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Property TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR:

Case Digests a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an area of


180.81 sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of
Article 484 Title No. 14733; and

1) ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994 model)
FEHR, respondent.
Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of
[G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003] 113.54 sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
FACTS: of respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Accordingly, petitioner is
hereby directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the
This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity name of respondent, covered by Condominium Certificate of
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to Title No. 14735, being respondents exclusive property,
comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 acquired prior to his marriage.
of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr
against respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr filed a motion for
Court of Makati in March 1997. reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication
of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the
After due proceedings, the trial court declared the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on
marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent
initio and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife
partnership of property. without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-
On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the
resolving the various motions filed by respondent after the Family Code.
case had been decided. The Order pertained to the properties RTC-- Resolving said motion, the trial court held in an
held by the parties, thus: Order dated October 5, 2000 that since the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was declared
After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties void abintio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the
submitted by both parties, the Court finds the following liquidation and partition of the properties they own in
properties to be excluded from the conjugal properties, common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. The
namely: court, however, noted that the parties have already agreed in
principle to divide the properties and/or proceeds from the
a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of sale thereof proportionately among them and their children
Title No. T-137232, considering that the same is owned by as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for
petitioners parents, Herminio Mercado and Catalina D. the children. It also affirmed its previous ruling
Mercado xxx and that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the
couples cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by respondent.
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, considering that
On November 28, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of
the same was purchased on installment basis by respondent
appeal questioning the October 5, 2000 Order of the trial
with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by
court. ]Respondent filed an Opposition to the Notice of
a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx
Appeal. ]On January 12, 2001, petitioner withdrew the notice
of appeal ]and instead filed on the following day a special civil
Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
respondent shall be distributed in the following manner: Appeals, questioning the findings of the trial court in its Order
dated October 5, 2000.
TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO:
CA -- The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October
a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of 671.84 26, 2001, dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of
sq. m., covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. merit. The appellate court stated that petitioner has not
14734; and shown any reason to warrant the issuance of a writ of
certiorari as the errors she raised were mere errors of
judgment which were the proper subject of an ordinary
b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)
appeal, not a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said respect to the properties they acquire during their
Decision, which was also denied by the appellate court. cohabitation.
We held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial
Hence this petition.
Court, Br. 102, Quezon City:

