Statcon case digest

Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar

18 SCRA 247 Statutory Construction Construction; defined Noscitur A

Sociis

In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its Caltex Hooded Pump

Contest. The mechanics of the contest were as follows:

1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at
each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period;

2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;

3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is

required.

4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest
Caltex station.

To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal
Office. However, then acting Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of
Caltex as Palomar deemed that the contest is a violation of the Postal Law
(Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]).

Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any

of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be
imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by
the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner

pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning
any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part
upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money
or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.

According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining

thereto cannot be mailed by Caltex via Philippine Post.

Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a
petition for declaratory relief. Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that
under prevailing jurisprudence, lottery consists of the following elements:

a. consideration;

b. prize;

c. chance.

Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element,
consideration, is missing. Said element is missing because participants are not
required to pay anything theres no consideration on the part of the participants.

Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He
insisted that he was merely applying the law and that there is no legal issue at
all; that there is no need for the courts to call for a construction on the statute in
question. Palomar further argued that even if the said contest, assuming
arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the same is considered as a gift enterprise
which is still prohibited by the Postal Law to be mailed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Caltexs petition for declaratory relief is proper.

2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.

HELD:

1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue

is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used in a certain law. As
defined in Blacks Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law
with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.

2. No.

The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first
element is lacking (no consideration).

The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss
that under prevailing jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions
provided by legal luminaries, there is no explicit definition as to what a gift
enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the term gift enterprise was
used in association with the term lottery. As such, the principle of noscitur a
sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other
meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it
involves a consideration, so also must the term gift enterprise be so
construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a consideration, it is
neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail of the
Philippine postal service.

G.R. No. L-19650

Caltex Philippines, Inc., petitioner-appellee

Vs.

Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondent-

appellant
Click Here for the Full Text of the case

FACTS:

In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work
for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products.
The contest was entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each
Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media
for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to
be cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex
to the Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its
counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its
position that the contest does not violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of
the Postal Law.

Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied

Caltexs request stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the
Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatexs request for clearance.

Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration

involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery.
However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as Gift
Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory

relief?
 2. Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the
coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?

HELD:

I.

By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which

deals with the applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states: Declaratory
relief is available to person whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine
any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and for a
declaration of rights thereunder.

In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down

certain conditions:

1. There must be a justiciable controversy.

2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy.
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue a
fraud order if carried out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow
of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and
stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the
time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellees desires
are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others which admittedly
does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a
justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a
positive claim of right which is actually contested.

Construction
 Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact
that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just
reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J.,
399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising
was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had
the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted,
the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the
corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan.

II.

Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

Lottery

Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance

e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as
various forms of gambling.

Three Essential Elements:

1. Consideration
2. Prize
3. 3. Chance

No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery
but it appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is
any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any services
be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate.
Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for
the entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the
same for the drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit
any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.

Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party
receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to
draw a prize.

Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the
way of increased patronage be considered as a consideration and thus
violates the Postal Law?

No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit
derived by the sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether or not the
participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning and not
whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of value for
the distribution of the prize.

Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?

Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there
appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that
the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold
for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product, the
purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.

And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at
bar since there is not sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as
an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestant
irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees products.

The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that
every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith.

In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the
Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be denied
the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.

3. People v. Mapa
Prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition of
appointed secret agent of a public official.

The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm or any
instrument, intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms,
or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. It is
the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law. It was decided that
construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any
clearer; there being no provision made for a secret agent.
 People v Mapa

GR No. L-22301

30 Aug 67
Facts:
On or about August 13, 1962, Mario Mapa was apprehended due to
possession of an unlicensed firearm. The defendant admitted before the trial
court that he was carrying the unlicensed firearm and that he does not have a
permit to carry such a weapon. In his defense, he said that he is a secret agent
of the Governor of Batangas and that he is exempt from the requirement of
securing a license of firearm. The defendant also showed a certification that he
was appointed as such.

Issue: whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a
permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary

Held: In the present case, there is no room for interpretation or construction

because the law is clear. The law provides for the class of people who are not
covered in the prohibitive law. No exemption was provided for secret agents.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them."

People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa

G.R. No. L-22301
August 30, 1967
 En Banc

Facts:

The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of
the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and
further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to
have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license
permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and
affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret
agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of
appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs.
Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and
which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is
covered by Art. 879.

Issue:

Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper

defense to illegal possession of firearms.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated
that the law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in
the list therefore the accused is not exempted.

