Republic of the Philippines [Petitioner] Claudio S. Yap was bonus.

However, with respect to

Supreme Court employed as electrician of the the payment of his wage, he
Manila vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 refused to accept the payment of
August 2001 by Intermare one-month basic wage. He insisted
SECOND DIVISION Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf that he was entitled to the payment
of its principal, Vulture Shipping of the unexpired portion of his
Limited. The contract of contract since he was illegally
CLAUDIO S. YAP, G.R. No. 179532
employment entered into dismissed from employment. He
Petitioner, Present:
by Yap and Capt. Francisco B. alleged that he opted for immediate
Adviento, the General Manager of transfer but none was made.
CARPIO, J.,
Intermare, was for a duration of 12
- versus - Chairperson,
months. On 23 August [Respondents], for their part, contended
NACHURA,
2001, Yapboarded M/T that Yap was not illegally
PERALTA,
SEASCOUT and commenced his dismissed. They alleged that
THENAMARIS SHIPS MANAGEMENT ABAD, and
job as electrician. However, on or following the sale of the M/T
and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., MENDOZA, JJ.
about 08 November 2001, the SEASCOUT, Yap signed off from
Respondents. Promulgated:
vessel was sold. The Philippine the vessel on 10 November 2001
May 30, 2011
Overseas Employment and was paid his wages
Administration (POEA) was corresponding to the months he
informed about the sale on 06 worked or until 10 November 2001
December 2001 in a letter signed plus his seniority bonus, vacation
by Capt. Adviento. Yap, along with bonus and extra bonus. They
the other crewmembers, was further alleged that Yaps
informed by the Master of their employment contract was validly
vessel that the same was sold and terminated due to the sale of the
will be scrapped. They were also vessel and no arrangement was
x-------------------------------------------------------------------- informed about the Advisory sent made for Yaps transfer to
----------------x by Capt. Constatinou, which states, Thenamaris other vessels.[4]
among others:

DECISION PLEASE ASK YR OFFICERS Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a

AND RATINGS IF THEY WISH complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages and
NACHURA, J.: TO BE TRANSFERRED TO Attorneys Fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
OTHER VESSELS AFTER Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the salaries
VESSEL S DELIVERY (GREEK corresponding to the unexpired portion of his
Before this Court is a Petition for Review VIA ATHENS-PHILIPINOS contract. Subsequently, he filed an amended
on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil VIA MANILA complaint, impleading Captain Francisco Adviento
Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of FOR CREW NOT WISH of respondents Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc.
Appeals (CA) Decision[2]dated February 28, 2007, TRANSFER TO DECLARE (Intermare) and Thenamaris Ships Management
which affirmed with modification the National Labor THEIR PROSPECTED TIME FOR (respondents), together with C.J. Martionos, Interseas
Relations Commission (NLRC) resolution[3] dated REEMBARKATION IN ORDER Trading and Financing Corporation, and Vulture
April 20, 2005. TO SCHEDULE THEM ACCLY Shipping Limited/Stejo Shipping Limited.

The undisputed facts, as found by the CA, Yap received his seniority bonus, On July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision[5] in
are as follows: vacation bonus, extra bonus along favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been
with the scrapping constructively and illegally dismissed by
respondents. Moreover, the LA found that
respondents acted in bad faith when they assured
petitioner of re-embarkation and required him to
produce an electrician certificate during the period of
his contract, but actually he was not able to board
one despite of respondents numerous vessels.
Petitioner made several follow-ups for his re-
embarkation but respondents failed to heed his plea;
thus, petitioner was forced to litigate in order to
vindicate his rights. Lastly, the LA opined that since
the unexpired portion of petitioners contract was less
than one year, petitioner was entitled to his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his contract for a period
of nine months. The LA disposed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, a decision is
hereby rendered declaring
complainant to have been
constructively
dismissed. Accordingly,
respondents Intermare Maritime
Agency Incorporated, Thenamaris
Ships Mgt., and Vulture Shipping
Limited are ordered to pay jointly
and severally complainant Claudio
S. Yap the sum of $12,870.00 or its
peso equivalent at the time of
payment. In addition, moral
damages of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) and exemplary
damages of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) are awarded
plus ten percent (10%) of the total
award as attorneys fees.
Other money claims
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
[6]
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse
from the NLRC.
In its decision[7] dated January 14, 2005, the SO ORDERED.[11]
NLRC affirmed the LAs findings that petitioner was
indeed constructively and illegally dismissed; that
respondents bad faith was evident on their wilful
failure to transfer petitioner to another vessel; and Respondents filed a Motion for Partial
that the award of attorneys fees was warranted. Reconsideration,[12] praying for the reversal and
However, the NLRC held that instead of an award of setting aside of the NLRC decision, and that a new
salaries corresponding to nine months, petitioner was one be rendered dismissing the complaint. Petitioner,
only entitled to salaries for three months as provided on the other hand, filed his own Motion for Partial
under Section 10[8] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. Reconsideration,[13] praying that he be paid the nine
8042,[9] as enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman (9)-month basic salary, as awarded by the LA.
Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission.[10] Hence, the NLRC ruled in this wise: On April 20, 2005, a resolution[14] was rendered by
the NLRC, affirming the findings of Illegal
WHEREFORE, premises Dismissal and respondents failure to transfer
considered, the decision of the petitioner to another vessel. However, finding merit
Labor Arbiter finding the in petitioners arguments, the NLRC reversed its
termination of complainant illegal earlier Decision, holding that there can be no choice
is hereby AFFIRMED with a to grant only three (3) months salary for every year
MODIFICATION. Complainant[s] of the unexpired term because there is no full year of
salary for the unexpired portion of unexpired term which this can be applied. Hence
his contract should only be limited
to three (3) months basic salary.
WHEREFORE, premises
Respondents Intermare considered, complainants Motion
Maritime Agency, Inc.[,] Vulture for Partial Reconsideration is
Shipping Limited and Thenamaris hereby granted. The award of three
Ship Management are hereby (3) months basic salary in the sum
ordered to jointly and severally pay of US$4,290.00 is hereby modified
complainant, the following: in that complainant is entitled to his
salary for the unexpired portion of
1. Three (3) months employment contract in the sum of
basic salary US$12,870.00 or its peso
US$4,290.00 or its equivalent at the time of actual
peso equivalent at the payment.
time of actual
payment. All aspect of our January 14, 2005
2. Moral Decision STANDS.
damages P100,000.00
3. Exemplary SO ORDERED.[15]
damages P50,000.00
4. Attorneys fees Respondents filed a Motion for
equivalent to 10% of Reconsideration, which the NLRC denied.
the total monetary
award.
 Undaunted, respondents filed a petition
for certiorari[16] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure before the CA. On February 28, 2007, the
CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and
the NLRC that petitioner was constructively and
illegally dismissed. The CA held that respondents
failed to show that the NLRC acted without statutory
authority and that its findings were not supported by
law, jurisprudence, and evidence on record.
Likewise, the CA affirmed the lower agencies
findings that the advisory of Captain Constantinou,
taken together with the other documents and
additional requirements imposed on petitioner, only
meant that the latter should have been re-embarked.
In the same token, the CA upheld the lower agencies
unanimous finding of bad faith, warranting the
imposition of moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC
erred in sustaining the LAs interpretation of Section
10 of R.A. No. 8042. In this regard, the CA relied on
the clause or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less provided in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042
and held:
In the present case, the
employment contract concerned
has a term of one year or 12 months
which commenced on August 14,
2001. However, it was
preterminated without a valid
cause. [Petitioner] was paid his
wages for the corresponding
months he worked until the 10th of
November. Pursuant to the
provisions of Sec. 10, [R.A. No.]
8042, therefore, the option of three
months for every year of the
unexpired term is applicable.[17]
Thus, the CA provided, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, this Petition for
Certiorari
is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 14, 2005,
and Resolutions, dated April 20,
2005 and July 29, 2005,
respectively, of public respondent
National Labor Relations
Commission-Fourth
Division, Cebu City, in NLRC No.
V-000038-04 (RAB VIII (OFW)-
04-01-0006) are
hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that private
respondent is entitled to three (3)
months of basic salary computed at
US$4,290.00 or its peso equivalent
at the time of actual payment.
Costs against Petitioners.[18]
Both parties filed their respective motions
for reconsideration, which the CA, however, denied
in its Resolution[19] dated August 30, 2007.
Unyielding, petitioner filed this petition,
raising the following issues:
1) Whether or not Section 10
of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the
extent that it affords
an illegally dismissed
migrant worker the lesser
benefit of salaries for [the]
unexpired portion of his
employment
contract or for three (3)
months for every year of
the unexpired
term, whichever is less is
constitutional; and
2) Assuming that it is,
whether or not the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in
granting petitioner only three
(3) months backwages when
his unexpired term of 9
months is far short of
the every year of the
unexpired term threshold.[20]
In the meantime, while this case was
pending before this Court, we declared as
unconstitutional the clause or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 in the case of Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc.[21] on March 24, 2009.
