CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-2ND EXAM CASE DIGESTS

RULES 114-116

RULE 114
Section 1

GOVT OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA

FACTS:

Munoz was charged criminally by the Govt of Hongkong. They requested that he be extradited.
He was initially arrested in 1997. When he applied for bail, it was denied, for the reason that bail
is not available in extradition. However, years later, without the case arriving at a decision, Judge
Olalia granted Munoz motion to bail.
Hongkong claims that it is not available in that in extradition, there is no presumption of guilt in
that it is not a criminal proceeding and that the guilt or innocence is not in question.

Issue:
WON right to bail is available in extradition cases.

Ruling: Yes, despite being an administrative proceeding, bail is available. The court looked at the
various treaties PHL entered in as well as modern trends especially involving the Universal
Declaration of Rights.
What is common here is that in extradition, there is deprivation of liberty and that the means and
machineries used are criminal in nature; provided, accused is not flight risk. The proof of evidence
required is clear convincing evidence.

Section 3
Ambil v SB
Facts:
Mayor Francisco Adalim was charged for the crime of murder and was detained. On the same day,
eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado ordered the
release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter
transferred from the provincial jail to the the governors residence. They were found guilty before
the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue:
WON Governor Ambil has the authority to order the transfer of the Mayor Adalim to his residence.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 3, Rule 114 provides no person under detention by legal process shall be released or
transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. The governor, despite
being a provincial jailer, has no authority to order release or transfer. It is clear in the letter of the
law that release and transfer of a detained person is only done through a court order or bail.

Section 4 and 5

People v. SB and Estrada

Facts:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, an informations for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 was filed against petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for [Jinggoy] and his co-
accused. On its basis, Jinggoy and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, Jinggoy filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he is entitled to
bail as a matter of right. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Jinggoys Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion. His alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all
accused. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign him
On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail. On
March 6, 2003, respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) granted the omnibus application
for bail. His bail was fixed at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00) to be paid in cash
and his release is ordered upon the posting thereof and its approval.

Issue:
Whether it is proper to grant Estradas petition for bail?

Ruling:
Yes.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. Jinggoy does not,
as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. The likelihood of escape on the part
individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that those who usually jump bail
are shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as long as they
can flee from the retribution of justice.
The grant of bail therein is predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence
adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the right to bail is
warranted. Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the same
Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits.
The SC that Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did not commit grave abuse of discretion when,
after conducting numerous bail hearings and evaluating the weight of the prosecutions evidence,
it determined that the evidence against individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis of
that determination, resolved to grant him bail.

Chua vs Chiok

Facts:
Chua filed an estafa case against Chiok before the RTC of Pasig. During promulgation of
judgment, Chiok and his counsel failed to appear despite notice. The RTC convicted Chiok of
estafa and the prosecution filed a motion for cancellation of Chioks bail on the ground that Chiok
might flee or commit another crime if released on bail. The court after hearing of bail issued an
Omnibus Order cancelling Chioks bail. Chiok then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
assailing the Omnibus Order to which the CA granted and held that Chiok should not be deprived
of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal as the offense he had committed is not a capital
offense.

Issues:
Whether the RTC was correct in cancelling Chioks bail? YES
What is the proper remedy in case ones bail is cancelled by the trial court? Motion for review

Held:
Yes. Pursuant to Sec 5 of Rule 114, bail is discretionary after conviction by the trial court of an
offense exceeding 6 years and if the bail negating circumstances are present. Particularly in this
case, paragraphs b,d and e are present. During promulgation of judgment, Chiok failed to appear
despite notice and such is considered as a violation as to the conditions of his bail. Further, it
demonstrates probability of flight and undue risk of committing another offense.
The proper remedy is provided under the last paragraph of sec 5 of the same rule. The appellate
court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party review the resolution of the trial court. Thus,
Chiok should have not filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, rather he should have simply
filed a motion to review said omnibus order in the same regular appeal proceedings.

OCA v. Judge Lorenzo

FACTS:
On November 6, 2001 a raid was conducted in a makeshift illegal drugs laboratory in Brgy.
Capitolyo, Pasig City. Three Filipinos were arrested while in the act of sniffing shabu and in
possession of 1.03 grams of sabu and paraphernalia. Also, five Chinese nationals were arrested
while manufacturing shabu.

Judge Lorenzo granted the petition for bail of the accused Filipinos without giving the prosecution
reasonable time and chance to oppose the petition for bail. The Chinese nationals were also granted
bail despite objection from the prosecution and despite strong evidence of guilt.
Issue: (1) Whether the offense committed by accused Filipinos is a bailable as a matter of right.
YES
Ruling: Pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 114, all persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter
of right xxx (b) before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by Death, Reclusion
Perpetua, or Life Imprisonment.
In the case at bar, the offense committed by accused Filipinos is punishable with prision
correccional (under MTC). Hence, the offense is bailable as a matter of right.
(2) Whether the grant of bail to accused Chinese Nationals is proper. No
Sec. 8, Rule 114 provides that there must be a bail hearing to determine as to whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong.
In the case at bar, Judge Lorenzo granted the bail without conducting a hearing. Hence, the
grant of bail is not proper as it violates Sec. 8, Rule 114.

PEOPLE VS. PLAZA

FACTS:

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to
Evidence.[2] The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by Order[3] of March 14, 2002, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the crime of homicide and not for murder, as charged. This
is because the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the information cannot be
appreciated in this case.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The defense thereupon presented evidence[4] in the course of which respondent filed a Motion to
Fix Amount of Bail Bond,[5] contending that in view of Judge Buysers ruling that the prosecution
evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. He thus prayed that
the bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00 which he claimed was the usual bond
for Homicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.
Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail
Bond.
By Order[7] of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the finding of Judge Buyser that
since the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is punishable by reclusion temporal
and, therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent could no longer be denied bail. He accordingly
granted respondents Motion and fixed the amount of his bond at P40,000.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of Judge Tan was denied for lack
of merit.[8]
Respondent was subsequently released[9] after he posted a P40,000 bond.

ISSUE:

W/N Plaza is entitled to bail.

HELD: YES.

Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons in
custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.

Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution evidence when
he denied the Demurrer and the latters statement that the evidence was sufficient to convict
respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine whether respondent was
entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the
prosecution.
The Peoples recourse to Section 5,[14] Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to
support its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said Section clearly
speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of conviction has already
been handed down by the trial court.

LEVISTE V. CA

FACTS

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.] It invoked the bedrock principle in
the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal
should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Citing well-established
jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing
medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner

failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued
confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger.
x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to
be attended by his personal physician.

