MODULE 6

Climate Change and

Air Pollution

Global Environmental Studies (GES) Course

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
a. What are the goals, objectives and teaching methods of the class?

This module aims to provide students with a general understanding of

the causes and mechanisms of climate change in the local, international
and global context, as well as its importance and links to other
environmental, social, economic and political factors.

The module includes a focus on South Africa, its role in climate change
and the impacts that climate change is likely to have on South Africa.

The Climate Change and Air Pollution Module consists of four (4) contact
lectures with participants over a two (2) week period.

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
a. What are the goals, objectives and teaching methods of the class?

The overall objective of this module is to enable the student to

understand:

the evidence that climate change is occurring and the predictions of further
changes likely to occur in the coming decades;
the causes of climate change, particularly the role of the current use of fossil
fuels as the main source of energy, in the local, international and global context;
the consequences of climate change; and
the importance and links of climate change to other environmental, social,
economic and political factors.

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
b. What problem set are we going to tackle and how?

Lecture 1 introduces climate change, the evidence that climate change is happening,
and the future scenarios.

Lecture 2 deals with the causes of climate change; the earths energy balance,
atmospheric emissions, air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation
and changes in land use, as well as carbon emissions by country, per capita, by sector
and the production as well as consumption aspects.

Lecture 3 explores the current and future likely impacts and vulnerabilities, including
factors such as water resources, food security and food sovereignty, ecosystems and
biodiversity, settlements and human society, as well as human health.

Lecture 4 highlights possible and current responses to climate change; drawing on

the Framework Convention and country responses, corporate and country vested
interests in consumption patterns, adaptation vs reducing carbon emissions and
other drivers of climate change, as well as industrial/sectoral and national responses,
and cross-cutting issues.
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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
c. What is Climate Change?

Climate change is a change in the statistical distribution of weather

patterns when that change lasts for an extended period of time (i.e.,
decades to millions of years).

Climate change may refer to a change in average weather conditions

(changes in average temperature, rainfall, etc.), or in the time variation of
weather around longer-term average conditions (i.e., more or fewer
extreme weather events).

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
To put this definition into perspective we may make the following observations:

Weather is the state of the atmosphere (temperature, rainfall, wind, cloudiness,

humidity etc.), from moment to moment, day to day and season to season. Weather
may also vary to some extent from year to year. For example, the rainfall during one
year may be less than the next, or one summer may be hotter than the next;
Weather patterns such as storms or droughts may vary from year to year. The
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as unusually intense storms
or prolonged droughts may also vary from year to year; and
Climate refers to weather patterns averaged over a long period of time, usually 30
years. Thus the phrase statistical distribution of weather patterns in the definition of
climate change refers to both the long term averages of temperature, rainfall, storms
etc. as well as measures of the variation of these values such as maximum and
minimum temperatures, extreme rainfall patterns (droughts and floods), and other
weather related factors.

These changes in climate (long term weather patterns), vary across the globe.
Thus certain areas are more affected than others.

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Illustration of the above ideas:

Day to day variation in maximum and minimum temperatures compared

with long-term (30 year) average temperatures (Figure 1):

Figure 1: Cape Town, March 2015: Day to day variation in maximum and minimum temperatures compared
7
with long term average temperatures (solid lines) (Source: AccuWeather.com)
LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Weather patterns vary with the season (summer, winter, etc.), and from
region to region. For example the Western Capes winter rainfall weather
compared with summer rainfall in much of the rest of South Africa.

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
d. Evidence that climate change is happening, future scenarios

Since the 1950s, many of the observed changes in climate have been
unprecedented compared with previous decades, extending back to thousands
of years. The atmosphere, earths surface and oceans have warmed, the amounts
of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of
greenhouse gases, the main cause of climate change, have increased.

The observed (measured) increase in the global average temperature between

the 1850 to 1900 average and the average for the period 2002 to 2012 is 0.78OC.
Since about 1970 global temperatures have increased more rapidly. The
temperature anomaly (temperature change between the reference period and
present or predicted future), is quite unevenly distributed across the planet, with
a temperature increase of 1.75 to 2.5oC (purple shade) in some regions (Figure
2), a factor which in itself has important implications in respect of the
consequences and effects of climate change.
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 Figure 2: Observed change in surface temperature 1901-2012.
(Source: UNFCC 5th Assessment Report: Summary for Policymakers) 10
LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been
observed since about 1950. The number of cold days and nights has
decreased and the number of warm days and nights has increased. The
frequency of heat waves has increased in large parts of Europe, Asia and
Australia. The frequency or intensity of heavy precipitation events has
increased in North America and Europe and possibly on other continents
as well.

Annual average precipitation changes have occurred, with some areas

receiving up to 100 mm per year more than the past long term average,
and some areas receiving less than 100 mm per year, (see Figure 3).

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Figure 3: Maps of observed precipitation change from 1901 to 2010 and from 1951 to 2010
(Source: UNFCC 5th Assessment Report: Summary for Policymakers)

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Predicted future temperature changes compared to the remote past

Predictions of the future CO2 concentrations and consequent possible

temperature increases and the corresponding effects and consequences
depend on the emissions scenarios used in the modelling.

Figure 4: Representative Concentration Pathways 13

LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Relative to the average from year 1850 to 1900, global surface temperature
change by the end of the 21st century is projected to likely exceed 1.5C for
RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (high confidence). Warming is likely to exceed 2C for
RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (high confidence), more likely than not to exceed 2C for
RCP4.5 (high confidence), but unlikely to exceed 2C for RCP2.6 (medium
confidence).

The increase of global mean surface temperatures for 20812100 relative to

19862005 is projected to likely be in the ranges 0.3C to 1.7C (RCP2.6), 1.1C to
2.6C (RCP4.5), 1.4C to 3.1C (RCP6.0), 2.6C to 4.8C (RCP8.5). The Arctic region
will warm more rapidly than the global mean, and mean warming over land will
be larger than over the ocean (see Figure 5).

