338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
465, JULY 29, 2005 339
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
23
MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. Hon. THELMA
A. PONFERRADA, in Her Official Capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and GLADYS
NOCOM, respondents.
Actions; Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Parties; An
offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime;
Exceptions.Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may
intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following
instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law
defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private
offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the
offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive
the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to
do so, or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these
instances, the private complainants interest in the case disappears
and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public
prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the instant case.
Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in
the estafa suit.
Same; Same; Estafa; Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22); While
the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two
distinct criminal offensesestafa and violation of B.P. 22the
same involves
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
VOL.
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
only one civil liability for the offended party since he sustained only
a single injury.True, each of the overt acts in these instances may
give rise to two criminal liabilitiesone for estafa and another for
violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check
involves only one civil liability for the offended party, who has
sustained only a single injury. This is the import of Banal v. Tadeo,
which we quote in part as follows: Generally, the basis of civil
liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable (Art. 100, The
Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the
traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political
entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the
individual member of that society whose person, right, honor,
chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by
the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad and
general provision is among the most complex and controversial
topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications
especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime
in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a
separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the
criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many
legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally
accepted notion that the civil liability actually arises from the crime
when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission
is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see
that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and
the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable
by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil
liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage
or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.
Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil
action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally
liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is
punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material
damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and
Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
Same; Same; Same; Same; Forum Shopping; The possible
single liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can
be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa
case and the BP 22 violation prosecution, and as both remedies are
simultaneously available to such party, there can be no forum
shopping.The possible single civil liability arising from the act of
issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions
deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation
prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically
in the present case, the institution of a civil action without need of
election by the offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously
available to this party, there can be no forum shopping.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Election of Remedies;
Words and Phrases; In its broad sense, election of remedies refers
to the choice by a party to an action of one of two or more
coexisting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of
the same facts, but the term has been generally limited to a choice
by a party between inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one
being necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other.
Petitioner is actually raising the doctrine of election of remedies. In
its broad sense, election of remedies refers to the choice by a party to
an action of one of two or more coexisting remedial rights, where
several such rights arise out of the same facts, but the term has been
generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent
remedial rights, the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to,
or a repudiation of, the other. In its more restricted and technical
sense, the election of remedies is the adoption of one of two or more
coexisting ones, with the effect of precluding a resort to the others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While some American
authorities hold that the mere initiation of proceedings constitutes a
binding choice of remedies that precludes pursuit of alternative
courses, the better rule is that no binding election occurs before a
decision on the merits is had or a detriment to the other party
supervenes.The Court further elucidates in Mellon Bank v.
Magsino as follows: As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose
of the doctrine of election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to
any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is
regarded as an application of the law of estoppel, upon the theory
that a party can-
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 341
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
not, in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions which
form the basis of his respective remedies. However, when a certain
state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative remedies,
both founded upon the identical state of facts, these remedies are not
considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the invocation of one
remedy is not an election which will bar the other, unless the suit
upon the remedy first invoked shall reach the stage of final
adjudication or unless by the invocation of the remedy first sought to
be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an advantage thereby or
caused detriment or change of situation to the other. It must be
pointed out that ordinarily, election of remedies is not made until the
judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits. Consonant
with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, opined
that while some American authorities hold that the mere initiation of
proceedings constitutes a binding choice of remedies that precludes
pursuit of alternative courses, the better rule is that no binding
election occurs before a decision on the merits is had or a detriment
to the other party supervenes. This is because the principle of
election of remedies is discordant with the modern procedural
concepts embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure which permits a
party to seek inconsistent remedies in his claim for relief without
being required to elect between them at the pleading stage of the
litigation. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the Rules
signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal
case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the
institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even
if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.In the
present cases before us, the institution of the civil actions with the
estafa cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with the
BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each
other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a
civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding
civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same
check.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Filing Fees; While ordinarily no
filing fees were charged for actual damages in criminal cases, the
rule on the necessary inclusion of a civil action with the payment of
filing fees based on the face value of the check involved was laid
down to prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat of a
criminal
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge.The purpose
of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice Florenz D.
Regalado (ret.), former chairman of the committee tasked with the
revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He clarified that the
special rule on BP 22 cases was added, because the dockets of the
courts were clogged with such litigations; creditors were using the
courts as collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for
actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary inclusion
of a civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the face
value of the check involved was laid down to prevent the practice of
creditors of using the threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on
their credit free of charge. Clearly, it was not the intent of the special
rule to preclude the prosecution of the civil action that corresponds
to the estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The crimes of estafa
and violation of BP 22 are different and distinct from each other.