Apparently, unaware of our ruling
in Serrano, petitioner claims that the 5th paragraph of
Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, is violative of Section
1,[22] Article III and Section 3,[23] Article XIII of the
Constitution to the extent that it gives an erring
employer the option to pay an illegally dismissed
migrant worker only three months for every year of
the unexpired term of his contract; that said provision
of law has long been a source of abuse by callous
employers against migrant workers; and that said
provision violates the equal protection clause under
the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed
local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code
of reinstatement with full backwages computed from
the time compensation was withheld from them up to
their actual reinstatement, migrant workers, by virtue
of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, have to waive nine
months of their collectible backwages every time
they have a year of unexpired term of contract to
reckon with. Finally, petitioner posits that, assuming
said provision of law is constitutional, the CA
gravely abused its discretion when it reduced
petitioners backwages from nine months to three
months as his nine-month unexpired term cannot
accommodate the lesser relief of three months for
every year of the unexpired term.[24]
On the other hand, respondents, aware of
our ruling in Serrano, aver that our pronouncement of
unconstitutionality of the clause or for three months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 in Serrano should not apply in this
case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is a
substantive law that deals with the rights and
obligations of the parties in case of Illegal Dismissal
of a migrant worker and is not merely procedural in
character. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there
should be no retroactive application of the law in this
case. Moreover, respondents asseverate that
petitioners tanker allowance of US$130.00 should not
be included in the computation of the award as
petitioners basic salary, as provided under his
contract, was only US$1,300.00. Respondents submit
that the CA erred in its computation since it included
the said tanker allowance. Respondents opine that
petitioner should be entitled only to US$3,900.00 and
not to US$4,290.00, as granted by the CA.
Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker
allowance should be excluded from the definition of
the term salary. Also, respondents manifest that the
full sum of P878,914.47 in Intermares bank account
was garnished and subsequently withdrawn and
deposited with the NLRC Cashier of Tacloban City
on February 14, 2007. On February 16, 2007, while
this case was pending before the CA, the LA issued
an Order releasing the amount of P781,870.03 to
petitioner as his award, together with the sum
of P86,744.44 to petitioners former lawyer as
attorneys fees, and the amount of P3,570.00 as
execution and deposit fees. Thus, respondents pray
that the instant petition be denied and that petitioner
be directed to return to Intermare the sum of
US$8,970.00 or its peso equivalent.[25]
On this note, petitioner counters that this
new issue as to the inclusion of the tanker allowance
in the computation of the award was not raised by
respondents before the LA, the NLRC and the CA,
nor was it raised in respondents pleadings other than
in their Memorandum before this Court, which
should not be allowed under the circumstances.[26]
The petition is impressed with merit.
Prefatorily, it bears emphasis that the
unanimous finding of the LA, the NLRC and the CA
that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not
disputed. Likewise not disputed is the tribunals
unanimous finding of bad faith on the part of
respondents, thus, warranting the award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. What remains
in issue, therefore, is the constitutionality of the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 and,
necessarily, the proper computation of the lump-sum
salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his
illegal dismissal.
Verily, we have already declared
in Serrano that the clause or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative
of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to
equal protection of the laws. In an exhaustive
discussion of the intricacies and ramifications of the
said clause, this Court, in Serrano, pertinently held:
The Court concludes that
the subject clause contains a
suspect classification in that, in
the computation of the monetary
benefits of fixed-term employees
who are illegally discharged, it
imposes a 3-month cap on the
claim of OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in
their contracts, but none on the
claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term
employment. The subject clause
singles out one classification of
OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage.[27]
Moreover, this Court held therein that the
subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; hence, the same violates not
just therein petitioners right to equal protection, but
also his right to substantive due process under
Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution.[28] Consequently, petitioner therein was
accorded his salaries for the entire unexpired period
of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to
the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
We have already spoken. Thus, this case
should not be different from Serrano.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The
general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 7. Laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall
not be excused by disuse or custom
or practice to the contrary.
The doctrine of operative fact serves as an
exception to the aforementioned general rule.
In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation,[29] we held:
The doctrine of operative
fact, as an exception to the general
rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the
effects of an unconstitutional law
by recognizing that the existence of
a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative
fact and may have consequences
which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it
was applied to a criminal case
when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by
 a municipality in reliance upon a
law creating it.[30]
Following Serrano, we hold that this case
should not be included in the aforementioned
exception. After all, it was not the fault of petitioner
that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal
committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would
be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and
would, in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning
agencies may violate an OFWs security of tenure
which an employment contract embodies and actually
profit from such violation based on an
unconstitutional provision of law.
In the same vein, we cannot subscribe to
respondents postulation that the tanker allowance of
US$130.00 should not be included in the
computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to
petitioner.
First. It is only at this late stage, more
particularly in their Memorandum, that respondents
are raising this issue. It was not raised before the LA,
the NLRC, and the CA. They did not even assail the
award accorded by the CA, which computed the
lump-sum salary of petitioner at the basic salary of
US$1,430.00, and which clearly included the
US$130.00 tanker allowance. Hence, fair play,
justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot
now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this
question. Matters not taken up below cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. They must be raised
seasonably in the proceedings before the lower
tribunals. Questions raised on appeal must be within
the issues framed by the parties; consequently, issues
not raised before the lower tribunals cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.[31]
Second. Respondents invocation
of Serrano is unavailing. Indeed, we made the
following pronouncements in Serrano, to wit:
The word salaries in
Section 10(5) does not include
overtime and leave pay. For difficulty in our country. Their
seafarers like petitioner, DOLE unfortunate circumstance makes
Department Order No. 33, series them easy prey to avaricious
1996, provides a Standard employers. They will climb
Employment Contract of Seafarers, mountains, cross the seas, endure
in which salary is understood as slave treatment in foreign lands just
the basic wage, exclusive of to survive. Out of despondence,
overtime, leave pay and other they will work under sub-human
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is conditions and accept salaries
compensation for all work below the minimum. The least we
performed in excess of the regular can do is to protect them with our
eight hours, and holiday pay is laws.
compensation for any work
performed on designated rest days
and holidays.[32] WHEREFORE, the Petition
is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
February 28, 2007 and Resolution dated August 30,
A close perusal of the contract reveals that 2007 are hereby MODIFIED to the effect
the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the
categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in entire unexpired portion of his employment contract
the basic salary clause, hence, forming part of the consisting of nine months computed at the rate of
basic salary of petitioner. Respondents themselves in US$1,430.00 per month. All other awards are
their petition for certiorari before the CA averred hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
that petitioners basic salary, pursuant to the contract,
was US$1,300.00 + US$130.00 tanker SO ORDERED.
allowance.[33] If respondents intended it differently,
the contract per se should have indicated that said
allowance does not form part of the basic salary or,
simply, the contract should have separated it from the
basic salary clause.
A final note.
We ought to be reminded of the plight and
sacrifices of our OFWs. In Olarte v. Nayona,[34] this
Court held that:
Our overseas workers
belong to a disadvantaged class.
Most of them come from the
poorest sector of our society. Their
profile shows they live in
suffocating slums, trapped in an
environment of crimes. Hardly
literate and in ill health, their only
hope lies in jobs they find with
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197539 June 2, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M.
GALLEMIT and RODERICK GALLEMIT y
TOLENTINO, Accused.
RODERICK GALLEMIT y
TOLENTINO, Accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For Our consideration is an appeal from the
Decision1 dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03168, which
affirmed the Joint Decision2 dated January 15, 2007
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Paraaque City,
Branch 195, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0122 to 30,
finding accused-appellant Roderick Gallemit y
Tolentino guilty of the crimes of ( 1) illegal
recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized
under Article II, Section 6, in relation to Section 7(b)
of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the
"Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995;" and (2) estafa, as defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, but modified the penalties imposed upon
appellant for said crimes.
In an Information dated January 3, 2003, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 03-0122, Angelita I. Daud (Daud),
Hanelita M. Gallemit (Hanelita), and appellant
Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino were charged before
the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about or sometime during the period from
February 5, 2001 to August 2001, in the City of
Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and both of
them mutually helping and aiding one another,
representing themselves to have the capacity to
contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and
Complainant Collected
promise employment abroad to
complainants Marcelo De Guzman, Evangeline Crim. Case No. Evangeline I. 25,000.00
Relox, Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena, 03-01245 Relox,
Nenita Policarpio, Myrna Crisostomo and Francisco
Poserio, without first securing the required license or Crim. Case No. Marcelo E. Rayo 45,000.00
authority from the Department of Labor and 03-01256
Employment thus deemed committed in large scale
and therefore amounting to economic sabotage.3 Crim. Case No. Brigada A. Rayo 28,000.00
Eight more Informations, all dated January 3, 2003, 03-01267
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123 to 03-0130,
charged Daud, Hanelita, and appellant before the Crim. Case No. Gina T. Decena 70,000.00
RTC with eight counts of Estafa, committed 03-01278
separately upon eight private complainants, namely, Crim. Case No. Nenita F. 50,000.00
Marcelo I. De Guzman (De Guzman), Evangeline I. 03-01289 Policarpio
Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada A. Rayo, Gina T.
Decena (Decena), Nenita F. Policarpio, Myrna S. Crim. Case No. Myrna S. 24,500.00
Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio (Poserio), 03-012910 Crisostomo
respectively.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0123 Crim. Case No. Francisco S. 70,000.00
alleged: 03-013011 Poserio
That on or about covering the period from February Only appellant was apprehended, while his co-
2001 up to March 2001, in the City of Paraaque, accused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this remained at large.
