Antagonistic Utopias Mughal Polity and Muslim Nationalism

ANTAGONISTIC UTOPIAS:
A CULTURAL APPROACH TO MUGHAL POLITY

AND MUSLIM NATIONALISM
by
Reza Pirbhai
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements

for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy
Graduate Department of History
University of Toronto
Copyright by Reza Pirbhai, 2004.
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Abstract
Antagonistic Utopias; A Cultural Approach to Mughal Polity and

Muslim Nationalism
Doctorate of Philosophy, 2004
Reza Pirbhai
Department of History
University of Toronto
This is a history of the idea of Muslim India. It is anchored in a growing body of
literature that suggests the thought and institutions of the Mughal state (1526-1858)
played a role in the rise of Muslim Nationalism in British India. Approached through
the lens of Paul Ricoeurs theses on ideology and utopia, the central question posed is
whether the idea of a religio-political community encompassing the Muslims of South
Asia - an idea integral to the Muslim Nationalist thesis - was a feature of the
ideologies and utopias of the Mughal period. Thus, textual sources chosen are best
suited to enunciating the ideologies of the Mughal state and the utopianism of
Muslims from a variety of classes and locales. These sources include the Arabic,
Persian and Urdu writings of Muslim jurists, mystics, philosophers and historians,
Urdu prose, poetry and journalism, Punjabi folk literature, travelogues from South
Asian and European authors, and a selection of English colonial sources, including
bureaucratic records and Orientalist scholarship.
Based on the above theoretical approach and textual sources, this study argues
that an idea o f Muslim India first entered Muslim discourse in the reign and under
the patronage of Jalal al-Din Akbar (r. 1556-1605), wrapped in the cloak of an
ideology hailing the Mughals as Caliphs in the formal Islamic sense. The utopianism
in this is explained through consideration of the Islamic legal and mystical ideals
underlying Mughal ideological and institutional initiatives. Given this regimes
enduring legacy, despite the demise of Mughal political authority by the 18* century,
the idea not only formed a significant part of the political rhetoric of this period, it also
spread from the writings of the political elite to such independent and influential
scholars as the Wali Allahis. Furthermore, the expansion in rhetorical domain was
accompanied by the grafting of alternate intellectual and institutional ideals to the idea
than those symbolized by the Mughals. It is these alternatives, held by the political and
scholarly elite, that are ultimately introduced to the ascendant classes of Muslim
capitalists in the 19* century, reinforcing the notions of Muslim India being
conjured under British Raj.
I ll
Acknowledgements
The roots of my interest in the topic of this dissertation stretch to the
beginnings of my graduate study, a Master of Arts in South Asian Studies under the
tutelage and supervision of Professor Milton Israel. Moving into the doctoral phase,
not only had my academic skills and interests been sharply focused, as I anticipated
they would be under the instruction of a scholar of his experience and reputation, but
so was my resolve to continue to benefit from the generosity of mind and spirit that I
had unknowingly stumbled upon. There is no possibility of accurately listing the ways
in which Professor Israels qualities have made it possible for me to pursue the
research presented in this work. The most telling items I can mention are that he
actually introduced me to the history of South Asia and its critical study; his example
provided the template, then he opened my door to the rewards of teaching history; and,
through the process o f being educated and learning to educate, he insured that there
was always someone to depend on when the difficulties a student faces turn from the
academic to the personal. A few years in the company of Professor Israel have left my
work and I immensely in his debt.
I was also fortunate enough to meet Professor Linda Northrup and Professor
Paul Rutherford early in my graduate studies, and their influence on my work and
patience with me over the years has been no less than that of Professor Israel. I can not
say that Professor Northrup introduced me to Islam, but her instruction in Islamic
history has opened my eyes to a world of inquiry and exposition that only appears
limited by the number of scholars engaging in Islamic Studies. As well, her invaluable
readings of this work have guided my understanding of the Islamic component ifom
IV
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
raw ideas to an informed thesis. The same is true for Professor Rutherford, though
with regard to the field of Cultural Studies. This field was also as new to me as any
field is at the beginning of graduate study, before Professor Rutherfords tutelage
illustrated the many possible approaches that cultural theory had already gifted and
continues to offer the study of Muslim societies. This studys pivotal critique of
Ricoeurs understanding of the relationship between Ideology and Utopia, as well as
the attempt made to resolve the issue, is one of the many aspects of this works
approach attributable to the time and insight Professor Rutherford has afforded my
academic interests. It is a great privilege to include Professor Rutherford and Professor
Northrup among my acknowledgements.
Having been a fixture at the Department of History, University of Toronto, for
some years, there are many others whose instruction, efforts and encouragement have
been a source of strength. The voices of Professors Narain Wagle, Martin Klein and
Sean Hawkins, in particular, have echoed through the course of my study, much to my
benefit. More recently. Professor Ritu Birlas role on my defense committee and her
insightful critique of this work must also be gratefully acknowledged. It was also a
boon to have Professor Ayesha Jalal of Tufts University as the external reader, and to
incorporate her evaluation.
Of course, all of the above contacts would not have been possible without the
financial support of the Department of History and the School of Graduate Studies,
University of Toronto. The aforementioned scholars and their multiple fields confirm
the rich academic environment I have been fortunate enough to imbibe at the
University of Toronto. However, I am equally indebted to the administrative staff at
the Department of History, particularly Jennifer Francisco and Rae Billings, without
whose tireless efforts, I dont believe we graduate students could make it through
orientation.
Of the people outside of academia whose variety of supports and safety nets
have allowed me to pursue this research, most are also insiders. My wife, Reem
Meshal, has not only held my hand through the stresses and labours of producing a
dissertation, her doctoral study of Islamic law and society, has provided a
knowledgeable sounding board for the specific angles of my approach. But ultimately,
I am most grateful that she held my hand.
The need to acknowledge my sister, Mariam Pirbhai, also extends beyond the
sisterly chores of listening to my gripes or pulling up my socks, while she herself
struggles with doctoral research. Her knowledge of the diasporic literatures of South
Asia, has provided as much insight on the communities and empires involved in the
displacement, as her confidence and support have provided inspiration.
Confidence and support are also ultimately what my other sister, Nooreen
Pirbhai, and my parents, Rafiq Pirbhai and Qamar Iqbal, have unconditionally
provided. No matter the quality of ones academic environment, without the presence
of such outsiders nothing seems possible.
VI
Transliteration Note
This works considerable reliance on Arabic, Persian and Urdu sources is both
advantageous and problematic for transliteration. All three languages not only utilize a
variant of the Arabic script, but Persian includes a great stock of Arabic terms and the
larger part of Urdu vocabulary is Arabic and/or Persian. The advantages of this
linguistic relationship may be evident, but problems stem from grammatical and
phonetic differences less immediately apparent. For example, phonetic differences
often lead the same word to be transliterated differently from language to language, as
in the case of the Arabic ^wahy and the Persian/Urdu \a h y.' As well, differences in
conjugation can render the same word unrecognizable, as in the Arabic "aqwam and
the Urdu "qawmun.' Given that this studys readers may not be familiar with all three
languages, the above differences may result in confusion. Thus, all shared terms
mentioned are transliterated in the Arabic form. Where differences of the latter variety
occur, the Arabic singular is given with the English s to denote plurality. Of course,
terms particular to a given language are given in the corresponding form. The
transliteration system utilized for all three languages is that of the International Journal
o f Middle East Studies. As the majority of terms transliterated are by no means
obscure to those familiar with either Arabic, Persian or Urdu, diacritical markings are
only included in the Glossary.
VU
Preface
Although not raised in the main body of this dissertation, this work must begin
with mention of the field research that guided its perspective. Facilitated by grants
from the Department o f Hi story and the School of Graduate Studies, University of
Toronto, I was able to spend time surveying the religious institutions, organizations
and schools of thought active in Karachi and Lahore, as well as rural areas of Sind and
Punjab provinces, Pakistan, followed by visits to similar institutions in Cairo, Egypt,
between October-December 2000.1 was also fortunate enough to be able to conduct
formal and informal interviews with the scholars, administrators, activists and
worshippers associated with the above variety of institutions.
The diversity of opinion encountered (even in one regional context) and its
import to the historical investigation of Muslim societies can be sufficiently gleaned
by a short introduction to the Sufi shrines of urban and rural Sind. Makli necropolis -
located on a bluff outside the pre-colonial capital of Sind, Thatta - is host to a vast
array of Muslim tombs dating back to the 12* century, including those of political and
scholarly figures. While the tombs of Sindi amirs and Mughal governors lay
abandoned and in ruin, those of Sufi saints representative of various orders remain
well-maintained sites of fervent worship. That the modes of worship vary from shrine
to shrine, suggests the intellectual influence of the saints order. For example, visiting
the shrine of a Naqshbandiyya saint between prayer times, one is ensconced in
reverential silence, whether at the saints graveside, or in the attached mosque, where
congregational prayers are held and children are taught Arabic. At the far grander
shrine of a Suhrawardiyya saint, there is no mosque attached, no Arabic instruction.