General v. Barrameda
January 30, 1976
Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang- Petitioners
Leoncio Barrameda- Repsondent
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA
I. Facts:
1. Plaintiff seeks to redeem the land formerly embraced by Transfer Certificate
Title (TCT) No. 1418, containing an area of 59 hectares in Minabalac Camarines
Sur, and to annul all contracts affecting the property between the Development
Bank of the Philippines and Rodolfo General.
2. The land in dispute was mortgaged by plaintiff (General) to DBP for P22,000.
For failure to pay, the mortgagee (DBP) foreclosed the property.
3. On April 23, 1962, provincial sheriff conducted auction sale in which the
highest bidder, the said mortgagee, bought the mortgaged property for P7,
271.22
4. On September 2, 1963, the registration of the sale and affidavit wherein TCT
No. 1418 in the name of plaintiff was canceled and TCT No. 5003 was issued to
the DBP.
5. On Sept 3, 1963 defendants General and Gontang purchased land from DBP.
Their sale was annotated in TCT 5003 on Nov. 26. 1963 only.
6. On Nov. 20 -1963 plaintiff offered to redeem the land. When DBP refused,
then planitiff filed suit. The original complaint was filed on Nov. 20, 1963 while on
August 12, 1964, plaintiff deposited with the clerk of court the sum of P7,271.22
representing the purchase price of the land.
7. In the trial court, the judge asserted that the one-year period of redemption
began to run on april 23, 1962, when the sale at public auction was held, and
ended on April 24, 1963 and the deposit of redemption price on August 12, 1964
were made beyond the redemption period and that defendants Rodolfo General
and Carmen Gontang were legitimate purchasers.
8. In the appellate court, the appealed judgment was reversed and the other one
entered declaring 1. Null and void the sale executed on September 3, 1963, by
defendant DBP to Gontang and General 2. TCT 5003 cancelled and 3. Mortaged
property redeemed and ordering the clerk of court to deliver to General and
Gontang and the Register of Deeds to issue a new transfer certificate of title in
the name of plaintiff in lieu of TCT 5003 upon payment of fees.
II. Issue/s:
1. WoN the interpretation of Section 31, Commonwealth Act 459 (law that
created the DBP), which provides that mortgager has right to redeem the real
property upon full or partial payment within one year from the date of the auction
sale, shall start from the date of the auction sale or the date of the registration of
sale in the register of deeds. (start from the registration of sale)
2. Were petitioners under obligation to look beyond what appeared in the
certificate of title of their vendor the Development Bank of the Philippines and
investigate the validity of its title before they could be classified as purchasers in
good faith?
III. Decision
Decision of Appellate Court affirmed with costs against petitioners.
No longer necessary to determine WON the petitioners were purchasers in good
faith of the land involved since Barrameda redeemed the mortgaged property
within the legal period of redemption.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner originally contended that Sec 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 clearly
states that the right to redeem the the real property sold at public auction
judicially or extra-judicially may only be exercised within one year from the date
of the auction sale and that there was no provision in the same act that
expressly stated that the redemption period of one year shall start from the
registration of the certificate of sale in the registration of deeds.
Also, he contended that the same provision governs redemption of real property
foreclosed by the DBP and prescribes the redemption period for judicial
foreclosures of mortgage.
The Algubos v Alberto ruling cited by respondent appellate court wasnt
applicable to the case at bar because it was not clear when the period of
redemption should start (date when execution sale was conducted, or when the
certificate of sale was executed by sheriff, or when the certificate of sale was
registered in the registry of deeds), and this Court ruled that as the land involved
in that case is registered under the Torrens system, the date of redemption
should begin to run from the date of registration, unlike in the case at bar where
Section 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 specifically and clearly provides that the
running of the redemption period shall start from the date of the auction sale.
Moreover, the petitioners rebuffed Gonzales vs. P.N.B.s applicability to the
case at bar because the provisions on the matter of the P.N.B. Charter, Act No.
2938, are different from that of Commonwealth Act 459. Section 32 of Act 2938,
wherein it provided mortgagor shall have the right to redeem within one year the
sale of the real estate. This was Identical to the provision appearing in Sec. 26,
now Sec. 30, Rule 39, Rules of Court, while under Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act
459, the period of redemption should start, on the date of the auction sale, and
the latter provision is applicable specifically and expressly to the case at bar.
The petitioners, on the other hand, asserted the applicability of the Marcaide v
Pigtain case where it categorically stated that the one year redemption period
shall start from the date of sale and not from the report of the sale or the
registration of the sale certificate in the office of the Register of Deeds, is more
applicable to the present case.
2. The court was of the view that a correct solution to the foregoing issue must
entail not merely trying to determine the meaning of the words auction sale" and
"sale" in different legislative enactments, but, more importantly, a determination
of the legislative intent which is quite a task to achieve as it depends more on a
determination of the purpose and objective of the law in giving mortgagors a
period of redemption of their foreclosed properties.
A public auction sale is an indispensible prerequisite to the valid disposal of
properties used as collateral for the obligation.
So that whether the legislators in different laws used the term "sale" or "auction
sale" is of no moment, since the presumption is that when they used those words
"sale" and "auction sale" interchangeable in different laws they really referred to
only one act the sale at public auction indispensably necessary in the
disposition of mortgaged properties and those levied upon to pay civil obligations
of their owners.
3. The court adhered to Salazar v. Meneses, where the period of redemption was
held as started on the date when the certificate of sale issued was registered.
The deed of sale does not take effect until it is registered.
They found no compelling reason to deviate from the ruling and not apply the
same to the present case. Because, to the court, the important issue was
whether auction sale shall be considered in its ordinary meaning or in the same
meaning of sale used in the texts of Sec 26 of Rules of Court and Act 2938
(PNB Charter) and Sec 30 And Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. To them these
words used interchangeably refer to one thing and that is the public auction sale
required by law in the disposition of properties foreclosed or levied upon. This
view was contrary to the petitioners main contention that there was a great deal
of difference in legislative intent in the two words.
The stands mentioned by the Court in the mentioned cases and other ones
(Garcia vs. Ocampo and Gonzales et al. vs. Philippine National Bank et al.) were
firmly planted on the premise that registration of the deed of conveyance for
properties brought under the Torrens System is the operative act to transfer title
to the property and registration is also the notice to the whole world that a
transaction involving the same had taken place.
To affirm the previous stand this Court has taken on the question of when the
one year period of redemption should start (from the time of registration of the
sale) would better serve the ends of justice and equity especially in this case,
since to rule otherwise would result in preventing the respondent-mortgagor from
redeeming his 59.4687 hectares of land which was acquired by the Development
Bank of the Philippines as the highest bidder at the auction sale for the low price
of only P7,271.22 -the unpaid balance of the mortgage debt of P22,000.00 after
the respondent-mortgagor had paid the sum of P14,728.78.
No answer on 2nd question posted by plaintiffs.