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, The nine criminal cases against appellant before the
conspiring and confederating together and all of them RTC were consolidated. When arraigned, appellant
mutually helping and aiding one another, did then pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him.
and there willfully and feloniously defraud Marcelo Thereafter, joint trial of the nine criminal cases
de Guzman y Ignacio pertinent to his overseas job ensued.
employment if he would deliver to them the amount The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine
of 545,000.00 by means of other similar deceit Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
knowing it to be false and only made to induce the Certification dated September 19, 2002 stating that
aforementioned complainant to give and deliver the Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy,
said amount of 545,000.00 and accused once in with address at India St., Don Bosco, Paraaque City,
possession of the same, did then and there willfully, set up and operated by appellant and his co-accused,
unlawfully and feloniously misapply and is not licensed to recruit workers for overseas
misappropriate the said amount to their own personal employment.12
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman,
said MARCELODE GUZMAN y IGNACIO in the Decena, and Poserio testified against Gallem it. The
aforementioned amount.4 presentation of a POEA representative was dispensed
The seven other Informations in Criminal Case Nos. with after the defense admitted the due execution and
03-0124 to 03-0130 were similarly worded as the genuineness of the POEA Certification dated
aforequoted Information, except as to the name of the September 19, 2002.13
private complainant and the amount purportedly Evidence for the defense consisted solely of
collected from him/her, to wit: appellants testimony.
Docket No. Private Amount
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its
Decision dated January 15, 2007 finding appellant
guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and
Estafa on three (3) counts. The dispositive portion of
the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 03-0122,
the Court finds accused Roderick
Gallemit y Tolentino, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT as principal of the crime
of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale in violation of Section 6 in
relation to Section 7 of RA 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 and hereby sentences
him to a penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos
(500,000.00).
(2) In Criminal Case No. 03-0123,
the Court finds accused Roderick
Gallemit y Tolentino GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT as principal of the crime
of Estafa under Article 315
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to
suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of
two (2) years and four (4) months
as minimum to thirteen (13) years
as maximum which carries with it
the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and
that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of
suffrage. The accused is further
sentenced to pay complaining
witness Marcelo De Guzman y
Ignacio the amount of Eighty
Thousand Pesos (80,000.00) plus
twelve percent (12%) interest from
the date of the filing of the
Information on February 3, 2003,
with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, plus the costs of
suit;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 03-
0127,the Court finds accused
Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino
GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as
principal of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate Penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months as minimum
to nine (9) years as maximum
which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage. The
accused is further sentenced to pay
the costs of suit; and
(4) In Criminal Case No. 03-0130,
the Court finds accused Roderick
Gallemit y Tolentino GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT as principal of the crime
of Estafa under Article 315
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to
suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of
two (2) years and four (4) months
as minimum to twelve (12) years
and two (2) months as maximum
which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage. The
accused is further sentenced to pay
costs of suit.
(5) Criminal Case Nos. 03-0124,
03-0125, 03-0126, 03-0128, and
03-0129, for failure to prosecute,
are hereby ordered Dismissed, as
against accused Roderick Gallemit.
Considering that accused ANGELITA I. DAUD and
HANELITA M. GALLEMIT remain at large for
more than six (6) months since the issuance and
delivery of the warrant of arrest to the proper police
or peace officer, the cases against them are hereby
ordered ARCHIVED pursuant to Administrative
Circular No. 7-A-92. Let an alias warrant of arrest be
issued against them.14
Following the denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration by the RTC in an Order15 dated
April 3, 2007, appellant filed an appeal before the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals summarized the private
complainants testimonies against appellant, viz:
Marcelo de Guzman[(De Guzman)], a dentist by
profession with a clinic in Bulacan, testified that
sometime in January 2001, he was introduced by his
patient Modesta Marqueda to her cousin, accused
[Daud]. [Daud] encouraged [De Guzman] to apply
for work abroad and convinced him that she would be
able to send him to Korea. To prove to [De Guzman]
that she was capable of sending workers abroad,
[Daud] invited him to visit her office located at Taft
Avenue, Manila.
A month later, [De Guzman] and his cousins Maricel
Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Myrna Crisostomo, Francisco
Poserio, Evangeline Relox, [Decena] and Nenita
Policarpio, wentto see [Daud] at the Jemimah
International Manpower Services, located at Taft
Avenue, Manila where the latter was then working as
a liaison officer. The group was shown job orders and
photos of [Daud] with Korean employees to prove
that she was indeed sending workers abroad. It was at
this office that [De Guzman] first met [appellant] and
[Hanelita].
Meanwhile, [Daud], together with [Hanelita] and
[appellant], put up their own business named Green
Pastures Worldwide Tours and Consultancy
Corporation in their residence at No. 4 Sta. Maria
Apartment, India St., Better Living Subdivision,
Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City.
Having been convinced by the documents shown to
him at the Taft Avenue office, [De Guzman] paid
[Daud] the amount of 35,000[.]00 as initial payment
for his placement fee at the latters office and
residence in Paraaque City on February 2, 2001. On
February 5, 2001, [De Guzman] gave [Daud] the
amount of 15,000[.]00 which was witnessed by
Hanelita. He gave another 15,000.00 on February
22, 2001. However, he lost the original receipts.
On March 3, 6 and 7, 2001, [De Guzman] again gave
[Daud] x x x different amounts consisting of
35,000.00, 30,000.00 and 15,000.00,
respectively, at her office in Paraaque City (Exhibits
"A" to "C"). In [De Guzman]s presence, [Daud]
counted the money, issued receipts therefor as
"processing fees of Nike applicants", affixed her
signature after signing the receipts in the name of
"Nimfa Min". [Daud] explained to him that "Nimfa
Min" was her contact who happened to be the wife of
a Korean national. [De Guzman] trusted [Daud] and
accepted her explanation. Whenever he gave his
payment to [Daud], it was in the presence of Hanelita
and [appellant] but he did not require the two to sign
as witnesses because he trusted them as they were
members of the same family. [De Guzman] was told
by [Daud] and [appellant] that he and his group
would be leaving in two weeks time.
[De Guzman] and his companions were instructed to
appear before the Korean Embassy and were
promised that they would be able to leave on March
11, 2001 as trainee workers in Korea where they
would earn a monthly salary of US$400, overtime
pay, with benefits of free board and lodging and 30-
day leave within a year. De Guzmans group were
shown photocopies of their passport and stamped
visas for Korea. However, they were not given their
working permits and job contracts.
When their departure date was getting near, [Daud]
postponed it thrice. Eventually, [De Guzman] asked
from accused [Daud] a photocopy of his passport
with a stamped Korean Visa. Upon inquiry with the
Korean Embassy, [De Guzman] was told that it was
fake. He proceeded to the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) and verified the
registration of Green Pastures Worldwide Tour and
Consultancy Corporation. The POEA informed them
that it was not registered with the POEA and gave[De
Guzman] a certification to the effect that the said
agency was not licensed to recruit employees for
abroad (Exhibit D).
Embarrassed because of the money given by his
cousins, [De Guzman] verbally asked [Daud],
Hanelita and [appellant] to return the money. They
promised him that they would settle the matter but
they failed to return the money. x x x.
Gina Decena, for her part testified that sometime in
January 2001, she was introduced by her cousin,
Maricel Rayo, to accused [Daud], [Hanelita] and
[appellant], at the Makati Medical Towers where
Maricel had her medical examination. [Decena] again
met the three accused at their office at No. 4 Sta.
Maria Apartment, Better Living Subdivision,
Paraaque City when Maricel obtained a copy of her
medical certificate. They enticed [Decena] to apply at
their agency by showing her job orders that offered
$400 [a] month salary, 150% overtime pay, free
board and lodging as well as photographs of
prospective Korean employers. [Appellant] even
gave her a copy of the job order. The three accused
assured [Decena] that they had already sent several
applicants for employment abroad. Convinced,
[Decena] and her husband Marcelo Rayo applied at
their agency. They were instructed to undergo
medical examination, to attend a Korean Language
seminar, and to pay 70,000.00 processing fee.
Thus, on February 15, 2001, [Decena] and her
husband each gave accused [Daud] the amount of
35,000.00 as placement fees. During trial, [Decena]
presented her receipt for 35,000.00 which was
received and signed by [Daud].
Thereafter, the couple were told to wait for two
weeks for the processing of their visas. As two weeks
have passed and nothing happened to their
applications, [Decena] and her husband went to the
POEA to verify the status of the agency. They were
informed to the effect that said agency was not
licensed to send workers abroad. [Decena] and her
husband went back to the agency and tried to look for
the accused but they were all gone. They later came
to know, through [De Guzman], that [appellant] was
apprehended. She identified her sworn statement in
court.
Sometime in January 2001, Francisco Poserio
[(Poserio)] was brought along by his cousin [De
Guzman] to No. 4 Sta. Maria Apt., India St., Better
Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque
City. While thereat, [De Guzman] introduced [Daud],
Hanelita and [appellant] as the owners of Green
Pastures Worldwide Tours and Consultancy and that
they were sending workers to Korea. The three
accused encouraged [Poserio] to apply for work in
Korea where he could get a job which offered a
monthly salary of US$400 with free meals and
housing, 150% pay on overtime work and vacation
leave of thirty (30) days in a two-year contract. To
convince [Poserio] that they can send workers to
Korea, they showed him job orders from Hyundai
Group and Nike requiring workers for Korea, a copy
of a Korean visa of one of their job applicants, and
photos of [Daud] in Korea with a Korean national
who would be [Poserio]s prospective employer if he
applied with their agency. Further, he would be able
to earn back his placement fee in three months work.
