Husserl's Concept of Existence

Husserl's Concept of Existence
Author(s): Henry Pietersma

Source: Synthese, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Feb., 1986), pp. 311-328
Published by: Springer
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HENRY PIETERSMA
HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE
We do not have any texts that deal extensively with the concept of
existence as such. Husserl never discussed the ontological argument, for
instance, which might have led to a lengthy consideration of it.When we
then try to become clear about it from a general study of his philosophy,
we expect to end up with the idea of modes or kinds of existence. For we
all know held the view that every form of consciousness,
that Husserl by
virtue ofits intentionality, has its own peculiar object, a view which
suggests that he probably thought that each type of intentional object
represents amode of existence. In fact, however, his concept is univocal.
His intentionality-thesis introduces objects as indexed with reference to
certain belief-contexts whose epistemic status is undecided, a point
central to the idea of phenomenological epoch?. As contextualized
objects, they are not assigned independent existence; they are internal to
a possible doxastic context. This being the case, my essay on the concept
of existence also sheds light on the relation between intentional and
really existing objects, because the logic of contextualization is such that,
if one positively appraises a certain belief-context and thus adopts it, one
ipso facto asserts a relation of identity between an intentional object and
a really existing object. If the result of epistemic appraisal is negative, or
at any rate not such as to lead me to adopt that belief-context, then an
object remains indexed and only the doxastic context is asserted to exist,
i.e., as a possibility. The way Husserl works out this logic shows his
concept of existence.
The principal source that inspired my interpretation is a recently
published text, written as early as 1894. In this text Husserl argues, very
much in the spirit of the later Brentano, that, while talk of intentional
objects is in some respects legitimate and unavoidable, such objects can
only in an improper sense be said to exist.1 It is true that in various
contexts we may speak of objects, but he emphatically denies that there
are several modes of existence.2 When we think so, this is either due
simply to improper use of language or due to the circumstance that,
having enriched the concept of existence and thus narrowed its range of
application, we accommodate objects falling outside this range by
Synthese 66 (1986) 311-328.
? 1986 byD. Reidel Publishing Company
312 HENRY PIETERSMA
assigning them a different mode of existence, as when only spatio

temporal items are held to exist with the result that truths, propositions,
and concepts can only be assigned a different mode of existence.
We will therefore not approve of unclear talk of different domains of existence, different
'worlds' (universes of discourse), which dispose of the existence and non-existence of the
same object in different ways. The 'world' of myth, the world of poetry, the world of
geometry, the real world are not equally legitimate 'worlds'. There is only one truth and one
world but there are many presentations, or mythical convictions,
religious hypotheses,
fictions. The whole distinction comes down to this: often, possibly on grounds of practical
convenience, we speak as though the judgements we make were unconditional, as though
we made absolute statements of existence, whereas the logically correct expression would
require conditional statements (in which these existential propositions would occupy the
place of the consequent).. .3
Thus to assign an intentional mode of existence, an existence all objects

would have by virtue of being presented in and by a mind, he argues, is
wrong for two reasons. First, it is counterintuitive in that, when we
make statements about an object, or feel an emotion with regard to it, it
seems to us that it is a really existing object which we are so directed
upon, not an image or some other counterpart or substitute which has
intentional existence. Second, when we epistemically appraise a
presentation or judgment (let's assume positively), we affirm that its
object is identical with such-and-such a really existent object. Here
again, the latter is not assumed to be merely a closely resembling
counterpart but literally the same individual as was presented.4 As we
will argue, particularly this second objection is important. It is a
concern to assure the possibility of such identification that controls the
author's way of introducing intentional objects.
Husserl accordingly proposes to introduce intentional objects in the
following way. They are, strictly speaking, not a kind of object classified
alongside real objects, but rather objects indexed with reference to
presentations or contexts of presentations. In the remainder of this
essay I speak of belief-contexts. As an example of such a belief-context
Husserl discusses Greek mythology.5 And as an example of an object
indexed with reference to this context he mentions Zeus. The locution
'an object indexed with reference to ...' ismy own. The author himself
speaks instead of an assumption or hypothesis on which Zeus is treated as
an existent object about which statements can be made that are either
true or false. It is, for instance, true that Zeus is the chief of the
Olympic
gods. Here two different presentational contents are said to be identical
HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE 313
as to referent. It is similarly true that Apollo is the brother of Artemis