There is no identity of offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in
one case may be invoked in the other. The offenses charged in the
informations are perfectly distinct from each other in point of law,
however nearly they may be connected in point of fact.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation to file the corresponding
civil action; The fact that the Rules do not allow the reservations of
civil action in BP 22 cases cannot deprive the private complainant
of the right to protect her interests in the criminal action for estafa
in promulgating the Rules, the Supreme Court did not intend to
leave the offended parties without any remedy to protect their
interests in estafa cases.What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court
prohibits is the reservation to file the corresponding civil action. The
criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. [U]nless a separate civil action has been filed before the
institution of the criminal action, no such civil action can be
instituted after the criminal action has been filed as the same has been
included therein. In the instant case, the criminal action for estafa
was admittedly filed prior to the criminal case for violation of BP
22, with the corresponding filing fees for the inclusion of the
corresponding civil action paid accordingly. Furthermore, the fact
that the Rules do not allow the reservation of civil actions in BP 22
cases cannot deprive private complainant of the right to protect her
interests in the criminal action for estafa. Nothing in the current law
or rules on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the corresponding civil
case exclusively in the
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 343
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
court trying the BP 22 criminal case. In promulgating the Rules, this
Court did not intend to leave the offended parties without any
remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases. Its power to
promulgate the Rules of Court is limited in the sense that rules shall
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Private
complainants intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified not
only for the prosecution of her interests, but also for the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; A recovery by
the offended party under one remedy necessarily bars that under the
otherobviously stemming from the fundamental rule against
unjust enrichment, this is in essence the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or
omission.The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the
private prosecutor may intervene before the RTC in the proceedings
for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the corresponding civil
action in the proceedings for violation of BP 22 pending before the
MTC. A recovery by the offended party under one remedy, however,
necessarily bars that under the other. Obviously stemming from the
fundamental rule against unjust enrichment, this is in essence the
rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for
the same act or omission.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
RRV Legal Consultancy Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing
check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). The
Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a
private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings.
However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising
from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in
the other criminal action. While the law allows two
simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it
authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes
arise from a single set of facts, only one civil liability
attaches to it.
The Case
1
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the2
Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the July 27, 2002 Order
of the Regional Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 104) in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-106256 to3 Q-01-106259. Also
assailed is the August 16, 2002 Order of the RTC denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The first assailed
Order is quoted in full as follows:
For consideration is the opposition of the accused, through counsel,
to the formal entry of appearance of private prosecutor. Accused,
through counsel, contends that the private prosecutor is barred from
appearing before this Court as his appearance is limited to the civil
aspect which must be presented and asserted in B.P. 22 cases pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
The private prosecutor submitted comment stating that the
offended party did not manifest within fifteen (15) days following
the filing of the information that the civil liability arising from the
crime has been or would be separately prosecuted and that she
should therefore be required to pay the legal fees pursuant to Section
20 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Considering that the prosecution under B.P. 22 is without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the
Revised Penal Code (BP 22, Sec. 5), the civil action for the recovery
of the civil liability arising from the estafa cases pending before this
Court is deemed instituted with the criminal action (Rule 111, Sec. 1
[a]).
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-22.
2 Id., p. 23. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
3 Id., p. 24-27.
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 345
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
The offended party may thus intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense (Rule 110, Sec. 16).
WHEREFORE, the appearance of a private prosecutor shall be
allowed upon payment of the legal fees for these estafa cases pending
before this Court pursuant
4
to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are narrated by petitioner as follows:
On 10 December 2001, the Honorable Assistant City Prosecutor
Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of Quezon City Prosecutors Office
issued her Resolution in I.S. No. 01-15902, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Premises considered, there being PROBABLE CAUSE to charge
respondent for ESTAFA under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as amended by
PD 818 and for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it is respectfully
recommended that the attached Information be approved and filed in Court.
As a consequence thereof, separate informations were separately
filed against herein [p]etitioner before proper [c]ourts, for Estafa and
[v]iolation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Upon payment of the assessed and required docket fees by the
[p]rivate [c]omplainant, the informations for [v]iolation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against herein [p]etitioner were filed and raffled
to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 42,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 0108033 to 36.
On the other hand, the informations for [e]stafa cases against
herein [p]etitioner were likewise filed and raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-106256 to 59.
On 17 June 2002, petitioner through counsel filed in open court
before the [p]ublic [r]espondent an Opposition to the Formal Entry
of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor dated 14 June 2002.
_______________
4 June 27, 2002 Order; Rollo, p. 23.
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
The [p]ublic [r]espondent court during the said hearing noted the
Formal Entry of Appearance of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as [p]rivate
[p]rosecutor as well as the Opposition filed thereto by herein
[p]etitioner. x x x.
As ordered by the Court, [p]rivate [c]omplainant through
counsel filed her Comment to the Opposition of herein [p]etitioner.
On 27 June 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent court issued the first
assailed Order allowing the appearance of the [p]rivate [p]rosecutor
in the above-entitled criminal cases upon payment of the legal fees
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On 31 July 2002, [a]ccused through counsel filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated 26 July 2002.
