Safety Series 050-SG-D15 1992

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SAFETY SERiES No. 50-SG-D15
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A PUBLiCATiON
W!TH!N THE NUSS PROGRAMME
)NTERNAT!ONAL ATOMtC E N E R G Y AGENCY, VtENNA, 1992

CATEGORIES IN THE IAEA SAFETY SERIES
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Basic objectives, concepts and principles to ensure safety.
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SEISM IC D ESIGN A ND Q U A LIFIC A TIO N

FO R N U C LEA R PO W ER PLANTS
A Safety Guide
The foHowing States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
A FG H A N ISTA N H A IT I PA N A M A
ALB A N IA H O LY SEE PARA G UA Y
A LG ERIA HUNGARY PERU
A R G E N T IN A IC EL A N D PH IL IPPIN ES
A U STRA LIA IN D IA POLAND
A USTRIA IN D O N ESIA PO R T U G A L
B A N G LA D ESH IR A N , ISLA M IC REPU B LIC OF Q A TA R
BELA RU S IRAQ RO M A N IA
B EL G IU M IR EL A N D R U SSIA N F ED ER A TIO N
BO LIV IA ISRA EL SA U D I ARABIA
B R A ZIL ITA LY SEN EG A L
B U LG A RIA IA M A IC A SIERR A LE O N E
C A M BO D IA JA PA N SIN G A PO RE
CAMEROON JO R D A N S O U TH A FR IC A
CANADA K EN YA SPA IN
C H ILE K O R E A , REPU B LIC O F SRI LA N KA
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C O LO M BIA LE B A N O N SW ED EN
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CU BA LIE C H T EN ST EIN TH A ILA N D
C Y PRU S LU X EM B O U R G TU N ISIA
C ZE C H O SLO V A K IA M A D A G A SCA R T U R K EY
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ESTO N IA M YANMAR TA N ZA N IA
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F IN L A N D N ETH ER L A N D S U R UG U AY
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G ER M A N Y N IG E R Y UG O SLA V IA
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G U A TE M A LA PA K ISTA N ZIM BA BW E
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O IAEA, 1992
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Printed by the IAEA in Austria
October 1992
SAFETY SERIES No. 50-SG-D15
SEISMIC DESIGN
AND QUALIFICATION
FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
A Safety Guide
INTERNATIONAL ATOM IC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 1992
THIS SAFETY SERIES PUBLICATION IS ALSO ISSUED IN

FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND SPANISH
VIC Library Catatoguing in Publication Data

Seismic design and qualification for nuclear pow er ptants : a safety guide.
Vienna : International Atom ic Energy A gency, 1992.
p. ; 24 cm. (Safety series, ISSN 0074-1892 ; 50-SG -D I5)
STI/PUB/917
ISBN 9 2 -0 -1 0 3 5 9 2 -6
Includes bibliographical references.
1. N uclear pow er plantsEarthquake effects. 2. Nuclear engineering

Safety m easures. 3. Earthquake resistant design. I. International Atomic
Energy Agency. II. Series.
VICL 92-00036
FOREW ORD
by th e D ire c to r G en eral
Nuclear power is well established and can be expected to become an even more
significant part o f the energy programmes o f many countries, provided that its safe
use can be ensured and be perceived to be so ensured. Although accidents have
occurred, the nuclear power industry has generally maintained a good safety record.
However, improvements are always possible and necessary. Safety is not a static
concept.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, recognizing the importance o f the
safety o f the industry and desiring to promote an improving safety record, set up a
programme in 1974 to give guidance to its M ember States on the many aspects of
the safety o f nuclear power reactors. Under this Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS)
programme, some 60 Codes and Safety Guides dealing with radiological safety were
published in the IAEA Safety Series between 1978 and 1986. The NUSS programme
was developed for land based stationary plants with thermal neutron reactors
designed for the production o f power but the provisions may be appropriate to a
wider range of nuclear applications.
In order to take account o f lessons learned since the first publication of the
NUSS programme was issued, it was decided in 1986 to revise and reissue the Codes
and Safety Guides. During the original development of these publications, as well
as during the revision process, care was taken to ensure that all M ember States, in
particular those with active nuclear power programmes, could provide their input.
Several independent reviews took place including a final one by the Nuclear Safety
Standards Advisory Group (NUSSAG). The revised Codes w ere approved by the
Board of Governors in June 1988. In the revision process new developments in
technology and methods of analysis have been incorporated on the basis of interna
tional consensus. It is hoped that the revised Codes will be used, and that they will
be accepted and respected by M ember States as a basis for regulation of the safety
o f pow er reactors within the national legal and regulatory framework.
Any M ember State wishing to enter into an agreement with the IAEA for its
assistance in connection with the siting, design, construction, commissioning,
operation or decommissioning o f a nuclear pow er plant will be required to follow
those parts o f the Codes and Safety Guides that pertain to the activities to be covered
by the agreement. However, it is recognized that the final decisions and legal
responsibilities in any licensing procedures rest with the M ember States.
The Codes and Safety Guides are presented in such a form as to enable a
M ember State, should it so desire, to make their contents directly applicable to
activities under its jurisdiction. Therefore, consistent with the accepted practice for
codes and guides, and in accordance with a proposal o f the Senior Advisory Group,
'shall' and 'should' are used to distinguish for the user between strict requirements
and desirable options respectively.
The five Codes deal with the following topics:
Governmental organization
Siting
Design
Operation
Quality assurance.
These five Codes establish the objectives and basic requirements that must be met
to ensure adequate safety in the operation o f nuclear power plants.
The Safety Guides are issued to describe to Member States acceptable methods
o f implementing particular parts o f the relevant Codes. Methods and solutions other
than those set out in these Guides may be acceptable, provided that they give at least
equivalent assurance that nuclear power plants can be operated without undue risk
to the health and safety o f the general public and site personnel. Although these
Codes and Safety Guides establish an essential basis for safety, they may require the
incorporation o f m ore detailed requirements in accordance with national practice.
M oreover, there will be special aspects that need to be assessed by experts on a case
by case basis.
These publications are intended for use, as appropriate, by regulatory bodies
and others concerned in M ember States. In order to comprehend the contents o f any
o f them fully, it is essential that the other relevant Codes and Safety Guides be taken
into account. Other safety publications o f the IAEA should be consulted as
necessary.
The physical security o f fissile and radioactive materials and of nuclear power
plants as a whole is mentioned where appropriate but is not treated in detail
Non-radiological aspects o f industrial safety and environmental protection are also
not explicitly considered.
The requirements and recommendations set forth in the NUSS publications
may not be fully satisfied by older plants. The decision of whether to apply them
to such plants must be made on a case by case basis according to national
circumstances.
CONTENTS
DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................... 1
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 7
Background (101-102) ............................ ............................. ........................ 7

Objective (103) .................................................................................................... 7
Scope (104) .......................................................................................................... 7
Structure (105-106) ........................................................................................... 8
2. GENERAL CONCEPT ...................................... .............................................. 8
Earthquake levels (202-203) ............................................................................. 8

Seismic categorization for structures, systems and
components (204-211) ................................................................................. 9
Combination o f earthquake loads with other plant process loading
conditions (212-215) ........................................................................... . 10
Allowable limits for stress, strain and deformation (216-220) ............... 11
3. SEISMIC DESIGN ............................................................................................. 12
General approach to seismic design (301-305) ...................................... . 12

Civil engineering structures (306) .................................................................. 13
Earth structures (307) ........................................................................................ 15
Piping and equipment (308) ............................................................................. 15
Improvement of the vibration resistance of components (309) ............ 16
Possible modes of failure o f new types o f equipment (310) .................. 17
Functional aspects o f seismic design (311) .................................................. 17
Effects o f vertical ground motion (312) ........................................................ 17
4. SEISMIC QUALIFICATION: ANALYSIS, TESTING,

EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE AND INDIRECT METHODS ............ 18
Seismic input (402) ............................................................................................. 18

Direct qualification (403) .................................................................................. 18
Qualification by analysis (404) ........................................................................ 19
General and analytical methods (405-408) .................................................. 19
General modelling techniques (409-411) ...................................................... 20
Civil engineering structures (412-423) ......................................................... 20
Mechanical and electrical components (424-439) ...................................... 22
Distribution systems (440-446) ....................................................................... 24
Seismic qualification testing (447-468) ......................................................... 25
Seismic qualification by earthquake experience (469) ............................... 29
Indirect method (470-473) ................................................................................ 30
5. SEISMIC INSTRUM ENTATION .................................................................. 31
Type, location and number of instruments (502-504) ............................... 31

Maintenance of instrumentation (505) ........................................................... 31
Data evaluation (506) ........................................................................................ 32
APPENDIX I: METHODS OF SEISMIC ANALYSIS ..................................... 33
APPENDIX II: M ODELLING TECHNIQUES ..................................................... 34
ANNEX I: EXAMPLES OF LISTS OF SEISMIC CATEGORY 1

AND OTHER CATEGORY ITEMS ................................... .......... 41
ANNEX II: SLOSHING AND IM PULSE EFFECTS IN

LIQUID CONTAINERS ....................................................................... 53
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 55
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 59
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW ........................................... 61
LIST OF NUSS PROGRAM M E TITLES .............................................................. 67
SELECTION OF IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO

THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POW ER PLANTS .............................................. 71
DEFINITIONS
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pMÂ'tafi'on.s' are ;7/M,sfr<3fed Ay fAe accompanying dfagraw.
Operational States
States defined under Norma! Operation or Anticipated Operational

Occurrences.
Normal Operation
Operation of a nuclear power plant within specified operational limits and

conditions including shutdown, power operation, shutting down, starting, main
tenance, testing and refuelling.
Anticipated Operationa! Occurrences*
All operational processes deviating from Normal Operation which are

expected to occur once or several times during the operating life o f the plant and
which, in view of appropriate design provisions, do not cause any significant damage
to items important to Safety nor lead to Accident Conditions.
Accident (or Accident State)
A state defined under Accident Conditions or Severe Accidents.
Accident Conditions
Deviations^ from Operational States in which the releases o f radioactive

materials are kept to acceptable limits by appropriate design features. These devia
tions do not include severe accidents.
' Examples o f Anticipated Operational Occurrences are toss o f normal electric pow er
and faults such as a turbine trip, malfunction o f individual items o f a normally running plant,
failure to function o f individual items o f control equipment, loss of pow er to main coolant
pump.
^ A deviation may be a m ajor fuel failure, a loss o f coolant accident (LOCA), etc.
1
Design Basis Accidents
Accident Conditions against which the nuclear power plant is designed accord
ing to established design criteria.
Severe Accidents
Nuclear power plant states beyond Accident Conditions including those

causing significant core degradation.
Accident M anagement
Accident management is the taking o f a set of actions
during the evolution of an event sequence, before the design basis of the plant
is exceeded, or
during Severe Accidents without core degradation, or
after core degradation has occurred
to return the plant to a controlled safe state and to mitigate any consequences o f the
accident.
Plant states
Operational states Accidents
Anticipated
Normal operational Accident Severe
operation ) occurrences conditions accidents
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Safety See Nuclear Safety
Nuclear Safety (or simply Safety)
The achievement o f proper operating conditions, prevention o f accidents or

mitigation o f accident consequences, resulting in protection o f site personnel, the
public and the environment from undue radiation hazards.
Safety Systems ^
Systems important to Safety, provided to assure the safe shutdown o f the

reactor or the residual heat removal from the core, or to limit the consequences of
Anticipated Operational Occurrences or Accident Conditions.
Protection System
A system which encompasses all electrical and mechanical devices and

circuitry, from sensors to actuation device input terminals, involved in generating
those signals associated with the protective function,
Safety Actuation System
The collection of equipment required to accomplish the necessary safety

actions when initiated by the Protection System.
Safety System Support Features
The collection of equipment that provides services such as cooling, lubrication,

and energy supply required by the Protection System and the Safety Actuation
Systems.
^ Safety Systems consist of the Protection System, the Safety Actuation systems, and
the Safety System Support Features. Components of Safety Systems may be provided solely
to perform Safety Functions or may perform safety functions in some plant Operational States
and non-safety functions in other plant Operational States (see diagram at the end of the
Definitions).
3
P la n t equipm ent
Items important to safety Items no? important to safety
system actuation system

systems support
features
Construction*
The process o f manufacturing and assembling the components o f a nuclear

pow er plant, the erection o f civil works and structures, the installation o f components
and equipment, and the performance of associated tests.
Design Floor Response Spectrum
Response spectrum defined at a particular building elevation and obtained by

modifying one or more floor response spectra in order to consider the variability and
uncertainty of input ground motion and of the characteristics of both building and
foundation.
Design Floor Time Histories
Time histories of floor motion o f structure under consideration derived from

the design basis ground motion, including the variability and uncertainty in input
ground motion and in building and foundation characteristics.
** The terms Siting, Design, Construction, Commissioning, Operation and Decom

missioning are used to delineate the six major stages of the licensing process. Several of the
stages may coexist; for example, Construction and Commissioning, or Commissioning and
Operation.
4
Floor Response Spectrum
The floor response spectrum at a particular level o f a structure for a given

ground motion.
Item
A general term covering materials, parts, components, systems or structures

and including computer software.
O p eratio n (see footnote 4)
All activities perform ed to achieve the purpose for which the nuclear power
plant was constructed^ including maintenance, refuelling, in-service inspection and
other associated activities.
R egulatory Body
A national authority or a system o f authorities designated by a Member State,

assisted by technical and other advisory bodies, and having the legal authority for
conducting the licensing process, for issuing licences and thereby for regulating
nuclear power plant Siting, Design, Construction, Commissioning, Operation and
Decommissioning or specified aspects thereof^.
R esidual H eat
The sum of the heat originating from radioactive decay and shutdown fission
and the heat stored in reactor related structures and in heat transport media.
Site
The area containing the plant, defined by a boundary and under effective con
trol of the plant management.
Siting (see footnote 4)
The process o f selecting a suitable Site for a nuclear power plant, including
appropriate assessment and definition o f the related design bases.
^ This national authority could be either the government itself, or one or more depart
ments of the government, or a body or bodies specially vested with appropriate legal authority.
5
Time History
A time record of earthquake motion or the earthquake response motion on a

time base of a particular floor or at some level on a structure resting on the ground.
NOTE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT
W hen an appendix is included it is considered to be an integral part o f the docu

