VI.

Principles and State Policies

1. Villavicencio vs. Lukban [GR 14639, 25 March 1919]

En Banc, Malcolm (J): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 2 dissented in separate opinions

Facts: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated
district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October
16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this
period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao,
Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the
Constabulary for a guard of soldiers, At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the
chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some
170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station
for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they
wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary
guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary
soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25. The vessels reached
their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial
governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in
the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. Just
about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away
from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them.
Some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different
capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila (7 of which
became witnesses in the present case).

Issue: Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to acquire the persons of the prostitutes shipped to
Davao.

Held: A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose
of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve
a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking
of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant
region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao
without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they
pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and
released or until they freely and truly waived this right. Further, if the public official is within the jurisdiction of the court and has
it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so.
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the
writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could
deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, these same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The said officials, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of
her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost
her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. Both on reason and
authority, that no one of the defenses offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of
habeas corpus.
2. Tuason vs Register of Deeds of Caloocan GR No 70484 29 January 1988

Facts: Spouses Tuason were retired public school teachers. With funds from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought
from Carmel Farms, Inc. a piece of land in the latters subdivision in Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmels Torrens title
was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property. Some eight
years thereafter, the Tuasons travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no
longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the
subdivision had been declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.,
the present bona fide occupants thereof.

On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Marcos, invoking his emergency
powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons
vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for
sale to the public. Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price.
Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the following imperious
manner: order and decree that any and all sales contracts between the government and the original purchasers, are hereby
cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any and all transfers are hereby declared invalid
and null and void ab initio as against the Government.

On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons title,
that their certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government
and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners
Association, Inc.

The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure
which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due
process and eminent domain 5 but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens
titles; 6 and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its
efficacy.

Issue: WON the remedy of petition for certiorari was proper

Decision: The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and
applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially
constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or
determine a cause.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in
essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances
indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond
the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had.

The Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently
made out a case for the latter. It will also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction exercised judicial
power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected.
3. ANGARA vs ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936
SEPARATION OF POWERS

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the
most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared
with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the
election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec
9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance
of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as
regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the
case.

ISSUES: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;
and
Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed
over the election of herein petitioner.

HELD: The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is
essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. The Judiciary, in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. This power of has been stated in
Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that x x x The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. In view of the deliberations of the
framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua. The petition of writ of
prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied.

4. Marcos vs. Manglapus [GR 88211, 15 September 1989]

En Banc, Cortes (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 5 dissent in separate opinions, 1 on leave

Facts: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution
and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.
Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political
leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of
"Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries
aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble
even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution
enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This
did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On 28 August 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major
players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were
several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the
military establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over the military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian
government could be at the mercy of a fractious military. But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in
misguided elements in the military establishment and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the communist
insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that
the communists have set up a parallel government of their own in the areas they effectively control while the separatists are
virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up in these groups' determination to wrest power from the
government. Not only through resort to arms but also through the use of propaganda have they been successful in creating
chaos and destabilizing the country. Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the
plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery,
three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while
the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his
wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, Marcos' petition for mandamus
and prohibition, asking the court to order Raul Manglapus as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Catalino Macaraig as Executive
Secretary, Sedfrey Ordonez as Secretary of Justice, Miriam Defensor Santiago as Immigration Commissioner, Fidel Ramos as
Secretary of National Defense, and Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff, to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue: Whether Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode, in light of the attendant
circumstances in the present case.

Held: The individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country,
a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as
separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state" separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." On the other hand,
the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" and the right to "be free to
leave any country, including his own." which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and freedoms of others." as distinguished from the "right to enter his
own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to
the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The
right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof. On the other hand, the Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "the prime duty of
the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and thepromotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings
of democracy." Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. Thus, in the
exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or
from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles,
among other things, and adhere to them. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a
decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. Since the persons who seek to
return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom
billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered, the constitutional guarantees must be adjusted to
the requirements of equally important public interests, as such are neither absolute nor inflexible. The President has
determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past
few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the
economy, the Court cannot argue with that determination.
5. Casibang v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
Makasiar, J.

Facts: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971
local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the
election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the
appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4)
open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No.
1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29,
1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same
was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on
March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered
in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had
rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost
jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which principally) Section 9 of
Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu
contended that ... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973
Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New
Constitution under its Article XI. He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year
term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under
Section 9 of Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII
thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones
authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been
entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of
Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of
a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of
judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of
petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.

Issue: whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit

Held: No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases.
The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were
incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as
indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit
under protest or contest and that subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory
Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt
aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971,
commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elects right
to the contested office.

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article
XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of
the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and
consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly,
they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision.

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor
rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him
the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his
tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

There is a difference between the term of office and the right to hold an office. Aterm of office is the period during winch an
elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A right to
hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the
term refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether
such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the
petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the right of the
private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision
is the term to the office, although the right of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the
term thereof, and that it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of
office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. They hold
their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests:
Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. And there has been no amendment,
modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election
contest against those proclaimed elected, and according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution all courts existing
at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in
accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then
in force. Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2,
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions.

General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of
the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision.

