Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Piansay v David (1964) 1. WoN the chattel mortgage and the sale between Uy Kim and
Piansay were valid.
Petition: Appeal from an order of CFI Manila
Petitioners: SALVADOR PIANSAY and CLAUDIA V. VDA. DE UY PROVISIONS: Art 416 of the Civil Code
KIM
Respondents: CONRADO S. DAVID and MARCOS MANGUBAT RULING + RATIO:
Ponencia: Concepcion 1. No.
Mrs. Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the alleged chattel
DOCTRINE: Regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a mortgage constituted in her favor, because it was in reality a
chattel mortgage on a house, as between the parties to the said mere contract of an unsecured loan.
contract, the same cannot and doesnt bind third persons who o Even if the chattel mortgage was registered, since
arent parties to the aforementioned contract or their privies. what was conveyed was in the nature of real property,
the registration of the document in the registry of
FACTS: chattels is merely a futile act and produces no effect.
1. Conrado S. David received a loan of P3,000 with interest at She could not, in the same token, have sold it validly to
12% per annum from Claudia B. Vda. de Uy Kim. For this loan, Salvador Piansay.
David executed a chattel mortgage on a house situated at
1259 Sande Street, Tondo, Manila. Regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel
mortgage on a house, as between the parties to the said
2. The mortgaged house was sold at public auction and was sold contract, the same cannot and doesnt bind third persons who
to Uy Kim in the said foreclosure proceedings. Uy Kim then arent parties to the aforementioned contract or their privies.
sold the said house to Marcos Mangubat. o As a consequence, the sale of the house in question
in the proceedings for the sale of the house in the
3. Mangubat filed a complaint (Civil Case #29078) against David proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said
in the CFI Manila, for the collection of the loan of P2,000 and chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar as
the annulment of the deed of absolute sale executed by Uy Mangubat is concerned and didnt confer upon Kim
Kim in favor of Salvador Piansay. (Note: It seems Uy Kim sold as buyer in said sale, any dominical right in and to
the mortgaged house to two people, Mangubat and Piansay) said house.
a. Decision was rendered ordering David to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P2,000 and dismissing the DISPOSITION: Appealed cases are affirmed with costs against
complaint to annul the sale, declaring the Piansay as petitioners.
rightful owner of the house.
b. CA reversed this decision saying David is the rightful
owner of the house.
ISSUE:
Author: Danielle Marie C. Tan
SIBAL V VALDEZ (1927) RULING + RATIO:
Petitioner:Leon Sibal Yes, Sugar cane in the case at bar is to be considered as personal
Respondent:Emiliano J. Valdez, Et. Al. property. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of
Ponencia: Johnson, J. the immovable. It belongs to the lessee, and may be sold by him,
whether it be gathered or not, and it may be sold by his judgment
DOCTRINE: creditors.
A crop raised on leased premises belongs to the lessee and in no Ungathered products have the nature of personal property. In other
sense forms part of the immovable. words, the phrase personal property should be understood to
include ungathered products. Crops, whether growing or standing in
Ungathered products have the nature of personal property. In other the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual
words, the phrase personal property should be understood to cultivation, no part of the realty
include ungathered products. Crops, whether growing or standing in
the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual Paragraph 2, Article 334 of the Civil Code interpreted by the
cultivation, no part of the realty Tribunal Supremo de Espana as that growing crops may be
considered as personal property
FACTS:
Sugar cane may come under the classification of real property as
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff "ungathered products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code,
of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the which enumerates as real property as "Trees, plants, and ungathered
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the products, while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part
defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff of any immovable property." That article, however, has received in
and his tenants on seven parcels of land. recent years an interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de Espaa,
which holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be
Plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the considered as personal property. (Decision of March 18, 1904, vol.
defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the 97, Civil Jurisprudence of Spain.) Thus, under Spanish authorities,
latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he pending fruits and ungathered products may be sold and transferred
may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest as personal property. Also, the Supreme Court of Spain, in a case of
corresponding thereto. ejectment of a lessee of an agricultural land, held that the lessee was
entitled to gather the Products corresponding to the agricultural year
However, Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar because said fruits did not go with the land but belonged separately to
cane to the plaintiff. the lessee. And further, under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909, as
amended, the mortgage of a piece of land does not include the fruits
Meanwhile, defendant argued that the sugar cane was personal and products existing thereon, unless the contract expressly provides
property hence not subject to redemption. otherwise
DISPOSITION:
3. Sy Qui then sold the boat to Rivera for 2500 pesos on Jan 4, 1915
and had it registered in the Bureau of Customs on March 17, DISPOSITION: Judgment is affirmed with costs against appellant.
