Ledesma v CA
J. Panganiban
Sept 5, 1997
FACTS:
- A Complaint for Libel was filed against Dr. Ledesma before
the QC prosecutor
- An Information on libel was filed against Rhodora Ledesma
before the RTC Quezon City Branch 104, which read:
That on or about the 27th day of June 1991, in Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, acting with malice, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously send a letter
addressed to Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Director of Philippine Heart
Center, East Avenue, this city, and furnished the same to other
officers of the said hospital, said letter containing slanderous and
defamatory remarks against DR. JUAN F. TORRES, JR., which states
in part and other words of similar import, when in truth and in fact,
as the accused very well knew, the same are entirely false and
untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose
said DR. JUAN F. TORRES, JR. to public ridicule, thereby casting
dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of the said
offended party, to his damage and prejudice.
- A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City
Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the
Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended
by P.D. No. 911.
- Department of Justice granted the petition and directed the
prosecutor to move for the deferment of the arraignment
(Trial Court granted)
- Private complainant filed a Motion to lift Order, and to Set
the Case for Arraignment/Trial (Granted)
- Justice Secretary Drilon directed the Quezon City Prosecutor
to withdraw the Informations
- QC Prosecutors filed a Motion to Withdraw Information
(Denied)
- Petitioner filed an MR (Denied)
- Hence this petition
ISSUE and RULING
WON Respondent Court commit any reversible error in affirming
the trial courts denial of the prosecutions Motion to Withdraw
Information?
YES. Determination of Probable Cause for preliminary
investigation is an executive function, and therefore, the order of
the Justice Secretary to withdraw the information was an
exercise of executive power.
Two kinds of determination of P.C.
1. determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the
information: Prosecutor (Executive function)
2. an investigation for the determination of a probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest: Judge (judicial
function)
Crespo v Mogul: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal It is not prudent or even permissible for
a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally
initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence
relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction.
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to
the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative
Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over
said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or
modify their rulings.

Marcelo vs. CA: Crespo did not foreclose the power or authority
of the secretary of justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases. The Court recognized in Crespo
that the action of the investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the
preliminary investigation is subject to the approval of the
provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Thereafter, it
may be appealed to the secretary of justice.

Martinez v CA: the Court overruled the grant of the motion to

dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal upon the recommendation
of the secretary of justice because such grant was based upon
considerations other than the judges own assessment of the
matter.

Furthermore, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part

of the Justice Secretary in ordering the withdrawal of the
Information, since there was no probable cause as the subject
matter was privileged and that the complaint was merely a
countercharge.