Only RCP2.6, which requires a rapid decrease in radiative forcing (and

greenhouse gas emissions by 2040-2050, is likely to avoid a more than 2oC
increase in global average surface temperature.
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Figure 5: Predicted change in surface temperature 20 year average 2081-2100
compared with 10 year average 1986 -2005 (Source: AR5 SPM)

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Note that even in the most optimistic scenario the Arctic region 20-year
average temperature anomaly is up to 2-3oC, in the worst case scenario
of RCP8.5, the Arctic region temperature anomaly is about 11oC.

Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations are now more than 400ppm,

higher than they have been for the last 800 000 years, and about 40%
higher than the pre-industrial era.

Figure 6 shows the record for the last 400 000 years.

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Figure 6: Historic temperature and CO2 data to 2007

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Ocean warning and rising ocean levels

Ocean warming accounts for more than 90% of the net increase in stored
energy in the climate system. The warming is largest near the surface.

The upper 75m warmed by 0.11oC per decade (0.44oC total), over the period
1971 to 2010, accounting for about 60% of the net energy increase. The total
mass of the upper 75m of the earths oceans is about 27billion tonnes thus
the 0.44oC temperature rise represents an enormous amount of stored
energy.

As a result of ocean warming, regions of high salinity (salt content), have

become more saline, and regions of low salinity where precipitation
dominates have become less saline.

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Loss of the cryosphere (ice sheets)

Between 1979 and 2012 the annual mean Arctic sea ice extent has
decreased by 3.5% to 4.1% per decade and the summer ice minimum has
decreased by 9.4% to 13.6% per decade. Arctic summer sea temperatures
are higher than they have been for the past 1 450 years.

The annual mean Antarctic sea ice extent increased at a rate in the range of
1.2% to 1.8% per decade between 1979 and 2012. There are strong regional
differences in this annual rate, with extent increasing in some regions and
decreasing in others.

Permafrost temperatures have increased in most regions since the early

1908s, up to 3oC in parts of Northern Alaska and up to 2oC in Russian
European North.

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Sea level rise

As a result of ocean warming (expansion) and the melting of polar

region ice sheets, the global mean sea level has increased by 0.19 m
over the period 1901 to 2010, and the rate of sea level increase has
accelerated between 1993 and 2010. Sea levels will continue to
increase by 0.40 m (RCP2.6) to 0.83 m (RCP8.5) by 2081-2100.

The rate of sea level since the mid-19th century (1850) has been
greater than during the last 2 000 years. Between 1971 and 2010 the
mean sea level (msl) rose by 2.0 mm per year; between 1993 and
2010 it rose at a rate of 3.2 mm per year.

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Changes in the carbon and other biogeochemical cycles

The atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and

nitrous oxide have increased to levels unprecedented in at least the
last 800,000 years. Carbon dioxide concentrations have increased by
40% since pre-industrial times, primarily from fossil fuel emissions
and secondarily from net land use change emissions. The ocean has
absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon dioxide,
causing ocean acidification.

Ocean acidification is quantified by decreases in pH. The pH of ocean

surface water has decreased by 0.1 since the beginning of the
industrial era, corresponding to a 26% increase in hydrogen ion
concentration.

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LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND
METHODS
Increasing frequency of extreme weather and climate events

In addition to an overall increase in global temperatures,

observations show that global warming has resulted in warmer and/
or fewer cold days and nights over most land areas; warmer and/or
more frequent hot days and nights over most land areas; warm
spells/heat waves frequency and/or duration increases over most
land areas (but particularly in large parts of Europe, Asia and
Australia); increase in the frequency, intensity, and/or amount of
heavy precipitation; increases in intensity and/or duration of drought
and increased incidence and/or magnitude of extreme high sea level.

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
a. The earths energy balance

Global warming, the increase of the earths average temperature,

particularly over the last 65 years (since 1950), is due to the impact
of human activities on the earths energy balance. Global warming is
causing the earths climate to change.

The earths atmosphere is mainly transparent to the short wave

radiation from the sun, transmitting about 70-75% of incoming
radiation and absorbing 25%-30%, but only 15%-30% of the longer
wavelength radiation from the earth is transmitted with 70%-85%
absorbed by the atmosphere, illustrated in Figure 7.

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
The greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, halocarbons and
nitrous oxide), absorb the radiation from the earth, and increasing
the concentrations of these gases in the atmosphere increases the
amount of energy absorbed by the earth.

The earths energy budget is summarized in Figure 8.

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Figure 8: The earth's energy budget

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
The relative contributions of the various factors that contribute to the
disturbance in the earths energy balance (radiative forcing, usually expressed as
W/ m2) are, as at 2011, as follows.

Note a positive value means the factor has a warming tendency, a negative
factor, a cooling tendency.

Total net anthropogenic radiative forcing relative to 1750: 2.29 W/ m2.

CO2, Ch4, N2O, O3 and halocarbons (the well-mixed gases): 3.00 W/ m2;
CO2 alone (73% of net radiative forcing) 1.68 W/ m2;
CO2 plus other carbon containing gases 1.82 W/ m2;
CH4 alone, including its effects on ozone and
stratospheric changes on water vapour 0.97 W/ m2;
Ozone depleting halocarbons alone, net 0.18 W/ m2
CO, NMVOC, NOx (net RF) -0.18 W/ m2
Aerosols and precursors (mineral dust, SO2,
NH3, organic carbon and black carbon) including cloud
adjustments due to aerosols -0.90 W/ m2,
Albedo (reflectance) change due to land use changes -0.15 W/ m2.
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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Non-anthropogenic (natural) radiative forcing: volcanic aerosols, -
0.11 W/ m2; changes in solar irradiance: -0.04 W/ m2
(Intergovernmental Panel on climate change (IPCC), 2013).

The role and sources of the forcing agents will be discussed in the
next sections.

