TOPIC: EASTMENTS AND SERVITUDES

Jabonete vs Monteverde, Legaspi, DBP, & Arcilla

GR No. L- 17482
March 31, 1966

Facts: On March 11, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Davao, found that Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in question with the knowledge that a "gravamen" or easement of right of way existed
thereon, promulgated a decision the dispositive portion of which reads (dili ma basa kay spanish) . In view of the March 11 order, the plaintiffs (Jabonete) immediately proceeded to the premises in
question and opened in the fence of the defendant (Antonio Legaspi) a sufficient opening for the passage of men and vehicles. Even then, however, the defendant filed with the court below on that very
same day, May 21, 1954, a motion for the reconsideration of the order granting discretionary execution. Thereafter, and upon the lower court's suggestion, the parties entered into an amicable
AGREEMENT which was later embodied in an order or "auto" dated May 24, 1954. (dili gihapon mabasa ang AGREEMENT) Both parties complied with terms of the AGREEMENT until the plaintiffs, unable
to continue with their repair shop, transferred to another place in December 1959 whereupon the defendant reconstructed his fence and its footing, closing thereby the opening previously made by the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' lot was foreclosed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which, later still, conveyed it under a conditional sale to Mrs. Luz Arcilla.

On her acquisition of the said lot, Mrs. Arcilla demanded of the defendant the re-opening of the fence in question as it was her plan to construct her house in the said lot. When the defendant refused, the
Development Bank filed with the lower court a petition to hold the said defendant in contempt. Mrs. Luz Arcilla later intervened in the case filed by DBP and was so allowed by the lower court. The
Development Bank of the Philippines and Mrs. Luz Arcilla contended that the refusal of the defendant to cause or allow the making of an opening in his fence was a defiance of the said court's decision of
March 11, 1954 and was, therefore, contemptuous. After due hearing, the lower court sustained the petitioners and found the defendant guilty of contempt with orders "to pay a fine of One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00) and to open the vereda or alley leading to the lot owned by the Development Bank of the Philippines and conveyed to Mrs. Luz S. Arcilla.

Issue: Whether DBP and Mrs. Arcilla has the right to the easement granted to Jabonete

Held: No. Under the aforesaid order of May 24, 1954, the easement awarded or secured by the lower court to the plaintiffs was strictly a personal one. The right of way granted was expressly limited to
the latter and their "family, friends, drivers, servants and jeeps." In the very language of the agreement the following appears : El demandado Antonio Legaspi, permitira el uso y paso en la calle privada
construida por el en su terreno a lo largo del terreno de los demandantes, a estos, su familia, sus amigos, chofers, servidumbre y de sus jeeps. The servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone
of the plaintiffs and the persons above enumerated and it is clear that the lower court, as well as the parties addressed by the said order, did not intend the same to pass on to the plaintiffs' successors-
in-interest. In other words, the right acquired by the original plaintiffs was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not a predial servitude that inures to the benefit of whoever owns
the dominant estate. Another evidence that the servitude in question was personal to the plaintiffs is the fact that the same was granted to the latter without any compensation to the respondent-
appellant.

Alcantara vs Reta Jr.

372 SCRA 368

Facts: Edilberto Alcantara, Florencio Villarmia, Policarpio Obregon, Ricardo Roble, EscolasticaOndong, Esteban Rallos, Henry Sesbino, Sergio Sesbino, Manuel Centeno, Renato Cruz, Marcelo Ceneza,
Buenaventura Ondong and Benjamin Halasan, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14, a complaint against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for the exercise of the right of first refusal
under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary injunction, attorney's fees and nullity of amicable settlement. THE PLAINTIFFS CLAIMEDthat they were tenants or lessees of the land
located in Barangay Sasa, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72594, owned by Reta; that the land has been converted by Reta into a commercial center; and that Reta is
threatening to eject them from the land. They assert that they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they are legitimate
tenants or lessees thereof. They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void ab initio for being violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.On the other
hand, DEFENDANT RETA CLAIMED that the land is beyond the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since it has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone; that the applicable law is Batas
PambansaBlg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to pay the rentals for the use of the land

On March 8, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and ordering the plaintiffs to pay Reta certain sums representing rentals that had remained unpaid. On April 6, 1994,
plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed the TCs decision. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: whether petitioners have the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517.