VUl
and the grave itself serves as the focus of worship - visitors circumambulating the
grave seven times while reciting certain Quranic verses. What is most striking is that
the type of worship exhibited at each tomb is equally vociferously defended by
attendants as Islamic. As for the worshippers, something of their attitude can be
gauged from the fact that I noted many faces moving from shrine to shrine,
irrespective of the form of worship, as part of their pilgrimage to Makli, literally,
Little Mecca.
Sufi shrines in the urban hub of Karachi, echo the orders and forms of worship
one encounters at the rural centre of Makli, while reflecting attitudes toward Islamic
credentials that correspond. They also reflect the manner in which aspects of local
customary worship are Islamicized. At the shrine of a Suhrawardiyya saint known as
Mangu Pir (c. 1300), rapidly being ensconced in Karachis urban sprawl, the form of
worship extends to the feeding of multitudes of crocodiles living in springs about the
tomb complex. Although the details of Mangu Pirs life are lost in antiquity, it is well
known that the site o f his shrine had been a destination for Hindu pilgrims since pre-
Islamic times. One o f the many tales told by attendants to legitimate as Islamic the
obviously pre-lslamic custom of feeding the crocodiles, is that people of the area,
hearing of Mangu Pirs piety and miraculous abilities, approached him to rid them of
bandits that had been terrorizing them. Mangu Pir is said to have walked the town
calling the bandits to reveal themselves, retum what they had taken, repent before
Allah and go on their way, to which many responded and were absolved of further
guilt. Those who did not, however, Mangu Pir miraculously turned into crocodiles
whose descendants still flock to his tomb. The malang (mendicant) who related this
tale concluded that the saint enjoined people to feed them as an act of mercy.
Illustrated by only three of the thousands of Sufi shrines in urban and rural
Sind, the diversity of orders and modes of worship, as well as the manner in which
these modes can include local customary practices as Islamic, is o f obvious import to
the historical exploration of Muslim societies. Given that across Pakistan, I observed a
plethora of patently local customary forms of worship legitimated and viewed as
Islamic, it became apparent that no notion of a normative Islam, even with respect
to modes of worship, could accurately depict the vision of Islam held by Muslims.
Furthermore, considering that Sufism itself is one among many disciplines influential
in defining Islam in a Muslim social space, it seemed necessary to challenge the
explicitly normative approach to Islam employed by many South Asianists concerned
with Mughal polity and Muslim Nationalism. Then, 1 went to Egypt...
The vastness of the historical and cultural distance between Egypt and Pakistan
can be inferred by any with no more than the knowledge of their respective places on
the map of the world. Visiting both countries back-to-back and with a purpose, the
distance between them was even apparent in decorative motifs on the roads from Cairo
and Karachi airports to each citys centre. The former is dotted with Pharonic
statuary, the latter with banners proclaiming the 99 Names of God. Yet, once I began
to speak with Egyptians and acquaint myself with the cultures of Cairo, particularly
as they pertain to Islam, I found that the gap between these vastly different places was
often no more than my assumption. A case in point is a discussion with the Imam of a
major Cairo mosque. On topics as varied as the works of certain Islamic philosophers.
theologians and Sufis, this graduate of al-Azhar University echoed the opinions of a
Shaykh at a Qadiriyya Sufi shrine and college complex in Karachi. Another instance
of similarity, illustrating a different aspect of Islam in both countries, occurred on
Laylat al-Qadr, at the Imam Husayn Mosque in Cairo. That night a procession of Sufi
orders displaying their flags, chanting to drums and swaying in ecstasy filled the
square, the likes of which I had not witnessed since the death anniversary
commemorations at the shrine of the Suhrawardiyya saint, Lai Shahbaz Qalandar, in
Sehwan, Sind, or the gatherings of Karachis Shiis in the month ofMuharram. Such
experiences and observations made it clear that there was definitely a great deal of
unity in Islams diversity.
The demands placed on this dissertation by the insights gathered during field
research are reflected in various ways. Most importantly, the choice of historical
authors, works and schools considered in the ensuing discussion of Islamic thought is
influenced by their prominence in conversations with contemporary Islamic scholars
and lay worshippers, as well as their abundance in the libraries and bookstalls attached
to the Islamic institutions of Pakistan. The point, of course, is not to define the past
according to present attitudes, but to explore the roots of the Modem Muslim. It is
my hope that the approach to Islam developed to facilitate that exploration projects the
diverse and evolving intellectual and rhetorical world of Muslims, rather than
remaining confined to the essentializing typologies so often imposed on Muslim
societies. Simultaneously, this approach seeks to illustrate that assumptions of
disconnectedness between segments o f the Muslim World, particularly when based on
Xi
observations of local cultural variations, are as treacherous as assumptions of an
essential Islam.
Table of Contents
Page
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iv
Transliteration Note vii
Preface viii
Introduction: History and Muslim Nationalism 1
Chapter One: Reason and Intuition, Sobriety and Intoxication:

The Categories o f Islamic Thought 32
I: Al-Ghazali and Al-Hujwiri: Categorizing Thought in the Middle Period 35

II: Middle Islam and Society 45
Conclusion: Islam and India 85
Chapter Two: Perfect Men and Servants of God in the Period o f Great Mughals 93
I: The Political Philosophy of Middle Islam 96

II: Jalal al-Din Akbar: Perfect Man 113
III: Muhammad Aurangzeb: Servant of God 148
IV: Perfect Men, Servants of God and the Subaltem 171
Conclusion: Mughal Caliphate and Muslim India 187
Chapter Three: A Tide o f Sobriety in the Period o f Lesser Mughals 191
I: The Wali Allahis and a New Sober Path: Muslim Modernism 197
II: The East India Company Regime and Islamic Institutions:
The Ascendancy of European Thought 224
III: Muslims and Colonial Institutions: Critical Acceptance and Jihad 250
IV: Identity in the Vernacular: Cultural Separatism in 19* Century
Punjabi Oral Literature 282
Conclusion: Muslim India and British India 299
Chapter Four: Muslim Moderns and Modern Muslims:

Re-Printing Islam in the Period o f British Raj 306
I: The New Sobriety: Deoband and Company 312

II: Intoxication Revived: Aligarh Alone 325
III: Defining Umma and Translating Qawm:
The Reconstruction of Muslim India 351
Conclusion: Muslim India and India 391
Conclusion: A Post-Orientalist History o f Muslim Nationalism? 395
Selected Bibliography 407
Glossary 432
Introduction: History and Muslim Nationalism
In the summer of 1947, the world was introduced to a new Urdu word, literally
translated as Land of the Pure. To most aware of the word Pakistan at the time, it
referred to an awkward state in two so-called wings constituted from the Muslim
majority areas of British India, with borders in the princely state of Kashmir
unresolved. For a few, like Muhammad Ali Jinnah (d. 1948)' - who chose Pakistan as the
name for this state - the aforementioned borders and wings were said to reflect no more
than the truncated and moth-eaten remnants of the nation of Muslim India.
Muslim Nationalists like Jinnah argued for their state based on the premise that
Pakistan has been for centuries, it is there today and it will remain there till the end of the
1 Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah was an English educated lawyer bom in Karachi to a merchant family fiom the Khoja community
in 1876, though he practiced law largely in Bombay. His political career began while still a student in England, where he aided in the
election of the first South Asian member of the English House of Commons. His involvement in British Indian politics only intensified
upon his retum fi'om Britain, beginning as the secretary of the Indian National Congress incumbent President in 1906, the same year other
South Asian Muslims were forming the Muslim League - the party he would eventually come to lead. As his early membership with the
Congress Party si^ e sts, in his early years, Jinnah was a fervent secular nationalist, so much so that the crown jewel of his political
career was creating a Pact between the Congress Party and the Muslim League in 1916 - Jinnah only joining the Muslim League in 1913
to fiirther this end. Furthermore, Jinnahs disillusionment with the Congress Party and the eventual resignation of his membership was
precipitated in part by his perception that M.K. Gandhi (the Mahatma) was introducing religion into politics by emplcMng Hindu
symbols. This perception was only fiirthered by the Congress Partys disavowal of the 1916 Lucknow Pact, leading to his retirement firom
politics and relocation to Britain by 1931. Jinnah was eventually induced to leave retirement and England to lead to the Muslim League in
elections scheduled to take place in 1936-7. Although the Muslim League fared poorly at the ballot, Jinnahs reorganization of the party
and strident negotiations with the Congress Party for power sharing arrangements, rejuvenated the Muslim League. This period also
firmed Jinnahs conviction that the Congress Party represented no more than Hindu interests and would continue to do so in an
independent India. Thus, in 1940, Jinnah was one of the authors of the Lahrae Declaration, calling for the creation of sovereign Muslim
states in South Asia. In 1946, with Jinnah leading a campaign on the platform of one state - Pakistan - the Muslim League won the
substantial share of Muslim votes, leading the way to the Partition of British India in 1947. Jinnah, a.k.a. Quaid-i Azam/Great
Leader, would only live to serve one year as the states first Governor General. While the idea of Pakistan did not originate with Jinnah -
in feet, the idea of a separate Muslim state is diametrically opposed to Jinnahs early political activity - every biographer acknowledges
that without Jinnahs leadership liom 1935-48, there could have been no Pakistan. The three leading biographies of Jinnah are: Hector
Bolitho, .Tinnah: Creator of Pakistan (London: John Murray, 1954); Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1984); and, A.S. Ahmad, Jinnah. Pakistan and T.s1amic Identity: The Search for Saladin (New York; Routlec%e, 1997).