Enticed, [Poserio] mortgaged his property to get
funds for his job application. [Daud] and Hanelita
informed him to undergo a medical examination and
seminar and even gave him a referral. On January 27,
2001, he gave his passport, medical examination
result, seminar result and certification for
employment. He was then told to pay 100,000.00 as
processing fee for his job application. On March 3,
2001, he gave his down payment of 25,000.00 to
[Daud] in the presence of Hanelita and [appellant].
He was told to wait for two weeks for the processing
of his papers. On July 2001, he was informed that
additional amount was needed to process his papers.
Thus, on July 5, 2001, he gave 45,000.00 as
additional payment to [Daud] in the presence of
Hanelita. He was again told to wait for another three
weeks. He was even promised that they would return
his money if he would notbe sent abroad. A year after
his payment, [Poserio] was still not able to leave the
country. Upon verification with the POEA, he and
the other job applicants discovered that the said
agency was not licensed to recruit workers for
overseas employment. He talked over the phone with
the accused and demanded the return of his money.
When they failed to return his money, he filed a
complaint with the Paraaque police.
All three complainants positively identified
[appellant] in court.16 (Citations omitted.)
The Court of Appeals similarly provided a gist of
appellants testimony, thus:
Roderick Gallemit [(appellant)] denied owning the
agency, undertaking any recruitment act or receiving
any amount from the complainants considering that
his name did not appear in the receipts. He admitted
that he is married to co-accused [Hanelita] and that
co-accused [Daud] is his mother-in-law.
He knew private complainants [De Guzman] and
[Poserio] who were introduced to him by [Daud] who
was then working as a liaison officer at Jemimah
International Manpower Services located in Taft
Avenue, Manila. [Appellant] denied knowing the
other complainants. He was just brought along by
[Daud] since he was also one of the job seekers
applying at the Jemimah International Manpower
Services where [Daud] worked. [Daud] told him that
private complainant [De Guzman] is her business
partner. [Poserio] was one of those applying for a job
abroad and [De Guzman] would refer them to
[Daud]. Thus, [De Guzman] frequented their
apartment in Paraaque.
He admitted that, from February 2001 to August
2001, he had been staying at the apartment in India
Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City he
shared with his wife Hanelita, their child and his
mother-in-law [Daud]. He and his wife were not
employed since they were applying for a job abroad.
His siblings help him out by sending him money for
his job application. He was aware that his mother-in-
law [Daud] was a recruiter and owned an agency
named Green Pasture Worldwide Travel and Tours
which she operated in the same apartment.
He claimed that [Daud] has only one employee, a
certain Badjong, who processed documents. At first
he did not apply with [Daud] because her business
was still new. He applied with her when she
convinced him that she could process his passport
and papers to Korea.
He denied he was present when the complainants
gave their payments to [Daud]. He insisted that he
was not involved with [Daud]s business and that he
was always out of the house as he would often go to
Cavite to ask for financial help from his siblings. x x
x.17 (Citations omitted.)
In its Decision dated March 18, 2011,the Court of
Appeals affirmed appellants conviction by the RTC,
but modified the indeterminate penalties imposed on
appellant for the three counts of estafa. The appellate
court decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding
accused-appellant RODERICK GALLEMIT y
TOLENTINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and of Estafa is
AFFIRMED with modification with respect to the
indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the
three counts of estafa, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 03-0123,
appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years and four (4) months of
prision correccional as minimum to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 03-0127,
appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years and four (4) months of
prision correccional as minimum to
nine (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 03-0130,
appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years and four (4) months of
prision correccional as minimum to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor
as maximum.
In all other respects, the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED.18
Hence, appellant comes before us via the instant
appeal with the same assignment of errors which he
raised before the Court of Appeals:
I the persons who recruited them for work abroad. 19
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF LARGE-SCALE
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND
ESTAFA DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF ESTAFADESPITE THE
ABSENCE [OF] THE ELEMENT OF
DECEIT.
Illegal recruitment in large scale
Appellant anchors his bid for acquittal on the failure
of the prosecution to prove that he gave private
complainants the distinct impression that he had the
power or ability to send them abroad for work such
that they were convinced to part with their money.
Any encouragement or promise of employment
abroad was solely made by Daud. Appellant points
out that it was only his alleged presence at the time
private complainants were making their payments to
Daud that led said private complainants to believe
that appellant participated in the recruitment scheme.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the
appellee, insists that appellant acted in conspiracy
with his co-accused in engaging in illegal recruitment
activities, specifically performing the following acts:
(1) Appellant, together with his co-accused, owned
and operated Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and
Consultancy Corporation; (2) Appellant, together
with his co-accused, encouraged private
complainants to apply for jobs abroad with their
agency, promising private complainants salary of
US$400.00, 150% overtime pay, and free board and
lodging; (3) Appellant, together with his co-accused,
assured private complainants that they could leave for
Korea within a short period after paying their
placement fees; and (4) Appellant was present
everytime private complainants made payments to his
co-accused Daud. In addition, private complainants
De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio positively
identified and pointed to appellant in court as one of
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment
and placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers; and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the
simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by
persons who, without authority from the government,
give the impression that they have the power to send
workers abroad for employment purposes.20
Republic Act No. 8042 broadened the concept of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that
constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment
Committed by a Syndicate.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defined illegal
recruitment as follows:
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring,
or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any
such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to
two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It
shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee,
non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the
worker in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases
where the deployment does not actually take place
without the workers fault. Illegal recruitment when
committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three
elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable him to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the
activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" under Article13(b) of
the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and (c) the
offender committed the same against three or more
persons, individually or as a group.21
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that all
the foregoing elements of illegal recruitment in large
scale are present in the case at bar. As the Court of
Appeals discussed in detail:
First, neither the agency "Green Pastures World Wide
Tours and Consultancy" nor appellant himself had a
valid license or authority to engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers. This was established by
the POEA certification stating that the said agency
located in that apartment was not licensed to recruit
employees for abroad. A license is a document issued
by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a
private employment agency, while an authority is a
document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person
or association to engage in recruitment and placement
activities as a private recruitment entity. It is the lack
of the necessary license or authority that renders the
recruitment activity, as in this case, unlawful or
criminal.
Second, despite not having such authority, appellant,
along with his co-accused, nevertheless engaged in
recruitment activities, offering and promising jobs to
private complainants and collecting from them
various amounts as placement fees. This is
substantiated by the respective testimonies of the
three private complainants who fell victim to their
illegal activities. Marcelo de Guzman testified that
appellant was physically present during the time that
he and his companions were being shown job orders
and while he was paying for the fees for himself and
in behalf of his companions. Francisco Poserio
testified that appellant was one of those who apprised
him of job benefits and tried to convince him to apply
for overseas employment through their agency. Gina
Decena mentioned that [appellant] even gave her a
copy of the job order.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
the lower court that there was conspiracy among the
accused in the commission of the offense. Direct
proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. Conspiracy exists where the
participants performed specific acts with such
closeness and coordination as unmistakably to
indicate a common purpose or design in committing
the crime.
The testimonies of the complainants on the matter are
affirmative in nature and sufficiently corroborative of
each other to be less than credible. It would be
contrary to human nature and experience for several
persons to conspire and accuse appellant of a crime
and send him to prison just to appease their feeling of
rejection and vindicate the frustration of their dreams
to work abroad if all he did was just to reside in the
same apartment where his mother-in-law [Daud]
operated her recruitment agency. It is in this light that
We find any inconsistencies that accused-appellant
harps on in the tesimonines of the complainants to be
inconsequential. What is important is that they have
positively identified accused-appellant as one of
those who enticed them to part with their money in
exchange for promised jobs abroad.
The crime of illegal recruitment, according to the
Supreme Court is committed when, among other
things, a person, who without being duly authorized
according to law, represents or gives the distinct
impression that he or she has the power or the ability
to provide work abroad convincing those to whom
the representation is made or to whom the impression
is given to thereupon part with their money in order
to be assured of that employment. This is what
obtains in this case.
Contrary to appellants mistaken notion, it is not the
issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees
that makes a case for illegal recruitment, but rather
the undertaking of recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority. The absence of
receipts to evidence payment is not necessarily fatal
to the prosecutions cause. A person charged with the
illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength
of the testimony of the complainants, if found to be
credible and convincing.
Considering the evidence on record, We agree with
the trial court that accused-appellant engaged in
recruitment of workers which was illegal and in large
scale. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three or more
persons individually or as a group. In this case, three
complainants testified against appellants acts of
illegal recruitment.22 (Citations omitted.)
