Jimenez v Rabot, 38 Phil 378 (1918)

Essential Elements of a Contract of Agency; Form

Nature of the Action:

Appeal from judgment of the CFI of Pangasinan

Street, J.

Facts:

1. This action was instituted by Gregorio Jimenez to recover from the defendant, Pedro Rabot, a parcel of land.
Theparcel of land together with two other parcels originally belonged to plaintiff Jimenez. While Gregorio
was staying atVigan in 1911, the subject property was confided by him to the care of his elder sister Nicolasa
Jimenez.

2. On February 7, 1911, he wrote his sister a letter from Vigan informing her that he was pressed for money
andrequested her to sell one of his parcels of land. This letter contains no description as to which land is to be
sold other than the indicated words one of my parcels of land. Acting upon this letter, Nicolasa approached
defendant Rabotand the latter agreed to buy the parcel.

3. A year later, Jimenez demanded that his sister return the subject parcel to him. Nicolasa refused. Gregorio,
together with his other siblings, then filed action for the recovery of their land. The action was decided in favor of
the plaintiffs.

4. Meanwhile, Nicolasa executed and delivered to defendant Rabot a deed purporting to convey to him the subject
parcel of land. Defendant went into possession and the property was found in his hands at the time when the
final judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs.

Issue:

Whether the authority confer red on Nicolasa by Gregorios letter sufficient to enable her to bind her brother

Ruling:

YES.

The principle embodied xxx is not, in our opinion, applicable to the present case, which relates to the sufficiencyof
the authorization, not to the sufficiency of the contract or conveyance.There is ample authority to the effect that a
person may by ageneral power of attorney authorize an agent to sell all the landpossessed by the principal, or
all that he possesses in a particular city, county or state.In present case, the agent was given the power to sell
either of the parcels of land belonging to the plaintiff. We can see noreason why the performance of an act within
the scope of this authority should not bind the plaintiff to the same extent as if hehad given the agent authority to
sell any or all and she had conveyed only one.

Judgment reverse.
Diego Linanvs Marcos Puno (G.R. No. L-9608)

Facts:

Linan an owner of a parcel of land executed a document stating the power, duties and obligations of Puno:

I, Diego Lian, of age, married, a resident of Daet, Province of Ambos Camarines, Philippine Islands, and at the
present timetemporarily residing in this city of Tarlac, capital of the Province of Tarlac, P.I., set forth that I hereby
confer sufficient power, such as the law requires, upon Mr. Marcos P. Puno, likewise a resident of this city of
Tarlac, capital of the Province of Tarlac, in order that in my name and representation he may administer the
interest I possess within this municipality of Tarlac, purchase, sell, collect and pay, as well as sue and besued
before any authority, appear before the courts of justice and administrative officers in any proceeding or business
concerning the good administration and advancement of my said interests, and may, in necessary cases, appoint
attorneys at law or attorneys in fact to represent him.

June 1911 Puno sold and delivered the said parcel of land to the other defendants for a sum of 800pesosPlaintiff
alleges that the document did not confer upon Puno the power to sell the land and prayed that the sale be set
aside, the land bereturned to him together with damages.Puno contend s that the sale was valid and prayed that
he be relieved from any liability.

Issue:

Whether the sale of Puno acting as an agent of Linan was a valid sale ?

Ruling:

RTC: Favored plaintiff LinanThat the document

(1) did not give Puno authority to sell the land;

(2) that the sale was illegal and void;

(3) That defendants should return to the land to the plaintiff; and

(4) That the defendants should pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as damages, P400 of which the defendant
Puno should alone beresponsible for, and to pay the costsSCFavored defendant puno : to quote;The SC
examined the power conferred upon the defendant Puno (Exhibit A) and ascertain, if possible, what was the real
intent of the plaintiff.The lower court held that the "only power conferred was the power to administer." Reading
the contract we find it says that the plaintiff "Iconfer ... power ... that ... he may administer ... purchase, sell, collect
and pay ... in any proceeding or business concerning the goodadministration and advancement of my said
interests." The words "administer, purchase, sell," etc., seem to be used coordinately. Each hasequal force with the
other. There seems to be no good reason for saying that Puno had authority to administer and not to sell when "to
sell" wasas advantageous to the plaintiff in the administration of his affairs as "to administer." To hold that the
power was "to administer" only when thepower "to sell" was equally conferred would be to give to special words
of the contract a special and limited meaning to the exclusion of other general words of equal import.The record
contains no allegation on proof that Puno acted in bad faith or fraudulently in selling the land. It will be presumed
that he acted ingood faith and in accordance with his power as he understood it. That his interpretation of his
power, as gathered from the contractthe other defendants acted in good faith, we are of the opinion that the
contract, liberally construed, as we think it should be, justifies theinterpretation given it by Puno. In reaching this
conclusion, we have taken into account the fact that the plaintiff delayed his action to annul saidsale from the
month of June, 1911, until the 15th of February, 1913. Neither have we overlooked the fact in the brief of the
appellants that theplaintiff has not returned, nor offered to return, nor indicated a willingness to return, the
purchase price In view of all the foregoing, we are of theopinion that the lower court committed the error
complained of in the second assignment, and, without discussing the other assignments of error, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked and that the
appellants shouldbe relieved from all liability under the complaint