ISSUE:
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is an woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other,
exclusive property of Bruno Fehr. so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
capacitated in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
RULING: refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage,
i.e., any male or female of the age of eighteen years or
No. upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Article 37 and 38 of the Code.
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court,
that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance
courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with Under this property regime, property acquired by both
respondent in the latters residence in Metro Manila. Their spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys
26, 1983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed household.
the contract as witness, using the name Elna Mercado
Fehr. Upon completion of payment, the title to the The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium,
condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner. was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the
time when petitioner and respondent were already living
In light of these facts, the contentions of the petitioner together. Hence, it should be considered as common
has more credence that Suite 204 was acquired during the property of petitioner and respondent.
parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Art 147 of the Family
Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co- As regards the settlement of the common properties of
ownership. petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership should apply. There is nothing in
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated the records that support the pronouncement of the trial
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as court that the parties have agreed to divide the properties
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under into three1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by and their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her petition
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of before this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-way
them through their work or industry shall be governed by division of the properties1/4 share each to the petitioner and
the rules on co-ownership. the respondent, and 1/4 share each to their two children.
Moreover, respondents argument that the three-way
partition is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
Family Code does not hold water as said provisions relate
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
only to voidable marriages and exceptionally to void
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
other party of any property shall be deemed to have
declared void.
contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family
and of the household.
The Supreme Court held that Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium is a common property of petitioner and
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally
respondent and the property regime of the parties should be
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, ]as in the
case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with 2) SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and
REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted by meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three deeds of sale
heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo Armada and Vicente particularly described the portion conveyed to each son in
Armada) respondents. metes and bounds. Petitioners contend that since the
property was already three distinct parcels of land, there was
[G.R. No. 122047. October 12, 2000]
no longer co-ownership among the brothers. Hence, Jose and
Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption when Crisostomo sold
FACTS: his share to the spouses Si. Petitioners point out that it was
Spouses Severo Armada, Sr and Escolastica owned a only because the Armada brothers failed to submit the
parcel of land consisting of 340 square meters, situated in San necessary subdivision plan to the Office of the Register of
Jose District, Pasay City, the property in dispute, covered by Deeds in Pasay City that separate titles were not issued and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (17345) 2460. During TCT No. 16007 was issued and registered in the names of
the lifetime of the spouses, the property was transferred to Jose, Crisostomo, and Severo, Jr.
their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued
TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows :
Trial Court no co-ownership, DoS valid, no redemption
(1) "DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to
available for the other two siblings:
Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters;
The trial court found that the disputed land was not part
(2) JOSE R. ARMADA, married to RemediosAlmanzor,
of an undivided estate. It held that the three deeds of
113.33 Square Meters; and absolute sale[12]technically described the portion sold to each
(3) DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age, son.The portions belonging to the three sons were separately
Filipinos." declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of
Pasay City on September 21, 1970.[13] Jose's testimony that
Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of the land was undivided was contradicted by his wife when
said title "... by virtue of the Deed of Sale dated March 28, she said they had been receiving rent from the property
1979, executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact specifically allotted to Jose.[14] More significantly, on January
of CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT
meters of the property herein, in favor of ANITA BONODE SI, 24751 and issued three new titles as follows: (1) TCT
married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in 134594[15] in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT
lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, Reg. Book 134595[16] under the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to
T-102. (Doc. No. 17, Page No. 5, Book No. 253 of Notary Serafin Si; and (3) TCT 134596[17] owned by Jose Armada,
Public of Pasay City, Manila, Julian Florentino)." married to RemediosAlmanzor. All these are on record.
On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and CA co-ownership exists:
RemediosAlmanzor, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed "A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 shows that the
of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with Damages, against portion sold by virtue of the Deeds of Sale to the Armada
herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and ConradoIsada, brothers do not appear in the said title, neither does it
brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale. indicate the particular area sold. Moreover, no evidence was
The complaint alleged that ConradoIsada sold presented to show that the Register of Deeds issued TCT No.
Crisostomo's share by making it appear that Cresenciana, the 16007 on the basis of the said deeds of Sale. In fact, TCT No.
attorney-in-fact of her husband, is a Filipino citizen, residing 16007 shows that the lot is co-owned by Jose, Crisostomo
with Isada at Cubao, Quezon City. By this time, Crisostomo and Severo, Jr. in the proportion of 113.33, 113.34 and
and Cresenciana had migrated and were already citizens of 113.33 sq. m. respectively.
the United States of America. It also stated that when Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed of
petitioners registered the deed of absolute sale they inserted Absolute Sale, executed by Cresencia Armada in favor of
the phrase "... and that the co-owners are not interested in defendants Si, stated that the portion sold was the 'undivided
buying the same in spite of notice to them.", and that one hundred thirteen & 34/100 (113.34) square meters' of
petitioners knew of the misrepresentations of the parcel of land covered by TCT NO. 16007 of the Registry
Conrado. Further, the complaint alleged that the other of Deeds for Pasay City, which means that what was sold to
owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the defendants are still undetermined and unidentifiable, as the
sale; and that all upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si, area sold remains a portion of the whole.
private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale Moreover, plaintiff Remedi[o]s Armada testified that on
and reconveyance of title with damages, claiming they had a March 27, 1979, Crisostomo Armada, thru his attorney-in-fact
right of redemption. and co-defendant, CresencianaAlejo, sold his undivided
113.34 share to defendants, Sps. Si as evidenced by a Deed of
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October Absolute Sale, and presented for registration with the
2, 1954, Escolastica, with the consent of her husband Register of Deeds without notifying plaintiffs of the sale.
executed three separate deeds of sale conveying 113.34 Instead, it appears that the phrase 'and that the co-owners
square meters of the property to Severo, and 113.33 square
are not interested in buying the same inspite of notice to RAMON OCAMPO, MIGUEL OCAMPO, JUANA OCAMPO,
them', was inserted in the Deed of Sale. ANDRES OCAMPO SR., VIOLETA OCAMPO, MERCEDITA
Hence, the present petition OCAMPO, ANTONIA OCAMPO, ELISA OCAMPO, BEATRIZ
OCAMPO, JUAN JOHNNY OCAMPO, JONAS OCAMPO, MARIA
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents (Jose and Dr. DOLORES OCAMPO, REBECCA OCAMPO, FIDELA OCAMPO,
Severo Jr.) are co-owners and are entitled to redemption. LUIS OCAMPO JR. and ERNESTO O. FORTUNO,petitioners,
vs.
RULING: NO. FIDELA LL. OCAMPO, FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO, BELEN
OCAMPO-BARRITO, VICENTE BARRITO, NEMESIO LL.
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers,
OCAMPO, IMELDA OCAMPO and JOSE
the community ownership terminated, and the right to OCAMPO, respondents.
redemption for each brother was no longer available.
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership G.R. No. 150707 April 14, 2004
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when
the different portions owned by different people are already FACTS:
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not
yet technically described. The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the
spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot
As early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had ten (10) children, namely: Fidela, Felix, Andres, Nemesio,
already been partitioned when their parents executed three Jose, Apolonia, Felicidad, Luisa, Rosario, and Luis.
(3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo,
all surnamed Armada, which documents purports to have
The complaint further alleges that during the
been registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, on
lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-
September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT No. 16007
Ocampo, they acquired several parcels of land and, upon
was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred
their death, left the following properties, namely:
to the three sons was definitely described and segregated
and with the corresponding technical description (sic). In
short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition. Moreover, (a) A parcel of residential/ commercial land situated
every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur, covered
for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name of
on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that FidelaOcampo;
the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants
Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely (b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis,
determined and identifiable. The fact that the three portions Nabua, Camarines Sur;
are embraced in one certificate of title does not make said
portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable, (c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua,
one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less Camarines Sur.
exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of
redemption among co-owners exists." that all the above named parcels of land are actually owned
Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose in common by the children of the late spouses Jose Ocampo
Armada was well informed of the impending sale of and Juana LlanderOcampo although the land denominated as
Crisostomo's share in the land. In a letter dated February 22, parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the
1979, Jose told his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king name of FidelaOcampo alone but acknowledged by her as a
of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza." Co- property owned in common by all of them, brothers and
owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties but
written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make defendants FidelaOcampo and Felicidad unlawfully and
certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to unreasonably refuse to do so and moved by a common
enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the purpose, both of them mortgaged to the PNB the land
limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint to secure the
actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or payment of a 110,000.00 loan, the proceeds of which were x
afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, xx exclusively to the benefit of said defendants only; that the
would be superfluous. same defendants FidelaOcampo and FelicidadOcampo have
been receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of
their co-heirs amounting to not less than 2,000.00 a year;
and, that because of their relationship, they undertook
3) APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by MARIANO O. earnest efforts to amicably settle this controversy but
QUIEN, AMELITA Q. TAN, MILOVAN O. QUIEN, LUISA because of defendants FidelaOcampo and
OCAMPO-LLORIN, MELITA F. OCAMPO, FELIX OCAMPO JR.,
FelicidadOcampo[s] utterly unreasonable and unjustified property by donation inter vivos which she accepted in the
actuations, the same failed. same public instrument; that TCT No. 1364 was issued to
defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito on the strength of the
In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be donation inter vivos executed in her favor by her
rendered ordering the partition of the properties; ordering predecessor-in-interest and has since 30 September 1987,
defendants FidelaOcampo and FelicidadOcampo, to release been the absolute owner thereof; that since 1949 none of the
or otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances on TCT which plaintiffs ever questioned the absolute ownership and title of
they had caused to be annotated thereon, particularly, the defendant Belen Ocampo-Barritos predecessor-in-interest
mortgage in favor of the PNB; requiring FidelaOcampo and over the property making the decree of registration
FelicidadOcampo to refrain from further encumbering said incontrovertible;
properties or otherwise subjecting the same to any lien and
for that purpose, a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued The RTC declares the defendant spouses are the true
against them to enjoin the commission of such acts; ordering and lawful exclusive owners of the following properties.
defendants FidelaOcampo and FelicidadOcampo to submit an
accounting of the fruits and other produce they had received CAaffirmed with modification on the damages.
from said properties; further ordering FidelaOcampo and
FelicidadOcampo to indemnify plaintiffs; and, further granting According to the appellate court, other than the
plaintiffs such other remedies as may be just and equitable in Acknowledgment of Co-ownership7 executed by Respondent
the premises. FidelaOcampo, no documentary evidence was offered to
establish petitioners claim of co-ownership. The CA held that
On 17 December 1987, counsel for plaintiffs filed a this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the
Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint dated 2 December array of testimonial and documentary evidence that had been
1987 which was granted by the Court as there was no adduced by respondents to prove their defenses. Communal
opposition to it. ownership of the property in question was supposedly not
proven, either, by the ancient photograph showing Spouses
The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Chino Jose and Juana LlanderOcampo with their ten children
Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses; that in front of the disputed property; or by another picture
on 1987, the TCT in the name of defendant FidelaOcampo showing the name "OniangOcampo -- 1-15-61" engraved on
and covering the lot described as parcel (a) was cancelled the said house or building.
and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 1364 was issued to defendant
Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to defendant Vicente Barrito,
on the strength of an allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo in their
favor on 13 January 1984;
ISSUE: whether or not there was co-ownership of the (a) A
Plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered (a) declaring
parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the
the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos allegedly executed by Fidela
poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur, covered by TCT No. RT-
Ll. Ocampo in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente
4389(983) in the name of FidelaOcampo;
Barrito be declare[d] null and void, (b) ordering defendants
Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito to reconvey so
much of the property subject thereof as pertain to the
plaintiffs, (c) directing defendants, jointly and severally, to
indemnify plaintiffs such amounts as this Honorable Court RULING: NO.
may consider fair and reasonable by way of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, inclusive of attorneys fees and related Petitioners chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in
expenses of litigation, and (d) granting plaintiffs such other question is simply the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership
remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises. executed by Fidela. Both the trial and the appellate courts
were correct in finding that this piece of documentary
As Special Defenses, defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and
allege that the original defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo, her documentary evidence that were adduced by respondents.
predecessor-in-interest, since 1949 has been the absolute
owner in fee simple of the property by virtue of the issuance Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers of
of the certificate of title in her name; that her predecessor-in- ownership of the questioned property that eventually led to
interest held the same certificate of title to the same parcel them. Allegedly, it was originally owned by their parents --
of land free of all encumbrances and adverse claims and was Spouses Ocampo -- whose deaths passed it on to the
in notorious, public, and actual possession of the property in children. Petitioners, however, presented absolutely no proof
concept of absolute owner from 1949 until 13 January 1984, of ownership of their predecessors-in-interest. In insisting
when said predecessor-in-interest validly conveyed the that it was so transferred and thus co-owned, the former rely
on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by was written and executed on 24 December 1985 when she
Fidela, their eldest sibling. was no longer the owner of the property as the year previous,
on 13 January 1984, she had already donated all her
On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in
alleged sole ownership of the property and presented effect, she had no more properties with which she can have
preponderant proof of her claim.First, she presented a Deed an interest to declare against.
of Absolute Sale of Residential Land,referring to the subject
property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and The engravings on the house ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. -- 1-
Felix Ocampo as buyer. The theory of petitioners is 15-61 cannot serve as evidence that the property is of
completely demolished by this document, which they never common ownership. Neither can the petitioners contention
contested. According to them, the land in question was the that co-ownership is shown by the fact that some of the
conjugal property of their parents; and that upon the latters children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up
deaths, the former inherited it in common. If indeed the land businesses on the property, be accepted. The appellate court
was the conjugal property of Spouses Ocampo, then correctly found that since the litigants in this case were blood
petitioners should have presented evidence to prove such relatives, fraternal affection could have been a good motive
ownership by their alleged predecessors-in-interest. that impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to
use the property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership
Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo among the parties cannot be presumed.
declared his "exclusive ownership" of the property, "having
been acquired by purchase[;] and [having] been in [his]
continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material possession
for more than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in 4) LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
rights and interest, in [the] concept of owner without any VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120,
claim of other persons." Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA, respondents.

Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 10, 1953, [G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003]
this property had been sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a
valuable consideration; and that Fidela had entered the FACTS:
property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of
dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners.
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square
meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was
As proofs of ownership of the property by Fidela, Belen registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-
presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4389 owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn
(983),which named the former as owner in fee simple; and a Sanchez married to NicanorMontalban, Lilian Sanchez,
Declaration of Real Property, evidencing payment of real widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to
property taxes, also by Fidela as owner. Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.On 20 February 1995,
the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of
To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of
property, Belen also presented a Real Estate Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June
Mortgage executed by the former as absolute owner. Fidela 1995]by all six (6) co-owners in her favor.Petitioner claimed
had executed it in favor of her sister ApoloniaOcampo, one of that she did not affix her signature on the document and
the original petitioners in this case, who is now represented subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting
by her heirs. Belen correctly argues that in agreeing to be a private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery
mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the of possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial
true owner of the land in question. Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime in September 1995,
subsequently raffled to Branch 49 of that court.
Third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter
Vivosexecuted on January 13, 1984, between herself as On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City
donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate ruled in favor of private respondent declaring that the sale
source of the formers claim of sole ownership of the was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other
property. 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been
On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo established as a forgery.
herself made a written acknowledgement for her co-
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial
ownership over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in
this case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration Court of Caloocan City, subsequently assigned to Br. 120,
which ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda
against Fidelas interest since the alleged acknowledgement
of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this
order, nor even inform her of the developments in her becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he
case. Petitioner not having filed any pleading with the RTC of may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-
Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 owners.
decision of the MeTC.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private respondent among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-
Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee
a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff for the others.
upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common,
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite
demolishing petitioners house without any special permit of portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
demolition from the court. abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or
thing.[17]
Due to the demolition of her house which continued
until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an
portion of the premises that used to serve as the houses undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
toilet and laundry area. dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease
his undivided interest to a third party independently of the
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for other co-owners.But he has no right to sell or alienate a
Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she
concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to
common because his right over the thing is represented by a
submit petitioners appeal memorandum. However the RTC
quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration. Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the
property, the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition
been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse Absolute Salevoluntarily entered into by the other co-owners,
of discretion on the part of the court a quo.
her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share
petition for lack of merit. On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition
a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied must be done without prejudice to the rights of private
the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002. respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the
lot under dispute.
5) (NOT YET SURE IF THIS IS THE CORRECT CASE)
ISSUE: Whether or not
FIRST DIVISION

RULING:
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil [G.R. No. 120122. November 6, 1997]
law: co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the
MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownershipwas
not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this
controversy in the interest of substantial GLORIA R. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMY
justice. Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this V. SUZARA and MANUEL R.
grave abuse of discretion. VIZCONDE, respondents.