The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the
findings and conclusions of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals. The prosecution witnesses were positive
and categorical in their testimonies that they
personally met appellant; that they knew appellant
was associated with Green Pasture Worldwide Tour
and Consultancy; and that appellant had performed
recruitment activities such as promising employment
abroad, encouraging job applications, and providing
copies of job orders. The private complainants
testimonies are consistent and corroborate one
another on material points, such as the amount of the
placement fees asked, and the purported country of
destination and nature of work.
It was not necessary for the prosecution to still prove
that appellant himself received the placement fees
from private complainants and issued receipts for the
same, given the finding of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals of the existence of conspiracy
among appellant and his co-accused Hanelita and
Daud, appellants wife and mother-in-law,
respectively. When there is conspiracy, the act of one
is the act of all.23 It is not essential that there be
actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part
in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective.24
Between the categorical statements of the private
complainants, on the one hand, and the bare denial of
appellant, on the other hand, the former must
perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far
stronger than a negative testimony especially when
the former comes from the mouth of a credible
witness. Denial, same as an alibi, if not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It
is considered with suspicion and always received
with caution, not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable, but also because it is easily fabricated
and concocted.25
Furthermore, without any evidence to show that
private complainants were propelled by any ill
motive to testify falsely against appellant, their
testimonies deserve full faith and credit. After all, the
doctrinal rule is that findings of fact made by the trial
court, which had the opportunity to directly observe
the witnesses and to determine the probative value of
the other testimonies, are entitled to great weight and
respect because the trial court is in a better position to
assess the same, an opportunity not equally open to
the appellate court. The absence of any showing that
the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect
the result of the case, or that its assessment was
arbitrary, impels us to defer to the trial courts
determination according credibility to the prosecution
evidence.26 This is more true if the findings of the
trial court were affirmed by the appellate court, since
it is settled that when the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court.27
Given the foregoing, we uphold the conviction of
appellant for illegal recruitment in a large scale,
which constitutes economic sabotage. The penalty of
life imprisonment and the fine of 500,000.00,
imposed upon appellant for the said offense by the
RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is in
accord with Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042,
which provides:
Sec. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of
illegal recruitment shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day
but not more than twelve (12) years
and a fine of not less than Two
hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00) nor more than Five
hundred thousand pesos
(500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos
(500,000.00) nor more than One
million pesos (1,000,000.00) shall
be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein. (Emphasis ours.)
Estafa
We likewise affirm the conviction of appellant for
three counts of estafa committed against the private
complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-
0127, and 03-0130, based on the very same evidence
that proved appellants criminal liability for illegal
recruitment.
It is settled that a person may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under
Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor
Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)of
the Revised Penal Code. As we explained in People
v. Cortez and Yabut28:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who
commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction,
while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent
of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction
for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar
conviction for offenses punishable by other laws.
Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a
conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of
estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice
versa. (Citations omitted.)
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code defines estafa as:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending
to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or
by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person. 29
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of
estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. He
insists on the absence of proof that he made any false
statement or fraudulent representation to private
complainants.
We are not persuaded. As we had previously
discussed herein, private complainants were able to
establish, through their positive and credible
testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with
his co-accused to mislead private complainants into
believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a fee,
can deploy private complainants abroad for
employment. Decena testified that appellant gave her
a copy of the purported job order for Korea, while
Poserio avowed that appellant encouraged him to
apply for work abroad. Daud, appellants fellow
conspirator, accepted placement fees from private
complainants, even issuing receipts for some;
instructed private complainants to undergo medical
examination; and took private complainants
passports. The representations made by appellant and
his co-accused to private complainants were actually
false and fraudulent, not only because they were not
duly authorized to undertake recruitment for overseas
employment, but also because there were no actual
jobs waiting for private complainants in Korea and
private complainants never had a chance to leave for
work abroad.
Appellant also argues that the second element of
estafa, which is prejudice or pecuniary loss, was not
established during trial as the prosecution was unable
to present any receipt signed by appellant proving
that he received money from private complainants.
We disagree once more with appellant. We reiterate
that when conspiracy has been established, the act of
one conspirator is the act of all. All three private
complainants testified that they paid placement fees
to Daud, who issued receipts for some amounts either
in her name or in the name of one "Nimfa Min."
Moreover, the payment of placement fees to illegal
recruiters is not evidenced by receipts alone; it can
also be established by testimonies of witnesses. In
People v. Pabalan,30 we held:
Although not all of the amounts testified to by
complainants were covered by receipts, the fact that
there were no receipts for some of the amounts
delivered to him does not mean that appellant did not
accept or receive such payments. This Court has
ruled in several cases that the absence of receipts in a
criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant
the acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to the case
of the prosecution. As long as the witnesses had
positively shown through their respective testimonies
that the accused is the one involved in the prohibited
recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense
despite the want of receipts.
The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do
not require the presentations of receipts in order to
prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and
the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases.
The amounts may consequently be proved by the
testimony of witnesses. (Citation omitted.)
Again, there is no cogent reason for us to disturb the
finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that both elements of estafa are present in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 03-0130.
Thus, we sustain appellants conviction for estafa,
punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the
Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of
defraudation.1wphi1 Per Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be[.]
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, when the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000.00 but not exceeding
22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months,
and 1 day to 8 years). Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere within prision
correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).31 Consequently, the minimum terms in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123,03-127, and 03-0130
were correctly fixed by the RTC, and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, at 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional.
The maximum term under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law shall be that which, in view of
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the Revised Penal Code. To
compute the minimum, medium, and maximum
periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when the
amount of fraud exceeds 12,000.00, the time
included in prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum shall be divided into three equal
portions, with each portion forming a period.
Following this computation, the minimum period for
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum is from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5
years, 5 months, and 10 days; the medium period is
from 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8
months, and 20 days; and the maximum period is
from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. Any
incremental penalty (i.e., one year for every
10,000.00 in excess of 22,000.00) shall thus be
added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21
days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court,
provided that the total penalty does not exceed 20
years.32
In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-127, and 03- 1. In Criminal Case No. 03-0122, appellant estafa, as defined and penalized in Article
0130, the maximum term shall be taken from the Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, which is beyond reasonable doubt of illegal Code, for which he is sentenced to a prison
6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. The Court recruitment in large scale, constituting term of two (2) years and four (4) months of
of Appeals fixed the maximum term at 8 years. economic sabotage, as defined and penalized prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve
But then, since private complainants were defrauded in Section 6, in relation to Section 7(b), of (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
in the amounts exceeding 22,000.00, incremental Republic Act No. 8042, for which he is and ordered to indemnify private
penalty shall be imposed upon appellant, determined sentenced to suffer the penalty of life complainant Francisco S. Poserio in the
as follows: imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos
1wphi1 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (70,000.00) as actual damages, with legal
(500.000.00); interest of six percent (6%) per annum from
Quotie
Criminal Differen 2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0123, appellant January 3, 2003, until the said amount is
nt
Case Amoun ce After Increme Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY fully paid.
After
No. t Subtrac ntal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SO ORDERED.
Dividin
(Private Defrau ting Penalty3 estafa, as defined and penalized in Article
g by
Complai ded 22,000. 3
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
10,00
nant) 00 Code, for which he is sentenced to a prison
0.00
term of two (2) years and four (4) months of
03-0123 80,00 58,000. 5.8 5 years prision correccional, as minimum, to
(De 0.00 00 thirteen years (13) of reclusion temporal, as
Guzman) maximum, and ordered to indemnify private
complainant Marcelo I. De Guzman in the
03-0127 35,00 13,000. 1.3 1 year amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos
(Decena) 0.00 00 (80,000.00) as actual damages, with legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum from
03-130 70,00 48,000. 4.8 4 years January 3, 2003, until the said amount is
(Poserio) 0.00 00 fully paid;
The incremental penalty shall be added to the 3. In Criminal Case No. 03-0127, appellant
maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY
Appeals. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals in beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
imposing the maximum penalty in Criminal Case No. estafa, as defined and penalized in Article
03-0123at thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal; 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal C
in Criminal Case No. 03-0127 at nine (9) years of ode, for which he is sentenced to a prison
prision mayor; and in Criminal Case No. 03-0130 at term of two (2) years and four
twelve (12) years of prision mayor. (4) months of prision correccional, as
Lastly, it is still incumbent upon appellant to minimum, to nine (9) years of prision
indemnify private complainants for the amounts paid mayor, as maximum, ordered to indemnify
to him and his conspirators, with legal interest at the private complainant Gina T. Decena in the
rate of 6% per annum, from the time of demand, amount of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos
which, in this case, shall be deemed as the same day (35,000.00) as actual damages, with legal
the Informations were filed against appellant, until interest of six percent (6%) per annum from
the said amounts are fully paid.34 January 3, 2003, until the said amount is
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with fully paid; and
MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated March 18, 4. In Criminal Case No. 03-0130, appellant
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY
No. 03168, to read as follows: beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with
shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the facts and
the law, to approximate justice for her.
We are asked to decide a petition for review1 on
certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
decision2 dated June 27, 2005. This decision partially
affirmed the National Labor RelationsCommissions
resolution dated March 31, 2004,3declaring
respondents dismissal illegal, directing petitioner to
pay respondents three-month salary equivalent to
New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00, and ordering it
to reimburse the NT$3,000.00 withheld from
respondent, and pay her NT$300.00 attorneys fees.4
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc.,
is a recruitment and placement agency.5 Responding
to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles,
submitted her application for a quality control job in
Taiwan.6
Joys application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked
to sign a oneyear employment contract for a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer
Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee
of 70,000.00 when she signed the employment
contract.9
Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co.
Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.10 She alleged that in
her employment contract, she agreed to work as
quality control for one year.11 In Taiwan, she was
asked to work as a cutter.12
Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyclaims that on
July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that "she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport." 13 She was
asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation." 14
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July
14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted
NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.16
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the
National Labor Relations Commission against
petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was
illegally dismissed.18 She asked for the return of her
placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation
costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as
moral and exemplary damages.19 She identified
Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys
foreign principal.20
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that
respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply
with the work requirements [of] her foreign
[employer]."21 The agency also claimed that it did not
ask for a placement fee of 70,000.00.22 As evidence,
it showedOfficial Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10,
1997, bearing the amount of 20,360.00.23 Petitioner
added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had
already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower &
Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6,
1997.24 Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already
substituted by Pacific Manpower.25
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of
petitioners claims against it.26 It alleged that there
was no employer-employee relationship between
them.27 Therefore, the claims against it were outside
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.28 Pacific
Manpower argued that the employment contract
should first be presented so that the employers
contractual obligations might be identified.29 It
further denied that it assumed liability for petitioners
illegal acts.30
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joys
complaint.31 Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro
C.Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on
mereallegations.32 The Labor Arbiter found that there
was no excess payment of placement fees, based on
the official receipt presented by petitioner.33 The
Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a discussion on
petitioners transfer of obligations to Pacific34 and
considered the matter immaterial in view of the
dismissal of respondents complaint.35
Joy appealed36 to the National Labor Relations
Commission.
In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National
Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was
illegally dismissed.38 It reiterated the doctrine that the
burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based
on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer.39 It
found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed
to prove that there were just causes for
termination.40 There was no sufficient proofto show
that respondent was inefficient in her work and that
she failed to comply with company
requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural dueprocess
was not observed in terminating respondent.42
The National Labor Relations Commission did not
rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees
for lack of jurisdiction.43 It refused to entertain the
issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to
Pacific.44 It did not acquire jurisdiction over that
issue because Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
failed to appeal the Labor Arbiters decision not to
rule on the matter.45
The National Labor Relations Commission awarded
respondent only three (3) months worth of salaryin
the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the
NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorneys fees of
NT$300.46
The Commission denied the agencys motion for
reconsideration47 dated May 12, 2004 through a
resolution48 dated July 2, 2004.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency caused the filing of a petition49 for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals assailing the National
Labor Relations Commissions resolutions dated
March 31, 2004 and July 2, 2004.
The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission with respect to
the finding of illegal dismissal, Joys entitlement to
the equivalent of three months worth of salary,
reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and
attorneys fees.51 The Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the National Labor Relations Commission to
address the validity of petitioner's allegations against
Pacific.52 The Court of Appeals held, thus: Although
the public respondent found the dismissal of the
complainant-respondent illegal, we should point out
that the NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months
backwages or the amount of NT$46,080.00, which
was based upon its finding that she was dismissed
without due process, a finding that we uphold, given
petitioners lack of worthwhile discussion upon the
same in the proceedings below or before us. Likewise
we sustain NLRCs finding in regard to the
reimbursement of her fare, which is squarely based
on the law; as well as the award of attorneys fees.
But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case
to the public respondent for further proceedings, for
the purpose of addressing the validity or propriety of
petitioners third-party complaint against the
transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower &
Management Services, Inc. and Lea G. Manabat. We
should emphasize that as far as the decision of the
NLRC on the claims of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the
same is hereby affirmed with finality, and we hold
petitioner liable thereon, but without prejudice to
further hearings on its third party complaint against
Pacific for reimbursement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
Resolutions are hereby partly AFFIRMED in
accordance with the foregoing discussion, but subject
to the caveat embodied inthe last sentence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.53
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
filed this petition.54
We are asked to determine whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding
respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the
cost ofher repatriation, and attorneys fees despite the
alleged existence of just causes of termination.
Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for
termination because there was a finding of Wacoal
that respondent was inefficient in her work.55
Therefore, it claims that respondents dismissal was
valid.56
Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoals
accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at the
time respondent filed her complaint, it should be
Pacific that should now assume responsibility for
Wacoals contractual obligations to the workers
originally recruited by petitioner.57
Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyspetition is
without merit. We find for respondent.
I here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show
that there was just cause for causing Joys dismissal.
The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due
process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose
productivity and quality standards at work.58 They
may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the
employees comply with these standards.59 Failure to
comply may be a just cause for their
dismissal.60 Certainly, employers cannot be
compelled to retain the services of anemployee who
is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the
employer.61 While the law acknowledges the plight
and vulnerability of workers, it does not "authorize
the oppression or self-destruction of the
employer."62 Management prerogative is recognized
in law and in our jurisprudence.
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is
"tempered with the employees right to security of
tenure."63Workers are entitled to substantive and
procedural due process before termination. They may
not be removed from employment without a validor
just cause as determined by law and without going
through the proper procedure.
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our
Constitution.64
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure
when they move to work in a different jurisdiction.
With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino
workers, we follow the principle of lex loci
contractus.Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services,
Inc. v. NLRC,65 this court noted:
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical
certificate requirement by contending that since
Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her
employment was subject to the laws of the host
country. Apparently, petitioner hopes tomake it
appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not
require any certification by a competent public health
authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioners argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus
(the law of the place where the contract is made)
governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that
the contract of employment in this case was perfected
implementing rules and regulations, and other laws
affecting labor apply in this case.Furthermore, settled
is the rule that the courts of the forum will not
enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums
public policy. Herein the Philippines, employment
agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3,
guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
selforganization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. Theyshall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided
by law.
....
This public policy should be borne in mind in this
case because to allow foreign employers to determine
for and by themselves whether an overseas contract
worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness
would encourage illegal or arbitrary pretermination
of employment contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights,
this court emphasized in PCL Shipping Philippines,
Inc. v. NLRC,67 to wit:
Petitioners admit that they did notinform private
respondent in writing of the charges against him and
that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to
give him opportunity to air his side. However,
petitioners contend that the twin requirements
ofnotice and hearing applies strictly only when the
employment is within the Philippines and that these
need not be strictly observed in cases of international
maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the
Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees
whether working within the Philippines or abroad.
Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the
law of the place where the contract is made) governs
in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the Contract of Employment entered
into by and between petitioners and private
respondent was executed here in the Philippines with
the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code
together with its implementing rules and regulations
and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case.68 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may
only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and
after compliance with procedural due process
requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just
causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer
may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioners allegation that respondentwas inefficient
in her work and negligent in her duties69 may,
therefore, constitute a just cause for termination
under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able
to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for
termination is on the employer. "The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that
the dismissal was for a justifiable cause."70 Failure to
show that there was valid or just cause for
termination would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was illegal.71
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in
work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer
has set standards of conduct and workmanship
against which the employee will be judged; 2) the
standards of conduct and workmanship must have
been communicated tothe employee; and 3) the
communication was made at a reasonable time prior
to the employees performance assessment.
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on
probationary employees, which allow termination
ofthe employee only when there is "just cause or
when [the probationary employee] fails to qualify as
a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his [or her] engagement." 72
However, we do not see why the application of that
ruling should be limited to probationary employment.
That rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and
due process, which are guaranteed to all employees,
whether their employment is probationary or regular.
The pre-determined standards that the employer sets
are the bases for determining the probationary
employees fitness, propriety, efficiency, and
qualifications as a regular employee. Due process
requires that the probationary employee be informed
of such standards at the time of his or her
engagement so he or she can adjusthis or her
character or workmanship accordingly. Proper
adjustment to fit the standards upon which the
employees qualifications will be evaluated will
increase ones chances of being positively assessed
for regularization by his or her employer.
Assessing an employees work performance does not
stop after regularization. The employer, on a regular
basis, determines if an employee is still qualified and
efficient, based on work standards. Based on that
determination, and after complying with the due
process requirements of notice and hearing, the
employer may exercise its management prerogative
of terminating the employee found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantlyattempt to
prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all
the standards for employment. This time, however,
the standards to be met are set for the purpose of
retaining employment or promotion. The employee
cannot be expected to meet any standard of character
or workmanship if such standards were not
communicated to him or her. Courts should remain
vigilant on allegations of the employers failure to
communicatework standards that would govern ones
employment "if [these are] to discharge in good faith
[their] duty to adjudicate." 73
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent
failed to comply with her foreign employers work
requirements and was inefficient in her work.74 No
evidence was shown to support such allegations.
Petitioner did not even bother to specify what
requirements were not met, what efficiency standards
were violated, or what particular acts of respondent
constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was
sufficiently informed of the standards against which
her work efficiency and performance were judged.