Ruling: The petition is without merit. The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting
that the land they were occupying be declared as an ULRZ Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property was an ULRZ.
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as "The Urban Land Reform Act," pertains to areas proclaimed as Urban Land Reform Zones. Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the
said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.

To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must be:
(1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more;
(2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and,

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(3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years.

Obviously, those who do not fall within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the
land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time. Respondent Reta denies that he has lease agreements with petitioners Edilberto Alcantara and Ricardo Roble.
Edilberto Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to present proof of a lease agreement other than his testimony in court that he bought the house that he is occupying from his father-in-law.
Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease.
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Petitioner Roble was allowed
to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable
settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by Presidential
Decree No. 1517. Indeed, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal under P.D. No. 1517.Another factor which militates against petitioners' claim is the fact that there is no
intention on the part of respondent Reta to sell the property.

North Negros Sugar Co. Inc. vs. Hidalgo

63 Phil. 664 (GR No. L-42334)
October 31, 19836

Facts: It appears that the plaintiff is the owner of a site in which is located its sugar central, with its factorybuilding and residence for its employees and laborers, known as the "mill site." It also owns
the adjoining sugarplantation known as Hacienda "Begoa." Across its properties the plaintiff constructed a road connecting the "millsite" with the provincial highway. Through this road plaintiff allowed
and still allows vehicles to pass upon paymentof a toll charge of P0.15 for each truck or automobile. Pedestrians are allowed free passage through it. Immediately adjoining the above-mentioned "mill
site" of the plaintiff is the hacienda of Luciano Aguirre,known as Hacienda "Sagay," where the defendant has a billiard hall and atubasaloon. Like other people in andabout the place, defendant used to
pass through the said road of the plaintiff, because it was his only means of access to the Hacienda "Sagay" where he runs his billiard hall and

Tubasaloon. Later on, by order of the plaintiff,every time that the defendant passed driving his automobile with a cargo of tubaplaintiff gatekeeper would stophim and prevent him from passing through
said road. Defendant in such cases merely deviated from said road andcontinued on his way to Hacienda "Sagay" across the fields of Hacienda "Begoa," likewise belonging to theplaintiff. Plaintiff filed a
writ of injunction to prevent defendant from entering his property especially the sugarcentral mill site

Issues:

1. WON an injunction applies in the instant case.

2. WON an easement has been created for the use of the community

Held:

1. No, an injunction applies only when there has been damage to third parties. The remedy sought by the plaintiff is invalid because the property or his person does not sustain damage every time
the defendant passes through the road. There has been a failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right of the plaintiff specially calling for judicial protection through an
extraordinary writ of the kind applied for, or that the defendant has committed or attempts to commit any act which has endanger or tends to endanger the existence of said right, or has
injured or threatens to injure the same. Defendant's sale of tuba at the Hacienda "Sagay" is nothing more than the exercise of a legitimate business, and no real damage to the third persons
can arise from it as a natural and logical consequence. The bare possibility that plaintiff's laborers, due to the contiguity of the Hacienda "Sagay" to its property, might come to the defendant's
store to imbibetubato drunkenness, does not warrant the conclusion that the defendant, in thusrunning this business, impinges upon plaintiff's property rights and should thereby be judicially
enjoined
2. Yes, it is clear and evident that the road was constructed in favor of the general public. No specialcondition or requirement was made for the passage of those who wished to pass. There were
manifest acts of theplaintiff allowing laborers, employees and other members of the community to freely pass through. ART. 531. Easements may also be established for the benefit of one or
more persons or of a community towhom the encumbered estate does not belong. As may be seen from the language of article 594, in cases of voluntary easement, the owner is given
ampleliberty to establish them: "as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider desirable." Theplaintiff "considered it desirable" to open this road to the public in general,
without imposing any condition savethe payment of a fifteen-centavo toll by motor vehicles, and it may not now go back on this and deny the existenceof an easement. Voluntary easements
under article 594 are not contractual in nature; they constitute the act of theowner. If he exacts any condition, like the payment of a certain indemnity for the use of the easement, any
personwho is willing to pay it may make use of the easement. If the contention be made that a contract is necessary, itmay be stated that a contract exits from the time all those who desire to
make use of the easement are disposedto pay the required indemnity. The plaintiff contends that the easement of way is intermittent in nature and can only be acquired by virtueof a title under
article 539. The defendant, however, does not lay claim to it by prescription. The title in this caseconsists in the fact that the plaintiff has offered the use of this road to the general public upon
payment of ascertain sum as passage fee in case of motor vehicles. Having been devoted by the plaintiff to the use of the publicin general, upon paying the passage fees required in the case of
motor vehicles, the road in question is chargedwith a public interest, and while so devoted, the plaintiff may not establish discriminatory exceptions against anyprivate person.

