part of the human condition to have suffered the loss of the full range
of divinely intended insights into the mysteries of nature. This is a condition
that no man-made instruments of precision could possibly obviate. As he
(1762, 11:12) assures fellow scientists, "We have not been made in this life
to explore knowledge down to the level of the atoms." Consistent with
God's intention to "remain partly hidden" from man (1762, 11:82,84),
Oetinger argues (1762, 1:6 [intro.]) that God has impaired the potential for
human understanding by means of a "Schleyer der Natur," or a veil sur-
rounding nature, that cannot be removed as a result of human effort. At
best, humans can hope to explore the "outer" but never the "inner" forms
of nature (1762, 11:149-150). As Oetinger observes in a book revealingly
entitled Das Geheimnis vom Salz (1770/1979:5), or "The Mystery of Salt,"
salt entails a secret "that to this day has not been uncovered by anyone";
he is convinced, moreover, that not even the combined effort of all the
sciences will enable humanity to gain insight into the "underlying princi-
ples" of salt (1770/1979:33). The acquisition of a deeper understanding of
nature, Oetinger argues (in Weyer-Menkhoff, 1990:249), must await the in-
finity of "time" that has been provided in the "hereafter."
Thus it is incumbent upon the contemporary scientist, in conscious
imitation of the approach practiced by the "ancients," to pursue his craft
with self-imposed measure and humility (Hauck, 1947:196-197); he is to
"ban all curiosity that could possibly lead him to stray from the narrow
path . . . [provided by the Scriptures]" (Oetinger, 1762, 11:18). The scien-
tist's fascination with precise measurement and magnification is to be
curbed as a futile and irreverent attempt to negate the intentions of God.
Even though the microscope has added to our knowledge, Oetinger (1762,
11:5) concedes, "microscopic subtlety when practiced to excess...prevents the
appreciation of truth in its totality." Instead of leading to genuine insight,
this fascination with instruments invites preoccupation with useless subtleties,
648 Becker
complex causal explanations, and deadly abstraction at the expense of

religious awe before the mysteries of the universe and the pursuit of
knowledge that speaks to God's intentions and the human benefits pro-
vided by nature (Spindler, 1982; Weyer-Menkhoff, 1990). In a reminder
to scientists, Oetinger (1762, 11:13) notes in typical fashion that far more
is to be gained from an understanding of "the influence that heaven has
upon earth" than from the knowledge of all the "solar systems compris-
ing the Milky Way."
Oetinger has yet other grounds for depreciating instruments of pre-
cision: the claim that these instruments are ill-suited to the subject matter
of nature. It is erroneous, we are told, to conceive of nature in material,
mechanistic, and coldly objective terms. More correctly, he feels, every ob-
ject in nature is infused with a "soul" or "spirit" and a life-sustaining energy
that itself is "life" (Oetinger, 1762, 11:11; Benz, 1971; Grossmann, 1979:
Heinze, 1969). It is one of the principles of nature that nothing in the
universe is fixed, determined, or totally predictable; rather, "the eternal
elements [of nature] are always becoming. At every moment they are some-
thing different from what they were before. They are in perpetuo fieri" (in
Beyreuther, 1977:XXII). Unlike the illustrious "ancients," Oetinger
(1762) charges, modern scientists have lost sight of this cardinal truth.
They approach nature as if it were a fixed and finished product, devoid
of "life." They accordingly rely on tools of measurement and observa-
tion, which are poorly suited to the subject matter of nature; as a result,
they tend to get lost in excessive analysis, measurement, and quantifi-
cation. A primary cost of this misplaced emphasis is the neglect of ap-
preciation for the "qualitative" attributes of nature (Hauck, 1947:65).
Once more, Oetinger's articulation of this organic and religious-mys-
tical conception of nature is the consequence of primarily religious rather
than purely empirical and scientific considerations (see Grossmann, 1979;
Hauck, 1947). For Oetinger, observations of nature and scientific experi-
mentation serve to reinforce his religious-mystical ideas; they confirm the
concept of a living nature (Grossmann, 1979). His fondness for the chemi-
cal experiment, in fact, had its origin largely in the conviction that chem-
istry, more than any other discipline of science, is most capable of
demonstrating the principle of life (Oetinger, 1771). As is typical of
Oetinger, however, the ultimate justification and test of any scholarly con-
ception is biblical authority (Grossmann, 1979). Indeed, he finds this req-
uisite justification in the biblical promise of resurrection and eternal life
(Grossmann, 1979:121), as well as in his conclusion that "life" is "the most
frequently encountered concept in the Holy Scriptures" (in Grossmann,
1979:117). Consistent with his view that God is not only the creator of
the universe, but also the sustainer and director of all its operations, is
his idea that nature involves the manifestation of the continuing unfolding
presence of God. And as the source of all life, Oetinger believes, God
necessarily sustains all nature with the energy of life and its underlying
principles.
Oetinger (1765, 1859) locates the primary source of this life-sustain-
ing energy in the latest area of scientific interest in his day, the power of
electricity (see Benz, 1971). He equates this newly found power with the
very same light that God called into being on the first day of creation,
prior to the existence of the sun. Conceived as a mysterious force that
permeates nature, electricity, or what he variously calls the "electrical" or
''natural light," is seen both as a demonstration of the presence of God's
power in the universe and as a means of implementation of his will. As
a source of life, it is capable of serving as a "balsam" in the healing of
the sick (Oetinger, 1765:155); its removal, conversely, invites decomposi-
tion and eventual death. As Oetinger argues in a typical attempt to reduce
scientific principles to biblical terms, for example, the plague that is fore-
told in Zechariah 14:12-whereby the enemies of Jerusalem shall suffer
the rotting of their flesh, their eyes, and their tongues while still standing
on their feet -involves nothing less than the punishment of having the
"electrical fire" within their bodies gradually extinguished (in Benz,
1971:83).
THE SENSUS COMMUNIS AND THE

PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD OF SCIENCE
Condemnation of the prevailing 18th-century approach to nature does

not lead Oetinger to conclude that science is unworthy of pursuit. Given
what he believes to be nature's potential for illuminating the design of God,
what is required is not the abandonment of science but its pursuit by means
of a different approach or method more attuned to Christianity and the
"true" attributes of nature. Oetinger believes he has discovered such an
approach in the "philosophy of the ancients," or that body of ideas that
he associates with certain church fathers, thinkers from Greek antiquity,
and more recent Renaissance mystics and alchemists (Heinze, 1969; Weyer-
Menkhoff, 1990).
This rediscovered approach of the ancients, which Oetinger hails as
a "new experimental method" (see Weyer-Menkhoff, 1990:241), is generally
identified in his writings as the "phenomenological method" (see esp.
Oetinger, 1762, I: intro.) Quite revealingly, however, it is a method that,
650 Becker
in addition to being variously referred to as the "method of life," the "gen-

erative method," the "physics of the farmer," and the "method of wisdom,"
is also described as the "method of Christ" and the "method of the Holy
Scriptures" (see Weyer-Menkhoff, 1990:240,248), for, as Oetinger observes,
the Bible "talks" to humanity "phenomenologically" (1762, 1:5 [intro.]). In
view of the broad scope of this method, it is deemed equally appropriate
for clergy, scholars, and philosophers, as well as for craftsmen, farmers,
and natural scientists (Weyer-Menkhoff, 1990).
In comparison to the mathematical-mechanistic approach to nature
-which Oetinger equates with weighing and measurement, formulation
of concepts and principles, and theoretical abstraction - the pheno-
menological method is conceived as a qualitatively oriented approach, and
is described by reference to such terms as intuition, feeling, experience,
and observation (Hauck, 1947; Heinze, 1969; Wehr, 1978). As a means of
discovery, it aims for an intuitive directness to the object under observa-
tion by means of a favorable disposition to those impressions and conclu-
sions that readily impose themselves upon the human senses. Of the
multitude of all possible observations on a given subject, Oetinger argues
(in Grossmann, 1979:94), scientists should content themselves with that
observation or conclusion "that presents itself most readily to human eyes"
(see also Hauck, 1947:66). Toward this end, the phenomenological method
calls for the deliberate pursuit of those insights and discoveries that meet
the three criteria of being "the simplest, the most useful, and the most
necessary" (in Weyer-Menkhoff, 1990:245) -qualities Oetinger (1762,
11:30) views as constituent parts of God's "fundamental law" ("Grundge-
setz") of creation. Oetinger's rationale for this law of creation is that God,
in his infinite love, has made nature and its benefits easily accessible to
humans by having made that which is the most necessary in nature also
the easiest to comprehend and the most useful to humans. Failure to ad-
here to these criteria of knowledge results, in Oetinger's view (in Hauck,
1947:66), in the pursuit of "all-too-subtle discoveries" by means of micro-
scopes and telescopes, and is likely to come at the cost of those significant
insights and conclusions, rooted in a Christian understanding, that are
equally accessible to the large multitude of humans who perceive the world
with "healthy" senses.
Even though Oetinger falls short of categorically rejecting measure-
ment and magnification along with rational-analytical approaches to sci-
ence, he leaves no doubt that these deserve a position decidedly secondary