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of


DECISION
subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
indivision, which means that there is a single object which is BELLOSILLO, J.:
not materially divided, and which is the element which binds
the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which A woman spurned and beguiled now whines - a costly
determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners. odyssey in relations extra legem.
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to Gloria R. Cruz was the owner of Lot 10, Blk. 565, PSD-
the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and 38911, with an area of 747.7 square meters, together with
attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the the improvements thereon, situated at 22 Bituan St., Bgy.
co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is Doa Imelda, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 242553 in her
impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner name; in 1977 she and respondent Romeo V. Suzara lived
together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage; in On 24 September 1990, responding to the amended
September 1982,solely out of love and affection for Suzara, complaint, Vizconde answered that there was no privity of
she executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 10 in favor of contract between him and petitioner; he (Vizconde) was a
Suzara without any monetary consideration; thereafter, purchaser for value in good faith; the sale between him and
Suzara registered the document in his favor and used the Suzara was executed on 22 December 1989 or long before
property as collateral for a bank loan of P350,000.00; he the execution of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and, the
however failed to pay the loan so that after four (4) years the action was barred by laches, estoppel and prescription.
mortgage was foreclosed. She paid the bank P40,638.88 to
On 24 May 1993 the trial court rendered a decision
restructure the loan resulting in the extension of the
dismissing the complaint and the counterclaims as well as the
redemption period to two (2) years. However, without her
knowledge and before the expiration of the extended period, cross claim of respondent Vizconde. It
ruled that the sale betweenpetitioner and respondent Suzara
Suzara redeemed the property. She tried to talk to him but he
was valid with "love, affection and accommodation" being
avoided her. Finally, to protect her interest, she executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim which she filed with the Register the consideration for the sale. It also found Vizconde an
innocent purchaser for value because at the time he
the Deeds of Quezon City asserting that her sale in favor of
purchased the property he was unaware of the adverse claim
Suzara was null and void for lack of consideration and being
of petitioner.[2]
contrary to law and public policy.
On 22 February 1990 she filed a complaint with the On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the court a quo.[3]
Regional Trial Court of Manila against respondent Suzara for
quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents and Petitioner now comes to us for review
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction. on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of
Denying petitioner's claim, respondent Suzara claimed the Court of Appeals and that of the trial court. She contends
that the lower courts erred in holding that the sale between
that he was already the registered owner of the property as
her and Suzara was valid; that she had no legal personality to
evidenced by TCT No. 295388, having acquired the same from
petitioner through a notarized deed of absolute sale; the sale question the legality of the sale in his favor, and, respondent
Vizconde was an innocent purchaser for value in good faith.
was for a valuable consideration and not tainted with fraud
nor executed under duress; and, petitioner was estopped Petitioner insists that there being a factual finding by
from impugning the validity of the sale and questioning his the trial court and the Court of Appeals that she and
title over the property. respondent Suzarawere common-law husband and wife, the
sale between them was void and inexistent, citing Art. 1490
On 22 March 1990 the trial court issued a temporary
of the Civil Code. She argues that the consideration of "love,
restraining order enjoining private respondent, his agents
and/or any person or persons acting in his behalf, from affection and accommodation" for the sale was not a valid
cause for the conveyance of the property as there was no
disposing and/or encumbering the litigated property until
price paid in money or its equivalent, and since her sale to
further orders.
Suzara was null and void the issue of its illegality cannot be
On 3 April 1990 petitioner filed an ex parte motion to waived or ratified; resultantly, the sale by Suzara to his co-
admit her amended complaint impleading respondent respondent Vizconde must also be declared null and void the
Manuel R. Vizconde as additional defendant and praying that latter being a purchaser in bad faith. Petitioner also contends
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be ordered to annotate that although she filed her adverse claim on 22 January 1990
her notice of lispendens on respondent Suzaras or after the execution of the deed of sale between the private
title. Favorably resolving her motion, the trial court admitted respondents on 22 December 1989, the sale was nevertheless
her amended complaint and ordered the Register of Deeds to nullified when it was substituted by a second deed of sale
show cause why it was refusing to annotate the notice dated 5 February 1990, registered 6 March 1990, to avoid
of lispendens filed by her. payment of fines and penalties for late registration.
On 22 May 1990 the Register of Deeds filed a We cannot sustain petitioner. Although under Art. 1490
manifestation informing the trial court that the property had the husband and wife cannot sell property to one another as
been sold by respondent Suzara to his co-respondent a rule which, for policy consideration and the dictates of
Vizconde who was already the registered owner thereof and morality require that the prohibition apply to common-law
since Vizconde was not impleaded in the case the notice relationships,[4] petitioner can no longer seek reconveyance
of lispendens could not be annotated on his title until the of the property to her as it has already been acquired by
requirements of law were met and the annotation of the respondent Vizconde in good faith and for value from her
notice judicially ordered. As stated in the immediately own transferee.
preceding paragraph, the motion to admit amended
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is
complaint impleading respondent Vizconde was
filed exparte on 3 April 1990.[1] to quiet title to land and to put a stop to any question of
legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in
the certificate of title at the time of registration or which may
arise subsequent thereto.[5] Every We cannot grant petitioner's prayer to have respondent
registered owner and every subsequent purchaser Vizconde's certificate of title declared null and void. Neither
for value in good faith holds the title to the property free can we order the reconveyance of the property to
from all encumbrances except those noted in the petitioner.Vizconde being a purchaser of registered land for
certificate. Hence, a purchaser is not required to explore value in good faith holds an indefeasible title to the land. This
further what the Torrens title on its face indicates in quest for is without prejudice however to any appropriate remedy
any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently petitioner may take against her erstwhile common-law
defeat his right thereto.[6] husband, respondent Suzara.
Where innocent third persons, relying on the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court is
rights over the property the court cannot disregard such AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate.[7] The
SO ORDERED.
effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair
public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone
dealing with property registered under the Torrens system
would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has
been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the
evident purpose of the law.[8] Every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way
oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.[9] Even if a decree in a registration
proceeding is infected with nullity, still an innocent purchaser
for value relying on a Torrens title issued in pursuance Property Cases
thereof is protected. A purchaser in good faith is one who
buys the property of another without notice that some other Co-Ownership Digests
person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a
full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or
before he has notice of the claim of another person.
Article 485
Both lower courts found that at the time respondent
Suzara executed the deed of absolute sale on 22 December 1) Quijano v Amante 737 S 552
1989 in favor of respondent Vizconde, which was
acknowledged before a notary public, Suzara was the FIRST DIVISION
registered owner appearing in the certificate of title. When G.R. No. 164277, October 08, 2014
the sale was executed, nothing was annotated in the FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner, v. ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE,
certificate to indicate any adverse claim of a third person or
Respondent.
the fact that the property was the subject of a pending
litigation. It was only on 22 January 1990, after the sale to
respondent Vizconde, that petitioner filed her adverse The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and
claimwith the Register of Deeds. Based on this factual Gloria, inherited from their father, the late BibianoQuijano,
backdrop, which we consider binding upon this Court, there is the parcel of land registered in the latter's name under
no doubt that respondent Vizconde was a purchaser for value Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-188 of the Registry of
in good faith and that when he bought the property he had
Deeds in Cebu City with an area of 15,790 square meters,
no knowledge that some other person had a right to or an
more or less.1 On April 23, 1990, prior to any partition among
adverse interest in the property. As the Court of Appeals
observed, Vizconde paid a full and fair price for the property the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share, measuring 600
at the time of the purchase and before he had any notice of square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante
petitioner's claim or interest in the property. For purposes of (respondent).
resolving the present controversy, the allegation that there
was a second deed of sale executed solely for the purpose of On July 25, 1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an
evading the penalties resulting from late payment of taxes
additional 1/3 portion of his share in the property to the
and registration is immaterial. The fact is, petitioner herself
admits that the actual sale of the property occurred on 22 respondent, with their deed of absolute sale stating that the
December 1989. A contract of sale is consensual and is sale was with the approval of Eliseo's siblings.
perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on
the subject matter and the consideration therefor. On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their father's estate
(consisting of the aforementioned parcel of land) among Issue:
themselves.4 Pursuant to the deed extrajudicial partition, To be resolved is the issue of who between the petitioner and
OCT No. 0-188 was cancelled, and on July 12, 1994 the the respondent had the better right to the possession of the
Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. disputed property.
6555, TCT No. 6556, TCT No. 6557 and TCT No. 65585 to the
petitioner, Gloria, Jose, and Eliseo, respectively. The partition Ruling:
resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of
respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to the disputed property, the CA properly ruled on the issue of
Eliseo.6 ownership for the sole purpose of determining who between
them had the better right to possess the disputed property.
Due to the petitioner's needing her portion that was then
occupied by the respondent, she demanded that the latter The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of
vacate it. Despite several demands, the last of which was by the late BibianoQuijano, and passed on to his heirs by
the letter dated November 4, 1994,7 the respondent refused operation of law upon his death.22 Prior to the partition, the
to vacate, prompting her to file agamst him on February 14, estate was owned in common by the heirs, subject to the
1995 a complaint for ejectment and damages in the payment of the debts of the deceased.23 In a co-ownership,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City (MTCC), docketed the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with
as Civil Case No. R-34426.8 She alleged therein that she was each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising
the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. her rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may use
6555, a portion of which was being occupied by the and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he
respondent, who had constructed a residential building shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying
thereon by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property rationale is that until a division is actually made, the
she and her siblings had inherited from their father had not respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-
yet been subdivided, and was thus still co-owned by them; owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
and that the respondent's occupation had become illegal ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use
following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands. and enjoyment of it.24