ment and to have the same status as the main text o f the document.
However, annexes, footnotes and bibliographies are only included to provide
additional information or practical examples that might be helpful to the user.
In several cases phrases may use the wording 'shall consider...' or 'shall... as
far as practicable'. In these cases it is essential to give the matter in question careful
attention, and the decision must be made in consideration o f the circumstances of
each case. However, the final decision must be rational and justifiable and its techni
cal grounds must be documented.
Another special use of language is to be noted: " 'a ' or 'b ' " is used to indicate
that either 'a ' or 'b ', but also the combination o f both 'a ' and 'b ', would fulfil the
requirements. If alternatives are intended to be mutually exclusive, "e ith er... o r... "
is used.
6
1. INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
101. This Safety Guide, which supplements the IAEA Code on the Safety o f Nuclear
Power Plants: Design (IAEA Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1)), forms part o f the
A gency's program m e, referred to as the NUSS programme, for establishing Codes
and Guides relating to land based stationary thermal neutron power plants. A list of
NUSS publication titles is given at the end o f this book.
102. The present Guide was originally issued in 1979 as Safety Guide 50-SG-S2
within the series o f NUSS guides for the siting o f nuclear power plants, extending
seismic considerations from Safety Guide 50-SG-S 1 into the design and verification
Held. During the revision phase in 1988-1990, this emphasis on design aspects was
confirmed and consequently the Guide has been reclassified as a design Guide with
the corresponding identification number 50-SG-D 15. The general character o f the
Guide has not been changed and it still relates strongly to 50-SG-S 1, which gives
guidance on how to determine design basis ground motions for a nuclear power plant
at a given site.
OBJECTIVE
103. The purpose o f this Safety Guide is to provide details of a generally accepted
way to design a nuclear power plant such that earthquakes at the site determined
according to IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-S1 will not jeopardize the safety o f the plant.
It is also intended to give guidance on methods and procedures for analysing, testing
and qualifying structures and equipment such that they fulfil the purpose foreseen in
the design. The Guide addresses designers o f nuclear power plants and also safety
assessors and regulators concerned with the licensing of plants.
SCOPE
104. The guide is applicable to the design o f nuclear power plants to withstand earth
quakes irrespective o f the severity of the earthquake ground motion or the risk to
individual plant items. It is recognized that there may be simplified procedures for
some of the recommended design and verification methods. The adequacy of such
procedures for the safety objective would have to be determined for the individual
circumstances. It is also recognized that there is m ore than one possible engineering
solution to problems and the approach adopted for one nuclear power plant may
result in significant differences in the design o f that plant compared to that o f another
for which a different approach has been adopted.
7
STRUCTURE
105. The general concept in Section 2 defines two or more categories of items in
the plant for which, depending on their importance to safety, different guidance and
recommendations are set out. This section also discusses combinations of loads and
allowable stresses or deformations. In Section 3 the primary design principles for the
achievement o f the protection objective are presented. Guidance on analytical
methods for structures and mechanical or electrical equipment is given in Section 4.
This section also contains advice on qualification and the conduct o f tests. Section 5
presents information on recommended seismic instrumentation, its location and use.
106. A number o f appendices and annexes expand on specific topics such as seismic
categorization of items, analysis and modelling techniques.
2. GENERAL CONCEPT
201. The specific objective o f this section is to assist in categorizing structures,

systems and components o f a nuclear power plant in terms o f their importance to
safety in the event of a design basis earthquake, to set out guidance and to provide
recommendations on seismic design, analysis and testing to ensure safety.
EARTHQUAKE LEVELS
202. For safety design purposes the SL-2 earthquake level' shall be used, where
SL-2 is a level o f extreme ground motion that shall have a very low probability of
being exceeded during the lifetime o f the plant^. The recommended minimum level
is a peak ground acceleration o f O .lg (see Safety Guide 50-SG-S1 (Rev. 1),
para. 504).
203. For certain conditions, including some event combinations, post-accident

inspection, national licensing requirements and economic considerations, a second
earthquake level^' ^ known as SL-1 may be considered in the design. This level
corresponds to a less severe, m ore likely earthquake load condition with different
safety implications from SL-2.
' This level corresponds to an earthquake level often denoted as SSE (safe shutdown
earthquake).
^ See Safety Guide 50-SG-S1 (Rev. 1), Section 5 for methodological background for
the determination of SL-2 and SL-1.
^ This level corresponds to an earthquake level often denoted as OBE (operational
basis earthquake).
SEISMIC CATEGORIZATION FOR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND

COM PONENTS
204 Structures, systems and components (called hereafter 'item s') may be divided
into two or m ore categories in terms o f their importance to safety in the event o f an
earthquake. The purpose of this categorization is to facilitate the protection of the
public and the environment against radioactive releases.
205. A jeMwz'c 7 shall be established for the plant. Items within this
category shall be designed or demonstrated to withstand the consequences of ground
motions associated with earthquakes of level SL-2. Category 1 shall include'*:
(1) Items whose failure could directly or indirectly cause accident conditions (see
Definitions).
(2) Items required for shutting down the reactor, monitoring critical parameters,
maintaining the reactor in a shutdown condition and removing residual heat
over a long period.
(3) Items that are required to prevent radioactive releases or to maintain releases
below limits established by the regulatory body for accident conditions
(e.g. the containment system).
206. As a conservatiye measure, it is recommended that category 1 include those

items which are designed to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents
which may be postulated to occur in the primary pressure boundary, despite the fact
that the primary pressure boundary is designed to withstand earthquake loads.
207. .s^/.svTMc 2 may be established for the plant. Items so categorized

shall be designed to withstand the consequences o f ground motions associated with
earthquakes o f a severity as defined below (para. 208). Category 2 should include:
(1) Items, not in category 1, which are required to prevent the escape of radio
activity beyond normal operational limits.
(2) Items, not in category 1, required to mitigate those accident conditions which
last for such long periods that there is a reasonable likelihood that an
earthquake of the defined severity will occur during this period.
208. The design earthquake level for category 2 shall be defined on the following
basis. The additional effort to protect the items against this level of earthquake shall
be commensurate with the potential reduction in risk to plant personnel or the public
due to the earthquake. Nationally established acceptable limits for the release of
radioactivity shall be complied with. In many cases it may therefore be reasonable
to choose SL-1 as the design basis for this category. Such an approach would
" Typical list of components or systems are given in Annex I, which describes
categorizations used in some Member States.
9
minimize the need for plant shutdown, inspection and reiicensing, thus allowing the
plant to continue to operate.
209. Nuclear power plant items not included in categories 1 or 2 should be designed
for earthquake resistance in accordance with national practice for non-nuclear
applications.
210. When, as the result of an earthquake, the collapse, falling, dislodgement or any
other spatial response of an item is expected on the basis o f analysis, test or
experience to occur and could jeopardize the functioning o f items in a higher
category:
(1) Such items shall be classified in the same category as the endangered items;
(2) Under the reference ground motion, the absence o f collapse or loss of function
of the lower category items shall be demonstrated; or
(3) The endangered items shall be suitably protected so they are not jeopardized.
Since only the structural integrity o f items reclassified because o f their potential to
jeopardize higher category items needs to be assured, less rigorous seismic
evaluation criteria may be used.
211. The inclusion o f an item in seismic categories 1 or 2 shall be based on a clear

understanding of the functional requirements which shall be assured for safety during
or after an earthquake or after an accident not caused by an earthquake (see
para. 207, item 2). According to their different functions, parts o f the same system
may belong to different categories. Tightness, degree o f damage (fatigue, wear and
tear, etc.), mechanical or electrical function capability, maximum displacement,
degree o f permanent distortion and preservation o f geometrical dimensions are
examples o f aspects which shall be considered (see paras 216-220).
COMBINATION OF EARTHQUAKE LOADS W ITH OTHER PLANT PROCESS

LOADING CONDITIONS
212. Plant process loads are grouped as follows:
L I: loads due to normal operation

L2: additional loads due to anticipated operational occurrences
L3: additional loads due to accident conditions.
213. Seismic loads should be calculated for the specific location o f the item under
consideration, taking into account the characteristics of the soil and plant structures,
including the masses and stiffnesses and the distribution of equipment within the
plant. Care should be taken to ensure that the controlling loading combinations are
considered in order that maximum stresses in structural elements are identified and
included.
10
214. For the seismic design, it is recommended that loads from earthquakes be
combined with plant process loads as follows:
(1) For category 1 items, LI be combined with SL-2 loads;

(2) For category 2 and uncategorized items, LI be combined with the loads from
the respective earthquakes according to paras 208 and 209;
(3) For all items, L2 or L3 be combined with the respective earthquake loads if
the L2 or L3 loads are caused by the earthquake and have a high probability
o f coinciding with the earthquake loads or if the L2 loads occur sufficiently
frequently, independently o f the earthquake^.
(4) For category 1 items, relevant L3 loads should be combined with SL-2 loads,
unless L3 is not correlated with SL-2 loads.
It should be noted that an L3 load for one group of items (e.g. the reactor coolant
system) can be an LI load for another group o f items (e.g. containment system or
safety injection system).
215. For the seismic design o f equipment and civil structures, ambient environ
mental conditions and other natural phenomena such as floods or fires assumed as
a consequence of the earthquake shall be taken into account. They could be identified
on the basis o f probabilistic considerations [1].
ALLOW ABLE LIMITS FOR STRESS, STRAIN AND DEFORM ATION
216. Behaviour limits for load combinations of sets of events, including the effects
o f SL-2 with LI or L2, and SL-1 or SL-2 with L3, should be the same as those adopted
in related practices for L3 acting without an earthquake. In load factor design,
behaviour limits are defined by variable load factors with set limits on stress, strain
or deformation. This is in contrast to working stress design where variable limits are
applied to stress, strain or deformation for a fixed set o f loads. Increasing allowable
stress, strain or deformation limits has the same effect as reducing load factors.
217. Items whose active safety functions require stricter behaviour limits (e.g. con
trol rod drive mechanisms) shall be designed within appropriate limits for load
combinations, which include the SL-2 earthquake, to ensure their operability during
or subsequent to the earthquake. .
218. The design margin for seismic classified items for LI and L2 combined with
earthquakes up to the SL-1 level, when SL-1 is considered as a design basis, should
^ Typica) L2 loads induced by the seismic event could be toads created by tripping of
the reactor or a pressure peak in the primary system due to a tripped turbine in a BWR with
a smatt steam bypass capacity to the condenser.
11
be greater than the design margin according to para. 216. For both passive compo
nents (e.g. piping, support members) and active components (e.g. valves, pumps and
control rod drives whose operation is important to safety), all behaviour due to
applicable load combinations should stay within the appropriate limits.
219. With respect to behaviour limits for seismically classified items, earthquakes
up to SL-1 shall be assumed to occur more than once in the plant lifetime. When
cyclic analyses which include the SL-1 as design basis are performed, approximately
five SL-1 earthquakes and one SL-2 earthquake should be used for design purposes,
assuming ten peak amplitudes corresponding to each earthquake [2, 3].
220. The behaviour limitation principle for uncategorized items should follow
applicable national codes.
3. SEISMIC DESIGN
GENERAL APPROACH TO SEISMIC DESIGN
301. Seismic input motion is normally defined in the free Held at: (a) the surface
o f the ground; (b) the level o f the foundation; or (c) on bedrock (see Safety
Guide 50-SG-S1 (Rev. 1), para. 508). A more specific identification of seismic input
motion depending on its use in design is defined as a 'control motion' and 'control
point' (see Safety Guide 50-SG-S8, Section 3.5).
302. In the early stages of the design o f the plant, a preliminary arrangement o f the
main facilities should be prepared; this should subsequently be periodically reviewed
to achieve the most suitable solution for the seismic design. All procedures for
seismic design must be firmly based on a clear appreciation of the results o f past
destructive earthquakes and must adopt and realistically apply this knowledge. In this
preliminary work, the following principles (paras. 303-305) should be taken into
account for reducing earthquake effects on structures and components.
303. In general terms, seismic effects^ shall be minimized by:
(1) Locating the centre o f gravity o f all structures as low as practicable;

(2) Selecting a plan and elevation that is as simple and regular as practicable;
(3) Avoiding protruding sections (lack of symmetry) as far as practicable;
Items (t)-(4 ) reduce seismic forces and unwanted torsional or rocking effects.
12
(4) Making the centre of rigidity at the various eievations as close to the centre of
gravity as practicable;
(5) Using antiseismic systems and devices (e.g. base motion isolators ^).
304. To reduce undesirable differential movements between structures, considera

tion shall be given to building these structures, to the extent practicable, on a
common foundation structure. In locating the plant, significant differences in soil
properties below the foundation structure should be avoided. If spread footings are
used, the need to connect these to adjacent foundation elements should be
investigated. Design loads for such connecting elements are defined according to
established practice.
305. The adoption of very simple layouts and connections to structures will facilitate
the seismic analysis and improve the seismic behaviour of piping and equipment
appended to buildings. Care shall be taken in crossing structural boundaries,
(e.g. expansion or construction joints), in making connections between buildings or
in bringing services to and from a building through underground conduits to avoid
damage or failure due to differential movements. AH equipment shall be positively
anchored unless a different approach can be justified.
CIVIL ENGINEERING STRUCTURES
306. Particular attention shall be paid to the following points in the design and
design review of structures:
(1) The adequacy of the supporting soil (see Safety Guide 50-SG-S8);
(2) The suitability of types of foundation supports or of different types of
foundations under interconnected structures (e.g. part of the foundation of one
building being supported on piles or rock and part being set directly on soil
should be avoided);
(3) A balanced and symmetrical arrangement of structural frames and shear walls
to achieve optimum stiffness, load and weight distribution, with minimum
torsional effects;
(4) The need to prevent collision between adjacent buildings as a consequence of
their dynamic deformations (this phenomenon may also occur in weakly
coupled structures);
(5) The adequacy of the connections of annexes and appendages to the main
structure (see also item (4));
' Base motion isolators shoutd be used with caution to avoid increasing the retative
movements or disptacements described in paras 304 and 305.
13
(6) The need to ensure sufficient resistance o f essentia! structural elements,

especially to lateral shear forces;
(7) The need to ensure sufficient ductility and avoid brittle failure by shear or com
pression, for example by ensuring that there is an adequate amount of
reinforcement steel, in particular enough hoop ties for columns (adequate
confinement);
(8) The arrangement and distribution o f reinforcing bars: too high a concentration
o f bars may cause cracking o f concrete along the lines o f the bars;
(9) The need for the design o f joints between structural elements and the anchorage
o f items cast into concrete to ensure ductile failure modes (for example, anchor
lengths must be sufficiently long to avoid pull-out and adequate transverse tie
reinforcement must be provided) and, whenever practical, for connections
between members to be made as strong and as ductile as the members they
connect;
(10) An evaluation o f the bending moments arising from the vertical forces and the
lateral deformation due to the P-A effect of the earthquake on the structures
when large deformations are permitted;
(11) The additional effect of groundwater buoyancy on the foundation;
(12) The possibility o f lateral sliding, during an earthquake, o f structures on
waterproofing (especially if wet);
(13) The effect o f 'non-structural' elements, such as partition walls, on structural
elements: cracks have sometimes occurred at colum n-beam connections as a
result o f in-plane forces in a partition wall and this may particularly occur at
the highest floor where the beneficial effect of such 'non-structural' elements
on the vertical loads is reduced;
(14) The detailed design o f construction joints and thermally induced stresses in
large, integrated, monolithic structures designed to resist differential earth
quake motions;
(15) The effects of the transfer o f forces in cases when the stiffness of a containment
vessel is greater than that o f the surrounding concrete structures, and they are
interconnected or may interact so that the earthquake loads of the concrete
structures may be transferred to the containment vessel; where, owing to the
complexity o f the interacting structures, it is too difficult to evaluate such
forces, it is recommended as far as possible to decouple such structures above
the foundation level.
14
EARTH STRUCTURES [4]
307. The following safety related earth structures may be encountered at nuclear
power plant sites:
Ultimate heat sinks dams, dikes and embankments