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
b. Atmospheric emissions, air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions

Emissions of the well mixed greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane,

nitrous oxide and halocarbons

The atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide

(CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), have all increased since 1750
due to human activity. In 2011 the concentrations of these greenhouse gases
were 391 ppm, 1803 ppb, and 324 ppb respectively, and exceeded the pre-
industrial levels by about 40%, 150%, and 20%, respectively. By mid-2014 the
CO2 concentration in the atmosphere reached 400 ppm.

The concentrations of CO2, CH4, and N2O, now substantially exceed the
highest concentrations recorded in ice cores during the past 800,000 years.
The mean rates of increase in atmospheric concentrations over the past
century are unprecedented in the last 22,000 years.

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement
production were 8.3 GtC (30.4 Gt CO2) per year averaged over 2002
2011 and were 9.5 GtC (34.8 GtCO2) per year in 2011, 54% above the
1990 level. CO2 values are either expressed as carbon or as CO2; 1 t
C is equivalent to 3.67 t CO2.

Annual net CO2 emissions from anthropogenic land use change were
0.9 GtC (3.3 GtCO2) per year on average during 2002 to 2011.

However, once released CO2 persists in the atmosphere for hundreds

to thousands of years. So does its global warming effect. The
important factor is therefore the cumulative sum of CO2 emissions.

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
From 1750 to 2011, CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and
cement production have released 375 GtC (1375 tCO2) into the
atmosphere, while deforestation and other land use change are
estimated to have released 180 GtC (660 tCO2.). This resulted in
cumulative anthropogenic emissions of 555 GtC (2035 tCO2). 1 Gt = 1
gigatonne = 1 billion tonnes = 1x109 tonnes; 1 t C equivalent to 3.67 t
CO2.

Of these cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions, 240 GtC (880

GtCO2), have accumulated in the atmosphere, 155 GtC (568 tCO2),
have been taken up by the ocean and 160 GtC (587 tCO2), have
accumulated in natural terrestrial ecosystems (i.e., the cumulative
residual land sink).

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
CO2 emissions and sources

CO2 emissions are the largest factor (driver) in global warming, with a
radiative forcing of 1.68 W/m2.

The combustion of fossil fuels, coal for power generation and liquid
hydrocarbons (petrol and diesel) for road transport, and cement production
(Figure 9), are the major sources of CO2 emissions globally.

Global CO2 emissions reached a new high of 35.3 billion tonnes (Gt) CO2 in
2013 (Oliver et al., 2014). Figure 10 shows global CO2 emissions by region in
2013. Due to the comparatively rapid growth of China and other developing
countries over the last 10-15 years, combined with the continued reliance on
fossil fuels for power and transport, their proportion of total CO2 emissions
has increased substantially.

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Figure 9: CO2 emissions from fossil fuel production, Figure 10: Global CO2 emissions by region from fossil fuel use
1870 to 2010 (Source: IEA. CO2 emissions from fuel and cement production
combustion 2014)

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Methane (CH4) emissions and sources

CH4 emissions are the second largest factor (driver) in Global

Warming, with a radiative forcing of +0.97 W/m2. The concentration
of CH4 has increased by a factor of 2.5 since pre-industrial times,
from 722 ppb (0.722 ppm), in 1750 to 1803 ppb (1.833 ppm), in 2011
(AR5: Technical Summary. P52.).

Anthropogenic (human origin) emissions from the rapidly increasing

number of cattle, the extraction of natural gas (including fracking),
and emissions from rice paddy agriculture and from landfills and
waste, account for 50-65% of total methane emissions.

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) emissions

Since pre-industrial times, the concentration of N2O in the

atmosphere has increased by a factor of 1.2. Changes in the nitrogen
cycle, in addition to interactions with CO2 sources and sinks, affect
emissions of N2O both on land and from the ocean.

Globally, about 40% of total N2O emissions come from human

activities. Nitrous oxide is emitted from agriculture, transportation,
and industry activities. In agriculture, nitrous oxide is emitted when
nitrogenous synthetic fertilizers are used. Nitrous oxide is also
emitted during the breakdown of nitrogen in livestock manure and
urine. In transportation, nitrous oxide is emitted when transportation
fuels are burned in passenger cars and trucks.

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Industrially, nitrous oxide is generated as a by-product during the
production of nitric acid, which is used to make synthetic commercial
fertilizer, and in the production of adipic acid, which is used to make
fibers, like nylon, and other synthetic products (United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 2015).

Historical data show that there has been a rapid increase in the
concentrations of three climate-forcing greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4
and N2O), since the start of the industrial revolution (around 1750),
and an even more rapid increase over the last few decades (United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 2015).

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Halocarbons

Halocarbons are hydrocarbon molecules containing one or more halogen

(chlorine, bromine, fluorine or iodine) atoms. Many of the halocarbons have
high or extremely high Global Warming Potentials (GWP) or potency relative
to CO2 over a given period, up to 23900 for silicon hexafluoride.

Manufactured halocarbons include compounds used as transformer oils

(now discontinued), as refrigerants, as fire retardants and as solvents. Due to
their ozone destroying properties the manufacture of some halocarbons has
stopped or has been restricted under the Montreal protocol but the
manufacture and consequent release into the atmosphere of others
continues.

Although the concentrations of halocarbons are relatively low compared to

methane (GWP=25), or nitrous oxide (GWP=298), their radiative forcing
impact is significant due to their high GWP values, Figure 11.

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Figure 11: Emissions of carbon dioxide equivalents of CO2, CH4, N2O and halocarbons: 1990 to 2010
(Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2015)

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Deforestation, changes in land use

Land use change such as deforestation is thought to increase the

surface albedo (i.e. the fraction of incoming ration that is reflected
rather than absorbed), that is deforestation is thought to have
negative forcing (-0.15 W/m2). However, there is uncertainty
whether the sign is negative or positive compared to the pre-
industrial era.

Deforestation also has the effect of reducing the absorption of CO2.

Annual net CO2 emissions from anthropogenic land use change were
0.9 GtC (3.3 GtCO2) per year on average during 2002 to 2011.

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Carbon emissions by country, per capita, by sector, etc. as well as production
and consumption

A countrys contribution to global warming may be assessed by examining its

total emissions of CO2, its emissions per capita, or its emission per unit of
GDP (Gross Domestic Product), Table 1, 2012 data.

The GDP figures are measured in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP),
which attempts to remove currency exchange rate differences.

Note that South Africa ranks 3rd, after the Ukraine and the Russian
Federation, in terms of the right-hand column of CO2 emissions per unit of
GDP, due to its reliance on coal for electricity production and fossil fuels for
road transportation.

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE

Table 1: Intensity of CO2 emissions, world and selected regions and countries: 2012 data

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Since carbon dioxide persists for several hundred to thousands of
years, the current CO2 concentrations in the biosphere are the result
of the historical accumulation of CO2 emissions since the start of the
industrial era.

Ranking cumulative emissions by country provides an indication of

the historic contribution of each country or region to climate change,
(see Figure 12).

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Figure 12: Cumulative CO2 emissions as a percentage by country (1990-2011) (Source WRI)
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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
If the accumulated CO2 emissions are calculated on a per person basis, the
contribution of low income countries is much lower than that of high income
countries. That is, high income industrialised countries bear a far greater
share of the historical responsibility for climate change.

Cumulative emissions from pre-industrial (1750-2013) have reached 580

75 GtC. This is an update to the IPCC 1750-2011 estimate of 555 [470 - 640]
GtC to include 2012-2013 emissions and a revision of early 20th century land
use emissions. The IPCC estimates that with cumulative emissions of 1000
GtC, there is a two-thirds chance of staying below 2C warming relative to
pre-industrial temperatures. Keeping warming below two degrees requires
total CO2 emissions to remain below this target. At current levels we are over
half way towards this figure. If other non-CO2 gases are included, the
emissions budget is substantially reduced. (Global Carbon Budget, 2014).

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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
The 1000 GtC ceiling is equivalent to 3 670 Gt CO2. As we have seen
in the Energy Module, world CO2 emissions are dominated by the
fossil fuel burning energy and transport sectors.

South Africas CO2 emissions by sector reflect the same pattern,

Figure 13, with electricity production responsible for 60.7% of total
emissions, road transportation 8.1%, and the coal-to-liquids process
for producing transportation fuels 5.0%.

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Figure 13: South Africa's greenhouse gas emissions by sector, 2010. Data: GHG emission inventory, 2010
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LECTURE 2: THE CAUSES, DRIVERS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Energy efficiency improvements can be made across all sectors of the
economy, but South Africas greenhouse gas emissions cannot be
reduced to the extent required without a rapid transition away from
its dependence on fossil fuels for power generation and road
transportation.

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LECTURE 3: CURRENT AND FUTURE LIKELY
IMPACTS (IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITY)
a. Water resources

Changes in the global water cycle in response to the warming over

the 21st century will not be uniform.

The contrast in precipitation between wet and dry regions and

between wet and dry seasons will increase, although there may be
regional exceptions, (see Figure 14).

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Figure 14: Changes in average precipitation due to climate change, to 2005 and future (Source AR5 SPM Final)

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LECTURE 3: CURRENT AND FUTURE LIKELY
IMPACTS (IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITY)
The high latitudes and the equatorial Pacific Ocean are likely to experience
an increase in annual mean precipitation by the end of this century under the
RCP8.5 [continuing high greenhouse gas emissions] scenario. In many mid-
latitude and subtropical dry regions, mean precipitation will likely decrease,
while in many mid-latitude wet regions, mean precipitation will likely
increase by the end of this century under the RCP8.5 scenario.

Extreme precipitation events over most of the mid-latitude land masses and
over wet tropical regions will very likely become more intense and more
frequent by the end of this century, as global mean surface temperature
increases.

Globally, it is likely that the area encompassed by monsoon systems will

increase over the 21st century. While monsoon winds are likely to weaken,
monsoon precipitation is likely to intensify due to the increase in atmospheric
moisture. Monsoon onset dates are likely to become earlier or not to change
much. Monsoon retreat dates will likely be delayed, resulting in lengthening
of the monsoon season in many regions. (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), 2013).

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LECTURE 3: CURRENT AND FUTURE LIKELY
IMPACTS (IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITY)
Note that average rainfall in large areas of the planet including parts
of Southern Africa has already decreased by 10 to 20%, a trend likely
to continue over the next few decades.

Lower rainfall combined with increasing temperatures is likely to

impact on the availability of water resources and viability of current
agriculture in the region.

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LECTURE 3: CURRENT AND FUTURE LIKELY
IMPACTS (IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITY)
b. Food security and food sovereignty

The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (UN FAO),

defines food security in terms of secure individual access to sufficient
food. It is separated from the context where that food is produced or
how it is produced, the marginalization and impoverishment of
subsistence and small scale food producers through the dominance
of world food production and distribution by a small number of
multinational food companies.

The WHO similarly defines food security: when all people at all
times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a
healthy and active life. As at 2014 there are 790 million people who
do not have a secure source of food by this definition.

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LECTURE 3: CURRENT AND FUTURE LIKELY
IMPACTS (IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITY)
The concept of food sovereignty on the other hand is defined in the
context that allows communities control over the way food is
produced, traded and consumed. It could create a food system that is
designed to help people and the environment rather than make
profits for multinational corporations. The food sovereignty
movement is a global alliance of farmers, growers, consumers and
activists. (globaljustice.org.uk)

Although global statistics are not available, a much larger number of

people do not have food sovereignty in the sense of having both
access to food and control over the food production process.

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LECTURE 3: CURRENT AND FUTURE LIKELY
IMPACTS (IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITY)
The UNFCCC factsheet assessed the likely impact of climate change
on agriculture and food security as follows:

Degrading soils and water resources will place enormous strains on achieving
food security for growing populations. These conditions may be worsened by
climate change.

