Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Facts:
The petitioner in this case is a corporation engages in the livestock and poultry business and together
with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of
Section 3 (b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(a) and 17, Section 32 under the provision of R.A. No.
6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and the Guideline and Procedures
implementing Production and Profit sharing and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11
promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989.
This petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent
injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Form for acting without
jurisdiction in enforcing the R.A. No. 6657, the Guideline and Procedures implementing Production and
Profit sharing, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the term agriculture as used in the provision of CARL embraces raising livestock, poultry and
swine raising?
Held/Ruling:
The transcript of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
agriculture clearly shows that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionality mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government. It was correctly stated that Agricultural land does not include commercial
industrial and residential lands.
In the forgoing discussion, Section 3 of R.A 6657 which includes private agricultural land devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of commercial farms is invalid, to the
extent of the afforested agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform
program of the state.
Opinion:
It was clearly stated in the ruling that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in
the definition of agriculture land and declared unconstitutional of certain provision of the CARL.
1G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990. LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
Issue:
W/not lands not classified for agricultural land use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and its agencies covered by R.A. No. 6657.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced all public and private agricultural lands. And agricultural lands is referred to as
land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as residential, commercial or industrial land.
Thus, the underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as
agricultural lands for this land was intended for residential use.
Opinion:
It was clearly stated in the provision of R.A No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, that the term agricultural land does not include residential, commercial or industrial
land. Since, the Natalia Reality, Inc. properties are not agricultural land, it will not covered by the RA
6657.
2 G.R. No. 103302 August 12, 1993 NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP., petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION IV, respondents.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/aug1993/gr_103302_1993.html
Kooperatiba ng Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc. (KSMP) vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, et al.
G.R. No. 139051 (June 26, 2000)3
Facts:
Petitioner questions the dismissal of its complaint-in-intervention filed in DARAB Case No. 0335 before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). In 1975, the private respondents filed
with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) a request for conversion of 1,837.30 hectares of
agricultural land situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, into residential, commercial, industrial and other urban
purposes. The Order stated that the subject land is not economically suited for agricultural cultivation
and that if there are any tenant-tillers, disturbance compensation should be paid to them in accordance
with law.
Fifteen (15) occupants assisted by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) claiming to be tenants of a
forty-four (44) hectare portion filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. But prior to such,
former President Ferdinand B. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 on November 27, 1975 declaring
the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate, Cavite and Nasugbu, Batangas as tourist zones more
suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and urban uses.
In December 1989, apparently unaware of the conversion orders and presidential proclamation, then
DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago issued Notices of Acquisition dated December 14-27, 1989,
making the subject land available for immediate acquisition and distribution by the government to
tenant-beneficiaries/actual tillers. Private respondents filed their objections to these Santiago notices.
Thereafter, on January 22, 1991, Secretary Benjamin T. Leong who succeeded Secretary Santiago ruled
on the validity of the questioned Order issued on May 27, 1975 and denied the Motion for
Reconsideration holding that pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, Maragondon,Ternate and Nasugbu
are declared as tourist zones.
Meanwhile, on May 14, 1991, the private respondents filed a Petition with the DARAB docketed as
DARAB Case No. 0335 for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders which in effect
suggested the manner of invalidating the Santiago Notices as it was contrary to the Leong Order
of January 22, 1991.
Issue: W/not the dismissal complaint-in-intervention and Petition for Certiorari imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the DARAB.
Held:
3 http://www.chanrobles.com/scresolutions/resolutions/2000/june/139051.php
We find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost considering that the Conversion
Orders have long become final and executory to which the Board has no jurisdiction to review, amend
or to declare their nullity. There was, therefore, no more case to which it could intervene. The
complaint-in-intervention was, therefore, correctly dismissed pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 19, Section 2 The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of the
judgment by the trial court.
Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition yet of the conversion case, as in fact, DARAB
Case No. 0335 was initiated by the private respondents is untenable. A perusal of the records reveal
that DARAB Case No. 0335 was filed by the private respondents for the purpose of implementing the
Conversion Orders particularly the fixing of the final disturbance compensation to the legitimate
farmer-occupants. The complaint-in-intervention, however, puts in issue petitioner's alleged tenancy
relationship and security of tenure which the DARAB does not have any jurisdiction.
Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no personality to file the instant petition to intervene in
the case as the real parties-in-interest are the members thereof who were not even recognized as the
rightful tenants occupying the subject land. As observed by the DAR, "members of petitioner are
merely holding on to expectancy that they will become the beneficiaries assuming that the land is still
CARPable." The fact, however, remains that the land in question has already been excluded from the
purview of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders which had
long become final and executory.
Gavino Corpuz petitioner, was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) who, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land with Lot Nos. 3017 and 012 and a
total area of 3.3 hectares located in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and formerly owned by a
certain Florentino Chioco.
