CIVIL LAW REVIEW SET 2

1. JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA,

complainants, vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B.
ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, respondents

FACTS: Respondent Judg Palaypayon, Jr. had been administratively charged with illegal solemnization
of 7 marriages. Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. As a consequence, the couples marriage contracts did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

Respondent judge denied that he illegally solemnized such marriages and in fact the marriage contracts
did not have his signature.

ISSUE: Did the respondent judge illegally solemnized marriages and if so, what is the effect of the
absence of the marriage license on such solemnized marriages?

RULING: Yes. The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia,
a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and
that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

In the marriage contract of one of the couples (Abellano and Edralin), which did not bear any date either
when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and
seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6)
years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been
less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe.
Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty
to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in
order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.

2. GRACIANA GERONIMO v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On January 7, 1955, Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman were married in Pateros. On
June 2, 1987, Graciana died without a will, leaving no descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by
her husband Antonio Esman, two siblings and a nephew. One of the siblings is herein petitioner Ireneo
who filed a letter of administration of the estate of the deceased. Ireneo questioned the capacity of
Antonio Esman to inherit and administer the property on account that their marriage was celebrated
without a Marriage License. To support its claim, Ireneo alleged that the certification issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of Pateros shows that the Marriage License No. 5038770 was not stated in the Marriage
Contract, and that the Marriage License No. 5038770 which was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros
was not really issued to Pateros, but to Pasig in October 1959.

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On the other hand, Antonio Esman presented a copy of the Marriage Contract filed with the National
Archives and Records Section where the Marriage License No. 5038770 does appear. He argued that the
omission of the Marriage License number on the Registry of Marriages in the Local Civil Registrar is not
fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no marriage license was actually issued before their
marriage.

ISSUE: Whether the non-recording of the marriage license number would make the marriage void

HELD: NO. The Court ruled that what really happened in the Marriage License of Graciana and Antonio
was non-recording and not certainly non-issuance of the license itself.

It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable forms of the Government like the
Marriage License come from the National Printing Office and are printed with serial numbers. These
forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the city/municipal treasurers concerned. But the serial
numbers printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers used in the succeeding years when
the same forms are again printed for distribution. However, the distribution of the serially-numbered forms
do not follow the same pattern.

This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which Petitioner Ireneo refused to
acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage License No. 5038770 was requisitioned and received
by the Municipality of Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal and
later used by Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo in their marriage on January 07, 1955, another,
marriage license bearing the same number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality of Pasig in
October, 1959. Subsequently, still another marriage license bearing No. 5038770 was also issued to the
Treasurer of Pasay City on June 29, 1976 that was used by a certain Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina
Guadiz. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

3.LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,

Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.

FACTS: Complainant Lupo Atienza filed an administrative complaint against the respondent Judge
alleging that the latter has been cohabiting with his wife while the respondent judge is still married with
certain Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children.

Respondent denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor
on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of
the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June
5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years
ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December
4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because
his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides: The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

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Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering
that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the
second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE: Does Article 40 apply to the respondent judge?

RULING: Yes, with regard to his second marriage with Ongkiko.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40
to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA
229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of
marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the
time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never
secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before
one can get married.

Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were
married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his
sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.

4. MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia
Montellano, he begot four children (Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ireneo). With his second wife,
Flaviana Montellano, he begot only one child (Cresenciana). And sometime in 1930, Lupo got married
with Felipa Velasco, his third wife. They had three children ( Jacinto, Julian Paulina). Lupo Mariategui
died without a will on June 26, 1953. He left certain properties herein described as Lots Nos. 163, 66,
1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate.

Lupos descendants by his first and second marriage executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition whereby
they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Later on, a decree of land
registration OCT No. 8828 was issued in their name. On the other hand, Lupos descendants by his third
marriage filed a Complaint praying for the partition of his estate and annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, since they were allegedly deprived of their rights as lawful heirs.

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ISSUES:
(1) Whether there is a presumption of marriage between a man and a woman have lived as husband and
wife

(2) Whether the children of Lupo by his third marriage are legitimate children duly entitled to their
respective legitimes

HELD:

(1)(OVERRULED BY EFFECTIVTY OF CIVIL CODE) YES. Courts look upon the presumption of
marriage with great favor so much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and
such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted
as a fact. In the present case, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully
married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui tohis
child Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he
and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no
marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these
facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present. However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code
of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules.

(2) YES. Article 172 of the Civil Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established
by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Applying the said article, Jacintos birth certificate is a
record of birth referred to in the Art. 172. In the case of the other two children Julian and Paulina - they
may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously
enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto. Moreover,
the undisputed fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the
children and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. In view of the foregoing, there can be no
other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and
therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an Action for Recognition is inapplicable to
this case.

5. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

FACTS: The Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed an administrative complaint against the
respondent judge with gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan
and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.Respondent judge holds office
and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The
wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not
fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

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Respondent Judge argued that the marriage of Tagadan and Borja, he merely relied on the affidavit
issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first
wife have not seen each other for almost seven years and therefore his wife is already presumed dead.

With respect to the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1
of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

ISSUE:

(1) Is the joint affidavit sufficient proof that Tagadans wife is presumptively dead to allow respondent
judge to proceed with the solemnization of Tagadans marriage with Borga?
(2) Is the respondent judge clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte?

RULING:

(1) No. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse."

Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the
Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error the part of respondent judge to
have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law
has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code,
"The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not
falling under Article 41."

