ENVI SET 1

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN (G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.)

FACTS: The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then Secretary of
DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the country
is causing vast abuses on rain-forest.They further asserted that the rights of their generation and the rights of the
generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.

HELD: The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard.Under Section
16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the rhythm and
harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral,
land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE OF TAON STRAIGHT V. REYES (G.R. No. 180771, 21
April 2015)

FACTS: June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey
and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the
Taon Strait.

May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Taon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom
profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the areas underwater composition.

January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Taon Strait (PAMB-Taon Strait) issued Resolution No.
2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably
recommended the approval of JAPEXs application for an ECC.

March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Taon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a
depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8,
2008.

Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007,
wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the
1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the
standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.

HELD: No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the
Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was
enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through
the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino
people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.

Contrary to the petitioners argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the
1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.

Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in
harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v.
Commission on Elections expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a
statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law
determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS
area.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY (GR NO. 171947-48;
DECEMBER 18, 2008)

FACTS: The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment
Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean
up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS: PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. Where the
quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u sage, the
government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense.
In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and
clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities
responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to
the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec.
17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general
application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation of the
MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of
doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under
what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by
administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure for
environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS (GR 122156, 3 FEBRUARY 1997)

FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two
bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the
Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28
September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused
to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that
the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came
to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or
place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to
or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that
a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to
that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore
and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put
it in operation.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS. CA ET AL. (G.R. NO. 93891, 11 MARCH 1991)

FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with
wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an
agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial
establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been
remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed
very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex
parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations.
Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari,
but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as
well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate
temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further
proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA
said that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury
to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due
process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.

Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and were not
violative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper
subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner asked the Supreme Court
to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation
v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims
that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an
establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the
pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board
contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the River provided prima facie
evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the
Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the
inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied
due process by the Board.

HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner
Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevant
pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of
plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for
certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in
fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial
court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order
and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
BALICAS vs. FFIB, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (G. R. No. 145972, March 23, 2004)

FACTS: In the development of the Cherry Hills Subdivision (CHS), Philjas applied for the issuance of ECC from the DENR-
Region IV. Respondent BALICAS, PENRO senior environmental management specialist, monitored the implementation of
the CHS Project Development to check compliance with the terms and conditions in the ECC. She conducted another
monitoring on the project for the same purpose. In both instances, she noted that the project was still in the
construction stage hence, compliance with the stipulated conditions could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a follow-
up monitoring is proper. It appeared from the records that this August 23, 1995 monitoring inspection was the last one
conducted by the DENR.

Immediately after the tragic incident on August 3, 1999, a fact-finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman through its Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), which duly filed an administrative complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman against several officials of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the local government of Antipolo.

The charge against petitioner involved a supposed failure on her part to monitor and inspect the development of CHS,
which was assumed to be her duty as DENR senior environmental management specialist assigned in the province of
Rizal.

For her part, petitioner belied allegations that monitoring was not conducted, claiming that she monitored the
development of CHS as evidenced by 3 monitoring reports .She further claimed good faith and exercise of due diligence,
insisting that the tragedy was a fortuitous event. She reasoned that the collapse did not occur in Cherry Hills, but in the
adjacent mountain eastern side of the subdivision.

The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision imposing upon petitioner the supreme penalty of dismissal from
office for gross neglect of duty.

Petitioner seasonably filed a petition for review of the Ombudsmans decision with the CA. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the appealed decision. It found that the landslide was a preventable
occurrence and that petitioner was guilty of gross negligence in failing to closely monitor Philjas compliance with the
conditions of the ECC given the known inherent instability of the ground where the subdivision was developed. The
appellate court likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON Balicas is guilty of gross neglect of duty

HELD: NO. In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we have to look at the lawfully prescribed duties
of petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR regulations are silent on the specific duties of a senior environmental management
specialist. Internal regulations merely speak of the functions of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) to which petitioner directly reports.

The monitoring duties of the PENRO mainly deal with broad environmental concerns, particularly pollution abatement.
This general monitoring duty is applicable to all types of physical developments that may adversely impact on the
environment, whether housing projects, industrial sites, recreational facilities, or scientific undertakings.

However, a more specific monitoring duty is imposed on the HLURB as the sole regulatory body for housing and land
development.

P.D. No. 1586 prescribes the following duties on the HLURB (then Ministry of Human Settlements) in connection with
environmentally critical projects requiring an ECC:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The President of the Philippines
may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environment Protection Council, by proclamation
declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing
an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper
management of said critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices,
agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel, and their
specific functions and responsibilities.

For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements [now HLURB] shall:

(a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or area(s);

(b) establish ambient environmental quality standards;

(c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or protective measures against calamitous factors such as
earthquake, floods, water erosion and others; and

(d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from time to time.

The legal duty to monitor housing projects, like the CHP, against calamities such as landslides due to continuous rain, is
clearly placed on the HLURB, not on the petitioner as PENRO senior environmental management specialist. In fact, the
law imposes no clear and direct duty on petitioner to perform such narrowly defined monitoring function.
TANO VS SOCRATES (GR NO. 110249; AUGUST 21, 1997)

FACTS: On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment
of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years,
in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said ordinances and
resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2
and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did
not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any
of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine
wealth. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at
all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out
such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in
the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity
of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.