Site protection dams, dikes, breakwaters, seawalls, revetments
Site contour retaining walls, natural slopes, cuts and fills.
These earth structures should be designed for the following seismic related effects
with adequate strength against failure:
(1) Slope failure induced by SL-2 vibratory ground motions, including

liquefaction;
(2) Sliding o f structures on weak foundation materials or materials whose strength
may be reduced by liquefaction;
(3) Piping failure or seepage through cracks induced by ground motions;
(4) Overtopping o f the structure due to tsunamis on coastal sites or seiches in
reservoirs, slides or rock falls into reservoirs or failure o f spillway or outlet
works.
Design methods and allowable values are subject to the criteria of each Member
State.
PIPING AND EQUIPM ENT
308. With regard to equipment and piping supports:
(1) Care should be taken in the design o f these supports to ensure that all joints
are designed to behave as assumed in the analysis o f the support and transmit
the full range of loads determined in the connected members. In particular, if
integral supports are used, they should be designed, manufactured and installed
so as to minimize the danger that any unexpected failure or crack initiated in
the supporting element propagates to the functional parts, such as the
pressurized shell and the prim ary piping.
(2) Care should be taken in the design of devices for anchoring equipment, for
example the possible use of hook-shaped or end-plate anchor bolts, to ensure
that all potential forces and moments are fully evaluated and that anchoring
materials are suitable for their purpose. It is o f particular importance to ensure
that base plates are sufficiently stiff to avoid prying effects and that anchor
bolts are adequately tightened to avoid rocking effects, lowered frequencies,
increased response levels, higher-than-design loads and increased risk of
loosening, pull-out or fatigue. Overdesigned or redundant anchors, preloaded
to close to their yield point on installation, are therefore recommended.
15
IM PROVEM ENT OP THE VIBRATION RESISTANCE OF COMPONENTS
309. The following points should be taken into account to improve the resistance of
components to vibration:
(1) Equipment support legs should be cross-braced unless their dimensions

warrant departure from this recommended practice. In most cases, stiffness
can be increased to avoid resonance; however, in some cases (e.g. for core
internals for which it is difficult to avoid resonance by design modification),
the vibration characteristics o f the reactor building internal structure itself
might be modified to prevent resonance effects. If systems are made stiffer for
this purpose, particular attention should be paid to thermal stresses, other
dynamic loads and differential motions o f the supporting points, because o f the
increase in stress caused by high rigidity.
(2) It is important to avoid, as far as is reasonably practicable, resonance of
equipment such as piping, instrumentation and core internals at the frequency
of the dominant modes of supporting structures. In some cases, where the
response of equipment, although significant, cannot in practice be reduced by
other means, the damping o f the system may be increased by suitable design
modifications.
(3) To provide seismic restraints for piping and components and at the same time
allow freedom for thermal deformations, dampers or motion limiting stops
should be used. Excessive use of snubbers should be avoided. ^ Realistic
damping values to define seismic design input should be used, since overdesign
for seismic loads can reduce design margins for thermal (restraint of free
displacement) loads [5, 6].
(4) Particular attention should be paid to the possibility of collision between
adjacent components, or between components and adjacent parts of a building,
as a consequence of their dynamic displacement. It is also important to allow
for flexibility o f connections between such components, between components
and building penetrations and underground connections to buildings, as well
as between buildings.
^ The advantage o f motion limiting devices o r stops for piping systems is that normal
thermal expansion is perm itted, without the potential o f overrestraint, as with locked snubbers.
In addition, motion limiting stops are less likely to fail when called upon to operate than
inoperative snubbers (free to move but offering no resistance to dynamic o r shock forces) as
a result, for example, o f corrosion or o f loss o f oil o r broken shear pins.
16
POSSIBLE MODES OF FAILURE OF NEW TYPES OF EQUIPM ENT
310. It is important to recognize which part (or parts) o f a piece o f equipment are
essential for structural integrity and functional capability. This means that a
systematic evaluation of the possible modes o f failure related to earthquakes is
important and has to be performed on hew types o f equipment for which there is no
relevant experience. Seismic qualification tests can identify the modes o f failure and,
for this reason, such tests are recommended. With more sophisticated computer
simulation analysis techniques available, even the performance o f 'active' equipment
under earthquake conditions can be predicted with some confidence (e.g. pumps,
valves and diesel generator sets). Use o f such analytical techniques is recommended
when considered applicable. However, it must be understood that even a high level
o f analytical sophistication still requires a number of assumptions and produces at
best only an indicator; of seismic behaviour. Real seismic behaviour o f a component,
particularly with regard to functionality, can only be determined by test or
experience of the actual or similar components in a strong motion earthquake.
FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF SEISMIC DESIGN
311. The designer should have a thorough and practical understanding of the
functional requirements and potential modes of failure of a mechanism when
considering its seismic design. It is also recommended that there be co-operation
between the designer and the analyst in developing analytical models which
adequately represent the behaviour of the structure and in interpreting the results.
EFFECTS OF VERTICAL GROUND MOTION
312. Vertical motions produced by an earthquake have the primary effect of

cyclically increasing and decreasing the vertical loads on structures, as well as
potentially amplifying the motion o f floors on which equipment may be supported.
Critical conditions can be reached during the phase in which load is decreased for
those structures or pieces o f equipment whose stability depends on frictional or
confinement effects (e.g. non-anchored pieces o f equipment and vertical reinforced
concrete structural elements see item (7) o f para. 306). The design shall take such
loads into account in protecting plant items against failure.
17
4. SEISMIC QUALIFICATION:
ANALYSIS, TESTING, EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE AND
INDIRECT METHODS
401. Seismic qualification o f items important to safety^ can be performed by the

use o f one or m ore of the following methods: analysis; testing; earthquake
experience; or comparison. It is also possible to use combinations o f these methods
or indirect means as shown in Pig. 1. Seismic qualification also generally includes
structural integrity qualification as well as operability or functional qualification.
Seismic qualifications are made directly on actual or prototype items, or indirectly
on a reduced scale model, a reduced scale prototype or a simplified item, or by
means of similarity where this can be established between a candidate and a reference
item and direct qualification has been performed on the latter.
SEISMIC INPUT
402. The horizontal and vertical components o f the earthquake motion should be
considered individually or in combination as inputs for the analysis. When the
components are used individually, the corresponding structural responses should be
suitably combined. In some countries, horizontal seismic input is defined as a
resultant, rather than as a component (see Appendix I). Dynamic input motions used
to qualify items are conservatively yet realistically defined by either time histories
or response spectra. In the case o f response spectra, it is necessary to define not only
the spectrum shape and the zero period peak ground acceleration, but also the
duration of the motion as discussed in Safety Guide 50-SG-S1. In some countries,
a constant acceleration input is used for a preliminary design or a simplified design,
especially for items of lower importance, and is also used in the vertical direction [7],
DIRECT QUALIFICATION
403. Direct seismic qualification impiies that the actual or a prototype item is being
qualified by either analysis, test or experience.
^ Testing or qualification of soils, with structures and foundation media, is outside

the scope of this Guide. This subject is treated in Safety Guide 50-SG-S8.
18
F/G. 7. &wwMfy !?f s'e;',s'w;'t' or ver!/:c<3fi'oM
QUALIFICATION BY ANALYSIS
404. Seismic qualification by analysis is generally applied to items which are unique
and are of such a size or scale as to preclude qualification by testing. Civil engineer
ing structures, tanks, distribution systems and large items o f equipment are usually
qualified by analytical methods.
GENERAL AND ANALYTICAL METHODS
405. A dynamic modal analysis, as well as a dynamic direct time integration analysis
o f a lumped mass model or other models with many degrees o f freedom, may be
used. The modal analysis can be applied using either time histories or response
spectra as input, as discussed in Appendix I.
406. Linear dynamic analyses are generally adequate for most items. Alternatively,
non-linear dynamic analysis may be used where appropriate or necessary (e.g.
structural lift-off or non-linear load dependent support or foundation properties).
19
407. An equivalent static analysis of items may be performed using the peak o f the
applicable acceleration response spectrum as input for cantilever and other items
supported at no more than two points along their long axis. For items supported at
more than two points along their long axis, a factor of 1.5 times the peak of the
applicable acceleration response spectrum is recommended, unless a lower value can
be justified by comparison with dynamic analysis results. The resultant accelerations
shall be applied to the mass distribution of the structure along the orthogonal axes
o f the item. Resultant seismic inertia forces, moments or stresses thus determined
may be combined by calculating the square root o f the sum o f the squares (SRSS)
or other appropriate means [8, 9].
408. A dynamic analysis is recommended for seismic category 1 structures to

determine seismic response, displacements or loads. Both the time history method
and the response spectra method are acceptable. An equivalent static load method,
without a parallel dynamic analysis, may be used only if its conservatism is
satisfactorily demonstrated.
GENERAL M ODELLING TECHNIQUES
409. Typically, nuclear power plant items can be modelled in one o f the following
ways, according to their structural characteristics: lumped mass models, one dimen
sional, axisymmetric, two dimensional or three dimensional finite element models
in two or three dimensional space. Rigid mass models with spring support may also
be used to represent foundation-structure interaction, as discussed in Appendix II.
410. Consideration should be given to translation, rocking and torsional modes,

individually or coupled, as appropriate.
411. In the lumped mass or finite element formulation, consideration should be

given to the adequacy of the num ber and distribution of masses chosen to represent
the item (see Appendix II).
CIVIL ENGINEERING STRUCTURES
412. In the modelling of the building or large ground mounted tank structures, the
soil-structure interaction should be taken into account (see Appendix II).
413. Subsystems, which may include the inertial effect o f the liquid contained in
tanks and pools, should be taken into account in the model of the structures (see
Annex II).
414. Adjacent buildings or components on the same foundation structure should be

included in the same model when relative motion o f the foundation is included in the
analysis.
20
415. Lateral earth pressures induced oh underground portions o f structures or

foundations by ground motion should be evaluated. These procedures usually
provide values o f the dynamic pressure increment induced by the earthquake; this
increment is then added to the applicable static lateral earth pressure. Simplified
procedures may also be used to calculate this dynamic pressure increment [9], These
simplified procedures, however, do not take into account the effect of adjacent
structures on this pressure increment; the effect may, in some cases, be significant,
depending on the plant layout.
416. The liquefaction potential o f saturated granular soil layers during the design
basis vibratory ground motion should be evaluated for the limiting earthquake, SL-2
or SL-1 ground motion, and the existence of appropriate safety margins should be
demonstrated [10, 11]. Appropriate measures to prevent liquefaction in these layers
should be undertaken if the results o f the evaluation indicate a lack o f the required
safety margins [4]. These measures may include in-place treatment (e.g. compaction
or grouting), dewatering, excavation and replacement with properly compacted fill
or permanent surcharging, or a combination of these measures. Field verification to
ensure attainment of the desired improvements in soil characteristics should be made.
417. The potential for a loss o f the bearing capacity of the soil during or after an
earthquake should be investigated [12, 13]. Normally, the bearing capacity factor o f
safety under static loading conditions is reasonably high. Therefore, unless there is
a significant reduction in the strength o f the soil as a result o f seismic loading (e.g.
liquefaction in granular soils, or reduction in strength due to development of high
shear strains in softer clays), the bearing capacity factor of safety under the combined
static and seismic loads is expected to remain adequately high. If significant
reduction in the bearing capacity is identified, such reduction should be accounted
for in design.
418. Potential settlements (especially differential settlements) caused by shaking

may be of significance, particularly in non-uniform soil conditions where they should
be evaluated [14, 15]. Judgement should be exercised in estimating settlements in the
vicinity o f and beneath the structures, on the basis o f the results o f the free field
calculations.
419. Foundation analysis for structures is also discussed in Safety Guide 50-SG-S8.
420. The following earthquake effects on buried long structures (e.g. buried pipes,
ducts and well casings) should be taken into account:
(1) Deformations imposed by the surrounding soil during the earthquake;

