300 INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY : COGNITION

the illusion of silver cannot be established by some other cognition. A sublating cognition merely
establishes the non-existence of the object of the sublated illusion ; it does not ascertain the object of
the illusory cognition. The third alternative also cannot be maintained. It cannot be held that a nacre is
the object of the illusion of silver. For, in that case, everything present at the time of the cognition,
e. g. the proximate piece of land, etc., would be regarded as the object of the illusory cognition.54
Hence Prabhākara concludes that whatever is manifested in a cognition must be regarded as its object.
In the illusory cognition of silver, it is silver that is manifested in consciousness ; so silver must be
regarded as its object. It is foolish to regard a nacre as the object of the illusion of silver.
We have already found that, according to Prabhākara, there are two elements in an illusory
cognition. It is made up of a presentative element and a representative element which are not
discriminated from each other as long as the illusion lasts. This lack of discrimination between the two
elements is the cause of exertion for the appropriation or avoidance of the object of illusion. A
sublating cognition does not contradict an illusion, but simply recognizes the distinction between the
presentative element and the representative element involved in an illusion. In the illusory cognition
‘this is silver’, ‘this’ is not identical with ‘silver’, as the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti holds ; ‘this’ is
nothing but ‘this’ which is perceived, and ‘silver’ is nothing but ‘silver’ which is remembered ; ‘this’ is
one thing (e. g. brightness, etc.), and ‘silver’ is quite a different thing. The distinction between these
two is recognized when there is the so-called sublative cognition ‘this is not silver’. But why are not
the two elements discriminated from each other before the socalled sublative cognition ? Prabhakara
holds that the representative element does not appear in consciousness as representation owing to
obscuration of memory (smṛtipramoṣa).
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Vivekākhyāti : Prabhākara
holds that an illusion is a complex psychosis made up of presentative and representative elements
which cannot be discriminated from each other owing to obscuration of memory. But when the illusion
is contradicted by a sublative cognition, the presentative element is discriminated
54
NM., pp. 176-7. HIP., i, pp. 805-9.