and that he is not the chief of the gods. But inasmuch as all such
truths hold only within the domain of Greek mythology, i.e., the domain
staked out by an assumption or hypothesis, 'truth' here means 'truth-in
a-context'. And Husserl is saying the same thing about existence: it is
existence-in-a-context. The identity affirmed between Zeus and the chief
of the Olympic gods, he writes, is not 'unconditionally asserted identity'.6
What he means is that one should not go beyond the context in question
and either affirm or deny the identity of Zeus with Ronald Reagan. To say
that Ronald Reagan is Zeus, he would say, is not a falsehood in the same
sense as the statement that Apollo is the husband of Hera.
When Husserl here speaks of making an assumption, he wants such
terminology to be taken quite seriously. To make an assumption, as he
points out, means to put oneself within a belief-context in a nonserious
way, i.e.,
imaginatively. Without making it one's own and actually
endorsing its beliefs one can, and indeed should, to
refer Zeus as an
existent entity of which some properties are true and others false, just as
on the strength of one's actual beliefs one refers to Ronald Reagan as
an existing person. As we can see, this would mean that, if I did actually
adopt the belief-context of Greek mythology and thus made it a part
of my present context of belief, I would then in effect identify Zeus
quite literally with a really existing entity. In the case of this example,
there would seem to be little justification for such a move, but it is
important to note that, as I said before, Husserl's introduction of
intentional objects is premised on the idea that, if sufficient epistemic
justification becomes available so that one can endorse a given belief
context, then an object previously indexed with reference to a belief
context is declared to be quite literally identical with a really existent
object. Therefore, introducing it as merely an intentional
object at
first, while permitting us to speak of it as existing, i.e., existing-in-a
context, does not compel us to change our concept of existence. As
long as we speak of it as merely intentional, we see it in relation to a
presentation or context of presentations (to put it in the author's own
terminology) from which we dissociate ourselves at the same time as we
imaginatively embrace it as if it were our own.
The general view I just characterized is also applied by Husserl to
contexts such as geometry and arithmetic, in which spatial forms and
numbers are treated as existent on the strength of underlying assump
tions formulated as definitions and axioms. He also discusses in this
314 HENRY PIETERSMA
connection the logical notion of class. He argues that we can develop a

logic on the assumption that every general concept has an extension
without thereby being compelled to hold that such an extension is
specified by really existing members. The extension is then viewed as
merely intentional (with a 'r').7 The objects are Begriffsgegenstaende,
i.e., specified by concepts; whether or not they really exist is left open by
the logical calculus.8 Critical of Schroeder's extensional logic and the
Boolean tradition of his time he in fact presented the outlines of such a
logic in an article published in 1891.9 That extensions are not merely
intentional entities but that they really exist even if they have no really
existing members, is the thesis Husserl argues for on phenomenological
grounds in his Logical Investigations. In this work they are called 'ideal
objects' in distinction from 'real objects', where the latter term desig
nates particulars in space and/or time.10 (When I use the expression
'real existence', as is only natural in the present discussion, keep inmind
that, on a view such as Husserl's ideal objects have real existence,
which simply means that they exist truly, not just intentionally. In other
words, I should not be read as undercutting the distinction between real
and ideal objects.)
On the basis of the preceding analysis Husserl now formulates the
intentionality thesis as follows:
Given a certainassumption every presentation can function as if in regard to its objects it

were unconditional; it can provide the subject of different sorts of true (i.e., hypothetic
ally true) categorical statements. Their (hypothetically assumed) objects then have such
and such properties and lack others, just as if the presentation were unconditionally
true...11
What is remarkable about this formulation is that Husserl does not

make use of the concept of directedness or relation. In fact, it is
suggested earlier in the text under discussion that, inasmuch as a true
statement of relation would imply the existence of the relata, we would
once again have to say that relation-talk in connection with in
tentionality is strictly speaking improper. As we have already seen, the
word 'intentional' indicates a certain way in which we classify presen
tations (in my terminology, belief-contexts). That every presentation
has an object means that every presentation can be envisaged by a
person as possibly his own, even if (on the strength of what he considers
to be his evidence) he does not actually make it his own. The
intentional object is a possible object in the sense that, ifwe had reasons
to endorse a correlative presentation as veridical, it would exist. But