The impact on crop yields and productivity will vary considerably. Added heat
stress, shifting monsoons, and drier soils may reduce yields by as much as a
third in the tropics and subtropics, where crops are already near their
maximum heat tolerance. Mid-continental areas such as the US grain belt,
vast sections of mid-latitude Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Australia
are all expected to experience drier and hotter conditions. Meanwhile,
longer growing seasons and increased rains may boost yields in many
temperate regions; records show that the season has already lengthened in
the UK, Scandinavia, Europe and North America.

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LECTURE 3: CURRENT AND FUTURE LIKELY
IMPACTS (IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITY)
Higher temperatures will influence production patterns. Plant growth and
health may benefit from fewer freezes and chills, but some crops may be
damaged by higher temperatures, particularly if combined with water
shortages. Certain weeds may expand their range into higher-latitude
habitats. There is also some evidence that the poleward expansion of insects
and plant diseases will add to the risk of crop losses.

Soil moisture will be affected by changing precipitation patterns. Based on a

global warming of 1.4 5.8oC over the next 100 years, climate models project
that both evaporation and precipitation will increase, as will the frequency of
intense rainfalls. While some regions may become wetter, in others the net
effect of an intensified hydrological cycle will be a loss of soil moisture and
increased erosion. Some regions that are already drought-prone may suffer
longer and more severe dry spells. The models also project seasonal shifts in
precipitation patterns: soil moisture will decline in some mid-latitude
continental regions during the summer, while rain and snow will probably
increase at high latitudes during the winter.

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More carbon dioxide in the atmosphere could boost productivity. These
positive effects could be reduced, however, by accompanying changes in
temperature, precipitation, pests, and the availability of nutrients.

The productivity of rangelands and pastures would also be affected. For

example, livestock would become costlier if agricultural disruption leads to
higher grain prices. In general, it seems that intensively managed livestock
systems will more easily adapt to climate change than will crop systems. This
may not be the case for pastoral systems, however, where communities tend
to adopt new methods and technologies more slowly and where livestock
depend more fully on the productivity and quality of the rangelands, which
may become degraded.

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Food security risks are primarily local and national. Studies suggest that
global agricultural production could be maintained relative to the expected
baseline levels over the next 100 years with moderate climate change (below
a 2C warming). However, regional effects would vary widely, and some
countries may experience reduced output even if they take measures to
adapt. This conclusion takes into account the beneficial effects of
CO2 fertilization but not other possible effects of climate change, including
changes in agricultural pests and soils.

The most vulnerable people are the landless, poor, and isolated. Poor terms
of trade, weak infrastructure, lack of access to technology and information,
and armed conflict will make it more difficult for these people to cope with
the agricultural consequences of climate change. Many of the world's poorest
areas, dependent on isolated agricultural systems in semi-arid and arid
regions, face the greatest risk. Many of these at-risk populations live in sub-
Saharan Africa; South, East and Southeast Asia; tropical areas of Latin
America; and some Pacific island nations.

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The negative effects of climate change can be limited by changes in
crops and crop varieties, improved water-management and irrigation
systems, adapted planting schedules and tillage practices, and better
watershed management and land-use planning. In addition to
addressing the physiological response of plants and animals, policies
can seek to improve how production and distribution systems cope
with fluctuations in yields.

Subsistence farmers and small scale farmers are considerably more

vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and have limited
capacity to adapt in response to changing conditions.

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c. Ecosystems and biodiversity

According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), 2010, factsheets:

Climate change can have broad effects on biodiversity (the

number and variety of plant and animal species in a particular
location). Although species have adapted to environmental
change for millions of years, a quickly changing climate could
require adaptation on larger and faster scales than in the past.
Those species that cannot adapt are at risk of extinction. Even the
loss of a single species can have cascading effects as organisms are
connected through food webs and other interactions.

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The oceans and the atmosphere are constantly interacting -
exchanging heat, water, gases, and particles. As the atmosphere
warms, the ocean absorbs some of this heat. The amount of heat
stored by the ocean, affects the temperature of the ocean both at
the surface and at great depths. Warming of the earths oceans
can affect and change the habitat and food supplies for many
kinds of marine life, from plankton to polar bears. The oceans also
absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Once it dissolves in
the ocean, carbon dioxide reacts with sea water to form carbonic
acid. An increasingly acidic ocean can have negative effects on
marine life, such as coral reefs.

Although some forests may derive near-term benefits from an

extended growing season, climate change is also expected to
encourage wildfires by extending the length of the summer fire
season.

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IMPACTS (IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITY)
Longer periods of hot weather could stress trees, and make them
more susceptible to wildfires, insect damage, and disease. Climate
change has likely already increased the size and number of forest
fires, insect outbreaks, and tree deaths, particularly in Alaska and
the West. The area burned in western U.S. forests from 1987 to
2003 is almost seven times larger than the area burned from 1970
to 1986. In the last 30 years, the length of the wildfire season in
the West has increased by 78 days.

As temperature, precipitation, and other conditions change, the

species best suited to the new conditions will thrive, often taking
food and resources away from others. Some of the species that
thrive might be invasive (not native to a region), and could
gradually drive out or even kill native species.

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The timing of many natural events, such as flower blooms and animal
migrations, is linked to climate factors such as temperature, moisture
availability, and amount of daylight.

Changes in weather patterns and extreme events associated with

climate change can disrupt these natural patterns. These disruptions,
in turn, can affect seasonal behaviour and interactions among
species.

For example, if birds migrate and lay eggs too early, hatchlings might
not have an adequate food supply. While some animals and plants
will successfully adjust life-cycle patterns to changing weather
pattern cues, others might not be so successful.

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d. Settlements and human society

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC), 1995, climate change will occur against a background of
other non-climate environmental factors and socioeconomic
factors that could either exacerbate or mitigate the effects of
climate change.