(2) No, but such defect will not invalidate the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario.Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity inthe
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the

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 judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

6. PILAPIL v. SOMERA

FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler
in the Federal Republic of Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila and begot
one child. However, marital discord set in, and it was followed by a separation de facto in April 1982.
Erich Ekkehard filed a divorce proceeding in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court on the ground
that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. Thereafter, a
decree of divorce was issued on January 1986.

Five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Erich Ekkehard filed two informations for adultery
against Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, alleging that she had an affair with two other men - William Chia and
Jesus Chua as early as 1982 and sometime in 1983. Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil field several motions
with the trial court, but to no avail. Hence, the present petition. This is anchored on the main ground that
the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted, since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint."

ISSUE: Whether Erich Ekkehard may still commence the adultery case against his former spouse

HELD: NO. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery
and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else. Accordingly, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Article 344 thus presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action.

American jurisprudence yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on
the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.

In the present case, the fact that Erich Ekkehard obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as Erich Ekkehard is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons. Under the same considerations and rationale, Erich Ekkehard, being no longer the

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husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

7. ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID
NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis

FACTS: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUES:
(1) Should the parties be capacitated to marry each other during the entire 5-year cohabitation
contemplated by law to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license?
(2) Do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his
death?

RULING:

(1) Yes. Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent,
only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other
that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid
under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse.
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.

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 (2) Yes.
"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between
any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts."

The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annullable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having
never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.

That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54
of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

8. SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: First Lieutenant Leouel Santos of the Phil. Army, and Julia Bedia exchanged vows before MTC
Judge Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. They begot one child. They
lived with Julias parents, and because of her parents frequent interference with their family affairs, the
couple would start to quarrel. Later, Julia finally left for U.S to work as a nurse, despite Leouels pleas to
so dissuade her. Seven months thereafter, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance
telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the US, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail. This prompted him to file a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under
Article 36 of the Family Code" on the ground that Julias failure to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Louel and Julia be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code

HELD: NO. The Family Code did not define the term Psychological Incapacity under Art 36. The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee show that the members thereof
intended to not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would
like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

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However, the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The factual
settings in the present case, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to
every individual problem.

9. CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

10. SUSAN NICDAO CARINO v. SUSAN YEE CARINO

FACTS: During the lifetime of late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages. The first was
on June 20, 1969 with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario and the second was on November 10, 1992 with
respondent Susan Yee Cario, with whom he cohabited for almost ten years. Later, SPO4 . Cario died
under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. During the funeral, it was
only then when Susan Yee learned that SPO4 Cario had a first wife. The two Susans filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies, wherein they were able to collect money claims. Susan Yee filed a case for collection of money
against Susan Nicdao praying that the latter would be ordered to return at least one-half of the money
claims it received.

Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between Susan Nicdao and the deceased.
This is entirely because she is not aware of SPO4 Carios previous marriage. However, she alleged that
the said first marriage was void because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether the two marriages are void ab initio

HELD: YES.
st
Marriage of SPO4 Cario and Susan Nicdao (1 marriage)

Under the Civil Code, valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of amarriage. This notwithstanding, the records of the present case reveal
that the marriage contract of Susan Nicdao and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Susan Nicdao and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome, and it is undoubtedly void ab initio.
nd
Marriage of SPO4 Cario and Susan Yee (2 marriage)

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant
case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without

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first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence,
the marriage of Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

11. DE DIOS CARLOS v. SANDOVAL

FACTS: Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn
over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.Eventually, the first three (3) parcels
of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of
respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action asserting that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father
of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

The RTC rendered a Decision declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and
Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted inthis case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license and Declaring that
the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late
Teofilo E. Carlos.

The CA, however, reversed the trial court on appeal.

ISSUE:

(1) Can persons not parties to the marriage file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage?

(2) The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.[24] But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that
any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

RULING:
(1) As a general rule, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or wife.The exceptions are:
a. Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC; and
b. Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

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 The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build
the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are
simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone
can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by
law.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional
right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15,2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is
so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.

(2) No. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person
to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[25]
Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

**The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to

seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

12. AMOR-CATALAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,Pangasinan.

Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens
thereof. After 38 years of marriage, they obtained a divorce decre. On June 16, 1988, Orlando contracted
a second marriage with Merope Braganza in Calasiao, Pangasinan.

Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the second marriage against Orlando and Merope,
contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with one
Eusebio Bristol. To support her claim, she alleged that the second marriage which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, and this confers her an interest to seek judicial remedy to
address her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicitas has the legal personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage of Orlando and Merope

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HELD: The Court properly remanded the case to the trial court in order to determine whether Felicitas
and Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been
judicially granted a divorce decree. Such determination may grant Felicitas a legal personality to file the
petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensaet thoro, or the foreign law may
restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.

However, the Court further ruled that if there was indeed a divorce decree and it does not restrict a
remarriage, it is correct to rule that Felicitas has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity
of marriage. Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest
nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently
contract.

Under the Civil Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. In fine, Felicitas personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it.

13. VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between
him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which
he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married
to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed
her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. The RTC found petitioner guilty
of bigamy. The CA affirmed the trial court.

In this petition, Tenebro

(1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and
(2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are
absent, and prays for his acquittal.

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the
National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila, dated February 3, 1997. Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no
record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986.

ISSUE:
(1) Did petitioner Tenebro provide sufficient evidence to invalidate his marriage to Villareyes?

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 (2) Does the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas?

RULING:
(1) No. The documents he presented merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record
of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as
to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. The marriage contract
presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is
absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil
registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage.

The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense
that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for
validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of
the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
marriage had all the requisites for validity.

(2) No.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners

valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a
subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least
insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.

***NOTE:Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these
effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

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