Husserl would not want to say that there are nonexistent objects,
namely intentional objects.
In view of the importance this view of intentionality ascribes to the
idea of assumptions, it is only natural that Husserl should point out how
easily one may lapse into unconditional modes of judging. Inasmuch as
making an assumption directs our mind to the objective domain opened
up by it, one may simply forget that one has access to that domain on the
strength of an assumption. It may also be the case that one has never
consciously made the assumption. Yet unless assumptions made are
taken account of as assumptions, confusion and conflict arise, when, for
instance, a judgment quite justifiably made on a certain assumption is
introduced into contexts in fact controlled by different assumptions. As
to the concept of existence, this circumstance explains how this concept
as it is used within a certain assumption may be mistaken for the proper
concept of existence.
Apart from the light it sheds on Husserl's concept of existence the
principal interest of this early text is its explicit mention of assumptions
and the close relation it establishes between the making of an assump
tion and the thesis of intentionality. Armed with the insight this text has
provided we can appreciate later texts much better. Take, for instance,
the following statement from the Logical Investigations:
It makes no essential difference to an object and given to consciousness
presented
whether it exists, or is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd.12
This makes good sense ifwe realize that it expresses the point of view of
one who assumes but does not actually adopt the points of view of other
experiences and understands them, as it were, from within. It does not
say that there are nonexistent objects. It does not say that such belief
contexts do not themselves distinguish between existence and fiction.
Neither does it say that the phenomenological concern with such
contexts will not itself raise the question as to what
really exists but be
content with acknowledging an ultimate diversification of existence into
various modes. It seems to me that the introduction of intentionality in
this work suffers because
the idea of assumption is not clearly stated in
the text. Intentionality is initially introduced simply as an essential
property of certain experiences (par. 10), while the idea of assumptions is
only introduced later (par. 38) as a qualitative modification of positing
acts. I would, however, maintain that the views so far discussed in this
316 HENRY PIETERSMA
paper are implicit here as well as in later works. Let us therefore turn to
examine the author's main work in order to try and elicit from it the
implied concept of existence.
In the Ideas the role played by the term 'assumption' is taken over by
'Einstellung'' (attitude). In this work the author is concerned principally
with the contrast between the so-called natural attitude and the
philosophical attitude which he calls 'transcendental-phenomenologi
cal.' While there is a fundamental contrast between these two attitudes,
there is likewise a relation between them: the philosophical attitude is a
modification of the natural attitude, to which it refers back and of which
it gives a critique. The author begins by emphasizing that on the natural
attitude objects, especially spatio-temporal particulars, exist as a matter
of course. There is no need felt for an express affirmation of the
existence of the world. On the philosophical attitude, however, the
objects whose existence was taken for granted are no longer treated as
existing. Because Husserl is concerned to stress the contrast, he
emphasizes that what the philosophical attitude treats as existent must
be clearly distinguished from spatio-temporal entities. But this does not
mean that the existence of the latter is denied, though he sometimes
gives that impression to his readers. It means that those same entities
are viewed by the philosopher in relation to consciousness. However,
because the author emphasizes the difference between the two attitudes
and their respective objects, this latter point gets obscured.
What is asserted as existent by the philosopher is emphatically
from the objects of the natural attitude as consciousness,
distinguished
which is a domain with its own peculiar status and nature. It is different
from spatio-temporal objects in the sense of having different properties
but also in being epistemically given in different ways. Husserl speaks in
this connection of being in two ways: being as reality or spatio-temporal
objects, and being as consciousness. And in paragraph 44 we are
presented with a distinction between phenomenal being and absolute
being. What does all this mean? Phenomenal being is the being of
entities in space and time. They exist all right, but they exist only from
the point of view of the natural attitude. When it is formulated in this
manner, it is of course the philosopher speaking from his own stand
point, adopting the transcendental-phenomenological attitude. He
speaks that way, because he has recognized the natural attitude as an
assumption the scope and limits of which are to be set forth in terms not
controlled by it. Its limitation consists in the fact that its assumptions are
unnoticed and uncriticized, so that spatio-temporal entities are asserted

as existing absolutely, i.e., without essential relation to the subject.
What is its scope? The philosopher, as noted, does not deny the
existence of those objects outright but simply insists on the nonabsolute
character of their existence. This does not entail that these things
cannot be justifiably asserted to exist. Husserl states that as long as we
have a harmonious experience it would be unreasonable not to regard
what such an experience seems to reveal as existent.13 The criteria
Husserl set down for appraising the justification of assertions of exis
tence are themselves absolute. They are the same criteria as those
which the philosopher himself employs in assessing assertion made from
the absolute standpoint. It is by application of the same epistemological
criteria that consciousness turns out to be absolute and spatio-temporal
things phenomenal. The latter exist but do not fully satisfy the demands
of our epistemic criteria, not the way consciousness does. Assertions of
their existence reflect the natural attitude such as it is. This signifies to
the philosopher the presence of certain assumptions, e.g., the con
viction that the harmony which we have thus far been able to establish
among our presentations in spite of mistakes and illusions will continue
and not at some time be irremediably disturbed, that problems which
arise can be solved without changing our natural attitude, that the
powers of inquiry we ascribe to ourselves will see us through, etc.
What is characterized as existing only phenomenally is therefore
related by the philosopher (who does the characterizing) to conscious
ness. In characterizing it this way he contextualizes it in a way in which
it would not be contextualized by the man who adopts the natural
attitude without being aware of its assumptions. The philosopher
cannot use the same words, since he does not adopt the same attitude.
So in order to make clear the difference in attitude he re-baptizes the
object and says that from his point of view it is a meaning.14
I have spoken earlier of indexing the object with reference to a context
of belief. The object is now viewed exclusively in terms of the properties
ascribed to it in a given belief-context. We do not let our description of it
be affected by any information we might have, or think we have, which
stems from other sources; even ifwe should be convinced that it does not
really exist at all, we do not allow this to affect us. (This is the heart of the
principle of phenomenological reduction.) The object, then, is viewed as
defined by such-and-such beliefs and viewing it as indexed with
reference to those beliefs means that it possesses all its properties
318 HENRY PIETERSMA
essentially or noncontingently. And as a context-bound object there