Impacts on human settlements from climate change may be

indirect, as well as direct. Direct effects of sea-level rise and
extreme events are important in coastal zones and island nations.
However, many of the impacts on human settlements from
climate change are likely to be experienced indirectly through
effects on other sectors, for example, changes in water supply,
agricultural productivity, and human migration.

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Thresholds beyond which impacts escalate quickly are unique to
individual local situations and tend to depend on the degree of
adaptive response.

The human settlements most vulnerable to climate change are likely

to be in locations already stressed by high rates of population
growth, urbanization, and environmental degradation.

However, in addition to islands, coastal communities, and

communities dependent on marginal rain-fed agriculture or
commercial fishing discussed in the previous reports, vulnerable
settlements include large primary coastal cities and especially
squatter settlements located in flood plains and on steep hillsides.

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A significant potential for non-coastal flooding (river basin and local
urban flooding), is expected if precipitation intensity increases in
certain as a result of climate change.

Many of the expected impacts in the developing world will occur

because climate change may accelerate rural-to-urban migration by
reducing natural resource productivity in rural areas, exacerbating
already crowded conditions in the cities and further depleting the
labour force of the countryside.

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Nearly 45% of the worlds people live in coastal areas, mostly in large
cities. Even in the most developed countries, storms are already
devastating coastal cities, often affecting the most vulnerable.

Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy cost the United States $149 billion, 50%
more than the world is committed to spending on climate financing
in developing countries.

The impact on coastal cities in developing countries will be greater,

even as the resources available to fix the problems are fewer (United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2014).

Many more people live in inland cities located on rivers.

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e. Human health

In 2009 The Lancet (www.lancet.com) called for a Commission on Climate

Change, calling it the biggest global health threat of the 21st Century, and
called for a global response.

Climate change and health

Climate change and its rapid emergence in the past decades, are a major
challenge to public health together with poverty, inequity, and infectious and
non-communicable diseases. Furthermore, the poorest countries will suffer
the greatest consequences of climate change even though they contributed
the least emissions.

Climate change has been responsible for 5.5 million disability adjusted life
years (DALYs) lost in 2000.

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The Lancet emphasised the likely adverse impact of climate change on the social
determinants of health:

The damage done to the environment by modern society is perhaps one of the
most inequitable health risks of our time. The carbon footprint of the poorest 1
billion people is around 3% of the worlds total footprint; yet, these communities
are affected the most by climate change... Adverse health outcomes are likely to
be greatest in low-income countries and in poor people living in urban areas,
elderly people, children, traditional societies, subsistence farmers, and coastal
populations. Loss of healthy life years as a result of global environmental change
(including climate change) is predicted to be 500 times greater in poor African
populations than in European populations. The observed variation is due to
several factors: regional variation in predicted rates and types of climatic change;
differing underlying vulnerabilities (such as existing levels of heat and food stress,
and exposure to disease vectors); and differing capacities to adapt to changing
conditions (related to governance and resources nationally and individual
incomes). These differences in the effects of climate change are due to existing
economic, social, and heath inequities.

Accordingly, we consider six ways that link climate change to health. These are
changing patterns of disease and mortality, extreme events, food, water, shelter,
and population.
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The Lancet also suggested a number of ways to respond to mitigate
the impacts of climate change on health:

Food

Climate change threatens human health through its effect on undernutrition

and food insecurity. Chronic and acute child malnutrition, low birthweights,
and suboptimal breastfeeding are estimated to cause the deaths of 3.5
million mothers and young children every year. Furthermore, one in three
children under the age of 5 years born in developing countries suffer from
stunting due to chronic undernutrition. .. Climate change will compound
existing food insecurity.

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Deaths due to undernutrition are set to worsen as climate change affects
crops, forestry, livestock, fisheries, aquaculture, and water systems. Increases
in extreme weather events will damage crops and disrupt farming. Sea level
rise and flooding of coastal lands will lead to salination or contamination of
fresh water and agricultural lands, and the loss of nursery areas for fishing.
Drought, and changing patterns of plant and livestock diseases and pest
infestations, reduction of income from animal production, decreased crop
yields, lessened forest productivity, and changes in aquatic populations will
all affect food production and security.

Water and sanitation

Safe and reliable access to clean water and good sanitary conditions are
essential for good health.

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The main health effects of lack of access to clean water and sanitation are
diarrhoeal and other diseases caused by biological or chemical contaminants.
Poor drainage in human settlements increases exposure to contaminated
water and provides habitat for mosquitoes, leading to increased incidence of
water-borne and vector-borne diseases... Changing rainfall and temperature
over the next decades are likely to make provision of clean water, good
sanitation, and drainage even more complicated than it is now... Regional
temporal patterns of rainfall might also be altered: the problem is not simply
sustained drought, but also severe rainfall all at once followed by less rainfall,
thus annual rainfall might rise, but still cause drought.

More than a sixth of the worlds population currently live in glacial-fed water
catchments, which are vulnerable to climate change. Increasing rates of
glacial melting are predicted to lead to great reductions of water availability.
In the near future, high peak flows in glacial-fed rivers are expected, as the
rate of glacier-mass loss increases, followed by dramatic reductions in river
flow and freshwater availability as glaciers progressively disappear.

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Shelter and human settlements

The management of health effects of climate change related to shelter and

human settlements requires not only secure emergency shelter for those
displaced or affected by climate variability events, but also human
settlements prepared for the future climate-changed environment.

Extreme events

Major disasters caused by extreme natural events and health are directly
linked, especially in relation to weather-related disasters, which can be
expected to increase in number and severity in a warmer planet.

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Associated health problems can arise from the loss or contamination of
potable water leading to disease, destruction of crops resulting in food
shortages, poor nutrition, and malnutrition. Health problems are
compounded by general infrastructure breakdown, notably with respect to
water supply, sanitation, and drainage.

