1.
Tijam vs Sibonghanoy
Facts:
The Spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a civil
action against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio
to recover from them the sum of P 1908.00 with legal interest. As
prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the
court against defendants properties, but the same was soon
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
The court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a
writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been
returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Surety's bond against which the Surety filed a
written opposition upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the
payment of the amount due under the judgment. Thereafter the
necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to pay,
the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-
bond. The court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the
latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon
its failure to file such answer, the court granted the motion for
execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that
the same was issued without the required summary hearing. As the
court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Surety alleged that the court erred when the case was submitted
for resolution without a summary hearing and compliance with the
other mandatory requirements of the Rules of Court.
CA decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
When the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion
asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. The CA granted the motion in its resolution. Two
days later, the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS,
on the ground that when the plaintiffs filed the case, Judiciary Act of
1948 was already in effect. It provides that all civil actions where the
value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not
exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs shall be filed with
the inferior courts. The Court of First Instance, where the case was
originally filed, had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The CA
resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to the SC.
Issue:
(Main Issue) WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.
Ruling:
No, though it is clear that the case is outside the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance, defendants were estopped from questioning
the court's jurisdiction. The Court explained "a party may be
estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party, it could have raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction, but it was only raised after 15 years. It invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally
woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Moreover, adds the Court, "we frown upon the 'undesirable practice'
of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse,"
Merits of the appeal:
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally
unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, for issuance of writ of execution against
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the
bond. But the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied.
Plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for
satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the
amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion, for issuance of writ of
execution against the surety, with notice of hearing. The surety
received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.
Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within
the period given him, the court, issued an order granting plaintiffs'
motion for execution against the surety; and the corresponding writ
of execution was issued.
The surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the
ground that it was issued without the required "summary hearing".
This motion was denied. The surety filed a motion for reconsideration
of the above-stated order of denial, which was also denied.
In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs'
motion for execution and of the date when the same would be
submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present
in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that
the court gave him a period of four days within which to file an
answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer
or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was
deprived of its day in court.
It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the
motion "for the simple reason that all its defenses can be set up
during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to
writing". There is obviously no merit in this pretense because what
the surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time
to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open
court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the four-day
period within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be deemed
submitted for resolution"; and counsel agreed, as the order was
issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
The orders appealed from are hereby affirmed.
2. Monzon vs. Relova
FACTS: Spouses Relova and Spouses Perez, respondents herein,
filed an initiatory pleading against Atty. Luna (Clerk of Court) and
Monzon (Petitioner). Respondents alleged that Monzon executed
two promissory notes, one in favor of Spouses Relova and the other
in favor of Spouses Perez, both were secured by two different lots
respectively. However, Coastal Lending Corp extrajudicially
foreclosed and sold the property of petitioner including the portions
mortgaged to respondents because petitioner was likewise indebted
to Coastal Lending Corp. Respondents then asked petitioner for the
enforcement of the two promissory notes. The hearing date for the
parties was set but petitioner and her counsel failed to appear on
that date. Citing the absence of petitioner and her counsel on said
hearing date despite due notice, RTC granted an oral Motion by the
respondents by issuing an Order allowing the ex parte presentation
of evidence by respondents.
RTC: The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents and
mentioned that the Order allowing the ex parte presentation of
evidence by respondents was due to the continuous and incessant
absences of petitioner and counsel. It can be seen that despite the
fact that Monzon was not declared in default by the RTC, the RTC
nevertheless applied the effects of a default order upon petitioner
under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.If the defending party fails to
answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion
of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of
such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the
court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence
may be delegated to the clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be entitled to
notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.
CA: Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal claiming that the RTC gravely
erred in rendering its Decision immediately after respondents
presented their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance to
present her evidence, thereby violating her right to due process of
law. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing
the appeal. According to the Court of Appeals, Monzon showed tepid
interest in having the case resolved with dispatch.
Monzon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. Monzon
stresses that she was never declared in default by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Monzon is in default when she and
her counsel failed to appear during the hearing date?
HELD: No, the petitioner is not in default. In his book on remedial
law, former Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes that failure to appear
in hearings is not a ground for the declaration of a defendant in
default. Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary
period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole ground for
an order of default, except the failure to appear at a pre-trial
conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the
defendant are followed. The rigid requirements of a default order are
the following: (1) the court must have validly acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant either by service of summons or
voluntary appearance; (2) the defendant failed to file his answer
within the time allowed therefor; and (3) there must be a motion to
declare the defendant in default with notice to the latter. In the case
at bar, petitioner had not failed to file her answer. Neither was notice
sent to petitioner that she would be defaulted, or that the effects of
default shall be imposed upon her. "Mere non-appearance of
defendants at an ordinary hearing and to adduce evidence does not
constitute default, when they have already filed their answer to the
complaint within the reglementary period. It is error to default a
defendant after the answer had already been filed. It should be borne
in mind that the policy of the law is to have every litigants case tried
on the merits as much as possible; it is for this reason that
judgments by default are frowned upon. Failure to attend, when
committed during hearing dates for the presentation of the
complainants evidence, would amount to the waiver of such
defendants right to object to the evidence presented during such
hearing, and to cross-examine the witnesses presented therein. It
would not amount to a waiver of the defendants right to present
evidence during the trial dates scheduled for the reception of
evidence for the defense.
3. Sablas v Sablas
FACTS:
Petitioner Sps were served with summons and a copy of the
complaint. They filed a motion for extension of time requesting an
additional period of 15 days to file for their answer. However, they
were able to file it only 3 days after the expiration of the extended
period. The trial court observed that the answer was filed out if time,
it admitted the pleading because no motion to declare the petitioner
sps in default was filed.
Thereafter, respondents filed a motion to declare petitioner sps in
default, but was denied by the trial court. Respondents moved for
reconsideration but was denied. They challenged the trial courts
order h the CA in a petition for certiorari alleging that the admission
of the answer by the trial court was contrary to the Rules of
Procedure and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
CA ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 9 of Rules of Court, that the trial court had
no recourse but to declare petitioner sps in default. CA granted the
petition, vacated the trial courts order and remanded the case to the
trial court for reception of plaintiffs evidence. Petitioner Sps assail
the decision of the CA in this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner sps is in default?
HELD: NO.
The elements of a valid declaration of default are:
1. the court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party either by service of summons or voluntary
appearance;
2. the defending party failed to file the answer within the time allowed
therefor and
3. a motion to declare the defending party in default has been filed
by the claiming party with notice to the defending party.
An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming
party. It can be properly issued against the defending party who
failed to file the answer within the prescribed period only if the
claiming party files a motion to that effect with notice to the defending
party.
In this connection, Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Default: Declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer
within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such
failure, declare the defending party in default. x x x. (emphasis
supplied)
Three requirements must be complied with before the court can
declare the defending party in default: (1) the claiming party must file
a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2)
the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in
default and (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party
has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rules of Court.
The rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such
motion to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant
fails to answer the complaint within the reglementary period. The trial
court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default] as the rules
leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial
court should not under any circumstances act as counsel of the
claiming party.
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the
defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after
the reglementary period for filing the answer expires. The Rules of
Court provides for discretion on the part of the trial court not only to
extend the time for filing an answer but also to allow an answer to be
filed after the reglementary period.
Since the trial court already admitted the answer, it was correct in
denying the subsequent motion of respondents to declare petitioner
spouses in default.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Accordingly, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The July 17, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 57397 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
December 6, 1999 order of the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte,
Branch 14 is REINSTATED. The case is REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
4. Sps Delos Santos vs Carpio
Facts:
On January 3, 2001, Metrobank filed a complaint for sum of money
against petitioners Sps Delos Santos before the RTC Davao.
On January 22, 2001, petitioners were served with the summons,
together with a copy of the complaint. As petitioners failed to file an
answer within the reglementary period, Metrobank, filed a motion to
declare them in default.
Acting on the motion, the lower court issued an order declaring
petitioners in default and setting the ex-parte presentation of
Metrobank's evidence.
On February 15, 2001, petitioners filed an opposition to Metrobank's
motion to declare them in default, claiming that upon receipt of the
summons, they immediately sought the services of Atty. Philip
Pantojan but it was only on February 12, 2001 that they were able to
meet with Atty. Pantojan. Petitioners alleged that not being "learned
in law", they were unaware "of the consequences of delay in the
filing of their answer."
On the same date, February 15, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to
admit answer, as well as the answer. In an order dated February 16,
2001, respondent judge disregarded petitioners' opposition to
Metrobank's motion for default and stood pat on his previous default
order.
On February 27, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of
default; Metrobank opposed the motion. In their motion, petitioners
reiterated that, being laymen, they were unaware of the fifteen-day
period within which to file the answer and that their failure to do so
was due to the unavailability of Atty. Pantojan who was then "always
out of town." They attached to their motion an "Affidavit of Merits"
which restated the contents of the motion. Petitioners further claimed
that "if given our day in Court, we have a meritorious defense to set
up against the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint."
On March 2, 2001, respondent judge issued an order holding in
abeyance the ex-parte reception of evidence pending resolution of
petitioners' motion to lift the order of default.
On March 5, 2001, respondent judge issued an order denying
petitioners' motion to lift the order of default and setting the reception
of Metrobank's evidence on March 7, 2001, as previously scheduled.
On that date (March 7, 2001), Metrobank presented its evidence and
the case was submitted for decision. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the March 5, 2001 order but their motion was
denied on March 21, 2001.
CA: The CA did not find the excuse proffered by petitioners, i.e., the
ignorance of procedural rules and their lawyer's unavailability, as
constitutive of excusable negligence. The CA further found
unmeritorious the contention of petitioners that they were declared in
default without giving them ample time to file an opposition to
Metrobank's Motion to Declare them in Default.
Issue: whether or not the CA erred in upholding the Orders of the
trial court declaring petitioners in default and denying their Motion to
Lift Order of Default.
Held: We rule in the affirmative. There are three requirements which
must be complied with by the claiming party before the court may
declare the defending party in default, to wit: (1) the claiming party
must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in
default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to
declare him in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the
defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by
the Rule. Therefore, as the present rule on default requires the filing
of a motion and notice of such motion to the defending party, it is not
enough that the defendant failed to answer the complaint within the
reglementary period to be a sufficient ground for declaration in
default. The motion must also be heard. We could not see any
justifiable reason why the trial court chose not to hear the petitioners
on the date and time fixed in Metrobank's motion, and instead,
hastily granted the motion before it could be heard on the ground
that it had found the motion to be impressed with merit. Indeed, in
totally disregarding the purpose for which the filing of a motion and
notice to defending party are required by the Rules, the trial court
had acted in a despotic manner that is correctly assailed through a
petition for certiorari which petitioners have seasonably filed with the
CA. In this case, we found the trial court to have gravely abused its
discretion when it declared defendants in default; that the answer
should be admitted because it had been filed before it was declared
in default and no prejudice was caused to plaintiff; and that the
hornbook rule is that default judgments are generally disfavored.
Since the Order declaring petitioners in default is null and void, the
filing of the Answer may be considered as having been filed before
petitioners were declared in default and therefore no prejudice was
caused to Metrobank and there was no undue delay on the part of
petitioners.
5. MONARCH INSURANCE VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This is a petition for review assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals which set aside the writ of execution issued by
the lower court for the full indemnification of the claims of the
petitioners Monarch and Tabacalera Insurance against private
respondent Aboitiz Shipping Corp.
Monarch and Tabacalera are insurance carriers of los cargoes when
the ship of Aboitiz sank. They indemnified the shippers and were
consequently subrogated to their rights, interests and actions against
Aboitiz, the cargo carrier. Aboitiz refused to compensate Monarch so
the latter filed a complaints against the former.
Aboitiz was subsequently declared as in default for its failure to
appear during the pre-trial, the counsel filed a motion to set aside the
motion of default. Without resolving the pending motion to set aside
the order of default, the trial court set the cases for hearing. Hoever,
since Aboitiz had repeatedly failed to appear in court, the trial court
denied the said motion and allowed Monarch and Tabacalera to
present evident ex-parte.
In due course, the trial court rendered judgment agaisnt Aboitiz but
the compalint against all the other defendants was dimissed. The
petitioners moved for exe cution of judgment, the respondent filed a
motion to restrain the execution in the Court of Appeals the the latter
granted the motion, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred from taking
cognizance the Aboitizs defenses on appeal for having been
declared in default.
RULING: PETITION IS DENIED.
It is true that for having been delcared in default, Aboitiz was
precluded from presenting evidence to prove its defenses in the
court a quo. We cannot, however agree with petitioners that this
circumstance prevents the respondent Court of Appeals from taking
cognizance of Aboitiz defenses on appeal.
It should be noted that Aboitiz was declared as in default not for its
failure to file an answer but from its absence during pre-trial and the
trial proper. A judgment of default does not imply a waiver of rights
except that of being heard and presenting evidence in defendants
favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of the facts and
causes of action of the plaintiff, because the codal section requires
the latter to adduce evidence in support of his allegations as an
indispensable condition before final judgment could be given in his
favor, nor could be interpreted as an admission by the defendant that
the plaintiffs causes of action find support in the law or that the latter
is entitled to the relief for. This is especially true with respect to a
defendant who had filed his answer but had been subsequently
declared in default for failing to appear at the trial since he has had
an opportunity to traverse, via his answer, the material averments
contained in the complaint. Such defendant has a better standing
than a defendant who has neither answered nor appeared at trial.