can be no question of its being identical with an object of another
belief-context; to adapt a locution from possible-world discussions in
contemporary philosophy, there is no question of trans-context iden
tity.15 The shift to the philosophical attitude, therefore, brings with it
what may look like a substitution of objects quite different from those of
the natural attitude.
Yet these 'new' objects cannot be simply altogether different objects.
If that were the case, how could the philosopher claim that what he says
about these objects intentional objects, noemata, or what
(meanings,
ever we call them) has critical relevance for the existential status of the
objects of the natural attitude? It would then simply be a case of
substituting a different domain of objects. But it is plain that Husserl
wants the philosopher's remarks to have such critical import for the
natural attitude. Consequently, when he emphasizes differences, as he
does when he states, for instance, that the tree in the garden can go up
in flames but the tree-as-perceived cannot, that the latter exists
whether or not the former does, there should be a way of specifying a
respect in which they are not different but rather the same.
The point I want to make came up earlier, when I took note of
Husserl's objections to intentional objects. Epistemic appraisal, he
urged, presupposes the possibility of saying that the object of a given
presentation (i.e., a certain intentional object) is identical with a really
existing object. It seemed to him that intentional objects were intro
duced by other philosophers in such a way that they would have to be
viewed as at best counterparts of real objects, closely resembling but
not literally the same. That same point is at issue here. What is at issue is
the possibility of a peculiarly philosophical epistemic appraisal of the
entire natural attitude. It is the kind of appraisal that we are given when
Husserl states that the entire spatio-temporal world is 'according to
its own meaning merely intentional existence, an existence, therefore,
which has the merely secondary, relative meaning of an existence for
consciousness'.16 This statement speaks directly of a meaning but its
critical import pertains to the objects which on the natural attitude are
treated as existent without any qualification.
The objects peculiar to the philosophical concern are therefore not to
be viewed simply as substitutes for those peculiar to the natural attitude.
There is here something like a transformation of objects, though this is of
course not a change in their ordinary properties but one that results from
the shift in attitude. When I speak here of objects being indexed I am not
using an idea entirely foreign to Husserl. He writes, for instance, that
what is bracketed is not simply wiped off the phenomenologist's slate: it is
still there provided with an index (his own word).17 And he likewise says
that the phenomenological object is 'exactly the same' as the object of
our natural mode of speech (in the text there are scare-quotes around the
phrase 'exactly the same'), though the paragraph as a whole is mainly
concerned with the sense inwhich there is a radical difference.18 In fact,
his own talk of bracketing, changes of prefix, and using quotation marks
goes a long way in the direction of my own idea of contextualization and
indexing.
I stated above that the object indexed with reference to a given
context of belief has its properties essentially and cannot be identified
with an object of a different context. In Husserlian language, the noema
is nothing but the correlate of a noesis and as such necessarily different
from the object of the natural attitude. This sort of claim registers the
difference between this attitude and the transcendental-phenomenolo
gical attitude. But I have just argued that we should not lose sight of the
sense inwhich they can be said to be the same. It should be that
possible
the indexed object is the same as the object without index. There should
be room for trans-context identity. Under what circumstances they can
justifiably be said actually to be identical is a matter that obviously
raises epistemological issues. In general an object indexed with respect
to a given context can only be asserted to be identical with an object not
so indexed, if one gives a positive epistemic appraisal of that context
and is therefore prepared actually to adopt it as one's own, asserting the
objects of one's beliefs to exist without qualification. We will see that
this epistemological question is very important inHusserl's philosophy.
As I noted earlier, a context-indexed object has all its prop
erties essentially. If, however, there is to be room for the possibility
of trans-context identification, that same object can exist without having
the properties assigned to it in a given context, or having them
contingently. John viewed exclusively as object of such and such beliefs
held by Peter is necessarily, let's say, bald. But if I identify John with a
person I know within my belief-context, he will at best be contingently
bald. And he might in fact not be bald at all. Now on the kind of
interpretation of Husserl I have been arguing for the author's entire
enterprise in philosophy has thus far assumed that the objects of the
so-called natural attitude are the same as the objects of the transcen
320 HENRY PIETERSMA
dental-phenomenological attitude. If they were not, how could the