(2) Differential displacements or loads at end connections to buildings or other
structures;
(3) Effects o f contained fluids (impulse loads, hydrostatic pressure and sloshing
effects).
21
421. AH effects can be evaiuated by appropriate modelling o f the soil-structure

complex [15], However, simplified conservative methods can also be applied [9].
422. Modelling of concrete structures is usually undertaken assuming uncracked

section properties. However, when the dominant frequency of the input motion falls
within the range o f fundamental frequencies o f the structure, the cracked section
properties should also be evaluated. Assumptions as to the stiffness o f shear wall type
structures can be found in Ref. [9].
423. The adequacy o f shake or rattle space in structural joints between adjacent
structural parts or between adjacent buildings should be checked, taking into account
the need for an adequate safety margin.
M ECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
424. Mechanical and electrical components are usually represented in the analysis
by a single mass or a multimass system attached to the supporting building. As
discussed in Appendix II, their dynamic coupling to the main building can usually
be neglected.
425. Either dynamic methods of analysis, as discussed in para. 405, or an equivalent

static analysis method, as discussed in para. 407, may be used.
426. A variation of the static method discussed in para. 407 has been used in some
M ember States. Here, the maximum acceleration o f the design response spectrum
in the frequency range between 0.5ff and 2 .Off (when f? is the fundamental
frequency of the equipment) is taken as the design acceleration. Again, a suitable
factor, typically 1.0 to 1.5 times such a maximum, depending on the number of
supports, has been applied. A further variation of this method is to determine,
statistically, the percentage o f total stress attributable to seismic loading and analyse
the horizontal type vessel and piping for normal dead weight loads, allowing a
conservative margin for the dynamic earthquake components [16].
427. The calculated stresses and reaction loads in the equipment and equipment
supports can be a direct output o f either dynamic or static analysis. It should be noted
that electrical equipment, exclusive o f anchorage or support, is generally evaluated
only for operability by testing or using experience data. For this reason, analysis of
these components is limited to assuring elastic response of the electrical cabinet,
panel or rack structure and evaluation of support or anchorage loads.
428. The modelling o f equipment is typically divided into several categories as

shown in Fig. 11.2 o f Appendix II.
22
429. F or components not modelled together with-the supporting structure, the input
for analysis is the floor response, expressed in terms o f either design floor time
histories or design response spectra. In some Member States, an equivalent static
input is used in the vertical direction.
430. The design floor response spectra, typically used as seismic input for
equipment, can be obtained on the basis o f structure response to design basis ground
motion. Time history motions which can be shown to generate response spectra at
least as conservative as the design ground motion response spectra can be used for
this purpose [17].
431. Alternatively, direct methods may be used to calculate design floor response
spectra [8, 9], It is recommended that before the direct method is used, it should be
ascertained for representative cases that the conservatism o f the results is comparable
to that provided by the time history solution.
432. Once the floor response curve has been obtained for a particular floor o f a
building, a critical review o f the calculated floor response spectra should be made
to assess their reasonableness (on the basis of sound engineering judgement), the
relationship between the vibration characteristics o f the building and the supporting
foundation materials, and the shape of the floor response curve.
433. The calculated floor response spectrum should be broadened to account for
possible uncertainties in the evaluation of the vibration characteristics of the building
components. Alternatively, segments o f a broadened spectrum can be used
sequentially to analyse the components. Examples o f current procedures are given
in Ref. [2j and Section 3.7.2 o f Ref. [8], For systems having closely spaced frequen
cies, the use of such segmented response spectra will avoid overconservatism.
434. Consideration should be given to the modification of floor response spectrum

input for equipment attached on very flexible structural members (vertical
amplification due to floor flexibility) and, when significant torsional motion o f the
building is present, for those items located away from the centre of shear of the build
ing, when the centre o f shear and centre o f mass are significantly different and such
a difference has not already been considered in the modelling o f the building
structure.
435. The design flodr time histories can be obtained from the structural response of
the building to design basis ground motion. Uncertainty effects, similar to those
associated with response spectra, should be considered in analyses in which the floor
motion time histories rather than the response spectra are used by altering the time
scale to define the time history motion (see Section 3.7.1 of Ref. [8] and
Refs [9, 17]).
436. The damping factors used in the analysis o f equipment should be based on field
testing and experience, as discussed in Appendix II. The quantity of insulation, the
23
size, location and the number o f support gaps, the frequency o f response, and the
use o f elastopiastic or energy absorbing support devices may all have an effect on
the damping to be considered in the design o f components.
437. Equivalent linear methods have usually been used to represent the response of
elastopiastic support devices.
438. For vessels and tanks which contain liquids, sloshing and impulse load effects,
including frequency effects, should be considered. The effects o f liquid motion or
pressure changes on submerged structures should also be considered, as discussed
in Annex I. These effects may involve hydrodynamic loads from the fluid, the
reduction o f functional capability (e.g. loss o f shielding efficiency of fuel pools or
disturbance o f instrument signals).
439. The operability o f active components may be analysed also when their potential
failure modes can be identified and described in terms o f stress, deformation (includ
ing clearances) or loads. Otherwise, the use of testing or earthquake experience is
required for the qualification o f active components.
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
440. This section covers the seismic analysis o f piping, cable trays, conduits, tubing
and ducts and their supports. Modal response spectrum analysis is often used for the
seismic design of large bore (Do > 6.0 cm) category 1 piping, but the static method
discussed in paras 407 and 426 is often used for the analysis of small bore and
category 2 or other category piping. Spacing tables and charts based on generic
analysis or testing are also used in the evaluation of small bore and category 2 or
other category piping and are typically employed to evaluate cable trays, conduits,
tubing and ducts. Simplified analytical or design procedures based on earthquake
experience data may also be used (see para. 472 for the application to cable trays).
In some Member States, modelling and analysis of cable trays and ducts, similar to
that performed on large bore piping systems, has been conducted.
441. When distribution systems are connected to two or more points having different
movements and applicable response spectra, the use o f a single response spectrum
to define input at a particular support point requires some modification. The usually
accepted method is to apply at all the support points an envelope spectrum o f the
inputs at each support. The results of this method are usually rather conservative.
Other methods which consider independent support motion in conjunction with
modal analysis may be used where design conservatism can be demonstrated [18].
442. In addition to inertia effects, careful consideration shall be given to the effects
o f differential motions between supports since earthquake experience has demon
24
strated that this phenomenon can be a major contributor to seismic induced failure
o f piping systems.
443. A static analytical method frequently used with particular application to small
bore piping of 6 cm or less in diameter is to apply the peak o f the applicable design
floor response spectrum acceieration, multiplied by a suitable factor, to the mass dis
tribution of the piping system in order to determine an inertial force to be applied
to the system. A factor o f 1.5 has typically been used in the past (see Section 3.7.2
of Ref. [8]) for systems supported at more than two points. However, lower values
may be used provided that such lower values can be shown to give conservative
answers when compared to dynamic (time history) analysis results.
444. M ethods commonly used for modelling piping systems include:
One dimensional finite element in three dimensional space

Transfer m atrix method, with the matrix coefficients calculated according to
beam theory [16],
445. The flexibility or stiffness o f elements of piping systems such as elbows, tees
and spring hangers shall be considered in the model. Constant spring hangers usually
have no stiffness effect but they behave as a constant external load on the system
throughout their travel range. Variable spring hanger effects are usually ignored in
the seismic analysis o f piping. If there is a pump or a valve in the piping system,
its contribution to the response should be evaluated. All additional masses, including
eccentricities such as valve operators, pumps, the liquid inside the pipe and thermal
insulation, should be taken into account.
446. It should be understood that the response o f distribution systems to earthquake

excitations tends to be quite non-linear. Therefore computations of stresses and
support reactions by means of linear elastic analyses are at best an indication of
stresses and support loads suitable for comparison with allowable behaviour criteria
to determine design adequacy but are not accurate measures of actual stresses and
support reactions. For this reason, nominally fixed supports for distribution systems
with some limit on deflections may be considered rigid for modelling purposes.
SEISMIC QUALIFICATION TESTING
447. Another method of direct seismic qualification o f items is the testing of the
actual item or prototype [19, 20]. If the integrity or functional capability o f an item
cannot be demonstrated with a reasonable degree of confidence by analysis, a test
may be needed to prove or to assist directly or indirectly in qualifying the item.
25
448. The types o f testing can be iisted as foHows:
type approval test (fragility test)

acceptance test (proof test)
low impedence test (dynamic characteristic test)
code verification test.
449. Test qualification o f seismic category 1 items is required when failure modes
cannot be identified or defined by analysis or earthquake experience. Direct qualifi
cation by testing employs type approval and acceptance tests. Low impedence
(dynamic characteristic) tests are normally used to identify similarity or verify or
help develop analytical models. Code verification tests are used to develop generic
verification of analytical procedures which typically use computer codes. The
methods o f testing depend on the required input, weight, size, configuration and
operating characteristics of the item, plus the characteristics of the available test
facility. Type approval and qualification acceptance tests include:
shake table, either one, two or three dimensional

hydraulic actuator
electric actuator
mechanical actuator (unbalanced mass type)
impact hammer
blast.
Low impedence and code verification tests typically use the last three of these
methods. In addition, they may also include self-excitation or ambient vibration
excitations.
450. A meaningful test, perform ed with the purpose o f assessing the integrity or
functionalcapability of an item, requires that the conditions existing for this item in
the plant during an earthquake are correctly or conservatively simulated or that any
departure from them will not significantly influence the result. Among these condi
tions, the most important are:
input motions
boundary (support) conditions
environmental conditions (e.g. pressure and temperature)
operational conditions (if functional capability has to be assessed).
451. The concept of the testing procedure is based on subjecting the item to conser
vatively derived test conditions in order to produce effects at least as severe as those
o f the design basis seismic event concurrent with other applicable operating or design
conditions.
452. The functional and integrity testing of complex items, such as control panels
containing many different devices, may be perform ed on the prototype of the item
26
itself or on individual devices with seismic test input scaled to allow for the location
and attachment of the device within the item or on the item.
453. Account should be taken of such effects as radiation and ageing, or other condi
tions which may cause deterioration or otherwise alter the characteristics of the item
during its in-service life.
454. Low impedence (dynamic characteristic) tests are usually made on items in
situ. Items are typically tested by:
mechanical actuation
impact
blast
and other low energy exciters as well as ambient excitation. These tests cannot be
used for direct seismic qualification o f the item but can be used to define dynamic,
including support, characteristics which can then be used in analysis or other tests
to qualify the item.
455. The type approval (fragility) test is typically used for standard electrical com
ponents and some mechanical components. In this case, design margins to failure,
damage or non-linear response and identification of the lower bound failure mode
can be obtained. Such testing is typically carried out by means o f a shaking table.
The fragility test is useful for finding unexpected failure modes or potential malfunc
tions, because the test conditions can cover a wider spectrum o f loading than those
required as a design basis. .
456. The acceptance (proof) test is also used for electrical and mechanical compo
nents to demonstrate seismic adequacy. It is typically performed by manufacturers
to demonstrate compliance with procurem ent specifications and does not give data
relative to seismic design margins or failure modes. Such testing is typically carried
out by means o f a shaking table.
457. The code verification test is important for reliable analytical work. Computer
codes should be verified before their application by using an adequate number o f test
results or results obtained from other appropriate computer codes or analytical
procedures. The use of a number of test results which cover the range o f interest and
have been correlated with analytical results is strongly recommended.
458. Seismic tests may be perform ed on the item itself or on a full scale model or,
where appropriate, oh reduced scale models. However, for qualification purposes,
it is strongly recommended that the component itself or a full scale model without
any simplification should be tested; if there is no other practical alternative, the care
ful use of a reduced scale model may be permitted for qualification purposes. Such
tests include:
27
functional tests intended to ensure the required safety function o f the compo
nent or absence of transient malfunctioning during and after an earthquake; and
integrity tests aimed at proving the mechanical strength of the component.
When reduced scale testing is performed, similarity requirements associated with

indirect methods o f seismic qualification, as discussed in para. 471, must be
considered.
459. The number of repetitions o f testing or cycles o f loading per test is dependent
on the application, but accumulation o f various types of damage associated with
fatigue or ratchetting phenomena should be taken into account for the evaluation of
the result and to permit qualification for the operating life o f the item.
460. For components whose functional capability has to be demonstrated by testing

under earthquake conditions, excitation in one direction at a time can be considered
adequate if one o f the following conditions applies:
(1) The component design review and visual inspection or exploratory tests clearly
demonstrate that the effects o f excitation in the three directions on the compo
nent are sufficiently independent of each other.
(2) The severity of shaking table tests can be increased in such a way as to take
into account the interaction effects from simultaneous excitation in the three
directions. (For example, the amplitude o f excitation can be increased in one
direction to envelope the response in another direction due to coupling effects.)
Otherwise, simultaneous multidirectional input should be applied [20],
461. If random vibration or multifrequency input motion are used, detailed recom
mendations such as those listed in Section 3.10 o f Ref. [8] should be followed. The
duration of the input motion should be decided on the basis of anticipated earthquake
duration (see Safety Guide 50-SG-S1).
462. A sinusoidal or sinusoidal beat motion can be used for qualification testing of
stiff systems at a frequency significantly lower than the first mode eigen frequency
o f the system. This results in a test response spectrum which envelopes the reference
response spectrum required to qualify the item. If no adequate shaking device is
available, a sinusoidal motion can be used at resonance to obtain the necessary
qualifying level of response o f the item.
463. When the system has one or more vibrational resonances in the frequency
range o f interest, the test input motion should have a response spectrum not less than
the required design response spectrum. This can be achieved by using a time history
input whose test response spectrum envelopes the reference response spectrum
required to qualify the item.
464. W hen the eigen frequencies o f the item are well separated, independent tests
can be made, for example with suitably scaled sinusoidal input at the given frequency
28
with a half-sine or other time envelope o f interest. 'Suitably scaled' means that the
amplitude of the test spectrum at the eigen frequency is higher than the amplitude
o f the required spectrum. However, it is recommended that tests be made with two
or more time histories or natural time histories whose response spectra are not less
than the required design spectrum. The use of several different time histories helps
to overcome the deficiencies which could arise from the peculiarities o f a single time
history.
465. Natural frequencies and other vibration characteristics o f the components may
generally be assessed by a low impedence vibration characteristic test (for which a
low level 0.01 to 0.05g input can be used).
466. It should be noted that the results o f the low impedence or excitation level test
may be different from those o f the test carried out under higher seismic levels for
non-linear systems. To be o f use in seismically qualifying equipment, low impedence
tests require the equipment response to be essentially linear up to potential failure
mode levels of excitation so as to be able to identify design margins.
467. In general it is necessary to establish functional requirements for active items