to the phenomenological method. It is this method that he deems central
to the restoration of science as a Christian discipline. Despite his acknow-
ledgment of some "remaining" weaknesses of this method, he (in Weyer-
Menkhoff, 1990:250) values the phenomenological approach as "more
fruitful" to the pursuit of knowledge than those other approaches that "seek
to be free of [all] error" yet prove deficient as a result of being "too far
removed from the human way of thinking." What associates the pheno-
menological method with the natural or "human way of thinking" is what
Oetinger (1861) posits as a God-given sensory organ in every human: the
sensus communis (Spindler, 1982).
Defined simultaneously as a higher sensorium of knowledge and the
inherent human desire and feeling for truth (Hauck, 1947:30-32), the sen-
sus communis stands in closest possible relation to life and nature, and
grasps in intuitive fashion the totality of every problem or situation. It
gives expression, therefore, to that inherent human feeling and desire that
grasps in everything that which is the "most necessary, the most useful,
and the simplest" (Oetinger, 1762, 11:33). Comprised of a "complex of
instincts," the sensus communis operates at the very border between sub-
jective and objective processes of knowing (Spindler, 1982). It involves
that feeling, accordingly, "which precedes investigation and piece-meal un-
folding, and which brings with it certainty and assurance before one dis-
entangles the distinguishing attributes" (in Stoeffler, 1973:115; emphasis
added).
Even though he defines it as a divinely intended means to higher
knowledge, Oetinger believes the sensus communis, as well as the corre-
sponding phenomenological method, will remain imperfect should it not
be informed by God's revelation (Stoeffler, 1973:115). Moreover, for many
people, and for scholars and scientists in particular, he is convinced the
sensus communis is an organ that has virtually been "lost" as a result of
neglect of the phenomenological method and the "excessive care given to
[the faculty of] reason at the institutions of higher learning" (in Spindler,
1982:46). Seeking to restore this method to a position of prominence,
Oetinger endeavored in many of his writings to acquaint his readers with
the method's various applications and benefits. Two of his typical examples
will illustrate.
The first deals with what Oetinger calls Theologia Emblematica
naturalis and speaks to his insistence that scientists should aim for those
insights and discoveries that easily impose themselves upon the senses,
on the grounds that the easiest to comprehend is also the most useful
to humans. Oetinger (1771:17) defines Theologia Emblematica naturalis
as that approach to science, informed by Christian understanding, that
seeks to discover that which is "invisible" through examination of the
"visible." It involves the attempt to ascertain in a given object that "em-
blem," or readily discernible "signature" or "form," that may provide
useful information through association with another object in possession
652 Becker
of the same emblematic. As Oetinger (1771:20) argues in regard to

herbs, for example:
One recognizes in the herbs encountered in the larger world a similarity to the
parts of the smaller world, that is, the parts of the human. . . . Since it is God's
intention to make that which is the easiest [to ascertain] also the most useful [to
humans], he has chosen to turn the earth into a general apothecary; accordingly,
there would be nothing that one could not accomplish [i.e., cure] by means of these
herbs, if one were to have knowledge of their strengths.
Applying this argument to the walnut, Oetinger (1771:20) next raises