Judgment of the MTCC-ruled in favor of Quijano since Even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not
disputed property, had not yet been partitioned, rendering yet been fully settled and partitioned and is thus merely
Eliseo a mere co-owner of the undivided estate who had no inchoate, Article 49325cralawred of the Civil Code gives the
right to dispose of a definite portion thereof; that as a co- heir the right to exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly,
owner, Eliseo effectively conveyed to the respondent only the when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent in
portion that would ultimately be allotted to him once the 1990 and 1991, he was only a co-owner along with his
property would be subdivided. siblings, and could sell only that portion that would be
allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Decision of the RTC- reversed the judgment of the MTCC. In The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed property in
the case at bar, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale the respondent but transferred only the seller's pro indiviso
executed by EliseoQuijano, one of the co-heirs of Fe Quijano, share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-
in 1990 and 1991, the defendant Atty. Amante took owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned.26
possession of the portion in question and built his residential
house thereat. As Eliseo's successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent
was vested with the right under Article 497 of the Civil Code
Undaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the
the RTC denied her motion on November 13, 1996. partition undertaken without his consent.27 Article 497
states:
Decision of the CA- On May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its
decision,15 affirming the decision of the RTC, and dismissing Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may
the case for ejectment, but on the ground that the take part in the division of the thing owned in common and
respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee holding the object to its being effected without their concurrence. But
right of possession over the disputed property. they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless
there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding
a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without In contrast, the respondent consistently stood firm on his
prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its assertion that his possession of the disputed property was in
validity. the concept of an owner, not by the mere tolerance of Eliseo,
and actually presented the deeds of sale transferring
The respondent could not deny that at the time of the sale he ownership of the property to him.
knew that the property he was buying was not exclusively
owned by Eliseo. He knew, too, that the co-heirs had entered WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
into an oral agreement of partition vis-a-vis the estate, such on May 26, 2004 subject to the MODIFICATION that the
knowledge being explicitly stated in his answer to the unlawful detainer action is dismissed for being an improper
complaint, to wit: remedy; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

12. That defendant, before he acquired the land from


EliseoQuijano was informed by the latter that the portion sold Article 487
to him was his share already; that they have orally partitioned
the whole lot before defendant acquired the portion from 1) FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003]
him. MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by
Unlawful detainer involves the defendant's withholding of the his Attorney-in-Fact, HermenegildaAbejo-Rivera,
possession of the property to which the plaintiff is entitled, respondents.
after the expiration or termination of the former's right to
hold possession under the contract, whether express or Facts:
implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful On 12 May 1986, ABEJO[4] instituted an action for recovery
detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but of possession with damages against DE GUIA. In his
turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to complaint, ABEJO alleged that he is the owner of the
possess. undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond
(FISHPOND) situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by
To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of TCT No. T-6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. He alleged
such lawful possession must then be established. With the ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of
averment here that the respondent's possession was by mere the FISHPONDs total area of 79,220 square meters. ABEJO
tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be further averred that DE GUIA continues to possess and use
proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent
to ABEJOs damage and prejudice. ABEJO also complained that
At least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of
of her or her predecessor's tolerance, or her co-heirs' the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE
permission for him to occupy the disputed property.31 But GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired.
she did not adduce such evidence. Instead, she appeared to ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an
be herself not clear and definite as to his possession of the approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as pay
disputed property being merely tolerated by Eliseo, as the damages.
following averment of her petition for review indicates:
DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf.
6.9. Their ignorance of the said transaction of sale, He filed his Answer on 12 January 1990 after the Court of
particularly the petitioner, as they were not duly informed by Appeals resolved several issues concerning the validity of the
the vendor-co[-]owner EliseoQuijano, [led] them to believe service of summons on him. In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged
that the respondent's occupancy of the subject premises was that the complaint does not state a cause of action and has
by mere tolerance of Eliseo, so that upon partition of the prescribed. He claimed that the FISHPOND was originally
whole property, said occupancy continued to be under owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with
tolerance of the petitioner when the subject premises became PrimitivaLejano as her only heir. According to him, ABEJO is
a part of the land adjudicated to the latter;32 (emphasis not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of
supplied) PrimitivaLejano who authorized him to possess the entire
FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJOs ownership of the undivided
portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over
an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself. DE Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership,
GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND
improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith. quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a
qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE
The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to file GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they
their pre-trial briefs. ABEJO filed his pre-trial brief[5] on 05 exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at the
April 1990. DE GUIA filed his pre-trial brief[6] on 31 July 1990. same time individual owners of a portion, which is truly
DE GUIAs pre-trial brief raised as the only issue in the case abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains
the amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA indeterminate or unidentified.[21] As co-owners, ABEJO and
should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA also submitted an Offer to DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the
Compromise,[7] offering to settle ABEJOs claim for P300,000 entire FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by
and to lease the entire FISHPOND to any party of ABEJOs identifying or segregating their respective portions.
choice. Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA,
Hearing commenced on 30 July 1990. ABEJO rested his case judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An
on 4 December 1990. DE GUIAs last witness completed her action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject
testimony on 22 November 1991. to laches.[22] Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property unless a co-owner has
The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992, disposing repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions.[23]
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership
under the conditions set by law.
Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting the DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts
trial court erred in ordering him to vacate and surrender erred when they ordered the recovery of rent when the exact
possession of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND and to identity of the portion in question had not yet been clearly
pay actual damages and attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals defined and delineated. According to DE GUIA, an order to
found DE GUIAs appeal without merit and affirmed the trial pay damages in the form of rent is premature before
courts decision. Upon DE GUIAs motion for reconsideration, partition.
the appellate court reduced the compensatory damages from
P262,500 to P212,500. We disagree.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a
Hence, the instant petition. similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot
devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice
Issues: of the co-ownership.[24] Hence, if the subject is a residential
(1) whether an action for recovery of possession and turn- house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective
over of the undivided portion of a common property is proper families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner
before partition; and alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the
(2) whether there is sufficient basis for the award of other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other
compensatory damages and attorneys fees. co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent.Conversely, if
there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can
Ruling: demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.

Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and
entire FISHPOND since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA disputed Resolution dated 27 June 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
ABEJOs claim of ownership over the undivided portion of the G.R. CV No. 39875 is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion
FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly recognized ABEJOs ordering Manuel T. De Guia to pay Jose B. Abejo
undivided share by offering to settle the case for P300,000 compensatory damages of P212,500 and attorneys fees of
and to vacate the property. During the trial proper, neither P20,000, and MODIFIED as follows:
DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or manifested a claim of 1. The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia
absolute and exclusive ownership over the entire FISHPOND. and Jose B. Abejo over the entire FISHPOND
Before this Court, DE GUIA limits the issues to the propriety covered by TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan
of bringing an action for recovery of possession and the Register of Deeds is recognized without
recovery of compensatory damages. prejudice to the outcome of CAG.R. CV No.
38031 pending before the Court of Appeals and
other cases involving the same property;
2. Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall
equally enjoy possession and use of the entire
FISHPOND prior to partition;
3. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per
annum representing rent from 27 November
1983 until May 1992 shall earn interest at 6%
per annum from 27 November 1983 until
finality of this decision, and thereafter at 12%
per annum until full payment;
4. Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a
yearly rent of P25,000 from June 1992 until
finality of this decision, with interest at 6% per
annum during the same period, and thereafter
at 12% interest per annum until full payment;
5. After finality of this decision and for as long as
Manuel T. de Guia exclusively possesses the
entire FISHPOND, he shall pay Jose B. Abejo a
yearly rental of P25,000 for the latters
undivided share in the FISHPOND, unless Jose
B. Abejo secures from the proper court an
order fixing a different rental rate in view of
possible changed circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
Article 488 on November 20, 1946, Angela filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Manila asking the court
1) Tusaon v Tuason. Jr. and Gregorio Araneta 88 P 428 to order the partition of the property in question
G.R. No.L-3404 April 2, 1951ANGELA I. and that she be given 1/3 of the same including
TUASON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. rents collected during the time that the same
ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, including rents collected during the time that
INC., defendants-appellees. Araneta Inc., administered said property.