(i.e. those which move or otherwise change state) in advance, as part o f the test
procedure. Most active items are required to perform their active function after the
earthquake excitation has passed. However, if they have to perform such active func
tions during the earthquake excitation or during potential aftershocks, this must be
considered in establishing functional test requirements. Care must also be taken that
functionality tests are consistent with the required safety functions in service. For
example, the lighting o f an indicator lamp as a result o f relay chatter during an earth
quake would be inappropriate for cases where a 20 ms opening o f the relay would
be required for the circuit to change state.
468. Functional requirements for a digital computer used for control or data evalua
tion are of particular concern. The seismic resistance of such equipment is very com
plicated and the detection of malfunction or failure may be difficult.
SEISMIC QUALIFICATION BY EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE
469. The direct seismic qualification o f items by the use of experience from strong
motion seismic events has seen limited but growing application. It has only been
within the past ten years that data from strong motion earthquakes have generally
been collected in the detail and quality necessary to provide the information required
for direct application to individual items. Such direct qualification requires that
seismic excitation o f the item at its point o f installation in the building structure
effectively envelopes the reference or required seismic design input motion. It also
requires that the item being qualified and the one which underwent the strong motion
29
earthquake be the same model and type or have the same physical characteristics and
have similar support or anchorage characteristics. In the case of active items it is also
necessary in general to show that the item in the earthquake performed the same
functions during or following the earthquake, including the potential aftershock
effects as would be required of the category 1 item. In general the quality and detail
o f the information,used to directly qualify individual items on the basis o f experience
data should not be less than those required for direct qualification by analysis or
testing. As is the case for direct qualification by analysis or testing, earthquake
experience may also be used as the basis for qualification by the indirect method.
INDIRECT METHOD
470. The indirect method o f seismic qualification employs the analysis, test or earth
quake experience methods applied to the direct qualification o f the reference item.
The indirect method involves establishing the similarity of a candidate item to a
reference item previously qualified and thereby seismically qualifying the candidate
item.
471. Similarity requires that the seismic input to the candidate item essentially
envelopes the reference or design requirement for that item and that the seismic input
to the reference item also equals or exceeds that required for the candidate item.
Input to scale models o f items shall consider proper similitude relationships. Similar
ity also requires that the physical and support conditions, the functional characteris
tics for active items and the requirements of the candidate item closely resemble
those o f the reference item. Guidance on the limits of similarity between reference
and candidate items is given in Ref. [21].
472. To some degree, large quantities of earthquake experience data, in particular
those applicable to the seismic qualification of distribution systems, have been used
to justify simplification o f the analytical evaluation and seismic qualification o f such
systems. The use of a factor o f three times the dead weight capacity, with respect
to normal behaviour criteria limits, is applicable to cable trays with ductile supports
(which permit large lateral movement without failure). Seismic qualification of cable
trays is an example of a simplified analytical evaluation based on earthquake
experience data.
473. Because o f the large numbers of potential seismic induced interactions between
structures, equipment and distribution systems and the importance of adequate
anchorage and support of structures, equipment and distribution systems, it is recom
mended that all seismically qualified items in the nuclear power plant be walked
down by qualified seismic design and earthquake experienced structural engineers
prior to operation to ensure that the 'as installed' items are capable of withstanding
the design basis seismic effects without loss o f structural integrity, with anchorage
and seismic interaction effects taken into account.
30
5. SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION
INTRODUCTION
501. Seismic instrumentation is installed at a nuclear power plant for the following
reasons:
(1) To check whether or not the design response spectra (i.e. free Held response
spectra, floor response spectra, and response spectra associated with a number
o f selected items) corresponding to SL-1 and SL-2 levels have been exceeded,
so that the need for post-earthquake inspection and plant shutdown can be
evaluated.
(2) To collect data on the dynamic behaviour o f structures, systems and compo
nents o f the nuclear power plant and to assess the degree o f applicability o f the
analytical methodology used in the seismic design and qualification o f the
buildings and equipment.
(3) To provide triggering mechanisms for alarms or for shutting down the plant
(in some M ember States).
TYPE, LOCATION AND NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS
502. A minimum amount of seismic instrumentation should be installed at each

nuclear power plant site as follows [22-24]:
(1) One triaxial strong motion recorder installed to register the free field motion
time history;
(2) One triaxial strong motion recorder installed to register the motion of the base
mat of the reactor building;
(3) One triaxial strong motion recorder installed on the most representative floor
of the reactor building.
503. Additional seismic instrumentation should be considered for installation at sites

having an SL-2 free field acceleration equal to or greater than 0.25g.
504. The instruments should be set to be triggered at levels o f motion consistent with
the seismicity of the site area.
M AINTENANCE OF INSTRUM ENTATION
505. The seismic instruments installed at the nuclear power plant should be
calibrated and maintained in accordance with written maintenance procedures.
31
DATA EVALUATION
506. Evaluation of data collected from the seismic instruments should be made in
accordance with prescribed w ritten procedures. The data should be considered as a
part o f the records of the nuclear power plant and the period of retention should be
determined on this basis.
32
Appendix I
METHODS OF SEISMIC ANALYSIS
1.101. The follow ingm ethods are currently used to calculate the maximum relative
displacements, relative velocities, absolute accelerations and maximum stresses
during an earthquake; time history; response spectrum; and equivalent static method.
1.102. The standard dynamic methods for major structures, systems and components
are the response spectrum and time history methods.
1.103. The equivalent static method can be used to obtain conservative results for
items which have been correlated with dynamic analysis results [25].
1.104. In the response spectrum method, the maximum response o f each mode is cal
culated by direct use of the design response spectrum. The maximum response in
each direction is usually taken as the square root o f the sum o f the squares o f each
modal response. For closely spaced modal frequencies, a conservative procedure is
to take the sum o f the absolute values o f each closely spaced modal and rigid
response [26]. Missing mass as a function of the modelling detail, and cut-off of
frequencies and modal participation used in the analysis must also be taken into
consideration [27],
1.105. Responses due to input acceleration in the three different component direc
tions can be combined by taking the square root o f the sum o f the squares of
individual responses. In some countries, horizontal input motion is defined as a
resultant in one o f two orthogonal directions and is combined with vertical motion
to determine the worst case response.
1.106. In the tim e history method, the response of the system is calculated as a
function o f time directly or after a transformation to modal co-ordinates. The input
motion may be natural or artificial time histories of acceleration at ground level or
a specific floor level, suitably chosen to represent the design response spectrum.
33
Appendix H
MODELLING TECHNIQUES
INTRODUCTION
11.101. Nuclear power plant structures may be very complex and a single complete
model o f the entire structure would be too cumbersome or ill conditioned. Thus, the
first step in the analysis o f a plant is to identify the substructures by defining main
systems and subsystems.
11.102. M ajor structures that are considered in conjunction with foundation media
to form a soil-structure interaction model constitute the main systems. Other struc
tures, systems and components attached to the main systems constitute the
subsystems.
DECOUPLING CRITERIA
II. 103. Certain criteria have to be used to decide if a particular subsystem has to be
taken into account in the analysis o f the main system. Such decoupling criteria are
obtained by putting some limits on the relative mass ratio between the subsystem and
the supporting main system, limits which have to be more severe when there is a
possibility o f resonance between the subsystem and the main system (see Sec
tion 3.7.2 of Ref. [8] and Ref. [28]).
II. 104. If the decoupling criteria are not satisfied, a suitable model o f the subsystem
should be included in the main system model. For a subsystem having all its resonant
frequencies (the flexibility of the support being taken into account) higher than the
amplified frequencies (15 to 30 Hz for usual design earthquakes), only the mass
needs to be included in the main system model.
11.105. For detailed analysis of subsystems, if necessary, the seismic input, includ
ing differential support or attachment motion, can be obtained by the analysis o f the
main system. W hen coupling is considered, it is essential that the model o f the sub
system be included in the analysis o f the main system and have at least the same
natural frequencies and modal masses as the detailed model of the subsystem in the
frequency range of interest.
M ODELLING OF SYSTEMS OR SUBSYSTEMS
11.106. The stiffness and mass characteristics o f the structural systems should be
adequately incorporated in the analytical models.
34
II. 107. M ore than one model might be needed when there is some doubt about the
behaviour o f some part o f the structure. A sensitivity analysis which had conver
gence towards the same results and which varies the number and size o f the elements
or masses used can provide a basis for this decision; it can also assist in the choice
o f the size and number o f finite elements if this modelling technique is used. Models
might also be validated by testing in order to resolve possible uncertainties.
Lumped mass method
11.108. The lumped mass method consists of lumping the masses (and inertial
moments, if necessary) at some adequately chosen points (e.g. floor levels in a build
ing) and determining the stiffness (or flexibility) coefficients by a static study of all
the single movements corresponding to the selected degrees of freedom. This method
is described in Refs [29-31].
11.109. Selection o f an adequate number of degrees of freedom is often straightfor

ward, as for example in the calculation o f a conventional building with floors. In
other cases, for shell or beam type structures, this selection is not obvious and
depends in fact on the number o f modes needed for the seismic analysis. The require
ment that the number fof degrees of freedom be at least twice the number of modes
is sometimes given; such a rule has to be used with care (see item II. la (4) of Section
3.7.2 o f Ref. [8]). A practical way to ensure that sufficient modes (missing mass)
are included in the analysis is to add a rigid body or zero period acceleration mode
which corrects for the higher modes that may otherwise not be included in the evalua
tion. It also ensures, within the limits of the finite element model, that full reactions
at supports are achieved [27, 32].
Finite element method
11.110. The finite element method is described in detail in many publications (e.g.
Refs [33, 34]). Various types o f elements can be used: beam elements (for frames,
pipes or long slender cylindrical structures); axisymmetric shell elements, which can
account for non-axisymmetric loadings or displacements by a Fourier representation
on the azimuthal variable (for containment buildings, pressure vessels, or other
axisymmetric structures); shell and plate elements (for complex shell structures or
box-type buildings); and three dimensional elements (for thicker wall items).
II. 111. The mesh size to obtain accurate results depends on the type o f finite element
used. A general requirement is that the shape o f the deformed structure be well
represented by the set o f elements chosen to model it.
35
T ransfer m atrix method
11.112. The basis of the transfer matrix method is that for some structures (pipes,
axisymmetric shells and, m ore generally, monodimensionally modelled simple struc
tures), it is possible to calculate analytically for each frequency the transfer matrix
between the vector state (forces, moments, displacements and rotations) at a point
and the vector state at the next point. Then, by successive matrix multiplication, it
is possible to obtain the frequency dependent matrix of the whole system, including
boundary conditions. This allows the determination of the natural frequencies, mode
shapes or response to sinusoidal inputs, or, by a Fourier transformation, the response
to more general inputs [16, 35], W hile there is no mesh size problem, care must be
M Ms< Ms< )
<< Ri Rs R,
M;< < M;< t
K R; R, Rz
M, < < <
R- 'Ri R-
/////// /////// Ke
/77T 777 Kv,
(b) (c) (d)
Lumped mass Lumped Beam or one Beam or one dimensional finite
or rigid mass mode) dimensions finite element on soil springs model
body model element mode)
7 * 7 7 * 7 7*7* 7*7
(e) (g).
Two dimensional Two dimensional Three dimensional
finite element mode) finite element or finite element model
representing building and axis symmetrical of foundation and
soil structure interaction building model building structure
K : 6 x 6 stiffness matrix : Horizontal spring stiffness

Ke : Rotational spring stiffness : Vertical spring stiffness
F/G. /A 7. Examples o / varioMS &MiMirtg modeis associated with dynamic o r static analysis.
36
77777777777
(a) (b) (c)

Lumped mass model Lumped mass model with Beam or one dimensional
flexible foundation finite element model
(d) (e) (f)

Two dimensional finite Combined two and one Three dimensional thick
element or axis symetric dimensional finite walled vessel mode)
equipment mode) etement mode)
F/G. //. 2. Ecawp/M o / van'oM-s mode/^ aMocfafed dynamic o r ,sfa;;c aâ/y.sM.
(a) Lumped m ass mode! (b) Beam or one dimensions)

finite etem ent mode!
* Structure node
S: Support of static node o M ass node
M: Mass node
K: 6 x 6 stiffness etem ent
F/G. //. J. o^ van'om d['jfr;'^M;;o/! .system aMociafed w M dynaw;c or iMU'c
37
exercised in the use o f this method because o f the possible accumulation o f errors
in the multiplication process. A sensitivity analysis which varies the number and size
of the elements or masses used can provide the basis for this decision; it can also
assist in the choice o f the size and num ber of finite elements if this modelling tech
nique is used. Typical models for structures, equipment and distribution systems are
shown in Figs 11.1-11.3.
DAMPING
11.113. Damping is applied to the analysis o f nuclear power plant items to obtain
general or more exact agreement between the observed response o f items to cyclic
loads arid the response predicted by linear analysis. The damping used in the analysis
includes hysteretic energy loss in materials in load deformation cycling plus the
effect of small non-linearities due to changes in structural stiffness (concrete crack
ing) and boundary conditions (joint slippage and small support gaps) and may include
the effects o f energy loss due to impacts as well. Damping values are normally
determined experimentally [36, 37],
II. 114. The damping used in the analysis to qualify design should be conservatively
yet realistically defined. (For example, experimentally determined damping for a
particular type of material and structural system might range between 2 and 10%.
In such a case, a conservative yet realistic value o f damping to be used in the analysis
to qualify a new design might be 4% .) Typical design basis damping values are given
in Refs [38-40],
11.115. Damping values used in seismic analysis to verify existing designs rather
than qualify a new design tend to be somewhat less conservative or more mean or
median centred. In the example noted in para. 11.114, a damping value of 6% might
be selected when design verification rather than qualification is being
perform ed [41],
11.116. For each of the modelling methods described in this Appendix, knowledge
o f the damping characteristics o f the main systems and subsystems is required. The
way in which damping needs to be expressed depends on the method of solution used
to evaluate the response o f the model (see Appendix I). In the response spectrum,
or time history modal analysis methods, damping is most conveniently expressed in
term s of modal damping coefficients as a function of the percentage critical damping.
In the time history direct integration method, it is necessary to construct a damping
matrix. The commonly used procedure is to express the damping matrix as a
combination o f the mass and stiffness matrices o f the model as follows [8, 9]:
[C] = a[M ] + <8[K]
where [C], [M] and [K] are the damping, mass and stiffness matrices.
38
11.117. Modal damping factors for composite structures can be obtained by the
energy weighting technique [9].
11.118. The most important contribution to foundation-structure damping is energy

dissipation within the ground. The actual radiation damping for nuclear power plants
associated with lumped mass or one dimensional finite elements and spring soil-
structure interaction models may be as great as 20-40% o f critical damping, but
lower values in the range o f 10-25% are used in design practice. However, it is
important to recognize that the damping o f supported structures is lower than those
values (2-7% ). If the structure is rigid, the radiation damping value depends on the
mode o f vibration o f the structure and the coupling o f the significant modes and the
severity o f the ground motion. If the structure is not rigid, it may be necessary to
adopt an interaction model which couples the basement with its flexibility (deforma
tion) taken into account and the soil represented by an elastic half-space. It is recog
nized that the value o f damping that is used in the seismic analysis o f structures will
require conservatively applied engineering judgement. Variation o f damping factors
with the frequency and amplitude of motion may be taken into account if warranted
by experimental data [42].
39
Annex I
EXAM PLES OF U S T S OF MAIN SEISMIC CATEGORY 1

