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To cite this article: Philip Daniels (1985) In the middle of the ford: The
Italian communist party in the mid1980s , Journal of Communist Studies, 1:2,
194-207, DOI: 10.1080/13523278508414769
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'In the Middle of the Ford'*:
The Italian Communist Party in
the mid-1980s
Philip Daniels
European Parliament in June 1984, sparked off the inevitable debate about
his likely successor and about whether Berlinguer's departure would mark a
turning point in the party's strategic line. In the event the person chosen on
26 June 1984 to be the party's new general secretary was Alessandro Natta.
A man who had held various senior posts in the party and who was closely
associated with Berlinguer's political line, he was expected to provide basic
continuity in the party's strategy. Natta took over the helm of the western
world's largest communist party in terms of both membership and electoral
support. Yet, for all its successes during the 1970s (its electoral advances,
increased role in sub-national government, growth in membership and
greater legitimacy)1 the party was confronted by considerable difficulties at
the time of Berlinguer's death. These related in particular to the strategic
and tactical choices designed to bring about the party's transition from a
permanent opposition role to one in national government. In the pages
which follow, the evolution of party strategy since the early 1970s is traced,
focusing on the experience of the period of 'national solidarity' govern-
ments; there then follows an examination of recent party changes and
adaptation, and discussion of the options presently available to the PCI as it
seeks to end its political isolation.
* From the title of a book by G. Napolitano, In mezzo al guado (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1979).
THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE MID-1980S 195
could guarantee any reforms at all, so long as the country was embroiled in
deep and persistent crisis.
The basic elements of the crisis were threefold.6 Firstly, there was an
economic crisis provoked by a huge public sector deficit, the quadrupling
of energy prices, structural weaknesses in the economy and the crisis of
accumulation, which provoked international speculation about Italy's
impending bankruptcy. Second, there was a political crisis relating to
the strategic weakness of the DC as options for stable coalition formulae
appeared exhausted. Third, there was the growing problem of political
terror, initially from the right but later also from the left.
Against this background, the PCI laid increasing emphasis on the
Berlinguer line after 1973, seeking a political rapprochement with the DC,
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first at sub-national and then at national level. After their advances in the
administrative elections of 1975 and in the national elections of 1976, which
were widely and probably mistakenly interpreted by the party as an endorse-
ment of the party's strategy,7 the PCI sought to implement the historic
compromise. It gave its support to successive governments led by the DC
over a period of almost three years from June 1976 to spring 1979, first
through parliamentary abstention and later as a formal part of the parlia-
mentary majority, but without ever acquiring posts in the cabinet.
Collaboration with the Christian Democrats during the period of'national
solidarity' governments entailed considerable costs for the PCI." The first
setback was electoral: the rapid gains which the party had recorded in 1975
and 1976 brought about not only a quantitative change in the Communist
electorate but also a qualitative one. The party's most significant electoral
advances were made in areas such as the south where the party organization
had been traditionally weak, rather than in the 'red zones' where the party
had its most effective political and cultural organizations to cope with a large
inflow of new voters. Parisi and Pasquino have argued persuasively that the
PCI drew support from three types of elector in 1976:" the central core of
PCI support was made up of the 'vote of belonging', those electors who have
a stable identification with the PCI and the Communist sub-culture and who
consistently support the party. The new electoral support came from 'voters
of opinion* and 'voters of exchange', and these posed organizational
problems for the PCI since they were generally to be found outside the
party's usual channels of communication. Typically the opinion voters
(principally located in northern urban areas) draw their political infor-
mation from the mass media and are electorally mobile, switching their vote
on the basis of evaluations of party programmes. Their vote for the PCI was
based on a desire for change, so in the 1978 administrative elections and the
June 1979 legislative elections many of them deserted the party for having
pursued the historic compromise with few palpable reforms to show for it,
and for failing to offer an alternative to the DC. As regards the 'exchange
voters' (who were most prominent in the south), their motivation for voting
Communist probably derived from the expectation that the party was close
to entering government at national level and therefore would have access to
THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE MID-1980S 197
ment. In the winter of 1978-79 the PCI withdrew from the arrangement
supporting the government, and demanded full cabinet participation. Pro-
tracted negotiations failed to satisfy the PCI's demands, and resulted in the
party's return to opposition in January 1979, the dissolution of parliament
(after the defeat of a minority government formed by Andreotti) and the
calling of national elections. The PCI's experience of the 'national solidarity'
period has been summarized well by Tarrow:
The party remained tangential to the cabinets; it was exploited for its
usefulness in reining in organized labour and for spreading amongst its
supporters moral revulsion against terrorism that helped the govern-
ment to adopt more serious police measures; but it was largely ignored
when it made even modest reform proposals."