The parties conflict as to the position held by
respondent showed that even the matter as basic as
the job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to
support a claim that there is just cause for
termination. There is no proof that respondent was
legally terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with
the due process requirements
Respondents dismissal less than one year from
hiring and her repatriation on the same day show not
onlyfailure on the partof petitioner to comply with
the requirement of the existence of just cause for
termination. They patently show that the
employersdid not comply with the due process
requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and
adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.75 The
employer is required to give the charged employee at
least two written notices before termination.76 One of
the written notices must inform the employee of the
particular acts that may cause his or her
dismissal.77 The other notice must "[inform] the
employee of the employers decision." 78 Aside from
the notice requirement, the employee must also be
given "an opportunity to be heard."79
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and
hearing requirements. Respondent started working on
June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated
on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and barely
a month from her first workday. She was also
repatriated on the same day that she was informed of
her termination. The abruptness of the termination
negated any finding that she was properly notified
and given the opportunity to be heard. Her
constitutional right to due process of law was
violated.
II
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally
dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired
portion ofthe employment contract that was violated
together with attorneys fees and reimbursement of
amounts withheld from her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of1995, states thatoverseas workers
who were terminated without just, valid, or
authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less."
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of
an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This
provisions [sic] shall be incorporated in the contract
for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to
be filed by the recruitment/placementagency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the
workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors
and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
orpartnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period
or duration of the employment contract and shall not
be affected by any substitution, amendment or
modification made locally or in a foreign country of
the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary
agreement on money claims inclusive of damages
under this section shall be paid within four (4)
months from the approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest
of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
....
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that
"repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or
her] personal belongings shall be the primary
responsibility of the agency which recruited or
deployed the worker overseas." The exception is
when "termination of employment is due solely to the
fault of the worker,"80 which as we have established,
is not the case. It reads: SEC. 15. REPATRIATION
OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION
FUND. The repatriation of the worker and the
transport of his personal belongings shall be the
primary responsibility of the agency which recruited
or deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant
to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the
agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the
repatriation of remains and transport of the personal
belongings of a deceased worker and all costs
attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal
and/or local agency. However, in cases where the
termination of employment is due solely to the fault
of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall
not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation
of the former and/or his belongings.
....
The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10%
of the amount of withheld wages as attorneys
feeswhen the withholding is unlawful.
The Court of Appeals affirmedthe National Labor
Relations Commissions decision to award
respondent NT$46,080.00 or the threemonth
equivalent of her salary, attorneys fees of
NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld
NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her
repatriation.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to
all of these awards. The award of the three-month
equivalent of respondents salary should, however, be
increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired
term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,82 this court ruled that
the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less" 83 is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause and substantive due process.84
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed
at all."85
We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less"was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides:
Section 7.Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damage. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC
shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the
developments in the global services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This
provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to
de [sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the
workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors
and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period
or duration of the employment contract and shall not
be affected by any substitution, amendment or
modification made locally or in a foreign country of
the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary
agreement on money claims inclusive of damages
under this section shall be paid within thirty (30) days
from approval of the settlement by the appropriate
authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from
the migrant workers salary, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his
placement fee and the deductions made with interest
at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
In case of a final and executory judgement against a
foreign employer/principal, it shall be automatically
disqualified, without further proceedings, from
participating in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino
workers until and unless it fully satisfies the
judgement award.
Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for
resolutions of case providedunder this section shall
subject the responsible officials to any or all of the
following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails
to render his decision or resolution within
the prescribed period shall be, or caused to
be, withheld until the said official complies
therewith;
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90)
days; or
(c) Dismissal from the service with
disqualification to hold any appointive
public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however,That the penalties herein provided
shall be without prejudice to any liability which any
such official may have incured [sic] under other
existing laws or rules and regulations as a
consequence of violating the provisions of this
paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March
8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the
clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect
at the time of respondents termination from work in
1997.86 Republic Act No. 8042 before it was
amended byRepublic Act No. 10022 governs this
case.
When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case
that clearly raises adversarial positions in their proper
context before considering a prayer to declare it as
unconstitutional.
However, we are confronted with a unique situation.
The law passed incorporates the exact clause already
declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived
substantial change in the circumstances.
This may cause confusion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission and the Court of
Appeals.At minimum, the existence of Republic Act
No. 10022 may delay the execution of the judgment
in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage
the wrong done to petitioner.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this
constitutional issue.
Moreover, this court is possessed with the
constitutional duty to "[p]romulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights."87 When cases become mootand academic, we
do not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and
bar in situations where the same violations are
capable of repetition but will evade review. This is
analogous to cases where there are millions of
Filipinos working abroad who are bound to suffer
from the lack of protection because of the restoration
of an identical clause in a provision previously
declared as unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme.
No branch or office of the government may exercise
its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law
that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot
be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read
in light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,the
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already
declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have sochanged as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by
the parties that the situation has so changed so as to
cause us to reverse binding precedent.
Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial
efficiency and economy that attend to these cases.
The new law puts our overseas workers in the same
vulnerable position as they were prior to Serrano.
Failure to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that
case will result in the same untold economic
hardships that our reading of the Constitution
intended to avoid. Obviously, we cannot countenance
added expenses for further litigation thatwill reduce
their hardearned wages as well as add to the indignity
of having been deprived of the protection of our laws
simply because our precedents have not been
followed. There is no constitutional doctrine that
causes injustice in the face of empty procedural
niceties. Constitutional interpretation is complex, but
it is never unreasonable.
Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we
ordered the parties and the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment on the constitutionality of the
reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 10022.
In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause
was constitutional.90 The legislators intended a
balance between the employers and the employees
rights by not unduly burdening the local recruitment
agency.91 Petitioner is also of the view that the clause
was already declared as constitutional in Serrano.92
The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that
the clause was valid and constitutional.93 However,
since the parties never raised the issue of the
constitutionality of the clause asreinstated in
Republic Act No. 10022, its contention is that it is
beyond judicial review.94
On the other hand, respondentargued that the clause
was unconstitutional because it infringed on workers
right to contract.95
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as
provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General
have failed to show any compelling changein the
circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime that limiting wages that should be
recovered by anillegally dismissed overseas worker
to three months is both a violation of due process and
the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that
persons under like circumstances and falling within
the same class are treated alike, in terms of
"privileges conferred and liabilities enforced." 97 It is
a guarantee against "undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality."98
In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to
make distinctions and classifications."99
In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion.100
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this
legislative power.101 A law is void on this basis, only
if classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no
violation of the equal protection clause if the law
applies equally to persons within the same class and
if there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing
between those falling within the class and those who
do not fall within the class.103 A law that does not
violate the equal protection clause prescribesa
reasonable classification.104
A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally
to all members of the same class."105
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement
of reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by
the reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-
period overseas workers and fixedperiod local
workers.106 It also distinguished between overseas
workers with employment contracts of less than one
year and overseas workers with employment
contracts of at least one year.107 Within the class of
overseas workers with at least one-year employment
contracts, there was a distinction between those with
at least a year left in their contracts and those with
less than a year left in their contracts when they were
illegally dismissed.108
The Congress classification may be subjected to
judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." 109
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special
protection.110 Thus, this court in Serrano, "[i]mbued
with the same sense of obligation to afford
protection to labor, . . . employ[ed] the standard of
strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject
clause a suspect classification prejudicial to
OFWs."111
We also noted in Serranothat before the passage of
Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally
terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-
term employment werecomputed in the same
manner.112 Their money claims were computed based
onthe "unexpired portions of their contracts." 113 The
adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No.
8042 subjected the money claims of illegally
dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term
of at least a year to a cap of three months worth of
their salary.114 There was no such limitation on the
money claims of illegally terminated local workers
with fixed-term employment.115
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas
workers whose employment contracts had a term of
less than one year were granted the amount
equivalent to the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally
dismissed overseas workers with employment terms
of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to
three months of their salary for the unexpired
portions of their contracts.117
Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we
also found that "the subject clause creates a sub-layer
of discrimination among OFWs whose contract
periods are for more than one year: those who are
illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their
contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are
illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining
in their contracts shall be covered by the reinstated
clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their
salaries for three months only." 118
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these
classifications do not rest on any real or substantial
distinctions that would justify different treatments in
terms of the computation of money claims resulting
from illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications
are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the
period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that
they cannot be dismissed before the end of their
contract terms without due process. If they were
illegally dismissed, the workers right to security of
tenure is violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local
worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than
norless than the rights violated when a fixed-period
overseas worker is illegally terminated. It is state
policy to protect the rights of workers
withoutqualification as to the place of
employment.119 In both cases, the workers are
deprived of their expected salary, which they could
have earned had they not been illegally dismissed.
For both workers, this deprivation translates to
economic insecurity and disparity.120 The same is true
for the distinctions between overseas workers with an
employment contract of less than one year and
overseas workers with at least one year of
employment contract, and between overseas workers
with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas
workers with less than a year left in their contracts
when they were illegally dismissed.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument
that "[overseas workers] are contractual
employeeswho can never acquire regular
employment status, unlike local workers"121 because
it already justifies differentiated treatment in terms
ofthe computation of money claims.122
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues
on overseas workers money claims do not justify a
differentiated treatment in the computation of their
money claims.123 If anything, these issues justify an
equal, if not greater protection and assistance to
overseas workers who generally are more prone to
exploitation given their physical distance from our
government.