the question, "does it [the walnut] not have the very same signature as the
[human] head?" It follows logically, he (1771:21) argues, that the striking
similarities between the two give strong indication that the nut is in pos-
session of powers that are of benefit in treating injuries to the head. Simi-
larly, medical powers are to be expected in other plants that in their shapes
resemble other human organs. Noting that some scholars "laugh at" this
conclusion, Oetinger (1771:21) defends his emblematical approach as su-
perior to what he calls the "artificial" system of classification of plants de-
veloped by the Swedish naturalist Carolus Linnaeus. His own approach is
to be preferred, he argues, on grounds that it is focused, not on the relation
of one plant to another but on the plant's relation to the parts of the human
body. To Oetinger, as we have seen, the greater importance that he assigns
to the latter relation is dictated by religious considerations - it is rooted
in his conviction that, in light of what he sees as God's intention to make
that which is easiest to comprehend also the most useful to humans, the
deity has chosen to turn the earth into a general apothecary. He views it
as a far more enlightening strategy, therefore, to pursue the Theologia
Emblematica naturalis than to follow other, less beneficial classifications of
nature.
A second and equally revealing example of Oetinger's application of
the phenomenological method is provided by the famous balm mint ex-
periment, which figures so prominently in a number of his writings. Ac-
cording to Oetinger's account (1859:188-193), after he had boiled the dried
and cut-up leaves of balm mints in a container of water, he found that a
film of yellowish-green oil had formed at the top that displayed an image
of all of the leaves fully restored to their original, natural shapes. These
leaves were arranged neatly alongside each other, enabling him to discern
the outlines of every leaf with striking clarity. Moreover, Oetinger alleges,
no matter how often he disturbed the image formed by the oil, it imme-
diately regained its original design with the same degree of clarity and
sharpness, thereby enabling his wife and some unnamed bystanders to wit-
ness the phenomenon.
Oetinger (1859:189-193) interprets the results of this experiment as

concrete demonstration of the interconnection of the natural and spiritual
realms. It serves to confirm his belief that God is forever present in the
operations of nature, not in the form of some preestablished harmony or
static natural laws, but as a directing force that is in "effectual continuous
action" (1859:190). He believes, moreover, that he has found here evidence
for his claim that all matter is subject to the principle of life. He concludes
from the image of the leaves formed by the oil that all matter carries within
itself some primal form or imprint that is capable of "resurrection" and
renewal of life.
This peculiar experiment provides demonstration, so it would appear,
of the hazards attending the failure in would-be science to separate objec-
tive inquiry from the subjective fulfillment of wishes. The phenomenological
method, it shall be recalled, is championed by Oetinger as a deliberately
subjective and Christian alternative to the objective and rational tendencies
in science. It corresponds to what is posited as the sensus communis, or
that organ conceived both as a higher sensorium of knowledge and the
inherent feeling and desire in humans for the truth of God. As a method
of scientific discovery, it entails the pursuit of this truth as manifested in
nature, not by recourse to careful scrutiny and rigorous analysis, but by
means of a favorable disposition to those impressions and conclusions that
readily impose themselves upon the unaided senses in accordance with the
principle, established by God, that the most necessary in nature is also the
easiest to comprehend and the most useful to humans. It is a method, in
short, that provides strong invitation to discern in nature that which the
observer wishes to see. Given Oetinger's deep religious conviction that all
nature is infused with the force of life and that it benefits from the con-
tinually unfolding presence of God, it comes as little surprise that the phe-
nomenological method should yield those very results to which Oetinger
was favorably disposed.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Oetinger's opposition to the new science, as we have seen, did not

