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JOSE C. SABERON v. ATTY. FERNANDO T.

LARONG

561 SCRA 493 (2008)

Utterances, petitions and motions are considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious
they may be, only if they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.

Petitioner Jose C. Saberon charged respondent Atty. Fernando T. Larong of grave misconduct for
allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP).

The Investigation Commissioner found Larong guilty of grave misconduct, Saberon nevertheless submits
that the recommended penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment. On the other hand,
Larong seeks for the Courts declaration that the questioned allegations were privileged communication.
He submits that the statements, while opening up a lawyer to possible administrative sanction for the use
of intemperate language under the Canons of Professional Responsibility, should not be stripped of their
privileged nature.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Larong is guilty of grave misconduct

HELD:

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by
the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

Respecting Larongs argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were
privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, should not
trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment.

True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently been
considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they
are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.

Thus, while Larong is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous
character as to merit Larongs disbarment. In light of Larongs apologies, the Court finds it best to temper
the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than
grave, misconduct.
Habawel v. Court of Tax Appeals
G.R. No. 174759. September 7, 2011.
First Division; Besamin, J.

Facts: Surfield Development Corporation (SDC), represented by Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina, elevated
a Regional Trial Courts dismissal of their petition for refund for the excess of realty taxes paid to a City
Government, to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The case was assigned to the CTAs First Division (FD). CTAs
FD, however, denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Undeterred, Habawel and Medina sought reconsideration in behalf of SDC, insisting that the CTA had jurisdiction
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9282; and arguing that the CTA FD manifested its lack of understanding or respect
for the doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe, to the effect that there was no need to file
an appeal before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160.
Unfortunately, the CTA FD denied SDCs motion for reconsideration. In addition, it took note of the
language Habawel and Medina employed in their motion, and thus required them to explain within five days from
receipt why they should not be liable for indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:

However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross ignorance
of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition;
the grossness of this Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal
expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the
understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis as derogatory, offensive and
disrespectful.

Habawel and Medina submitted a compliance, in which they appeared to apologize but nonetheless
justified their language as, among others, necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the
grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade.
The CTA FD found the apology wanting in sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words that
were so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts
alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion, and thus found them guilty of direct contempt of court for failing
to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts.

Issue: Whether or not the language employed by Habawel and Medina in their motion and compliance were
contumacious?

Held: Yes. The test for criticizing a judges decision is whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good
faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
By the statements employed, Habawel and Medina clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of
propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross
ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation, and
constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in
pleadings or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are
treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.
No attorney, no matter his great fame or high prestige, should ever brand a court or judge as grossly
ignorant of the law, especially if there was no sincere or legitimate reason for doing so.