Why Theories of Social Change Fail... Raymond Boudon PDF

American Association for Public Opinion Research
Why Theories of Social Change Fail: Some Methodological Thoughts

Author(s): Raymond Boudon
Source: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer, 1983), pp. 143-160
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public
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Why Theories of Social Change Fail:
Some Methodological Thoughts
RAYMOND BOUDON
This is the fifth of the Paul F. Lazarsfeld Lectures, presented annually

under the auspices of the Center for the Social Sciences of Columbia
University. It was delivered, in slightly different form, on February 11,
1983.
PAUL F. LAZARSFELD often complained that his concept of method-

ology tended to be misunderstood and to be taken in the sense of
technology. Methodology, he insisted, has to be taken as a synonym
for Kant's notion of criticism. And he often quoted Bridgman's dis-
tinction in the Nature of Physical Science, according to which prog-
ress in science proceeds along two paths: the development of
theories, on the one hand, and the critical examination of theories on
the other (Lazarsfeld, 1972). While theories try to relate data, meth-
odology analyzes why theories fail or work. At least this is one of its
main tasks.
Considering the field of social change theory, I would like to start
from two facts. The first, a rather obvious one, is that an impressive
number of theories of change have been produced in the three dec-
ades after World War II. To some extent, the social sciences have
even tended to be implicitly defined as sciences of change. Social
scientists-economists, sociologists, or political scientists-often
Abstract Social change theories fail when they are taken as similar to physical theories
leading to empirical predictions, rather than as idealized models. The author identifies
and discusses four postulates which seem responsible for this failure: (1) the postulate
of the coherence of the social structure, (2) the nomological postulate, (3) the structural
postulate, and (4) the ontological postulate.
Raymond Boudon is Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne and Director of the
Groupe d'Etude des Methodes de l'Analyse Sociologique (Study Group on Methods of
Sociological Analysis).
Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 47:143-160 ? 1983 by the Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362X/83/0047-143/$2.50
144 RAYMOND BOUDON
thought of themselves as being in charge of explaining and anticipating

social change. One need only think of the numerous theories produced
in such fields as development, mobilization, cultural change, and the
like.
The second fact is that we have now reached a state of Ent-
zaiiberung, of disenchantment, with regard to these theories. Some
years ago, Robert Nisbet published his important book, History and
Social Change (1969), which, as the title itself suggests and as I see it,
correctly so, maintains that theories of social change either are indis-
tinguishable from history or, if they aim at being different and insist
on their nomological ambitions, appear to be debatable. In a recent
paper on the limits of social science, S. M. Lipset (1981) gathered an
impressive list of cases where predictions derived from theories of
social change failed, in spite of the very general character of these
predictions. Finally, I would like to quote a paper where T. Caplow
(1982) summarizes some of the findings of the Middletown III study:
"We did not discover consistent trends of equalization, seculariza-
tion, bureaucratization, increased mobility, and depersonalization as
various theories of social change led us to expect." And further, "The
tendency to inconsistency was consistent, so to speak. . . . The
reality of social change in a community is much less manageable
intellectually than the myths we make about it when our imaginations
are not fettered by hard data." These remarks can be taken to apply
not only to change in communities, but more generally to change in
societies.
This situation provides an opportunity for an exercise in methodol-
ogy. Given that the theories of change often fail, why is that so?
Obviously, I do not intend to deal with this difficult question in its full
extent, but only present a few remarks resting, as Paul Lazarsfeld
recommended, on the critical examination of a few pieces of research,
which I will take mainly from the field of development theory, though
the conclusions we will derive have a more general application.
Along with other reasons, four postulates can be identified which,
individually or in combination, appear responsible for the recurrent
failure of social change theories.
I. The Coherence of the Social Structure
I call the first the postulate of the coherence of the social structure.
A very old idea to be found in Montesquieu, as well as in many
modern works, holds that the various features which can be identified
and isolated in a society tend to be coherent with one another.
Montesquieu's very title, L'esprit des lois, indicates that laws in the
WHY THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE FAIL 145
broad sense constitute more or less coherent systems. In the same