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In the elections of June 1979 the PCI suffered a drop in its vote to 30.4 per
cent from the post-war high of 34.4 per cent in 1976. Although the party
retained some of the gains it had made in 1976, it suffered serious losses,
particularly among young voters, workers in the major industrial centres of
the north, and in the south. During the leftward tide of the mid-1970s the
party had picked up votes from all groups interested in a transformation of
the system.
This proved a mixed blessing: the PCI had to deal with a complex
society, in a phase of high expectations and low resources, without
achieving a formal government role. The paradox lies in the fact that it
was considered responsible for the [relative] failure of the period of
'national solidarity': that is, a non-governing party was penalized
electorally for its inability to influence the process of decision making
of a government controlled and staffed by another party."
Although the historic compromise experiment had failed to meet the
party's expectations, the PCI leadership continued to advocate this strategic
line throughout 1979 and most of 1980. Despite the hostility of the party base
to any further collaboration with the Christian Democrats, the leadership
could not jettison immediately a strategic line which had guided the party's
political actions since the early 1970s. However, after an agonizing re-
appraisal at a special meeting of the PCI Directorate in November 1980, an
abrupt change of political line was announced.15 The timing of the change
followed the revelation of a series of scandals involving Christian Demo-
crats, and the appalling inefficiency of the state apparatus in dealing with the
earthquake disaster in the south. The PCI formally abandoned the pursuit of
an alliance with the DC. replacing it with the strategy of the 'democratic
alternative'; that is, a government of lay parties without the participation of
the Christian Democrats, not necessarily led by the PCI itself but with its full
participation as an equal partner. This new strategy, known as the svolta di
Salerno ('Salerno shift') implied a new attitude not only toward the DC but
also toward other parties, primarily the Socialists and Republicans, since the
success of the democratic alternative depended crucially on the willingness
of these political groups to collaborate with the PCI.
THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE MID-1980S 199
Craxi, have collaborated in government with the DC and the centre parties,
and since August 1983 have held the prime ministership of the pentapartito
(five-party) coalition."-
Since Craxi's election in 1976 to the post of Socialist Party Secretary (used
subsequently to dominate the party), his strategy has been clear.'" First, to
advocate an indispensable and central role for the PSI in ensuring the
governability of the country, and to prevent exclusive Communist-Christian
Democrat collaboration which would threaten the political relevance of the
Socialists. Second, to create a new, third 'pole' around the centre 'lay'
parties to replace the DC as the pivotal party in government coalitions.
Third, to distance itself from the PCI and challenge the Communists'
credentials as a viable and legitimate partner of government. The Socialists
have often launched virulent attacks on the PCI, claiming that its ties with
the Soviet Union were still too close, that party doctrine and ideology were
still imbued with Leninism and thus outdated, and that the PCI's internal
organization, based on democratic centralism, was not sufficiently demo-
cratic. In the long run the PSI hoped to emulate Mitterrand's Socialist Party
by isolating the Communists and attracting disgruntled PCI voters to its own
ranks, thereby bringing about a rebalancing of the forces of the left. Only
when the relative strengths of the left-wing parties had shifted in favour of
the Socialists would the 'democratic alternative' be possible. However, so
far this has not occurred and Socialist inroads into the Communist electorate
appear unlikely given the subcultural nature of much of the Communist vote
and the PCI's formidable organizational apparatus. As LaPalombara has
observed, 'the doubters insist that the Mitterrand analogy won't fly because,
simply put, Italy's PCI is not the French Communist Party".'" The Socialists
have adopted the posture of a modern, pragmatic, reformist party in an
attempt to win votes from emerging social strata and the growing pool of
'opinion' voters. This strategy, however, is based on the assumption that the
opinion voters 'are both many and available and that their preferences are
most closely reflected by the PSIV" To date the results of this electoral
appeal have been meagre: although the PSI has made some important gains
in local elections (for example, Bari and Foggia in 1981). at national elec-
tions in June 1983 the party's vote increased by a disappointing 1.6 per cent.