philosopher's observations have critical import with regard to the natural
attitude? His view must accordingly indicate the possibility of trans
context identification. This is what he does in the final section of his
Ideas.
In this section, which is entitled 'Reason and Reality', he says what
seems at first quite puzzling. He writes:
The noema itself sustains a relation to the object; indeed it has this relation of its
by virtue
own intrinsic 'meaning' ('Sinn').19
And on the next page we read that 'each noema has a "content", which
is its "meaning", and by it the noema is related to "its" object.' The
discussion then proceeds to designate the noema as a predicate or,
rather, a set of predicates which are ascribed to an object. The object
itself, however, is designated as a determinable X. It functions as the
bearer of the predicates, and as such it unifies them.20
What are we to make of this? What makes this text so difficult to
interpret, as I see it, is the circumstance that the author addresses at the
same time two sets of problems. On the one hand, he addresses the
traditional problems about the relation between a substance and its
qualities. On the other hand, he advances the exposition of his views
on the relation between the natural and the phenomenological atti
tudes. Since these two issues may seem to the average reader quite
distinct, a discussion of both at the same time is bound to be difficult to
follow. I think we can interpret and summarize Husserl's views as
follows. holds that there is an attitude, distinct from that of the
(1) He
phenomenologist, in which so-called noematic meanings function in
quite a different way from the way they function as direct of
objects
phenomenological discourse. Within the experience defined by this
attitude noematic meanings function as properties or predicates
ascribed to some object that is distinguishable from those properties in
the sense of being re-identifiable, the same in spite of differences in
properties. (2) The phenomenological attitude, however, only reports
on these ascriptive acts of consciousness and as such it is not a
performance of them. The phenomenologist does not refer to the
object in a way that implies independent knowledge of it. For him the
only object that exists is the object as indexed, i.e., only as one or more
noematic meanings. He does, however, introduce into his talk a
stand-in for the object of the natural attitude, namely the phrase
'determinable X'. (3) The object of the natural attitude is not an

absolutely unknowable Lockean substance 'behind' or 'beneath' the
properties or predicates ascribed to it. Facing here the traditional
debate about substance Husserl carefully weaves into his discussion his
views on this matter. The object of the natural attitude is not a bare
substance which has existence in its own right but is not known by way
of its properties. Neither is it to be identified with the sum of its
properties. That is to say, the concept of object is not the concept of a
class specified by enumeration of its properties. Such an object could
not change. It would have all its properties essentially in the way a class
specified purely extensionally has all itsmembers essentially. The object
to which the natural attitude ascribes properties is re-identifiable
through change.
Husserl's talk of an X is therefore basically an acknowledgement on
the phenomenologist's part of the fact that there is a distinctively
different attitude from the phenomenological one, on which the
phenomenologist reports but which the phenomenological attitude does
not replace.21 It is certainly not an acknowledgement of a Kantian
thing-in-itself. What he tries to achieve with his distinction between
noematic meaning and a determinable X is a conceptual apparatus
enabling him to say that an object can be identified trans-contextually.
As I said earlier, this is a necessary presupposition for epistemic
appraisal in general and for a philosophical critique of the pre
philosophical attitude in particular. Given this distinction it is possible
for Husserl to hold that the same object which is believed to be existing
without qualification by a person who actually adopts the natural
attitude may be viewed by the phenomenologist as object-in-a-context.
What the phenomenologist refers to as an X thought of as being F in
some act of consciousness may be the same as the object to which that
form of consciousness ascribes the property of being F.
How does this possibility of identification comport with the concept
of existence? To answer this question we have to become clear about
the epistemic conditions which would justify an assertion to the effect
that an identity actually obtains. As I stated, Husserl can envisage such
an assertion, inasmuch as the phenomenologist considers a belief
context (namely that of the natural attitude) in which the noema is
actually ascribed to, or predicated of, an object as a property of that
object. But considering such a context does not amount to an actual
assertion that there exists an object possessing the property and being
322 HENRY PIETERSMA
identical with the object which the phenomenologist views as indexed