VALISNO v. ADRIANO
G.R. No. L-37409
2
 May 23, 1988

FACTS: Valisno bought a parcel of land irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal traversing Adrianos land. Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was
deprived of the irrigation water. On his defense, Adriano contended that Valisno did not acquire any water rights since it was him (Adriano) who applied for and obtained it. He merely allowed his sister to
use his water rights when she still owned the adjacent land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valisno is entitled to an easement of water.

HELD: As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference such as the appellee's act of levelling
the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River. Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land,
pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated
even if the water is supplied by a third person (Watson vs. French, 112 Me 371, 19 C.J. 868-897). The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does not
detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity (Benedicto vs. CA, 25 SCRA 145).

Valderama vs. North Negros Sugar Central

48 Phil 482
1925

Facts: Several hacienda owners of Manapla, Occidental Negros entered into a contract with Miguel J. Osorio, known as milling contract, wherein Osorio agreed to install in Manapla a sugar central of a
minimum capacity of 300 tons, for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners, who in turn bound themselves to furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in
their estates for thirty years from the execution of the contract, all in accordance with the conditions specified therein. Later on, the defendant North Negros Sugar Co., Inc., acquired the rights and
interest of Miguel J. Osorio in the milling contract aforesaid. Under the contract an easement of way 7 meters wide upon the lands of the plaintiffs was given for the construction and operation of a
railroad for the transportation of sugar cane, said easement of way was established without any restriction whatsoever, as regards the ownership of the cane to be transported over the said railroad; that
said contract was then in full force and effect and had never been annulled or modified. The plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging that the easement of way, which each of them has established in his
respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof, while the defendant maintains that it had the right to transport to its central upon the
railroad passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.

Issue: Whether or not North Negros Sugar Co. has the right to transport sugar belonging to other hacienda owners?

Held: Yes. This is a case of an easement for the benefit of a corporation, voluntarily created by the plaintiffs upon their respective estates for the construction of a railroad connecting said estates with
the central of the defendant. Once the road is constructed, the easement is apparent because it is continuously exposed to view by the rails which reveal the use and enjoyment of said easement. It is
evident, as above stated, that the cane of the plaintiffs if to be transported to the central by means of wagons passing upon the railroad; but as the easement was created for the benefit of the
corporation, owner of the central, it may cause its wagons to pass upon the road as many times as it may deem fit, according to the needs of the central. If the plaintiffs do not produce sufficient cane to
cover the capacity of the central, it would be unjust to impose upon the defendant corporation the burden of maintaining a central, prohibiting it to obtain from another source sufficient cane with which
to maintain its business; this is especially true here, because in the milling contract with the plaintiffs, there is nothing to prohibit the defendant from making milling contracts with other planters, and
obtain in that way all cane necessary to cover the capacity of the central.

Another reason advanced by the appellees in support of their theory is that by transporting upon the road, through the servient estates, the cane of the planters of Cadiz, it would alter the easement,
making it more burdensome. It is true that the owner of the dominant estate, in making on the servient estate the necessary works for the use and preservation of the easement, cannot alter it, nor
make it more burdensome (art. 543 of the Civil Code); but this does not mean that the defendant cannot transport in the wagons passing upon the railroad other cane that of the plaintiffs. What is
prohibited by the legal provision above cited is that the defendant, in excavations or building materials outside of the area of 7 meters, because in the first case, the easement will be altered, and in the
second it would become more burdensome. But nothing of the kind happens when the defendant transport on the railroad, crossing the servient estates, the cane of the planters of Cadiz; the railroad
continues to occupy the same area on the servient estates, and the encumbrance resulting from the easement continues to be the same, whether the tractors traverse the line 10, 20 or 30 times a day
transporting cane for the central.