way Murdock's (1949) notion of social structure illustrates the postu-
late according to which a minimal coherence among the various social
rules and norms would be expected in primitive societies. And most
classical sociological typologies or distinctions, such as the opposition
between modern and traditional societies, between Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft, between urban and folk societies or the many distinc-
tions of the same type which can be found in the literature imply that
when a feature is observed in a society other features coherent with
this first one will likely be observed.
When taken too seriously, this postulate of the coherence of the
so-called social structure can suggest dubious implications for the
study of social change. One of these corollaries is that change should
take two main paths, what I would call reproduction and transforma-
tion. Indeed, one draws from the idea of the coherence of social
features the consequence that either change should not occur because
a change in any of the elements implies a change in the others, or that
if a change actually occurs it will affect not one but all the elements.
This corollary is often present in theories of social change. Thus a
current view is that the modernization of traditional societies is diffi-
cult because of the close interrelationships which prevail among the
religious, cultural, economic, technical, and all the other social as-
pects. Rather complementary than opposed to this view is the idea
that, when a change makes its way through a social system, it is likely
to generate a chain reaction and to progressively affect all the ele-
ments of the system.
There are perhaps, to use an expression coined by M. Mead (1953)
to describe Indian villages, timeless and changeless societies, and
there are also cases of complete transformation. A study of French
peasants by Mendras (1967) can be mentioned in this respect. This
study shows that the tremendous modernization of French rural soci-
ety that occurred in the 1950s was mainly due to a chain reaction
originally produced by a minor technical change, i.e., the introduction
of hybrid corn. Originally, the administration tried to convince the
peasants to substitute hybrid corn, because of its higher productivity,
for the traditional one. Since hybrid corn requires more space and
care, the peasants had to buy additional land, tractors, insecticides,
and fertilizers. Consequently, they became dependent on banks and
had to get familiar with modern management methods. They earned
more money but were also more concerned with food prices, and as
the latter are regulated by political authorities, national or European,
they became involved in political and social movements. Powerful
peasant unions developed. Thus, this sector of French society was
146 RAYMOND BOUDON
totally transformed as the result of a minor change. So much so, that

Mendras called his book The End of Peasants. Culturally, econom-
ically, politically, everything had changed in the attitudes and the
situation of these peasants and in their relations with their environ-
ment.
Such examples, combined with the corollaries implied by the pos-
tulate of the coherence of the social structure, tend to impose the
view that the reproduction model or the chain-reaction process is
more typical, more frequent, or more important than other types of
processes. In fact, it is necessary to distinguish very carefully be-
tween coherence and interdependence. Even when the various
categories of actors in a social system as well as its social features are
very dependent on one another, this does not mean that change must
be coherent.
A study in India, in a context where actors are highly interdepen-
dent and where the social features are also interdependent, helps to
illustrate this point. In this study, S. Epstein (1962) analyzed the
consequences of the development of irrigation in two southern Indian
villages. In the first village, directly affected by irrigation, the peas-
ants started substituting sugar cane for the traditional subsistence
crops, and derived a progressively growing income from the cultiva-
tion of sugar cane. On the whole, an exchange economy replaced the
older subsistence system. Irrigation also had modernization effects on
family and sex roles. Women gained in importance because, as a
result of the growing family income, the activities of the farm could be
extended and diversified. Since some of these activities, like raising
poultry and cattle, selling eggs and milk, are part of women's roles,
their economic autonomy as well as their influence in the family
increased. Moreover, the cane is bought from the peasant by
administration-owned factories. Being publicly run, the factories face
two constraints. First, they must deal with each peasant on an
equalitarian basis. Second, they must avoid buying more cane than
can be used and consumed. As a consequence of these two con-
straints, a ceiling was defined, which fixed the maximum amount of
cane a family unit could sell to the factory. This practice in turn had
the consequence of inducing peasants to settle their eldest son on an
independent plot much earlier than they would have done otherwise.
Before irrigation, legal cession followed actual cession; after irriga-
tion, legal cession preceded. Consequently, irrigation made for sons
becoming more independent of their fathers. At least, they gained
autonomy earlier. All these effects are convergent and can be consid-
ered as modernization effects.
At the same time other effects of the irrigation program developed
which reinforced, rather than eroded, the traditional system. The new
crops brought an increase in income. But their cultivation required all
kinds of further investments. Taking advantage of the boom, the
peasant to whom a surplus was available could lend money to the less
well-off. This increased disparities of income within the caste of
peasants, though all became richer after irrigation. Irrigation also
reinforced the traditional links between Peasants and Untouchables.
Because of the boom, the Peasants needed the Untouchables more
than ever. Before irrigation the system was characterized by a high
level of underemployment of the labor force, which decreased with
irrigation and cultivation of the new crops. The Untouchables could
not afford to buy plots. But they benefited from the boom, and the
higher rate of employment reinforced their links with the landowners.
Furthermore, the feelings of solidarity and of group identity within the
group of the Untouchables were reinforced because they felt them-
selves more wanted, because they were not in competition with one
another, and also because the exchange of labor force increased as a
consequence of the increase in agricultural activity. So, too, since the
cultivation of cane required more time than the traditional crops, the
Peasants had less time to go to the nearby city. In this way, irrigation
reduced rather than increased the exchanges between the villages and
their environment. On the whole, this example illustrates a case
where an exogenous change produced a complex set of consequences,
some of them going in the direction of what is generally considered as
modernization, while others were reinforcing traditional features of
the social structure.
Interestingly enough, the structure of change in the villages not
directly affected by irrigation because their fields were at too high an
altitude, was quite different. There, the Peasants could not take ad-
vantage of irrigation to cultivate commercial crops, but they did
derive benefit from the demands of their environment. As the ag-
ricultural boom in the irrigated villages increased the demand for
cattle, the Peasants in the nonirrigated villages became cattle dealers,
or ran small enterprises where they produced the tools and other
goods needed by the Peasants of the irrigated villages. On the whole,
in the nonirrigated villages, nonagricultural activities increased, with
the consequence that, here, the traditional links between Untoucha-
bles and Peasants were eroded. And when the new entrepreneurs
wanted to hire a worker, they looked at his effectiveness rather than
at the traditional links they had, or did not have, with him. As they
were in competition in a market, the Untouchables tended to lose
their sense of group solidarity. All these features are convergent and
go in the direction of what is generally considered as modernization.
148 RAYMOND BOUDON
But in this case, other features moved in the opposite direction. Since
agricultural activities did not expand in the second category of vil-
lages, the women remained confined to their subordinate role. They
continued cultivating dry crops which traditionally made use of more
woman labor than wet crops.
This example shows that there is no reason whatever for all the
consequences of an initial change to go in the same direction. It
illustrates the case of a wholly incoherent structure of change. The
structure of change differs greatly in the two categories of villages,
and in the two cases some traditional features are reinforced while
other effects go in the direction of modernization. Now, while social
change is complex and incoherent, it is not at all unintelligible. On the
contrary, we easily understand-using the word "understand" in the
Weberian sense-why the structure of change is what it is in the two
categories of villages. That structure is nothing but the aggregate
effect of individual adaptations to the new situation created by irriga-
tion. Reciprocally, the fact that the elements of the social system
constituted by the two types of villages are obviously highly interde-
pendent does not imply that all elements must change and that they
must change in the same direction, or that clear "contradictions" can
be detected in the course of change between, say, the cultural and
economic dimensions.
The notion of the coherence of social change, which has a great
place in many theories of change, is perhaps a modern version of the
basic postulate of what, after Voltaire, was called the philosophy of
history in the nineteenth century. By contrast to history, the so-called
philosophy of history assumed that history is rational in the sense
that, like the stars, it follows simple and universal paths. Maybe there
is more "philosophy of history" in the theories of social change than
we often recognize.
II. The Nomological Postulate
I call the second postulate the nomological postulate. It assumes