with respect to that context of belief. For he does not actually adopt the
relevant belief-context as his own; he merely makes an assumption,
imagining it as if he did adopt it. Husserl therefore insists on dis
tinguishing the noema from what according to our natural attitude is
the really existing object.
Now, while the possibility of identification is given with the intro
duction of a determinable X, the actual assertion of identity presup
poses nothing less than a unification of the respective belief-contexts
of phenomenology and the natural attitude. But such a unification, in
Husserl's view, would require satisfaction of conditions of complete
rationality. Because the phenomenologist tries to satisfy these con
ditions he limits his own assertion of existence to an assertion of an
object-in-context, i.e., an object indexed with reference to a belief
context. If, however, he should be in a position to appraise the
belief-context of the natural attitude as likewise satisfying those con
ditions of rationality, he would actually assert the identity of the
object-in-context with the object asserted to be existent by that
attitude. In fact, his designation of it as an object-in-a-context would
then cease to have any particular use. His philosophical attitude would
cease to be one of dissociation from the natural attitude and the two
belief-contexts would be unified. The object singled out as the object of
the natural attitude would be asserted as existing in reality, without
qualifications of the sort implied by the use of hyphenated expressions
such as
'object-in-a-context'.
It is well known that Husserl did not think that there are grounds to
evaluate the natural attitude in such a completely affirmative manner.
As he argued, the man who sets high standards of rationality for himself
cannot adopt the natural attitude without feeling the need to modify it
and to adopt at times the transcendental-phenomenological attitude.
Earlier in this paper I already briefly mentioned his fundamental
contention that this attitude is based on assumptions which have to be
brought to light and then turn out not to satisfy the standards of
complete rationality. For our present purpose we need not go into this
in detail. For this purpose it is sufficient to note that when the natural
attitude is abandoned in favour of the transcendental-phenomenologi
cal attitude, the objects regarded as existent without qualification on
the natural attitude are transformed into indexed objects. Only as
indexed do they truly and absolutely exist; that is to say, only meanings
and their correlative meaning-bestowing forms of consciousness exist

absolutely.
It is not difficult now to discern Husserl's concept of existence. He
regards it as legitimate and unavoidable that in various contexts or
frameworks one should talk of objects as existent. It is legitimate,
because given the assumptions underlying a particular context it is
rational to assert that they exist. More precisely stated, if those
assumptions could be validated by reason, those objects would really
exist. Therefore, if one accepts the assumptions as if they were perfectly
valid, which is exactly what one does on the natural attitude, it is
unreasonable not to assert existence. Existence-in-a-context, however,
is not a primitive or basic notion for Husserl; he does not hold that the
term 'existence' has various senses. Existence-in-a
strictly speaking
context ought to be explained in terms of existence without
qualification, which in turn is to be explained in terms of rationality.
Existence within an as yet uncriticized context of belief, whether it be
that of mathematical objects, theoretical objects of physics, or objects
of everyday experience, is not true of absolute existence, when con
sidered philosophically.
From the latter point of view, as we saw, the object asserted to be
existent on the basis of certain assumptions, i.e., within a certain
doxastic context, is asserted as existent only when it is indexed with
reference to that context. One could say that only in this way does the
object 'attain' absolute existence. This is context-free existence, since
the philosophical assertion of existence is made from a point of view
that is not circumscribed by assumptions. More in the spirit of Husserl's
rationalism, no rational argument can show that there are such assump
tions. Rational inquiry cannot take yet another step back in order to
attain a more ultimate point of view from which this would appear as
once again a context controlled by assumptions taken for granted. The
absolutely existent, from which we should take the concept of existence,
is that which can be asserted with absolute justification.22
Let me conclude by discussing a few remaining topics. Is existence a
predicate? How did Husserl deal with negations of existence? Do
essences exist in the same sense as exemplifications of essences? On the
first issue it should be noted that Husserl carefully distinguishes
between assertions and predications.23 Assertion is a doxastic attitude,
holding something to be existent and/or holding something to possess
or to lack a property. An attitude may be assertive, while what we
324 HENRY PIETERSMA
thereby put before us is not a subject term of which a predicate is either

affirmed or denied. Examples of this are perceiving and naming. A
predication, on the other hand, need not be asserted; the expressed
state of affairs need not be held to really obtain. Existence, therefore, is
in the first instance correlated by Husserl to the doxastic attitude of
assertion. When it is explicitly predicated of something, it functions as a
second-order predicate.24 And that of which it is predicated is a
meaning. An existential statement is a categorical statement the subject
term of which has been peculiarly altered as to itsmeaning.251 think it is
safe to understand the author as holding, in effect, that what existence is
predicated of is an object indexed with reference to a belief-context. In
affirmative existential statement that object is declared to be identical
with a certain really existing object.
What about negative existential predications? Are these not nonsen
sical, inasmuch as that of which one predicates nonexistence must first
be mentioned and therefore seems to enjoy the very status which one
then proceeds to say it does not enjoy, namely existence? Mustn't there
be objects that do not exist and of which it is therefore true to say that
they do not exist? Husserl confronted this difficulty in the text of 1894,
when he considered the precise nature of the introduction of intentional
objects. As he saw it, there was a temptation to introduce intentional
objects as objects which exist even when it is true that they do not exist,
in which case the two occurrences of 'exist' express two different senses
of existence. He attributes such a view to Twardowski, the author of the
influential treatise on content and object of presentations, a work of
which Husserl wrote a review article which was never published.26 He
counters the view just indicated with objections of the sort I already
noted earlier in the paper. When one says that every presentation
presents an object one does not make an existential judgment with
respect to that object, but one indicates simply that every presentation,
can enter into
regardless of the validity of such a judgment of existence,
certain contexts of judgments (Urteilszusammenhaenge), for example, a
context in which Zeus is judged to be the husband of Hera. We thus do
not need to hold that there is a difference between one kind of existence
and another. What I emphasized as a very important point in Husserl's
thought, namely that it should be possible (given the necessary epis
temic justification) to say that the same object which is presented by a
mind also exists in reality, is likewise urged in connection with true
negations of existence. What is said not to exist must be the same object
that was thought of as existing, not a surrogate for itwhose existence is