For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed
pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a
preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed
by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

THE ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court
to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of
bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

SUPREME COURT RULING

No.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial

Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may
be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with
and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same
bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
 If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or

has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or

conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party,

review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party
in either case. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by
the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically
be granted.

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on
the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with
the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue
risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the
said circumstances.

The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of
retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
 Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused
may be summarized in the following rules:

xxxxxxxxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of

imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not
one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of

imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x] (emphasis supplied)

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is
of the same thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when

the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable death, reclusionperpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six

(6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall
be denied.[25] (emphasissupplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none
of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the
appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may
be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are
absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion,
that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate
courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the
allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself
sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is
present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize
the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that
are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a
simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the
established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.

In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail
pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination
of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position
is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted
pending appeal.

Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling
out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding
six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by
requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.

Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara

Facts:
A criminal case for murder was filed against Abdul and Dipatuan before the RTC of Marawi
City. Due to the death of the judge presiding RTC Branch 10 of Marawi, their case was then
transferred under the jurisdiction of Judge Mangotara. Said judge then rendered a judgment
against Abdul and Dipatuan finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder. In addition, Judge Mangotara then increased their bail bond from Php75,000 to
Php200,000.
Issue: W/N it was proper for Judge Mangotara to have increased the bail bond
Ruling: NO.

Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 114:

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution

In the case at bar, the judge had already found both Dipatuan and Abdul guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of murder which is an offense punishable by a penalty of
imprisonment that exceeds six years. The judge herein should have already cancelled their bail
instead of increasing the bail bond.

Qui v People
Facts:
Qui was charged with 2 counts of violation of Sec 10 of RA 7610. She was convicted by the
RTC and sentenced to 2 equal periods of imprisonment or an indeterminate penalty of 5y 4 mo
and 21d to 7y 4mo and 1d.
After filing her Notice of appeal, she also filed an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail pending
appeal before the CA.
The CA denied the application on the basis of Sec 5d of Rule 114 saying that failed to attend
several hearings before the RTC and that she was a flight risk.
Qui question this resolution saying among others that she should be accorded the constitutional
guarantee of innocence until proven guilty.
Issue:
Whether Qui is entitled to bail pending appeal
Held:
No. The CA correctly denied Quis application for bail on the ground that she is a flight risk, a
bail negating factor under Sec 5(d), Rule 114.
Upon examination of records, the Court found that:
She failed to attend several hearings before the RTC which compelled the said court to
issue 3 warrants of arrest. In one instance, she even lied about the death of her father to
excuse her absence
She also transferred residence without informing her bondsman
Considering these facts and circumstances, the Court found Quis propensity to evade the law.
Hence she should be denied bail.
PEOPLE vs. PIAD
Facts:
Piad, Villarosa, Carbo and Davis were all charged in separate Informations for violations
of RA 9165.
Davis (one of the accused) applied for and was granted bail, and secured a surety bond
with Summer Guaranty and Insurance Company.
Piad, Villarosa and Carbo were arraigned. However, Davis was not because he had
jumped bail.
Almost 3 years after, Davis was arrested and arraigned.
RTC: found the accused GUILTY.
CA: affirmed the conviction.
OSG: asserted that:
When Davis jumped bail, the RTC should have immediately cancelled his
bailbond;
He should have been placed under custody after the promulgation of the RTC
judgment; and
He had become a fugitive of justice who had lost his standing to appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Davis is entitled to bail as a matter of right or a matter of discretion. (A
MATTER OF RIGHT)
2. WON his bailbond should have been immediately cancelled when he jumped bail.
(YES)
HELD:
1. Davis is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Before conviction by the RTC, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than death, RP or LI (Section 4, Rule 114).
If it is punishable by death, RP or LI, then bail becomes a matter of discretion.
In case bail is granted, the accused must appear when the court requires his presence;
otherwise, his bail shall be forfeited (Section 21, Rule 114).
In the case at bar, Davis was charged with the crimes of illegal possession of drugs and
drug paraphernalia during a party.
Both offenses did not have a prescribed penalty of death, RP or LI.
Thus, bail is a matter of right.

2. Davis failed to appear before the RTC which considered him to have jumped bail.
At that point, the RTC should have immediately cancelled the bailbond of Davis with
Summit.
Furthermore, because Davis violated the conditions of his previous bail, any motion for
bail pending appeal should have been denied (pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114).
In the case at bar, though, when the RTC promulgated its decision for conviction, Davis
did not file any motion for bail pending appeal. Thus, since he jumped bail and no bail
pending appeal was secured, the RTC should have immediately issued a warrant of arrest
against him.
San Miguel vs Judge Maceda

Facts:
San Miguel was arrested for illegal sale, distribution of meth punishable by PC. He jumped bail.
Judge alumbres issued a bench warrant and cancelled his bail bail bond in the amount of 60k and
fixed a new bail bond in the amount of 120. The state prosecutor filed a motion to cancel his bail
on the ground that he is a flight risk. Judge maceda issued an order granting the motion.
San Miguel argues his right to bail is constitutionally guaranteed right and cant be defeated

Issue:
Won bail should be granted

Ruling:
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that before conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, all persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right.

Records show that complainant was charged with violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No.
6425 which is punishable by prision correccional. Following the provisions of the Constitution
and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, complainant is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

Section 7
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HU RUEY CHUN A.K.A. RICHARD HU

FACTS: The City Prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft against Hu in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City on July 18, 2002. The prosecutor recommended a bail of
P40,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the accused, based on DOJ Department Circular No. 74
issued on November 6, 2001, which reads:

B. FOR QUALIFIED THEFT:

3) Where the value of the property stolen is P32,000.00 or over, in which the imposable penalty
ranges from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal
in its maximum period, pursuant to Par. 2(a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by
P2,000.00, plus an additional P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00; Provided,
however, that bail shall not exceed P80,000.00.[8]

The RTC rejected the recommendation of the public prosecutor to grant bail to the accused in the
amount of P40,000.00.

The CA rendered judgment granting the petition and nullifying the assailed orders of the trial
court.[15] The appellate court cited DOJ Department Circular No. 74, which provides that
qualified theft is bailable.

ISSUE: Whether qualified theft, though carrying the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is bailable on
the basis of DOJ Circular No. 74 alone

RULING: NO

The Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.[27] Section 7, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that no person charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

xxx If the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the judge should not grant bail for his provisional release, regardless of whether
or not the prosecutor recommends bail for the provisional release of the accused under DOJ
Department Circular No. 74. However, if the accused has been brought under custody of the
court, he may file a petition for bail for his provisional liberty. If, after the requisite hearing,[29]
the court finds that the evidence of the accused is strong, the petition shall be
denied. Consequently, the accused will remain under the custody of the court. However, if the
evidence of guilt of the accused is not strong,[30] the petition shall be granted and the accused
discharged upon approval of the bail bond, in such amount fixed by the court, taking into
consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in tandem with DOJ Department Circular No. 74, as well as the recommendation of
the public prosecutor.