1
2
world.' Yet, the word Pakistan had not entered the rhetoric of Jinnahs party - the
Muslim League - until about the time he made the above statement in 1941. In the Lahore
Declaration of 1940, the Muslim League called for two states, western and eastern,
echoing Muhammad Iqbals (d. 1938) argument in a letter to Jinnah penned in 1937,
without reference to the word Pakistan.^ As President of the Muslim League in 1930,
however, Iqbal had called for the constitution of only the western wing as a separate
political entity, whether within British India, or outside of it, without mention of the
eastern.'* In fact, the word Pakistan was coined at about the same time, in 1933, to refer
only to the western wing o f Muslim India in the thought of its originator, Chaudhuri
Rahmat Ali, though it numbered among ten, not two w ings.Prior to the 1930s, neither
2 Syed Sharifaddin Peerzada, ed. Jimiafa on Pakistan (Bombay; fCstab Publishing House, 1943), p: 10.
3 Muhammad Iqbal was bora into a scholarly family in Sialkot, Punjab, in 1873. He was educated through the British colonial
system, going on to further sttidy in Britain and Germany. His intellectual pursuits included philosophy, law, politica! theory, psychology
and literature, but it is for his poetry', philosophy and political thought that he is remembered. Like Jirmah, Iqbals earliest political
thought was directed toward Indian unity, though not in thesecularnationalisf sense of his contemporary. To Iqbal, unity' was based
on the study and fusion of Sufi and Eirropean thought. However, by the 1920s Iqbals ideas had also changed. The problems between the
Congress Party and various Muslim groups, including the Muslim League, undoubtedly affected Iqbal as much as Jinnah, but Iqbals shift
to separatist politics also stemmed from an abiding commitment to Islamic thought in general, which he I'ietved as dj'namic and ultimately
adaptable to Modernity. Thus, his difficulty with Indian nationalism was more a response to the Congress secular agenda than merely
its Hindu one. In Iqbals view, for Muslims in South Asia to live up to their potential, they required full legislative autonomy to develop
and implement his views of a progressive shari 'a. This spiritual democracy was the view underlying Iqbals call for a separate political
entity for Muslims in 1930. Furthermore, Iqbals meetings and correspondence with Jinnah in the 1930s are credited with a hugely
influential role in shaping Jinnahs leadership of the Muslim League upon his return from Britain in 1935 - Iqbals last direct contribution
to the formation of Pakistan before his death in 1938. Out of the great deal of literature available on Iqbal, three fine introductions remain,
C.M. Naim. Iqbal. Jirjtah and Pakistan; The Vision and the Reality (New York: Sytacuse University, 1979); Hafeez Malik, ed. labal:
Poet-Phiiosotrher of Pakistan (New York; Columbia University Press, 1971); and, Annemarie Schrmmel, Gabriels Wing; A Study into the
Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad lobal (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1963). Iqbals own outline o fspiritual democracycan be read in his hugely
4 Muhammad Iqbal, Presidential Address, Sources of Indian Tradition II. Stephen Hay, ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1988), pp.218-222.
5 The word was coined in 1933 by Choudhuri Rahmat Ali while a student in England. His motivation was, in his own words,
that in the modem world the recognition of our nationhood was impossible without a national name for our people and our Indian
homelands... that the absence of such a name, in the past, had proved harmful to our interests, but, in the future, vvoirld prove fatal to our
existence. Chaudhtrri Rahmat Ali, Giving a Name to Pakistan, Sources of Indian Tradition II. Stephen Hay, ed. (New York: Columbia
3
the word Pakistan, nor the ultimate borders of a possible state, was a feature of Muslim
rhetoric.
Historiography
The novelty o f the word, the vast implications of the Muslim Nationalist ideology of
which it was a part, and the rapidity of events that led to the emergence of Pakistan, have
quite appropriately attracted a great deal of historical inquiry in the wake of
independence. By the 1970s, such works as Peter Hardys The Muslims of British India,
and Francis Robinsons Separatism Among Indian Muslims, focusing on the class and
regional interests o f Muslim Nationalists and their supporters in the late 19**ând early
20* centuries, laid the foundations of the contemporary South Asianists understanding of
Pakistan as one o f the consequences, along with conununaT politics more generally, of
the cultural idioms o f the colonial regime and the socio-economic changes ongoing under
their tenure. Regarding the call for Pakistan itself, such later works as Ayesha Jalals Sole
Spokesman, added colour to the above lines of inquiry by showing that behind the rhetoric
of nationhood, the call for a state was largely employed by Jinnah and the Muslim League
as a bargaining chip in elite negotiations between the British Government and the
political parties they chose or were compelled to deal with in British India.
Since the laying o f such foundations, not merely the study of Muslim Nationalism, but
University Press, 1988), pp. 233-34.

6 See, Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge; University Press, 1972); and, Francis Robinson, Separatism
Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims 1860-1923 (Cambridge; University Press, 1974),
7 See, Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman; Jinnah. the Mnslim I.eaaue and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: University
Press, 1985).
the very theoretical approaches employed by South Asianists, have undergone a
progressive shift away the elite colonial focus apparent above. On the cutting edge of this
shift was a newcomer to the discourse in the 1980s; that is, the historians associated with
the Subaltem Studies Group.* Gyan Prakash identifies his Subaltemisf colleagues as a
group o f Indian and British Marxist historians scattered between India, Britain and
Australia - all of them having had first world academic training or experience.^The
general objective of the group, as stated by Prakash, is to write Post-Orientalist history -
that is, history that does not subscribe to the assumptions and essentialisms of
Orientalism, which Subaltemists accuse all predecessors of accepting to various
degrees. This is particularly necessary in the South Asian context, in the words of
Gayanendra Pandey - another of the groups earliest contributors - because Orientalism
stands accused of
the emptying out o f all history - in specific variations in time, place, class, issue -
from the political experience of the people, and the identification of religion, or the
religious community, as the moving force of all Indian politics. ^
8 The Subaltern Studies Group is primarily represented ty authors published in and associated with the series: Subaltem
Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Societt'. 10 vols. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982-00), Important monographs include:
Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments (Princeton: University Press, 1994); Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony:
History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Gyanendia Pandey, The Constmction of Colonialism
in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); and. Cyan Prakash, The World of the Rural Labourer in Rural India (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1992).
9 Gyan Pakash, Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography,
Comparative Journal of Society and History (April 1990), p. 399.
10 References to Orientalism by Subaltemists generally adhere to definitions found in, Edward Said, Orientalism (New Yoric:
Vintage, 1979). As well, like Said and as Marxists, early Subaltemists largely employed the theoretical approaches of Antonio Gramsci
and Michel Foucault For examples of the manner in which their thought has been specifically interpreted and applied, see, Ranajit Guha,
Discipline and Mobilize, Subaltem Studies, vol. 7 (Dehli: Oxford University Press, 1993), or David Arnold, Gramsci and Peasant
Subaltemity in India, Subaltern Studies, vol. 1 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982). Works by Gramsci and Foucault that receive
particular attention include, Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Quintin Hoarc and Geoffre)' Smith, eds. (New York:
International Publishers, 1971); and, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Pimish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York:
Vintage Books, 1979).
11 G. Pandey, The Colonial Constmction of Communalism: British Writing on Banares in the 19th Century, Subaltem
Echoing other Subaltemists, Prakash accuses Nationalist historians of accepting
various Orientalist tenets, particularly as they relate to the periodization of Indian history
into Hindu, Muslim and British periods... and ...the long and unchanging existence of a
Sanskritic Indie civilization.*^Regarding Foundational historians, that is. Classical
Marxists like P C. Joshi and A.R. Desai, and Cambridge historians including David
Washbrook and Chris Bayly, the Subaltemist critique has less to do with accepting
Orientalist tenets, than subscribing to an Orientalist approach. Thus, Prakash lauds the
above scholars for replacing the undivided India of the [Indian] nationalists with one
divided by classes and class conflict, as well as releasing India...from the restricting lens
of national history... [to place it] in the larger focus of world history.*^ However, they are
criticized for continuing to write histories ultimately founded in and representable
Studies, vol. 6 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 132.

12 The reference to Nationalist historians points specifically to Indian Nationalism in Prakashs present writing, btit it can
certairrly be said to extend to all forms o fnational perspectives on history written even today. These include such ethnic nationalist
perspectives as Dravidian Nationalism,' or Punjabi Nationalism, as well as such religious nationalisms as the Hindu and Sikh,
beside the Muslim variety under discussion in this study. In essence, however, each narrative is circumscribed by the rhetoric of
nationhood, G. Prakash, Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography, p. 388.
Of the types of natiorralisms arising in the colonial period, the two of particular pertinence to this study are the Indian and
Hindu varieties. The historical literature espousing these rtationalisms is too vast to begin to address. It can only be said that in the view
of Indian Nationalist historians, the idea of a historical Muslim India is as contrived as the word Pakistam From their perspective,
Hindus and Muslims have historically identified as members of a secular Indian nation for some, and a religious nation that transcends
Hinduism artd Islam for others. The latter stream is most influentially forwarded by M.K. Gartdhi, in his Hind Swaraj (1909), lately
Published as. Hind Swaraj and Other Writings. A.J. Parel, ed. (Cambridge: University Press, 1977). Among the secular, Jawaharlal
Nehru, The Discovery Of India (London: Meridian Books, 1960), is a well-cited work.
