Stonehill v.

Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ

Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the
corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search
and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the
Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases
against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's premises.
The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in
the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object
belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the
premises).

Archives: Government of Hongkong v. Olalia

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

Posted in CONLAW2 cases by katcobing

Facts

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final
decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for
the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and
that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the
respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer
the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court,
will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets
of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007,
that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in
criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the
sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to
post bail.

TIME INC VS HILL

Brief Fact Summary. Defendants published an article and reenacted a play about Plaintiff and his family being held
hostage. The article and play were false, but were portrayed by Defendant to be the truth. Plaintiff sued Defendant for
false light.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Defendants published an article and reenacted a play about Plaintiff and his family being held
hostage. The article and play were false, but were portrayed by Defendant to be the truth. Plaintiff sued Defendant for
false light.

Facts. Hill (Plaintiff), his wife, and five children were held hostage in their suburban Philadelphia home by three escaped
convicts. Plaintiff and his family were released without any harm but the story made the front pages of the newspapers.
Plaintiffs then moved to Connecticut. Time, Inc. (Defendant) published an article that told of a new Broadway thriller, The
Desperate Hours. The article said Plaintiff and his family rose in heroism in the time of crisis. The article included pictures
of scenes from the play that was to be reenacted in Plaintiffs Philadelphia home. Plaintiff sued under Sections 50-51 of
the New York Civil Rights Law; Defendants publication of the issues gave the impression that the play was true when in
fact it did not accurately recount Plaintiffs actual experience and Defendant knew the article was false and untrue.
Defendant answered that the article was a subject of a legitimate news article. The trial judge denied Defendants
motion to dismiss and the j
ury awarded Plaintiff $50,000 in actual damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue. Does a publication of a false report on a matter of public interest need only meet the New York Times test of
actual malice to permit recovery in a lawsuit for false light?

Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded.

* Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of their
exposure is an essential incident of life in a society, which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. A
broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system. Fear of litigation will inevitably
create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized. However, constitutional guarantees cannot tolerate
sanctions against calculated falsehood without significant impairment of their essential function.
* The evidence in this case reasonably would support a jury finding of either innocent or merely negligent misstatement
by Defendant, or a finding that Defendant portrayed the play as a re-enactment of the Hill familys experience reckless of
the truth or with actual knowledge that the portrayal was false.

Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board

Brief Fact Summary. Striking union members picketed in front of a retail store that was located within a shopping mall.
The general manager of the mall threatened the picketers with arrest for trespassing if they would not leave.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town and, therefore, not a state
actor subject to the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Facts. Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the nine retail locations in Atlanta. One of
those stores was located within the North DeKalb Shopping Center, owned by the Petitioner, Hudgens (Petitioner). After
the picketers had been marching for about half an hour, the general manager of the shopping center threatened to have
the strikers arrested if they did not leave.

Issue. Can a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the public?

Held. Yes. Because a shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town, it may restrict First Amendment rights
based solely on the content of the speech.

Discussion. The majority overrules the holding of Logan Valley and reasserts the holding of Lloyd. A mall may look like
and function as a small town would, yet it does not have all of the attributes of a town. So, it is not restricted by the
prohibition on content-based speech review that a state actor would be under in the same circumstances.

U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

J. Malcolm

Facts:

In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges against Roman Punsalan,
the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.

Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.

The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found him guilty.

Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the
charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.

The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasnt acted upon.

Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.

The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case
of insolvency.

The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion.
All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.

1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.

2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged

3. Error in not acquitting defendants

4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.

5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.

6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon
which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.

7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their counsel to the
admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.

Issue:Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace in
Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small
efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of
speech.

During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when he
wrote, that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.

In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and
democracy. It also said the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as
any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part
of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.

It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is
further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public
officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the
part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made.

Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result of this. Privilged
communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is the unfettered
administration of justice.

Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of malice. This is
apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public officials conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the
statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good faith.
There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.

A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of
proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the
true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.

It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous
per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a
general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct
touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of
direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official
and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are
probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded
their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends
and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable.
In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on
instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of
first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of
commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.