200 THE JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES
and then fell by 0.2 per cent to 11.2 per cent in the 1984 elections to the
European Parliament.21
These challenges and attacks on the PCI have been accompanied by
Socialist manoeuvres to undermine Communist power in sub-national
governments; the Socialists have abandoned participation with the PCI in
some left alliances at local level and switched to DC or lay coalitions (as, for
example, in Florence, Turin and Naples). The Christian Democrat leader
Ciriaco de Mita has urged the Socialists to abandon left alliances throughout
the country in order to forge a durable collaboration between the DC and
PSI at national level. Certainly, this Socialist strategy of open antagonism
towards the PCI has contained its own contradictions:
The Socialists could hardly expect the PCI not to react, at the national
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how to strike a balance between open party debate and the preservation of
political unity:
the problem of giving more genuine and solid bases to the unity of a
party which relies so much on the concrete and combative contribution
of its militants. The balance between freedom of debate and solidarity
in action, between participation of the base in the formation of the
political line and the exercise of the proper role of the national leader-
ship organs,... clear affirmation of a majority line without resulting in
a crystallization into currents, [and] opposing factions.21'
The PCI's overhaul of the party structure may be seen as a response to
challenges facing the mass party in a modern, complex society like Italy.
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between the two parties. The PCI secretariat condemned interference by the
USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries in the Polish crisis, asserting that the
military intervention had constituted a blow to democracy and socialism.
According to the PCI's analysis, Solidarity was not a reactionary movement
hostile to socialism; rather it was committed to democracy in political life
and to the defence of workers' interests, and was against positions of
privilege and corruption within the Communist Party. However, the central
thrust in the PCI's analysis was that 'the phase in the development of
socialism which began with the October Revolution has lost its driving
force'.:v Two weeks later, in the middle of January 1982, the PCI central
committee met and overwhelmingly endorsed the leadership's position on
the Polish crisis. 'In Europe, as well as in Italy, these events were seen as a
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Conclusion
The PCI in the mid-1980s finds itself further from participation in national
government than it was at the beginning of the 1970s, and although the party
continues to share governmental responsibility in many regions, large cities
and municipalities, its strength even in this realm is threatened by Socialist
withdrawal from left alliances at local level.
The PCI's current political isolation is paradoxical given the evolution of
the party's strategy and the advances it has made since the early 1970s: the
PCI is perceived as a more legitimate governing party as a result of the
national solidarity experience and its changed international positions."1
Since its return to opposition in 1979 the PCI has retained its posture as a
partito di lotta e di governo ('party of struggle and government'), rejecting
the temptation to resort to sectarianism and 'isolationism' (although its
opponents have accused the party of 'excessive opposition').'" In the elec-
toral arena the party has a seemingly solid bed-rock of support of about one-
third of the Italian electorate (more than at the beginning of the 1970s
despite losses in 1979 and 1983). In the elections of June 1984 to the
European Parliament it polled 33.3 per cent of the vote (more than the DC
with 33 per cent), and for the first time in its history became the party of
'relative majority'.*' With regard to its internal structure the PCI 'is more
flexible, more open, more "participatory"", and more democratic than at any
time in its history'.41 Yet, the so-called 'Communist question', that is, how to
accommodate the PCI and its third of the electorate into the political system,
remains unresolved.
The party claims that its large following and strength in the trade union
movement give it an indispensable role to play in the government of Italy:
204 THE JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES
'In the elections of 1983 and 1984 the PCI confirmed its position as a party
which can rely on 30 per cent of the vote and go further: and therefore a force
which cannot easily be left on the sidelines and without which, indeed, it is
impossible to give a valid response to the problems of the Italian crisis'.4-1
This echoes Berlinguer's analysis of the 1970s, which asserted the impossi-
bility of governing Italy without the PCI or against the PCI. However, in the
1980s the PCI is confronted by a new political and economic context. As we
have seen, during the 'national solidarity' governments the PCI and their
trade union allies ensured that 'austerity' measures were carried through,
labour costs controlled and productivity improved to restore the economy to
health. However, the Craxi government has sought to obtain sacrifices from
workers without Communist 'consent'. The decision to cut the scala mobile
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NOTES
Parties and Voters", in Lange and Tarrow (eds.), Italy in Transition, pp.6-30.
10. Pasquino, 'Sources of Stability and Instability in the Italian Party System', West European
Politics, Vol. 6 (1983). pp.93-110, (p. 101).