On 16 August 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent court issued the
second assailed Order5
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
herein [p]etitioner.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Noting petitioners opposition to the private prosecutors
entry of appearance, the RTC held that the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1) waives the
civil action, (2) reserves the right to institute it separately, or
(3) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Considering that the offended party had paid the
corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior to the filing
of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), the RTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear
and intervene in the proceedings.
6 _______________
Hence, this Petition.
_______________
5 Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 153-155.
6 The case was deemed submitted for decision on May 28, 2004,
upon receipt by this Court of Petitioners Memorandum signed by
Atty. Redemberto R. Villanueva. Respondents Manifestation and
Motion For Leave to Adopt Comment as Memorandum, signed by
Assistant Solicitor General Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Associate
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 347
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
Issues
Petitioner raises this sole issue for the Courts consideration:
Whether or not a [p]rivate [p]rosecutor can be allowed to intervene
and participate in the proceedings of the above-entitled [e]stafa cases
for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from
the issuance of the checks 7involved which is also subject matter of
the pending B.P. 22 cases.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue: Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar
to Civil Action in Estafa Case
Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising
from the criminal case pending before the MTC for violation
of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil
action in the criminal case for estafa now pending before the
RTC. She hinges her theory on the following provisions of
Rules 110 and 111 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal
action.Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
Solicitor Josephine de Sagon Mejia, was received by the Court on August 20,
2003.
7 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; Rollo, p. 155.
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against
the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or
information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment awarding such damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of
the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages
are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the
civil and criminal actions.
Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may
intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the
following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime
and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises
in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the
nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil
indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil
action, (b) ex-
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 349
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
pressly reserve the right to do so, or (c) the suit has already
been instituted. In any of these instances, the private
complainants interest in the case disappears and criminal
prosecution8 becomes the sole function of the public
prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the instant
case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from
intervening in the estafa suit.
True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give
rise to two criminal liabilitiesone for estafa and another for
violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing
check involves only one civil liability for 9
the offended party,
who has sustained10
only a single injury. This is the import of
Banal v. Tadeo, which we quote in part as follows:
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that Every man criminally liable is
also civilly liable (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying
this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person
commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he
had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most
complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be
misleading in its implications especially where the same act or
omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in
another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed
independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it
is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a
misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that the civil
liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis,
it does not. While an act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because
it is a crime
_______________
8 Gorospe v. Gamaitan, 98 Phil. 600, 602, March 14, 1956.
9 See Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540, February 23, 1989.
10 156 SCRA 325, 329-330, December 11, 1987, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things
pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his
own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or
not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability
will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the
foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions
for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission
complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also
causes material damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on
Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).
Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of
issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil
actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22
violation prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and
violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly
allows, even automatically in the present case, the institution
of a civil action without need of election by the offended
party. As both remedies are simultaneously11
available to this
party, there can be no forum shopping.
Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner
ultimately espouses. At the present stage, no judgment on the
civil liability has been rendered in either criminal case. There
is as yet no call for the offended party to elect remedies and,
after choosing one of them, be considered barred from others
available to her.
Election of Remedies
Petitioner is actually raising the doctrine of election of
remedies. In its broad sense, election of remedies refers to
the choice by a party to an action of one of two or more
coex-
_______________
11 See Cancio v. Isip, 391 SCRA 393, November 12, 2002.
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 351
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
isting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of
the same facts, but the term has been generally limited to a
choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights, the
assertion of one being necessarily
12
repugnant to, or a
repudiation of, the other. In its more restricted and
technical sense, the election of remedies is the adoption of
one of two or more coexisting 13
ones, with the effect of
precluding a resort to the others.
The Court further elucidates in Mellon Bank v. Magsino
14
as follows:
As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of
election of remedies is not to prevent recourse
15
to any remedy, but to
prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is regarded as an
application of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party
cannot, in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions
which form the basis of his respective remedies. However, when a
certain state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative
remedies, both founded upon the identical state of facts, these
remedies are not considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the
invocation of one remedy is not an election which will bar the other,
unless the suit upon the remedy first invoked shall reach the stage of
final adjudication or unless by the invocation of the remedy first
sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an advantage
16
thereby or caused detriment or change of situation to the other. It
must be
_______________
12 Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, 190 SCRA 633, 649, October 18, 1990, per
Fernan, CJ.
13 Id., citing People v. Court of Appeals, No. 54641, November 28, 1980, 101
SCRA 450, 463-464 citing Whitney v. Vermon [Tex. Civ. A] 154, 264, 267
and Southern R. Co. v. Attalla, 147 Ala. 653, 41 S. 664.
14 Ibid.
15 Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 603 P. 2d 793.