We also find that the classificationsare not relevant to
the purpose of the law, which is to "establish a higher
standard of protection and promotion of the welfare
of migrant workers, their families and overseas
Filipinos in distress, and for other
purposes."124 Further, we find specious the argument
that reducing the liability of placement agencies
"redounds to the benefit of the [overseas]
workers."125
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas
workers does not increase the standard of protection
afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign
employers are more incentivizedby the reinstated
clause to enter into contracts of at least a year
because it gives them more flexibility to violate our
overseas workers rights. Their liability for arbitrarily
terminating overseas workers is decreased at the
expense of the workers whose rights they violated.
Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are
impressed with an expectation of a stable job
overseas for the longer contract period disregard
other opportunities only to be terminated earlier.
They are left with claims that are less than what
others in the same situation would receive. The
reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation where
the law meant to protect them makes violation of
rights easier and simply benign to the violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in
Serrano:
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid
rules and measures, and in fact provides a hidden
twist affecting the principal/employers liability.
While intended as an incentive accruing to
recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded,
simply limits the OFWs recovery in
wrongfuldismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the
benefit of whoever may be liable, including the
principal/employer the direct employer primarily
liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense,
Section 10 read as a grant of incentives to
recruitment/manning agencies oversteps what it
aims to do by effectively limiting what is otherwise
the full liability of the foreign principals/employers.
Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the
wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable
reason, to mitigate its liability for wrongful
dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the
limitation ofliability under Section 10 cannot be an
"appropriate" incentive, to borrow the term that R.A.
No. 8042 itself uses to describe the incentive it
envisions under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of
granting the incentive: instead of a grant that, to
encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly
related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply
limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of
already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-
imposed partial condonation of their liability to
OFWs, justified solely by the laws intent to
encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the
incentive,from a more practical and realistic view, is
really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor
at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the
market. . . .
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly
odious by its effect on the OFWs the benefits
accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and
their principals are takenfrom the pockets of the
OFWs to whom the full salaries for the unexpired
portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the
principals/employers and the recruitment/manning
agencies even profit from their violation of the
security of tenure that an employment contract
embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded
the OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery
afforded him or her by operation of law, but also
because this same lessened recovery renders a
wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to
undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino
will always bea consideration a foreign employer will
take into account in termination of employment
decisions. . . .126
Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for any
form of government action that alleviates the burden
of one sector, but imposes the same burden on
another sector, especially when the favored sector is
composed of private businesses suchas placement
agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed
ofOFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands. The idea thatprivate
business interest can be elevated to the level of a
compelling state interest is odious."127
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated
clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it
deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims
without any discernable valid purpose.128
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for
the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance
with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The
award of the three-month equivalence of
respondents salary must be modified accordingly.
Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was
terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to
her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To
rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and
other OFWs, and would,in effect, send a wrong
signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs
security of tenure which an employment contract
embodies and actually profit from such violation
based on an unconstitutional provision of law."129
III
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which revised the
interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6%
in the absence of stipulation,applies in this case. The
pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of
2013, read: The Monetary Board, in its Resolution
No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following
revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence
of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby amending
Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an
express contract as to such rateof interest, shall be six
percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1
of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections
4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions are
hereby amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado
Peralta, we laid down the guidelines in computing
legal interest in Nacar v. Gallery Frames:130
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in
the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the
rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it
consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the
interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the
interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 6% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions
of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a
loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except
when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin
to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such certainty cannot be so
reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of
the court awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executory, the rate of legal interest,
whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then
an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have
become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013,
shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be
implemented applying the rate of interest fixed
therein.131
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and
forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in
judgments when there is no stipulation on the
applicable interest rate. Further, it is only applicable
if the judgment did not become final and executory
before July 1, 2013.132
We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when
there is a law that states otherwise. While the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit
interest rates,133 these interest rates do not apply
when the law provides that a different interest rate
shall be applied. "[A] Central Bank Circular cannot
repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law."134
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers
are entitled to the reimbursement of his or her
placement fee with an interest of 12% per annum.
Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars
cannotrepeal Republic Act No. 8042, the issuance of
Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of changing
the interest on awards for reimbursement of
placement fees from 12% to 6%. This is despite
Section 1 of Circular No. 799, which provides that
the 6% interest rate applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts.
"The contracting parties need not repeat them. They
do not even have to be referred to. Every contract,
thus, contains not only what has been explicitly
stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any
bearing on the matter."135 There is, therefore, an
implied stipulation in contracts between the
placement agency and the overseasworker that in
case the overseas worker is adjudged as entitled to
reimbursement of his or her placement fees, the
amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per annum.
This implied stipulation has the effect of removing
awards for reimbursement of placement fees from
Circular No. 799s coverage.
The same cannot be said for awardsof salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract under
Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by
Circular No. 799 because the law does not provide
for a specific interest rate that should apply.
In sum, if judgment did not become final and
executory before July 1, 2013 and there was no
stipulation in the contract providing for a different
interest rate, other money claims under Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6%
interest per annum in accordance with Circular No.
799.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an
interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from
the finality of this judgment.
IV
Finally, we clarify the liabilities ofWacoal as
principal and petitioner as the employment agency
that facilitated respondents overseas employment.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign
employer and the local employment agency are
jointly and severally liable for money claims
including claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship and/or damages. This section
also provides that the performance bond filed by the
local agency shall be answerable for such money
claims or damages if they were awarded to the
employee.
This provision is in line with the states policy of
affording protection to labor and alleviating workers
plight.136
In overseas employment, the filing of money claims
against the foreign employer is attended by practical
and legal complications.1wphi1 The distance of the
foreign employer alonemakes it difficult for an
overseas worker to reach it and make it liable for
violations of the Labor Code. There are also possible
conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural
rules that may be raised to frustrate an overseas
workersattempt to advance his or her claims.
It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign
employer must be impleaded in the complaint as an
indispensable party without which no final
determination can be had of an action.137
The provision on joint and several liability in the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
assures overseas workers that their rights will not be
frustrated with these complications. The fundamental
effect of joint and several liability is that "each of the
debtors is liable for the entire obligation."138 A final
determination may, therefore, be achieved even if
only oneof the joint and several debtors are
impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of
overseas employment, either the local agency or the
foreign employer may be sued for all claims arising
from the foreign employers labor law violations.
This way, the overseas workers are assured that
someone the foreign employers local agent
may be made to answer for violationsthat the foreign
employer may have committed.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in
law despite the circumstances of their employment.
By providing that the liability of the foreign
employer may be "enforced to the full
extent"139 against the local agent,the overseas worker
is assured of immediate and sufficientpayment of
what is due them.140
Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in
law, the provision on joint and several liability in the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
shifts the burden of going after the foreign employer
from the overseas worker to the local employment
agency. However, it must be emphasized that the
local agency that is held to answer for the overseas
workers money claims is not leftwithout remedy.
The law does not preclude it from going after the
foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever
payment it has made to the employee to answer for
the money claims against the foreign employer.
A further implication of making localagencies jointly
and severally liable with the foreign employer is
thatan additional layer of protection is afforded to
overseas workers. Local agencies, which are
businesses by nature, are inoculated with interest in
being always on the lookout against foreign
employers that tend to violate labor law. Lest they
risk their reputation or finances, local agenciesmust
already have mechanisms for guarding against
unscrupulous foreign employers even at the level
prior to overseas employment applications.
With the present state of the pleadings, it is not
possible to determine whether there was indeed a
transfer of obligations from petitioner to Pacific. This
should not be an obstacle for the respondent overseas
worker to proceed with the enforcement of this
judgment. Petitioner is possessed with the resources
to determine the proper legal remedies to enforce its
rights against Pacific, if any.
V our workers when their contracts are breached by the
Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos
may encounter as they travel into the farthest and
mostdifficult reaches of our planet to provide for
their families. In Prieto v. NLRC:141
The Court is not unaware of the many abuses
suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land
where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts,
in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of
contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient
nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other
forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane
acts towhich they are subjected by their foreign
employers, who probably feel they can do as they
please in their own country. Whilethese workers may
indeed have relatively little defense against
exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage
must not continue to burden them when they return to
their own territory to voice their muted complaint.
There is no reason why, in their very own land, the
protection of our own laws cannot be extended to
them in full measure for the redress of their
grievances.142
But it seems that we have not said enough.
We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and
their heroism can be told a million times over; each
of their stories as real as any other. Overseas Filipino
workers brave alien cultures and the heartbreak of
families left behind daily. They would count the
minutes, hours, days, months, and years yearning to
see their sons and daughters. We all know of the joy
and sadness when they come home to see them all
grown up and, being so, they remember what their
work has cost them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and
many other gadgets and online applications will
never substitute for their lost physical presence.
Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat
through the ebb and flow of political and economic
crises. They are our true diplomats, they who show
the world the resilience, patience, and creativity of
our people. Indeed, we are a people who contribute
much to the provision of material creations of this
world.
This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure
decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default by
limiting the contractual wages that should be paid to
foreign employers. While we sit, this court will
ensure that our laws will reward our overseas
workers with what they deserve: their dignity.
Inevitably, their dignity is ours as weil.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C.
Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the
unexpired portion of her employment contract at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse
respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay
respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
judgment.
The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.
SO ORDERED.