In this case, the respondent was charged with qualified theft of P762,076.35. In People v.
Caales,[31] the Court ruled that the penalty for qualified theft under Article 40 of the Revised
Penal Code, taking into account the value of the property stolen, is reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalty of death, with no possibility of pardon before the lapse of forty years
xxx
Since the imposable penalty for the felony charged is reclusion perpetua, the respondent was not
entitled to bail as a matter of right. Hence, the RTC was correct in rejecting the recommended
amount of bail of P40,000.00, and ordering the issuance of a warrant for the respondents arrest.

Valerio vs CA
Facts: Information of murder was filed against three persons arising from the death of Jun Valerio.
Also, an information for parricide was filed against the wife, Milagros. Milagros filed an
application for bail claiming that the evidence of guilt against her was not strong, which the RTC
granted. The killers pleaded guilty and implicated Milagros as principal by inducement of the
killing of her husband. However, Milagros contends that she is entitled to bail as a matter of right
because according to her, the evidence was not strong.
Issue: WON Milagros is entitled to bail as a matter of right?
Ruling: NO, Bail is not a matter of right where the person is charged with offense or an offense
punishable by RP or life imprisonment. Since the crime attributed to her was parricide which has
the penalty of RP to death, she is not entitled to bail as a matter of right

PEOPLE v. VALDEZ

FACTS:

Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half were for the complex crime of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles 2175 and 171,6 in
relation to Article 487 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). All the cases were raffled before public
respondent.

Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail", Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing of
a Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail.8 She argued that
the three cases are bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating or modifying
circumstance was alleged.

Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition9 that the charge constituting the complex crime
have the corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary. Instead of a motion to fix bail, a summary hearing to
determine if the evidence of guilt is strong is, therefore, necessary conformably with Section 13,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules.

Due to the issuance and release of a warrant of arrest, Valdez subsequently filed an Urgent
Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the
Amount of Bail with Additional Prayer to Recall/Lift Warrant of Arrest.10

As aforesaid, on October 10, 2014, public respondent granted the motions of Valdez. It recalled
the arrest order. In lieu thereof, a new arrest order was issued, fixing the bail for each offense
charged in said cases in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

ISSUE:

Whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
RULING:

The appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an accused who is charged with a
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00.

Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide:

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. (4a)

SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,

not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term "punishable" under the provisions
above-quoted?

In Our mind, the term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not imposable, penalty.

Following Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification
of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00, the "prescribed
penalty" is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. After trial, should
the commission of such crime be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the
"imposable penalty" is reclusion perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed
penalty of reclusion temporalmaximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in its
maximum.27 The falsification, which is the means used to commit the crime of malversation, is
in the nature of a generic aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the imposition of the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period.28 Both Articles 63 and 64 refer to the penalty to be
imposed after considering the aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s. Finally, the "penalty
actually imposed" is still reclusion perpetua, considering that the ISL finds no application as the
penalty is indivisible.29
The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is spot on had it not
confused imposable penalty with prescribed penalty. Nonetheless, reading through the text of the
assailed Resolution reveals that the anti-graft court actually meant prescribed penalty whenever
it referred to imposable penalty. Therefore, in essence, the ruling is correct. Respondent court
held:

If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be imposed in its maximum

period, there is no doubt that, in case of conviction, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. The cases, however, are still at their inception. Criminal proceedings are yet to
ensue. This is not the proper time, therefore, to call for the application of the penalty
contemplated under Article 48 by imposing the same in its maximum period.

For purposes of determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
it is the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime charged which should be
considered and, not the penalty to be actually imposed. Illustrative cases such as Catiis v.
Court of Appeals, et al. and People v. Hu Ruey Chun evidently confirm this to be so.

xxxx

In both cases, therefore, it is the penalty imposable for the offense charged that was
considered for purposes of bail.

A circumspect reading of substantive law validates this view. Section 13, Article III of
the Constitution provides that: x x x x

On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended,
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

Notably, the word used is ["punishable,"] which practically bears the same meaning as
"imposable." It is only logical that the reference has a direct correlation with the time
frame "before conviction" since trial is yet to begin; hence, it can only be the penalty
imposable of the offense charged that can be considered for purposes of bail.

In these cases, the offenses charged are the complex crimes of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents. In determining the penalty
imposable, it is the penalty for the most serious crime which is considered. Between
Malversation and Falsification, it is Malversation which provides the graver penalty. As
thus provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, "[i]f the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua."

The penalty, however, cannot be immediately applied in its maximum period,

or reclusion perpetua, since this will already consider the application of the penalty in the
event of a conviction.
 A clear perusal of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

The word used is "imposed," not imposable. Thus, the reference can only point to the
time when a judgment of conviction is impending. If and when "the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period," is thus
applied in the proper application of the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Certainly,
this cannot be considered for purposes of bail.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in charging a complex crime, the
information should allege each element of the complex offense with the same precision as if the
two (2) constituent offenses were the subject of separate prosecutions.31 Where a complex crime
is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the
defendant can be convicted of the offense proven.32

At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00. Falsification, like an aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during
the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the supposed crime
committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial has terminated that falsification
could be appreciated as a means of committing malversation. Further, it is possible that only the
elements of one of the constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse,
none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial.