Goldcrest Realty Corp. vs. Cypress

G.R. No. 171072
Apr. 7, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Herrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest
executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions [3] which constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation
(Cypress) to manage the condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which the condominium stands was transferred toCypress under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. S-67513. But Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium registered under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. S-1079 of
the Register of Deeds of Makati City. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled the management and administration of the Condominium until 1995. Following the turnover of the

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administration and management of the Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached
upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the common
areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures it built thereon. Upon the directive of HLURB Arbiter San Vicente, two ocular inspections [5] were conducted on the condominium
project. During the first inspection, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed and used the common area fronting the two elevators on the ninth floor as a storage room. It was likewise discovered that
Goldcrest constructed a permanent structure which encroached 68.01 square meters of the roof decks common area. During the second inspection, it was noted that Goldcrest failed to secure an
alteration approval for the said permanent structure. In his Decision dated December 2, 1999, Arbiter San Vicente ruled in favor of Cypress. He required Goldcrest, among other things, to: (1) remove the
questioned structures, including all other structures which inhibit the free ingress to and egress from the condominiums limited and unlimited common areas; (2) vacate the roof decks common areas and
to pay actual damages for occupying the same; and (3) pay an administrative fine for constructing a second penthouse and for making an unauthorized alteration of the condominium plan. Cypress
appealed to CA because nanu ge delete daw ang award and then the ruling was partially granted mau toh ge pasaka sa SC na dayun.

Issue: WON THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IMPAIRED THE EASEMENT ON THE PORTION OF THE ROOF DECK DESIGNATED AS A LIMITED COMMON AREA.

Ruling: Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof decks common limited area is for its exclusive use, building structures thereon and leasing the same to third persons do not impair the subject
easement. The question of whether a certain act impairs an easement is undeniably one of fact, considering that its resolution requires us to determine the acts propriety in relation to the character and
purpose of the subject easement. In this case, we find no cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right to erect an
office structure on the limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation
of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957. The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise
rights necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that
previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify
the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least
convenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number of the aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office structure were neither
necessary for the use or preservation of the roof decks limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on the condominiums foundation and on the roof decks common limited
area, making the easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the
intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project plan and violated Section 4 [27] of the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions

PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. RAMON DUMADAG et al

G.R. No. 194336
March 11, 2013
Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint for accion publiciana with damages against respondents for allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and consent in its property. It claims that said
parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name was designated as an open space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision
residents. Respondents denied the material allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over them. The trial court
dismissed petitioners complaint, finding that the land being occupied by respondents are situated on the sloping area going down and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the three-
meter legal easement; thus, considered as public property and part of public dominion under Article 502 of the Civil Code, which could not be owned by petitioner. The court held: And in the present
case, what is expressly reserved is what is written in TCT No. T-481436, to wit "that the 3.00 meter strip of the lot described herein along the Mahabang Ilog Creek is reserved for public easement
purposes.. x x x" The trial court opined that respondents have a better right to possess the occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes and that only the local
government of Las Pias City could institute an action for recovery of possession or ownership. Referring to Section 2 10 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 99-21 of the DENR, the CA ruled that the 3-
meter area being disputed is located along the creek which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion. It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact,
which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip was indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the TCT, it is then estopped from claiming ownership and enforcing its supposed right. Unlike
the trial court, however, the CA noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of the contested portion is not the City of Las Pias, but the Republic of the Philippines, Pursuant to CA
141.

Issue: WON petitioner, as the owner of the subject party of land, the proper party to file an action for recovery of possession against respondents conformably with Articles 428 and 539 of Civil Code.

Held: We deny. An easement or servitude is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his or her property, for the benefit of another person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from the estate to which it actively or passively belongs, indivisible, perpetual,
and a continuing property right, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. The Code defines easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule
that "the owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement,"
Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "all matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the
absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title Title VII on Easements or Servitudes." In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21, cannot be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further
the governments program of biodiversity preservation. Section 2.3 of which further mandates: Complex Subdivision or Consolidation Subdivision Surveys for Housing/Residential, Commercial or Industrial
Purposes: When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-subdivided into lots for residential, commercial or industrial purposes the segregation of the three (3) meter wide strip along the banks of rivers
or streams shall be observed and be made part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216. The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject to subsequent subdivision.

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Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as
forming part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216. Said law is explicit: open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men" and that "[the] areas
reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable." Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines which provides: Art.
51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and
forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in
this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, the above prove that petitioners right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court
cannot agree with the trial courts opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of the land because they are occupying an area
reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is public land. Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters have no
possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the
nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.