Facts: The suit was administered principally against


Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio Tuason Jr.,
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves one of the co-owners evidently did not agree to the
Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason suit and its purpose, for he evidently did not agree to
Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. the suit and its purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc.
m. covered by Certificate of Title No. 60911 in as a co-defendant. After hearing and after
Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an considering the extensive evidence introduce, oral
undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for and documentary, the trial court presided over by
a partition of the common property, but failing in Judge Emilio Pea in a long and considered decision
this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share of dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as
Nieves was offered for sale to her sister and her to costs. The plaintiff appealed from that decision,
brother but both declined to buy it. The offer was and because the property is valued at more than
later made to their mother but the old lady also P50,000, the appeal came directly to this Court.
declined to buy, saying that if the property later
increased in value, she might be suspected of having Issue:
taken advantage of her daughter. Finally, the share Whether or not the contract should be declared null
of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a and void because its terms, particularly paragraphs
domestic corporation, and a new Certificate of Title 9, 11 and 15 which we have reproduced, violate the
No. 61721 was issued in lieu of the old title No. provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code,
60911 covering the same property. The three co- ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a
owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided party to the community. Each may, at any time,
into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the demand the partition of the thing held in
sale to be later divided among them. This agreement common.Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the
is embodied in a document (Exh. 6) entitled thing undivided for a specified length of time, not
"Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may
pages, dated June 30, 1941. be a new agreement.
Before, during and after the execution of this
contract (Exh. 6), Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting Ruling:
as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co- We agree with the trial court that the provisions of
owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The
Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a member of the contract far from violating the legal provision that
Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a party
Inc. to the community, precisely has for its purpose and
object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of
On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the community by selling the parcel held in common
the powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact and and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-
lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta. Then in a letter dated owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to
October 19, 1946, Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall
because of alleged breach of the terms of the have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object
"Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and abuse of of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the
powers granted to it in the document, she had document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and
decided to rescind said contract and she asked that substantially entered into a contract of partnership
the property held in common be partitioned. Later, as the best and most expedient means of eventually
dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said
partnership to end when the object of its creation "2. Na sapamamagitannito ay
shall have been attained. pinawawalangkabuluhannaminangnasabingkasula
This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was tan at nagkasundo kami
perhaps based on the other agreement or contract naangbawatisasaaminniArsenio de Castro at Felisa
(Exh. "L") referred to by appellant where the parties Cruz Vda. de Castro ay isaulikay GREGORIO
thereto in express terms entered into partnership, ATIENZA angtig P2,500.00 o kabuuanghalagang
although this object is not expressed in so many P5,000.00
words in Exh. 6. We repeat that we see no violation napaunangnaibigaynitoalinsunodsanasabingkasula
of Art. 400 of the Civil Code in the parties entering tan; naangnasabingtig P2,500.00 ay
into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very reason that isasaulingbawatisasaaminsa o bagodumatingang
Art. 400 is not applicable. Dec. 30, 1956."

2) Vda de Castro v Atienza 53 S 264 Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A.
G.R. No. L-25014 October 17, 1973 Defendant did not pay the P2,500.00 which under
DOLORES LAHORA VDA. DE CASTRO, ARSENIO DE the above-quoted paragraph of Exhibit A, he should
CASTRO, JR., WILFREDO DE CASTRO, IRINEO DE have paid on December 30, 1956. Demand for
CASTRO and VIRGINIA DE CASTRO ALEJANDRO, (in payment was made by plaintiff's counsel on January
substitution for the deceased defendant-appellant 7, 1957 but to no avail, hence the present action.
ARSENIO DE CASTRO, SR.)., petitioners,
vs.GREGORIO ATIENZA, respondent. Issue:

Facts: Whether Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond owned


On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de Castro pro-indiviso by him with his brother Tomas
and Arsenio de Castro, Sr. leased to plaintiff a (succeeded by FelisaVda. de Castro) could validly
fishpond containing an area of 26 hectares situated lease his half-interest to a third party
in Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a bigger parcel (respondentAtienza) independently of his co-owner,
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. and in case his co-owner also leased his other half
196450 of the registry of the property of Bulacan. interest to the same third party, whether Arsenio
The lessors are co-owners in equal shares of the could cancel his own lease agreement with said third
leased property. party?

According to the contract of lease (Exh. 1) the term Ruling:


of the lease was for five years from January 24, 1956
at a rental of P5,000 a year, the first year's rental to The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as without
be paid on February 1, 1956, the second on February merit and affirms the judgment of the appellate
1, 1957 and the rental for the last three years on court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-
February 1, 1958. The first year's rental was paid on owner of an undivided one-half interest in the
time. fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died. party, respondent Atienza, independently of his co-
owner (although said co-owner had also leased his
In the month of November, 1956, plaintiff as lessee other undivided one-half interest to the same third
and defendant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the party) and could likewise by mutual agreement
lessors, agreed to set aside and annul the contract of independently cancel his lease agreement with said
lease and for this purpose an agreement (Exh. A) was third party. Said predecessor-in-interest (and
signed by them, Exhibit A as signed by plaintiff and petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs)
defendant shows that Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro, therefore stands liable on his express undertaking to
widow of Tomas de Castro, was intended to be made refund the advance rental paid to him by the lessee
a party thereof in her capacity as representative of on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the non-
the heirs of Tomas Castro. cancellation of the co-owner's lease to elude such
Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows: liability.
Jr., sold to petitioner ZosimaVerdad (their interest
The appellate court's judgment is fully supported by on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of
the Civil Code provisions on the rights and P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, dated
prerogatives of co-owners, and specifically by Article 14 November 1982, it would appear, however, that
493 which expressly provides that the lot was sold for only P23,000.00. Petitioner
explained that the second deed was intended merely
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full to save on the tax on capital gains.
ownership of his part and of the fruits and Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while
benefitspertaining thereto, and he may therefore she was at the City Treasurers Office. On 31 March
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute 1987, she sought the intervention of the
another person in its enjoyment, except when LupongTagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja,
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the for the redemption of the property. She tendered
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co- the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be to accept the amount for being much less than the
alloted to him in the division upon the termination of lots current value of P80,000.00. No settlement
the co-ownership. * having been reached before the LupongTagapayapa,
private respondents, on 16 October 1987, initiated
3) Verdad v CA 256 S 593 against petitioner an action for Legal Redemption
FIRST DIVISION with Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial
[G.R. No. 109972. April 29, 1996] Court of Butuan City.
ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT On 29 June 1990, following the reception of
OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA evidence, the trial court handed down its decision
ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, holding, in fine, that private respondents right to
FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND redeem the property had already lapsed.
VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents. An appeal to the Court of Appeals was interposed by
private respondents. the appellate court, in its
Facts: decision of 22 April 1993, reversed the court a quo;
The petitioner, ZosimaVerdad, is the purchaser of a thus:
248-square meter residential lot (identified to be Lot the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED,
No. 529, Ts-65 of the ButuanCadastre, located along and a new one is accordingly entered declaring
Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan plaintiff-appellant, Socorro C. Rosales, entitled to
City). Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda.de redeem the inheritance rights.
Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption
over the subject property and traces her title to the Thus, her recourse to the Supreme Court.
late MacariaAtega, her mother-in-law, who died
intestate on 08 March 1956. Issues:
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two
marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the Whether or not private respondent Socorro C.
second, following the latters death, with Canuto Rosales is incapacitated to redeem the property, she
Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was being merely the spouse of David Rosales, a son of
survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her Macaria, and not being a co-heir herself in the
grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) intestate estate of Macaria.
Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children
of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Ruling:
Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a
himself, some time after Macarias death, died daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative
intestate without an issue. by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of law;[3] however, Socorro s right to the property is
Ramon Burdeos, namely, his widow Manuela not because she rightfully can claim heirship in
LegaspiBurdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Macarias estate but that she is a legal heir of her
husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
share in his mothers inheritance. redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mothers prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
estate passed on to her surviving children, among Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
them David Rosales, who thereupon became co- affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
owners of the property. When David Rosales himself notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
later died, his own estate, which included his
undivided interest over the property inherited from Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet
Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co- to commence when private respondent Rosales
heirs pursuant to the law on succession. sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale
and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City,
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987,
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, before the trial court.
without prejudice to the rights of brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any,
under Article 1001.
xxxxxxxxx