It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the same only
after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust for Us to
give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused person's constitutional right to bail for
allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even considered as inherently grievous, odious
and hateful. To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the
constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law. When committed through falsification of official/public documents, the RPC
does not intend to classify malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in Republic Act No.
7659.33 If truly a non-bailable offense, the law should have already considered it as a special
complex crime like robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with homicide, and
kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Jose Ponce Enrile Vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:
 1. Enrile was charged for plunder at the Sandiganbayan occasioned on the misuse or
misappropriation of PDAF. Plunder is punished by Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Enrile filed his Omnibus Motion before the SB praying that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against him;
3. SB denied Enriles motion for being premature as Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law. Consequently, SB ordered the
arrest of Enrile;
4. Enrile voluntarily surrendered at the CIDG. He was later on confined at the PNP General
Hospital due to his health condition;
5. Now, Enrile filed his motion for fixing of bail. He argued that the prosecution has not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt is strong. That, although he was charged of plunder
punished by RP, he shall be charged of RT because he voluntarily surrendered. Also, he is
already above 70 years of age, and he is not a flight risk;
6. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion of Enrile through a resolution. SB contended that
Enrile has not even filed an application for bail. That, it is upon hearing can the court make
a determination WON the evidence of guilt is strong, and only such time that Enrile can
demand bail as a matter of right, and only then can the court determine or fix the amount
of bail.
7. Enrile filed his MR over the SBs resolution but was denied. Hence, this present petition
for review by the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON Enrile who was charged of Plunder punished by RP can post bail?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court explained that the attendant of mitigating circumstance i.e. Voluntary
surrender has no bearing in the determination WON a bail is matter of right or discretion. What
matters is the prescribed penalty for the offense. In this case, plunder that is punishable by RP. The
Court cited Sec 7 Rule 114 (Offenses when non-bailable). The Court also explained the
indispensability of hearing with notice to prosecution in determining WON the evidence of guilt
is strong for purposes of Bail citing the case of Cortes v Catral where the Court outlined the
guidelines for bail. HOWEVER, THE SUPREME COURT NEVERTHELESS GRANTED
BAIL TO ENRILE. the Court explained the purposes of bail that is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial or whenever required by the court. Further, it explained that Bail protects
due process and presumption of innocence. ENRILES Poor health condition justifies his
admission to bail. The Court explained that allowing Enrile to post bail could enable the latter to
properly attend to his medical condition, given the medical report that PNP General Hospital does
not have facilities for emergencies such that to respond when Enriles medical condition worsen.
Enriles better health attendant will benefit the Court as Enrile can cooperate with the legal
processes. Further, the Court cited the Philippine commitment to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights particularly the presumption of innocence and granting of bail. The Court also
explained that Enriles social standing and his past history of being charged for rebellion wherein
he was allowed to post bail showed his cooperation and respect to the legal processes.

People vs. Sobrepea

Facts: Dr. Sobrepea and his co-workers in Union College of Laguna were charged in several
informations for allegedly committing Estafa and Large Scale Illegal Recruitment before the
Regional Trial Court.

After a summary hearing conducted and based on the summary of evidence, the RTC in an order
denied the petition to bail. The RTC found that the evidence of guilt is STRONG.

Dr. Sobrepea et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC by stating that the evidence available on record merely
showed that Union College provided the venue and the English language training course and that
the RTC took out of context the statement appearing in the flyer INVEST IN YOUR FUTURE
GET THE SKILLS YOU NEED TO WORK, EARN, AND LIVE IN CANADA.

Thus, Adelfo Carandang filed a petition for review for the reversal of the decision of the CA
finding that the evidence of guilt is not strong.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in finding that the evidence of guilt is not strong.

Ruling: Yes. The CA erred in finding that the evidence of guild is not strong.

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states that no person charged with a capital offense or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

What is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is a matter
of judicial discretion that remains with the judge. The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a
hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court to determine the existence of
strong evidence or lack of it against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. "The court's grant or refusal of bail must
contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution on the basis of which should be formulated
the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused."

In the present case, the RTC held a summary hearing and based on the summary of evidence,
formulated its conclusion in denying the Petition to Bail. From a perspective of the CA Decision,
the issue therein resolved is not so much on the bail application but already on the merits of the
case. The matters dealt therein involved the evaluation of evidence which is not within the
jurisdiction of the CA.

Section 8
Gacad vs. Judge Clapis
Facts:
There was a pending criminal case for murder against the suspect who allegedly gunned down
Gacads brother. Gacad alleged that Judge Clapis employed several schemes to dismiss her case.
The judge set the hearing for the petition for bail where in fact there was not yet an application
for bail and Gacad was not notified. He also set a series of hearings. In these hearings, Gacad
was not represented by a counsel she was only represented on the last day of the hearing. But
they were not able to adduce evidence. But immediately after the defense completed presenting
its evidence in support of its bail application, the petition for bail was submitted for resolution.
The prosecution was not given an opportunity to present evidence to prove that the guilt of the
accused was strong. Bail was granted.
Issue:
W/N the bail hearings were conducted in accordance with the Rules on Criminal Procedure
Held:
No, as it was in violation of Sec 8 Rule 114
Section 8 presupposes 2 things
1. An application for bail was filed
2. The judge notifying the prosecutor and conduct a bill hearing for the prosecution to
adduce evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
In this case, Judge Clapis set the first bail hearing on March 29, 2010 yet the petition for bail was
filed only on April 8, 2010. Furthermore, the bail hearings reveal that the prosecution was not
given the opportunity to be heard in court. Judge Clapis clearly failed to observe the proper
procedure in granting the bail.

Section 9
ARMANDO M. BALANAY, Complainant, v. JUDGE JULIANA ADALEM WHITE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 5, EASTERN SAMAR, Respondent.

Facts:
On September 20, 2010, Balanay filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a
verified Affidavit-Complaint1 charging Judge White with gross ignorance of the law for allowing
Isidoro N. Adamas, Jr. (Adamas) six furloughs despite being charged with murder, a non-bailable
offense. Worse, the judge granted Adama's motions without requiring the prosecution to comment
or giving it opportunity to be heard thereon.

In fine, the court granted the motion ex parte without hearing.

Issue: WON Judge White violate or transgressed the rules on motikns on bail hearing?
Held: Yes. It is basic that bail hearing is necessary even if the prosecution does not interpose any
objection or leaves the application for bail to the sound discretion of the court.
Citing the case of Villanueva vs Judge Buaya, stressing the necessity and indispensable nature of
bail hearing.
Where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or denial of bail hinges on the issue WON the
evidence of guilt is strong and the determination WON the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion. But before the judge could properly exercise its discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing. The discretion lies not on the determination WON a hearing should be held, but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecutions evidence of guilt against the
accused.
In any event, when bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for petition of bail is required
in order to consider the guidelines set forth in Section 9 Rule 114 in fixing the amount of bail.
The court held in the past that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition of the
application for bail, the court may require the prosecution to answer questions in order to ascertain
not only the strength of the evidence of the state but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
In the case at bar, Judge White granted the motion ex parte to allow Adama temporary liberty
without the setting of the necessary hearing.
By analogy, if hearing is indispensable in motions for bail, more so in this case of motion for
temporary liberty, filed without the offering of any bail or without any prayer to be released on
recognizance.
It is basic bail cannot be allowed without a hearing.

Section 15
Tabao v Judge Barataman

FACTS: It appears that on July 16, 1998, respondent judge issued an Order granting the motion
for bail on recognizance filed by the father of the accused pursuant to R.A. No. 6036. The motion
of the prosecution to cancel bail on the ground that accused is a certified public accountant and
can afford to post cash bond was denied by respondent judge in an Order dated June 30, 1999,
stating that the law, in allowing bail on recognizance, does not distinguish whether an accused is
rich or poor.

ISSUE: Whether the grant of the Motion for Bail on Recognizance was proper

HELD: NO.

In the present case, it is not disputed that the sworn statement supporting the motion for bail filed
before respondent judge was signed, not by the accused but by his father. The failure of the
accused to sign the sworn statement is in clear contravention of the express mandate of the law
that the person charged shall sign a sworn statement binding himself to report to the Clerk of Court.