that nomological regularities can be detected in the sector of reality
the social sciences are concerned with, and that, as a matter of fact,
one of the main tasks of the social sciences is to discover these
regularities. This view is quite general in the social sciences. Many
social scientists would accept K. Popper's statement in his Poverty of
Historicism (1964) that the main objective of the social sciences is to
produce conditional statements of universal validity. I do not want to
analyze the difficulties raised by this postulate in detail, but only to
suggest that it often leads sociologists to grant to statements grounded

on local or singular evidence more generality than they deserve.
An example comes immediately to mind. A classical analysis
"shows" that the nuclear family is more easily compatible with an
industrialized society than the extended family. This theory leads to
the corollary that industrialization should be accompanied by a nucle-
arization effect on family structures. Contrary to this conclusion,
however, many studies show that industrialization can reinforce
rather than weaken the extended family. E. Vogel (1967) has drawn
attention to this point in the case of Japan: in that country, busi-
nessmen used to negotiate the hiring of a new worker with his family;
if the worker was fired for reasons which the family considered
illegitimate, the family could mobilize its solidarity resources, use
them for the purpose of retorsion, and make the hiring of new work-
ers difficult for the businessman. As the industrialization process
provided the extended family with the opportunity to use its solidarity
as a resource, the value of family solidarity tended to increase, and
solidarity was reinforced.
In many other cases it has been observed that a remedy against the
low industrial salaries which often prevail in the early stage of
industrialization-and this early stage can last a long time-is for
workers to maintain and reinforce their links with their rural family
orientation. Against a part of his salary, the salaried worker takes
advantage of the goods and services the family can provide to him at
low cost, while the family benefits from his industrial salary. Here
again, industrialization reinforces rather than weakens the extended
family.
On the whole, the effect of industrialization on the structure of the
family is highly dependent on the context. In some cases, the effect
goes in one direction; in others, in the opposite direction. Moreover,
it is hardly possible to say that one kind of effect is more frequent, or
more typical, or more normal. In other words, it is impossible to
develop a valid nomological statement that relates industrialization to
the evolution of family structure, even if one is prepared to put this
nomological statement in probabilistic form. This does not say that
the effects of industrialization on the family cannot be scientifically
studied. It says only that looking for nomological statements is not a
natural task or at least not the main task of the social sciences. In
some cases, and maybe in most, the problem is rather to understand
why A is sometimes followed by B and sometimes by not-B, while the
question whether A is more frequently followed by B than by not-B
often appears as a question without answer.
E. Hagen's theory of social change (1962) itself a fascinating theory,
150 RAYMOND BOUDON
provides a striking example of the influence of what I have called the