AND OTHER CATEGORY ITEM S
The foHowing are typical M em ber State positions on seismic design categoriza
tion or classification.
1-1. CANADIAN POSITION CANDU REACTOR
Table 1-1 gives a list o f CANDU systems and their earthquake design
classifications.
TABLE 1-1. LIST OF SYSTEMS TO BE QUALIFIED
Earthquake
System
level'
a n d sVrMCfMre.s
Reactor building DBE

Airlocks DBE
Turbine buitding DBE

Service buitding DBE
Secondary contro] area DBE
Spent fuel bay DBE
Emergency water and power DBE
Supply structures
Rgacfor
Fuel channel assemblies DBE
Calandria and end shields DBE
Reactivity control units DBE
41
TABLE 1-1. (cont.)
Earthquake
System
level"
P nm ary fra^.spor: syi!em
Main circuit and all subsystems DBE
Steam generators DBE
Shutdown cooling system DBE
/4MLXi7i'ary sysfewM
Dousing system DBE
Emergency core cooling system DBE/SDE
Emergency w ater supply system DBE/SDE
Liquid injection shutdown DBE
system (SDS2)
Fuel changing DBE
Spent fuel transfer and storage DBE
JfeafM afM? wafer .sy^/e^!
Main steam supply DBE

Steam generator pressure DBE
relief system (main steam safety valves)
Fuel DBE
M aw y ee^w a^r c;rcM;'f DBE
R e c fn c a /
Emergency power supply system DBE
Lighting DBE
Cables, conduits and cable trays DBE
42
TABLE 1-1. (cont.)
Earthquake
System
level"
/fMfrHfHenfaMOM and con?ro/
Failed fuel monitoring DBE
Reactor regulatory system DBE
Computer system (watchdog) DBE

Secondary control area equipment DBE
Shutdown system No. 1 DBE
Shutdown system No. 2 . DBE

Process instrumentation systems DBE/SDE
Common procgMM an d ggrwca?
Fire protection system DBE

Containment isolation DBE
Instrum ent air (inside reactor building) DBE
Solid radioactive waste DBE
" DBE is similar to SL-2 level earthquake; SDE is similar to SL-1 level earthquake.
1-2. FRENCH POSITION PRESSURIZED W ATER REALTOR
The French regulations provide that the safe shutdown o f a nuclear plant reac
tor, the fuel cooling and the radioactive product confinement be achieved in the event
o f probable earthquakes on the plant site considered, and after such earthquakes.
They also define acceptable methods to determine all the motions to which the
structures and civil works classified as 'seism ic' will be subjected, on the basis of
the motions considered as well as their corresponding load levels, in order to allow
the design and checking of:
the resistance Of the civil works subjected to loads resulting from earthquakes
and other actions combined with earthquakes;
the appropriate behaviour o f the equipment connected to these civil works
under combined action conditions involving earthquakes.
43
The evaluation o f the motions and loads included in the structure by earthquake
actions takes account of:
the design seismic motions corresponding to the design spectra mentioned in

basic safety rule 1.2.c;
the foundation soil mechanical characteristics determined according to basic
safety rule 1.3.c;
the characteristics of the civil works, including those of the foundation system
and the possible interactions between structures;
the characteristics o f the equipment connected to these structures, in so far as
they influence motions.
As a result o f the standardization policy followed in France, which implies the

use of standardized spectra, the computed SMS (seisme majore de securite or over
valued safety earthquake) spectra are used for each site to verify that the standardized
spectrum actually provides an envelope of the SMS spectra.
Some examples o f elementary systems classified as seismic are given in
Table 1-2.
TABLE 1-2. FRENCH POSITION: LIST OF ELEMENTARY SYSTEMS CLAS

SIFIED AS SEISMIC (PWR PLANT)
Elementary systems and symbols System limits/item
Steam generator blowdown system (APG) From steam generator to contain

ment isolation
Feedwater flow control system (ARE) From external containment to

steam generator
Auxiliary feedwater system (ASG) Entirely
Circulating water filtration system (CFI) Filters and washing
Electrical building chilled water system Entirely

(DEL)
Fuel building handling equipment (DMK) Lifting chain
Reactor building handling equipment (DMR) Handling platform
Control room air conditioning system (DVC) Entirely
Auxiliary feedwater pump room ventilation Unit heaters

system (DVG)
44
TABLE 1-2. (cont.)
Elementary systems and symbols System limits/item
Charging pump room emergency ventilation Extraction o f smoke from

system (DVH) charge pump room s and extraction
to chimney
Fuel building ventilation system (DVK) Part concerned with reduced flow
N uclear auxiliary building ventilation Release to stack

system (DVN)
Computer room air conditioning system (DVR) Entirely
Safety injection and containment spray Part concerned with air extraction
pump m otor room ventilation system (DVS)
Electrical room ventilation (DVZ) Entirely
Containment spray system (EAS) Entirely
Containment sweeping ventilation system Entirely

(EDE)
Containment atmosphere monitoring system Entirely (expected blowing)

(ETY)
Containment continuous ventilation system Pool well

(EVR) Extraction: dome level of
reactor building
Turbine bypass system (GCT) Connection with main steam

system
Fire fighting general w ater distribution N uclear island

system (JPD)
N uclear island fire protection system (JPI) N uclear island
Nuclear island liquid radwaste monitoring Storage tanks

and discharge system (KER)
Emergency pow er supply systems Entirely and including all

(LHP-LHQ) annex materials
Fuel handling and storage system (PM C) Entirely
Reactor cavity and spent fuel pit cooling Pool and tank coolant
and treatm ent system (PTR)
45
TABLE 1-2. (cont.)
Eiementary systems and symbols System limits/item
Reactor coolant system (RCP) Entirely (except pressurizer dis

charge tank)
Chemical and volume control system (RCV) Entirely
R eactor boron and water make-up system Boric acid preparation equipment
(REA)
N uclear sampling system (REN) Connection with primary circuit

Connection with the secondary
side o f steam generator
Connection with gas storage
tanks
In-core instrumentation system (RIC) Partly
Safety injection system (RIS) Entirely
N uclear island vent and drain system (RPE) Primary and gaseous wastes
Residual heat removal system (RRA) Entirely
Component cooling system (RRI) Two redundant lines
Instrum ent compressed air distribution Main tanks

system (SAR)
Essential service water system (SEC) Entirely
Chemical reagent injection system (SIR) From containment isolation to

steam generator
Gaseous waste treatm ent system (TEG) Entirely
Boron recycle system (TEP) Head tank o f the chain
Liquid waste discharge system (TER) Three tanks
Main steam system (VVP) From steam generator to steam

isolation (outside o f reactor
building)
1-3. JAPANESE POSITION
The Japanese position in shown in Table 1-3.
46
TABLE 1-3. SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION OF M AIN NUCLEAR POW ER PLANT FACILITIES IN JAPAN
Examples o f items
Seismic classification Facilities
PW R BWR
As (i) Equipment and piping constitut (1) Reactor vessel

ing the 'reactor coolant pres (2) R eactor coolant pressure boundary
sure boundaries' whose
definition is the same as that
given in 'Regulatory Guide for
Safety Design o f Light W ater
Power Reactors'
(ii) Spent fuel storage facilities (1) Spent fuel pit 0) Fuel pool
(2) Spent fuel storage rack (2) Spent fuel storage rack
(iii) Facilities required to introduce (1) C ontrol rod cluster (1) C ontrol rod
negative reactivity into the core C ontrol rod drive mechanism (2) C ontrol rod drive mechanism
to affect an emergency shut (2) Boron injection system (3) C ontrol rod drive hydraulic
down and to maintain the core (transfer system) system
in a shutdown state
(iv) Facilities required for the (1) M ain steam feedw ater system (1) R eactor core isolation
removal o f decay heat from the (2) Auxiliary feedw ater system cooling system
core after reactor shutdown (3) Condensate storage tank (2) High pressure core spray
(4) Residual heat rem oval system system
(3) Residual heat removal system
(4) Suppression pool
TABLE 1-3. (cont.)
Examples o f items
PWR BWR
(v) Facilities serving as pressure (1) Containment vessel (1) Prim ary containment vessel
boundaries which directly (2) Container boundary (2) C ontainer boundary
prevent the spread o f radio
active material in the event of
a failure of the reactor coolant
pressure boundaries
A (i) Facilities required for the (1.) Safety injection system (1) Emergency core cooling system
rem oval o f decay heat from the (2) Refuelling water storage High pressure core spray
core in the event o f a failure (3) Residual heat removal system system
o f the reactor coolant pressure Low pressure core spray
boundaries system
Residual heat rem oval system
Automatic depressurization
system
(ii) Facilities, other than those (1) Containment spray system (1) Residual heat removal system
belonging to As class (v), which (2) Annulus seal (2) Flam mability control system
serve to prevent the discharge (3) Annulus air cleanup system (3) Reactor building
o f radioactive material into the (4) Containment purge exhaust stack (4) Filtration recirculation and
atm osphere after an accident (5) Safeguard component area ventilation system
involving radioactive material cleanup system (5) Pressure suppression system
TABLE 1-3. (cont.)
Examples of items
PW R BW R
(diaphragm floor, vent pipe)

(6) M ain steam isolation valve
leakage control system
(iii) Others (1) Spent fuel pit service water (1) Fuel pool w ater make-up
system system
(2) Standby liquid control system
(i) Facilities which are directly (1) Chemical and volum e control (1) M ain steam system
connected to the reactor coolant system (2) Feedw ater system
pressure boundaries and which (2) Letdown system (3) R eactor coolant purification
contain or may contain primary (3) Excess letdown system system
coolant
(ii) Facilities containing radioactive (1) W aste disposal system

waste material, excluding those
with relatively small quantities
of radioactive material or those
whose rupture would lead to a
considerably lower radioactive
dose to the general public than
the annual dose permitted at
the controlled environs
TABLE 1-3. (cont.)
Examples of items
Seismic classification Facilities ---------------------------------------------------------------
PWR BWR
Facilities containing radioactive (1) Spent fuel pit cleanup system (1) Turbine, condenser and feed
material other than radioactive (2) Auxiliary building crane water heater
waste whose rupture might lead (3) Spent fuel pit crane (2) Condensate dem ineralizer
to the excessive exposure of (4) Refuelling crane system
the general public and/or plant (3) Fuel transfer system (3) Condensate storage tank
personnel (4) Fuel pool purification system
(5) Shielding
(6) Control rod drive hydraulic
system
(7) Reactor building crane
(8) Fuel handling system
(9) Control rod storage rack
Facilities required to cool spent (!) Spent fuel pit water cooling (!) Fuel pool cooling system
fuel system
(v) Facilities, other than those

belonging to classes As, A and
B, which would prevent the
release of radioactive material
into the atmosphere in the
event of an accident accompa
nied by the release of radio
active material
TABLE 1-3. (cont.)
Examples o f items
PW R BWR
C (i) Facilities other than those (1) C ontrol rod drive mechanism (1) Recirculation flow control
belonging to classes As, A and system
B, which are required to (2) Control rod drive hydraulic
control radioactivity system
(") Facilities other than those (1) Sampling system (!) Sampling system
belonging to classes As, A and (2) F loor drain system (2) F loor drain system
B, which contain or relate (3) Laundry drain treatm ent (3) Laundry liquid waste treatment
to radioactive material package system
(4) Solid waste disposal system (4) Solid waste treatm ent system
(5) Boric acid evaporator (5) W aste disposal system
(6) W aste evaporator (6) H ydraulic press baling machine
(7) Prim ary m ake-up w ater system
(iii) Facilities not related to (1) Turbine system (1) C irculating w ater system
radioactive safety but classified (2) Component cooling water (2) Turbine building closed
as reactor facilities system cooling w ater system
(3) Auxiliary boiler (3) Auxiliary boiler
(4) Fire protection system (4) Fire protection system
(5) M ain gnerator and main (5) M ain generator and transformer
transform er (6) Turbine building crane
(6) Heating and ventilation system
(7) New fuel storage system (7) Station air system
TABLE 1-3. (cont.)
Exam ples o f items