entail categorical rejection of scientific endeavor but involved articulation
and endorsement of a religious-mystical conception of science, on grounds
that only the "correct" (in his phenomenological sense) study of nature
leads to greater reverence for God and a more thorough understanding of
his design. While supporters of the Merton thesis might argue that this
endorsement of science provides demonstration of the thesis's validity, suf-
ficient evidence has not been adduced to show the belief that science is
654 Becker
deserving of study for the "greater glory of God" was more strongly em-
braced by Pietism and other forms of ascetic Protestantism than by
Catholicism or Protestantism in general (Greaves, 1969; Harris, 1989).
Oetinger's "support" for science was consistent with an established Chris-
tian tradition -the belief that the realm of nature is a means of divine
revelation and, therefore, deserving of study ad maiorem Dei gloriam. Given
this religious endorsement, the critical question for Christians historically
has been not whether but how to undertake the study of nature without
challenge to the domain of religion and established theological precepts.
The Christian solution to this problem since at least the Middle Ages, cap-
tured by the dictum philosophia ancilla theologiae, clearly subordinated sci-
ence to theology, the undisputed "queen of the sciences." It was during
the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, as we have seen, that the forces
of modernity began to challenge the status of science as a mere hand-
maiden to theology by stripping away the theological and metaphysical un-
derpinnings of the traditional Christian approach to science (Dillenberger,
1960) and by articulating what Merton (1968b) has called the norms of
institutional science. As I have argued elsewhere (1984, 1991), Pietism re-
acted with particular alarm to this challenge to religious authority. As a
result of Pietism's belief in the inviolability of the Bible, along with its com-
mitment to a strongly emotional and mystical approach to religion and its
tendency to view all endeavors with an eye to salvation, it responded to
the challenge of the new science with a deep sense of distrust for all secular
and purely scientific methods of inquiry. Oetinger serves as a demonstration
of this fact.
This is not to suggest, of course, that all Pietists were inclined to en-
dorse all of the elements in Oetinger's conception of nature and science.
However, although Oetinger's articulation of "correct" science may have
been largely his own, dissatisfaction with this new science of the 17th and
18th centuries is evident in the ideas and writings of many of his Pietist
predecessors, which provided impetus to his own newfound approach (see
Tholuck, 1865; Dillenberger, 1960; Hahn and Reichel, 1977; Buddeus, 1980;
Lange, 1980; Becker, 1991). His was not a lone and aberrant voice calling
out in the wilderness against the modern scientific heresy, but a natural
outgrowth of a chorus of previously articulated dissatisfaction.
What Oetinger had in common with the generality of 18th-century
Pietists was his opposition to most of the tenets characteristic of the
new science. Oetinger's contribution rests with his moving beyond criti-
cism of these tenets to articulation of an alternative conception of sci-
ence consistent with the theological precepts and values of Pietism. It
is as a result of this contribution that Oetinger provides us with what
is perhaps the clearest indication of the conceptual and valuative distance
that tended to separate Pietists from the "modern," 18th-century prac-

tice of science.
At the core of the differences separating the two was the Pietists'
insistence that the study of nature was illegitimate as an end in itself; sci-
ence, like all secular knowledge, derived its ultimate justification by refer-
ence to strictly defined religious priorities and Christological assumptions.4
In accordance with this belief, curiosity and the passion for knowledge were
seen as inherently suspect; the danger always existed that these might give
rise to sinful pride and knowledge incompatible with established theological
precepts. To guard against these dangerous possibilities, Oetinger devel-
oped a mystical and organic conception of nature that assigned a central
place to biblical prediction and the premise of a God actively involved in
the operations of nature. Key components of this endeavor were the iden-
tification of the sensus communis as a higher sensorium of knowledge, and
its methodological extension, the phenomenological method. Unlike the
phenomenological orientation in contemporary sociology and philosophy,
which views the researcher's subjective disposition as a barrier to knowledge
and therefore requires stringent investigation as a counterbalance (Ritzer,
1983; Wallace and Wolf, 1986), Oetinger's phenomenological method con-
ceives of subjectivity as a virtue and posits the Christian frame of reference
as indispensable to the correct interpretation of nature. To Oetinger, the
phenomenological method is not simply another, complementary approach
to the subject matter of nature; rather, it is conceived as the only genuinely
Christian alternative to the new science and the Godless direction that it
had taken.
Oetinger's preference for the subjectively oriented phenomenologi-
cal method had its origins in the Pietists' ambivalence toward many of
the very premises of modern science and the associated "scientific" meth-
ods of inquiry. Among the premises most troubling to Pietists were those
evolving norms of institutional science that prescribe an attitude of de-
tached objectivity (disinterestedness), the necessity for logical and em-
pirical proof (skepticism), and the adherence to established impersonal
4The need to observe the subordination of all secular knowledge to theology is a theme that
was echoed by every Pietist of importance. As Phillip Jakob Spener (1964:51), the "father"
of German Pietism, observed, "no little damage is done when one tries to be smart and
clever without the Scriptures or beyond them." August Hermann Francke, perhaps the
foremost figure of the German Pietist movement, argued in a similar vein. "All sagacity, by
whatever name," Francke (1969:149) cautioned, "must have the honoring of God as its goal
or purpose, and it must employ all other means on behalf of this holy purpose. Where the
quest for knowledge aims for something other . . . it constitutes not genuine sagacity but
rather falsehood, deception, hypocrisy, and cunning." And as Count Zinzendorf, the founder
of the Herrnlhut faction of Pietism noted, "If we want to remain on the correct path, we
should never consult books other than the Bible." (in Hahn and Reichel, 1977:187). Oetinger,
as we have seen, concurred in these judgments entirely.
656 Becker
criteria in the approach to science and the evaluation of knowledge