nomological postulate. This theory starts from the fact that several
countries enjoyed a high rate of development contrary to prevailing
nomological theories. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century,
Colombia had one of the highest rates of development though ac-
cording to the nomological theories, it should not have, since its
markets were local, since little overhead capital and practically no
foreign capital were available, since the country was poor, and since,
as a result of this poverty, its savings and investment capacities were
very limited. In his book, Hagen brilliantly analyzes the reasons for
the unexpected development of Colombia. That development oc-
curred not by virtue of general laws but because of a complex of
singularities, as Hagen convincingly showed.
The history of Colombia had led to the province of Antioquia
becoming a kind of backwater in the nineteenth century. This situa-
tion derived from the fact that the Antioqueiios had long had a mining
economy and that the gold and silver mines had become progressively
exhausted. At the end of the nineteenth century, after a century of
slow and steady development, the elites of Antioquia faced opportu-
nity structures very different from those confronting the elites of, say,
Bogota' or Cali. The political, scientific, and cultural professions were
practically closed to them because of prejudices against the marginal
province and also because of the resulting lack of educational institu-
tions in that province. Buying land and raising cattle did not make
sense either, since there was traditionally no landed gentry in An-
tioquia. But the Antioquenios could readily become entrepreneurs.
Rejected by the political and cultural system, they developed a mate-
rialistic Weltanschauung and an interest in business. Moreover, their
old mining experience had led them-as mining is a risky activity-to
adopt complex forms of business organization, with a distribution of
risks among shareholders. On the whole, this differential structure of
opportunity explains why the Colombian economic enterprises in the
early twentieth century were much more than proportionally founded
and led by Antioquefios, and why Colombia developed so rapidly.
I do not go into the details of this analysis, but only note one fact of
interest from the point of view of our discussion: Hagen was not
satisfied by his brilliant analysis and went on to look for a nomologi-
cal theory whereby the development of Colombia would become an
example of a general law. He found such a law, since in Colombia as
in Japan and elsewhere, marginal groups-the Samurai in Japan, the
Antioquefios in Colombia-had played an important role in the devel-
opment process. But if the relationship between marginality and de-
velopment is to be of nomological value, it must be derived from an
intermediary mechanism which also has universal validity: the uni-
form mechanism, according to Hagen, that when a group loses status,

it retains memory of this loss and a desire to restore its status. Both
the memory and the desire will be stored in a particular subculture,
which will develop as a consequence of the marginalization process.
But the Antioquefios had suffered their collective loss of status in the
sixteenth century. It is difficult to assume that their role in the
development of Colombia results mainly from a feeling of frustration
that was transmitted from one generation to the next over the course
of four centuries. In spite of its weakness or at least its complexity,
Hagen preferred this explanation-probably because of its nomologi-
cal character-to the beautiful analysis in his book where he shows
that the role played by the Antioquenos could be explained by the
singularities of their situation, these singularities themselves being a
result of history, and by the fact that they were exposed to a structure
of opportunities differing greatly, for instance, from that of the
Bogotanos or Calefios.
This example eloquently shows the influence of the nomological
postulate. At the same time it raises the question whether detecting
macroscopic regularities should be considered the main objective of
social change theory in spite of the consensus of philosophers of
science and social scientists on this point.
HII. The Structural Postulate
The third postulate can be described as an implicit assimilation of

the notion of structure to the classical philosophical notion of es-
sence. The concept of structure, though often ambiguous, can occa-
sionally have a precise meaning (Boudon, 1971). Thus, in the Marxian
tradition and in other traditions as well, it is a label for those social
features which are considered essential to the detection and explana-
tion of the main trends of social change. An underlying statement is
common to these various traditions: if a society is characterized by
a certain type of structure, it should also be characterized by
certain well-defined processes of change. However, such statements
generally rest on the questionable postulate that the social features
which are not considered structural in nature can be ignored in the
analysis of change.
To illustrate this point, I again take another study in India, more
specifically West Bengal (Bhaduri, 1976). The study was undertaken
because, in spite of the efforts made by the administration to induce
landowners to modernize their agricultural practices, in spite of the
subventions proposed by the administration and of the gain in pro-
ductivity which would probably have resulted from minor investment,
152 RAYMOND BOUDON
most landowners rejected the innovation. The easy explanation in