The former should be allowed to reiterate all affirmative defenses
pleaded in his answer before the Court of Appeals. Likewise, the
Court of appeals may review the correctness of the evaluation of the
plaintiffs evidence by the lower court.
6. ANTONIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) and SPS. WILLIAM
UY and MA. JAJORIE UY, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Garcia filed an action for damages
against private respondents, spouses William and Ma. Jajorie Uy.
For failure of the private respondents to file their answer within the
reglementary period, petitioner moved to declare the former in
default. RTC granted the motion. Private respondents then filed an
appearance with motion for extension of time to file answer but the
trial court denied the motion for having been filed out of time.
RTC issued a judgment of default against private respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial
court granted. Private respondents appealed to CA challenging the
validity of the writ of execution because it was granted without proper
notice to them and without hearing.
CA granted the petition and set aside the RTC order. A motion to
reconsider the decision was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N a party who has been declared in default is entitled to
notice of a motion for execution pending appeal of a judgment by
default
HELD: YES. A party declared in default is entitled to notice of the
motion for execution pending appeal. Consistent with this right to
notice of final order or judgment is the right to notice of the motion for
execution pending appeal of the default judgment. Without such
notice, the various recourses available to the defaulted party after
judgment would be rendered illusory. For once a judgment has been
executed, restitution, although provided for in a case of reversal, is
oftentimes incomplete and unsatisfactory as damages may arise
which cannot be fully compensated. A party has a right to rely upon
the rules of court and to expect that he would be given notice as
required thereby. As being in default does not imply a waiver of
rights the defaulted party has the right to expect compliance with the
requisites for executing a judgment pending appeal under Section 2
of Rule 39.
A party in default loses the right to present his defense and examine
or cross-examine witnesses. It does not mean that being declared in
default, and thereby losing ones standing, constitutes a waiver of all
rights; what is only waived is the right to be heard and to present
evidence during trial while default prevails. Such party is still entitled
to notice of final judgments, land orders and proceedings taken
subsequent thereto.
Petition denied.
7. OTERO vs. TAN
G.R. No. 200134 August 15, 2012
Case History:
MTC - rendered a Decision directing Otero to pay Tan his
outstanding obligation in the amount of 270,818.01, as well as
attorneys fees and litigation expenses and costs in the amounts of
15,000.00 and 3,350.00, respectively. The MTCC opined that
Oteros failure to file an answer despite notice is a tacit admission of
Tans claim.
RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
Facts:
A Complaint
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_200134_2012.ht
ml - fnt3for collection of sum of money and damages was filed by
Roger Tan (Tan) with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities , Cagayan
de Oro City on July 28, 2005 against Roberto Otero (Otero). Tan
alleged that on several occasions from February 2000 to May 2001,
Otero purchased on credit petroleum products from his Petron outlet
in Valencia City, Bukidnon in the aggregate amount of 270,818.01.
Tan further claimed that despite several verbal demands, Otero
failed to settle his obligation.
Despite receipt of the summons and a copy of the said complaint,
which per the records of the case below were served through his
wife Grace R. Otero on August 31, 2005, Otero failed to file his
answer with the MTCC.
Held:
Yes, Otero is in default.
A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be
declared by the court in default. Loss of standing in court, the
forfeiture of ones right as a party litigant, contestant or legal
adversary, is the consequence of an order of default. A party in
default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings,
and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect
that his pleadings would be acted upon by the court nor may be
object to or refute evidence or motions filed against him.

On November 18, 2005, Tan filed a motion with the MTCC to declare Yes, Otero can appeal.
Otero in default for his failure to file his answer. Otero opposed Tans
Indeed, a defending party declared in default retains the right to
motion, claiming that he did not receive a copy of the summons and
appeal from the judgment by default. However, the grounds that may
a copy of Tans complaint. Hearing on the said motion was set on
be raised in such an appeal are restricted to any of the following: first,
January 25, 2006, but was later reset to March 8, 2006, Otero
the failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of the
manifesting that he only received the notice therefor on January 23,
complaint; second, the decision is contrary to law; and third, the
2006. The hearing on March 8, 2006 was further reset to April 26,
amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed
2006 since the presiding judge was attending a convention. Otero
for. In these cases, the appellate tribunal should only consider the
failed to appear at the next scheduled hearing, and the MTCC
pieces of evidence that were presented by the plaintiff during the ex
issued an order declaring him in default. A copy of the said order
parte presentation of his evidence.
was sent to Otero on May 9, 2006.

A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded from

Issue: Whether or not
raising any other ground in his appeal from the judgment by default
Otero is in default? since, otherwise, he would then be allowed to adduce evidence in his
defense, which right he had lost after he was declared in default.
Can otero appeal?
8. CRISOLOGO VS GLOBE TELECOM Appeals, wherein it was ruled that a defendant declared in default has the
remedy set forth in Sec. 2, par (3) of Rule 41.
G.R. No. 167631
December 16, 2005
Issue:
Facts:
WON the Petitioners filing of review on certiorari with the SC citing
Petitioner was an employee of respondent company. When she was Matute case is the proper recourse for a judgment by default rendered by
promoted, she became entitled to an executive car. In April 2002, she was the trial court.
separated from the company. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and reinstatement with NLRC which later dismissed the Ruling:
complaint. The Petitioner filed for certiorari with the CA assailing the
dismissal. No. The filing of the present petition is clearly not the proper remedy to
assail the default judgment rendered by the trial court. The Matute case is
Pending said petition, Respondent filed a civil case with the RTC an action
of 1969, vintage and pertained to the old Rules of Court and has already
for recovery of possession of the car with application for a writ of replevin
been superseded by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
with damages docketed as case MC04-2480. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping but was Her only recourse then is to file an ordinary appeal with the Court of
denied by the trial court. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with Appeals under Sec. 2 (a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
the CA. Petitioner also filed with the CA a motion for the issuance of a writ amended.
of prohibition to enjoin proceedings in the replevin case before the trial
court. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The petition is
reinstated and the case is REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for
Thereafter, Respondent filed a motion to declare defendant in default in
appropriate action.
Civil Case No. MC04-2480, which was granted by the trial court.
Respondent was thus allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of default but it was denied
by the trial court. The trial court rendered a judgment by default, 9. VLASON ENTERPRISES VS. CA
declaring respondent having the right of possession over the subject motor G.R. Nos. 121662-64. July 6, 1999.
vehicle and ordered the petitioner to pay for damages, attorneys fee, and
cost of suit.

Petitioner then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on Facts:
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was denied for being Ruling that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final
the wrong remedy under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. and executory, the Court of Appeals ordered the Regional Trial Court
Thus, Petitioner filed the present motion for reconsideration, alleging that to take appropriate action on the urgent ex parte motion for issuance
the filing of said petition is the proper recourse, citing Matute vs. Court of of a writ of execution filed by private respondent. Pursuant thereto,
the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued a writ of possession thus
placing private respondent in possession of petitioner's barge Lawin.