ex hypothesi guaranteed by the act of thinking. As Husserl puts it, 'the
(same) centaur, called Chiron, which I am now talking about and which
accordingly I present does not exist.'27 What he means is clear. In
mentioning Chiron I conceive a belief-context in which that centaur is
regarded as an existent entity. If I supposed this entity to be context
bound, its existence would be given with that context and there would
be no occasion to deny its existence. It could not possibly be identical
with, though it might closely resemble, an entity in another context,
e.g., the belief-context in which I live and which I trust to reveal to me
what really exists. When I do proceed to deny its existence, I have
already put myself outside the context within which it is an existent. (In
the earlier discussion of this paper basically the same idea was expressed
by speaking of assumptions.) And I now say that I cannot identify
Chiron with anything in reality. We can therefore conclude this
discussion by saying that, inasmuch as the mentioning of the centaur
involves intentional-object talk, and inasmuch as such talk involves
dissociation from the context of centaur-beliefs, true negations of
existence do not involve the absurdity mentioned at the beginning of
this discussion. The existence presupposed and acknowledged is only
existence-in-a-context.
Do essences or ideal objects exist in a different sense from individual
objects? In the Logical Investigations, close to the beginning of the
second investigation, having just stated most emphatically that ideal
objects truly exist Husserl says that the sense of this existence is not
exactly the same as in the case of real or individual objects.
... There is a fundamental categorial split in our unified conception of being (or what is
the same, in our conception of an object as such); we take account of this split when we
distinguish between ideal being and real being; between being as Species and being as
what is individual.28
The answer to the question is clear from the quotation itself. The
distinction indicated does not destroy the unity in the concept of
existence. That the concept of existence is univocal does not preclude a
recognition of radically different categories of objects. Categorial
differences show in the different predicates we apply to ideal and
individual objects. But the unity of the concept of existence is given by
the circumstance that with regard to objects of both categories some
statements are true and others are false. As he puts it in his
develop
326 HENRY PIETERSMA
ment of a logic of contents, if an object does not exist, every statement is

true of it, a point he interprets as showing the absurdity of nonexistent
objects.29
While the above distinction between ideal and real objects may be
compatible with a univocal concept of existence, it does perhaps show
the need for another metaphysically important concept. Such a
concept would address itself specifically to the distinction just dis
cussed. Ideal objects are possibilia. That is to say, it must be logically
possible for them to be instantiated, although they exist even if they are
not. Real objects, on the other hand, are not only possible but also
actual. Now, ifwe are to have a complete metaphysics, shouldn't we be
able to say what actuality means? What property does an ideal object
acquire when it gets instantiated? Or if this way of putting it is wrong,
what is the property which actual objects have by virtue of which we
distinguish them from merely possible objects? It seems to me that it
would be worthwhile to try and elicit from Husserl's works an answer to
this in the way I have tried to do with respect to the concept of
existence.
NOTES
1 vol.
Edmund Husserl: 1979, Aufsaetze und Rezensionen (1890-1910) (Husserliana,
XXII), The Hague pp. 303-348. For the views of Brentano, see appendices I and
Nijhoff,
IX of his Psychologie, Kategorienlehre, p. 16ff., and Wahrheit und Evidenz Part Three, I.
2
Husserl, Aufsaetze, p. 326.
3
Ibid., pp. 328-9.
4
Ibid., pp. 305-9.
5
Ibid., p. 317.
6
Ibid., p. 316.
7
Ibid., p. 319.
8 occurs in the next footnote
The German expression in the article mentioned (Aufsaetze,
p. 55).
9
'Der Folgerungskalkuel und die Inhaltslogik', Aufsaetze pp. 44-46.
10
It should be clear that this argument is no longer in the spirit of the later Brentano, who
insists that talk of the existence of universals is improper, even if convenient.
11
Ibid., p. 336.
12
Logische Untersuchungen II, 1 (Fourth impression, Halle, 1928), p. 373 (English
translation, p. 559).
13 I give the
Ideen (Husserliana, vol. Ill, 1), p. 55. In this and subsequent references
pagination of the first edition.