terms of such concepts as traditionalism or resistance to change did
not satisfy the author of the study, the Indian social scientist A.
Bhaduri. Instead, he tried to explain the attitude of the peasants as an
understandable consequence of the structure of the relations of pro-
duction. The social context of the case can be considered semifeudal
in the sense that the tenants, although freely employed on a contrac-
tual basis, are financially dependent on their landowners. Since they
cannot live on their income for an entire year, they must borrow
money and can only do it from their landlords since their poverty
allows them no access to bank loans. Because of this permanent
indebtedness of the tenants, the system can be defined as semifeudal.
Using a mathematical model, the author then shows that any in-
crease in productivity is a threat to the landowner. If the crop and
therefore its value increase as the result of a gain in productivity, the
income of the two players in the game, the landowner and the tenant,
will increase. The game will be, as game theoreticians say, coopera-
tive. But it will be so with certainty only at the beginning of the
process. For, in the next cycles, the tenants can benefit from the
increase of their income and reduce their yearly loans. Since the
landowner draws a non-negligible part of his own income from his
loans, he can experience, in the middle-run, either a net loss or a net
gain. But even in the latter case, the difference of income between
tenant and landowner will likely be reduced unless the tenant con-
sumes all of his additional income. Which situation would have been
realized, we cannot know, since the innovation was not adopted. But
obviously the change in the income distribution between the two
groups would have depended on the reaction of tenants to the in-
crease of their incomes as well as on the level of the increase in
productivity. At any rate, the analysis shows that the landowner
would have taken a risk had he accepted the innovation, since the
game between the tenant and the landowner can become non-
cooperative in the middle-run.
Should we draw from this analysis the consequence, which Bhaduri
seems to suggest, that innovation will always be rejected in a society
characterized by a semifeudal structure? Does a semifedual structure
necessarily generate a reproduction process? To do so we would have
to introduce a realistic interpretation of the notion of structure. In
other words, we would have to consider that the structural features
are so essential that all other elements can simply be ignored.
But this is a rather dangerous and dubious postulate. Going back to
our example, it can be easily shown that the structural features as
such in reality explain very little. The landlord would obviously take a
risk if he chose to increase his productivity. But this risk is also an

opportunity for him. He could as well have been better off as worse
off as a consequence of adopting the innovation. Thus, it is not the
structure as such that determines which course of action would be
best from his viewpoint. Reciprocally, the structural features as such
are insufficient to explain why the landowners actually refrained from
adopting the proposed innovation.
Moreover, the analysis implicitly introduces a number of assump-
tions which, although dealing with nonstructural features, are essen-
tial. Thus, it is supposed that the landowner can decide autonomously
whether or not the innovation should be introduced. But the distribu-
tion of the power of decision depends on the type of innovation. If it
implies a financial investment, the power of decision will likely belong
to the landowner. But there are other types of innovations, those
dealing with the organization of production teams, for instance. In
that case, the power of decision would less easily be exerted exclu-
sively by the landowner. Or, to turn to another point, the entire
analysis rests upon the fact that the tenants have no access to the
financial market. But this institutional point itself does not depend on
the structures, and there is#no reason whatever for treating it as a
constant. But if it is not treated as a constant, no prediction can be
derived from the structure about the future behavior of the system.
In other words, it is not only that the structural features as such
cannot allow any prediction about the future behavior of the system.
They do not even explain the rejection of the innovation in the
particular case under examination. More specifically, it is not only
that there are no grounds for saying that a semifeudal structure
generally leads the actors to technological conservatism. One cannot
even say that in this particular case, the innovation was rejected
because it included risks. All that can be said is that it included risks
and that for some unstated reasons the landowners were more sensi-
tive to the risk they were exposed to than to the changes they could
benefit from. These reasons were probably not elucidated in the
analysis because the author was convinced that the structure of the
relationships of production was so compelling that all other factors
and data could be neglected.
I have taken the example of a brilliant piece of neo-Marxist
analysis. But we should not conclude from this example that the
structural postulate is specific to the Marxist tradition. The example
implies, I believe, a more general conclusion. Many social predictions
and theories of change rest on the postulate that change can be
predicted once we have isolated the structural features of a social
system (Hernes, 1976). In the neo-Marxist tradition, the structural
154 RAYMOND BOUDON
features are assimilated to such concepts as the relations of produc-