Seismic classification Facilities ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PW R BWR
(8) Steam gnerator flowdown

system
(9) Station service air system
(10) Polar crane
Notes:
As: items are usually evaluated for the SL-2 level earthquake.
A: items are usually designed for the SL -t level earthquake.
B: items are usually designed for an earthquake o f 0.5 Sl-1 intensity.
C: items are usually designed for an earthquake o f 0.33 SL-2 intensity.
Annex H
SLOSHING AND IMPULSE EFFECTS IN LIQUID CONTAINERS
II-J . CONCEPT
The oscillation o f a free liquid surface [43] has been called 'sloshing'. This
phenomenon is similar to the seiches resulting from earthquake effects in a lake or
basin. F or seismic design associated with the sloshing liquid, only the fundamental
frequency is important. The natural frequency is about 1 Hz for a cylindrical vessel
whose diameter is approximately 1 m, while for a 100 m diameter vessel it is slightly
greater than 0.1 Hz. The fundamental frequency o f sloshing motion therefore lies in
the range o f 1 to 0.1 Hz for the cases relevant to seismic design in a nuclear power
plant-
Also o f concern in the seismic design of liquid containers are impulsive load
effects o f the liquid below the sloshing liquid [44, 45].
H -2. SIGNIFICANCE
The sloshing liquid, typically in an up and down motion, can impart significant
impulsive and impact loads as well as cyclic loads on a structure or portions o f the
structure in its path. In particular, it can cause failure o f tank roofs and attachments
to walls o f tanks and pools in its path.
Impulsive liquid levels are o f paramount importance in the design o f the con
tainer and container anchorage, because the impulsive liquid typically generates
overall loads associated with pressure and overturning or uplift moments on the
container and its supports which are much larger than the sloshing loads.
11-3. DESIGN
To evaluate the motions, the concepts of sloshing liquid and an impulsive liquid
are generally used [9]. The subdivision derives from the fact that only the semispher-
ical or cylindrical part o f the water with diameter equal to the average dimension o f
the free surface is sloshing (moving) in the case o f an axisymmetric or rectangular
vessel. Therefore, if the depth o f the liquid container is greater than one half o f the
diameter, the fundamental frequency o f the sloshing liquid is a function only o f the
diameter o f the container.
The seismic response o f the impulsive fluid is also a function o f the dynamic
characteristics of the container and can be determined as shown in Ref. [9].
53
11-4. RESONANCE SLOSHING EFFECTS
Sometimes resonance phenomena have been observed and damage to fuel

stored in pools and underground water reservoirs has been reported. The ground
motion o f high magnitude earthquakes sometimes reaches total displacement values
o f up to 1 m peak-to-peak amplitude. If the sloshing resonates with the ground
motion, its wave height can easily reach several metres.
11-5. DAM PING
The damping coefficient for the sloshing mode is extremely low and is
typically taken as 0.5% or less. Damping associated with the impulse mode of vibra
tion is typically that associated with the container material, and the connections and
anchorage used.
11-6. VERTICAL EXCITATION
If the vertical component o f the acceleration at the free water surface is greater
than l.Og, additional waves at the free surface could be generated. In such cases,
non-linear damping effects should be considered in the response.
54
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55
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Power Plants, Rep. ANSI/ANS-2.2-1988, ANS, La Grange Park, IL (1988).
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plant systems", paper presented at ASME/CSME Pressure Vessels and Piping Conf.,
Montreal, Canada, 25-30 June 1978.
[29] NEWMARK, N.M., ROSENBLUETH, E., Fundamentals of Earthquake Engineering,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ (1971).
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University, Orlando, FL, 7-9 December 1988.
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56
[37] KOT, C.A., Dynamic Testing of As-Built Civil Engineering Structures: A Review and
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of Tokyo, No. 8 (1974) 18,
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Commission Piping Review Committee, Rep. NUREG-1061, Vols 1-5, USNRC, Washing
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Am. Soc. Civ. Eng. 94 SM5 (1968) 1053.
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59
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW
During the development phase the following experts participated in one or

more o f the meetings (1975-1978):
Akino, K. Japan
Beare, J.W. Canada
Becker, K. International Organization for Standardization
Burkhardt, W. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Candes, P. (Chairman) France
Carmona, J. Argentina
Ciement, B. France
Dtouhy, Z. Czechostovakia
Fischer, J. Germany
Franzen, L.F. Germany
Gammill, W.P. United States of America
Ganguly, A.K. India
Gausden, R.A. United Kingdom
Giuliani, P. Italy
Gronow, W.S. United Kingdom
Hedgran, A. Sweden
Heimgartner, E. Switzerland
Hendrie, J. United States of America
Hurst, D. Canada
Iansiti, E. Internationa] Atomic Energy Agency
61
Id riss, I.M . U nited States o f A m erica
Itari, O. Nuctear Energy Agency of the OECD
Jeschki, W. Switzerland
Karbassioun, A. Internationat Atomic Energy Agency
Ktik, F. Czechostovakia
Konstantinov, L. International Atomic Energy Agency
Kovalevich, O.M. Union of Soviet Sociatist Repubtics
Kriz, Z. Czechostovakia
Livotant, M. France
Mattson, R.J. United States of America
Messiah, A. France
Minogue, B. United States of America
Mochizuki, K. Japan
Nitson, R. Internationat Organization for Standardization
Omote, S. Japan
Pete, J. Commission of the European Communities
Petrangeli, G. Itaty
Roberts, I. Craig United States of America
Sanchez Gutierrez, J Mexico
Schwarz, G. Canada
Sevcik, A. Czechostovakia
Shibata, H. Japan
Soman, S.D. India
62
Stadie, K. Nuclear Energy Agency o f the OECD
Stevenson, J.D . United States o f America
Tiidsiey, F.C .J. United Kingdom
U chida, H. Japan
Van Reijen, G. Commission o f the European Communities
Velez, C. Mexico
W itulski, H. Germany
Zuber, J.F . Switzerland
D u rin g th e re v isio n p h a se th e fo llo w in g e x p e rts p a rtic ip a te d it

(1 9 8 8 -1 9 9 0 ):
A ggarwal, M .L. Canada
Conte, M. France
Culam bourg, J. France
Danisch, R. Germany
Duff, G. Canada
Fischer, J. International Atomic Energy Agency
Ford, P.J. United Kingdom
Giuliani, P. International Atomic Energy Agency
Godoy, A. International Atomic Energy Agency
Giirpinar, A. International Atomic Energy Agency
H intergraber, M. Germany
Inkester, J. United Kingdom
Jeng, P.J. United States o f America
63
Maiboroda, V.V. U nion o f Soviet Socialist R epublics
Paganini, C. Argentina
Shibata, H. Japan
Stevenson, J. United States of America
Takashima, K. Japan
N U C LEA R SA FETY STANDARDS A D V ISO RY G R O U P (NUSSAG)
Barber, P. France
Brooks, G. Canada
Bystedt, P. Sweden
Gast, K. Germany
Herttrich, M. Germany
Heltemes, C.J., Jr. United States of America
Isaev, A. Russian Federation
Ishikawa, M. Japan
Kovalevich, O.M. Russian Federation
Lee, S.H. Korea, Republic of
Lei, Y. China
Lopez-Menchero, M.E. Commission of the European Communities
Medina, M. Mexico
Mucskai, G. Hungary
Pele, J. Commission of the European Communities
Reed, J. United Kingdom
64
Ryder, E. U nited K ingdom
Sarma, M.S.R India
Scherrer, J. France
Versteeg, J. Netherlands
Yamamoto, K. Japan
65
LIST OF NUSS PROGRAMME TITLES
A sAoMM wofeJ sowe ;n

ser;'cs way rewscd w fAe wear ^fMrg.
77iosc fAar Aave a/rcady êcw rcwscJ arc :W:'ca?ed &y fAe
ajdi'doH o / '(Kcv. 7)' ;o yAe HMw^gr.
1. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
50-C-G (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Governmental 1988
organization
&3/efy GMK?M
50-SG-G1 [Qualifications and training of staff of the regulatory body 1979

for nuclear power plants
50-SG-G2 Information to be submitted in support of licensing 1979

applications for nuctear power plants
50-SG-G3 Conduct of regutatory review and assessment during the 1980

licensing process for nuclear power plants
50-SG-G4 Inspection and enforcement by the regulatory body for 1980

nuclear power plants
50-SG-G6 Preparedness of public authorities for emergencies at 1982

nuctear power plants
50-SG-G8 Licences for nuclear power plants: Content, format and 1982
i legal .considerations :
50-SG-G9 Regulations and guides for nuclear power plants 1984
2. SITING
50-C-S (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of nuctear power plants: Siting 198,8
3a/efy GtH'des
50-SG-S1 (Rev. 1) . Earthquakes and associated topics in relation to nuclear 1991

power plant siting
50-SG-S3 Atmospheric dispersion in nuclear power plant siting 1980

50-SG-S4 Site selection and evaluation for nuclear power plants 1980
with respect to population distribution
67
50-SG-S5 External man-induced events in relation to nuclear power 1981

plant siting
50-SG-S6 Hydrological dispersion o f radioactive material in relation 1985

to nuclear pow er plant siting
50-SG-S7 Nuclear pow er plant siting: Hydrogeological aspects 1984
50-SG-S8 Safety aspects o f the foundations o f nuclear pow er plants 1986
50-SG-S9 Site survey for nuclear pow er plants 1984
50-SG-S 10A Design basis flood for nuclear pow er plants on river sites 1983
50-SG-S 10B Design basis flood for nuclear pow er plants on coastal 1983
sites
50-SG-S H A Extreme meteorological events in nuclear power plant 1981

siting, excluding tropical cyclones
50-SG -SH B Design basis tropical cyclone for nuclear pow er plants 1984
3. DESIGN
50-C-D (Rev. 1) Code on the safety o f nuclear pow er plants: Design 1988
50-SG-D 1 Safety functions and component classification for 1979

BW R, PW R and PTR
50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1) Fire protection in nuclear pow er plants 1992
50-SG-D3 Protection system and related features in nuclear 1980

pow er plants
50-SG-D4 Protection against internally generated missiles and 1980

their secondary effects in nuclear pow er plants
50-SG-D5 External man-induced events in relation to nuclear 1982

pow er plant design
50-SG-D6 Ultimate heat sink and directly associated heat transport 1981
systems for nuclear pow er plants
50-SG-D7 (Rev. 1) Emergency pow er systems at nuclear pow er plants 1991
50-SG-D8 Safety-related instrumentation and control systems for 1984

nuclear pow er plants
50-SG-D9 Design aspects of radiation protection for nuclear 1985

power plants
68
50-SG-D10 Fuel handling and storage systems in nuclear power plants 1984
50-SG-D11 General design safety principles for nuclear pow er plants .1986
50-SG-D12 Design o f the reactor containment systems in nuclear 1985

pow er plants
50-SG-D13 Reactor coolant and associated systems in nuclear pow er

plants 1986
50-SG-D14 Design for reactor core safety in nuclear pow er plants 1986
50-SG-D15 Seismic design and qualification for nuclear pow er plants 1992
4. OPERATION
50 -C -0 (Rev. 1) Code on the safety o f nuclear pow er plants: Operation 1988
So/i?fy
50-SG -01 (Rev. 1) Staffing o f nuclear pow er plants and the recruitment, 1991
training and authorization o f operating personnel
50-SG -02 In-service inspection for nuclear pow er plants 1980
50-SG -03 Operational limits and conditions for nuclear pow er plants : 1979
50-SG -04 Commissioning procedures for nuclear pow er plants 1980
50-SG -05 Radiation protection during operation o f nuclear 1983

pow er plants
50-SG -06 Preparedness o f the operating organization (licensee) 1982

for em ergencies at nuctear pow er plants
50-SG -07 (Rev. 1) Maintenance o f nuclear power ptants 1990
50-SG -08 (Rev. 1) Surveillance o f items important to safety in nuclear 1990

pow er plants
50-SG -09 Management o f nuclear power plants for safe operation 1984
50-SG -010 C ore management and fuel handling for nuclear 1985
pow er ptants
50-SG -011 Operational management of radioactive effluents and 1986

wastes arising in nuctear power plants
S. QUALITY ASSURANCE
50-C-QA (Rev. 1) Code on the safety o f nuctear pow er ptants: 1988

Quality assurance
69
50-SG-QA1 Establishing o f the quality assurance programme for a 1984

nuclear pow er plant project
50-SG-QA2 Quality assurance records system for nuclear 1979

pow er plants
50 SG-QA3 Quality assurance in the procurem ent of items and 1979

services for nuclear pow er plants
50-SG-QA4 Quality assurance during site construction o f nuclear 1981

pow er plants
50-SG-QA5 (Rev. 1) Quality assurance during comm issioning and operation 1986
o f nuclear pow er plants
50-SG-QA6 Quality assurance in the design o f nuclear pow er plants 1981
50-SG-QA7 Quality assurance organization for nuclear pow er plants 1983
50-SG-QA8 Quality assurance in the manufacture o f items for 1981

nuclear pow er plants ;
50-SG-QA10 Quality assurance auditing for nuclear power plants 1980
50-SG-QA11 Quality assurance in the procurem ent, design and 1983

manufacture o f nuclear fuel assemblies
SAFETY PRAC7YCES
50-P -l Application o f the single failure criterion 1990
50-P-2 In-service inspection o f nuclear power plants 1991

A manual
50-P-3 Data collection and record keeping for the 1991

management o f nuclear pow er plant ageing
70
SELECTION OF IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATING

TO THE SAFETY OF
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
SAFETY SERIES
9 Basic safety standards for radiation protection, 1982,,

1982 edition
49, Radiological surveillance o f airborne contaminants 1979

in the working environment
52 Factors relevant to the decommissioning o f land-based 1980,

nuclear reactor plants
55 Planning for off-site response to radiation 1981;

accidents in nuclear facilities
57 Generic models and param eters for assessing 1982

the environmental transfer o f radionuclides
from routine releases: Exposures o f critical groups
67 Assigning a value to transboundary radiation exposure 1985
69 Management of radioactive wastes from nuclear 1985

pow er plants
72 Principles for establishing intervention levels for the 1985

protection o f the public in the event o f a nuclear accident
or radiological emergency
73 Emergency preparedness exercises for nuclear , 1985

facilities: Preparation, conduct and evaluation
75-INSA G-1 Summary report on the post-accident review meeting 1986 :

o n th e C h e m o b y la c c id e n t,
75-INSAG-2 Radionuclide source term s from severe accidents to 1987

nuclear pow er plants with light water reactors
75-INSAG-3 Basic safety principles for nuclear power plants 1988-
75-INSAG-4 Safety culture 1991
75-INSAG-5 The safety o f nuclear power: INSAG-5 1992
75-INSAG-6 Probabilistic safety assessment 1992
77 Principles for limiting releases of radioactive 1986

effluents into the environment
71
79 Design o f radioactive waste management systems 1986

at nuclear pow er plants
81 Derived intervention levels for application in 1986

controlling radiation doses to the public in the event o f a
nuclear accident o r radiological emergency: Principles,
procedures and data
84 Basic principles for occupational radiation monitoring 1987
86 Techniques and decision making in the assessment 1987

o f off-site consequences o f an accident in a nuclear facility
93 Systems for reporting unusual events in 1989

94 Response to a radioactive materials release 1989

having a transboundary impact
97 Principles and techniques for post-accident 1989

assessment and recovery in a contaminated
environment o f a nuclear facility
98 On-site habitability in the event o f an 1989

accident at a nuclear facility:
Guidance for assessm ent and improvement
101 Operational radiation protection: A guide to optimization 1990
103 Provision o f operational radiation protection 1990

services at nuclear pow er plants
104 Extension o f the principles o f radiation protection 1990

to sources o f potential exposure
105 The regulatory process for the decommissioning 1990

o f nuclear facilities
106 The role o f probabilistic safety assessment 1992

and probabilistic safety criteria in nuclear power
plant safety
TECHNICAL REPORTS SERIES
217 Guidebook on the introduction o f nuclear power 1982
224 Interaction o f grid characteristics with design and 1983

perform ance o f nuclear pow er plants: A guidebook
230 Decommissioning o f nuclear facilities: 1983

Decontamination, disassembly arid waste management
72
237 Manual on quality assurance programme auditing 1984
239 N uctear pow er plant instrumentation and control: 1984