This is a personal obligation imposed by R.A. No. 6036 on the accused and cannot be assumed by
the custodian or responsible citizen who may be appointed by the court.
It is different from Section 15, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which allows the
release of the accused on his own recognizance or that of a responsible person.

R.A. No. 6036 applies to criminal cases where the prescribed penalty is not higher than six
months imprisonment and/or a fine of P2,000.00, or both.

In the case at bar, accused stands charged with abandonment of a minor which carries with it the
imposable penalty of arresto mayor and/or a fine of P500.00.

Moreover, R.A. No. 6036 allows the release of the accused on his own recognizance only where
it has been established that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond.

The accused in this case is a CPA who is engaged in the transport business. We reject the
contention of respondent judge that the law does not distinguish whether the accused is rich or
poor. The distinction is all to clear for the law explicitly provides that the accused can be released
on his own recognizance only if he is able to clearly establish that he is unable to post cash or bail
bond.

CABRERA V ZERNA,

FACTS:
Atty. Cabrera charged Judge Zerna with an administrative charge citing some misconduct
involving criminal cases that were pending in his sala. In one of the cases, Judge Zerna granted
the bail by recognizance of two minor accused despite the absence of the required hearing and that
the procedure laid down in the law were not followed.

Issue:
Was the granting of the bail by recognizance proper?

Ruling: No, bail by recognizance is allowed by law or by the Rules. And if a law allows, any
procedure must be complied with. Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing
is mandatory, which was not made in this case. Also, though bail by recognizance is allowed under
PD 603, as the accused were minors, the procedures were not followed.

*note: Laws/Rules allowing Recognizance (not in the case)

RA 6036 = light felonies (imposable pen: 6 months or less
Sec. 16, Rule 114 (when accused has been in custody for equal or more than the minimum
penalty)
Art. 191, PD 603 minors; surrender to DSWD or responsible person in the community

Tabao v Judge Barataman

FACTS: It appears that on July 16, 1998, respondent judge issued an Order granting the motion
for bail on recognizance filed by the father of the accused pursuant to R.A. No. 6036. The motion
of the prosecution to cancel bail on the ground that accused is a certified public accountant and
can afford to post cash bond was denied by respondent judge in an Order dated June 30, 1999,
stating that the law, in allowing bail on recognizance, does not distinguish whether an accused is
rich or poor.

ISSUE: Whether the grant of the Motion for Bail on Recognizance was proper

HELD: NO.

In the present case, it is not disputed that the sworn statement supporting the motion for bail filed
before respondent judge was signed, not by the accused but by his father. The failure of the
accused to sign the sworn statement is in clear contravention of the express mandate of the law
that the person charged shall sign a sworn statement binding himself to report to the Clerk of Court.

This is a personal obligation imposed by R.A. No. 6036 on the accused and cannot be assumed by
the custodian or responsible citizen who may be appointed by the court.

It is different from Section 15, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which allows the
release of the accused on his own recognizance or that of a responsible person.

R.A. No. 6036 applies to criminal cases where the prescribed penalty is not higher than six
months imprisonment and/or a fine of P2,000.00, or both.

In the case at bar, accused stands charged with abandonment of a minor which carries with it the
imposable penalty of arresto mayor and/or a fine of P500.00.

Moreover, R.A. No. 6036 allows the release of the accused on his own recognizance only where
it has been established that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond.

The accused in this case is a CPA who is engaged in the transport business. We reject the
contention of respondent judge that the law does not distinguish whether the accused is rich or
poor. The distinction is all to clear for the law explicitly provides that the accused can be released
on his own recognizance only if he is able to clearly establish that he is unable to post cash or bail
bond.

Section 17
Re: Anonymous letter-complaint against Hon. Marilou Runes Tamang
Facts:
An anonymous Concerned Filipino Citizen sent to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a
letter dated October 22, 2003 requesting the investigation of Judge Marilou D. Runes-Tamang,
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Pateros and Acting Presiding Judge
of the MeTC in San Juan, Metro Manila.
The letter-sender complained that Judge Tamang, through the connivance of the arresting officer
and court employees of MeTC at San Juan, had been indiscriminately approving fake bonds for a
fee of P1,000.00 per count ng kaso.
Investigation reveals that Judge Tamang had approved the bail bonds issued by a blacklisted
company without any showing of the unavailability of all the RTC Judges in Pasig, considering
that the accused persons posting the bail bonds were charged in criminal cases pending before
the RTC in Pasig and were detained in the Pasig City Jail.

Issue: whether Judge Tamangs approval of the bail bonds was proper.

Ruling:
Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal
cases pending outside the judges territorial jurisdiction.
Under the provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending,
or with any RTC of the place of arrest, or if no RTC Judge is available, with any MeTC or MTC
of the place of arrest.
The list of approved bail bonds contained in the OCA memorandum dated June 29, 2004 shows
34 involved accused detained in Pasig City, seven in Taguig City, six in San Juan, and one in
Pateros. The remaining three cases involved accused who voluntarily surrendered to Judge
Tamang in the San Juan MeTC. However, all of the criminal cases were pending in the Pasig
RTC.
Yes. As to those accused who were detained and who voluntarily surrendered in San Juan. They
could file their applications for bail in San Juan; that the accused detained in Pateros could do the
same; and that the bail applications of those detained in Taguig City were legally approved,
because she was then the Pairing Judge of the MeTC in Taguig City.
As a judge in San Juan, Judge Tamang was correct in approving the applications for bail of the
accused who had voluntarily surrendered and been detained in San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig
City, because Section 7(a), Rule 114, supra, granted her the authority to approve applications for
bail of accused detained within her territorial jurisdiction, in the event of the unavailability of
any RTC Judge in the area. It is worth noting that at the time of the subject bail applications,
there was still no RTC Judge stationed in San Juan and Pateros.
However as to those that she had approved the bail applications of the accused detained in Pasig
City and had issued the corresponding release orders after office hours on Fridays because no
RTC Judges had been available in Pasig City. Such approvals of the bail bonds constituted an
irregularity arising from her lack of the authority to do so.

TORMIS VS. JUDGE PAREDES

FACTS:

In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave
misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester
of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime
in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis
(Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu
City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also
mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and
ignorant of the law.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her
mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the
amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a
case entitled, People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio, docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-
R,6 then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally
accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13,
2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and
other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained
that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on
the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash
bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and
issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of
the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.

ISSUE:

W/N it was proper for judge Paredes to receive the bail bond.

HELD: Yes.