There is also a long and rich tradition of Hindu Nationalist history. Although there are mtances to this school as well, the
basic perspective is that there may have been a Muslim presence in South Asia for centuries, but this was a foreign presence vrith no
claims to Mother India. Saninal works include, V.D. Sarvarfcar. Hindutva - Who is a Hindu? (Bombay: V. S. Prakashan, 1969); and,
M.S. Golwalkar. We or Our Nationhood Defined (Nagpur: M.N. Kale, 1947). Secondary literature on Indian Nationalism is under
discussion along vrith that tai Muslim Nationalism, but for Hindu Nationalism in particular, see, Peter van der Veer, Religious
Nationalism (Berkeley: University of Califoniia Press, 1994). Also, for a Subaltemist perspective, see, G. Pandey, Hindus and Others -
The Question of Identity in India Today tNew Delhi: Viking Press, 1993).
6
through some identity - individual, class or structure - which resists further decomposition
into heterogeneity."^The type o f Post-Orientalist history that Prakash proposes instead
is credited to Edward Saids lead, not seeking to substitute the real Orient for the myth
o f the Orientalists, but attempting to take an interpretive position that would trace third-
world identities as relational rather than essential.^ The over-arching, relational
alternative that two of the founding members of the Subaltem Studies Group proposed can
be summarized as follows.
In the first volume of the Subaltem Studies series of publications, Ranajit Guha and
Partha Chatterjee outlined what David Hardiman - another influential member of the
group - would later repeat as the staple themes of the Subaltemist approach;
the relative autonomy of subaltem consciousness and action, the need to make the
subaltem classes the subject of their own histories, the failure of the Indian
bourgeoisie to speak for the nation, and the existence of two domains of politics
[elite and subaltem].^
Clearly, the pivotal idea is the distinction drawn between elites and subalterns. Guha
defines the former to include the dominant groups of the indigenous society or the
colonial authorities, the latter are seen to comprise the mass of the labouring population
and the intermediate strata in town and country - that is, the people. This distinction is
not a mere restatement of economic class dichotomies, but is argued in terms of
differences in pattems o f mobilization, ideology, idiom, norms and values. For example,
13 Ibid, p. 395.
14 Ibid, p. 397.
15 Ibid, p. 399.
16 David Hardiman, Subaltern Studies at Crossroads, Economic and Political Weekly (February 15, 1986), p. 288.
17 Ranajit Guha, On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India, Subaltern Studies, vol. 1 (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1982), p. 4.
7
while in the domain of elite politics mobilization was achieved vertically, with a reliance
on colonial adaptations of British parliamentary and the residua o f semi-feudal political
institutions of the pre-colonial period, subalterns mobilized horizontally, relying on
traditional organization of kinship and territoriality or on class association....*
Furthermore, an invariant feature o f subaltem ideology was a notion of resistance to
elite domination.^
Guha goes on to caution that when speaking of elites and subalterns the above
dichotomy did not...mean that these two domains were hermetically sealed off from each
other.... On the contrary, there was a great deal of overlap arising precisely from the effort
made from time to time by the more advanced elements in the indigenous elite, especially
the bourgeoisie, to integrate them [i.e., the subaltem].^ The result of this braiding
together of elite and subaltem politics, however, is argued to have led to explosive
situations in which people mobilized by the elite to fight for their own purposes
managed to break away from their control and put the characteristic imprint o f popular
politics on campaigns initiated by the upper classes.^
Along with Guhas definition of elite and subaltem domains, the analytical categories
he constracts and employs (e.g., semi-feudal, bourgeois, etc.) also hint at Guha and his
associates Marxist pedigree. However, the Neo-Marxist approaches of Gramsci and
Foucault are not always apparent. It is thus that in another of his later writings, Guha can
describe the pre-capitalist era in South Asia as one in which:
18 Ibid, p. 4.
19 Ibid, p. 5.
20 Ibid, p. 6.
21Ibid,p.6.
conquistadors, kings and barons were content to rule over subjugated populations
without integrating or assimilating the latter's culture into a hegemonic ruling
culture....The despotic state was, in this sense, the reverse of the bourgeois state. The
despot, wrote Montesquieu, governed by fear - a measure o f his distance from the
objects of governance. That distance was mediated by no education at all, that is no
persuasion involving any exchange at the level of culture: all that despotism required
was total subordination and all that changed hands was tribute.
Furthermore, Guha is not alone in characterizing pre-colonial polity as at least partially
despotic in his version of the feudal. An alternative example, also found in the first of
the Subaltem Studies volumes, lays in the writings o f Partha Chatteijee. In the latters
opinion, prior to the period of European colonial expansion, the modes of power active in
South Asia are best described as communal and feudal. Like Guha, Chatteijee explains
that the feudal mode of power is characterized by sheer superiority of force, a system
dependent on the elites direct physical control over the life-processes of the producers
through institutions ranging from slavery to the payment of tribute.^^ However, he adds
that a communal mode o f power also
arises typically in societies based predominantly on agricultural production, where

there is, as Marx puts it, the natural unity of labour with its material presuppositions,
where the individual relates to himself as proprietor, as master of the condition o f his
reality... [and] to the others as coproprietors, as so maiw incarnations of the common
property, or as independent proprietors like himself.^
In such a communal society, Chatteijee further argues, political power would be organized
as the authority of the entire collective.^^ He concludes that in agrarian societies where
22 R. Guha, Dominance without Hegemony and its Historiography, Subaltem Studies, vol. 6 (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1989), p. 273.
23 P. Chatteijee, Agrarian Relations and Communalisin in Bengal, 1926-1935, Subaltem Studies, vol. 1 (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1982), pp. 13-15. Also see. P. Chatteriee. More on Modes of Power and the Peasantry. Subaltem Studies, vol. 2
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 311-49.
24 P. Chatteijee, Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 1926-1935, p. 12.
25 Ibid., p. 13.
9
peasant communities are formally organized into large political units such as kingdoms
and empires, these two modes of power are intertwined in the state formation."'^
Chatteijee also points out that the above scheme is fundamentally opposed to the
bourgeois mode of power in which the capitalist is economically dominant and the
political domination of the bourgeoisie is maintained by institutions of representative
govemment.^^ This dichotomy, between the feudaT/communal and the bourgeois, not
only provides insightf on these authors approaches to the pre-capitalist state, it is
ultimately necessary for one to grasp these authors views of the colonial state.
In Guhas opinion, the colonial state in South Asia gained power when its
representatives
used the power of the sword effectively to cut through the maze of conflicting
jurisdiction exercised by a moribund Mughal Empire, an effete nawab [local ruler]
and a company of foreign merchants officiating as tax collectors... .However, the
justification of Britains occupation of India by the right of conquest was soon to be
subjected to a dialectical shift as colonialism outgrew its predatory, mercantilist
beginnings to graduate to a more systematic, imperial career....In other words, the
idiom of conquest came to be replaced by the idiom of Order.^^
In the interest of Order in the colonies, Guha describes colonial concern extending to
matters that ventured further than the power of the state in Europe (at least since the end of
the absolute monarchies), including public health, sanitation and municipalization,
and the body through forced labour, particularly plantation workers and conscripts.
Yet,
the idiom of Order could not function all by itself. It interacted with another idiom to
make C [coercion] what it was under colonial conditions. That was an Indian idiom -
26 Ibid, p. 14.
27 Ibid., pp. 13-15.
28 R. Gtiha, Dominance without Hegemony and its Historiography, p. 234.
29 Ibid, pp. 234-39.
10
the idiom of Danda [lit., the stick] which was central to all indigenous notions of
dominance.^
In effect, this Indian idiom legitimized pre-colonial modes of power, such as private
feudal armies and levies, caste and religious sanctions, bonded labour, the partial
entitlement of landlords to civilian and criminal jurisdiction, punitive patriarchal codes,
sectarian, ethnic and caste strife, among other exam ples.Thus, Guha concludes, [tjhis
harsh concept of power [Danda] served, in the colonial period, to legitimize all exercises
o f coercive authority by the dominant over the subordinate in every walk o f life that was
outside the jealously guarded realm of official Order.
Along with such coercive idioms as Order and Danda, Guha also identifies the
following persuasive idioms, British and Indian: Improvement and Dharma,
Obedience and Bhakti, and Rightful Dissent and Dharmic Protest,^^ which together served
30 Ibid., p. 238.
31 Ibid., p. 238.
32 Ibid.. p. 239.
33 Dharma, lit. vrfmt supports or upholds, is most widely understood in Btahmanical Hinduism as the go\eming principle
or law of the universe. As the influence of Vedic Hinduism (15th-5th century BCE) waned before the rise of Buddhism and Jainism in
the 5th-4th centuries BCE, Brahmanical scholars had already begun writing Dharma Sutras, or treatises on law, that would be the
forerunners of Hindu legal thought in the Brahmanical period, beginning in the 1st century B CE. According to Brahmanical legal
th o i^ t, it is necessary to know dharma, because advancement in the cycle of rebirth (samsara), or release (moksha) from the cycle
altogether, requires the moral purity gained by acting in accord with the law of the universe. Thus, three main sources for knowing
what is, or is not dharma, are: sruti, the heard truths of the Vedas; smrti, the remembered truths of ancilliary texts {Vedangas)', and,
sadacara/sistacara, r the example of the person who practices what is right according to sruti and smrti. See, W. Mahony,
Dhatma/Hindu Dharma, Enevciortaedia of Religion, vol. 4 (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1987), pp. 329-32; and, M. Hinayanrra,
Outlines of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1994).