A guidebook
242 Qualification o f nuclear pow er plant operations 1984

personnel: A guidebook
249 Decontamination o f nuclear facilities to perm it 1985

operation, inspection, maintenance, modification o r plant
decommissioning
262 Manual on training, qualification and certification 1986

o f quality assurance personnel
267 Methodology and technology o f decommissioning 1986

nuclear facilities
268 Manual on maintenance o f systems and components 1986

im portant to safety
27 i Introducing nuclear pow er plants into electrical pow er 1987

systems o f limited capacity: Problems and remedial
measures
274 Design o f off-gas and air cleaning systems at nuclear 1987'

pow er plants
282 Manual on quality assurance for computer software 1988

related to the safety o f nuclear pow er plants
292 Design and operation o f off-gas cleaning and 1988

ventilation systems in facilities handling low and
intermediate level radioactive material
294 Options for the treatm ent and solidification 1989

o f organic radioactive wastes
296 Regulatory inspection o f the implementation 1989

o f quality assurance programmes: A manual
299 Review o f fuel elem ent developments for water cooled 1989
nuclear pow er reactors
300 Cleanup o f targe areas contaminated as a result 1989

o f a nuclear accident
301 Matnual on quatity assurance for installation and 1989

commissioning o f instrum entation, control and
electrical equipment in nuclear pow er ptants
306 Guidebook on the education and training of technicians 1989

for nuclear power
73
307 Management of abnormal radioactive wastes 1989

327 Planning for cleanup o f large areas contaminated as a 1991

result of a nuclear accident
328 Grading o f quality assurance requirements: A manual 1991
330 Disposal o f waste from the cleanup o f large areas 1992

contaminated as a result o f a nuclear accident
334 Monitoring program m es for unrestricted release 1992

related to decommissioning o f nuclear facilities
338 Methodology for the management o f ageing of 1992

nuclear pow er plant components important to safety
IAEA TECDOC SERIES
276 M anagement o f radioactive waste from nuclear 1983

pow er plants
294 International experience in the implementation o f the 1983

lessons learned from the Three M ile Island accident
303 Manua) on the selection o f appropriate quality assurance 1984

programmes for items and services o f a nuclear pow er plant
308 Survey o f probabilistic methods in safety and risk 1984

assessment for nuclear pow er plant licensing
332 Safety aspects o f station blackout at nuclear power plants 1985
341 Developments in the preparation o f operating procedures 1985

for emergency conditions o f nuclear power plants
348 Earthquake resistant design o f nuclear facilities with 1985

iimited radioactive inventory
355 Comparison o f high efficiency particulate filter testing 1985

methods
377 Safety aspects o f unplanned shutdowns and trips 1986
379 Atmospheric dispersion models for application in 1986

relation to radionuclide releases
387 Combining risk analysis and operating experience 1986
390 Safety assessment o f emergency electric power systems 1986

for nuclear pow er plants
416 Manual on quality assurance for the survey, evaluation and 1987
confirmation of nuclear power plant sites
74
424 Identification o f failure sequences sensitive to 1987

human error
425 Simulation o f a loss of cooiant accident 1987
443 Experience with simulator training for emergency 1987

conditions
444 Improving nuctear pow er ptant safety through 1987

o p erato raid s
450 Dose assessments in nuctear pow er ptant siting 1988
451 Some practical implications o f source term reassessment 1988
458 OSART results 1988
497 OSART resutts II 1989
498 Good practices for improved nuctear power ptant 1989

perform ance
499 Models and data requirements for human reliability analysis 1989
508 Survey o f ranges o f component reliability data 1989

for use in probabilistic safety assessment
510 Status o f advanced technology and design for 1989

water cooted reactors: Heavy water reactors
522 A probabitistic safety assessment peer review: 1989

Case study on the use o f probabitistic safety assessment
for safety decisions
523 Probabilistic safety criteria at the 1989

safety function/system tevet
525 Guidebook on training to estabtish and maintain 1989

the qualification and competence o f nuctear pow er ptant
operations personnet
529 U ser requirem ents for decision support systems 1989

used for nuctear pow er plant accident prevention
and mitigation
540 Safety aspects o f nuctear pow er ptant ageing 1990
542 Use o f expert systems in nuctear safety 1990
543 Procedures for conducting independent peer reviews o f 1990

probabilistic safety assessment
547 The use o f probabitistic safety assessment in the 1990

reticensing o f nuctear pow er plants for extended tifetimes
75
550 Safety of nuclear installations: Future direction 1990

553 Computer codes for Level 1 probabilistic safety 1990
assessment
561 Reviewing com puter capabilities in nuclear pow er plants 1990
570 OSART mission highlights 1988-1989 1990
581 Safety implications o f computerized process control 1991

in nuclear pow er plants
586 Simulation o f a loss o f coolant accident with rupture 1991

in the steam generator hot collector
590 Case study on the use of PSA methods: 1991

Determining safety importance o f systems and components
591 Case study on the use of PSA methods: 1991

Backfitting decisions
592 Case study on the use o f PSA methods: 1991

Human reliability analysis
593 Case study on the use o f PSA methods: 1991

Station blackout risk at Millstone Unit 3
599 Use o f probabilistic safety assessment to evaluate nuclear 1991

pow er plant technical specifications
600 Numerical indicators of nuclear pow er plant safety 1991

performance
605 OSART good practices: 1986-1989 1991
611 Use of plant specific PSA to evaluate incidents at 1991

618 Human reliability data collection and modelling 1991
631 Reviewing reactor engineering and fuel handling: 1992

Supplementary guidance and reference material for
IAEA OSARTs
632 ASSET guidelines: Revised 1991 edition 1991
635 OSART guidelines: 1992 edition 1992
640 Ranking o f safety issues for W W ER-440 model 230 1992

648 Procedures for conducting common cause failure analysis 1992

in probabilistic safety assessment
76
658 Safety related maintenance in the framework of the 1992

reliability centered maintenance concept
659 Reactor pressure vesset embrittlement 1992
PROCEEDINGS SERIES
STI/PUB/593 Quaiity assurance for nuclear pow er piants 1982
STI/PUB/628 Nuclear pow er plant control and instrumentation 1983
STI/PUB/645 Reliability o f reactor pressure components 1983
STI/PUB/673 IAEA safety codes and guides (NUSS) in the light o f 1985
current safety issues
STI/PU B/700 Source term evaluation for accident conditions 1986
STI/PUB/701 Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear 1986

facilities
STI/PUB/716 Optimization o f radiation protection 1986
STI/PUB/759 Safety aspects o f the ageing and maintenance o f 1988

STI/PUB/761 N uclear power perform ance and safety 1988
STI/PUB/782 Severe accidents in nuclear pow er plants 1988
STI/PUB/783 Radiation protection in nuclear energy 1988
STI/PUB/785 Feedback of operational safety experience 1989

from nuctear pow er plants
STI/PUB/803 Regulatory practices and safety standards 1989

for nuclear power plants
STI/PUB/824 Fire protection and fire fighting in nuclear installations 1989
STI/PUB/825 Environmental contamination fotlowing a 1990

major nuclear accident
STI/PUB/826 Recovery operations in the event o f a nuclear accident or 1990

radiological emergency
STI/PUB/843 Balancing automation and human action in nuctear 1991

pow er plants
STI/PUB/880 The safety of nuclear power: Strategy for the future 1992
77
HOW TO ORDER !AEA PUBL!CAT!ONS

An exciusive sa te s agen t for tAEA pubtications, to whom a!) orders and
inquiries shoutd be addressed, has been appointed for the
foHowing countries:
CANADA
UNITED STATES O F AMERICA UNIPUB, 4 6 1 1-F A ssem bly Drive, Lanham , MD 20706-4391, USA
)n th e foiiowing countries tAEA pubtications may be pu rch ased from the

sa te s ag e n ts or booksetiers tisted or through major iocai
bookseiiers. Paym ent can be m ade in tocai currency or
with UNESCO coupons.
ARGENTINA C om ision N acional d e Energi'a Atdm ica, A venida d el L lbertador 8250,

RA-1429 B u en o s A ires
AUSTRALIA H u n ter Publications, 58 A G ipps S tree t, Collingw ood, Victoria 3066
BELGIUM S erv ice C ourrier UN ESCO , 202, A venue du Roi, B-1060 B ru ssels
CHILE C om isi6n C hilena d e Energi'a N uclear, V enta d e P u blicaciones,
A m unategui 95, C asilla 188-D, S an tiago
CHINA IAEA P u b licatio n s in C h in ese:
C hina N uclear E n ergy Industry C orporation, T ranslation S ection,
P.O . Box 2103, Beijing
IAEA Pu b licatio n s o th e r th a n in C h inese:
C h in a N ational P u b licatio n s Import & Export C orporation,
D e u tsc h e A bteilung, P.O . Box 88, Beijing
CZECHOSLOVAKIA S.N .T.L., M ikulandska 4, C S-116 86 P ra g u e 1
Alfa, P u b lish ers, H urbanovo n a m e stie 3, C S-815 89 B ratislava
FRANCE Office International d e D ocum entation e t Librairie, 48, rue G ay-L ussac,
F-75240 P a ris C ed e x 05
HUNGARY Kultura, H ungarian F oreign Trading C om pany,
P.O . Box 149, H-1389 B u d ap e st 62
INDIA O xford Book a n d S tatio n ery C o., 17, P ark S treet, C alcutta-700 016
O xford Book a n d S tatio n ery C o., S cindia H ouse, N ew D elhi-110 001
ISRAEL YOZMOT (1989) Ltd, P.O . Box 56055, Tel Aviv 61560
ITALY Libreria Scientifica, Dott. Lucio d e B iasio " a e io u " ,
Via Meravigli 16, 1-20123 Milan
JAPAN M aruzen C om pany, Ltd, P.O . Box 5050, 100-31 Tokyo International
PAKISTAN Mirza Book A gency, 65, S h a h ra h Q uaid-e-A zam , P.O . Box 729, L ahore 3
POLAND Ars P olona-R uch, C en tra la H andlu Z ag ran iczn eg o ,
K rakow skie P rze d m ie scie 7, PL-00-068 W arsaw
ROMANIA llexim, P.O . Box 136-137, B u ch a re st
RUSSIAN FEDERATION M ezh d u n aro d n ay a Kniga, S m o len sk a y a-S e n n ay a 32-34, M oscow G -200
SOUTH AFRICA V an S ch aik B ookstore (Pty) Ltd, P.O . Box 724, P retoria 0001
SPAIN Diaz d e S a n to s, L a g a sc a 95, E-28006 Madrid
Diaz d e S a n to s, B alm es 417, E -08022 B arcelona
SW EDEN AB Fritzes Kungl. H ovbokhandel, F re d s g a ta n 2, P.O . Box 16356,
S-103 27 Stockholm
UNITED KINGDOM HMSO, Pu b licatio n s C en tre, A gency S ection,
51 Nine Elm s L ane, London SW 8 5DR
YUGOSLAVIA J u g o sla v e n sk a Knjiga, T erazije 27, P.O . Box 36, YU-11001 B elgrade
O rders from countries w here sa te s ag e n ts have not yet been appointed and
re q u e sts for information shoutd be ad d ressed directty to:
Division of Pubiications
internationa) Atomic Energy Agency
W agram erstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria
to
00
5
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)NTERNAT!ONAL ATOMtC E N E R G Y AGENCY, VtENNA, 1992

CATEGORIES IN THE IAEA SAFETY SERIES

/t new /Herarc^i'ca/ cafegon'zafion .sc^twe ^a.s ^cen infrodMced, according M

Safety F u ndam entals (silver cover)

Basic objectives, concepts and principles to ensure safety.

Safety Standards (red cover)

Basic requirements which must be satisfied to ensure adequate safety for

Safety Guides (green cover)

Recommendations, on the basis of international experience, relating to the ful

Safety Practices (blue cover)

An additional category, Safety Reports (purple cover), comprises independent

SEISM IC D ESIGN A ND Q U A LIFIC A TIO N

SAFETY SERIES No. 50-SG-D15

INTERNATIONAL ATOM IC ENERGY AGENCY

THIS SAFETY SERIES PUBLICATION IS ALSO ISSUED IN

VIC Library Catatoguing in Publication Data

1. N uclear pow er plantsEarthquake effects. 2. Nuclear engineering

Background (101-102) ............................ ............................. ........................ 7

2. GENERAL CONCEPT ...................................... .............................................. 8

Earthquake levels (202-203) ............................................................................. 8

3. SEISMIC DESIGN ............................................................................................. 12

General approach to seismic design (301-305) ...................................... . 12

4. SEISMIC QUALIFICATION: ANALYSIS, TESTING,

Seismic input (402) ............................................................................................. 18

5. SEISMIC INSTRUM ENTATION .................................................................. 31

Type, location and number of instruments (502-504) ............................... 31

APPENDIX I: METHODS OF SEISMIC ANALYSIS ..................................... 33

APPENDIX II: M ODELLING TECHNIQUES ..................................................... 34

ANNEX I: EXAMPLES OF LISTS OF SEISMIC CATEGORY 1

ANNEX II: SLOSHING AND IM PULSE EFFECTS IN

CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW ........................................... 61

LIST OF NUSS PROGRAM M E TITLES .............................................................. 67

SELECTION OF IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO

States defined under Norma! Operation or Anticipated Operational

Operation of a nuclear power plant within specified operational limits and

Anticipated Operationa! Occurrences*

All operational processes deviating from Normal Operation which are

Accident (or Accident State)

A state defined under Accident Conditions or Severe Accidents.

Deviations^ from Operational States in which the releases o f radioactive

Design Basis Accidents

Nuclear power plant states beyond Accident Conditions including those

Accident management is the taking o f a set of actions

Operational states Accidents

re/an'owsAv'ps de/MH?;'oH, tv/;;'cA re/er espec:'a//y ro rAe

Safety See Nuclear Safety

Nuclear Safety (or simply Safety)

The achievement o f proper operating conditions, prevention o f accidents or

Systems important to Safety, provided to assure the safe shutdown o f the

A system which encompasses all electrical and mechanical devices and

Safety Actuation System

The collection of equipment required to accomplish the necessary safety

Safety System Support Features

The collection of equipment that provides services such as cooling, lubrication,

Items important to safety Items no? important to safety

system actuation system

The process o f manufacturing and assembling the components o f a nuclear

Design Floor Response Spectrum

Response spectrum defined at a particular building elevation and obtained by

Design Floor Time Histories

Time histories of floor motion o f structure under consideration derived from

** The terms Siting, Design, Construction, Commissioning, Operation and Decom