Population and migration

Population growth will interface with climate change in ways that intensify
several other mechanisms, especially shelter, food, and water scarcity.
Population growth also puts additional stress on already weak health systems
and exacerbates vulnerability to the adverse health effects of climate change.
Independent of population growth, large-scale population movement is likely
to intensify as changing climate leads to the abandonment of flooded or arid
and inhospitable environments.

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a. International: The Framework Convention, country responses

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) is one of three conventions adopted at the Rio earth
summit of 1992, along with the UN Convention on Biological
Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification.

The ultimate objective of the Convention is to stabilize

greenhouse gas concentrations "at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the
climate system." It states that "such a level should be achieved
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner."

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The developed industrialized countries (Annex I countries in the
Convention), since they were overwhelmingly responsible for
historic greenhouse gas emissions, committed themselves to
reduce their emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.

Industrialized nations agree under the Convention to support

climate change activities in developing countries (to meet the
agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in
complying with their obligations), by providing financial support
for action on climate change above and beyond any financial
assistance they already provide to these countries. Industrialized
countries also agree to share technology with less-advanced
nations.

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Industrialized countries (Annex I) have to report regularly on their
climate change policies and measures, including issues governed by the
Kyoto Protocol (for countries which have ratified it). They must also
submit an annual inventory of their greenhouse gas emissions, including
data for their base year (1990) and all the years since.

Developing countries (Non-Annex I Parties) report in more general terms

on their actions both to address climate change and to adapt to its
impacts - but less regularly than Annex I Parties do, and their reporting is
contingent on their getting funding for the preparation of the reports,
particularly in the case of the Least Developed Countries.

The Convention acknowledges the vulnerability of all countries to the

effects of climate change and calls for special efforts to ease the
consequences, especially in developing countries which lack the
resources to do so on their own.

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The Kyoto protocol

The UNFCCC does not include specific emission reduction targets.

The Kyoto Protocol (KP) was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11
December 1997. It included emission targets but only entered into
force on 16 February 2005 when the hurdle rate of countries
responsible for 55% of the global total was achieved when the
Russian Federation ratified the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol
legally binds developed countries to emission reduction targets.
The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol but has thus far
refused to ratify it, meaning that it is not bound by emission
targets. In 2012 Canada withdrew from the KP. The Protocols first
commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. The
second commitment period began on 1 January 2013 and will end
in 2020.
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The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have failed to curb the growth in
global CO2 emissions, which grew by an average of 1.9% per year in
the period 1990 to 2012. The provision of financial assistance and
transfer of technology to non-Annex I countries (developing
countries) has consistently been less than required. Transnational
companies based in the industrialised countries have transferred
large energy and emission intensive industries to developing
countries, in many instances without transferring the most energy
efficient but more costly technology in the process.

Consequently, although Annex I country emissions have reportedly

more or less stabilized at 1990 levels (when international carbon
credits and sinks are allowed for), global CO2 emissions have
continued to rise, from 21.0 GtCO2 in 1990 to 31.7 GtCO2 in 2012, an
overall increase of 51.3%, (see Figure 15).

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Figure 15: CO2 emissions in terms of the Kyoto Protocol, 1990 to 2012. (Source: IEA. CO 2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 2014)
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Over the 1990 to 2012 period the performance of individual
countries against target is very uneven, (see Table 2).

Table 2: Selected country and region CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and Kyoto Protocol targets

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As already noted, the United States did not ratify the Protocol and
Canada withdrew in 2012.

The Department of Environment (DoE) has published a White Paper

setting out its views on meeting its international responsibilities in
relation to climate change. It proposes to manage its emissions, using a
carbon budget approach, to peak between 2020 and 2025, to plateau
(remain more or less at peak levels) for 10 years (until 2030 to 2035)
then decline by 2050. While the best case (from the perspective of
minimizing climate impacts), envisages emissions peaking at 398
GtCO2eq. before declining to 212 GtCO2eq., this scenario is already
impossible as current emissions are about 550 GtCO2eq. The Upper
Limit case envisages emissions peaking at 614 GtCO2eq. and then
declining to 428 GtCO2eq. by 2050. Government has not set out a plan to
achieve its emission trajectory. Although it has announced an expanded
renewables energy procurement program, it has simultaneously new
coal plants in its IPP program in addition to the large Medupi and Kusile
coal power plants under construction.

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b. Corporate and country vested interests in consumption patterns

The coal and oil industries globally account for nearly all CO2 emissions, the
major driver of climate change.

Oil production, refining and marketing is dominated by a relatively small

number of very large transnational corporations and state-owned
companies, with combined annual sales of trillions of (US) dollars.

The global coal industry, although more nationally based than transnational,
is similarly large. In countries such as the US, Australia and South Africa, the
dominance of coal-based power and linkages between the industry and
government, enables the coal industry to have a powerful lobby to influence
government policy.

The fossil fuel-based motor industry is similarly dominated by a handful of

very large corporations.

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All these three major industries have a vested interest in the prolonged
continuation of their industries in their current form. The oil and coal industries
view their fossil fuel reserves (unexploited oil and coal), as massive assets which
can only be monetized through extraction and sale.

Global coal reserves are estimated at about 1 trillion tons, sufficient for about
110 years of consumption at current rates; global oil reserves are about 1700
billion barrels (239.8 billion tons), sufficient for about 53 years of consumption at
current rates (BPWES, 2014). These reserves at current prices are valued at
trillions of dollars; the global oil and gas industry alone has annual revenues of
about $4 trillion.

If the worlds reserves of coal, oil and natural gas are burnt the emissions of CO2
will result in dangerous if not catastrophic climate change. If the world is to
avoid dangerous climate change the fossil fuel industry has to be phased out
within the next few decades to ensure that the worlds carbon budget, the
cumulative sum of CO2 emissions, does not exceed 1000 GtC (3670 GtCO2).
Between the start of the industrial revolution in 1750 through to the end of 2014
about 1480 GtCO2 have been emitted, nearly half of the carbon budget, with
about half of that amount released over the last 30 years.