In Buddhism, dharma holds much the same general meaning as in Brahmanical Hinduism, but more specifically refers to the
doctrine which benefits one rat the spiritual path. At Buddhisms inception, with the birth of Siddharta Gautama (the Buddha) in the
5th or 4th century BCE, dharma referred to the rising canon of the Buddhas personal teachings. However, in the centuries that followed,
marked by the growth of institutional Buddhism, elite patronage and popular support, doctrinal diversity and schism seem bound to have
erupted. The most effectual Buddhist response, articulated as part of the rising creed of the Mahayana sect, which overshadowed the
older Theravada between the 1st-5th centuries CE, was to argue that dharma includes any doctrine that effectively serves the spiritual
path. See, E. Steinkellner, Dharma: Buddhist Dharma, Encyclopaedia of Religion, voi.4, pp. 332-39; Richard Gombrioh, Theravada
Buddhism (London: Routledge, 1988); and, Paul Williams, Mahayana Buddhism (London: Routledge, 1994).
11
the elite (British and South Asian) in their domination of the rest of society. To Guha, the
intrusion of the Indian and the compromise of bourgeois values and institutions implies
that the colonial era can not be viewed as a period in which those bourgeois values gained
ascendancy through hegemony, but rather represents a period of Dominance without
Hegemony; that is, rule ultimately founded on the forceful domination of society in
general by the elite, a semi-feudal mode of power, a despotism. To think otherwise, he
argues, is to ignore the evidence of resistance and believe that the modest local
institutions engaged by the colonial regime provided representation sufficient to mobilize
Indian cooperation and consent on a scale so wide as to put the regime in a non-
antagonistic relation with its subjects and therefore make for a hegemonic and unifying
d o m in a n c e .The failure to produce the climate necessary for hegemony, it follows,
stems from the fact that colonialism could continue as a relation of power in the
subcontinent only on condition that the colonizing bourgeoisie should fail to live up to its
Bkakti, lit devotion,is as central a concept in Brahmanioal Hindu thought as dharma. A prime difference between
Brabmanioal and the earlier Vedic Hinduism, is a shift from elaborate sacrificial worship to personal devotion for a sectarian deity,
particularly Vishnu or Shiva. Under the influence, or in dialogue with Buddhism and Jainism between 500-100BCE, the above shift
reflected the growth of Hinduism from an elite, to a popular faith. By the 6th century CE, however, along with the development of a larger
philosophical framework placing bhakti at the centre of ritualized worship, a movement began to take shape in the Tamil speaking areas at
the southern tip of South Asia that is referred to by contemporary scholars as Bhaktism.In essence, Bhaktism challenged the legalism of
Brahmanioal Hinduism, offering devotion to a god or goddess (Shiva, Vishnu, or a number of others) as a greater good than following the
dharma of Brahmanioal jurists. The rationale was that devotion to the Gods could win their intercession in aiding the individual toward
moksha (release). Institutionally, Bhaktism dspeaded on saintly figures who took on disciples to whom they taught their theistic creed
and devotional methods. Between the 1lth-15th centuries CE, Bhaktism spread from the Tamil poet-saints who had long sung their
devotions to Shiva or Vishnu, attracting large, popular followings, to most parts of South Asia, finding support and devotees among
Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Muslims alike. Although generally employii^ highly syncretic vocabulary and organized as local cults
centred on saints Q>haktm)haaDhsts (gurus), in Punjab, Bhakti syncretism led to the birth of the Sikh (disciple) faith, founded by the
guru Nanak (d. 1538). He called for devotion, but to the one God (Sot/Truth), and more firmly insisted on the end of caste (vamd) than
most other bhaktas. See, J.B. Carman, Bhakti, Encyclopaedia of Religion vol. 2, pp. 130-34;and Burton Stein, A History of India
(Oxford; Blackwell Publishers, 1998), pp. 85, 134, 162.
34 R. Guha, Dominance without Hegemony and its Historiography, p. 274.
12
own universalist p r o j e c t . I n the final analysis, the sword which founded the colonial
state, the absolute externality of the regime, and its despotic mode of power, together
result in the fact that bourgeois culture hits its historical limit in colonialism.^^
In Chatteijees view of the colonial state, more emphasis is again placed on the
communal mode o f power than in Guhas writings. Thus, for Chatterjee:
the colonial state in India fashioned its own institutions and administrative procedures
in order to subjugate and rule over a population organized as communities: in the
process, bourgeois principles of equality before the law or the neutrality of the state
were thoroughly compromised, often abandoned.
However, even reading between the above lines, it is clear that the juxtaposition of the
feudal/communal and the bourgeois implies that the colonial states mode of power
is again viewed as semi-feudal. Turning from the colonial state to the rise of the
nationalisms, therefore, one must be aware that if the analytical categories employed by
Guha and Chatteijee are significant to their imderstandings of the pre-capitalist and the
colonial state, clearly, these categories would also colour their views of the nation-states
which arose under colonial rule.
The above hypothesis is most directly confirmed by Guha. Writing on the Indian
Nationalist movement, he ponders that neither bourgeois nor subaltern initiatives were
ultimately sufficient to develop the nationalist movement into a full-fledged struggle for
national liberation.^* Instead, the study of Indian Nationalism is the pursuit of the
historic failure o f the nation to come to its own, a failure due to the inadequacy of the
bourgeoisie as well as the working class to lead it into a decisive victory over
35 Ibid., p. 279.
36 Ibid., p. 277.
37 P. Chatteqee, Agrarian Relations and Cornmunalism in Bengal, p. 18.
38 R. Guha, On Some Aspects of the Histcxriography of Colonial India, p. 6.
13
colonialism and a bourgeois-democratic revolution of either the classic nineteenth
century type under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie or a more modem type under the
hegemony of workers and peasants, that is, a new democracy.
The implications for Muslim Nationalism, therefore, are clear. It should be viewed an
occasion on which segments of the Muslim elite linked with the subaltern, but with
no firm anti-imperialist objectives at all or... [having] lost them in the course of their
development and deviated into legalist, constitutionalist or some other kind of
compromise with the colonial government... [which] produced some spectacular
retreats and nasty revisions in the form of sectarian strife."^^
Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that the nation-state of Pakistan, like its colonial
predecessor, could arise only on condition that an Indian bourgeoisie and working class
failed to develop the nationalist movement into a full-fledged stmggle for national
liberation.
Again, by way of contrast, Chatterjees views on nationalism, particularly as
represented in his The Nation and its Fragments, shows that his relative emphasis on
community, when coupled with Benedict Andersons expression of nations as imagined
communities, produced a perception of Indian Nationalism as a far more creative
process than alluded to in Guhas perspective o f failure.'^' However, when this creativity
is placed in the context of the analytical juxtaposition of the feudal/communal and the
bourgeois, it is clear that Chatteijee echoes Guha in projecting the ideology of Muslim
Nationalism as semi-feudal; that is, no more than a by-product of the colonial
compromise o f bourgeois values by the British and the Indian bourgeoisie. In the final
analysis, therefore, Guha and Chatteijees writings not only project much of the Classical
39 Ibid, p. 7.
40 Ibid, p. 6.
41 See, Partha Chatteijee, The Nation and its Fragments (Prinoeton; Utiiversit}' Press, 1994). Also, Benedict Anderson.
14
Marxist image o f pre-Modem and Modem societies, they more specifically view the
relationship between pre-colonial polities, the colonial state and the rise of Muslim
Nationalism in much the same light as the works of other South Asianists that the
Subaltem Studies Group more generally accuses of harbouring Orientalist essentialisms
and assumptions.
Of course, it did not take long for those whom Prakash labels Cambridge historians
and criticizes as Foundationalists, such as Washbrook and Bayly, to observe much the
same inconsistencies in Subalteraist writings as those mentioned above, as well as begin
publishing detailed critiques o f various aspects of the Subaltem Studies Groups
theoretical and methodological approaches.*^However, trae to Prakashs declaration that
the Subaltem Studies Group defies the formalism of a school of thought, thus remaining
open to criticism from within, the particulars of the views presented above were also
challenged by other Subaltemists. For example, soon after the publication of the first
volume of the Subaltem Studies series, Hardiman suggested that Guhas labeling of the
pre-colonial era as feudal begged many questions, as it assumed a certain unchanging
quality to medieval Indian society and culture. A contrast of an orientalist variety was thus
set up between an unchanging past and the dynamic society brought into being by
colonial mle.*Âs well, Dipesh Chakrabarty criticized Guha for his reliance on
Brahmanioal sources in defining Indian idioms, while Sumit Sarkar took Guha to task for
42 Seminal articles by Bayly and Washbrook, as well as by Rosalind OHanlon and Tom Brass, along with the rebuttals of G.
Prakash and D. Clsakrabarty, can be found in Mapping Subaltem Studies and the Post-Colonial Vinayak Chaturvedi, ed. (London; Verso,
2000). For other critical perspectives, see, David Ludden, ed. Reading Subaltem Studies: Critical History. Contested Meaning and the
Globalization of South Asia (Lcmdon: Anhtem Press, 2002).