14 as a synonym of
Ibid., par. 55. The German term is Sinn. In par. 90 it is introduced
'intentional object' and defined as that which every presentation or thought has, even if its
object does not exist. While it does not fully capture what is also designated as noema, it
does designate what the author calls the nucleus of a noema.
15
I have no desire at the moment to enter into a discussion such as Hintikka and Mohanty
recently engaged in. Cf. Husserl and Cognitive Science: 1982, H. L. Dreyfus (ed.), MIT
Press, pp. 233-55.
16
Ideen, p. 93.
17
Ibid., p. 142.
18
Ibid., pp. 183-4.
19
Ibid., p. 266.
20
Ibid., pp. 270-1.
21
I emphasize the peculiar relation between the philosophical and the natural attitudes,
because a recent criticism of Husserl seems to overlook this. Ronald Mclntyre maintains
that the author is committed to hold that the noematic meaning 'determines precisely which
object the act is directed toward' (Husserl and Cognitive Science, p. 219). He then argues
with the aid of Kripke that it is not possible to identify the object of reference without
bringing in empirical considerations, e.g., the occasion and circumstances of the particular
reference. And he concludes that such considerations would violate the phenomenological
principle of reduction. I find this a very strange criticism. Why should the phenomenologist
hold that simply on the basis of the noema, i.e., the object considered by him as indexed with
reference to a possible belief-context, he should be able to pick out the object? He can
surely ascertain the mode of reference, what the object is taken to be, etc. But the demand
in question does not even make sense. What kind of performable act does Mclntyre have in
mind? To say that the demand makes no sense is not to say that there is no way in which the
object can be identified. We do it all the time in our non-philosophical life, when we say
things to the effect that there exists 'in reality' an object and that this object is precisely the
same object as was referred to by a certain person. And Mclntyre is right that we then
appeal to empirical, contingent facts, i.e., matters not contained in the noematic meaning.
But why should the phenomenologist's inability to do this be considered a shortcoming? In
view of the fact that he himself acknowledges the existence of an attitude of which his is a
modification, not a replacement, that would appear to be quite unreasonable.
22
Ideen, par. 142. For a more epistemological consideration of this 'optimal epistemic
situation' see my article 'Husserl's Views on the Evident and the True', in Frederick A.
Elliston and Peter McCormick (eds.), Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, University of
Notre Dame Press, 1977, pp. 38-43.
23
I have analyzed the relevant texts in an article in Husserl Studies, vol. 2 (1985).
24
Erfahrung und Urteil, par. 73.
25
Formale und Transzendentale Logik, Halle, 1929, pp. 64, 266 n. 1. Cf. Aufsaetze, pp.
341, 347, n. 2, and Log. Unt., IV, ?11.
26
Aufsaetze, pp. 349-356.
27
Ibid., p. 306.
28
Logische Untersuchungen II. 1, p. 353.
29
Aufsaetze, pp. 59-60,69-71.1 take this to imply that for something to be an object there
must be at least some properties such that some are true of itwhile others are false of it. (To
have predicates something need not really exist.) Intentional objects clearly satisfy the
condition just stated. But there are many properties P such that neither P nor the
328 HENRY PIETERSMA
of P is true of a given intentional object, because in its doxastic context the

complement
remains in several ways. Does the fairy tale about Hans and Gretel
object unspecified
specify what size feet Gretel had? With regard to a real object, however, I think that Husserl
does hold that for any property P either P or not-P is true of it. (In considering this point we
have to keep inmind of course that the real world in his view, cannot be identified with the
external world in space and time.) When he says, for instance, that the real world, in contrast
to an imaginary world, leaves nothing open, isn't he pointing in this direction (Cf.
Erfahrung und Urteil, p. 202)?
Department of Philosophy
Victoria College
University of Toronto
Toronto, Canada M5S 1K7

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HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE

Synthese 66 (1986) 311-328.

? 1986 byD. Reidel Publishing Company

assigning them a different mode of existence, as when only spatio

place of the consequent).. .3

Thus to assign an intentional mode of existence, an existence all objects

as to referent. It is similarly true that Apollo is the brother of Artemis

connection the logical notion of class. He argues that we can develop a

Given a certainassumption every presentation can function as if in regard to its objects it

What is remarkable about this formulation is that Husserl does not

to endorse a correlative presentation as veridical, it would exist. But

unnoticed and uncriticized, so that spatio-temporal entities are asserted

essentially or noncontingently. And as a context-bound object there

dental-phenomenological attitude. If they were not, how could the

'determinable X'. (3) The object of the natural attitude is not an

identical with the object which the phenomenologist views as indexed

and their correlative meaning-bestowing forms of consciousness exist

thereby put before us is not a subject term of which a predicate is either

that was thought of as existing, not a surrogate for itwhose existence is

ment of a logic of contents, if an object does not exist, every statement is

pagination of the first edition.

of P is true of a given intentional object, because in its doxastic context the

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Husserl's Concept of Existence - Pietersma

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