Hence, this petition.
The case filed by private respondent with the trial court involved
multiple defendants. Several defendants entered into a compromise
agreement with private respondent. A compromise agreement is
immediately final and executory. As to these defendants therefore,
the trial court Decision had become final. Nevertheless, said decision
cannot be said to have attained finality as to petitioner, which was
not a party to the compromise. Moreover, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration two days before the lapse of the reglementary
period to appeal. Execution shall issue as matter of right upon the
expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner
in this case.
Held:
NO. The sheriff's return showed that the president of petitioner
corporation was served summons through his secretary. A summons
addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of the
President binds that corporation. The secretary however, should be
an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. In the case
at bar, the secretary was not an employee of petitioner but of
Vlasons Shipping, Inc.
Acting under the impression that petitioner had been placed under its
jurisdiction, the trial court dispensed with the service on petitioner of
new summons for the subsequent amendments of the petition. But
the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Thus, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Not having been
validly served summons, it would be legally impossible to declare
petitioner to be in default. A default judgment cannot affect the rights
of a party who was never declared in default.
10. Banares v. Flordeliza (GR No. L-29355; July 20, 1928)
Facts:
>November 1916 private respondents (Julian Cavito) rice, hemp
and coconut land was levied because of a writ of execution issued by
Justice of the Peace of Barcelona, Province of Sorsogon in the case
filed by Eugenio Fortuno against the private respondent.
-November 4, 1916 private respondents land was sold at a public
auction and the highest bidder was the petitioner (Donato Banares)
and since the one-year redemption period expired, a deed of sale
was executed in favor of the petitioner.
>October 18, 1927 private respondent filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon against the petitioner and praying
before the Court to allow the private respondent to redeem the land,
to restore ownership and possession of the land and order the
petitioner to pay damages.
>November 15, 1927 the petitioner filed an answer to the
complaint but a copy was not served to the private respondent so the
latter filed a motion for default against the former on December 12,
1927, which was granted by the public respondent (Judge Tomas
Flordeliza) on December 17, 1927.
>February 9, 1928 and before the assignment of the date of the
hearing the petitioner filed a sworn motion to set aside the order of
default together with its pertinent documents but the public
respondent refused to set aside the order of default.
Issue Was it correct for the public respondent to refuse to set aside
order of default?
Ruling:
>No, it was not correct for the public respondent to refuse to set
aside the order of default.
>The Court ruled that while it is correct for a court to declare a
defendant in default due to the failure of the latter to serve a copy his
answer to the plaintiff and it is sufficient for a court to refuse to set it
aside when a motion to that effect is presented without a sworn
statement of merit and evidence to establish them.
-But when the motion to set aside order of default was made
without any loss of time and before a date was set for hearing of
the case on the merits and is accompanied by a sworn
statement of merit and copies of documents which constitutes
prima facie a just and valid defense, such failure to serve the
answer to the plaintiff is insufficient to refuse to set aside the order
of default which will deprive a defendant of his rights.
In the present case, the public respondent should have set aside
the order of default since the petitioner filed a motion to set aside
order of default before a date was set for hearing on the case on the
merits and is accompanied by a sworn statement of merit and copies
of documents which constitutes a prima facie a just and valid
defense of petitioners failure to serve a copy of the answer to private
respondent.
11. PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP vs A.C. ORDOEZ
CORPORATION
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58 and
reinstated the Orders of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 66 which admitted respondents Answer.
Petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, a
complaint for damages against respondents. Based on the Sheriffs
Return of Service, summons remained unserved on respondent
Suspine while it was served on the respondent corporation and
received by Samuel D. Marcoleta.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default; however,
on June 28, 2000, the respondent corporation filed an Omnibus
Motion alleging that summons was improperly served upon it
because it was made to a secretarial staff who was unfamiliar with
court processes and asked for an extension of 15 days within which
to file an Answer. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
66, issued an Order admitting the answer and setting the case for
pre-trial.
Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City which granted it. The
respondent corporation appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the decision.
Issue:
Was there a valid service of summons?
Held:
Petition is denied. There was no valid service of summons.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service
may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers
who can receive summons on behalf of a corporation. Service of
summons to someone other than the corporations president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer,
and in-house counsel, is not valid.
The new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in
statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
Thus, the service of summons to respondent corporations Receiving
Section through Samuel D. Marcoleta is defective and not binding to
said corporation.
12. SPOUSES RUDY S. AMPELOQUIO, SR. AND LAGRIMAS
OBNAMIA vs.
COURT OF APPEALS &, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
FACTS:
Petitioners failed to pay their loan to private respondent PNB despite
the demand made by the latter. PNB then instituted an extrajudicial
foreclosure which consequently awarded in their favor the mortgaged
property after winning the highest bid in auction sale. A transfer of
ownership was issued in favor of PNB. Petitioners filed before RTC a
complaint for annulment of mortgage contract and also asked for the
cancellation of transfer of ownership to PNB. PNB then filed a motion
for extension of time to file an answer. Thereafter, instead of filing an
answer, PNB filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause
of action. RTC, however, denied said motion and an order was sent
and addressed to a certain Atty. Manzala at PNB Escolta office. PNB
claimed it did not receive the trial courts order because Atty.
Manzala who temporarily handled the case no longer held office in
Escolta. The case was eventually transferred to Atty. Torres of PNB
Cavite. This prompts now petitioners to file a motion to declare
private respondent in default for its failure to file an answer within the
reglementary period. RTC denied petitioners motion and CA upheld
the decision of RTC.
Petitioners asserted that PNB should have declared in default
because the reason for delay in filing an answer is inexcusable. It
also failed to show that its failure to file its answer within the
reglementary period was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. It had no meritorious defense to warrant the
denial of the motion to declare in default. Furthermore, petitioners
state that the liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not
contemplate inexcusable failure to comply with lawful orders of the
Regional Trial Court and the Rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent be granted a liberal construction
of the Rules and be declared in default for its failure to file an answer
within the reglementary period?
HELD:
Respondent appellate court emphasized that a liberal construction of
the Rules is allowed by this Court to promote speedy, just, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. Under
Section 11 of Rule 11 of the New Rules of Civil Procedure, it is within
the discretion of the trial court to permit the filing of defendant's
answer even beyond the reglementary period, provided there is
justification for the belated action, and there was no showing that the
defendant intended to delay the case. Where the failure of defendant
to seasonably file his answer is excusable and will not in any way
prejudice the plaintiff's substantial rights, courts apply the Rules
liberally and set aside the default order, or deny the motion by the
plaintiff. In this case, respondent trial judge found that private
respondent had a meritorious defense and the case needed a full-
blown trial.