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found
that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the position of Judge
Paredes that the approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the
rules. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jills allegation that Judge Paredes committed
grave misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio
case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set
forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on
petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and
special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge
shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt
therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be held
administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule
114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed
either with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the
place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of
the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are
authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the
performance of their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge
Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since he
was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguios payment
for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assigned to the court where the
Guioguio case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not
available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice
was for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty
during Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity
reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by
sufficient evidence.

Simbulan vs Judge Bartolome

Facts:

A criminal case against Mercado was filed before the RTC of San Fernando of which Judge
Simbulan was presiding. He received an indorsement stating that the accused Mercado had
voluntarily surrendered before the MTC of Bulacan and subsequently filed her bail bond in the
same. Her bail bond was likewise granted by Judge Bartolome, the MTC Judge.

Issue: Was Judge Bartolome correct in granting bail to Mercado? NO

Held: Sec 17 of Rule 114 provides that as a general rule, bail must be filed in the court where the
case is pending. The exceptions are when the said judge is absent, it can be filed before any branch
of the same municipality or city. If the accused was arrested in a municipality or city other than
where the case is pending, the same can be filed before the RTC of the place or in its absence, the
MTC.
Thus it was error for Judge Bartolome to grant the bail bond of Mercado since the same should, in
accordance with the rules, be filed before the court where the accused case is pending or in this
case, before the RTC of San Fernando. Should the judge in said RTC be absent, the exceptions can
then apply where the bail bond could be filed in another branch of the same court in Pampanga or
San Fernando.
Further, Mercado was not arrested in the municipality where she applied for bail since as gleaned
from the facts, she merely voluntarily surrendered to the MTC.What was proper was to apprise
Mercado to file her bail bond before the RTC of San Fernando.

Pantilo v. Judge Canoy

Facts: On September 3, 2008, an inquest proceedings was conducted by the City Prosecutor of
Surigao City involving Leornardo Luzon Melgazo, who was charged with Reckless Imprudence
with Homicide. After the inquest, Melgazo and his lawyer went to the office of Judge Canoy to
post bail. Judge Canoy granted the bail in the amount of 30,000 as recommended by the prosecutor.
However the Prosecutor did not file information on that same day as it was already past 5pm. Judge
Canoy verbally ordered the escorting police officers to release Melgazo from detention.
Issue: Whether the grant of bail is proper. No.
Ruling: Pursuant to Sec. 17 (c) of Rule 114, any person in custody who is not yet charged in court
may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held.
In the case at bar, the accused was not yet charged when he was released on bail since the
information was not yet filed. Also, there was no written application or petition for the grant of
bail that was filed with the RTC of Surigao City when the accused posted bail. Hence, the grant of
bail by Judge Canoy was in violation of the procedure in Section 17 of Rule 114.

Virginia Savella v. Judge Ines

Facts:
Criminal complaint for falsification of public document was filed against Isabel before the mtc of
vigan. A warrant of arrest was not served. Daughter posted a posted a 12k bail bond. Judge ines
ordered directing the provisional release of the accused upon posting a 12k bial bond. Birgina
claim that the clek of court of mtc- sinait did not forward the bail bond papers to the court where
the case was pending. Inest said it was on holdy teus that Isabel together with Virginia dropped
by her house, voluntarily surrendered to her and posted bail. And on account of the holdy week
celeb. And heavy workload in her court. She forget to transmit the bail bond papers to the MTC

Issue:
Won judge irred in entertaining the bail application despite knowledge of the pendency of the
case in MTC vigan

Ruling:
respondent judge failed to properly apply the rule regarding the bail bond application. Section 17,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that bail in the amount fixed may be filed with
the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge of the province or city or municipality. The instant falsification case against accused was
filed before the MTCC-Vigan, presided by Judge Ante. There was no showing of the unavailability
of Judge Ante at that time. Following the said rule, respondent judge clearly erred in entertaining
the bail application despite knowledge of the pendency of the falsification case before the MTCC
of Vigan.

Section 18
Torrevillas v. Judge Navidad

FACTS

Judge Navidad did not conduct the requisite hearing before he granted bail to the
accused, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.Respondents claim that there had been an oral petition for bail which was
extensively heard and argued during the pre-trial of the cases on June 20, 2002 is not
supported by the record .While the respondent maintains that the stenographer failed to
take down the discussion on the oral petition for bail, the undersigned finds this
unsubstantiated and totally self-serving. The record speaks for itself and the transcript of
the stenographic notes is wholly bereft of any reference to the oral petition for bail.It was
established by the undersigned that the July 2, 2002 order was based on the June 27,
2002 motion filed by the accused. Respondent contends that the motion filed by the
accused was in compliance with an order by the court for the accused to file a formal
petition for bail. However, no such order requiring the accused to file a formal petition for
bail can be found in the record. The undersigned is thus convinced that the respondent did
not conduct a hearing before he granted the motion filed by the accused for the grant of
provisional liberty.

Issue:
Whether or not hearing is mandatory

SUPREME COURT RULING:

Yes.

Rule 114, on bail, of the Rules of Court reads

Sec. 8. Burdern of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application

for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has
the burdern of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented
during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but,
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to testify.

xxxx
 Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail
under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to
the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation. (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)

In granting bail without conducting any hearing to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
4023, 4024, 3701, 4109 and 4110 who were charged with murder and frustrated
murder, respondent judge knowingly disregarded the well-established rule that no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. Under the present rule, a hearing on application for bail is mandatory. Whether bail
is a matter of right or discretion, the prosecutor should be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at
least his recommendation on the matter must be sought. These tasks were ignored by the judge.

Section 19
Virginia Savella v. Judge Ines
Facts:
A criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents was filed by Savella against Ibanez
before the MTCC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. A warrant of arrest was not immediately served on the
accused because she was residing in the United States of America at that time. On 18 April 2006,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) operatives tried to serve an alias warrant of arrest on the
accused, who reportedly returned to the Philippines to visit her hometown in Sinait, Ilocos Sur.
The accused, however, was not found at her residence. Instead, her daughter produced a copy of
the Order dated 13 April 2006 issued by Judge Ines directing the provisional release of the
accused upon posting of a 12,000.00 bail bond.
Savella is not alleging that there was a violation of Section 19 of Rule 114 when Judge Ines
herein who is the presiding Judge of MTC-Sinait, failed to forward the bail bond papers to the
court where the case was pending.
Issue: W/N It was proper for Judge Ines herein to have granted the provisional release of Ibanez
even without forwarding the bail bond papers to MTCC of Vigan where the case is pending
Ruling: NO
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 19 of Rule 114:

Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted
the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the
court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed.