11. M. Barbagli and P. Corbetta, 'Una tattica e due strategie: Inchiesta sulla base del Pci', Il
Mulino, Vol. 27 (1978), pp.922-67. Also see L'Espresso, 14 Dec. 1980, pp.8-9.
12. Lange. p. 125.
13. Tarrow, 'Historic Compromise', p. 136.
14. Pasquino, 'Sources of Stability', p. 102.
15. L'Unit, 28 Nov. 1980. Also see M. Barbagli and P. Corbetta, 'After the Historic Com-
promise: A Turning Point for the PCI', European Journal of Political Research, No. 10
(1982), pp.213-39.
16. See G. Sani, 'Amici-Nemici; Parenti-Serpenti: Communists and Socialists in Italy", in
B.E. Brown (ed.), Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism: The Left Confronts Modernity
(New York: Cyrco Press. 1979), pp. 105-42.
17. For an account of the first months of Craxi's premiership, see P. Allum, 'The Craxi
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Government: Turning Point or Dead End?', Political Quarterly, Vol. 55 (1984), pp. 314
20. Also see V. Giuzzi, 'Craxi's Italy', Government and Opposition, Vol. 20 (1985),
pp. 166-77.
18. See Pasquino, 'La strategia del Psi: tra vecchie e nuove forme di rappresentanza politica',
Critica Marxista, Vol. 21 (1983), pp.29-50; and J. LaPalombara, 'Socialist Alternatives:
The Italian Variant', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1982), pp. 924-42. Also see the collection of
articles on the Italian Socialist Party in Il Mulino, No. 281 (1982).
19. LaPalombara, p. 927. On differences between the organizations of the French and Italian
Communist Parties, see P. Lange, 'The French and Italian Communist Parties: Postwar
Strategy and Domestic Society', in S. Bialer and S. Sluzar (eds.), Radicalism in the
Contemporary Age, Vol. 3 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 186-95.
20. Pasquino', 'Sources of Stability', p. 105.
21. G. Mazzoleni, 'Italy', Electoral Studies, Vol. 3 (1984), pp.294-8.
22. Pasquino, 'Sources of Stability', p. 106.
23. See Panorama, 2 April 1984, pp.44-7.
24. Pasquino, 'Sources of Stability', p. 102. Also see G. Amato and L. Cafagna, Duello a
sinislra (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1982), pp.206ff.
25. Pasquino, 'Il PCI nel sistema politico italiano degli anni settanta', p.888.
26. G. Napolitano, 'Il PCI secondo il PCI', in S. Belligni (ed.), Lagiraffa e illiocorno (Milan:
Franco Angeli, 1983), pp. 17-28 (p.25).
27. There is a growing literature in Italy on the 'crisis of the mass party'. See, for example,
Pasquino, 'Mass media, Partito di massa e trasformazioni della politica', Il Mulino, Vol. 22
(1983), pp. 559-79. Also see Democrazia e diritto, Vol. 23 (1983), for a collection of articles
on the PCI and its organization.
28. Pasquino. 'Sources of Stability', p. 102.
29. L'Unit, 30 Dec. 1981. See ibid., 25 Jan. 1982, for a translation of Pravda's attack on the
PCI, and the PCI's reply in ibid., 26 Jan. 1982.
30. LaPalombara, p. 937.
31. See Cossutta's article in L'Unit, 6 Jan. 1982.
32. See the interview with PCI general secretary Natta in Il Manifesto, 22 Feb. 1985. Also see
G. Napolitano, 'Senza timidezze per nuove prospettive di progresso e di unit' , Rinascit, 9
Feb. 1985, pp.41-2; and idem, 'Governare un arduo periodo di transizione', Critica
Marxista, Vol. 21 (1983). pp.61-72.
33. Napolitano, 'Senza timidezze'. pp.41-2.
34. Ibid., pp.41-2. On the convergence between the SPD and the PCI, see the interview with
Luciano Lama. L'Espresso, 16 Dec. 1984; and Heinz Timmermann, L'Espresso, 23 Dec.
1984. Also see Panorama, 24 Feb. 1985, on the suggestion of a 'social democratic line'
within the PCI (pp. 46-8).
35. Napolitano. 'Senza timidezze'.
36. Ibid., p.42.
37. Interview with Natta. La Repubblica, 29 Sept. 1984.
38. On the PCI's growing legitimacy, see the evidence presented in G. Guidorossi. Gli lialianie
THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE MID-1980S 207