Judgments by default are generally looked upon with disfavor. A
default judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits of
the controversy. A judgment by default may amount to a positive and
considerable injustice to the defendant; and the possibility of such
serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the
grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Under
the circumstances of this case, respondent appellate court did not err
nor gravely abused its discretion when it eschewed technicalities and
allowed the parties to litigate.
13. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(Second Division) and FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. (as
executor of the estate of FERDINAND E. MARCOS).
G.R. No. 148154 December 17, 2007
FACTS:
The administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino
successively sued former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former
First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Mrs. Marcos), and their
alleged cronies or dummies before the anti-graft court to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth that they amassed during the former
president's 20-year rule.
On April 18, 1988, the court ordered that alias summonses be served
on the Marcoses who were then in exile in Hawaii. The alias
summonses on the Marcoses were served at 2338 Makiki Heights,
Honolulu, Hawaii. The Marcoses, however, failed to file an answer
and were accordingly declared in default by the anti-graft court on
April 6, 1989.
Respondent asked for three extensions totaling 35 days to file an
answer. The court granted the motions and gave him until July 17,
1999 to file an answer. But instead of filing an answer, respondent
filed on July 16, 1999, a Motion For Bill of Particulars, praying for
clearer statements of the allegations which he called "mere
conclusions of law, too vague and general to enable defendants to
intelligently answer."
Invoking Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner argues that since the default order against former
President Marcos has not been lifted by any court order, respondent
cannot file a motion for a bill of particulars. Petitioner stresses that
respondent did not file a motion to lift the default order as executor of
his father's estate; thus, he and the estate cannot take part in the trial.
Petitioner also contends that respondent was granted leave to file an
answer to the expanded complaint, not a motion for a bill of
particulars. The anti-graft court should not have accepted the motion
for a bill of particulars after he had filed a motion for leave to file
responsive pleading and three successive motions for extension as
the motion for a bill of particulars is dilatory.
ISSUE:
Did the court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting respondent's motion for a bill of
particulars as executor of former President Marcos' estates
considering that the deceased defendant was then a defaulting
defendant when the motion was filed?
RULING:
The court rule in the negative, and dismiss the instant petition
for utter lack of merit.
Under the Rules of Court, a defending party may be declared in
default, upon motion and notice, for failure to file an answer within
the allowable period. As a result, the defaulting party cannot take
part in the trial albeit he is entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings.
In this case, former President Marcos was declared in default for
failure to file an answer. He died in Hawaii as an exile while this case
was pending, since he and his family fled to Hawaii in February 1986
during a people-power revolt in Metro Manila. His representatives
failed to file a motion to lift the order of default. Nevertheless,
respondent, as executor of his father's estate, filed a motion for leave
to file a responsive pleading, three motions for extensions to file an
answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of which were granted
by the anti-graft court.
While it is true that there was no positive act on the part of the
court to lift the default order because there was no motion nor
order to that effect, the anti-graft court's act of granting
respondent the opportunity to file a responsive pleading meant
the lifting of the default order on terms the court deemed proper
in the interest of justice. It was the operative act lifting the
default order and thereby reinstating the position of the original
defendant whom respondent is representing, founded on the
court's discretionary power to set aside orders of default.
Indeed, failure to file a motion to lift a default order is not
procedurally fatal as a defaulted party can even avail of other
remedies mentioned above.
As default judgments are frowned upon, we have been advising the
courts below to be liberal in setting aside default orders to give both
parties every chance to present their case fairly without resort to
technicality.
But as defaulted defendants are not actually thrown out of court
because the Rules see to it that judgments against them must be in
accordance with the law and competent evidence, this Court prefers
that the lifting of default orders be effected before trial courts could
receive plaintiffs' evidence and render judgments. This is so since
judgments by default may result in considerable injustice to
defendants, necessitating careful and liberal examination of the
grounds in motions seeking to set them aside. The inconvenience
and complications associated with rectifying resultant errors, if
defendant justifies his omission to seasonably answer, far outweigh
the gain in time and dispatch of immediately trying the case. The fact
that former President Marcos was in exile when he was declared in
default, and that he later died still in exile, makes the belated filing of
his answer in this case understandably excusable.
14. Swagman Hotel and Travel Inc vs. CA | GR 161135 | Apr 8,
2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Swagman through its president and vice-president,
respectively, obtained from Private Respondent Christian loans
evidenced by three promissory notes. Each of the promissory notes
is in the amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date
with an interest of 15% per annum payable every three months. In a
letter, Christian informed the petitioner corporation that he was
terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment of said
loans.
Private Respondent Christian filed with the RTC a complaint for a
sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation.
Petitioner corporation filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of
cause of action. According to them, Christian had no cause of action
because the three promissory notes were not yet due and
demandable.
The trial court ruled that under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint which states no cause of action
may be cured by evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if
the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant
complaint, as defendants obligation are not yet due and demandable
then, he may nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes
in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations
covered by the two promissory notes are now due and demandable.
When the instant case was filed, none of the promissory notes was
due and demandable, but the first and the second promissory notes
have already matured during the course of the proceeding. Hence,
payment is already due.
This finding was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed
be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of
the case?
HELD:
No. Jurisprudence states that unless the plaintiff has a valid and
subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the
defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of
one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an
amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not
permissible.
Such interpretation by the trial court and CA of Section 5, Rule 10 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous. The curing effect
under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at
the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for
failure to allege the essential facts. Amendments of pleadings are
allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order
that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities,
and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in
a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits.
15. ALPINE LENDING INVESTORS and/or ROGELIO L. ONG,
petitioners, vs. ESTRELLA CORPUZ, respondent.
Facts:
Zenaida pretending to help Estrella in securing a Garage Franchise
from the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Zenaida took from her
the original registration papers of her vehicle, a Toyota Tamaraw FX
with Plate No. UMR 660. Zenaida, using respondents registration
papers in representing herself as the owner of the vehicle, was able
to retrieve it from Richmond Auto Center where it was being repaired.
Thereafter, Zenaida disappeared with the vehicle. Respondent then
reported the incident to the LTO Muntinlupa City Branch. There, she
was informed that Zenaida mortgaged her vehicle with petitioner
Alpine. The LTO showed respondent the Chattel Mortgage Contract
bearing her forged signature. Estrella informed Alpine but the latter
refused to turn over the vehicle to her. Instead of filing an answer to
respondents complaint, Alpine submitted to the RTC a motion to
dismiss on the ground that it is not a juridical person, hence, not a
proper party in the case. RTC denied Alpines motion to dismiss.
Alpine then filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. The
RTC then directed respondent to file her amended complaint within
ten (10) days. However, respondent filed her Amended Complaint
with an accompanying Motion to Admit Amended Complaint two (2)
days late. Nonetheless, in an Order dated December 13, 2002, the
RTC admitted the amended complaint. On January 3, 2003, Alpine
filed a Motion to Expunge respondents motion to admit amended
complaint on the ground that the latter motion was not accompanied
by a notice of hearing. In her Comment on Alpines motion to
expunge, respondent averred that her contested motion need not be
accompanied by a notice of hearing as it is a non-litigated motion.