43 D. Hardiman, Subaltern Studies at Crossroads, p. 288.
15
a lack of subtlety in his understanding of Bhaktism.' More lately yet, at least in part driven
by the critques lodged by the likes of Washbrook and Bayly, the internal polemic has also
extended beyond the above deconstruction of particulars to not only incorporate further
theoretical nuances to the already variegated approaches of the group, but also question the
very ways in which the groups foundational thinkers engaged in the interpretation of
history. Sarkar, for example, has called for a shift in perspective, moving away from
Marxist concerns while reassessing the Saidian framework of earlier contributions to
the group.Nevertheless, such criticism of Guha and Chatteijee in particular was not
lodged by all Subaltemists, nor does it extend to all the arguably Orientalist assumptions
and essentialisms earlier contributors employed to characterize the institutional history of
South Asia.
The most direct evidence o f Guha and Chatteijees continued relevance among
Subaltemists specifically, and South Asianists more generally, is provided by the fact that
the foundational works cited above have been republished in subsequent group
anthologies. More specifically, in the volumes of Subaltem Studies and later anthologies,
Guha and Chatteijee are more often than not cited by every contributor, and their
analytical categories widely employed. For example, while criticizing various aspects of
previous approaches, Sarkar implicitly conceives of history as a progressive movement
44 Ibid, p. 289.
45 Sumit Sarkar, Orientalism Revisited: Saidian Frameworks in the Writing of Modem Indian History, Mapping Subaltem
Studies and the Post-Colonial, pp. 239-255. This anthology also includes articles by D. Chakrabarty, G. Pandey and Gayatri Spivak that
make similar calls and re-evaluate various aspects of the groups earlier approaches. Also see, D. Chakrabarty, Habitations ofModemitv:
Essavs in the Wake of Subaltem Studies (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 2002).
46 For example, see. Selected Subaltem Studies. Ranjit Guha and Gayatri Spivak, eds. (Dehli: Oxford University Press, 1988);
and, A Subaltan Studies Reader, Ranajit Guha, ed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997). Indeed the influence of this group has
even extended beyond South Asian Studies, as evinced by such works as. The Latin American Subaltem Studies Reader. Ileana
16
toward the new democracy, himself referring to more modem types of movements in
his, The Conditions and Nature of Subaltem M ilita n cy .V a rio u s articles by
Chakrabarty invoke Chatteijees categorical framework of feudal, communal and
bourgeois modes of power, as do the writings o f Asok Sen, Ajit Chaudhury and others.'**
And, if not in as boldly Hindu terms as Guha, Subaltemist usage o f such terms as Indian
elites and Indian subalterns into the present, is as prone to reduce the variegated and
complex pre-colonial cultures of South Asia to unitary assumptions. The pre-colonial
India in Bemard Cohns, The Command of Language and the Language of Command,
is a case in point, one in which Muslims and Hindus operated with an unbounded
substantive theory of objects and persons.'*^ That is to say, an intellectual and institutional
India - Hindu or, in Cohns case, secular - is not Guha or, as will be illustrated directly in
the next chapter, the Subaltem Studies Groups conception alone. Thus, cognizance o f the
multiplicity of opinions held by Subaltemists in the past as in the present cannot diminish
the import of the manner in which these historians converge as a group, not merely as
Subaltemists, but also as South Asianists, particularly considering the implications for the
understanding of Islam and Muslims in South Asian history. Unless one is of the mind that
contemporary Subaltemists have entirely exorcised the ghosts o f the old, therefore, the
Rodriguez, ed. (Durham; Duke University Press, 2(X)1).

47 Sumit Saikar, The Conditions and Nature of Subaltem Militancy: Bengal from Swadeshi to Non-Cooperation, 1905-22,
Subaltem Studies, vol. 3 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 278.
48 For D. Chakrabarty, see his, "Conditions for Knowledge of Working Class Conditions; Employers, Government and the
Jute Workers of Calcutta, 1890-1940, Subaltem Studies, vol. 2 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983); Trade Unions in a Hierarchicai
Culture: The Jute Workers of Calcutta, 1920-50, Subaltem Studies, vol. 3 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984); and, Invitation to
Dialogue, Subaltem Studies, vol. 4 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985). For Asok Sen and Ajit Chaudhury, see, Subaltem Studies.
vol. 5, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987).
49 Bemard Cohn, The Command of Language and the Language of Command, Subaltem Studies, vol. 4 (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1985), p. 279.
17
example o f the trajectory taken by the Subaltem Studies Group over the past two decades
behooves one to inquire into the possible reasons that the very type o f assumptions and
essentialisms deemed inappropriate, lingers in the writings of a group self-consciously
seeking to avoid them?
Theory
Much o f the early Subaltemist critique o f previous historians is drawn from an
aiqsroach couched in cultural theory, as evinced by reference to Edward Saids notion of
Orientalism. In this reference alone, one notes a reliance on Antonio Gramscis concept
o f hegemony, while Michel Foucaults ideas on discourse and studying history from the
fringes are implicit in the focus on the subaltern. Thus, considering that these
intellectuals continue to figure prominently in the writings o f the Subaltem Studies Group,
notwithstanding internal criticism of various aspects o f their earlier colleagues
interpretations, addressing why Orientalist notions persist despite a Post-Modernist
approach obliges one to consider how other cultural theorists might view the issue. In fact.
50 It should be noted that suooinctaess alone does not account for lack of foither discussion of the particulars of Edward Said,
Michel Foucault or Antonio Gtamsois writings. Ths reascais for each omissirai, however, differ. In the ease of Foucault, such basic
OOTcepJs as discourse theojy, the relationship between knowledge and power, as well as the writing of gowalogies, quite liberally
complement and underscore this works specific theoretical perspective. It is in echoing die widesptead unttetanding and usage of these
concepts ly late South Asianists that Foucault receives no further attention here. Regarding Gtamsci, however, the primary justification for
no further address is that this discussion is driectly amcetned with Gramois hegerocsny theoty only insofar as it is an appendage of the
early Subaltemist analytical categories feudal and bourgeois. As these categorira, which undwlie the early Subaltemist undsrstanding
of the conditions necessary for a hegemonic order to arise, are themselves tinder critical review, flje issue of hegemcary becomes
seooiKtoty. Furthennore, given that some early Subaltemists like Guha ultimately characterized {e-ooloaial, colonial and post-ooltmial
states as examples of'doaunance without hegemMiy, it af^tears acceptable to engage GramscinjOTe directly in another coalext Saids
concept o f Orientalism is, of course, theoretically anchored in an interfsetatif of brth Foucault and Gramseis ideas, thus needing ly
slight fiBther address. Given that aspects of Foucaults ideas are implicitly inowporated into this w ak, but Gxamsoi is ejqtlicitly excluded,
the last direct word on Said is that this study appreciates and employs Orientalism as discourse, but leaves open the issue of whether it
18
the most pertinent address is found in the ideas o f Paul Ricoeur. From his perspective, it
would appear that the early Subaltemists faced and failed to resolve Mannheims
Paradox.
Recall that it is the Subaltemists objective to write Post-Orientalist history.
Following in the footsteps o f Karl Mannheim, Ricoeur asks whether it is at all possible to
write non-ideological histories, be the historians Marxists or, by extension,
Subaltemists.^* In Paul Ricoeurs words,
Mannheims paradox results from his observation o f the development of the Marxist
concept of ideology. The paradox is the nonapplicability o f the concept of ideology to
itself. In other words, if everything that we say represents interests that we do not
know, how can we have a theory o f ideology which is not itself ideological? The
reflexivity o f the concept o f ideology on itself provides the paradox.^^
Ricoeur argues that this paradox is a box o f the Marxist theoreticians own making. False
premises, a contrast between ideology, defined as all prescientific approaches to social
life, and science, or the study o f the material conditions o f existence, result in the
paradox. Ideology then, is viewed negatively as it appears as the general device by
which the process o f real life is obscured. Thus, what is required is not the dismissal o f
Marxs concept, but to relate it to some o f the less negative functions o f ideology.
Ricoeur continues:
We must integrate the concept o f ideology as distortion into a framework that

recognizes the symbolic structures o f social life. Unless social life has a symbolic
structure, there is no way to understand how we live, do things, and project these
activities in ideas, no way to understand how reality can become an idea or how real
ean be wndestood as hêniMiic.
51 For Mannheims ideas on the subject, see, Karl Mannheim, Meoloyv and Utopia: An Introdugtion to the Sooioloay of
Knowledfe. tiaas., L. Wirth & Shils, E. (San Diego; Harcourt Brace Jovanovioh, 1985).
52 Paul Ricoeur, Lecturers on Ideology and Utopia. O.H. Taylor, ed (New Yodc; Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 8.