1915.
ISSUE:
1. WoN Rubiso has a better right to the boat Valentina.
PROVISIONS:
Article 573 of the Code of Commerce: Merchant vessels constitute
property which may be acquired and transferred by any of the
means recognized by law. The acquisition of a vessel must
appear in a written instrument, which shall not produce any effect
with respect to third persons if not inscribed in the registry of
vessels.
Author: Carlo Africa
Philippine Refining Co. vs. Jarque RULING + RATIO:
1) Yes they are personal property making them subject to the Chattel
Petition: Appeal from judgement Mortgage law.
Petitioner: Philippine Refining Co.
Respondent: Francisco Jarque Vessels are considered as personal property under the civil law (Code of
Ponencia: Malcom, J. Commerce) and under the common law. Therefore since they are personal
property they are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
Doctrine: Vessels are considered as personal property under the civil law
(Code of Commerce) and under the common law. Therefore since they are 2) No, the mortgages on the boats are not valid as the lack
personal property they are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage requirements provided by law and therefore they cannot be foreclosed.
Law. Failure to conform to the requirements of the said law makes the chattel
mortgage unenforceable against third persons. The Chattel Mortgage law requires a sufficient chattel mortgage to include an
affidavit of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The
absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and
FACTS: subsequent encumbrancers. Therefore this chattel mortgage in
unenforceable against third persons.
1. Philippine Refining Co. and Franciso Jarque executed 3 mortgages
on the motor vessels named Pandan and Zaragoza. These were
recoreded as chattel mortgages but the first two mortgages did not
append an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage did but it was
not registered in the customs house within the 30 day period prior to THREE MORTGAGES -- PRC AND JARQUE
the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque on these were recorded as chattel mortgage
May 17.
First two - not registered
2. A fourth mortgage was executed between Jarque and Aboitiz on FIRST THREE to PRC
Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry also
FOURTH MORTGAGE to JARGUE to ABOITIZ--
within the 30 day period before the commencement of insolvency
registered
proceedings on May 12.
JARQUE -- I'm insolvent!!!!
3. The insolvency proceedings began on June 2 where Jarque was
declared as an insolvent debtor which resulted in the execution of all
the properties for Jose Carominas.
ISSUES:
W/N the vessels are personal property which makes them subject to the
chattel mortgage law
W/N the mortgages on the boats are valid and therefore can be foreclosed.
Author: Ramirez
US v Carlos (1911) True test of what is the proper subject of larceny is not
whether it is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is
Petition: Appeal from a judgment of CFI capable of appropriation by another than the owner.
Petitioners: United States It is settled that illuminating gas may be the subject of
Respondents: Ignacio Carlos
Ponencia: Per Curiam larceny. Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of
merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property,
DOCTRINE: and is capable of appropriation by another.
The true test of what may be stolen (or what can be considered a
personal property) is not whether it is corporeal or incorporeal, but DISPOSITION: No error in holding that electricity is a subject of
whether, being possessed of value, a person other than the owner, may larceny.
appropriate the same.
FACTS:
1. Ignacio Carlos was accused of the crime of theft for stealing 2,273
kilowatts of electric current worth P 909.20, the property of Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Company.
2. The court issued a warrant of arrest. He demurred and refused to
enter a plea. He claims that what he did does not constitute and
offense.
3. His counsel asserts that larceny applies only to corporeal property.
The subjects of larceny are tangibles, movables, chattels,
something that can be taken away, and some that had intrinsic
value. Electricity is said to be an unknown force.
4. He was guilty and was sentenced to 1 year and 8 months and 21
days presidio correccional. From this, Carlos appeals.
