Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc.

vs Jose Pao Aratuc vs Comelec

21 SCRA 895 Political Law Delegation of Control Power to the Executive G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979
Secretary
FACTS: Facts:
Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in respondent Comelec.A supervening panel headed by Comelec had conducted
Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an hearings of the complaints of the petitioner therein alleged irregularities in the
agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., election records. In order for the Commission to decide properly. It will have to
Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner. go deep into the examination of the voting records and registration records
and it will have to interview and getstatements from persons under oath from
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land.
the area to determine whether actual voting took place. The Comelec then
The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture
rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the final result
likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
of the canvass.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the
earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence Issue:
beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion
is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional Ruling:
duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
No.Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 the
ISSUE:
commission on elections shall have direct control and supervision over the
Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive board of canvassers. In administrative law, a superior body or office having
Secretary. supervision or control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed
to do or ought to have done. The petition is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit.
HELD:
Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional
powers in person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to the
Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate powers
which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The
reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform
in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office
of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The
rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional setup
the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any
order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the
Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President,
shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President.
In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land
to Pao cannot be reversed.
 Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. v. Enage,
G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987
Facts: The parties are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are
adjacent to each other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent
are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary. Reports of
encroachment by both parties on each others concessions triggered a survey
to establish the common boundary of the respective concession areas and
was held that the claim of Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to the
intentions of the Office granting the Timber License Agreement to Lianga Bay
Logging.
Ago Timber appealed to Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
set aside the appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled in favor
of Ago. Lianga Bay Logging elevated the case to office of President and ruling
of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. On Motion for Recon,
decision was reversed and reinstated decision of Director of Forestry.
For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence already
presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute
its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider
and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by
law.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere
with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear showing
that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they
have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may
amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

A civil action was instituted by Ago Timber to determine the correct boundary
line of license timber areas. TRO was set in place. Lianga brought the case to
SC on certiorari.

Issue: WON respondent court has jurisdiction over the administrative case

Held: Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by

respondent Ago, asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary
line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been
determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials under
whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs.

Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of

Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public
forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish,
and for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may