53 Ibid, p. 4.
19
life can produce illusions; these would all be simply mystical and incomprehensible
events. This symbolic structure can be perverted, precisely by class interests and so on
as Marx has shown, [but the]... distorting function covers only a small surface of the
social imagination, in just the same way as hallucinations or illusions constitute only a
part of our imaginative activity in general.^'*
One is further informed that the ideology-science dichotomy which excludes so much o f
the social imagination was adopted by many Marxist thinkers from Marxs later works,
while in earlier works, Marx juxtaposed ideology and praxis, or real social life,^^
Ricoeur advocates a return to the earlier formulation, but adds that the ideology-praxis
relationship be recast so that the most fundamental [contrast] is not the distortion or
dissimulation o f praxis by ideology. Rather, most basic is an inner connection between
the two t e r m s . The nature o f that connection can be apprehended in these questions:
How can people live...conflicts - about work, property, money and so on - if they do not
already possess some symbolic systems to help them interpret conflict? Is not the process
o f interpretation so primitive that in fact it is constitutive o f the dimension of praxis? In
other words,
[i]f social reality did not already have a social dimension, and therefore, if ideology, in
a less polemical or less negatively evaluative sense, were not constitutive of social
existence but merely distorting and dissimulating, then the process o f distortion could
not start. The process of distortion is grafted onto a symbolic function.^
Where this connection is not recognized, Ricoeur, like Clifford Geertz,^ holds that
54 Ibid., p. 8.
55 Ibid, p. 9.
56 Ibid, p. 10.
57 Ibid, p. 10.
58 See, Clifford Qeertz, Hie Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essavs (New Yodc: Basic Bodes, 1973). For our pinposes,
another work is also important: C. Gesrtz. Islam Observpd Reliipous Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1975). In this woiic, Geertz most Mly argues his categories of Muslims and nomiml-Muslims. Jacques Waardenburg
20
Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers consider only what causes and promotes ideology, but
do not ask how ideology functions, they do not question how a social interest, for
example, can be expressed in a thought, an image, a conception of life.^În the final
analysis, therefore, if we do not master the rhetoric of public discourse, then we can not
articulate the expressive power and the rhetorical force of social symbols.^
Implicit in this view of ideology is its dual role in social reality, as the agent of
interests in the distortion o f thought and the integration o f a community. The
legitimation function o f ideology, therefore, is the connecting link between the Marxist
concept of ideology and the integrative concept o f ideology found in Geertz.^
As evinced by Hardiman, Sarkar and Chakrabartys criticisms o f Guhas use o f the
term feudal, and so on, it is clear that Subaltemists are well aware o f the discourse and
critiques surrounding Marxist concepts of ideology. Indeed, it is precisely such ideas,
though not necessarily the writings o f Ricoeur, that underlie the reorientation o f Subaltem
Studies mentioned previously to have been initiated by Sarkar, Chakarbarty and others. In
Ricoeurs terminology, that is to say such Subaltemists recognize that the concept of
ideology inherent in the formulations o f Guha, invests religion with little more role than
the distortion o f the processes o f real life. Thus, Ricoeur and Geertzs critique of the
premise ideology-science not only suggests that a large part o f the social imagination was
left untapped by the early Subaltemist approach, as contemporaries have argued, it
has since critiqued this formuktiai, essentially arguing that Geertz implies tfaeie is a cxe Islam which some follow, and othns only
oiaim to. In other words, Geertz decides what is and is not Islam, and who are and are not true Muslims. Unis, in seddng to avoid such
external injpositioos, this study incorporates Waaidsnbwgs caution in its thewetical approach. See, Pieter Vrijhof and Waardenbtt^
Jacques, eds. Religiim and Society (I.a ifegue; W. de Gn^ter, 1979).
bOHad., p. 11.
21
provides a detailed argument o f why this occurs and how it can be avoided, largely
independent o f Subaltemist approaches. Furthermore, Ricoeurs formulations are
particularly significant in the case of the history o f Muslim Nationalism, one whose
rhetoric of public discourse is religious/ because unlike the aforementioned reform-
minded Subaltemists, he adds M annheiins concept o f Utopia to his more integrative
concept o f Ideology.
Utopia is, in Mannheims imagination and Ricoeurs words, a declared genre, not only
declared but w ritten .U to p ia s literary form engenders a kind of complicity or
connivance on the part o f a well-disposed reader, who is also inclined to assume the
utopia as a plausible h y p o th esis.Y et, it remains a scattered genre, one that does not
necessarily imply a definitive Utopia. In other words, a kemel of a utopia is difficult to
isolate, and each social stratum can hold its own Utopian concepts. Utopia is distinct
from Ideology, therefore, in so far as the latter is by definition an undeclared genre that
legitimates what is, while the former represents a non-congruence with the state of
action and reality within which it occurs, at least in Mannheims estimation. Ricoeur adds
that if the distorting effect of Ideology is to be recognized. Ideology too must be a non
congruence. Thus, for Ricoeur the ultimate differential feature o f ideology and utopia is
that utopia is sitiiationally transcendent, while ideology is not.^ That is to say, Utopias
transcendent character includes an idea that shatters a given order, has a futuristic
61 Ibid., p. 14.
62 Ibid, p. 269.
63 Ibid, p. 270.
64 Wd., p. 272.
22
element and is fundamentally realizable.^^
Ricoeur further reveals that according to Mannheim, the earliest example of
Utopianism in the European context is Thomas Munzers work. This is one of Mannheims
Chiliastic Utopias, in that it satisfies the transcendent element, advocates social
revolution, promotes a sense of realizability and dispels the fatalistic acceptance of
power as it is, but is driven by belief in transcendental energies (i.e., the spiritual
presuppositions of Millenarianism).^ The second type identified is the Liberal-
Humanitarian Utopia, one which conflicts with an existing order in that it emphasizes the
power o f intelligence to form and to shape.^ Ideas are thus the driving force, and an
educative, informative process, is the mechanism o f realization. Next, one encounters
the Conservative Utopia. Here, one finds a sense o f historical determinateness like the
growth o f a plant, and this is opposed to ideas, which simply float.... p*]riority is given to
the past, not a past as abolished but one that nourishes the present by giving it
roots.... Against the kairos o f the first utopia and the progress o f the second, a sense of
duration is a f f ir m e d .Finally, Mannheim considers the Social-Communist Utopia, a
movement that is related to the former not only in a competitive sense, but also one that
is synthetic, that is, it is based upon an inner synthesis of the various forms of utopia
which have arisen hitherto...
In relation to each other, Mannheims Utopias are not only antagonistic, their forms
65 Ibid, p. 273.
66 Ibid.. p. 276.
67 Ibid, p. 277.
68 Ibid. p. 279.
69 Ibid, p. 279.
23
constitute a temporal sequence.^^Ricoeur explains that Mannheims basic idea here is
that the history o f utopia constitutes a gradual approximation to real life and therefore to
the decay of utopia.... Modem history is a movement taking increasing distance from
Chiliasm.^ While retaining the general thrust o f Mannheims argument, Ricoeur modifies
the formers view o f Utopia in a number of significant ways, such as excluding the
progressive element. Ricoeur also argues quite emphatically that Utopia and Ideology are
functionally distinct; the former maintains the status quo, while the latter promotes
change. In this manner, Ricoeur conceives o f Ideology and Utopia as sealed compartments.
However, to speak o f Islamic Utopias, it is clear that further revisions are necessary.
First, one must clearly eliminate Mannheims categories o f Utopia altogether as they are
explicitly Eurocentric. As well, one must leave room for the possibility that Utopian
notions outside Europe may not be expressed as a declared genre. And finally, regarding
Ricoeurs notion of the functional distinction between Ideology and Utopia, one must
allow for Utopias that do not seek absolute transcendence, but simultaneously legitimate
aspects o f what is while promoting change in other aspects. Thus, in the final analysis,
Utopia may only be employed if it is reduced to no more than a genre (written or oral)
related to the social stratum in which it is active, containing antagonistic models of the
future, non-congruent with what is, transcendent at least in some respects, yet appearing
realizable. With this definition in mind, this appears an opportune moment to ask; can one
approach Islam as an Ideology which not only distorts, but also legitimates the praxis o f
Muslims, and add, can Muslim Nationalism and Pakistan be considered part o f a
70 Ibid., p. 280.
71 Dad, pp. 280-81.
24
Utopianism which inclined and continues to incline the well-disposed Muslim reader to
consider them a plausible hypothesis?
Methodology
As previously alluded, the coalescence of the Subaltem Studies Group during the
1980s can be seen as a larger shift in the theoretical approaches in the study of South Asian
history, in part due to the growing influence o f Cultural Theorists on South Asian Studies
in general. As in the case of the Subaltemists, these new histories expanded beyond the
earlier discussion o f elite colonial politics to explore the symbolic realm o f Muslim social
discourse, elite and subaltem. To the argument that Muslim Nationalism was in various
manners a colonial constract, later histories added an understanding of the influence of
what Farzana Shaikh terms elements oflndo-Muslim moral discourse and the
assumptions that flowed there from.^^ Along these lines, Bayly also began study of the
possibility that religious cornmunalism in general had certain pre-colonial roots.^^ And
more lately, Jalal has carried the discussion beyond the focus on community inherent in the
aforementioned works, to consider the place of the individual in the Indo-Muslim moral
discourse."^'*Like earlier studies, however, the majority o f work has concentrated on the
late 19* and early 20* centuries, the era o f British Raj. Thus, much more can be learned
o f the links between the South Asian Muslim discourses o f the colonial and the pre-
72 Faaana Shaikh, Community and Ccmmsua in Islam: Muslim Recreseatatioa in Colonial India 1860-1947 (Cambridge:
University Press, 1989), p, 8,
73 C A Bayly, The P)re-Histoiy ofComnmnalism? Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860, Modem Asian Studies 19 :2
(1985). pp. 177-203.