In the case at bar, the was filed the MTCC of Vigan and so when Judge Ines being the Judge of
MTC-Sinait, received the bail bond papers, said judge should have forwarded the same to MTCC
of Vigan.
 Section 21
TALAG V SANDIGANBAYAN, & Judge Reyes

Talag was involved in a BP 22 case. Pending judgment, he posted bail. When a hearing was set in
December of 2002. He failed to appear despite notice. Another hearing was set in January 2003,
yet, he failed to appear again. The judge ordered his arrest as well as the forfeiture of his bond.
Talag questions the forfeiture claiming that it was not proper as his non-appearance was due to the
lack of notice, when the order was sent to his old address when he previously notified the court.

Issue: WON the forfeiture was proper.

Ruling: YES, it was proper. The accused must appear when required by the court. In the event of
his non-appearance, the forfeiture may follow after failure to provide justification and due course.
His contention that he was not notified is unmeritorious as found by the court, when the change of
address was actually his counsels residence and not his. The order of the court for the hearing was
sent properly to his address. Being properly notified, yet failing to appear, the forfeiture was
proper.

MENDOZA vs. ALARMA

Facts:
Spouses Alarma owned a parcel of land which was posted as a bail bond for the
provisional liberty of Joselito Mayo.
When Joselito failed to appear in court, the trial court ordered his arrest and the
confiscation of his bailbond in favor of the Government.
It also directed the bondsmen, the spouses, to produce within 30 days the person of the
accused and to show cause why judgment should not be entered against the bailbond.
However, 2 years had passed, and still without judgment against the bondsmen, the trial
court issued a writ of execution against the land and was eventually sold at public auction
to Mendoza and Miclat.
ISSUE:
WON the procedure laid down in Section 21 of Rule 114 as to the judgment on the bond
against the bondsmen had been fully complied with. (NO)
HELD:
The Supreme Court cited the case of Reliance Surety & Insurance Company vs. Amante,
Jr. wherein the Court held that there are 2 occasions upon which the trial court judge may
rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases where the accused failed to appear in court:
First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge to summarily
declare the bond as forfeited;
Second, the bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given 30
days within which to produce the principal and to show cause why judgment
should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond.
 It is only after the 30-day period that the trial court may render judgment on the bond
against the bondsmen.
Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by
(1) the order of forfeiture and (2) the opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the
accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.
In the case at bar, the accused indeed failed to appear before the trial court and that the
trial court declared his bail as forfeited.
The trial court also gave the bondsmen, spouses Alarma, 30 days to produce the
accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production.
However, 2 years had passed since the court ordered the forfeiture and still, no
judgment had been rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of bail.
Instead, an order if execution was issued and the property was put up for sale and
was sold to Mendoza and Miclat.
These turn of events distinctly show that there was failure of due process of law.
The execution was issued, not because of a judgment, since there was none, but solely
because of the declaration of forfeiture.
Therefore, Rule 114, Section 21 has not been fully complied with which violated the
right of the spouses to procedural due process.

Section 22 and 24
People vs Cawaling
Facts: Cawaling was charged of murder. He applied for a bail and Cruz, as Cawalings bond
person, executed a property bond. However, upon his bail, Cawaling escaped. Cruz, filed a motion
to withdraw the property bind and replace it with a cash bond.
Issue: WON Cruzs property bond may be replaced with a cash bond?
Ruling: NO, section 22 of Rule 114 provides that upon application of the bondsmen with due
notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his
death. Further, the bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgement of conviction. Since Cawaling escaped from
his bail, the judgment cannot be executed. The posted property bond cannot be cancelled, much
less withdrawn and replaced with a cash bond unless Cawaling surrendered to the Court or
adequate proof of his death.
PANFILO D. BONGCAC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Bongcac was charged with two counts of Estafa before the Sandiganbayan. The cases
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded
not guilty. Trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly. He was found guilty. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The motion
was denied in the Resolution dated 3 September 2001. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for
review on certiorari[4] with this Court and this Court issued a Resolution denying the petition.

On 4 December 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a notice to petitioner and counsel directing them
to be present on 8 January 2003 for the execution of judgment in the criminal cases. The
Sandiganbayan directed the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner to serve the
sentence imposed upon him. The cash bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty was
ordered cancelled. Petitioner was given five days to voluntarily surrender.
ISSUE: Whether the cash bond is automatically cancelled upon execution of judgment
RULING: YES
SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of
the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. (emphasis
supplied).
From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the
judgment of conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioner's cash bailbond
after the judgment of conviction became final and executory and its execution became
ministerial.

Section 26
BORLONGAN v. PENA
Facts:
Informations were filed before the MTCC charging petitioners with four counts of the
crime of Introducing Falsified Documents. Thereafter, the MTCC Judge issued the
warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. Upon the issuance of the warrants of arrest,
petitioners immediately posted bail. On the same day that they posted bail, they filed an
Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or for Reinvestigation, insisting
that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure
on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court.

On the scheduled date of their arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea,
the MTCC entered a plea of Not Guilty for them. The MTCC subsequently denied the
omnibus motion since petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since
they already posted bail and were already arraigned.

Issue:
Are the petitioners barred from challenging the legality of the warrants for their arrest?

Ruling:
 No. The principle in Section 26, Rule 114 that the accused is precluded from questioning
the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and
participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.

Herein petitioners filed the omnibus motion on the same day that they posted bail. Their
bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right
to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused
to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending
with the court. Thus, when the MTCC entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no
valid waiver of their right to assail their arrest.

RULE 116
Section 1
Facts:
Olbes was indicted for the crime of grave coercion. He was released after he posted bail. It was
only after 4 months before he was arraigned. His pre trial was also delayed. He filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that his right to speedy trial was violated.
Issue: Is he correct?
Ruling: No. Although Sec 1 g Of Rule 116 provides for certain prescribed time, this does not
preclude any reasonable and justifiable postponements. In this case, there is no showing that the
delays were oppressive and prejudicial to him, especially on the fact that he has already posted
bail and was released.

PEOPLE V ALFREDO PANGILINAN

FACTS: Two informations were filed charging Alfredo Trinidad Pangilinan-appellant with raping
AAA, his daughter.
On 5 May 1997, appellant, who was arrested and detained with no bail recommended, filed a
petition for bail.
On 30 October 1997, the prosecution formally offered its evidence consisting of Exhibits A to
E, with sub-markings, and the testimonies of its witnesses, praying that they be admitted and
considered in the resolution of the petition for bail, and that the same be considered as part of its
evidence in chief.
On 15 December 1997, appellant filed his comment and/or opposition to the prosecutions offer
of evidence.
In an Order dated 23 April 1998, the trial court, finding that the evidence against the accused is
strong, denied appellants petition for bail.
On 9 June 1999, the trial court, having discovered that Alfredo Trinidad Pangilinanappellant had
not yet been arraigned, scheduled his arraignment.
 On 17 June 1999, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
charges against him. Since the prosecution adopted all the evidence it adduced during the hearing
for the petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief, which evidence the trial court admitted,
the trial court deemed the cases submitted for decision.
In its Decision dated 9 September 1999, the trial court convicted appellant of two counts of rape
and imposed on him the capital punishment for each count.