On January 24, 2003, the RTC denied Alpines motion to expunge
for lack of merit. Alpine moved for a reconsideration, but this was
denied in an Order dated January 28, 2003. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in admitting respondents amended
complaint.
Held:
Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive
pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint in
Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter of right. Following this Courts
ruling in Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., 84 Phil. 618 (1949),
considering that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it
is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the amended
complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words,
the trial courts duty to admit the amended complaint was purely
ministerial. In fact, respondent should not have filed a motion to
admit her amended complaint. It has always been the policy of this
Court to be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings in order that
the real controversies between or among the parties may be
presented and cases be decided on the merits without delay.
16. RAFAEL BAUTISTA and LIGAYA ROSEL, Petitioners,
vs.
MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for cancellation of
petitioners title. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it does not state a cause of action. The RTC granted
the motion to dismiss.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for leave
to file an amended complaint for quieting of title. Petitioners filed their
opposition, contending that the amended complaint does not also
state a cause of action and if admitted, respondents theory of the
case is substantially modified.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent may amend his pleading.
Whether a motion to dismiss is a responsive pleading.
RULING:
Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides:
"SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any
time within ten (10) days after it is served."
The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any
responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his
pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in
theory is introduced.
It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the responsive
pleading contemplated by the Rule. Records show that petitioners
had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in
the civil case. What they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows that
respondent, as a plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after
the original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order
of dismissal is not yet final.
17. Home Guaranty Corp vs R-11 Builders Inc. and National
Housing Authority
G.R. No. 192649
March 9, 2011
Facts:
On 19 March 1993, a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered
into between respondents National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II
Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) for the implementation of the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP).
On 26 September 1994, NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner
Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC) as guarantor and the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as trustee, entered into an Asset
Pool Formation Trust Agreement which provided the mechanics for
the implementation of the project. To back the project, an Asset Pool
was created.
On the same date, the parties likewise executed a Contract of
Guaranty whereby HGC, upon the call made by PNB and conditions
therein specified, undertook to redeem the regular Smokey Mountain
Project Participation Certificate (SMPPCs) upon maturity and to pay
the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum.
Subsequent to R-II Builders' infusion of P300 Million into the project,
the issuance of the SMPPCs and the termination of PNBs services
on 29 January 2001, NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on the
institution of Planters Development Bank (PDB) as trustee on 29
January 2001. By 24 October 2002, however, all the Regular
SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already
amounted to an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of
liquid assets with which to effect redemption of the regular SMPPCs
prompted PDB to make a call on HGCs guaranty and to execute in
the latters favor a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of
the entire Asset Pool,.
On 1 September 2005, R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC
and NHA before Branch 24 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, a
Special Commercial Court (SCC). Contending that HGCs failure to
redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining
possession of the Asset Pool ballooned the stipulated interests and
materially prejudiced its stake on the residual values of the Asset
Pool, R-II Builders alleged, among other matters, that the DAC
should be rescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in executing
the same prior to HGCs redemption and payment of the guaranteed
SMPPCs;
Having filed its answer to the complaint, in the meantime, HGC went
on to move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative
defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction. On 2
August 2007, R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit its
Amended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted the prayer for
resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint. In
lieu thereof, said pleading introduced causes of action for
conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, for
NHA to pay the Asset Pool the sum of P1,803,729,757.88
representing the cost of the changes and additional works on the
project and for an increased indemnity for attorneys fees in the sum
of P2,000,000.00.
Consistent with its joint order dated 2 January 2008 which held that
R-II Builders complaint was an ordinary civil action and not an intra-
corporate controversy, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued a
clarificatory order dated 1 February 2008 to the effect, among other
matters, that it did not have the authority to hear the case. As a
consequence, the case was re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of
the Manila RTC . the case was re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of
the Manila RTC .
R-II Builders filed a motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint,
on the ground that its previous Amended and Supplemental
Complaint had not yet been admitted in view of the non-payment of
the correct docket fees therefor. Said Second Amended Complaint
notably resurrected R-II Builders cause of action for resolution of the
DAC, deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of
title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced the claim
for attorneys fees to P500,000.00 sought its appointment as
Receiver pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Court and, after an
inventory in said capacity, prayed for approval of the liquidation and
distribution of the Asset Pool in accordance with the parties
agreements.
On 2 September 2008, HGC filed its opposition to the admission of
R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint on the ground that
respondent RTC had no jurisdiction to act on the case until payment
of the correct docket fees.
Issues:
1. Whether Branch 24 of Manila RTC, a Special Commercial Court
has a jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether a branch of the Regional Trial Court which has no
jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to remand the
same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the defects on
venue and jurisdiction.
Rulings:
1. No. the said court significantly took cognizance of its lack of
jurisdiction over the case in the following wise:
At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is a designated Special
Commercial Court tasked to try and hear, among others, Intra-
corporate controversies to the exclusion of ordinary civil cases.
When the case was initially assigned to this Court, it was classified
as an intra-corporate case. However, in the ensuing proceedings
relative to the affirmative defences raised by defendants, even the
plaintiff conceded that the case is not an intra-corporate controversy
or even if it is, this Court is without authority to hear the same as the
parties are all housed in Quezon City.
Thus, the more prudent course to take was for this Court to declare
that it does not have the authority to hear the complaint it being an
ordinary civil action. As to whether it is personal or civil, this Court
would rather leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this
Court. Being outside the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts,
the rule is settled that cases which are civil in nature, like the one
commenced by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in a regular
court.
2. No. Calleja ruled on the issue, thus: Such being the case, RTC Br.
58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer
of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only
action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of
the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it
cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive of
the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a
jurisdictional defect.
18. SPS DELA CRUZ VS CONCEPCION
GR No. 172825, October 11, 2012
FACTS:
On March 25, 1996, petitioners entered into a Contract to Sell with
respondent involving a house and lot in Antipolo City for a 2 million
consideration.
Respondent made the following payments, to wit:
(1) 500,000 by way of downpayment;
(2) 500,000 on May 30, 1996;
(3) 500,000 paid on January 22, 1997; and
(4) 500,000 bounced check dated June 30, 1997 which was replaced.
Thus, Respondent was able to pay the 2 million total obligation.
Before respondent issued the 500,000 replacement check, she told
petitioners that based on the computation of her accountant as of
July 6, 1997, her unpaid obligation which includes interests and
penalties was only 200,000. Petitioners agreed with respondent.
Despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to collect the amounts
they claimed. Hence, the complaint for sum of money with damages
filed with the RTC of Antipolo Rizal. In her answer with Compulsory
counterclaim and during the presentation of evidence, respondent
presented a receipt purportedly indicating payment of the remaining
balance of 200,000 to Losloso who allegedly received the same on
behalf of petitioners.