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective
positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of
the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts
issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued
under Proclamation No. 1081.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy.
No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative
Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The
term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an
issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive
determination to which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the
President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon.
6. Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary (1992)

211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties,
taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into
the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the
previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative
from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume
such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills
is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that
therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be
exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this
case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

7. Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:

Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act.
CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations
to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.

2. EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in
the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3. EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the
Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials
refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by
this EO.

4. EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June
30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of
the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the
funds by virtue of this EO.
 5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949. was
questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents from
disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

HELD: YES.
1. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met during the
opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law .
The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session after it.
2. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948)
regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the
Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in
November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or
after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that the
National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.

8. CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi,
which voted for the creation of such region were later on known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent
with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the existing regions,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in
Mindanao. Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly
delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge by administrative determination the existing regions or
at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted is not expressed in the
title of the law.aw They also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734 to the
President is only to merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly
not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents discretion.

HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative determination the existing regions following the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation
dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical
because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but
also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. (Abbas v.
COMELEC) The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to
the power to adjust municipal boundaries which has been described as "administrative in nature. (Pelaez v. Auditor
General)Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President
and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services
9. KURODA vs JALANDONI
83 Phil. 171 Political Law Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation.
He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were
done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which
established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals.
Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further
underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering Land
Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international.

ISSUE: Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

HELD: [The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the
Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person
military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes
and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are
held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our
Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only
in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore
form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle
of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Justice v. Hon. Lantion

GR No. 139465 Jan. 18 2000
MELO, J.

Lessons: Extradition Process

Laws: Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States, PD 1069, Bill of Rights

FACTS:

In accordance to "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America" (RP-US Extradition Treaty), the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States attached with
the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other
supporting documents on June 18, 1999. Mr. Jimenez was charged with the following:

i. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
ii. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts; Maximum Penalty:5 years/count)
iii. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
v. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts; Maximum Penalty: less than 1 year)

The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez request for extradition documents based
on the following:

i. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements
and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary
requirements are under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069. Evaluation by the Department of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused
in all criminal prosecutions are not available. It merely determines the compliance of the Requesting Government with the
procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty. After the filing of the petition for extradition, the person
sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition.
ii. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition
requests. Furthermore, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides that the Philippine Government must represent the
interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. Thus, it must comply with the request
of the United States Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.
iii. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests
for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition presided over by the
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation:
i. mandamus to compel the Department to furnish the extradition documents
ii. certiorari to set aside Departments letter dated July 13, 1999 denying his request
iii. prohibition to restrain the Department from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in
court
iv. enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition
v. application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction

Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the
acts complained of, from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government, from
filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court and from performing any act directed to the extradition for a period
of 20 days from service of the order.

Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered Hon. Lantion to cease and desist from
enforcing the order. Due to transcendental importance, the Court brushed aside peripheral procedural matters which concern
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684 and the TRO and proceded on the issues.

ISSUE:
i. Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal
cases
ii. Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court on the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents and the right to submit counter-affidavits and
other supporting documents within 10 days from receipt is dispensable
iii. Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted under Sec. 7 of Art. III of the
1987 Constitution is violated

HELD: DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
i. NO.

Extradition Request
The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has the executive authority to
conduct the evaluation process which, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis. It
is not a criminal investigation but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage,
the executive authority has the power:
1) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers in form and substance
2) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable
3) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is
not punishable under non-military penal legislation.

The process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an administrative body's quasi-
judicial power) (Sec. 5. PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to
prosecution. The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in
an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions
or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. If the only
purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and
if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of the administrative body is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the
extradition petition can be filed in court. The court has the power to determine whether or not the extradition should be
effected. The evaluation procedure (in contrast to ordinary investigations) may result in the deprivation of liberty of the
prospective extraditee or accused (Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2 stages:

1) provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person
sought pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall be
automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD 1069) if no request is
submitted. Otherwise, he can be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty)
2) temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).

The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:

1) there is yet no extradite; BUT
2) it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration

The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly
lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice,
information, and hearing.

In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999 (the following day the
Department of Justice received the request). Thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs failed to discharge its duty of evaluating
the same and its accompanying documents.

Extradition Petition
After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Justice, the latter shall
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Par. 1, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The attorney shall file a
written Extradition Petition with the proper regional trial court, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under
consideration (Par. 2, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The presiding judge shall issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to
appear and to answer the petition. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice or to prevent flight (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).

Extradition Hearing
 The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings,
shall apply during the Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069) The attorney may represent the Requesting state. (Sec. 8, PD
1069). The Courts decision on whether the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and
other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty or whether or not the offense for which extradition is
requested is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) shall be final and immediately executory (Sec. 12,
PD 1069) and appealable with the Court of Appeals where the provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal
cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).

ii. YES.

Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin rights of notice and hearing from a prospective extradite. In the
absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. Petitioner contends that United States requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Such argument, however has been
overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during
trial. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process
rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.

However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of
time due to its intricacies and certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the
official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated) it cannot to be said to be urgent. Therefore, notice
and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.

iii. NO.
During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the
invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters
of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition
request.