Due Process of Law

Deprivation of Property

Remman Enterpries, Inc. v. PRC, G.R. No. 197676, 4 February 2014

- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the
"Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines".
- Among other grounds, they contend that the law is unduly oppressive and
infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due
process of law. They stress that real estate developers are now burdened by law
to employ licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose of their
properties. Despite having invested a lot of money, time and resources in their
projects, petitioners aver that real estate developers will still have less control in
managing their business and will be burdened with additional expenses.
- Issue: Whether or not requiring real estate developers to employ licensed
brokers to sell properties constitutes deprivation of property.
- Ruling: There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and
enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If
petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of
engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and
marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a
reasonable regulatory measure.

Eminent Domain
City of Manila vs. Te, G.R. No. 169263, 21 September 2011
- The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7951, an ordinance authorising the
mayor to acquire by negotiation or expropriation pieces of real property along
Maria Clara and Forbes Streets where low-cost housing could be built and
awarded to bona-fide residents therein. One of those included was the property
of herein respondent, Melba Te.
- Issue: Whether or not the concept of socialized housing falls under the definition
of public use.
- Ruling: public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
- the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or
sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in
the expanded definition of public use or purpose in the context of the States
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Equal Protection

Villanueva vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, 7 April 2015
- Judge Villanueva applied for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC
branches. The JBC however informed him that he was not included in the list of
candidates for such position because the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5
 years of service as judge of first-level courts before one can apply as judge for
second-level courts.
- Judge Villanueva argues that said requirement is unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection clause, among other grounds.
- Issue: Whether or not the requirement of
- Ruling: The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification
created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. Substantial
distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience and
those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a
second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is
a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution.

Laude vs. Ginez-Jibalde

- Petitioner argue that petitioners argue that the Visiting Forces Agreement
should be declared unconstitutional. Among other grounds, they contend that to
allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a
different rule of procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
- Ruling: The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial
basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces
allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. The rule in international law
is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one's territory is immune from
local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon.
- Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity
from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to
long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and
members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter
another State's territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).

Freedom of Religion

Freedom of Expression

1UTAK vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, 14 April 2015

- COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and
local elections and subsequent elections.
- Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis--vis privately owned
public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner requested
 the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and
allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign
materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
- Ruling: assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and are prior
restraints on speech.
- The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition,
owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited
from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election
offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.

Access to Information

IDEALS v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp. (PSALM), G.R. No.
192088, 9 October 2012
- Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the
conduct of the bidding it disregarded and violated the peoples right to
information guaranteed under the Constitution.
- Petitioners contend that: (1) the bidding process was commenced by PSALM
without having previously released to the public critical information such as the
terms and conditions of the sale; (2) (2) PSALM refused to divulge significant
information requested by petitioners, matters which are of public concern; and
(3) the bidding was not conducted in an open and transparent manner.
- Ruling: The Court distinguished the duty to disclose information from the duty to
permit access to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of
the Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under
the Constitution, the other aspect ofthe peoples right to know requires a
demand or request for one to gain access to documents and paper of the
particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only transactions
involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of
information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but
any matter contained in official communications and public documents of the
government agency.
- Consequently, this relief must be granted to petitioners by directing PSALM to
allow petitioners access to the papers and documents relating to the company
profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder.

The Impairment Clause

PAGCOR vs. BIR, G.R. No. 172087, 15 March 2011
- With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. At issue in this case is
 Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs
that are exempt from payment of corporate income tax.
- Petitioner contends, among other arguments, that Section 1 (c) of R.A. No. 9337
is null and void ab initio for violating the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner avers that laws form part of, and is read into, the contract
even without the parties expressly saying so. Petitioner states that the private
parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax exemptions, which inure
to their benefit, as the main consideration and inducement for their decision to
transact/invest with it.
- Ruling: The non-impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate
from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing
the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the
terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with
those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of
the parties.
- Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCORs franchise is subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment under
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of
PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCORs
transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution.

Rights of the Accused

Custodial Investigation

People vs. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, 13 August 2012

- The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
- The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation
and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police
line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.

People vs. Guillen, G.R. No. 191756, 25 November 2013

 - RTC ruled Guillen guilty of the crime of rape. Guillen claims that the trial court
gravely erred when it deemed his silence at the police station immediately after
his arrest as an implied admission of guilt.
- Ruling: Records show that appellant remained silent and passive despite being
confronted by "AAA" with the rape charge at the police station immediately after
his arrest.
- It should be borne in mind that when appellant was brought to the police station,
he was already a suspect to the crime of rape. As such, he was already under
custodial investigation. Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted
by the accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his basic and
fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be taken
against him.

Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, 1 February 2012

- This case involves the death of Lenny Villa that was caused by a hazing session of
his fraternity.
- Dizon, one of the accused, was held guilty of the crime of homicide.
- Dizon contends that he was denied due process when the trial court made a
ruling forfeiting Dizons right to present evidence during trial.
- the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-
accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial.
According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because
he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a
resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to
present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier
hearing date.
- Ruling: The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less
than the Constitution itself. Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in
ones defense, as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at
every stage of the proceedings.
- The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially
since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon
was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-
assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of
the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his
 pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process.
- However, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard does
not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an
automatic remand of the case to the trial court. where facts have adequately
been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity
has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid
waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the
judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.

Right of Confrontation
Bangayan vs. RCBC, G.R. No. 149193, 4 April 2011
- Bangayan assails the lower courts order that reinstated the direct testimony of
Mr. Lao, respondent RCBCs lone witness. Petitioner claims that Judge Santiago
acted with partiality by reinstating Mr. Laos testimony, because this Court in
another case had already sustained the lower courts earlier Order striking out
the testimony. Hence, petitioner says that the judges reinstatement of Mr. Laos
testimony was in violation of petitioners right to due process.
- Ruling: Bangayans arguments are unmeritorious.
- Discretionary power is generally exercised by trial judges in furtherance of the
convenience of the courts and the litigants, the expedition of business, and in the
decision of interlocutory matters on conflicting facts where one tribunal could
not easily prescribe to another the appropriate rule of procedure.
- In the instant case, the trial court was within the exercise of its discretionary and
plenary control of the proceedings when it reconsidered motu propio its earlier
order striking out the testimony of Mr. Lao and ordered it reinstated. The order
of the judge cannot be considered as willful, arbitrary, capricious and
uncontrolled discretion, since his action allowed respondent bank to present its
case fully, especially considering that Mr. Lao was the sole witness for the
defense.

Liberty of Abode and Travel

Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap vs. Robredo, G.R. 200903, 22 July 2014

- Petitioners reside in the cities of San Juan, Navotas, and Quezon. These LGUs
sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction
of infrastructure projects in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners.
- The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their
constitutional right to due process because they warrant evictions and
demolitions without any court order. They point out that Section 6, Article 3 of
the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of abode
 unless there is a court order. Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate
their right to adequate housing, a universal right recognized in Article 25 of
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279.
- Ruling: Petitioners right to liberty of abode was not violated. In Magkalas v.
NHA, this Court had already ruled on the validity of evictions and demolitions
without any court order.
- Demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial
order in the following instances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) when the property involved is an expropriated property xxx pursuant to Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1315;
(2) when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal
occupants in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by
the NHA pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472;
(3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds, pursuant to Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279;
(4) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.

- Notably, Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or
rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in
accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.