tion while they are assimilated to other concepts in other traditions.
But the idea that the structures are responsible for change is a very
general one. However, these structural features are only mental con-
structs. Features which the analyst considers unimportant or
nonstructural can, in reality, play a definite and important role in the
generation of change. In other words, once the artificial character of
the idea of structure is recognized, there is no reason to expect that,
knowing the structures, the trends of change can be determined.
IV. The Ontological Postulate
I will call the fourth postulate the ontological postulate. According

to it, there is always the possibility of deciding in which categories or
variables, i.e., in which sector of the social reality, the main determi-
nants of change are to be found. In the extreme form of this postulate,
it is assumed that the same category of variables is always responsible
for change. In its moderate form, it is assumed that the nature of the
main determinants of change can vary from one case to the other, but
that there are always such main determinants.
However, as soon as change is conceived as the product of the
aggregation of individual actions, such a linear order appears as an
exception rather than the rule. Interaction effects and feedback ef-
fects make it difficult to determine which variables are "in the last
instance" responsible for change. Reciprocally, the notion of the main
variables responsible for change has a meaning only in very simple,
atypical, and exceptional situations. To take a simple example: a
government takes a decision which provokes a reaction that in turn
generates a modification of the decision. In this case, neither the
initial decision nor the reaction nor the reaction to the reaction can be
considered as the main variable responsible for the final form of the
decision. Rather, all the variables are responsible for that final form.
In spite of such obvious facts, determination of the main variables
responsible for change remains one of the favorite objectives of social
change theoreticians. For some of them, conflicts are the main source
of change. For others, this role is held by the relations of production,
by technological change, or by change in ideas and/or values. The
persistence of this ontological bias can be detected by many signs.
Thus, the intense development of the literature on political socializa-
tion in the 1960s and afterward must be related to a belief, the belief
that social change should be considered as being mainly the result of a
change in values. The success of the neo-Marxist approach in the
social sciences during the last decade is, for its part, founded more on
the general belief that group and class conflicts are the main factors of
change than on an adherence to the details of the Marxian doctrine.
Or consider this small exercise in the sociology of success: why,
among Max Weber's works, is the Protestant Ethic (1948) the most
famous and popular? Probably not because it is the best, or the
easiest or the most novel, or the least controversial, though it is
beyond doubt of utmost importance. Rather, because it consolidates
the belief that large-scale social change can also result from a change
in basic values, and not only from change, say, in the relations of
production. Briefly, its success is certainly due to its refuting the
materialistic view of history. I have mentioned Hagen's work on the
socioeconomics of development, which stresses in Weberian fashion
the importance of value mutations in the generation of change, while
others insist in making social change a more-or-less mechanical con-
sequence, say, of technical change.
Even the greatest sociologists are not always immunized against the
ontological postulate, probably because it is rooted in deep-seated
metaphysical questions; this can be said even of those who, like Max
Weber, considered macroscopic phenomena as the product of the
aggregation of individual actions and were quite aware of the com-
plexity of social processes. The case of the Protestant Ethic and of
the post-Weberian discussion of that book is interesting in this re-
spect. Because Weber wanted the Protestant ethic to be a primum
mobile in the generation of the capitalist system or at least in the
diffusion of the accumulation and investment behavior typical of the
capitalist entrepreneur, he built a theory which, along with its fas-
cinating intuitions, contains many ad hoc and controversial state-
ments, as further research has shown. Weber's theory required him,
for example, to oppose the entrepreneurs of the fifteenth century-the
Fuggers, for instance, who are treated as adventurers rather than
entrepreneurs-to those of the sixteenth, a distinction which lacks
historical support. So, too, he probably insisted on the dogma of
predestination as a distinctive feature in part because he rightly ob-
served and was puzzled by the fact that the bankers or businessmen
in Lutheran countries and courts were often Calvinists. But he failed
to explain why the entrepreneurs active in Geneva were born neither
in Geneva nor in Switzerland, why they were Catholic in Cologne, or
why the Calvinist businessmen of Amsterdam in most cases came
from Antwerp. As is well known, most of the difficulties raised by
Weber's theory have been dissipated by Trevor-Roper (1972): the
businessmen of Amsterdam or Geneva were not only Calvinists, they
were also businessmen who had been expelled or had left the coun-
tries under Spanish control when the Counter-Reformation made
156 RAYMOND BOUDON
business more difficult and life harder for them. These businessmen
had been early attracted by the Erasmian doctrine and by the Cal-
vinist doctrine which owes much to the former-in spite of the dif-
ferences between the two-for the reason that these doctrines consid-
ered business as a legitimate activity, not incompatible with God's
will.
These two facts, i.e., the congeniality between Erasmism-Calvinism
and business, as well as the difficulties opposed to business in the
countries under Spanish control explain, as Trevor-Roper has shown,
most of the data which Weber failed to explain. In other words, the
Weberian theory is much more powerful and much more easily ac-
ceptable in the revised version presented by Trevor-Roper than in its
original version; even though the post-Weberian discussion has re-
tained the core of the Weberian theory and has generally accepted the
fact that Calvinism because of its insistence on worldly asceticism
was more likely, other things equal, to attract the economic elites
than say, Lutheranism. Yet, at the same time this revised version
shows the weakness of the statement, which gave Weber's book its
popularity according to which the Calvinist values had a direct influ-
ence on the development of capitalism. For in Trevor-Roper's ver-
sion, religious values are treated as one variable among others in a
complex system of variables which cannot be ranked in a linear order,
so that the answer to the question of the main causes of change and of
the specific influence of Calvinism on the diffusion of accumulation
behavior vanishes into thin air.
Conclusion
To conclude these methodological remarks, I would like to make two