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Eliminating the worlds dependence on fossil fuels for energy would
dramatically reduce the value of these reserves. Conversely, if the world
does not reduce its dependence on fossil fuel energy, the value of the
remaining reserves will dramatically escalate as these reserves diminish over
the next few decades. This provides a powerful financial incentive for these
industries to maintain the status quo.

For decades the oil and coal industries have been promoting a campaign to
deny the link between their products and climate change, and
simultaneously to resist any national or international policy that will curtail
dependence on coal and oil. The oil industry in particular has a strong
lobbying presence at all major UNFCCC meetings such as at the COPs. Recent
reports have revealed that the oil industrys American Petroleum Institute
(API), as well as coal industry groups and individual oil companies, used a
range of approaches to undermine the science that shows the link between
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, to sow doubt in the public
mind (Hansen, 2012) (Mulvey and Shulman et al., 2015). Tactics included
secretly funding NGOs to propagate the industries views and publically
attacking and vilifying scientists advocating action to reduce dependency on
fossil fuels.

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Union of Concerned Scientists (Mulvey and Hulman et al.,
2015):

Internal documents from the major fossil fuel companiesincluding BP,

Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Peabody Energy, and Shellreveal an
irrefutable story: for nearly three decades, as the scientific evidence
concerning climate change became overwhelmingly clear, these companies
and their allies developed or participated in campaigns to deliberately sow
confusion and block action to address global warming.

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c. Adaptation vs reducing carbon emission and other drivers of climate
change

Mitigation means taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,

and to stop or curtail activities such as deforestation which destroy
carbon sinks.

Adaptation means taking action to minimize the impacts of inevitable

climate change such as setting up disaster relief infrastructure to cope
with the increasing frequency of natural disaster, anticipating the effects
of changing temperatures and rainfall patterns on agriculture and
anticipation of flooding of low lying habitats.

The IPPC has provided a framework document for addressing the issues
of impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), 2014).

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Governments have generally been more comfortable setting
aside funds to deal with adaptation but have placed less
emphasis on effective action to curb greenhouse gas
emissions because it entails confronting the powerful fossil
fuels industries.

South Africa, under the auspices of the Department of the

Environment, has initiated an extensive Long Term
Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) scenario planning process to
firstly identify possible or likely future impacts of climate
change and to identify and develop adaption strategies in
anticipation of these impacts. It has also initiated a Long
Term Adaptation (LTAS) scenario planning process.

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d. Industrial/Sectoral and National responses

In spite of international and national commitments to

address climate changing fossil fuel emissions, the fossil fuel
industries continue to receive massive government
subsidies.

A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2015), study

showed that the global energy industry receive massive ($5
trillion) subsidies, including externalised pollution costs. This
study was published ahead of the next UNFCCC COP in Paris
in December 2015.

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Some of the key issues:

The issue of energy subsidy reform remains high on the international policy
agenda, reflecting the need for countries to pledge carbon reductions ahead
of the Paris 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, ..

Energy subsidies damage the environment, causing more premature deaths

through local air pollution, exacerbating congestion and other adverse side
effects of vehicle use, and increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations.

Energy subsidies discourage needed investments in energy efficiency,

renewables, and energy infrastructure, and increase the vulnerability of
countries to volatile international energy prices.

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The key findings of the study are the following:
Post-tax energy subsidies are dramatically higher than previously estimated
$4.9 trillion (6.5 percent of global GDP) in 2013, and projected to reach $5.3
trillion (6.5 percent of global GDP) in 2015.

Post-tax subsidies are large and pervasive in both advanced and developing
economies and among oil-producing and non-oil-producing countries alike. But
these subsidies are especially large (about 1318 percent) relative to GDP in
Emerging and Developing Asia...

Most energy subsidies arise from the failure to adequately charge for the cost of
domestic environmental damageonly about one-quarter of the total is from
climate changeso unilateral reform of energy subsidies is mostly in countries
own interests, although global coordination could strengthen such efforts

The most dramatic difference, compared with the pre-tax figures, is for coal which
is the biggest source of post-tax subsidies, amounting to 3.0 percent of global
GDP in 2011 and rising to 3.9 percent in 2015. The considerable size of coal
subsidies reflects the substantial undercharging for its environmental impacts
coal is the most carbon-intensive and air- pollution intensive energy product (per
unit of energy), yet no country really imposes meaningful taxes on coal use from
an environmental perspective.
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e. Cross-cutting issues

The role of the fossil fuel industries and the major industries that
directly use fossil fuels for energy the electricity and vehicle
industries, as the major causes of climate change is clear. But the
impacts of fossil fuels go beyond climate change.

Coal mining causes massive water and air pollution and land
degradation; the combustion of coal for power generation releases
vast quantities of the air pollutants sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides
and particulate matter, with the attendant health impacts of these
pollutants. Coal power generation uses scarce water resources and
produces ash dumps that further contaminates the land.

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Conventional oil production causes extensive land pollution,
especially in countries unable to effectively regulate the activities of
giant oil companies such as in Nigeria and Ecuador. The extraction of
oil off-shore marine contamination, and the process of extracting and
producing oil from tar-sands is not only carbon intensive but results
in extensive destruction of natural habitats and land degradation. The
more recent use of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) to extract natural
gas uses scarce water resources and contaminates groundwater. Oil
refineries are not only significant energy consumers but release
significant quantities of air pollutants. Fossil fuel powered vehicles
are the main sources of air pollution in urban areas.

Beyond the questions of clean energy, climate change will impact on

virtually all aspects of social and economic life including health,
habitats, food production, water and sanitation.
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ASSESSMENT

Assignment Question: Module 6: Climate Change and Air Pollution

In 2000 3000 words explore the current and future likely impacts and
vulnerabilities caused by climate change by looking at a specific
municipality within South Africa, as well as the current and possible
responses in terms of the municipality going forward.

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