Petitioner mortgaged the subject land to pay for his wife's hospitalization on January 20, 1982 in favor
of Virginia de Leon. Upon the expiration of the contract, he again mortgaged the property to
respondents Hilaria Grospe and Geronimo Grospe for a period of four years (from December 5, 1986 to
December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500.00. The parties even executed a "Kasunduan sa
Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan" which allowed the respondents to use and/or cultivate the land
during the duration of the mortgage. Petitioner instituted an action for recovery of possession with the
DARAB in Cabanatuan City Region III against the respondents averring that the latter entered the
4G.R. No. 135297 (June 8, 2000) Gavino Corpuz vs. Spouses Geronimo Grospe and Hilaria Grospe
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/135297.htm
disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991 and destroyed the palay planted on
the land.
The Respondents alleged that the petitioner himself allowed them to take over the possession and
cultivation of the property until the latter has paid his loan. However, instead of paying his loan,
petitioner had allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights" over the landholding in
consideration in the amount of P54, 394.00. Petitioner denied waiving his rights and claimed that his
and his children's signatures appearing on the waiver were forgeries.
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered
the landholding to the Samahang Nayon ng Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija which in turn, had
passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent
spouses who were the "most qualified farmers-beneficiaries".
The DARAB affirmed the PARAD decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied. Likewise, petitioner's appeal and subsequent reconsideration thereof were denied by the
Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellate court was correct in finding that the signatures of petitioner and
his sons on the waiver were not forged?
Whether or not the petitioner abandon and voluntary surrender his rights as a beneficiary
under PD 27?
Held:
1. The presence or the absence of forgery was an issue of fact that was convincingly settled by the
agrarian and the appellate tribunals. Petitioner utterly failed to convince us that the appellate
court had misapprehended the facts. Quite the contrary, its findings were well-supported by the
evidence.
2. PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not be
transferable except through hereditary succession or to the government, in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws and regulations.
The CA ruled that abandonment required (a) the tenant's clear intention to sever the
agricultural tenancy relationship; and (b) his failure to work on the landholding for no valid
reason. The CA also deemed the following as formidable evidence of his intent to sever the
tenancy relationship: (a) the mortgage and (b) his express approval and conformity to the
Samahang Nayon Resolution installing the private respondents as tenants/farmers-beneficiaries
of the landholding.
As earlier shown, the Waiver was void. Furthermore, the mortgage expired after four years. The
private respondents were obligated to return possession of the landholding to the petitioner. At
bottom, we see on the part of the petitioner no clear, absolute or irrevocable intent to abandon.
His surrender of possession did not amount to abandonment because there was an obligation
on the part of private respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan.
However, the nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear
showing that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under
the present circumstances, may qualify as surrender or transfer to the government, of his rights
under the agrarian laws.
The petitioner insists that his act of allowing another to possess and cultivate his land did not amount
to abandonment or voluntary surrender. The waiver become void because of violation under PD 27
provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not be transferable
except through hereditary succession or to the government, in accordance with the provisions of
existing laws and regulations. But the main issue that the petitioner was surrendered the land to
Samahang Nayon, which understood voluntary surrender to the government, and through the DAR,
they are now has the power to decide who would be the qualified beneficiaries of that said land. The
court awarded to private respondent as the qualified farmers-beneficiaries. I agree to the decision of
the court that it was awarded to most responsible and qualified beneficiaries can take care of the
agricultural land.
5 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/148044.htm
Petitioners Antonio Masaquel (Antonio), Juliana Masaquel-Marero (Juliana), Apolonia Masaquel-
Tolentino (Apolonia) and Maria Masaquel-Oliveros (Maria) were co-owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 66,703 sq. m. located in Barrio Biga, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. ON-724.
On 27 September 1993, Respondent Jaime Orial filed an amended complaint with the DARAB against
petitioners alleging that he was a tenant of a parcel of agricultural land owned by and registered in the
name of Antonio.
Petitioners denied the existence of a tenancy relationship between them and respondent claiming that
respondent was a mere usurper and trespasser, petitioners specifically denied the allegation that they
harassed him and threatened him with physical harm. During the hearing, the heirs of petitioners
submitted their respective affidavits affirming their ownership over the subject property and denying
that they or their predecessors authorized respondent to enter and occupy their property.
In a Decision dated 18 December 1994, the provincial adjudicator ruled that respondent was not a
tenant of the subject land. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the findings of the provincial adjudicator
and declared respondent a tenant of the subject land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
the DARAB denied it in a Resolution dated 22 November 1999.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where the appellate court affirmed the DARAB
decision on 9 May 2001.
The evidence presented by respondent failed to meet the test of substantiality, in line with the
standard of proof required in administrative cases.
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is the
owner, lessee, use fructuary or legal possessor of the land, and not thru the acts of the supposed
landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy.
In view of the absence of a tenancy relationship, the case falls outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Thus, it is cognizable by the regular courts. Consequently, the complaint filed by respondent was
rightfully dismissed by the provincial adjudicator.
Opinion: