CP-1 NDC
The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as follows:
[G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999]
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999]Type equation here.
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO
E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA
ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its
PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS
ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C.
MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No.
1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan.Since then the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan has under gone various changes,[1] the most recent of which were
effected through Republic Act Nos. 7975[2] and 8249.[3] Whether the Sandiganbayan,
under these laws, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
municipal mayors accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019 [4] and Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code[5] is the central issue in these consolidated petitions.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001,
21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will
lay down in the Binay cases.
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan
three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code,[6] and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.[7] The informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all
alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioners
incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-
year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July
27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7,
1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was
held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners
motion to quash. Petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the
prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to
the prosecutions opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted
the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the
resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for suspension pendente lite were present
as petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019[8] and
the informations containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution
denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari,[9] to set aside the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process
when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he could file a reply
to the prosecutions opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying
the motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the
Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995,
issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of
the motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution
reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite.
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Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took
effect on May 16, 1995.[10]
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his
cases to the proper court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions,
both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction
over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied
petitioners motion, holding thus:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade 27 under the
compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the commission
of the offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay
was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has,
under Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The
allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower than
Grade 27, because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged he was paid a
salary which merits a grade lower than Grade 27 does not hold water. In 1986 when the
herein offenses were committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence. From the very definition of he very
Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The
Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the offense
or thereafter, is determined by his classification under the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a
Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the offenses and the Compensation &
Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade 27, it is a
conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C.
Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade
28 under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the Index of
Occupational Services, the position titles and salary grades of the Compensation &
Position classification system prepared by the Department of Budget and Management
pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been
classified as Grade 27.[11]
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos.
21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set aside: (1)
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court
also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3)
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case
to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order
preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7, 1995,
resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction
of alternative reliefs), praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same
on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman
prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that,
moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual,
Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-petitioners
are officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San Pascual,
Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H.
Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. The complaint charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente
de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central
School. This was docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla
recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S.
Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, recommended approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting
Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note:
Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation of the
information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court.[12]
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed
against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14,
1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The information was signed by a
Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the
information with the Sandiganbayan.
In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual,
Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia Amada
and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also alleged, among
2
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others, the overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case
was docketed as OMB-0-94-0149.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos
recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with proper court. The resolution, which was
recommended for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and
approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the
resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced.
On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping
project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently amended
on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information
charged essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. The
case was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense in
two informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners
to double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds motion to quash in a
Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case
until the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved
in the Binay petition.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC
to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that under
R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3,
1996, the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer
the case since the issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 21, 1996.On August 2, 1996,
filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On October 22, 1996, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the
case for arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996
Resolution ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to
prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the
Sandiganbayan.
The petition raises the following issues:
I
Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor
after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an information
for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and
venue of the commission of the offense?
II
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or waiver from
filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier of
the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the
same category and finally to respondent court?
III
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule on
duplicity of information?
IV
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be
dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
V
Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty of
forum shopping?[13]
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the
Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the common
question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
I
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject
cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7,
1994, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,[14] as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1861,[15] the pertinent provisions of which state:
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CP-1 NDC
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00;
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx.
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet
been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in
effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was filed on August 11, 1995
in the RTC of Batangas City.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx.
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CP-1 NDC
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, congress enacted R.A.
No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per
Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication on
February 8, 1997 in the Journaland Malaya, two newspapers of general circulation.
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now
reads:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at he time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of he Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation
to heir office.
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
PambansaBlg. 129, as amended.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan because:
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal
mayors were not classified as Grade 27.
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A
In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay
argues:
xxx. The new laws consistent and repeated reference to salary grade show[s] an
intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and the
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regular courts on pay scale. Grades are determined by compensation. The essence
of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades.[16]
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification[17] from the City Personnel Officer of
Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00 from
March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22
under R.A. No. 6758.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification[18] from the Municipal
Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:
x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of
San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only
to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary
constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May
1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades.
The Constitution[19] states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees, Congress shall take into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions, thus:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for their positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20] provides in Section 2 thereof
that differences in pay are to be based upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In short, the nature of an
officials position should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her salary. This is
not only mandated by law but dictated by logic as well.
Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the grade
defined in Presidential Decree No. 985[21] as including
xxx all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter
of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions
within one range of basic compensation.[22]
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of ones position -- the level of difficulty,
responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another
position. It is the officials Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around.
It is possible that a local government officials salary may be less than that prescribed
for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or
her respective local government unit.[23] Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the officials
grade.
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-President,
Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Chairmen and
Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to
the foregoing officials, where applicable and to assign such officials the same Salary
Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to
prepare the Index of Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position prescribed
in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not
determinative. An officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law of which the
Court must take judicial notice.[24]
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position
Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner
mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
mayors are local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are [o]fficials of
the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.[25]
B
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in Section
4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est expressio
alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal
officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction.
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CP-1 NDC
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is clear
and unambiguous.[26] The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of [o]fficials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27
and higher, of the compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain
meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.
The premise of petitioners argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is
exclusive. It is not. The phrase specifically including after [o]fficials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 necessarily
conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive,[27] or where the enumeration is by way of
example only.[28] In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First
Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in Section 4a(5) was necessary for it would
be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be
created pertaining to grades 27 and above. The same rationale applies to the enumeration
in Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list.
Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner mayors are under the category
of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to
Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing
guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Courts Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration, we treated the above provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade
assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors.
C
Petitioner Binay cites previous bills[29] in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the
Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these officials ,especially those
from the provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials in Manila.
The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the law in
this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule
of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is
also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo,
165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is
clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil.
42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule,
should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than
the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail
the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. CA., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).[30]
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:
x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
would be inconvenient since the witness in their case would come from Baguio City and
San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes
of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement
its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with
Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court
is duty-bound to obey the congressional will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the present, the
Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused who are of limited means
who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called small fry -- the barangay officials, the
municipal officials and employees, postal clerks and letter carriers and the like -- who
are involved with nickel-and-dime cases and money-related cases such as malversation,
estafa and theft. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that
only those occupying high positions in Government and the military fall under the
jurisdiction of the court.[31]
7
CP-1 NDC
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials are
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not bound by
a legislators opinion in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular
legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the legislator.[32] Such opinions do not
necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress.[33]
D enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.]
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay
cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines
in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong:[34]
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected
by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The
exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect
that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute
changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case
that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the
rule. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply
its provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan. To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.
Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are
found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts.[35]There is no reason why
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.
The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means courts of competent jurisdiction,
and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975. The former should not be read in isolation but construed in conjunction with the
latter.
The term proper courts as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted
to regular courts, but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of
Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular courts,
it should have employed the term proper regular courts or regular courts instead of proper
courts. Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term regular courts, not proper courts:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than salary grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding
Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of R.A.
No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No.
7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the case shall be referred
to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be referred to
the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the
approval of R.A. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over the said
cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which
states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislatures intent and in any event
should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al.,[36] The Court explained the
purpose of the foregoing provision.
8
CP-1 NDC
x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [Sandiganbayans] jurisdiction
would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the
form of a transitory provision. x x x. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. x x x. Moreover, those cases where
trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the
new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature.Congress has, furthermore,
deemed the commencement of the trial as the crucial point in determining whether a court
retains a case pending before it or lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per
the provisions of R.A. 8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort
already devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other
hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to apply to cases
the trials of which have not yet to start.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval
of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A.
No. 8249, then said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains
jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall
be referred to the regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the
latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains
jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction
over said cases.
II
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy disposition
has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the
Ombudsman.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings.[37] Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.[38]
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,[39] is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.[40] Equally applicable is the balancing test
used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution
and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for
such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay.[41] The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.[42]
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient.[43] In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.[44]
In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court held that the length of delay and the
simplicity of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The
unexplained inaction[46] of the prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against
petitioner Tatad.
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the
right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the
frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural
reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by
executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions
and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the
accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[48] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the
accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to
her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
9
CP-1 NDC
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator,[49] the Court, considering also the complexity of
the cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the
right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.
In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the
disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the
Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length
of the delay:
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan
an affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio Santos, Roberto
Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam,
Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo
Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the
following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple
Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d)
Violation of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on the initial findings and
observations of the COA on the examination of the cash and accounts
covering transactions from April 1, 1987 to January 4, 1988 and Post-
Audit of Selected Accounts for the last quarter of 1987 of the
Municipality of Makati contained in its Report dated January 11,
1988. The COA furnished the Tanodbayan a copy of this report on
August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of the report, the
Tanodbayan was informed that this COA audit report of January 11,
1988 is not yet released since the Mayor of Makati was given thirty days
within which to explain/clarify the findings in the report and is subject to
change or modification depending upon the explanation/clarification to
be submitted by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this information from
the COA the preliminary investigation was held in abeyance until the
submission of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final Report on Audit of Makati
was received by the Office of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for
purposes of the ensuring preliminary investigation to the Tanodbayan
which received the same on March 22, 1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the fifteen (15) adverse
findings, above elsewhere stated as the basis of Bobby Brillantes
complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the documentation and
analysis of its findings and preparation of the final report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by a Supplemental
Report on Findings No. 1 and 3. This Supplemental Report is dated July
3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents supporting the
COA findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel of
Prosecutors, issued the corresponding subpoena directing the respondents
to submit their respective counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his
counter-affidavit on May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon,
Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on June 4,
1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990, Roberto Chang on August 27,
1990.Feliciano Bascon submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on
November 22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were conducted on September
27, 1990, October 26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy of this Petition
for Certiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of Makati filed
with the Supreme Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the
Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that said petition is submitted to
support Binays stand as regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit containing
allegations incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa
Chan, Jejomar Binay submitted his comment thereto on April 30, 1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy Special
Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was approved by the Special
Prosecutor, who forwarded the same and the entire records to the Office
of the Ombudsman for review and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the Ombudsman submitted
to the latter its review action for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman approved some of the
recommendations of the Review Panel and directed the preparation and
filing of the informations.[50]
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit
(COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable
cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct it s own review of the COA
10
CP-1 NDC
findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus
justifying the length of time for their resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution, unable to rely
on the raw findings of the Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused the
investigation and examination of thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and
supporting documents considering that no less than the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members
had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and
analysis of the initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases must have
involved complicated legal and factual issues which do warrant or justify a
longer period of time for preliminary investigation.
xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to three
(3) years from the time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to the
Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the fact that very few documentary and
testimonial evidence were involved. In the above-entitled cases, the
preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely two (2)
years and four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last pleading,
on April 30, 1992.[51]
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his
suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him were not
valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was no
delay in the resolution of the subject cases in violation of his right to speedy
disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are valid an petitioners
suspension pendente lite must be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases
is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman.Absent any grave abuse of such
discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise thereof.[52] Petitioner in this case has
failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
III
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the
following issues raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information
alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan
considering that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before
the Regional Trial Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double
jeopardy.
The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions of
duplicity of information and forum shopping.
Petitioners invoke the rule that the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be
ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.[53] They claim that the filing of the
information in the Sandiganbayan was a subsequent happening or event which cannot
oust the RTC of its jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed
before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over
the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined by law,
not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel.[54] As a consequence of this
principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals[55] that:
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no jurisdiction
over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the competent
court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before
in the choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can
exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary
conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether
erroneously or even deliberately, in derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases[56] that estoppel prevents a party
from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel,
however, remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is
vested by law.[57] Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party
estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the
proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This
is not the case here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in
the RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the
Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous
motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTCs jurisdiction. There were no further
proceedings after the filing of the information save for the motion to refer the case precisely
11
CP-1 NDC

on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally,
the trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one adverse to petitioners.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not
themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the
commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or information
filed in court is required to be brought in the name of the People of the Philippines.[58] Even
then, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal
prosecutions.[59] Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted
murder,[60] is a public offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of the
offender; hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much
less barred by the rules of estoppel.[61]
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double
jeopardy even though they had already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in
the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of
competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a
plea in a court that had no jurisdiction.[62] The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to
move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground
of double jeopardy.[63] Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information
pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[64]
The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated the rule
against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious.That rule presupposes that there
is one complaint or information charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:
Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one
offense but with more than one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly speaking,
forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks
a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[65] We discern no intent on the part
of the State, in filing two informations in two different courts, to gamble that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition.
Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after
investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas charging
petitioners of overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another complaint from the Concerned
Citizens Group accusing petitioners of, among others, overpricing the same project subject
of the previous complaint. Finding probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the
criminal action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the
first, this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux pas,
respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for
various offenses.

Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117:

Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any
of the following grounds:

xxx

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;

xxx

12
CP-1 NDC

Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169004 on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The
Petitioner,
Information reads:
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or
-versus- VELASCO, JR.,* subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
PERALTA, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
BERSAMIN,* and ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the
ABAD, JJ. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City
DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA, Promulgated: Government of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND
Respondents. PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason
September 15, 2010 of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the
period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
advances of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CONTRARY TO LAW.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is a petition[1] dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution[2] of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] dated April 7, 2005 with
the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order[4] dated April 12, 2005 directing
petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition[5] to the Motion to Dismiss
on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution[6] on July 20,
2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the
proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby
ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in the
proper court.

The facts follow. SO ORDERED.

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo

City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Thus, the present petition.
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The

13
CP-1 NDC
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases
involving public officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606,
(as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a
position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation
of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to
office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's
decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,[7] claiming that the Inding case did not categorically
nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense
charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D.
1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
In his Comment[8] dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as
phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in
the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan
was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where
the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the
accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in
the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense
involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the
three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position
with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction
over him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose
salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines.
This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v.
Sandiganbayan and Amante[9] is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In
fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were
both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent
to this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount
of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed
to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[10]as
a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of
public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers
and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to
the people.[11]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[12]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983,
further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975approved on
March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
14
CP-1 NDC

was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of

be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission
R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x
. of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:
on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law
that should be applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004.
As extensively explained in the earlier mentioned case, A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
commission of the offense.[13] The exception contained in R. A.
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening
specifically including:
sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall
governors, members of the sangguniang
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
involving:
assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
(b) City mayors, vice mayors,
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
other city department heads.
following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
the commission of the offense: x x x.[14]
occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force

colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other
higher rank;
offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office
are involved where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in (e) PNP chief superintendent and
PNP officers of higher rank;
the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to

15
CP-1 NDC
(f) City and provincial prosecutors
and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are
specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In
order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses,
the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive
branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of
exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still
fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they
hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and
exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the
diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine
army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that
other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also
fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[15]
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent
provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during
the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding[16] case wherein it was ruled that the
officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which
the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the
earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,[17] that the Inding case did not
categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed:
16
CP-1 NDC
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with
violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its
disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically
enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where offenses or felonies involved
are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision
shows that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan
with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses
or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and
felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are
committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court
had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no
personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is
held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to
his office.[18] Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et
al..,[19] where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad
as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accuseds official functions.
Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or
rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those
public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a
of Section 4. x x x
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[20] where the public
official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information
contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein,
took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor
of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had
rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the
crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge
of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon
by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution
wherein it held that the accused was performing his official
duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public
hearing and that accuseds violent act was precipitated by
complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor
or chief executive of the municipality, during the latters
privilege speech. It was his response to private
complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor,
he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever
private complainant might have said during said privilege
speech. Thus, based on the allegations in the information,
the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading
of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was
committed in relation to her office, making her fall underSection 4 (b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the
intention of the law had been to extend the application of the exceptions
to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert
jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a
distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a),
it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the
said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies
17
CP-1 NDC

involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v.
felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or
employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to Sandiganbayan and Amante,[25] the issue as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has
have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
now attained clarity.
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)],
the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and
offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by
referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is
Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan
was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613
(1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that for further proceedings.
an offense may be considered as committed in relation to
the accuseds office if the offense cannot exist without the SO ORDERED.
office such that the office [is] a constituent element of the
crime x x x. In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief
Justice Concepcion, said that although public office is not
an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the
facts in a particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately

connected with [the accuseds] respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed,
[the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime
and they would not have committed it had they not held
their aforesaid offices. x x x[21]

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section

4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials
involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public
officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words
of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,[22] unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[23] The
intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. (Italics supplied.)[24]

18
CP-1 NDC
G.R. No. 120640 August 8, 1996
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ENRIQUE M. COJUANGCO, MANUEL M.
COJUANGCO, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA and GABRIEL L. VILLAREAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), JULIETA C. BERTUBEN, IDE C. TILLAH, EMMANUEL E.
CRUZ, SERGIO OSMEA III AND TIRSO D. ANTIPORDA, JR., respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
When this Court was tasked to determine, via Garcia, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, 1 whether
the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to take up the special civil actions of
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto, it ruled:
It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be
expressly conferred by the. Constitution or by law. . . . .
With respect to petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus, original
jurisdiction over them is expressly conferred to this Court by Section 5(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution and to the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts by Section 9(1) and Section 21(1), respectively, of B.P. Blg.
129.
In the absence then of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the
said extraordinary writs, the. Sandiganbayan, as a court with only special
and limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto filed by petitioner.2
By force of that decision, respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division), on 09 May 1995,
acting motu proprio on the petition for quo warranto instituted by herein petitioners
assailing the qualifications of private respondents for election to, and membership in, the
Board of Directors of San Miguel Corporation ("SMC"), issued a resolution dismissing
the quo warranto petition. The Sandiganbayan held:
Considering the subject matter of the instant petition, i.e., the qualification
of the respondents to the seats in the Board of Directors of the San Miguel
Corporation in favor of the petitioners herein for which reason this petition
for quo warranto is filed, and considering the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 114135, October 7, 1994) which
explicitly stated that for lack of explicit statutory grant, the Sandiganbayan
had no authority to issue a writ of quo warranto, among other extraordinary
writs, thus rendering this Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter
hereof, the instant petition is dismissed. 3
This resolution is sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
We cull presently the facts that have led to the filing of the petition for quo warranto.
During the annual meeting of the stockholders of SMC, held on 18 April 1995, the election
of fifteen directors for the ensuing year was taken up. Petitioners, along with private
respondents, were among the nominees to the board. Private respondents were
nominated by Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG") following the registration in their respective names (at the instance
of PCGG) of SMC sequestered shares of stock (the "corporate shares"), belonging to
some 43 corporate stockholders led by Archipelago Finance and Leasing Corporation, in
order to allow the nominees to qualify for the contested board seats.
During the election, the bulk of the votes cast by petitioner Mendoza in favor of his group
had come from substantially the same sequestered corporate shares of SMC which were
used by the PCGG in voting, in turn, for private respondents.
Following the canvass of the votes cast, private respondents landed on the top 15 slots
and were accordingly declared to have been the elected members of the SMC Board of
Directors for the year 1995-1996. None of the petitioners (Messrs. Estelito Mendoza,
Manuel Cojuangco, Enrique Cojuangco, Gabriel Villareal and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
who, respectively, landed on the 16th to the 20th places) made it.
Petitioner Mendoza protested the results of the election contending that the votes he had
cast, particularly those in representation of the corporate shares, had not been duly
appreciated and reflected in the results, and that had said votes been properly counted
he, Manuel Cojuangco and Enrique Cojuangco would have themselves been duly elected.
In reply, SMC Corporate Secretary Jose Feria stood by his verbal ruling during the
canvassing of votes that only the PCGG, through Chairman Gunigundo, could validly vote
the sequestered shares.
Petitioners filed a petition for quo warranto before the Sandiganbayan questioning the
election of PCGG's nominees to the SMC Board and prayed
that
19
CP-1 NDC
1. Respondents Julieta C. Bertuben, Ide C. Tillah, Emmanuel E. Cruz,
Sergio Osmea III and Tirso D. Antiporda, Jr. should be ousted from the
SMC Board for not owning the requisite number of qualifying shares of
stock and in their stead, petitioners Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Enrique M.
Cojuangco, Manuel M. Cojuangco, Estelito P. Mendoza and Gabriel L.
Villareal be declared members of the Board of Directors of SMC; and
2. Respondents Julieta C. Bertuben, Ide C. Tillah and Emmanuel E. Cruz
be ousted for not having more votes than petitioners Enrique M.
Cojuangco, Manuel M. Cojuangco, Estelito P. Mendoza who should in their
place be declared duly elected members of the Board of Directors of SMC.4
The dismissal by the Sandiganbayan (First Division) of the petition, as well as its
subsequent rejection of the motion for reconsideration, has led to the present recourse.
Petitioners impute on the Sandiganbayan the alleged commission by it of the following
errors:
A. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN APPLYING TO
S.B. CIVIL CASE NO. 0166 THE NEW DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED BY
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF
"GARCIA, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.", G.R. NO. 11435,
PROMULGATED ON OCTOBER 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 552, HOLDING
THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN CANNOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION
OVER A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS AND QUO
WARRANTO, DESPITE THE CLEAR NON-APPLICABILITY OF SAID
DOCTRINE TO THE FACTS OF CIVIL CASE NO. 0166.
xxx xxx xxx
B. IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) IGNORED APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT RENDERED IN SEVERAL
CASES HOLDING THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS EXCLUSIVE AND
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS,
INCLUDING PETITIONS FOR QUO WARRANTO, INVOLVING
"INCIDENTS ARISING FROM, INCIDENTAL TO, OR RELATED TO"
CASES MENTIONED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 14, DATED MAY 7,
1986, AND OVER SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS INVOLVING THE POWERS
AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) OR ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN OR
SEQUESTERED WEALTH.
xxx xxx xxx
C. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) LIKEWISE IGNORED THE
PROVISION OF SEC. 2 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7975, WHICH
AMENDED SEC. 4 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606 ON THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, GRANTING THE
SANDIGANBAYAN "ORIGINAL JURISDICTION" OVER "CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES" FILED PURSUANT TO AND IN CONNECTION WITH
EXECUTIVE ORDER NOS. 1, 2, 14 AND 14-A.5
Respondents, calling attention to the Court's ruling in Garcia, infra, insists that the
Sandiganbayan is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto.
We find merit in the appeal.
The rule that the Sandiganbayan cannot exercise jurisdiction over petitions for quo
warranto is not without exception, a situation which by now should be fairly evident from
the Court's pronouncements in a number of cases. In PCGG vs. Pea, et al.,6 the Court
has observed:
. . . Under Section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on
May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys,
Assets and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former
President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close
Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or
Nominees" whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the
Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review
on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the two subsequent consolidated cases of PCGG vs. Aquino, Jr., and Marcelo
Fiberglass Corporation vs. PCGG, 7 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a restraining order and injunction was lodged with the Regional Trial Court
of Malabon, instead of the Sandiganbayan, against a writ of sequestration issued by the
PCGG. Marcelo Fiberglass Corporation argued that Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14
gave to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed by the PCGG but
not over special civil actions filed by private parties. In brushing aside the contention, the
Court, reiterated the aforequoted portion of the Court's ruling in Pea, and concluded that
any attempt to remove special civil actions, 8 similarly involving the powers and functions
of the PCGG, from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction would be of no avail.
Just barely two months thereafter, six cases9 emanating from the Regional Trial Courts,
as well as from the Securities and Exchange Commission, were subsequently filed with
the Court. In one 10 of these cases, a supplemental petition was filed with the SEC by one
20
CP-1 NDC
of the stockholders of the SMC assailing the 1986 annual election of directors on the
ground that PCGG voted the sequestered shares 11 without authority. The SMC Board of
Directors moved to dismiss the petition contending that SEC had no jurisdiction over the
action. The motion was denied by the SEC declaring, inter alia, "that what was being
questioned were merely 'the acts of the Board of Directors of San Miguel Corporation and
not the acts of the PCGG through its nominees,' a matter clearly within its statutorily
prescribed competence."12 When this order of the SEC and those of the Regional Trial
Courts in the other related cases were eventually elevated to this Court, we stressed that
the "exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only
to the principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to
'all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases,' such as the dispute over
the sale of shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies
relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate
actions or proceedings in another forum." Thus, the Court ordered the dismissal of the
cases "without prejudice to the assertion and ventilation before the Sandiganbayan by the
parties of their respective claims by such appropriate modes as prescribed by law."13
The instant petition, contrary to the observation in the dissenting opinion, is not just
confined to the grievance of petitioners relative to the election of directors and the counting
of the votes therein cast but directly challenges the power of the PCGG to vote, or to make
use of, the sequestered shares of stock. The very kernel then of the controversy, relating,
such as it does, to PCGG's authority over alleged ill-gotten wealth (the sequestered
corporate shares), is within the precinct of Section 214 of Executive Order No. 14. The
Pea edict that "those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or
orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is
vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction"15 perforce governs.
Garcia, it might be recalled, did not involve any question about the alleged "ill-gotten
wealth" or its sequestered status; there, indeed, any reference to "ill-gotten wealth" was
but a peripheral matter. The controversy was instead, and as so aptly described by the
Sandiganbayan itself, a mere "case of a Board of Directors ousting two of its members for
reasons which it had deemed proper."16 The graft court observed:
While it is not denied that the PCGG through its Chairman had asked
petitioner Garcia to resign, Garcia had refused to do so; while PCGG
Chairman Gunigundo had written petitioner Garcia on July 6, 1993 to tell
him that his representation of the Government in the UCPB Board had
been terminated, petitioner did not there and then cease to be a member
of the UCPB Board of Directors. Instead, it was the Resolution (No. 66-93)
of the Board of Directors at its meeting on July 22, 1993 which replaced
petitioner Garcia with respondent Cesar A. Sevilla in the Board, albeit
undoubtedly upon the request or, if petitioner pleases, upon instigation of
the PCGG Chairman.
Respondent members of the Board of Directors Tirso D. Antiporda, et al.,
have well pointed out that while PCGG Chairman Gunigundo had also
terminated the representation of Director Manuel Concordia, as
Gunigundo indeed had in his letter of July 6, 1993, . . . the UCPB Board
declined to follow that lead resulting thus in the termination only of
petitioner Garcia and Wencelito T. Andanar. 17
In fine, while ordinarily the Sandiganbayan cannot exercise jurisdiction over petitions
for quo warranto, it may, however, do so as an exception when it involves an incident
arising from, or related to PCGG cases over alleged "ill-gotten wealth" within the context
of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14.
Mention has been made on the passage of R.A. No. 7975,18 on 06 May 1995, which grants
to the Sandiganbayan the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. While a petition for quo warranto is not among the special
civil actions enumerated in the fourth sub-paragraph of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 7975, the
first sub-paragraph of the same Section 4(c) of the law, however, is no less specific; it
provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx xxx xxx
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A.
The reiteration of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the above cases
emphasizes a continuing legislative regard for the special graft court's original
jurisdiction over cases that are inextricably linked to the various aforenumbered
Executive Orders.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed 09 May 1995 Resolution of the
respondent Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE, and the Sandiganbayan is directed to give due
course to the petition for quo warranto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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CP-1 NDC
Republic Act No. 6770 November 17, 1989
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION
OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.
Section 3. Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the
Office of the Overall Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the Office of the Deputy
for the Visayas, the Office of the Deputy for Mindanao, the Office of the Deputy for the
Armed Forces, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The President may appoint other
Deputies as the necessity for it may arise, as recommended by the Ombudsman.
Section 4. Appointment. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special
Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least twenty-one (21)
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees
for each vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled within three (3) months after it occurs,
each of which list shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
In the organization of the Office of the Ombudsman for filling up of positions therein,
regional, cultural or ethnic considerations shall be taken into account to the end that the
Office shall be as much as possible representative of the regional, ethnic and cultural
make-up of the Filipino nation.
Section 5. Qualifications. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special
Prosecutor, shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, at least forty (40) years old, of
recognized probity and independence, members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have
been candidates for any elective national or local office in the immediately preceding
election whether regular or special. The Ombudsman must have, for ten (10) years or
more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
Section 6. Rank and Salary. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the same
ranks, salaries and privileges as the Chairman and members, respectively, of a
Constitutional Commission. Their salaries shall not be decreased during their term of
office.
The members of the prosecution, investigation and legal staff of the Office of the
Ombudsman shall receive salaries which shall not be less than those given to comparable
positions in any office in the Government.
Section 7. Term of Office. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special
Prosecutor, shall serve for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.
(1) In accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the
President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and
after due process.
(3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation,
removal or permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy
shall serve as Acting Ombudsman in a concurrent capacity until a new
Ombudsman shall have been appointed for a full term.n case the Overall Deputy
cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman, the President may designate any
of the Deputies, or the Special Prosecutor, as Acting Ombudsman.
(4) In case of temporary absence or disability of the Ombudsman, the Overall
Deputy shall perform the duties of the Ombudsman until the Ombudsman returns
or is able to perform his duties.
Section 9. Prohibitions and Disqualifications. The Ombudsman, his Deputies and
the Special Prosecutor shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office or employment.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. They
shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately following their
22
CP-1 NDC
cessation from office. They shall not be allowed to appear or practice before the
Ombudsman for two (2) years following their cessation from office.
No spouse or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree and no law,
business or professional partner or associate of the Ombudsman, his Deputies or Special
Prosecutor within one (1) year preceding the appointment may appear as counsel or agent
on any matter pending before the Office of the Ombudsman or transact business directly
or indirectly therewith.
This disqualification shall apply during the tenure of the official concerned. This
disqualification likewise extends to the law, business or professional firm for the same
period.
Section 10. Disclosure of Relationship. It shall be the duty of the Ombudsman, his
Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor to make under oath, to the best of their
knowledge and/or information, a public disclosure of the identities of, and their relationship
with the persons referred to in the preceding section.
The disclosure shall be filed with the Office of the President and the Office of the
Ombudsman before the appointee assumes office and every year thereafter. The
disclosures made pursuant to this section shall form part of the public records and shall be
available to any person or entity upon request.
Section 11. Structural Organization. The authority and responsibility for the exercise
of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and
functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of
the said office.
(1) The Office of the Ombudsman may organize such directorates for
administration and allied services as may be necessary for the effective discharge
of its functions. Those appointed as directors or heads shall have the rank and
salary of line bureau directors.
(2) The Office of the Overall Deputy shall oversee and administer the operations
of the different offices under the Office of Ombudsman.t shall likewise perform
such other functions and duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special
Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be
an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the
supervision and control of the Ombudsman.
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control
and upon the authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
The Special Prosecutor shall have the rank and salary of a Deputy
Ombudsman.
(5) The position structure and staffing pattern of the Office of the Ombudsman,
including the Office of the Special Prosecutor, shall be approved and prescribed
by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman shall appoint all officers and employees of
the Office of the Ombudsman, including those of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, in accordance with the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Section 12. Official Stations. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for
Luzon, and the Deputy for the Armed Forces shall hold office in Metropolitan Manila; the
Deputy for the Visayas, in Cebu City; and the Deputy for Mindanao, in Davao City. The
Ombudsman may transfer their stations within their respective geographical regions, as
public interest may require.
Section 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees
of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.
Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:
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CP-1 NDC
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.t has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as
any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform
and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any
abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer
or employee at fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required
by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority
as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground
for disciplinary action against said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of
documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving
the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity
to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in
the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records
and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in
paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with
due prudence: provided, that the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may
determine what cases may not be made public: provided, further, that any publicity
issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination
and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take
testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have
access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority
or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers,
functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or
unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the
parties involved therein.
The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government
officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses
as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.
Section 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
Section 17. Immunities. In all hearings, inquiries, and proceedings of the
Ombudsman, including preliminary investigations of offenses, nor person subpoenaed to
testify as a witness shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books,
papers, correspondence, memoranda and/or other records on the ground that the
testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to incriminate
him or subject him to prosecution: provided, that no person shall be prosecuted criminally
for or on account of any matter concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed
the privilege against self-incrimination, to testify and produce evidence, documentary or
otherwise.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of
documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing,
inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the
performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives.
The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not
exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be
exempt from demotion or removal from office.
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CP-1 NDC
Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall be subject to
punishment for contempt and removal of the immunity from criminal prosecution.
Section 18. Rules of Procedure.
(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its rules of procedure for the
effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
(2) The rules of procedure shall include a provision whereby the Rules of Court are
made suppletory.
(3) The rules shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, one of which is printed in the national language.
Section 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in
accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Section 20. Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes
that:
(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial
body;
(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
(4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance; or
(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of.
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members
of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
Section 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power
to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable
by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private
person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private
person in the investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may
warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be
subject to the same penalties and liabilities.
Section 23. Formal Investigation.
(1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall
be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.
(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the
proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employees, which shall be determined
within the period prescribed in the civil service law. Any delay without just cause in
acting on any referral made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be a ground for
administrative action against the officers or employees to whom such referrals are
addressed and shall constitute a graft offense punishable by a fine of not
exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
(3) In any investigation under this Act the Ombudsman may: (a) enter and inspect
the premises of any office, agency, commission or tribunal; (b) examine and have
25
CP-1 NDC
access to any book, record, file, document or paper; and (c) hold private hearings
with both the complaining individual and the official concerned.
Section 24. Preventives Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation,
if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Section 25. Penalties.
(1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties
and rules provided therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension
without pay for one (1) year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging
from Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally
taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking into consideration
circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee
found guilty of the complaint or charges.
Section 26. Inquiries.
(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall inquire into acts or omissions of a public
officer, employee, office or agency which, from the reports or complaints it has
received, the Ombudsman or his Deputies consider to be:
(a) contrary to law or regulation;
(b) unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular or inconsistent with the
general course of the operations and functions of a public officer,
employee, office or agency;
(c) an error in the application or interpretation of law, rules or regulations,
or a gross or palpable error in the appreciation of facts;
(d) based on improper motives or corrupt considerations;
(e) unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been
revealed; or
(f) inefficient performed or otherwise objectionable.
(2) The Officer of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in
whatever form concerning an official act or omission.t shall act on the complaint
immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same
and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons therefor.f it finds
a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent
public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to
submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof.f the
answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case.
(3) When the complaint consists in delay or refusal to perform a duty required by
law, or when urgent action is necessary to protect or preserve the rights of the
complainant, the Office of the Ombudsman shall take steps or measures and issue
such orders directing the officer, employee, office or agency concerned to:
(a) expedite the performance of duty;
(b) cease or desist from the performance of a prejudicial act;
(c) correct the omission;
(d) explain fully the administrative act in question; or
(e) take any other steps as may be necessary under the circumstances to
protect and preserve the rights of the complainant.
(4) Any delay or refusal to comply with the referral or directive of the Ombudsman
or any of his Deputies, shall constitute a ground for administrative disciplinary
action against the officer or employee to whom it was addressed.
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
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CP-1 NDC
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive
or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of
the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
from filing: provided, that only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial
of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the
interest of justice may require.
Section 28. Investigation in Municipalities, Cities and Provinces. The Office of the
Ombudsman may establish offices in municipalities, cities and provinces outside
Metropolitan Manila, under the immediate supervision of the Deputies for Luzon, Visayas
and Mindanao, where necessary as determined by the Ombudsman. The investigation of
complaints may be assigned to the regional or sectoral deputy concerned or to a special
investigator who shall proceed in accordance with the rules or special instructions or
directives of the Office of the Ombudsman. Pending investigation the deputy or investigator
may issue orders and provisional remedies which are immediately executory subject to
review by the Ombudsman. Within three (3) days after concluding the investigation, the
deputy or investigator shall transmit, together with the entire records of the case, his report
and conclusions to the Office of the Ombudsman. Within five (5) days after receipt of said
report, the Ombudsman shall render the appropriate order, directive or decision.
Section 29. Change of Unjust Laws. If the Ombudsman believes that a law or
regulation is unfair or unjust, he shall recommend to the President and to Congress the
necessary changes therein or the repeal thereof.
Section 30. Transmittal/Publication of Decision. In every case where the
Ombudsman has reached a decision, conclusion or recommendation adverse to a public
official or agency, he shall transmit his decision, conclusion, recommendation or
suggestion to the head of the department, agency or instrumentality, or of the province,
city or municipality concerned for such immediate action as may be necessary. When
transmitting his adverse decision, conclusion or recommendation, he shall, unless
excused by the agency or official affected, include the substance of any statement the
public agency or official may have made to him by way of explaining past difficulties with
or present rejection of the Ombudsman's proposals.
Section 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may
utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor
or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist
him herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
The Ombudsman and his investigators and prosecutors, whether regular members of his
staff or designated by him as herein provided, shall have authority to administer oaths, to
issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, to summon and compel witnesses to appear
and testify under oath before them and/or bring books, documents and other things under
their control, and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant
witness through application before the Sandiganbayan or before any inferior or superior
court having jurisdiction of the place where the witness or evidence is found.
Section 32. Rights and Duties of Witness.
(1) A person required by the Ombudsman to provide the information shall be paid
the same fees and travel allowances as are extended to witnesses whose
attendance has been required in the trial courts. Upon request of the witness, the
Ombudsman shall also furnish him such security for his person and his family as
may be warranted by the circumstances. For this purpose, the Ombudsman may,
at its expense, call upon any police or constabulary unit to provide the said security.
(2) A person who, with or without service or compulsory process, provides oral or
documentary information requested by the Ombudsman shall be accorded the
same privileges and immunities as are extended to witnesses in the courts, and
shall likewise be entitled to the assistance of counsel while being questioned.
(3) If a person refuses to respond to the Ombudsman's or his Deputy's subpoena,
or refuses to be examined, or engages in obstructive conduct, the Ombudsman or
his Deputy shall issue an order directing the person to appear before him to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt. The contempt proceedings
shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court.
Section 33. Duty to Render Assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman. Any
officer or employee of any department, bureau or office, subdivision, agency or
instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and local governments, when required by the Ombudsman, his Deputy or the Special
Prosecutor shall render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman.
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CP-1 NDC

Section 34. Annual Report. The Office of the Ombudsman shall render an annual Section 42. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
report of its activities and performance to the President and to Congress to be submitted publication in the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the
within thirty (30) days from the start of the regular session of Congress. Philippines.

Section 35. Malicious Prosecution. Any person who, actuated by malice or gross bad Approved: November 17, 1989.
faith, files a completely unwarranted or false complaint against any government official or
employee shall be subject to a penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
imprisonment and a fine not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

Section 36. Penalties for Obstruction. Any person who willfully obstructs or hinders
the proper exercise of the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman or who willfully
misleads or attempts to mislead the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor
in replying to their inquiries shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00).

Section 37. Franking Privilege. All official mail matters and telegrams of the
Ombudsman addressed for delivery within the Philippines shall be received, transmitted,
and delivered free of charge: provided, that such mail matters when addressed to private
persons or nongovernment offices shall not exceed one hundred and twenty (120) grams.
All mail matters and telegrams sent through government telegraph facilities containing
complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman shall be transmitted free of charge, provided
that the telegram shall contain not more than one hundred fifty (150) words.

Section 38. Fiscal Autonomy. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Appropriations for the Office of the Ombudsman may not be reduced below the
amount appropriated for the previous years and, after approval, shall be automatically and
regularly released.

Section 39. Appropriations. The appropriation for the Office of the Special Prosecutor
in the current General Appropriations Act is hereby transferred to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.

Section 40. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is held unconstitutional,
other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and binding.

Section 41. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
executive orders, rules and regulations insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act, are
hereby repealed or amended as the case may be.

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CP-1 NDC
[G.R. No. 131445. May 27, 2004]
AMADO G. PEREZ (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HIS WIDOW GUILLERMA T.
PEREZ, MARIO S. FRANCISCO, RAFAEL P. ARGAME, MIRASOL V.
MENDOZA, GLORIA S. GONZALVO AND MARIA FE V.
BOMBASE, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, MAYOR
IGNACIO R. BUNYE, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, ROGELIO P. MADRIAGA,
RECTO CORONADO, TEODORA A. DIANG, TOMAS M. OSIAS, REYNALDO
CAMILON AND BENJAMIN BULOS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the November 13, 1997
resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 45127, dismissing petitioners
motion for reconsideration of its September 9, 1997 resolution[2] which in turn dismissed,
for lack of jurisdiction, petitioners petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petition
questioned the Office of the Ombudsmans April 11, 1997 dismissal of their criminal
complaint against Mayor Ignacio R. Bunye.
Petitioners, members of the Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM), instituted two complaints at the Office
of the Ombudsman (docketed as OMB-0-89-0983 and OMB-0-89-1007) against several
respondents, one of whom was then Mayor Ignacio R. Bunye, for violation of RA
3019 (also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Respondents allegedly
destroyed the doors of the KBMBPM office while serving on petitioners the Take-Over
Order of the KBMBPM management dated October 28, 1998 issued by then Agriculture
Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez.
In disposing of said complaints on April 11, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman issued
a resolution (hereinafter, Ombudsman resolution)[3] excluding respondent Bunye from the
criminal indictment. The petitioners assailed the exclusion in the CA on September 1, 1997
through an original petition for certiorari and mandamus. The CA, however, dismissed it
for lack of jurisdiction supposedly in accordance with Section 27 of RA 6770 (also known
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989). Citing Yabut vs. Ombudsman,[4] Alba vs.
Nitorreda[5]and Angchangco vs. Ombudsman,[6] the CA likewise denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
The CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus.
It is the nature of the case that determines the proper remedy to be filed and the
appellate court where such remedy should be filed by a party aggrieved by the decisions
or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman. If it is an administrative case, appeal should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[7] If it is a criminal case,
the proper remedy is to file with the Supreme Court an original petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.[8]
We find that, although the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, it
erroneously invoked as ratio decidendi Section 27 of RA 6770[9] which applies in
administrative cases only, not criminal cases,[10] such as the graft and corruption charge
at bar. In our en banc decision in Fabian vs. Desierto,[11] which is still controlling, we held
that Section 27 applies only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from
a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. Nevertheless, we declared Section 27
unconstitutional for expanding the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction without its advice
and consent. We thus held that all appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Court.
As the present controversy pertained to a criminal case, the petitioners were correct
in availing of the remedy of petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 but they erred in filing it in
the Court of Appeals. The procedure set out in Kuizon vs. Ombudsman[12] and Mendoza-
Arce vs. Ombudsman,[13] requiring that petitions for certiorari questioning the
Ombudsmans orders or decisions in criminal cases should be filed in the Supreme Court
and not the Court of Appeals, is still the prevailing rule.[14]
But even if the petition for certiorari had been filed in this Court, we would have
dismissed it just the same. First, petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Ombudsman resolution as it was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, not filing a petition for certiorari directly in the Supreme
Court. Second, the Office of the Ombudsman did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Ombudsman resolution.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the exercise of power is in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.[15]
In this case, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Ombudsman in dismissing the complaint against respondent Bunye upon the factual
finding that:
xxx xxx xxx
29
CP-1 NDC

Indeed no evidence is shown in the record that respondent Mayor Bunye specifically
participated in the violent implementation of Secretary Dominguez Order of October 28,
1988. It was not shown with certainty by complainant that the alleged presence of
respondent Mayor Bunye at the scene of the incident was an active participation thereof
by the latter.
On the other hand, if the alleged presence of the respondent Mayor Bunye at the scene
were really true, such would not be improper because of the provision of Article 87, par. 2
(VI) of the Local [G]overnment Code which states:
x x x call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies to
restore disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of
the law when public interest so requires, and the municipal police force are inadequate to
cope with the situation or the violators. (underlining supplied)
Anent the alleged letter dated August 8, 1988 of respondent Mayor Bunye, the same
seems only a request for the suspension of complainant. He did not take it upon himself
to issue any suspension of complainant. At that point in time, the respondent Mayor Bunye
reasonably believed that the Order of Secretary Dominguez was valid. Besides, the facts
and the evidence on record do not show any interest personal or otherwise on the part of
respondent Mayor Bunye in the implementation of Secretary Dominguez Order.
Accordingly, the exclusion of respondent Mayor Bunye from the criminal charge and the
dismissal of the complaint against him are in order.
We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason.[17] This policy is
based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the
Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper
influence.[18] Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal
of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so
that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order
an acquittal.[19] Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case
dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of
discretion.[20]Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same
way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, if at the instance of complaint, respondents (sic) Secretary Dominguez

whose Order dated October 28, 1988 was questioned by the complainant and Atty. Rogelio
Madriaga, who allegedly orchestrated the implementation of the said Order were dropped
from the complaint, how can respondent Bunye be liable for the same act, if as alleged, he
was merely standing in front of the KBS Building, New Muntinlupa Market?

It will be noted that at the time of the alleged implementation of the Order on October 29,
1988 and the take-over of the Management and operation of the KBMBPM cooperative,
respondent Bunye apparently believed that the said Order of Secretary Dominguez was
valid.

Considering the earlier approval of the Honorable Ombudsman on the memorandum of

then SPO III, now Director Wendell E. Barreras-Sulit as reiterated in the memorandum of
the Honorable Assistant to the Ombudsman re: the exclusion of respondent Bunye from
criminal indictment, undersigned respectfully concurs with the same.

xxx xxx xxx.[16]

30
CP-1 NDC

G.R. Nos. 187896-97, June 10, 2013 (1) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred when it dismissed the complaint-
affidavit of herein petitioner on the ground that two cases involving the same issues
AMANDO P. CORTES, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN as in the complaint-affidavit were previously filed by petitioner, as complainant therein.
(VISAYAS), VICTORY M. FERNANDEZ, JULIO E. SUCGANG AND NILO (2) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred in finding that a mere Inventory of
IGTANLOC, Respondents. Barangay Roads and Bridges as of 1999 could prevail over an Original Certificate of
Title registered on 28 May 1985.
RESOLUTION (3) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred in allowing respondents Fernandez,
Igtanloc and Sucgang, to grossly violate the constitutional mandate provided for in the
PEREZ, J.: Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
(4) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred in not expressing clearly and distinctly
in its Order dated February 7, 2008 and Consolidated Evaluation Report dated
The subject of this petition for review is the dismissal of the criminal and administrative
December 14, 2006, the law on which it is based in careless disregard of a
complaints filed by petitioner Amando P. Cortes with the Office of the Ombudsman
constitutional mandate.2
(Visayas) against respondents Victory M. Fernandez (Fernandez), Julio E. Sucgang
(Sucgang) and Nilo Igtanloc (Igtanloc), who were sued in their capacity as Provincial
Petitioner refutes the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) that he had filed a
Engineer, Barangay Captain of Barangay Soncolan and Grader Operator, respectively, of
similar administrative and criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner claims that
the Province of Aklan.
the complaints adverted to were filed by one Hernando Cortes and they pertained to
another parcel of land that was also graded and levelled
In his Complaint-Affidavit filed on 28 November 2006, petitioner charged respondents with
by respondents. Petitioner maintains that the affected portion of his land is covered by an
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
original certificate of title and that a document such as the inventory of barangay roads
Act, and Misconduct. Petitioner alleged that during the period of 29 March 2006 to 1 April
upon which the authority to scrape and level barangay roads is based should have been
2006, respondents utilized a heavy equipment grader owned by the Province of Aklan in
first annotated as lien to petitioners certificate of title. Petitioner stresses that
levelling a portion of his land. Petitioner claimed that the portion of the land destroyed has
respondents actions violated his constitutional right to due process and that his property
an area of 1,125 square meters and that several fruit trees were
was taken without just compensation. Finally, petitioner assails the Consolidated
destroyed. Petitioner impleaded Fernandez for the latters failure to ascertain from
Evaluation Report and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) for having been
the BarangayCaptain whether the roads sought to be levelled were barangay roads, and
issued in violation of the constitutional requirement that decisions must state the factual
for issuing a drivers trip ticket to the Grader Operator.1
and legal basis thereof.
In a Consolidated Evaluation Report dated 14 December 2006, the Office of the
In their Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of
Ombudsman (Visayas) recommended the dismissal of the cases due to the fact that two
the petition because petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Moreover, the Office of the
(2) other cases involving the same parties and issues had already been filed by petitioner.
Solicitor General supports the dismissal of petitioners complaint due to identity of issues
and respondents in the previous and the present complaint.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Consolidated Evaluation Report. On 7
February 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) denied the motion for
Respondents also filed their respective Comments. Igtanloc denied levelling and grading
reconsideration.
a portion of petitioners land. According to Igtanloc, he only followed the contours of the
existing barangay road and did not widen or create a new one. Fernandez asserts that he
Petitioner takes the appeal directly to this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari,
was merely acting in his official capacity and exercising his duty in issuing a drivers trip
pursuant to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, assailing the denial of his motion for
ticket to Igtanloc. Sucgang characterizes the complaint as a case of the "second brother
reconsideration by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
(Amando P. Cortes)" filing cases against the same respondents, raising the same issue
that was previously disposed of by the same office, in the cases filed by his brother
Petitioner cites the following errors as grounds for the allowance of
(Hernando P. Cortes).3
the petition:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Petitioner, in filing this petition for review, committed a procedural misstep which warrants
an outright dismissal.
31
CP-1 NDC
Petitioner misconstrued Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of
1989 and disregarded prevailing jurisprudence. Section 27 provides, in part,
that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorariwithin
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decisionor denial
of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This provision, insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from
the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, had been declared
unconstitutional by this Court as early as in the case of Fabian v. Desierto.4 We ruled
in Fabian that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule
43, in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.5
Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal case
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. We made the pronouncement in Acua v. Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon6that the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before
the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and a criminal
complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 with
the Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before this
Court. Neither of these two remedies was resorted to by petitioner.
By availing of a wrong remedy, this petition merits an outright dismissal.
A review of the substantial merit of this petition would likewise yield to the same
conclusion.
It appears that prior to the filing of the instant complaint, Atty. Hernando P. Cortes
(Hernando) had filed both criminal and administrative complaints against respondents
Igtanloc and Sucgang, who were the Provincial Engineer and Barangay Captain,
respectively. These complaints involved the alleged grading and levelling of a portion of
Hernandos property. On 15 August 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman issued
a Decision on the administrative case docketed as OMB-V-A-06-0344-F and
a Resolution on the criminal case docketed as OMB-V-C-06-0315-F, dismissing both
complaints for lack of merit. Three months later, petitioner filed an administrative and
criminal complaint bearing the same facts and issues. The cases, docketed as OMB-V-
C-06-0577-K and OMB-V-A-06-0639-K, were consolidated by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner additionally impleaded Fernandez as respondent. The Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas) dismissed the case on the ground that a similar complaint
involving the same facts and issues had already been filed against the
same respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) was referring to the
Hernando complaint.
Records disclosed that Hernando and petitioner are not only brothers but are also
registered as owners of the property allegedly levelled and graded by Igtanloc. In his
complaints, Hernando alleged that he, together with Amando P. Cortes, is the registered
owner of a land denominated as Lot 427, Psc 35, of Batan Cadastre, which is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34885.7 However, TCT No. T-348858 could be
traced back to the mother title, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-15197,9registered
under the name of petitioner. The same OCT was attached to the complaints filed
by petitioner, wherein he also asserted ownership over the subject property.
The facts point to the result that the previous and the present complaints, bearing
complainants who are owners of the same affected property, same respondents, same
issues and same arguments, in reality are one and the same. The Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) explained:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
To reiterate, the issues are identical and were in fact already resolved and decided upon
by the assigned investigator handling the complaints which were filed earlier. To allow a
similar complaint to proceed before the same forum using the same arguments and
counter-arguments already raised and discussed in a previous complaint would cause
endless litigations which is frowned upon by the courts. It is observed that there is identity
of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for which are being founded on the same facts. It
also bears stressing that there is also identity with respect to the two preceding particulars
in the two cases, such that any findings that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to be a rehash of the other.
This Office cannot allow the simple changing of complainants just to side step its earlier
findings. Neither should it deviate or come out with a different view with what was already
ruled upon by allowing the filing of another complaint.10
For failing to overcome the procedural hurdle and for lack of merit, the petition must be
denied.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated 7 February 2008 in OMB-V-C-06-0577-K and
OMB-V-A-06-0639-K is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
32
CP-1 NDC

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the
reversal of the Decision[2] dated December 23, 2005 and the Resolution[3] dated May 3,
FIRST DIVISION
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90567. The decision of the appellate court
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 172553
FOR LUZON, HONORABLE VICTOR C. reversed the Order[4] dated May 30, 2005 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Deputy
Present: for Luzon in Administrative Case No. OMB-C-A-05-0032-A, while its resolution denied the
Ombudsman for Luzon, and THE GENERAL
INVESTIGATION BUREAU-A, Represented motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners.
by MARIA OLIVIA ELENA A. ROXAS, CORONA, C.J.,
Petitioners,
Chairperson, We quote hereunder the preliminary facts of the case, as succinctly stated in the Decision
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, of the Court of Appeals dated December 23, 2005:
BERSAMIN,
- versus -
VILLARAMA, JR., and Sometime in November 1998, Ligorio Naval filed a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman, accusing Jessie Castillo, the mayor of the
MENDOZA,* JJ. Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, among others, of violating Section[s] 3(e),
(g) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in relation to the
JESUS D. FRANCISCO, SR., award of the construction of the municipal building of Bacoor, Cavite, worth
more than 9 Million Pesos, to St. Marthas Trading and General
Respondent. Contractors. Naval alleged that the latter was not qualified for the award;
Promulgated: its license had expired at the time the contract was signed, and was
classified as belonging to Category C, hence, may only undertake projects
worth 3 Million Pesos or lower.The complaint was docketed as OMB-1-98-
2365.
December 14, 2011
Castillo submitted certifications to the effect that the contractor was not a
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x holder of an expired license, and was classified as a Category A contractor.

On 29 April 1999, the Ombudsman ruled that Navals allegation of lack of

qualification of the contractor has been satisfactorily controverted by
Castillo, and dismissed the complaint. Naval moved for reconsideration,
RESOLUTION which was denied on 27 August 1999.

In a series of communications with Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P.

Gervacio, Jr., Naval insinuated that his evidence [was] not considered and
LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.: the complaint was dismissed in exchange for millions of

33
CP-1 NDC
pesos. Ombudsman Gervacio relayed the said allegations to Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto, who ordered a reevaluation of the 29 April 1999 decision.
In a Memorandum dated 30 May 2000, Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer II, Julieta Calderon, recommended that OMB-1-98-2365 be revived,
re-docketed, and be subjected to a further preliminary investigation, with
the inclusion of additional respondents. On 30 September 2000,
Ombudsman Gervacio approved the said memorandum. Thereafter, the
Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Ombudsman executed a
complaint-affidavit for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the
interest of the service, against 5 municipal officers, including [Jesus
Francisco], which was docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0032-A.[5] (Emphases
ours.)
The respondents specifically named in Administrative Case No. OMB-C-A-05-
0032-A were Saturnino F. Enriquez, Salome O. Esagunde, Federico Aquino, Eleuterio
Ulatan and herein respondent Jesus D. Francisco, Sr.,[6] all of whom were members of the
Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) of the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite. Francisco was then the Municipal Planning and Development Officer of
the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite.
The complaint stated, among others, that
the Municipality of Bacoor conducted its prequalification of documents and bidding, St.
Marthas Trading and General Contractors license was not renewed. Furthermore, the said
contractor was allegedly not qualified to undertake the construction of the P9.5 million
project as it can only enter into a contract for a project that is worth P3 million or less. The
complaint likewise sought to place the aforementioned individuals under preventive
suspension pending the investigation of the case.[7]
On May 30, 2005, Director Joaquin F. Salazar of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon issued an Order[8]preventively suspending the above PBAC
members. The same was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez
on May 31, 2005.[9] The Order decreed thus:
WHEREFORE, in accordance with Section 24, R.A. No. 6770 and
Section 9, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, respondents Saturnino
F. Enriquez, Salome Esagunde, Jesus D. Francisco, Sr., Federico
Aquino, and Eleuterio Ulatan, all municipal employees of Bacoor, Cavite
are hereby PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDED during the pendency of this
case until its termination, but not to exceed the total period of six (6) months
without pay. In case of delay in the disposition of the case due to the fault,
negligence or any cause attributable to the respondents, the period of such
delay shall not be counted in computing the period of the preventive
suspension.
In accordance with Section 27, par. (1), R.A. No. 6770, this Order
is immediately executory. Notwithstanding any motion, appeal or petition
that may be filed by the respondents seeking relief from this Order, unless
otherwise ordered by this Office or by any court of competent jurisdiction,
the implementation of this Order shall not be interrupted within the period
prescribed.[10] (Emphasis ours.)
Francisco received the above Order on July 1, 2005.[11] Consequently, on July 22, 2005,
when
he filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He argued that the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it ordered his preventive suspension since the transactions
questioned in the case had already been passed upon in OMB-1-98-2365 entitled, Naval
v. Castillo, which was dismissed for lack of merit. Furthermore, Francisco averred that the
imposition of preventive suspension was not justified given that: (1) he was charged with
gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service, not dishonesty,
oppression, grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, as required by law;
(2) it was not shown that he caused prejudice to the government that would warrant his
34
CP-1 NDC
removal from office; and (3) his stay in office would not prejudice the case filed against him
as the documentary evidence therein were not in his possession.[12]
On December 2, 2005, Francisco moved for the early resolution of his petition, reiterating
his prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction.
On December 23, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision,
finding in favor of Francisco. Thus, said the Court of Appeals:
The petition has merit.
Francisco argues that while he may not have been charged in OMB-1-98-
2365, which was dismissed, still the transaction involved therein is the
same transaction for which he was charged in OMB-C-A-05-0032-A, thus
barred under the principle of res judicata.
We agree. The respondents in OMB-C-A-05-0032-A were administratively
charged for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service when they awarded the contract to construct their municipal hall to
St. Marthas Contractor, allegedly an unqualified contractor, because both
at the time of the bidding and at the time of contract signing, the contractor
had an expired license. Moreover, St. Marthas Contractor belongs to small
B category, which means it cannot enter into a contract for a project worth
3 Million Pesos or less.Therefore, the respondents should have
disqualified the said contractor.
The said allegation was the exact matter decided by the Ombudsman in
OMB-1-98-2365, to wit:
xxxx
Contrary to the allegation of the complainant that the
awardee, St. Marthas Trading and General Contractor was
not qualified to undertake the project being classified under
Category C, respondent submitted a xerox copy of a letter
dated 05 January 1999 of Jaime Martinez, OIC-Engineer
DPWH, Trece Martirez City stating that St. Marthas
Trading & General Contractor is classified under Category
A. He likewise submitted a certification dated 06 April 1999
issued by Carolina C. Saunar, Supervising TIDS of the
Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board to the effect
that St. Marthas Trading & General Contractor is a holder
of Contractors License No. 24109 originally issued on 18
December 1997 with Category A and classification of
General Building and General Engineering. x x x.
After a thorough study and evaluation of the records of the
case as well as after the conduct of an actual ocular
investigation, this Office finds the defenses interposed by
the respondent to be meritorious.
A judgment bars a subsequent action, with the concurrence of the following
requirements: (a) the first judgment must be a final one; (b) the court
rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (d)
there must be between the two cases, identity of parties, identity of subject
matter and identity of action.
The order of dismissal in OMB-1-98-2365 should operate as a bar to OMB-
C-A-05-0032-A. There is no question that the order dismissing the charges
in OMB-1-98-2365, is a judgment on the merits, by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and had attained
finality. There is, between OMB-1-98-2365 and OMB-C-A-05-0032-A, an
identity of parties, an identity of subject matter and an identity of
action. While it may be argued that there was no absolute identity of
35
CP-1 NDC
parties, a shared identity of interest by the parties in both cases is sufficient
to invoke the coverage of the principle. The substitution of parties will not
remove the case from the doctrine of res judicata; otherwise, the parties
could renew the litigation by the simple expedient of substitution of parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The 30 May 2005 order
of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-05-0032-A is hereby SET
ASIDE.[13]
On January 18, 2006, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[14] on the above decision, but the same was denied in the assailed
Resolution dated May 3, 2006.
On June 26, 2006, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the General
Investigation Bureau-A of the said office, through the OSG (petitioners), filed the instant
petition, praying for the reversal of the adverse rulings of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent filed his Comment[15] on January 8, 2007 while petitioners filed a Reply[16] on
March 19, 2007. In a Resolution[17]dated April 23, 2007, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. The OSG, in a Manifestation and Motion,[18] adopted
its Petition and Reply as its Memorandum in the instant case. In turn, respondent filed his
Memorandum[19] on September 7, 2007.
Upon elevation of the records to this Court, it became apparent that the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a Joint Resolution,[20] dismissing Administrative
Case No. OMB-C-A-05-0032-A for lack of probable cause. The said resolution was
approved by Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro on February 28, 2008.[21]
The Court finds that the petition at bar, which seeks the reinstatement of the Order of
preventive suspension dated May 30, 2005 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, has been rendered moot. In view of the above-stated supervening event that
occurred after the filing of the instant petition, the same has ceased to present a justiciable
controversy.
In Ombudsman v. Pelio,[22] the Court clarified that [p]reventive suspension is merely a
preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation; the purpose
thereof is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives
of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in
the prosecution of the case against him.
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 expressly provides for the power of the Ombudsman
or his Deputy to place a public officer or employee under preventive suspension, to wit:
SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt
is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than
sixmonths, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the
case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not
be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
(Emphasis ours.)
Similarly, Section 9, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman [23] in
administrative cases recites:
36
CP-1 NDC

Ombudsman on February 28, 2008. Consequently, the Order of the Office of the Deputy
SECTION 9. Preventive Suspension. Pending investigation, the Ombudsman for Luzon placing Francisco and his co-respondents under preventive
respondent may be preventively suspended without pay if, in the judgment suspension in Administrative Case No. OMB-C-A-05-0032-A has already lost its
of the Ombudsman or his proper deputy, the evidence of guilt is strong and significance.
(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or gross misconduct, or gross neglect in the performance of
duty; or (b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
Barbieto v. Court of Appeals[26] reiterates that [t]ime and again, courts have refrained from
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the just, fair and
independent disposition of the case filed against him. even expressing an opinion in a case where the issues have become moot and academic,
there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof
would be of no practical use or value.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated; however, the total period of preventive suspension
should not exceed six months. Nevertheless, when the delay in the While the Court is mindful of the principle that [t]he moot and academic principle is not a
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or any cause magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
attributable to the respondent, the period of such delay shall not be
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis
ours.) Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review,[27] the above exceptions do not find application in
the instant case.
To recall in the instant case, the Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon dated May 30, 2005, which placed the respondents in Administrative Case
No. OMB-C-A-05-0032-A under preventive suspension, was received by respondent
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the instant petition for mootness. No
Francisco on July 1, 2005. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration[24] thereon,
costs.
Francisco filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The appellate court,
however, did not issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary SO ORDERED.
injunction. Accordingly, the six-month period of the preventive suspension was not
interrupted. Having received notice of the Order on July 1, 2005, the period of suspension
lapsed on December 28, 2005.[25]

Of greater importance, however, is the fact that Administrative Case No. OMB-C-
A-05-0032-A was already terminated by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon when it dismissed the case in a Joint Resolution, approved by the Acting

37
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G.R. No. 170046 December 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR., BURT B. FAVORITO, FLORENDO B. ARIAS, ERDITO Q.
QUARTO, AGERICO C. PALAYPAY, NAPOLEON S. ANAS, DANILO C. PLANTA,
LUISITO S. DELA ROSA, ROGELIO L. BERAY, NORMA A. VILLARMINO, RICARDO
M. JUAN, JR., NELSON UMALI, MARIA LUISA T. CRUZ, MELISSA T. ESPINA,
VIOLETA R. TADEO, JESSICA J. CATIBAYAN, VIOLETA C. AMAR, RON ALDO G.
SIMBAHAN, FELIPE A. SAN JOSE, ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, CONCHITA N. DELA
CRUZ, JANETTE A. BUGAYONG, JESUS D. CAPUZ, RODELIA R. UY, ROMEO C.
FULLIDO, NO NETTE H. FULLIDO, VICTORIA M. GO, CARMELITO V. EDEM,
.AUGUSTO C. CAPUZ,+ VICENTE SANTOS, JR., JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, AND
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated January 20, 20051 and October 12, 20052 of
the Sandiganbayan inCriminal Case No. 27969 dismissing the same for lack of probable
cause for the crime of plunder without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against
respondents. The factual antecedents follow.
On January 9, 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Simeon Datumanong, issuedDepartment Order No. 15, Series of 2002, creating
a committee for the purpose of investigating alleged anomalies and illegal disbursements
in connection with the repair of DPWH-owned motor vehicles and equipment.3 As a result
of the investigation, it was discovered thatduring the period of March 2001 to December
2001, the emergency repairs conducted on hundreds of DPWH vehicles, approved and
paid for by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in the loss of about One
Hundred Thirty-Nine Million Pesos (139,000,000.00).4
On August 7, 2002, Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal Audit Service of the DPWH and
member of the committee, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended, in relation to
Sections 20 and 9 of the General and Special Provisions, respectively, of the General
Appropriations Act, Memorandum of the Secretary on the Guidelines on Purchases of
Spare Parts and Repair of Vehicles dated July 19, 1997, Department Order No. 33, Series
of1988 of RA 6770, as amended by RA No. 3018, COA Circular 85-55 A, Seriesof 1985,
COA Circular 76-412, Series of 1976 on splitting of RSE, PO, vouchers and payrolls,
against the several officials/employees of the DPWH, including respondents herein.5
On March 1, 2004, the Special Prosecution Officer, Humphrey T. Monteroso, of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, filed an Information 6 with
respondent Sandiganbayan accusing Maximo A. Borje, Jr., Burt B. Favorito, Florendo B.
Arias, Erdito Q. Quarto, Agerico C. Palaypay, Napoleon S. Anas, Danilo C. Planta, Luisito
S. Dela Rosa, Rogelio L. Beray, Norma A. Villarmino, Ricardo M. Juan, Jr., Nelson Umali,
Maria Luisa T. Cruz, Melissa T.Espina, Violeta R. Tadeo, Jessica J. Catibayan, Violeta C.
Amar, Ronaldo G. Simbahan, Felipe A. San Jose, Rolando C. Castillo, Conchita N. Dela
Cruz, Janette A. Bugayong, Jesus D. Capuz, Rodellia D. Uy, Romeo C. Fullido,Nonette H.
Fullido, Victoria M. Go, Carmelito V. Edem, Augusto C. Capuz, Vicente Santos, Jr., of the
crime of Plunder defined and penalized under RA No. 7080, as amended, committed as
follows:
That during the period from March to December, 2001, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused MAXIMO BORJE, JR. y AQUINO, a public officer, being
then the Chief of the Motorpool Section of the Department of Public Works and Highways,
Port Area, Manila, by himself and in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused BURT
FAVORITO y BARBA, FLORENDO ARIAS y BUAG, ERDITO QUARTO y QUIAOT,
AGERICO PALAYPAY y CORTES, NAPOLEON ANAS y SEBASTIAN, DANILO PLANTA
y CALUYA, LUISITO S. DELA ROSA, ROGELIO BERAY y LAGANGA, NORMA
VILLARMINO y AGCAOILI, RICARDO M. JUAN, JR., NELSON UMALI, MARIA LUISA
CRUZ y TALAO, MELISSA ESPINA y TANGPUZ, VIOLETA TADEO y RAGASA,JESSICA
CATIBAYAN y JARDIEL, VIOLETA AMAR y CASTILLO, RONALDO G. SIMBAHAN,
FELIPE A. SAN JOSE, ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, and JOHN DOESand JANE DOES, who
are his officemates being likewise officials and employees of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), two of whom are high ranking public officers, namely:
BURT FAVORITO y BARBA, Director III, Administrative and Manpower Management
Services [Salary Grade 27] and FLORENDO ARIAS y BUAG, Assistant Director, Bureau
of Equipment [Salary Grade 27], and in further connivance/conspiracy with his other
coaccused private individuals engaged inthe business of motor vehicle and spare parts
supply, namely: CONCHITA N. DELA CRUZ, JANETTE A. BUGAYONG, JESUS D.
CAPUZ, RODELLIA UY y DEL ROSARIO, ROMEO C. FULLIDO, NONETTE H. FULLIDO,
VICTORIA GO y MANIEGO, CARMELITO EDEM y VARGAS, AUGUSTO CAPUZ y CO,
VICENTE SANTOS, JR., as well as other JOHN DOESand JANE DOES, with evident bad
faith and intent to defraud and cause damage to the government, and taking undue
advantage of his official position, authority, connection or influence as such public officer,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally, amass, accumulate and acquire, by
himself, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY-TWO MILLION THREE
HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE AND 38/100
PESOS (82,321,855.38), more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself at the expense
and to the damage of the Filipino People and the Republic of the Philippines inthe
aforestated amount, through a series and/or combination of overt orcriminal acts or similar
schemes or means, consisting of misappropriations, conversions, misuses, diversions
and/or malversation of public funds and/or raids on the public treasury, by means of false
38
CP-1 NDC
pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to, or simultaneously with, the fraud, by
falsifying public, officials and/or commercial documents, such as Job Orders, Pre-Repair
Inspection Reports, Post-Repair Inspection Reports, Requisition for Supplies and/or
Equipment (RSE), Certificates of Emergency Purchases/Repair, Waste Material Reports,
Certificate of Acceptance, Certificates of Fair Wear and Tear, Price Verifications, Requests
for Obligation Allotment and Disbursement Vouchers, and such other falsified documents,
untruthfully narrating therein material facts on fictitious emergency repairs of various
DPWH vehicles and/or ghost purchases of spare parts, which are, in truth, imaginary or
spurious transactions, and by using such falsified documents of said imaginary or spurious
transactions for said accused to unlawfully cause the undue releases of public funds and
obtain undue payments on 4,406 transactions, more or less, for said fictitious emergency
repairs of DPWH vehicles and/or ghost purchases of spare parts, thereby
misappropriating, converting, misusing, diverting and/or malversing the proceeds thereof
for MAXIMO BORJE, JR. y AQUINOs personal use and benefit.
Thereafter, respondents filed their responsive pleadings essentially assailing the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause. On March 19, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued
an Order7 giving respondents a period within which to submit their memoranda of authority.
In its Omnibus Comment/Opposition8 of even date, petitioner questioned the authority of
the Sandiganbayan to act on respondentsmotions, arguing that the same had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents and, hence, it had no authority
to hear and decide their motions. Petitioner also alleged that it successfully established
probable cause justifying the issuance by the respondent court of a warrant of arrest.
On January 20, 2005, respondent Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
Resolution9 upholding its authority to act on respondents motions for their filing of the
same may be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court and
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause for the crime of plunder without prejudice
to the filing of appropriate charges against the accused-respondents. Itruled that as the
records reveal, not all elements of the crime are present for the accused Borje had not
amassed ill-gotten wealth of at least 50 million. It further denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution10 dated October 12, 2005 for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition invoking the following grounds:
I.
THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF AN INFORMATION IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE
PROSECUTION.
II.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN ITS DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CASE.
Petitioner maintains that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman is an executive, not a judicial function. As such, it asserts that respondent
Sandiganbayan should have given deference to the finding and determination of probable
cause in their preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner faulted the respondent court
for taking into consideration the findings of Atty. Irene Ofilada of the Investigating
Committee that it was not respondent Borje who encashed the checks but the respondent-
suppliers, by virtue of a blanket authority given by the former to the latter. It posits that said
findings cannot bind the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of the existence of
probable cause.
Respondents counter that the respondent court correctly dismissed the case for the
evidence clearly shows the absence of certain elements of the crime. They maintain that
while investigating officers have a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of
probable cause, which deserves respect from the courts, the acts of the Ombudsman in
disregarding essential pieces of evidence are tantamount to an abuse of discretion
authorizing the dismissal by the court of the case.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
It is well to recall that there are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive
and judicial. On the one hand, executive determination of probable cause ascertains
whether a criminal case must be filed in court.11 It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and should be held for trial.12 On the other hand, judicial determination of probable
cause ascertains whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. It is
one made by a judge who must satisfy himself that based on the evidence presented, there
is necessity in placing the accused under custody so that the ends of justice will not be
frustrated.13
Verily, as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the
determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for
thatmatter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is empowered
to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge
the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law.14
It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine the presence or absence of probable cause believing that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the
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CP-1 NDC
corresponding information with the appropriate courts.15 This rule is based not only on
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the functions
of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in
court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.16
The Office of the Ombudsman, in this case, found probable cause which would warrant
the filing of an information against respondents.1avvphi1 For purposes of filing a criminal
information, probable cause has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents are probably
guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any
offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.17 A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not
a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. It need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.18 Thus, unless it is shown that the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause was done
in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with
the same.19
In the instant case, the act of filing an Information against respondents by the Ombudsman
cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic amounting to a
grave abuse of discretion. A review of the records clearly reveals that accused Borje, Jr.
was the payee of 4,406 checks amounting to 82,321,855.38 covering the
reimbursements of the supposed payments for the anomalousand questionable repairs of
the DPWH vehicles. While there may havebeen evidence presented which may lead to an
inference that the end-receiver of the amounts covered by the checks is not actually
accused Borje, Jr., but the accused private individuals suppliers, the fact that the name of
accused Borje, Jr. appears on the subject checks cannot be denied. Indeed, merebelief
that respondents probably committed the crime suffices to establish probable cause.
Whether they are, in fact, guilty of plunder is a different matter, which can properly be
determined at a full-blown trial on the merits of this case.20 As this Court has ruled in
People v. Castillo:21
Moreover, it was clearly premature on the part of the Sandiganbayan to make a
determinative finding prior tothe parties presentation of their respective evidence that
there was no bad faith and manifest partiality on the respondents part and undue injury
on the part of the complainant. In Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, we held that "it is
well established that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense that may be best passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits." Also, it would be unfair to expect the prosecution to present all the evidence
needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information against
the latter. The reason is found in the nature and objective of a preliminary investigation.
Here, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Moreover, the fact that the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman differs from the
findings of Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal Audit Service of the DPWH, who conducted
the initial investigation, falls short of being capricious or arbitrary. It has consistently been
held that there is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to
act at all in contemplation of law.22 The Ombudsman in this case, however, was merely
performing his duty as mandated by the Constitution23and by law.24 Filing an Information
against respondents in this case based on sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof
cannot be said to be whimsical or despotic. As effectively shown by evidence, the
Ombudsmans charge was not at all baseless for the link between the respondents and
the anomalous transactions herein has been satisfactorily established. In the absence,
therefore, of any showing that the questioned acts of the Ombudsman were done in a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of his constitutionally mandated powers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated January 20, 2005 and October 12, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan
inCriminal Case No. 27969 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated January 7, 2004 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-02-0507-H, finding probable cause to indict respondents for the
crime of plunder is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
40