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their


children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other half.[4]
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with
the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became co-
owners of the property that originally descended
from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the
Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption
arose in favor of private respondents; thus:

ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be


subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who
acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment,
or by any other transaction whereby ownership is
transmitted by onerous title.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the
right of redemption in case the shares of all the
other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a
third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
We hold that the right of redemption was timely
exercised by private respondents. Concededly, no
written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos
heirs (vendors) to the co-owners[5] required under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code
Article 491
1) LEONOR B. CRUZ,Petitioner,- versus -TEOFILA M. After petitioners motion for reconsideration was
CATAPANG,Respondent. denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
June 11, 2004, she filed the instant petition.
Facts:
Issue:
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Whether or not consent given by a co-owner of a
Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land parcel of land to a person to construct a house on
covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a
Barangay MahabangLudlod, Taal, Batangas.[5] With forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against
the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the that person.
aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M.
Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the Held:
abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992.
The house intruded, however, on a portion of the co- No, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote
owned property.[6] common property to his or her exclusive use to the
prejudice of the co-ownership.[18] In our view, a co-
In the first week of September 1995, petitioner owner cannot give valid consent to another to build
Leonor B. Cruz visited the property and was a house on the co-owned property, which is an act
surprised to see a part of respondents house tantamount to devoting the property to his or her
intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. exclusive use.
She then made several demands upon respondent to Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code
demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the provide:
portion encroaching on their property. The
respondent, however, refused and disregarded her Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing
demands.[7] owned in common, provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the
complaint[8] for forcible entry against respondent co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC using it according to their rights.The purpose of the
decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of co-ownership may be changed by agreement,
only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify express or implied.
defendants construction of the house and Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall,
possession of the portion of the lot in question.[9] without the consent of the others, make alterations
in the thing owned in common, even though benefits
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, for all would result therefrom. However, if the
affirmed the MCTCs ruling in a Decision dated withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-
October 22, 2001. owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest,
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the courts may afford adequate relief.
the RTC, respondent filed a petition for review with Article 486 states each co-owner may use
the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTCs the thing owned in common provided he does so in
decision. The Court of Appeals held that there is no accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
cause of action for forcible entry in this case because and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the
respondents entry into the property, considering the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a
be characterized as one made through strategy or third person to construct a house on the co-owned
stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for property will injure the interest of the co-ownership
forcible entry.[12] The Court of Appeals decision and prevent other co-owners from using the
further held that petitioners remedy is not an action property in accordance with their rights.
for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with Under Article 491, none of the co-owners
the appropriate forum. shall, without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in common. It His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70)
necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming
without the consent of the other co-owners, validly that the said lot was registered in their parents
consent to the making of an alteration by another name and they had been living in the said house and
person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in lot since birth. The only reason why the said house
common. Alterations include any act of strict and lot was transferred in Dominadors name was
dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or when their parents were in need of money for
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of renovating their house, their parents were not
alteration.[19] The construction of a house on the qualified to obtain a loan and since Dominador was
co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, the only one who had a college education, they
it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of
Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, Dominador.
respondent had no right to construct her house on
the co-owned property. The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that
Arnelitos filiation and the settlement of the estate
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit.
dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed And since Dominador was survived by his wife,
against the builder. The consent given by Norma Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in
Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to
and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also
to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into granted the motion of execution which was opposed
the property still falls under the classification by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim
through strategy or stealth. that they have a share in the lot.

2) De Guia v CA 413 S 114 FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding
120864. October 8, 2003] that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF thus he cannot eject them from the property via
APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
HermenegildaAbejo-Rivera, respondents. ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the
A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring ejectment suit
an action without necessity of including all the co-
owners as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the HELD:
benefit of all BUT if the action of the plaintiff alone, NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito
the action should be dismissed. would prove that he is not the sole heir of
Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife,
FACTS: upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed
name of DominadorAdlawan, the father of on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making
(petitioner) ArnelitoAdlawan. He is the them co-owners as well.
acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is
claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file
to himself the said house and lot to himself and out the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-
of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true
occupy the property provided that they vacate when that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o
asked. Time came when he demanded that they necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs
vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment because it is presumed to be instituted for the
suit against them. benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for
his benefit alone and his repudiation of the
ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
ARTICLE 501 Is the sale of the designated undivided and co-
owned portion valid?
1) PEDRO OLIVERAS vs. CANDIDO LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988 RULING
168 SCRA 431
In long line of decisions, the court has held that the
portion of a land or hold in common, no individual or
Facts:
co-owner could held title to any definite portion
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685. When Lorenzo Lopez thereof. All the co-owners has abstract or
died he leave the said property to his wife Tomasa proportional share of the entire land or thing.
Ramos and his 6 children. From that time on, the
However, the juridical condition of co-ownership is
heirs did not initiate any move to partition the
not absolute. Under article 494 and 1083 of the NCC,
property.
co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the
20 years late on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos period of twenty (20) years. And, under the former
and her eldest son Candido Lopez, executed a deed article, any agreement to keep a thing or property
of absolute sale of the Eastern undivided 4,257 undivided should be for a ten-year period only.
square meters portion of their rights and interest Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in
over lot 4685 in favour of the spouses Melecio division which exceeds the maximum allowed by
Olivares and Anecita Minor for P1,000 as law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the
consideration. period beyond such maximum.