On March 8, 2014, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with
modification by deleting the award of moral damages and attorney's
fees in favor of respondent. Aggrieved, petitioners come before the
Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether it was proper to dismiss the complaint based on the ground
that the defendant fully paid the claims of plaintiff
HELD:
Yes.
When the issue is tried without the objection of the parties, it should
be treated with all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings.
On the other hand, when there is an objection, the evidence may be
admitted where its admission will not prejudice him.
Thus, while respondent judicially admitted in her answer that she
only paid 2 million and that she still owed petitioners 200,000,
respondent claimed later and in fact, submitted an evidence to show
that she already paid the whole amount of her unpaid obligation. It is
noteworthy what when respondent presented evidence of payment,
petitioners did not object thereto.
To be sure, petitioners were given ample opportunity to refute the
fact of and present evidence to prove payment.
19. Simeon Nicolas Chan, Leroy Chan and Mae C. Torres versus
Yolanda Chan, Rosalina Rivera, Kathleen Rivera, Alvin Rivera.
Facts:
Respondents as well as petitioners were stockholders
Ambassador Hotel, Inc.
In a letter addressed to Yolanda and Rosalina requested the Hotels
President and Gen. Manager, Simeon Chan, for a special meeting of
the Hotel Board of Directors. Simeon refused to call a meeting
arguing that it was not necessary. Thus the respondents themselves
called for a meeting wherein in said meeting, respondents as
members of the Board, approved various resolutions intended to
save the Hotels financial image and goodwill, and to safeguard its
funds and assets as a result of alleged mismanagement by
petitioners.
Another board meeting was held, also attended by the respondents
where a new of officers were elected, namely: Yolanda as President
replacing Simeon Chan, Rosalina as Chairman of the Board also
replacing Simeon Chan, and Alvin as Treasurer and Head of the
Finance Department. They likewise approved the designation of new
bank signatories.
Simeon Chan refused to honor the results of these two board
meetings, alleging that he alone, as the Hotels President can call a
special meeting in accordance with its By-Laws.
Case History:
Petitioners thus filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Special
Meetings and the Matters Taken Up Therein before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Petitioners likewise applied for a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the respondents from
implementing the resolutions approved during the questioned
meetings. The SEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
valid for seventy-two (72) hours, but denied the prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Admit a Supplemental
of Petition for the declaration of respondents shares as invalid and
ineffectual; and for the declaration that Rosalina Riveras shares be
limited only to those stated in the Articles of Incorporation. The SEC
admitted the supplemental petition. Then, petitioners asked for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction again. Respondents, on
the other hand, moved for the creation of a management committee.
The SEC issued an Omnibus Order1[13] denying both the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and the creation of a management
committee. It further directed the Hotel to call and hold a
stockholders meeting. In its order, the SEC concluded that the
disputed shares should not be allowed to vote and be voted for
pending the resolution on the merits as to who actually owns the
shares.
Aggrieved, Yolanda elevated the matter to the SEC en banc which
dismissed the same for non-payment of appeal fee. On petition2[15]
before the CA, the latter directed the SEC en banc to take
cognizance of the appeal.The CA decision became final and
executory.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Deem Conclusive the Basis of Shares
Entitled to Vote as Those Listed in the Original Articles of
Incorporation and Those in the 1985 Increase in Subscription of
Shares.
Petitioners filed separate motions to declare the respondents
Riveras and Yolanda Chan in default. Yolanda filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners
then filed a motion to cite respondents counsel in contempt of court
and to expunge the above motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction.
By virtue of the enactment and approval of the law transferring
jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC to the
regular courts designated as special (commercial) courts, the case
was then transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 46, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-99677.
the RTC issued an Order denying the petitioners and
respondents motions.
Unsatisfied, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The
appellate court dismissed the petition, ratiocinating that there
was no clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial courts denial of the motion to declare the
respondents in default for failing to answer to the petitioners
supplemental petition was proper?
Ruling:
Yes.
Motion to Declare the respondent in default not available in the case
at bar.
The Interim Rules specifically provide that the
defendant/respondent shall be considered in default if he fails to file
an answer to the complaint. 3 [31] However, it has no provision
therein to govern the filing and admission of supplemental pleadings,
as well as the filing of an answer thereto. Thus, the provisions of the
Rules of Court apply suppletorily.4[32]
Section 6, Rule 10 and Section 7, Rule 11, of the Rules of
Court are relevant, thus:
Sec. 6. Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party, the court
may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth
transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party
may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the supplemental pleading.
Sec. 7. Answer to supplemental complaint. A supplemental
complaint may be answered within ten (10) days from notice of the
order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the
court. The answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to the
supplemental complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed.
As can be gleaned from the above provisions, the filing of an
answer to the supplemental pleading is not mandatory because
of the use of the word may. This is bolstered by the express
provision of the Rules that the answer to the original pleading
shall serve as the answer to the supplemental pleading if no
new or supplemental answer is filed. Thus, the Court cannot
declare the respondents in default simply because the latter
opted not to file their answer to the supplemental petition.
20. AMANTE VS SUNGA (FULL TEXT)
This case raises in issue the validity of the Order dated February 14,
1975 of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Branch I, setting aside its Order of December 6,
1974, granting petitioner an extension of fifteen (15) days from
December 9, 1974 within which to file his answer to the complaint in
Civil Case No. 7799 (Vigaan Agricultural Development Corporation
vs. Segundo Amante) and declaring the petitioner in default,
notwithstanding the fact that said party had already filed his answer.
It appears that the petitioner, on December 2, 1974, filed a written
motion with the trial court requesting for an extension of fifteen (15)
days from December 9, 1974, within which to file his answer.
Although it is not disputed that a copy of said motion was furnished
the counsel for the plaintiff, the said pleading appears to have been
addressed only to the Clerk of Court, with the request that said
official submit the motion to the Court for its consideration and
resolution immediately upon receipt thereof.
On December 6, 1974, the trial court granted, the motion. Petitioner,
however, on December 10, 1974, filed a "Motion for Bill of
Particulars". Copy of this motion was appropriately addressed to the
counsel of plaintiff, informing him that petitioner will submit the said
motion to the, court for its consideration and resolution at 8:30 a.m.
on December 23, 1974.
In the meantime, on December 11, 1974, private respondent
corporation, as plaintiff in said case, filed a motion to set aside the
trial court's Order of December 6, 1974, alleging that the notice in
petitioner's motion of December 2, 1974 was defective for non-
compliance with Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court,
and praying that the defendant be declared in default.
The aforecited motions of the petitioner and of the corporation were
set for hearing on February 7, 1975. On said date, after the
respondent corporation showed to the petitioner its Articles of
Incorporation, the latter agreed to withdraw his Motion for Bill of
Particulars, leaving the private respondent's motion for resolution by
the Court.