1. National Federation of Labor v. Eisma

Construction is required to determine jurisdiction.

The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them. However, jurisdiction over the subject
matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority, which
organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it
must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the
jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes
of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in
force.

CASE DIGEST: NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) VS EISMA

 NFL v. Eisma

G.R. No. L-61236

January 31, 1984

Facts:
On 1982, the National Federation of Labor, certified by the Ministry of
Labor as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly
paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., charged the
respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment.
Petitioners declared a strike against the respondent, after the latter terminated
the president of the union. Respondent firm filed a complaint before the
respondent Judge against the members and officers of the union for obstruction
and prayed for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The petitioners
assail the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, as amended, and filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge has jurisdiction on Labor related
cases.

Held:
The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for
damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. Hence, the respondent
Judge is devoid of jurisdiction.
4. Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
Adoption under para 1 of Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating
the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil
Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in the Spanish Civil
Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The children thus
mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include
grandchildren. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the
grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the
adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. Therefore, the
general rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
the subjects of statutory construction.

Daoang v Municipal Judge

G.R. No. L-34568

28 March 1988
Facts:
Petitioners are grandchildren of private respondents Agonoy. Private
respondents filed a petition before the MTC of San Nicolas seeking adoption of
two minors. Petitioners filed an opposition to the adoption invoking the provisions
of the Civil Code. That the respondents have a legitimate child, the mother of the
petitioners, now deceased, as such they are not qualified to adopt as per Article
335 of the aforesaid Code. The petition for adoption was granted. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
 Whether or not private respondents are disqualified to adopt under paragraph
1 of Art. 335.

Held:
No. The provision invoked by the petitioners is clear and unambiguous.
Therefore, no construction or interpretation should be made. To add
grandchildren in this article where no such word is included would be in
violation to the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally
exclude what is not included.

Facts:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a
petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the
adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. On 22 April 1971, the
minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad
litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971,
and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil
Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-
Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
children by legal fiction;

HELD:

The words in the paragraph (1) of the Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When
the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in the
Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The
children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not
include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the
effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted.
The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
subjects of interpretation. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang ,
the grandchildren of Antero and Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied
the petition and affirmed the judgement of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte,declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to
all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint
petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed
from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel
Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and
Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names Bonilla and
Marcos be changed with Agonoy, which is the family name of the petitioners,
without pronouncements as to costs

5. Paras v. Comelec
Is SK to be considered a regular local election in a recall proceeding?
The subject provision of the Local Government Code, Sec. 74 Paragraph (b)
provides that No recall shall take place within one year from the date of the
officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. Hence, It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context. In the present case, the
Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this
would render inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It would
be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe
regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the
local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.

Paras v. COMELEC Case Digest

Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the
incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to
Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take
place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one
year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may
be instituted.

ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its
context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its
general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official
to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The
spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its
construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include
SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a
recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court
assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation
should
be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

Paras vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996)

16APR
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Ponente: FRANCISCO
FACTS:
Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular
barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed
the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the
petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
resolved to approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the
holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition
for injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government
Code (LGC) which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from
the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK
elections, where the recall election is for Barangay post.
HELD:
NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.

RATIO:
Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against
the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for
the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall election.

It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of
the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where
the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested
and be filled by the electorate.

By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under the same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.

CONCURRING OPINION:
DAVIDE:
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise
disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for
the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the
person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is
that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in
the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec.
424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are
not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18.
In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether
national or local).