As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, We find and so hold that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local
government of Las Pias City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also
bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). Under R.A. 7279, all local government units (LGUs) are
mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks,
roads, parks, and playgrounds. Yet all is not lost for petitioner. It may properly file an action for mandamus to compel the local government of Las Pias City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the
eviction, demolition, and relocation of respondents and any other persons similarly situated in order to give flesh to one of the avowed policies of R.A. 7279, which is to reduce urban dysfunctions,
particularly those that adversely affect public health, safety, and ecology.

Villanueva vs Velasco
GR# 130845
November 27, 2000

Facts:

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking
Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner bought the parcel of land
there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of
private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement.

Villanuevas Arguments: The Contract of Easement could not be enforced against him. First, he says that a right of way cannot exist when it is not expressly stated or annotated on the Torrens title.
According to him, even if an easement is inherent and inseparable from the estate to which it actively belongs as provided in Art. 617 of the Civil Code, the same is extinguished when the servient estate
is registered and the easement was not annotated in said title conformably with Section 39 of the Land Registration Law. He adds that Section 76 of P.D. No. 1529 also requires that when a case is
commenced involving any right to registered land under the Land Registration Law (now the Property Registration Decree), any decision on it will only be effectual between or among the parties thereto,
unless a notice of lis pendens of such action is filed and registered in the registry office where the land is recorded. There was no such annotation in the title of the disputed land, according to Villanueva.

Issue: Whether the contract of easement of right of way binds Villanueva considering that it was entered by Sps. Gabriel and the Espinolas

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Held: At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court
of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement
is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right.[14] As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs,
as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code.

The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are:

1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. proper indemnity has been paid;
3. the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
4. the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
5. to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private
respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in
view of the needs of private respondents estate. Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis
pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties
to said case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court.[18] In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated
Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991,[19] against the original owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds[20] on March 24,
1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For, although not a party to the suit, he is a
successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in court.

Ramos, Sr. vs Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,

GR No. 75905
Oct. 12, 1987

FACTS: Petitioner Ramos is the owner of a house and lot containing an area of 901 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14927 situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro
Manila. The lot was acquired by the petitioner from Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision.In the subdivision survey plan of Lot 4133-G-11. Two road lots abut petitioner's property: lot 4133-G-12 with an
area of 2,160 square meters clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan. Lot 4135 as Gatchalian Avenue owned by respondent ASPREC. Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135.
Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was granted the road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivisions, by the
respondent Asprecs. The records of this case disclose that on April 30, 1981, a complaint for an easement of a right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction was filed by Ramos against the private
respondents. Among the allegations in the complaint are: That Petitioner, (REMIGIO RAMOS) constructed his house at 27 Gatchalian Avenue, Paraaque, and has since resided therein with his family
from 1977 up to the present; that during construction of the house, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8 feet high concrete wall right infront of appellant's premises, blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian
Road, the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road or highway; he addressed separate request/demand letters to defendant company to allow him to exercise a right of
way on the subject premises; that in September 1977, a meeting/conference was held between petitioner and his counsel and Mr. Roberto Gatchalian and counsel on the other, during which defendant
Corporation manifested its conformity to grant the requested right of way upon payment of proper indemnity, with the request that appellant inform defendants Asprec of their aforesaid agreement.

On November 26, 1981, the PETITIONER FILEDan urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction as well as a preliminary prohibitory injunction. On the same day, the
lower court ordered that the defendant corporation is temporarily restraining petitioner ramos from using, passing the said GATCHALIAN AVENUE. On December 1, 1981, Gatchalian Realty filed its answer
a.) They never into a verbal agreement with the petitioner to grant them a road right of way, b.) The so-called Gatchalian Avenue or Palanyag Road is not a public road but a private street established
and constructed by the defendant Corporation intended for the sole and exclusive use of its residents and lot buyers of its subdivisions. On December 2, 1981, RESPONDENT ASPREC FILED THEIR
ANSWER which basically contained the same averments as that of the realty company. The lower court rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to grant the former
a right of way. RESPONDENTS Asprec and Gatchalian, likewise, FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of the lower court's grant of a right of way through Gatchalian Avenue in petitioner's favor
would be in derogation of the "Contract of Easement of Road Right-of-Way and of Drainage" executed between them and Gatchalian Realty. On July 8, 1983, the lower court under a new judge by virtue
of the reorganization of the judiciary, issued an order setting aside and vacating its previous decision. The Court of Appeals on August 29, 1986, found that the petitioner ramos failed to establish the
existence of the preconditions in order that he could legally be entitled to an easement of a right of way.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his favor are present.

RULING: Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the petitioner
and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way.
FIRST, WE NEED TO KNOW THE REQUIREMENTS, SOURCE: In the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company, Inc. v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al. (17 SCRA 731, 735-6), we held that:
". . . the Central had to rely strictly on its being entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way, under the Civil Code, and it could not claim any such servitude without first establishing the
preconditions for its grant fixed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
1. That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1, end);
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 3. That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. That the right of way claimed is 'at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.' (Art. 650).

"By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way cannot be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist,
On the first requisite, Thepetitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a
road right of way provided by the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes
inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. We agree with the appellate court's observation that the petitioner
should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said
subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. "Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the
imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."- (important) Considering that the petitioner has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as
aforestated, we find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way.

Costabella Corporation vs. CA, Katipunan Lumber Co.

GR No. 80511
January 25, 1991

Facts: Petitioner owns the real estate properties designated as Lot No. 5122 and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre situated at SitioBuyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a resort and
hotel. Private respondents, on the other hand, own the adjoining properties designated as Lot No. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon Cadastre. Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach
hotel, the private respondents, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner
closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property through which the private respondents, as in the past, were
allowed to pass. But later on, or sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative
passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it. So, private respondents then filed an action for injunction with damages against the petitioner before the CFI of Cebu.
They assailed the petitioners closure of the original passageway which they claimed to be an ancient road right of way that had been existing before WWII and since then had been used by them and
the general public. They also alleged that the dike constructed by petitioner was without a permit and obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris and flotsam on the
beach.

In its answer, petitioner denied the existence of an ancient road through its property and counter-averred that it and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted the temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous
use of (or passage through) is property by the private respondents and others by mere tolerance and purely as an act of neighbourliness. It also alleged that respondents were not entirely dependent on
the subject passageway as they had another existing access to the public road through other properties. Petitioners also said that the dike was merely a breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its
property and has been benefitting the fishermen who used the same as mooring for their boats during low tide. Lastly, they assailed respondents failure to implead as defendants the owners of the other
properties supposedly traversed by the alleged ancient road right way. The CFI ruled in favor of the respondents, finding that they had acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy based
on its long existence and its continued use and enjoyment. The CA questioned the lower courts finding on private respondents vested right by virtue of prescription but nevertheless granted their right to
an easement of way.

Issue:

1. WON easement of right of way can be acquired through prescription.

2. WON the private resp. had acquired easement of right of way in the form of a passageway on petitioners property

Held:

1. No. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription.
2. No. One may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that there is another outlet for the
private respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of the private respondents). Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was never a
gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private respondents
made no mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioner for the right of way to be established over its property.Hence, the Private respondents' properties cannot be said to be isolated,
for which a compulsory easement is demandable. Insofar therefore as the Appellate Court declared the case to be proper as a controversy for a compulsory right of way, this Court is
constrained to hold that it was in error.The SC also clarified that least prejudicial prevails over shortest distance (so shortest distance isnt necessarily the best choice).

QUIMEN v. OLIVEROS (ANASTACIA v. YOLANDA)

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 G.R. No. 112331
May 29, 1996

FACTS: Yolandas land is behind and adjacent to Anastacia and Soteros (Yolandas father) property. Yolanda has no access to the municipal road except through a pathway on Soteros property which
was blocked by his sari-sari store. Anastacia suggested a detour traversing the property of Anastacia to which Anastacia doesnt agree.

ISSUE: Whether the right of way should be the shortest route, a straight path from the property of Yolanda down to the municipal road which in effect would lead to the demolition of the sari-sari store
OR to take longer path, a detour traversing Anastacias property which in effect will lead to the cutting of her avocado tree.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the CAs findings, to wit: In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda will cause the
least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials. As between a
right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the
second alternative should be preferred. Furthermore, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used,
even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation.

Talisay-Silay Milling Co. vs CFI of Negros Occidental

42 SCRA 577

Facts

On May 5, 1971, upon the Central's posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000, we enjoined the respondent court and the respondent landowners from giving effect to the various orders denying
continuance of the Central's railway operations in the areas concerned. Following its receipt of our injunction order, the respondent court directed the restoration of the railroad tracks in the places where
the same had already been dismantled, all at the expense of the landowners who had caused the uprooting of the said tracks. This latter action of the respondent court was likewise halted by us on
November 25, 1971, pending final adjudication on the merits.
The record shows that the Central has been operating in the Talisay-Silay mill district in Negros Occidental as early as in the sugar crop year 1920-1921. Sugarcane grown in the district and outlying areas
was being processed into sugar and other products in its mill. Coinciding with the start of its operations in 1920, the Central entered into identical milling contracts with the sugarcane planters in the mill
district, among them the respondent landowners. Under these contracts, the Central was granted the right to construct and maintain railroad lines traversing the planters' properties for the hauling of
sugarcane from the various plantations in the mill district to the mill site. The identical milling contracts, as with the contractual railway easements, were for a period of fifty years to expire at the end of
the 1969-l970 sugar crop year.
On July 25, 1970 the Central lodged a complaint again the respondent landowners "for the conversion of the contractual easement of right of way into a legal easement. They alleged that there is no
other way plaintiff can pass in order to reach the plantations of planters growing sugar canes in the Talisay-Silay Mill District and milling with plaintiff, except thru the railroad lines.

Issue: Can the Plaintiff extend the legal easement after the contract has expired?

Ruling:

After the central's right to maintain and use the railroad tracks over the properties of the landowners incontrovertibly expired with the milling contracts, the central has to rely strictly on its supposed
entitlement to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, but it cannot claim any such servitude without first establishing the preconditions for its grant, namely, (a) that it is surrounded
by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of proper indemnity; (c) that the isolation is not the result of the centrals own acts; and (d) that the right of way
claimed at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the short test. The foregoing
preconditions were not properly established in the courts below by the central's concerned in the three cases mentioned. Their naked claim that they were entitled to compulsory easements of right of
way was not enough to warrant the issuance of preliminary injunctions in their favor.
The Central points out that at the time it commenced litigation against the respondent landowners, its contractual right of way still subsisted. The petitioner thus argues that the injunction issued shortly
thereafter was proper because it merely saw to the preservation of the status quo. This, to our mind, is a simplistic view of the meaning of "status quo." True, at the time the injunction was initially issued
by the court below, the Central had open and free use of the easements of right of way over the properties of the respondent landowners. It is equally true, however, that such contractual easements
were fast coming to an end. The fact of the normal running of the period during which the milling contracts should last, is part too of the status quo, and it would not serve the salutary function of
injunctive relief to simply halt the same.
The factual disparity of the case at bar from the situations obtaining in the Bacolod-Murcia, etc., cases is not substantial and does not give additional leverage to the Central insofar as it must deal with
the respondent landowners respecting its desire to obtain a legal easement of right of way for its railway system. The Central claims that it has fulfilled all the preconditions prescribed in articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code or, at the very least, has alleged their attendance in its verified complaint. This claim of the Central is self-serving. As regards the requisite that the Central's mill must be shown to

8
be surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway, the complaint clearly shows that the Central, even as it assumes the role of a dominant estate, wants a railway
access to the fields of its planters to be able to haul the latter's sugarcane to the milling site. It does not seek access to a public highway. The Central's cardinal mistake is its assumption that the railroad
route secured to it under its former milling contracts with the respondent landowners is the same route the court would grant the Central in the event the latter succeeds in proving its right to a legal
servitude. It made no attempt to negotiate with the respondent landowners for such railroad connections as will be least prejudicial to the latter's estates, and, insofar as consistent with this norm, where
the distance from the Central to the proposed outlet is the shortest. Nor yet did the Central, in its complaint, ask the court to fix the location and length of the servitude sought in the manner and under
the limitations defined by law.
In sum, as in Bacolod-Murcia, Angela Estate, and Locsin, the herein Central's right to the legal easement of right of way over the properties of the respondent landowners is not clear. And, unless it can
show otherwise during the hearing on the merits, the Central cannot ask for the establishment of the said legal servitude in its favor, much less demand the restoration of the injunction orders dissolved
by the respondent court.