On the same date (February 7, 1975.), petitioner filed his answer
with counterclaim to the complaint. The court a quo, however, on
February, 14, 1975, on the basis of its opinion that the notice in the
motion of petitioner for the extension of the period within which to file
an answer was defective because of its alleged failure to comply with
the requirements of Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court, set aside its Order of December 6, 1974, declared petitioner in
default and authorized the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence of
the plaintiff.
In view of the legal issue involved, this Court considered the
Comment of respondent corporation as its Answer. As the matter
was already amply discussed in the pleadings, this case was
deemed submitted for decision.
We grant certiorari and set aside the trial court's Order of February
14, 1975.
1. The motion for extension of time within which a party may plead is
not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary
1
to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex
parte motion "made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the
parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the
2
knowledge of the other party or parties." As "a general rule, notice of
motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought
by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights
3
be not affected without an opportunity to be heard..."
It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in
procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances
of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is
sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to
defeat the objection of the motion."
4
Section 1 of Rule 11 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the
trial court to permit the submission of an answer even after the time
fixed in the rules for its presentation. The granting of extension to
5
plead is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In
some cases the court allowed the defendant to file his answer "even
after the time fixed for their presentation."
6
Thus We have set aside orders of default where defendant's failure
7
to answer on time was excusable.
In the case at bar, respondent private corporation was not deprived
of any substantial right by reason of the alleged defect of notice in
petitioner's motion praying for an extension of the time to plead.
There are motions that may be heard and granted ex parte, and a
8
motion for extension of time to file an answer belongs to such class.
It was, therefore, error for the court a quo to set aside its Order
granting extension to petitioner within which to file his pleading.
2. Moreover, petitioner had filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars on
December 10, 1974, and under the Rules "after service of the bill of
particulars ... or after denial of his motion, the moving party shall
have the same time to serve his responsive pleading, if any is
permitted by these rules, as that to which he was entitled at the time
of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event."
(Section 1 [b], Rule 12, Revised Rules of Court.) The pendency of
the motion for a bill of particulars, therefore, interrupts the period
within which to file a responsive pleading, and movant should have,
after notice of the denial of his motion, the same time to serve his
answer "as that to which he was entitled at the time of serving his
motion."
It is true that petitioner, on February 7, 1975, withdrew his Motion for
a Bill of Particulars, but on the same date he also filed his answer.
In the attendant circumstances, We cannot perceive how the
interests of justice was served and promoted by the precipitate
action of the trial court. A default judgment does not pretend to be
based on the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified by
expediency. It may, however, amount to a positive and considerable
injustice to the defendant. The possibility of such serious
consequences necessarily requires a careful examination of the
circumstances under which a default order was issued. And when no
real injury would result to the interests of the plaintiff by the
reopening of the case, the only objection to such action would,
therefore, be solely on a technicality. On such an infirm foundation, it
would be a grievous error to sacrifice the substantial rights of a
litigant. For the rules should be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective in assisting the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases.
WHEREFORE, the default order of February 14, 1975, as well as the
Order of March 14, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, is hereby set aside, and this case is ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against
private respondent.
21. FILIPINAS FABRICATORS & SALES INC., FELIPE V.
PESTANO, and BENITO UNCHUAN,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CELSO L. MAGSINO, JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AND ATLAS COPCO
(PHILIPPINES), INC.,respondents.
FACTS: On January 21, 1977, a collection suit against Filipinas and
its sureties was commenced by Atlas before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal alleging that Filipinas total outstanding balance of
P139,295.95.
Petitioners filed on March 11, 1977, a motion for bill of particulars
alleging insufficiency of the complaint and requested for a more
precise statement of the matters alleged therein.
On March 15, 1977, the lower court resolve the petitioners' motion
for extension and gave them ten (10) days from march 4, 1977 within
which to file answer.
In its order dated April 6, 1977, the respondent court required the
petitioners to set for hearing the motion for bill of particulars with
notice to adverse party, "otherwise said motion shall be treated ... as
a mere scrap of paper."
On June 25, 1977, another "ex-parte motion to declare all the
defendants in default" was filed by respondent Atlas alleging that
petitioner Benito Unchuan's period to file answer had already expired
on May 6, 1977, and therefore, "all the defendants (could) now be
properly declared in default."
ISSUE: WON the motion filed for bill of particulars had definitely
suspended the period to answer
RULING:
The petitioners state that, under the above provision, they were still
allowed at least five (5) days from receipt of the order denying their
motion for bill of particulars within which to file answer and, to find
them in default within this period is really premature and highly
irregular for being contrary to the Rules; thus, the respondent court,
in declaring the petitioners in default before the lapse of the five-day
period, had acted clearly in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion.
We agree with the petitioners' premise that a filed motion for bill of
particulars renders the running of the reglementary period to answer,
suspended. This statement is, of course, accurate only if the filed
motion is sufficient in form and substance, meaning, it complies with
the general requirements of motions under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Revised Rules of Court, which explicitly require a motion to
accompanied by a notice of hearing, to be served by the movant on
the adverse parties concerned at least three (3) days before the
hearing, and to state therein the exact time and place of hearing.
Section 6 of the same Rule further commands that "no motion shall
be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice
thereof except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the
adverse party or parties are not affected." These requirements under
Rule 15, as we have often held, are mandatory, and the failure of the
movant to comply with them renders his motion fatal.
period to answer, the petitioners, who had not filed their answer to
the complaint of respondent Atlas, should, as early as May 14, 1977
(the last day of the extended period to answer), have been declared
in default.
Significantly, the fact that the court had taken cognizance of the
defective motion first, by requiring the parties to set it for hearing and
second, when it denied the same for lack of merit in its omnibus
motion, did not cure the defect nor alter the nature of the defective
motion. InAndrada v. Court of Appeals (60 SCRA 379, 382), we held:
"[T]he subsequent action of the court hereon does not cure the flaw,
for a motion with a notice fatally defective is a "useless piece of
paper."
Even on the assumption that the respondent court's omnibus order
was irregular for denying the petitioners' defective motion and at the
same time declaring them in default, still, we find the default order
valid. The petitioners, who admit in paragraph 6 of their petition that
a copy of the omnibus order denying the motion for bill of particulars
was received on August 30, 1977, again failed to file their answer
within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned orders are AFFIRMED.

The petitioners' motion for bill of particulars filed on may 12, 1977,
did not contain the notice of hearing and proof of service required by
the Rules. This kind of motion, as we have already held in several
cases, is nothing but " mere scrap of paper." It presents no question
which merits the attention and consideration of the court. In fact, it is
not even considered a motion. A defective motion of this kind does
not interrupt the running of the period within which to file answer. As
the motion filed by the petitioners was nothing but a useless scrap of
paper which did not affect at all the running of the reglementary