repeal or modify the decision of the Director of Forestry when advisable in the
public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of the
President.
 Gualberto De La Llana vs Manuel Alba
112 SCRA 294 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question if
there is no question of law involved BP 129
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed.
Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because,
first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of
the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the
constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the
courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the
Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed
by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is
empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law,
the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one
of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be
a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this
Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of
law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its
say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it
could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from
the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the
charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal
is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between
one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former
is to be preferred.
De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)
>
The issue in this case is whether or not B.P. 129, An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, is unconstitutional, considering that in the time-honored principle
protected and safeguarded by the constitution the judiciary is supposed to be
independent from legislative will. Does the reorganization violate the security
of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution?
HELD:
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.
What is really involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the
judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the
abolition of their offices.
It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent
is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. As well-settled as the rule that
the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent
is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good
faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise.
 U.S. v. Dorr
G.R. 1051 May 19, 1903
FACTS:
1. Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an offense of
writing, publishing and circulating scurrilous libel against the
Government of the U.S. and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands in violation of Section 8, Act 292 of the Commission.
2. The alleged libel was published in Manila Freedom issue dated 06 April
1902 as an editorial issue.
3. The editorial is about the appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to
important Government positions by the Civil Commission (CC for
brevity).
The following are part of the article:
the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a
protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail or deportedxxxthis
kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the Island, reinstating
insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during struggle, at
the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.
The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos
who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal
character.
it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the
Civil Commission are rotten and corruptxxx.
4. Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense
against it. However, albeit the article has a virulent attack against the
policy of the CC, the complaint in question cannot be regarded as having
a tendency to produce anything like what may be called disaffection or a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws.
5. There is a question as how the term the Insular Government of the Phil.
Islands, is used in Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as the existing law
and institutions of the Islands or the aggregate of the individuals by
whom the government of the Islands is administered?
ISSUE: Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation of the
Art. 292 for it directly attacks the U.S. government and the Insular Government
of the Phil. Island?
RULING:
1. In modern political science, the term government is defined as the
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rulesxxxthe government is the
aggregation of authorities which rule a society (administration).[1]
2. On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term government is
used in an abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the
existing political system, its laws and institutions. The Court opines that
it is in this sense that the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under
consideration.
3. Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of Insular of the Government of the Phil.
Islands is the government as a system, however, the article in questions
attacks the government as the aggregate of public officials who run it.
4. The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the
governmental system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is
enforced in these Islands per se. In this case, it is the character of men
who are entrusted with the administration of the government which the
writer wants to bring disrepute due to their motives, public integrity, and
private morals and wisdoms of their policy. The publication does not
constitute any seditious tendency being apparent to be in violation of Art.
292.
Respondents are acquitted.
[1] ADMINISTRATION the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins
of government are for the time being.
 G.R. No. L-10759 May 20, 1957
LEONARDO MONTES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS and THE SECRETARY OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents-appellees.
Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the
Floating Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public
Works. In Administrative Case No. R-8182 instituted against him for
negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk
because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care),
the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings
made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the
decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in not pumping the
water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his
last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion
of the appointing officer.
Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the
decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on
the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies
before he instituted the action. The case is now before us on appeal against
the order of dismissal.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 598, which provides:
The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority
to hear and decide all administrative cases brought before it on
appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised
or modified by the President of the Philippines.
It is urged on the appeal that there is no duty imposed on a party against whom
a decision has been rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal
to the President, and that the tendency of the courts has been not to subject
the decision of the President to judicial review. It is further argued that if
decisions of the Auditor General may be appealed to the courts, those of the
Civil Service Board of Appeals need not be acted upon by the President also,
before recourse may be had to the courts because such a courts. It is also
argued that if a case is appealed to the President, his action should be final
and not reviewable by the courts because such a course of action, would be
derogatory to the high office of the President.
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to
recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the
separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executive, the
legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and
duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is
not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and
subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not
because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above
the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case
of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be
viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the courts should be
governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all
administrative acts of all administrative officers.
The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an
administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be
sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-
581.) The doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and
convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative machinery,
this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to
give the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself
correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
(Ibid.)
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598 above-quoted is a clear expression
of the policy or principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the
President, under whom the Civil Service directly falls in our administrative
system as head of the executive department, may be able to grant the remedy
that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that
resort be made to him before recourse can be had to the courts. We have
applied this same rule in De la Paz, vs. Alcaraz, et al., 99 Phil., 130, 52 Off.
Gaz., 3037, Miguel et al., vs. Reyes, et al., 93 Phil., 542, and especially in Ang
Tuan Kai & Co. vs. The Import Control Commission, 91 Phil., 143, and we are
loathe to deviate from the rule we have consistently followed, especially in view
of the express provision of the law (section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 598).
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
 Leonardo Montes vs. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, et.al. The above-mentioned provision is a clear expression of the policy or principle
G.R. No. L-10759 20 May 1957 of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the President, under whom the
Civil Service directly falls in our administrative system as head of the executive
TOPIC: Principle of Exhaustion of Admin Remedies department, may be able to grant the remedy that petitioner pursues, reasons
of comity and orderly procedure demand that resort be made to him before
FACTS: In Administratice Case No. R-8182 instituted against Montes for recourse can be had to the courts.
negligence in the performance of duty as a watchman of the Floating
Equipment Section, Ports and Harbours Division of Bureau of Public Works,
the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him on the basis of findings
made by a committee. On appeal, the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified
the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in not pumping
the water from the bilge which sunk the dredge under his watch, and ordered
that he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without
prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.

Petitioner files an action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to review
the decision. On a Motion to Dismiss, the said court dismissed the action on
the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies
before he instituted the action as provided in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
598. Montes argued that there is no duty imposed upon him to appeal to the
President. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Montes erred in filing the action immediately before the
Court of First Instance of Manila instead of filing an appeal before the President
of the Philippines?

HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires where

an administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be
sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. The doctrine is a
device based on considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still
available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before
resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency
opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 598 provides that:

The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority to hear
and decide all administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its
decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised or modified by the
President of the Philippines.
THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
G.R. No.
135945 March 7, 2001
TOPIC: AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY IS NOT A COURT.
FACTS: Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City, was
mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually
foreclosed and acquired later on by the said bank as the highest bidder. On 11
April 1983, through its President Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the subject property was
donated to the Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation stipulated that
Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in
human settlements and economic development and governmental purposes" of
the Ministry of Human Settlements.
On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing
the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well
as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential
Management Staff (PMS).
On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its application before the
PMS to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. In a MOA, PMS and
United agreed that the latter may purchase a portion of the said property from
HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATIO, acting as originator, on a
selling price of P75.00 per square meter.
Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The
deed of conditional sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would
be paid upon signing, with the balance to be amortized within one year from its
date of execution. After UNITED made its final payment on January 31, 1992,
HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.
Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the
Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon.
Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor. Unable to
stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN
HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for
brevity) filed an actionfor injunction before RTC Baguio City. Private respondents
were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction was later denied.
The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and
annulment of the said MOA. It was later on dismissed upon motion of United. The
said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City
Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that
private respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures.
To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed
a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order
before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against
petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the
Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent
COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status
quo. Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status
quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP.
ISSUE: W/O COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of
contracts with prayer for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a
hearing thereof?
RULING: COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It
discharges quasi-judicial functions:
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency,
albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are
not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our
system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3)
branches the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each department
being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the
executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its
own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
United Residents of Dominican Hills vs. Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems, 353 SCRA 782
Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency,
albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are
not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals.
HELD:
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice,
19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over,
or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of
cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest
the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass
actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang
Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education
served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For
failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days
pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee
was consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said
teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings.
Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the
suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a
case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in
the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to
them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the
cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-
work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the
striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been
replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been
violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to
investigate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It
can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in
cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But
it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,
or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood
and quite distinct meanings.
Investigate vs. Adjudicate
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve
or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . .
to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm
L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits
of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service
Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.
Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based
on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or
defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not
the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and
determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the
Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced
it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the
question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the
teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether
or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order
to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules
and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by
the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done
by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed
for said acts or omissions.
 MACEDA v. ERBDOCTRINE:
The ERB, as an administrative body is not bound by the strict or technical rules of
evidencegoverning court proceedings
FACTS:
Because of the outbreak of the conflict on the Persian Gulf, private respondents
oil companies filed with the ERB their applications on oil price increases. The
ERB granted provisional increase (P1.42 per liter).
Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify this provisional
increase. He claims that the increase in prices has to undergo the requirements of
notice and hearing, however in this case the requirements were not complied with,
and therefore Maceda claims he was deprived of due process.
In reaffirming the increase, the lower court ruled that Executive Order 172 does
not preclude the board from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase.
These provisional increases, however, will be subject to final disposition of whether
or not it should be made permanent, to reduce or increase it, or to deny the
application. In fact, in the same order which authorized the provision increase,
the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties.
Petitioners Maceda failed to appear at said hearing and at the second hearing. The
notice of hearing was also published in newspapers of general circulation. Hearing
for presentation of the evidence commences and the ERB outlined the procedure
to be observed in the reception of evidence
not preclude the Board from ordering a provisional increase subject to final
That the oppositors and the board must have all the evidence-in-chief to be places
on record first then the examination will come later and the cross-examination will
come later.
Maceda claims that this order of relaxed procedure for presentation of proof
resulted in a denial of due process because it deprived him of finishing his cross-
examination of the witnesses.
ISSUE:
W/N Maceda, through this relaxed procedure of presentation of evidence was
deprived of due process.
HELD: NO.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that administrative bodies may relax
the procedures in the introduction of evidence in trials. It is not improper. The ERB,
as an administrative body is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence
governing court proceedings. In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Hearings before the ERB provides that
These rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the ERB in all
matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceeding within
the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board
may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such suitable
procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order.
Ernesto M. Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.
18 July 1991 :: G.R. No. 96266
FACTS:
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private
respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on
oil price increases. ERB then issued an order granting a provisional increase
of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to
nullify said increase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board should be
subject to presidential review.
HELD:
Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does
disposition of whether or not to make it permanent or to reduce or increase it
further or to deny the application. The provisional increase is akin to a
temporary restraining order, which are given ex-parte.
The Court further noted the Solicitor Generals comments that the ERB is not
averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision, except that there is
no law at present authorizing the same. The Court suggested that it will be
under the scope of the legislative to allow the presidential review of the
decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still
an administrative body under the Office of the President whose decisions
should be appealed to the President under the established principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, especially on a matter as
transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all
Filipinos.