final points. Underlying and beside the four postulates I have tried to
distinguish, one can identify a general mental process, a trend toward
a realistic interpretation of the mental constructs represented by the
theories of social change. Take, for instance, as one example among
many, one of the most famous nomological statements in the theory
of development, the theory of the vicious circle of poverty. If a
country is poor and has no capacity to save, there can be no invest-
ment, no increase in productivity, and hence no endogenous way out
of poverty. Such a law should not be interpreted as being of the same
type as physical laws. It should not be taken as an empirical state-
ment but rather as a mental construct, as a model, which can be
applied to a social system provided that it can be independently
proved that it can actually be considered an accurate description of
that system. However, such constructs are often interpreted as em-
WHY THEORIES OF SOCUIL CHANGE FAIL 157
pirical laws. In the same fashion, classical typologies such as Red-

field's, Tonnies', or Parsons' are very useful provided they are inter-
preted as constructs which as such never literally apply to the social
reality, but which must rather be considered as general mental guides,
as sources of inspiration for the building of theories proper.
Yet, interestingly enough, there is a general trend toward a realistic
interpretation of such typologies. Instead of being taken as ideal-to
use Weber's language-they are taken as real. Such realistic in-
terpretations are not without practical danger. When, for example, the
theory of the vicious circle of poverty is taken realistically, it leads to
the political consequence that foreign aid is the only way to draw a
country away from underdevelopment. When the classical sociologi-
cal typologies opposing traditional and modern societies, or industrial
and post-industrial societies, are interpreted in a realistic fashion,
they lead to all kinds of dangerous and false consequences, for in-
stance that technical modernization necessarily generates changes in
religious values.
It is understandable that realism should have such powers of at-
traction: if the notion of structure is taken realistically, if the vicious
circle of poverty or the contrast between traditional and modern
societies are interpreted realistically, social scientists can derive em-
pirical predictions and practical recommendations from their theories.
If values are really what matter, values must be changed if such-and-
such changes-for instance, change in economic productivity-are
considered desirable. Realism is the key to success and influence for
the social scientist. In contrast, as soon as one distinguishes carefully
between mental constructs and theories proper, the predictive power
of the social sciences vanishes: for example, as soon as we realize
that the notion of semifeudal structure is a construct, we no longer
know whether a semifeudal society will change or not and if it does,
in which direction. Or we no longer know whether a society which,
according to development theories, should not develop because its
markets are local, or because it is poor and has no overhead capital,
will actually develop or not.
Abandoning realism, then, is not without cost, but it is not without
advantage, either. As soon as we consider theories of social change as
ideal constructs we need no longer be surprised and worried by the
fact that some social systems follow such-and-such theory, while
others-though they are apparently very comparable--do not. All this
does not maintain that these theories are useless, since they can
eventually be applied to some social systems and can be taken as
guides for the understanding of others. If we turn again to the case of
theories of development, most of them explain very poorly the devel-
158 RAYMOND BOUDON
opment of countries such as Japan or Colombia, and of many other