On the same day, they executed another deed of In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez
sale involving another 4,257 square meters of the maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty
undivided lot 4685 infavor of the spouses Pedro years. We hold that when Candido and his mother
Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar. sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly
exercised dominion over them because, by
Since the execution of the deed of sale the vendees operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The
had paying the real property taxes of their respective filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases
purchased properties to which they planted palay who, as vendees, are legally considered as
and peanut. subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of
Lot 4685 in their possession, 16 merely served to put
20 years later, on November 21, 1966, the Olivares a stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise
(vendees) reminded the heirs of Lorenzo lopez accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.
(vendors) of their demand to partition the land so
they could acquire their respective titles thereof. 2) CONCEPCION ROQUE vs IAC
The lopezes did not reply, hence the Olivares filed a G.R. No. 75886 August 30, 1988
complaint for partition and damages. \ 165 SCRA 118

The defendants answered that there was no sale Facts:


transpired because the alleged vendors could not JanuarioAvendao a bachelor owned a land with an
have sold specific portion of their property, the area of 312 square meter designated as lot 1549,
Januario died intestate on October 22 1945. On
possession and occupation of the plaintiff is illegal so
September 21, 1959 his intestate heirs executed an
it could not ripen to ownership. The Deed of Sale extra-judicial settlement of estate by which and
being null and void thus unenforceable against extra judicial partition was effected (in case
them. mangutanasimaamsa share, each heirs- 4 shares).

LOWER COURT RULING: Declared the validity of the On September 28, 1959, co-owners Illuminada,
Deed of Sale and ordered the segregation of the sold Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido,
portions. Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao,
transferred their collective and undivided
ISSUE: threefourths (3/4) share in Lot No. 1549 to
respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque,
thereby vesting in the latter full and complete 3) ANTIPOLO INING vs. LEONARDO VEGA
ownership of the property.

Subsequently, Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque sold Facts


the undivided portion to their half-sister Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner
Conception Roque (petitioner) although it remained of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land inKalibo,
registered under the name of JanuarioAvendano. Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue.
Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan
Then, the lot was surveyed, consequent was a and Gregoria Roldan Ining, who are now both deceased.
subdivision plan duly approved identifying and
delineating that of the portion belongs to Ernesto Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion
Roque (respondent) and of the portion belongs to Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R.
the Conception Roque. The Petitioner claimed that Vega (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is
the subdivision plan is the first step leading to the survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I.
partition of the property which was previously Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto
agreed between the respondent and petitioner. and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
However, Ernesto refused to acknowledge the Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six
ownership of conception and rejected the children. In short, herein petitioners, except for
subdivision plan. Ramon Tresvalles and Roberto Tajonera are
Gregorias grandchildren or spouses thereof
Lower Court rendered a decision in favour of the (Gregorias heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are
Plaintiff and ordered the respondents to deliver the transferees of the said property.
portion of land to the plaintiff.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject
IAC dismissed the complaint and respondents appeal property belonged to him as Romanas surviving
also the MR of the petitioner. (Reason nganogi heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court
dismiss in case mangutanasimaam: action for (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan for partition, recovery of
partition cannot prosper the moment that co-owner ownership and possession, with damages, against
asserts an adverse title, the proper action should be Gregorias heirs.
accionreindivicatoria or action for recovery of title
and possession). In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregorias heirs
(through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had
ISSUE no cause of action against them; that they have
become the sole owners of the subject property
Is Conception Roque a co-owner of the property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good
sought to be partitioned? faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in
turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo
RULING: was aware of this fact.
Conception Roque is a co-owner thus, entitled for
the portion of the said land. ISSUE:

The court reinstated the ruling of the CFI Malolos. 1. Is there a repudiation of co-ownership when
Lucimo sr. acquired the property by sale from
Under article 494 of the NCC, each co-owner may Juan Enriquez?
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
2. Is Leonardo barred by laches?
in common, in so far as his share is concerned.
Petitioner Conception Roque the co-owner seeking
RULING:
partion has been and is presently in open and
continous possession of the portion of the
property owned in common. Prior to filing of the 1. petitioners insistence on Lucimo Sr.s 1943 purchase
parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of the property to reinforce their claim over the
of absolute and exclusive ownership of the whole lot property must be ignored. Since no transfer from
1549, thus co-ownership of the property had Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property
continued to be recognized by all the owner. clearly remained part of Leons estate upon his
passing in 1962.

Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings


Romana and Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his 4) BRAVO-GUERRERO vs GUERRERO
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005
the property in equal shares. In turn, Romanas and 465 SCRA 244
Gregorias heirs the parties herein became
entitled to the property upon the sisters passing.
Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the Facts
succession are transmitted from the moment of
death. Spouses Mauricio Bravo and Simona Andaya Bravo
owned two parcels of land (Properties) measuring
Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the 287 and 291 square meters.
subject property.
Mauricio and Simona had three children (table para
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of dililibog)
Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents
became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may Roland Bravo Cesar Bravo Lily Bravo
use the property owned in common, provided they Died without Lily married
do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is issue David Diaz
intended and in such a way as not to injure the
(children) Lily (Children) David
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other
Elizabeth Bravo- B. Diaz Jr.
co-owners from using it according to their rights.
Guerrero,
They have the full ownership of their parts and of
Edward Bravo,
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may
Roland Bravo,
alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even
Senia Bravo.
substitute another person in their enjoyment, except
Benjamin
when personal rights are involved.Each co-owner
Mauricio Bravo,
may demand at any time the partition of the thing
Ofelia Bravo
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of
the co-heirs against the others so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Simona by virtue of General Power of Attorney,
appointed Mauricio to be the atty-in-fact and
authorize him to mortgage or otherwise
2. Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner
hypothecate, sell, assign and dispose of any and all
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
of their property. Subsequently, he mortgage the
co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-
properties to PNB and DBP.
ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in
favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of
acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage (Deed
other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of of Sale) conveying the Properties to Roland A. Bravo
repudiation have been made known to the other co- (anakni Mauricio ugSimona), Ofelia A. Bravo
owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and (anakniroland) and Elizabeth Bravo (anakniroland)
convincing. and was conditioned on the payment of P1,000 and
on the assumption by the vendees of the PNB and
DBP mortgages over the Properties.
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that
the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive
period within which Leonardo may seek partition However, the deed of sale was not annotated on the
from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and TCT of the subject land, and the mortgage loans and
Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that the receipts was still in the name of Mauricio even
prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner after his death.
and against the other co-owners only from the time
he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes Then on, On 23 June 1997, Edward
known his repudiation to the other co-owners. (anaknirolandaponi Mauricio ugSimona),
represented by his wife, Fatima Bravo, filed an
action for the judicial partition of the Properties.
Edward claimed that he and the other grandchildren
of Mauricio and Simona are co-owners of the
Properties by succession. Despite this, Roland, Ofelia
and Elizabeth refused to share with him the iincome
and rentals of the properties.

David jr. (anakni lily) filed a complaint-in-


intervention impugning the deed of sale and praying
for the partition of the properties among the heirs of
Mauricio and Simona.

RTC ruling: Upheld the sale of the properties to the


vendees.

CA ruling: The DOS was declared void for lack of


simonas consent, the GPA is not sufficient tho. Thus,
ordered the partition.

ISSUE

Is it proper to grant Edward of the partition of the


property?

RULING:

Petitioners have consistently claimed that their


father is one of the vendees who bought the
Properties. Vendees Elizabeth and Ofelia both
testified that the Roland A. Bravo in the Deed of Sale
is their father.

As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent


Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of
Roland Bravo, and entitled to a share, along with his
brothers and sisters, in his fathers portion of the
Properties. In short, Edward and petitioners are co-
owners of the Properties.(buseet and ruling taas pa
kayo ang facts haha oh di bapwederamansilaunta
mag sabot kayigsuonrasila)

As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of


the Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property unless a
co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This
action for partition does not prescribe and is not
subject to laches.

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