JUAN GARGANTOS vs TAN YANON and THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-14652
June 30, 1960

Facts: The record discloses that the late Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the poblacion of
Romblon. He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion to different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion,
with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the third portion, which, together
with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.
On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the roofing of the oldcamarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin. On
May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval
of this application.
Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from
constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters
from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding building permit to defendant. CFI rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant to pay damages.
CA set aside the decision of the CFI and enjoined defendant from constructing his building unless "he erects the same at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line of his property, in
conformity with Article 673 of the New Civil Code."
Issue: WON the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos.
Held: The kernel of petitioner's argument is that respondent never acquired any easement either by title or by prescription. Assuredly, there is no deed establishing an easement. Likewise, neither
petitioner nor his predecessors-in-interest have ever executed any deed whereby they recognized the existence of the easement, nor has there been final judgment to that effect. Petitioner maintains that
respondent has not acquired an easement by prescription because he has never formally forbidden petitioner from performing any act which would be lawful without the easement, hence the prescriptive
period never started.
It is obvious, however, that Article 621, N.C.C. and the doctrine in the Yu-Tibo case are not applicable herein because the two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that owner by respondent, were
formerly owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in such a
way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion now belonging to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which serve as
passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence when respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that the easement of light and view
would not be established. This then is precisely the case covered Article 624, N.C.C which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor
of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the contrary is
stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the
aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence. It should be noted, however, that while the law declares that
the easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one
owner of both estates. We find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against petitioner's property. By reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his land
any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line separating the two estates.

Maximo Cortes vs Jose Palanca Yu-Tibo

GR No. 911
March 12, 1903

Facts: House No. 65 Calle Rosario is the property of the wife of the plaintiff (Maximo Cortes), has certain windows therein, through which it receives light and air. The said windows are adjacent to
house, No. 63 of the same street. These windows have been in existence since 1843. Defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view to raising the roof of the

9
house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in said house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received through the window. The
Trial Court found that plaintiff has not proven that he has, by any formal act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63, from making improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the complaint.

The CONTENTION OF THE PLAINTIFF is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows referred to above during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired from prescription an easement of light
in favor of the house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63, and, consequently, has acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter house which might in any manner
be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the said easement. He contends that the easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a
prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the same commenced , or, in other words, applying the doctrine to this case, from the time that said windows were
opened with the knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this part. The DEFENDANT, on the contrary, CONTENDS that the easement is negative, and that
therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from
doing something which would be lawful but for the existence of the easement.

Issue: Whether the easement is positive or negative and whether plaintiff has acquired the easement through prescription

Held: It is our opinion that the easement of lights in the case of windows opened in one's own wall is of a negative character, and, as such, cannot be acquired by prescription under article 538 of the
Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate (House No. 65) may, by a formal act have prohibited the owner of the servient estate
(House No. 63) from doing something which it would be lawful from him to do were it not for the easement.

The plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of the house No. 63 Calle Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might
obstruct the light of the house No. 65 of the same street, the property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned as error, he
has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall of the said house No. 65, because the
period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed.

Villanueva vs Velasco
346 SCRA 99

Facts:

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking
Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner bought the parcel of land
there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of
private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
10
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private
respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case for easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the
spouses Gabriel. As successors-in-interest of Espinolas, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement.
Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. Gabriels filed a Motion for
recon but was denied by the CA and upheld RTCs issuances.

Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Writ of Demolition = CA DIMISSED. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari asserting that the existence of easement was ot annotated in his titles and he was not a
party to the civil case, thus the contract of easement of Gabriels and Espinola cannot be enforced against him = DISMISSED.

ISSUE: Is this a voluntary kind of easement considering that Petitoners predecessor in interest, theGabriels had granted an easement of right of way to the Espinolas who are the predecessor in interest
of private respondents?

RULING:

The easement in the case at bar is both voluntary and legal easement. The settled rule is that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Hence, petitioner ought to demolish
the small house on the easement obstructing the entry of private respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle. And even if the easement was not annotated in the title of the land and the notice
of lispendens was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, in legal easement, the servient estate is bound to provide the dominant estate ingress from and egress to the public highway. Further, the
decision enforcing the right of easement against the previous owner, is conclusive and binding upon the successor-in-interest.||| Moreover, Villanueva was bound by the contract of easement, not only as
a voluntary easement but as a legal easement.

At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private
respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the
easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents' estate.

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