claims (universalism; for details see Becker, 1991). As is apparent from
Oetinger's version of science, in the absence of these normative expec-
tations, science is likely to become subject to the dictates of nonscientific
considerations and the attendant imposition of the methods subjectively
deemed appropriate, the types of questions to be addressed, and the an-
swers to be sought and tolerated. In short, without these normative
guides, science is reduced to a fundamentally meaningless, stagnant, and
regressive activity.
This is not to imply that Oetinger's theorizing regarding nature and
science was devoid of any merit or that it failed to leave an imprint on
intellectual developments. It might be argued, for example, that Oetinger's
insistence that nature is "always becoming" and changing into something
new helped pave the way for the evolutionism of Darwin -an evolution-
ism, however, that Oetinger and Pietists in general would have felt com-
pelled to reject on purely religious grounds. Similarly, Oetinger's belief
that every object in nature is infused with a "spirit" and the energy of life
-can be seen as a needed, albeit overzealous, counterbalance to a one-
sided mechanistic orientation encountered during the 18th century that
viewed nature in fundamentally fixed and predictable terms. Indeed, it is
the organic emphasis in Oetinger that a number of German Romantics,
in particular Holderlin, Schelling, and Goethe, found especially appealing
(Dillenberger, 1960; Spindler, 1982). His writings helped shape their for-
mulations of a Romantic Naturphilosophie that stressed the experience,
the vitalities, and the impenetrable mysteries of nature in contrast to what
they saw as the barren order of the Newtonian world. Goethe (1810/1983),
for one, formulated a romantic theory of color, one that stressed the "sen-
sory-moral" effects of colors, in conscious opposition to Newton's theo-
rizing on the subject (Hauck, 1947; Wehr, 1978). Neither Goethe's theory
of colors, however, nor other scientific conceptions associated with the
Naturphilosophie of the Romantics are today much more than a curious
footnote in the history of science. Similar to Oetinger's, their contribu-
tions to science are little more than reminders of the failure of scientific
inquiry to always resist the infusion of aesthetic, metaphysical, or theo-
logical considerations.
Oetinger's articulation of a religious-mystical conception of science,
one that is closely tied to the religious precepts and values of Pietism, is
difficult to reconcile, so it would appear, with Merton's claim (1968a:643)
that "the Pietists . .. entered into a close alliance with the 'new education':
the study of science and technology." Specifically, it casts doubts on
Merton's assertion that a close compatibility of values characterized the
relationship between Pietism and modern science. Even though Pietism,
consistent with the Merton thesis, did embrace at least two values (empiri-
cism and utilitarianism) frequently identified with an interest in science,
the same cannot be said for three key elements of what Merton (1968b)
elsewhere has called the institutional norms of science (disinterestedness,
skepticism, and universalism) - those norms, in other words, that tend to
define the very enterprise of modern science and in the absence of which
all science is essentially reduced to meaningless and self-defeating activity.
Whatever Pietism's contribution to the development of modern science may
have been, this contribution did not have its origin in the compatibility of
the Pietist ethos with those norms or values deemed indispensable to the
exercise of science.
Defenders of the Merton thesis might argue (see Merton, 1984) that
Oetinger's and, more generally, Pietism's critical stance toward science, is
not injurious to the thesis in view of Merton's specification (1968a:651)
that it "was the unintended and largely unforeseen consequences of the re-
ligious ethic formulated by the great Reformist leaders which progressively
developed into a system of values favorable to the pursuit of science."
Given this specification, the argument proceeds, Pietism's support or non-
support for science fails to constitute a critical challenge to the thesis. A
major objection to this argument is that it removes the thesis from the
court of falsification. No matter how compelling a critic's evidence may be
that testifies to Pietism's opposition to science, the specification invites the
uncritical rejection of this evidence on theoretical grounds. Ironically, in
fact, this very evidence can be used against the critic: it can be seen as
strengthening the thesis by providing demonstration of the claim that
Protestantism's contribution to science indeed must have been a latent, un-
intended consequence. If the pronouncements or actions of Pietists are
deemed inadmissible as evidence, it is far from clear what if any grounds
are left to allow for the falsification of the thesis.5 The specification of
unintended consequence, in other words, leaves the critic in what is seem-
ingly a no-win situation.
That the Pietists' position toward science cannot be dismissed as
irrelevant to the issue, however, can be deduced from Merton's exposition
51t should be noted in this connection that elsewhere I have challenged Merton's argument
that the Realschule provides empirical evidence of a close Pietism-science connection (see
Becker, 1984, 1986). Merton (1968a:645) originally described this institution as "completely
a Pietist product" that "centered on the study of mathematics, the natural sciences, and
economics." Not only was the Realschule not exclusively a "Pietist product," a point that
Merton now readily concedes (see Merton 1984:113-114), but, as I have noted, the
18th-century Pietist version of this school "was not primarily or even substantially committed
to the pursuit of scientific knowledge" (Becker, 1986:1214). At best, it provided a "practical"
curriculum with only the most superficial attention devoted to the rudiments of science (for
details see Becker, 1984, 1986).
658 Becker
of the Pietism-science connection. He gives no indication in his discussion