countries, but they have isolated processes and mechanisms which
can be considered as adequate descriptions in other cases, though
they can in no way be considered as more typical or more frequent
than alternative processes and mechanisms.
In short, the theories of change fail when they are taken for what
they cannot be taken to be, when they are considered as similar to
physical theories leading to empirical predictions, rather than as
idealized models. One of these idealized models shows, for instance,
that industrialization can lead to the dissolution of the extended fam-
ily. Another, that industrialization can reinforce traditional family
structures. The two hold some interest since the two types of effects
have been observed in different contexts. But the very fact that two
interesting and valid models can lead to contradictory consequences
and that neither of them can be considered as more typical or more
frequent shows also that none of them should be used for prediction
without caution.
This bias toward realism, which the German classical sociologists
Weber and Simmel (1977) had in their time identified and criticized
with great accuracy, is responsible for the disenchantment aroused by
the theories of social change, as it was responsible for the great
expectations previously invested in them. Both the present skepticism
and the past optimism are excessive. The theories of change are
interesting provided that they are taken as mental constructs whose
adequacy to reality is conditional and can only be demonstrated a
posteriori.
Finally, another bias can be related to this bias toward realism: the
bias toward confusing existential and general statements. Thus the
statement which relates industrialization and family nuclearization is
in reality an interesting existential statement and not, contrary to
current views, a general statement: under given conditions, industri-
alization can have the effect of dissolving the extended family. To
take another famous statement: Tocqueville (1969) writes in the Old
Regime that social rebellion occurs more frequently not when the
social conditions become worse, but when they become better. As is
well known, he derived this statement from an examination of the
social conditions prevailing in the years before the French Revolution
of 1789. The statement is beyond doubt of utmost interest and im-
portance: it is counterintuitive and shows convincingly that under
certain circumstances, when conditions become better, people can
generate unrealistic aspirations, so that dissatisfaction will increase.
The same idea can be found in Durkheim's Suicide (1962). Interest-
ingly enough, Tocqueville presented his statement as a probabilistic
law: when conditions become better, dissatisfaction will more fre-

quently increase. But it is, rather, a possibility statement or an exis-
tential statement: contrary to common-sense expectations, when con-
ditions become better, dissatisfaction can increase rather than de-
crease.
On the whole, I believe that the main reason for the failure of social
change theories resides in their being often taken and presented for
what they are not: conjectures are presented as predictions, existential
statements for general statements, and models for theories. This
raises the interesting question in the sociology of the social sciences
as to why that is so. I cannot explore this question here but will
content myself with a quotation from Georg Simmel (1894) which
contains, I think, a good part of the answer: "The obstinacy with
which social scientists look for the laws of society testifies to their
attachment to the old metaphysical creed according to which true
knowledge must be universal and necessary.'"
References
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Boudon, R., and F. Bourricaud
1982 Dictionnaire critique de la sociologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Caplow, T.
1983 "La repetition des enquetes. Une niethode de recherche sociologique." L'An-
nee Sociologique, forthcoming.
Durkheim, E.
1962 Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Glencoe: The Free Press.
Epstein, T. S.
1962 Economic Development and Social Change in South India. Manchester: Man-
chester University Press.
Hagen, E.
1962 On the Theory of Social Change. Homewood: The Dorsey Press.
Hernes, G.
1976 "Structural change in social processes." American Journal of Sociology
82:513-47.
Lazarsfeld, P.
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Lipset, S. M.
1981 "The limits of social science." Public Opinion, Oct.-Nov., 2-9.
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1953 Cultural Patterns and Technological Change. Paris: Unesco.
Mendras, H.
1967 La fin des paysans. Paris: SEDEIS.
Murdock, G. P.
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Nisbet, R.
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160 RAYMOND BOUDON
Popper, K.
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Simmel, G.
1894 Soziale Differenzierung. "La differenciation sociale." Revue Internationale de
Sociologie 2:198-213.
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Tocqueville (de), A.
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Trevor-Roper, H. R.
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MacMillan.
Vogel, E. S.
1967 "Kinship structure, migration to the city and modernization," pp. 91-11
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American Association for Public Opinion Research

Why Theories of Social Change Fail: Some Methodological Thoughts

This is the fifth of the Paul F. Lazarsfeld Lectures, presented annually

PAUL F. LAZARSFELD often complained that his concept of method-

thought of themselves as being in charge of explaining and anticipating

I. The Coherence of the Social Structure

broad sense constitute more or less coherent systems. In the same

totally transformed as the result of a minor change. So much so, that

II. The Nomological Postulate

I call the second postulate the nomological postulate. It assumes

suggest that it often leads sociologists to grant to statements grounded

provides a striking example of the influence of what I have called the

form mechanism, according to Hagen, that when a group loses status,

HII. The Structural Postulate

The third postulate can be described as an implicit assimilation of

most landowners rejected the innovation. The easy explanation in

risk if he chose to increase his productivity. But this risk is also an

features are assimilated to such concepts as the relations of produc-

IV. The Ontological Postulate

I will call the fourth postulate the ontological postulate. According

To conclude these methodological remarks, I would like to make two

pirical laws. In the same fashion, classical typologies such as Red-

opment of countries such as Japan or Colombia, and of many other

law: when conditions become better, dissatisfaction will more fre-

Order from your bookstore, please

Stanford University Press

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