ISSUE:
1. WoN electrical energy may be stolen
PROVISIONS:
Art 416(3): Forces of nature which are brought under control by science.
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES.
In US v Genato, the defendant used a jumper to steal
electricity. It was ruled that even without ordinances, the
right of ownership of electric current is secured.
Electricity is no longer regarded as fluid, but its
manifestations and effects, like those of gas, can be seen
and felt.
Author: Carlo Africa
United States v. Tambuntin
FACTS:
1. Accused and his wife were occupants of the upper floor of a house
where the Manila Gas Corporation installed apparatus for the
delivery of gas.
2. Occupants who asked to install this vacated the same house and this
the gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the meter.
3. However the company visited the house later on and found that gas
was being used without the knowledge and consent of the gas
company. It was being used by the accused and his wife for around 2
months as an iron pipe was inserted in the gap where the gas meter
was formerly placed.
ISSUES:
W/N the gas can be the subject of larceny.
RULING + RATIO:
1) Yes gas can be the subject of larceny.
There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which
renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. It s a
valuable article of merchandise bought and sold like other personal property,
susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being
transported from place to place.
Issue:
Involuntary Insolvency of Paul Strochecker
vs. Ildefonso Ramirez 1.) Whether or not Ramirez claim to the mortgage should be given
preference over Fidelity and
Paul Strochecker - Appellee Co on the grounds of :
Ildelfonso Ramirez - Creditor and Appellant
William Edmonds - Assignee A.) That the first mortgage of Strochecker with
Fidelity & Surety Co. is not valid because the property
Doctrine: Half-interest over a business is a movable property. which is the subject matter thereof is not capable of
being mortgaged
Facts:
Held+Ratio:
1.) On March 10, 1919, Strochecker executed a mortgage in
favor of the Fidelity & Surety Co. and registed in due time in the 1.) No. As to the first ground, the thing that was mortgaged to the
registry of property. corporation was described as a drug business known as Antigua
Botica Ramirez. With regard to the nature of the property thus
mortgaged, which is one-half interest in the business described,
2.) On September 22, 1919 another mortgage was
such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and
executed in favor of Ramirez and the mortgage was also not included in the enumeration of real properties in article
registered in the registry. 335 of the Civil code and may be the subject of mortgage.
All personal property may be mortgaged.
3.) Ramirez claims preference on the mortgage on the following
grounds:
DOCTRINE: On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the
The mere reclamation of foreshore or submerged areas by the PEA administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended
doesnt convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into JVA.
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
FACTS: petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
On November 20, 1973 the government signed a contract with the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also ISSUES:
included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty WON the physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged
percent of the total reclaimed land. areas make the land inalienable and disposable lands of public domain.
On February 4, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA PROVISION: Sec.3 Art. 12 of the Constitution, Title I and III of CA No. 141
tasked "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to
develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands RULING + RATIO:
and later issued PD No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal NO. Foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere
physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does
On December 29, 1981, President Marcos issued a memorandum directing not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable
PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP and disposable lands of the public domain.
x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA."
Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands
of the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal
On November 29, 1996, Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother the public domain, open to disposition.
of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The PEA and Amari
Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL
7
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the and VOID ab initio.
Digest Author: Leiron Martija
Republic v Court of Appeals (1997) RULING + RATIO:
Petitioner: DIRECTOR OF LANDS, SOLICITOR GENERAL 1) NO
It is no longer public domain because it has already been granted to
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, Mrs Morato et al. Morato under the Homestead Patent, which is as indefeasible as a
Torrens title.
Ponencia: PANGANIBAN, J. o BUT!
4. The Director of Lands sends investigators upon reports that the land
was being subjected to encumbrances. They find the allegations to
be valid, and subsequently revoke the Homestead Patent.
ISSUES:
Is the land still public domain?
Can the government revoke the patent?
Author: Joss P.
Lanzar v. Director of Lands (1977) whatsoever has been made of any portion of them to private
persons, remain part of the public domain and are of public
Petition: Petition to Review on Certiorari CA Decision uses.
Petitioner: RAMON LANZAR, 2. Until they are converted to patrimonial property by the State,
Respondent: DIRECTOR OF LANDS and CITY OF ILOILO,. they are not susceptible of prescription as they are not within
Ponencia: FERNANDEZ, J. the commerce of men.
DOCTRINE: DISPOSITION:
Law of Waters:
ISSUES:
1. WoN the title may be registered on the ground of 30 years of
adverse possession by Lanzar
1. The shores and land reclaimed from the sea while they
continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant
Digest Author: Alexi Calda
ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits
caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When
IGNACIO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS (1960) they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
Petitioner: FAUSTINO IGNACIO special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall
Respondent: DIRECTOR OD LANDS AND LAUREANO declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
VALERIANO thereto and as increment thereof.
Ponencia: MONTEMAYOR
DOCTRINE: Land formed by the action of the sea is property of RULING + RATIO: YES.
the state. Until a formal declaration on the part of the Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the
Government, through the executive department or the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in
Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or
needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain,
industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not not available for private appropriation of ownership.
available for private appropriation of ownership.
DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed.
FACTS:
5. The Dir of Land on the other sought that the parcel of land is a
foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide, thus
forming part of the public domain.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the parcel of land is part of the public domain.
PROVISION:
1. Art. 420 of the Civil Code
RATIO/HELD:
DOCTRINE: Streets are for Public Use 6. As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del '96 Street,
A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of through the tolerance of the public respondents, and in clear violation
man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease of the decision it Civil Case No. C-12921, Dacanay filed the present
or other contract. petition for mandamus on June 19, 1990, praying that the public
respondents be ordered to enforce the final decision in Civil Case
FACTS: No. C-12921 which upheld the city mayor's authority to order the
1. On January 5, 1979, MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the demolition of market stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes del
Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city and '96 Streets and to enforce P.D. No. 772 and other pertinent laws.
municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets.
Pursuant, thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up seven (7) flea .
markets in that city. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96" ISSUES:
where the petitioner lives. WoN public streets may be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue
of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?
2. In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City,
caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del '96, V.
Gozon and Gonzales streets. To stop Mayor Martinez' efforts to clear PROVISION: Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code
the city streets, stallowners filed an action for prohibition against the
City of Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the City Engineer and/or RULING + RATIO:
their deputies (Civil Case No. C-12921) in the Regional Trial Court of NO.
Caloocan City, Branch 122, praying the court to issue a writ of There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private
preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to discontinue the respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, as
demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the action. found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy
3. The court issued the writ prayed for. However, on December 20, portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been
1987, it dismissed the petition and lifted the writ of preliminary leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and
injunction which it had earlier issued. The trial court observed that void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets
the Heroes del '96 street, V. Gozon street and Gonzales street, being may not be bargained away through contract.
of public dominion must, therefore, be outside of the commerce of
man. The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of
Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted
4. However, shortly after the decision came out, the city administration licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves
in Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not
successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latter's policy of infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose
clearing and cleaning up the city streets. they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and
pedestrians.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted
Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles
Petitioner: Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. PROVISION:
Respondent: Judge Pascual Bercilles
Ponencia: Concepcion, Jr., J. Civil Code
Digest Author: Gullas, J. Article 422: Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
DOCTRINE: Patrimonial Property State
Property of public dominion becomes patrimonial property of the state when
no longer intended for public use or public service. The city council is the Cebu City Charter
competent authority to determine whether or not a certain property is still Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to
necessary for public use. the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following
legislative powers:
FACTS: (34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or
square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
1. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City
Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the may be lawfully used or conveyed.
terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an
abandoned road, the same not being included in the City RULING + RATIO:
Development Plan. Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City
Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting I. YES. From the foregoing provision from the Cebu City Charter, it is
City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city
road or street.
2. The lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder a. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority
and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City competent to determine whether or not a certain property is
Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a still necessary for public use.
total consideration of P10,800.00. 3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of b. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And
absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered
instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered. with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or
collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed.
3. On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a So the fact that some private interests may be served
motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property incidentally will not invalidate the ordinance.
sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is II. Yes. Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's
considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it
commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
by any private individual. which can be the object of an ordinary contract