of this movement that its contribution to modern science was in any way
unintended or viewed by its members as an unwelcome development.
Rather, what is encountered is evidence, derived from secondary sources,
that ostensibly demonstrates the Pietists' active involvement in the pro-
motion of 18th century science. To Merton, in other words, it is a matter
of significance to demonstrate an empirical link between Pietism and the
promotion of science.
This article is an attempt to question this very connection. Consistent
with my previous critiques (1984, 1986, 1991), this article concurs in the
conclusion that Pietism, far from providing a supportive environment to-
ward science, as Merton pointedly argues, more typically reacted with cir-
cumspection, distrust, and even outright hostility. In light of Pietism's
oppositional stance, it is far from certain whether the movement was in-
deed capable of imparting a positive impulse toward the development of
science. It is distinctly probable, in fact, that the Pietists' reaction toward
modern science may have worked to inhibit rather than further scientific
development. Such a probability should not be precluded on theoretical
grounds.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am indebted to Daniel B. Cornfield, Stewart S. Forde, Anne P.

McGovern, Robert K. Merton, Jon P. Miller, and two anonymous reviewers
for their detailed and helpful comments. Partial support for this work was
provided by the German Academic Exchange Service and the Vanderbilt
University Research Council.
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The Merton Thesis - Oetinger and German Pietism, A Significant Negative Case

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The Merton Thesis: Oetinger and German Pietism, a Significant Negative Case

Author(s): George Becker

The Merton Thesis: Oetinger and German

The Merton thesis identifies two movements -English Puritanism and

KEY WORDS: Merton thesis; Pietism-science thesis; Pietism; science; Oetinger.

In an argument widely known as the Merton thesis, Robert K. Merton

0884-8971/92/1200-0641$06.50/0 ? 1992 Plenum Publishing Corporation

historical cases - 17th-century English Puritanism and 18th-century

environment for the teaching of science at secondary schools and univer-

THE TRANSGRESSIONS OF THE NEW SCIENCE

The German Pietist movement arose in the period of economic and

in the hierarchy of intellectual endeavors. Consistent with this allocation

complex causal explanations, and deadly abstraction at the expense of

THE SENSUS COMMUNIS AND THE

Condemnation of the prevailing 18th-century approach to nature does

in addition to being variously referred to as the "method of life," the "gen-

of the same emblematic. As Oetinger (1771:20) argues in regard to

Applying this argument to the walnut, Oetinger (1771:20) next raises

Oetinger (1859:189-193) interprets the results of this experiment as

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Oetinger's opposition to the new science, as we have seen, did not

that tended to separate Pietists from the "modern," 18th-century prac-

criteria in the approach to science and the evaluation of knowledge

of the Pietism-science connection. He gives no indication in his discussion

I am indebted to Daniel B. Cornfield, Stewart S. Forde, Anne P.

Becker, George tantism and science." Journal for the

*Original publication date.

Nelson, C. Clifford Schmidt, Martin

*Original publication date

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