16 Giron v. Housing Authority of Opelousas, 393 So. 2d 1267.
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
pointed out that ordinarily, election of remedies is not made
17
until the
judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits.
Consonant with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, opined that while some American authorities hold that the
mere initiation of proceedings constitutes a binding choice of
remedies that precludes pursuit of alternative courses, the better rule
is that no binding election occurs before a decision 18
on the merits is
had or a detriment to the other party supervenes. This is because
the principle of election of remedies is discordant with the modern
procedural concepts embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure
which permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies in his claim for
relief without being required
19
to elect between them at the pleading
stage of the litigation.
In the present cases before us, the institution of the civil
actions with the estafa cases and the inclusion of another set
of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly
repugnant or inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the
Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in
20
a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law
precludes the institution in an estafa case of the
corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the
issuance of the same check.
The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by
Justice Florenz D. Regalado (ret.), former chairman of the
committee tasked with the revision of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. He clarified that the special rule on BP 22 cases
was added, because the dockets of the courts were clogged
with such litigations; creditors were using the courts as
collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for
actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary
inclusion
_______________
17 Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Tracy, 557 P. 2d
639, 276 Or. 1193; Johnson v. Daves Auto Center, 257 Or. 34, 476
P. 2d 190.
18 Radiowealth, Inc. v Lavin, L-18563, April 27, 1963, 7 SCRA
804.
19 Giron v. Housing Authority of the City of Opelousas, supra.
20 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 353
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
of a civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the
face value of the check involved was laid down to prevent
the practice of creditors of using the threat of a21 criminal
prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge.
Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule to
preclude the prosecution of the civil action that corresponds
to the estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The crimes
of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and distinct
from each other. There is no identity of offenses involved,
for which legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked in the
other. The offenses charged in the informations are perfectly
distinct from each other in point of22
law, however nearly they
may be connected in point of fact.
What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits is the
reservation to file the corresponding civil action. The
criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. [U]nless a separate civil action has been filed
before the institution of the criminal action, no such civil
action can be instituted after the criminal action has been
23
filed as the same has been included therein. In the instant
case, the criminal action for estafa was admittedly filed prior
to the criminal case for violation of BP 22, with the
corresponding filing fees for the inclusion 24
of the
corresponding civil action paid accordingly.
_______________
21 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 9th
revised ed., pp. 293-294.
22 Ada v. Virola, 172 SCRA 336, 341, April 17, 1989.
23 Agpalo, Handbook on Criminal Procedure (2001), pp. 96-97.
Emphasis supplied.
24 Section 20, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Other Fees.The following fees shall also be collected by the
clerks of Regional Trial Courts or courts of the first level, as the case may be:
(a) In estafa cases where the offended party fails to manifest within fifteen
(15) days following the filing of the in-
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
Furthermore, the fact that the Rules do not allow the
reservation of civil actions in BP 22 cases cannot deprive
private complainant of the right to protect her interests in the
criminal action for estafa. Nothing in the current law or rules
on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the corresponding civil 25
case exclusively in the court trying the BP 22 criminal case.
In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to
leave the offended parties without any remedy to protect
their interests in estafa cases. Its power to promulgate the
Rules of Court is limited in the sense that rules shall
26
not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Private
complainants
_______________
formation that the civil liability arising from the crime has been or
would be separately prosecuted[.]
25 Unlike in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (Revising
Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special Court to Be Known
as Sandiganbayan and For Other Purposes, December 10, 1978), as
amended, which provides:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with
it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall
be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may
be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate action shall be deemed abandoned.
26 See Abellana v. Marave, 156 Phil. 79; 57 SCRA 106, May 29,
1974. Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 355
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified not only
for the prosecution of her interests, but also for the speedy
and inexpensive
27
administration of justice as mandated by the
Constitution.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the
private prosecutor may intervene before the RTC in the
proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the
corresponding civil action in the proceedings for violation of
BP 22 pending before the MTC. A recovery by the offended
party under one remedy, however, necessarily bars that under
the other. Obviously stemming
28
from the fundamental rule
against unjust enrichment, this is in essence the rationale for
the proscription in our law against double recovery for the
same act or omission.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed Order AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Corona, J., On Official Leave.
Petition dismissed, assailed order affirmed.
_______________
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
27 See Banal v. Tadeo Jr.; supra, p. 331.
28 Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 541, 545, February 23, 1989.
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abad vs. Guimba
Notes.The judgment creditors having received what is
due them, should not seek nor be granted anything more, not
even by a final and executory judgment, for to do so would
be to sanction unjust enrichment. (Buan vs. Court of Appeals,
235 SCRA 424 [1994])
A party can not be required to pay twice for the same
items, for it would be tantamount to unjust enrichment on the
part of the other party. (Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 291
SCRA 656 [1998])
o0o