Inasmuch as the penalty it imposed was the death penalty, the trial court forwarded the records of
the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to Section 10, Rule 122 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE
WAS NOT PROPERLY ARRAIGNED, AND WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM BEFORE THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION WAS PRESENTED.

RULING: Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The
question is: Were appellants rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only
at this stage of the proceedings?

We do not think so. Alfredo Trinidad Appellants belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This
procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any
objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross- examined the
prosecution witnesses. His counsels active participation in the hearings is a clear indication
that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected
and informed the court of this blunder.

Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did
not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted
and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been
violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.

In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar
circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had
been submitted for decision, the error is non- prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellants
rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not
violated.

Kummer v. People Rule

Facts:
The prosecution filed an information for homicide on January 12, 1989 against the petitioner and
Johan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits accordingly followed.
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she was
convicted. The petitioners argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on
amendment and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not
see any merit in this claim.

Issue:
WON there is a need for another arraignment.

Ruling: no.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even
after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or

in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially
the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused
[would] not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.

A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is
more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused
since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense

Section 3

GUMIMBA v PEOPLE

facts:
Gumimba was charged with rape with homicide and he pleaded not guilty. He later pleaded guilty.
Being charged with a crime involving capital offense, the conditions under Sec.3, Rule 116 must
be complied with, namely:
 (1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by
the accused of the consequences of his plea;
(2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and
(3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow
him to do so if he so desires.

ISSUE: Whether or not such conditions were complied with.

Ruling: NO, it is not enough that a mere warning is given. Applying the guidelines in People v
Tonyacao, the court found that it was not satisfied.

Guidelines in the conduct of a searching inquiry

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his
age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index
of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty
in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty
carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.

note: A copy of the guideline is also found in CrimPro Book of Atty. Suarez, page 293-294.

Section 9
Webb vs De Leon

Facts:

The NBI filed with the DOJ a letter complaint charging Webb and several others with the crime
of Rape with Homicide. After that, a panel of prosecutors was formed to conduct the requisite
preliminary investigation. Alfaro, one of the principal witnesses executed two affidavits, one in
April 1995 and another in May 1995. However, only the May 1995 affidavit was submitted by the
NBI to the DOJ. Webb contends that their right to discovery proceedings was violated by the act
of the prosecution to supress the April 1995 affidavit as well as the FBI report.

Issue: Is the right to discovery proceedings (Sec 9 and 10 of Rule 116) available during preliminary
investigation? Not expressly but yes.

Held: The Rules do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings during preliminary
investigation. Sec 9 and 10 of Rule 116 simply provide an accused the right to move for a bill of
particulars and for production and inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution.
But, these provisions, as a general rule, apply after the filing of an information in court. However,
in this case, the SC noted that the failure to expressly provide for discovery proceedings during PI
does not negate its use when necessary or indispensable to protect his right to life and liberty.
In this case, a finding of probable cause subjects the suspects life and liberty to risk of loss.
Moreover since the offense committed her is a non bailable offense (Rape with Homicide)

Therefore, Webb can demand from the prosecution and the NBI, the april 1995 affidavit as well
as the FBI report considering their exculpatory character and unquestionable materiality to the case

Section 11
BIENVENIDO DIO AND RENATO COMPARATIVO, PETITIONERS VS. PABLO
OLIVAREZ,
FACTS: Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo Olivarez.
Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by Assistant City
Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor of Paraaque, two
Informations were filed before the RTC on 29 September 2004 charging respondent Pablo
Olivarez with Violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code
The arraignment of the respondent was initially set on 18 October 2004.

On 7 October 2004, respondent filed before the Law Department of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) an "[a]ppeal of [the] Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Paraaque City with Motion to Revoke Continuing Authority" This caused the resetting of the
scheduled arraignment on 18 October 2004 to 13 December 2004.

On 1 December 2004, Judge Madrona issued an Order resetting the hearing scheduled on 13
December 2004 to 1 February 2005 on account of the pending Motion to Quash of the
respondent and the Amended Informations of the public prosecutor.
On 1 February 2005, Judge Madrona reset the arraignment to 9 March 2005, with a warning that
the arraignment would proceed without any more delay, unless the Supreme Court would issue
an injunctive writ.

On 9 March 2005, respondent failed to appear before the RTC. Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in
open court, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Quash
and admitting the Amended Informations, and ordered the arrest of respondent and the
confiscation of the cash bond.

ISSUE: Whether the arraignment may be suspended indefinitely due to the pending review filed
before the COMELEC

RULING: NO
As regards Judge Madrona, we ruled he did not abuse his discretion when he issued the Orders
dated 9 March 2005 and 31 March 2005 for the arrest of respondent due to his failure to be
present for his arraignment and for the confiscation of his cash bond. Having acquired
jurisdiction over the cases and the persons of the accused, the disposition thereof, regardless of
what the fiscal may have felt was the proper course of action, was within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the court.

We further ruled that pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 116 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the arraignment of respondent cannot be suspended indefinitely, for the reviewing
authority has at most 60 days within which to decide the appeal. The arraignment of respondent
was initially scheduled on 18 October 2004, but the same was reset three times. A motion to
quash the two informations was filed on 11 October 2004. On 12 January 2005, Judge Madrona
denied the Motion to Quash and admitted the Amended Informations. Respondent sought the
reconsideration of said order. On the scheduled arraignment on 9 March 2005, respondent failed
to appear, resulting in the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the order denying the
motion to quash and admitting the amended informations, the order for his arrest, and the
confiscation of his cash bond. We said that five months was more than the sixty days allowed by
the rules for the suspension of the arraignment and was ample time to obtain from COMELEC a
reversal of the Joint Resolution finding probable cause.

SPOUSES TRINIDAD v. ANG

FACTS:

On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against
the petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
a petition for review challenging this Resolution.
On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City, an Information for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners.

The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and
Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest[5] praying, among others, for the deferment
of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ.

The MTCC, in its Order[6] dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion, "subject x x x to paragraph
c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure." On August 10, 2009, the
MTCC reconsidered this order, and set the petitioners' arraignment on September 10, 2009.[7]

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in setting the arraignment date of Spouses Trinidad despite
pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ

RULING:

No, the trial court did not err in setting the arraignment date of Spouses Trinidad.

In Samson v. Daway,[10] the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment under Sec. 11 par. c of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the same provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period
of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the
accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10,
2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10
months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the
Rules.
Hence, it was only proper for the judge to set the arraignment date of Spouses Trinidad.