74 A Jalal, Self and Sovereignty:. lodividBal and Commttoitv in Scwth Asian Isteia.ame6J850 (London: Routledge, 2000).
25
colonial periods. Furthermore, beginning this discussion in the pre-colonial period affords
the opportunity to consider various intellectual and institutional developments as they
immerge, thus checking any tendency to view late 19*-eariy 20* century developments as
aged traditions, or aged traditions as late developments.
To unravel the above links, the theoretical writings o f Mannheim and Ricoeur suggest
an enticing approach. Beyond capitalizing on the novelty of considering the rise o f Muslim
Nationalism in Utopian terms, this study aims to show that Ricoeur and Mannheims
concepts provide (or imply) a broader conceptual framework that is well suited to the study
o f Islam and Muslim politics in South Asia. Through the lenses o f Ideology and Utopia in
unison, one is afforded an intimate glimpse o f how Islam was entwined in the socio
political and cultural turns of the pre-colonial and colonial era. Furthermore, the
theoretical approach outlined above is also advantageous in that it implies a methodology
for this particular study.
Ricoeur and Mannheim suggest that in approaching a given environment, one must
first ask whether there are not ideas as yet unrealized in reality which transcend a given
reality...În this context, that implies a textual analysis of Muslim sources in search o f
ideas that do not conform to the social structures active in Muslim society; that is, a search
for Islamic Utopias. The same pool of sources would also reveal ideas that distort or
legitimate extant social structures; that is, Islamic Ideologies. Regional, chronological
and class variations in social structure may then be considered in the context o f the variety
o f antagonistic Islamic Utopias and Ideologies present in a given locale. The key, o f
course, is to know the social structures active in Muslim society, the given reality in
26
which this work is interested.
I approach the above problem by declaring that for the purpose o f this study, what is /
is the reality constructed by South Asianists. In this light, any aspect o f Islamic thought
that legitimates/distorts the reality described as, for example, feudal by Guha and
Chatterjee, is referred to as Ideological. In actual practice, that is to say I consider Islam
to be distorting and/or legitimating reality when a feudal institution, such as slavery, is
doctrinally justified by Muslims. When a doctrinal ideal transcends the reality constructed
by South Asianists, however, it is referred to as U topian/ In actual practice, that is to
conclude that when a Muslim writes or acts upon ideals that transcend the feudal in the
name o f Islam, he/she is the well-disposed reader/ andIslam the plausible
hypothesis associated with the influence o f Utopianism in a given society.
The greatest difficulty with the above approach in the context o f a single work is that
theoretical and methodological concerns dictate a multi-disciplinary survey o f Islamic
thought stretching back more than a millennium, besides Muslim institutions on a
geographic scale set by the dimensions o f South Asia. Thankfully, the forerunners of the
new study of Muslim Nationalism unanimously suggest that colonial Muslim views were
particularly shaped by the ingredients o f a Mughal political culture.^Âs well,
discussed at greater length in Chapter 1, the 16-17* centuries are agreed by South Asianists
and Islamicists to have ushered in the culmination o f long established cultural patterns, and
the inception of new socio-political and cultural tropes. Thus, it is appropriate to narrow
chronological parameters to begin in 1526, the earliest date at which one can speak o f a
27
Mughal state in South Asia, let alone a Mughal political culture. This also focuses the
discussion on a particular polity. Furthermore, as the Mughal state ruled in two distinct
phases - that of the Great Mughals (1526-1707) and the Lesser Mughals (1707-1858)-
this era can be divided into manageable periods.
Muslim Nationalism is generally understood to have developed in two contiguous
phases, the first roughly encompassing the late 19*century, the second covering the early
20* centuries. Given that historians argue that the second phase follows from new lines
of thought and institutions initiated in the first, this study elects only to consider the first
phase to establish the relationship between the old Mughal political culture, extinct with
the state in 1858, and the new culture given birth under colonial administration in the late
19* century. Thus, the ultimate chronological parameters cover 1526-1900.
These chronology parameters remain temporally vast, and barely address the
expansiveness o f intellectual diversity and physical demography that must be covered.
However, in the shadow of a great deal o f secondary scholarship, by South Asianists and
Islamicists, one can be directly guided to the most pertinent cultural movements in each
phase o f the discussion. One can also be instructed in the most important intellectual
figures and schools. As for the scale o f the physical demography involved, the same
secondary works allow one to consider different localities (geographic, class-based,
religious, and so on), while retaining a general framework into which the local can be
slotted. And finally, the number of localities to be considered is further reduced by
restricting this study to no more than a search through the Ideologies and Utopias of the
Mughal era for notions o f community inclusive of the idea o f Muslim India - the
28
cornerstone of Muslim Nationalist rhetoric in the era of British Raj.
Sources
Considering only the historiographical dimension o f this study, it is primarily
interested in sources that illuminate the Ideologies and Utopias o f the Mughal era and
suggest whether Mughal political culture is best represented as Islamic or Indian.
Furthermore, these sources must reveal whether the modes o f power active in the Mughal
era are best described as feudal /communal, as core Subaltemists have argued, operating
through coercion (sheer force o f arms) and persuasion (religious thought), as
described by other influential members of the group. They must also shed light on a given
Ideology or Utopias range of influence, in terms o f time, physical location and/or class.
And finally, they must illustrate the manner in which individual Ideologies or Utopias
further or retard relations between fellow Muslims, and between Muslims and non-
Muslims.
To date, Islamicist and South Asianist discussions o f Mughal and colonial political
culture have drawn their insights from a variety o f sources. Prime among them are the
scholastic writings o f Muslim mystics, jurists, theologians and philosophers; literary
works, including poetry, travelogues and histories; and, Orientalist scholarship, colonial
records and newspapers. This study benefits from previous scholarship by focusing on
seminal works from the above pool. From this focus, I gain the opportunity to fulfill my
historiographical objectives by considering largely the same types o f sources as used by
previous historians, only viewed from an alternative approach. Regarding my own
29
conclusions, drawing from this pool also presents the opportunity to consider such sources
together, an opportunity seldom arising given that sources are written in Arabic, Persian,
English and other European languages, besides a host of South Asian vernaculars.
However, seminal Arabic and Persian works are now available in English and Urdu
translation, while there are sufficient original works in English, Urdu and Punjabi to take
into consideration something of the variety o f sources, and consider more than one
locality, whether circumscribed by class, language, geography or vocation.
The choice of particular works is further explained in the coming chapters, but the
prime works involved can be listed as follows. From scholastic works in Arabic, I consider
the writings of al-Ghazali, al-Mawardi, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Muqaffa, Ibn Rushd, Ibn al*
Arabi and Shah Wali Allah. From Persian, I read Barani, al-Hujwiri, Nizam al-Din
Awliya, Sharif al-Din Maneri, Nizam al-Mulk and Shah Wali Allah. In Urdu, I draw from
the works of Muhammad Ismail, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Imad Allah Thanawi, Ashraf
Ali Thanawi, Muhammad Qasim Nanawtawi and Sayyid Ahmad Khan. From literary
works in Persian, I read numerous historical works, and a travelogue. In Urdu, I consider
the historical writings of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Altaf Husayn Kali, as well as the latters
poetry and the formers travelogue. In Punjabi, I focus on a collection o f more than sixty
orally transmitted tales, songs and plays recorded in the mid-19* century. And, in
European languages, I take up English, French, Portuguese and Italian travelogues from the
17* century. Further to Orientalist scholarship and colonial records, I turn to a host of
published writings by colonial administrators, while also scouring two immense microfilm
collections for appropriate works; that is. The Eishteenth Century (Cambridge: Chadwick-
30
Healey, 1986-), and The Nineteenth Century (Reading: Research Publications, 1984-). For
British and colonial newspapers, I draw from microfilm publications o f the London Times
and a selection of newspapers from the microfilm collection, Early English Newspapers
(Reading: Research Publications, 1980-). As well, newspapers, periodicals and documents
related to various socio-political organizations in the late 19* century are accessed through
a number of printed documentary collections.
As these sources and the preceding historiographical discussion should suggest, within
the large ocean o f South Asian Studies, this works follows a few others beginning the
consideration of ties between Mughal political culture and Muslim Nationalism. However,
under the gaze o f a novel theoretical approach, the same pool o f sources is sufficient to
consider whether more can be added to the history o f Muslim Nationalism and Pakistan
than can be learned from a concentration on developments in the colonial era alone. As
well, regarding theory itself, these sources allow one to take up the issue o f whether Utopia
and Ideology are best conceived as the sealed compartments that Ricoeur suggests in the
European context, when applied in a Muslim context.
In the coming chapters it is made explicitly clear that, more often than not, a single
text includes separate notions that arguably legitimate and transcend what is, thus
implying Utopias that are not absolutely transcendent, unrelated to contemporary
Ideologies, or even distinguishable from Ideologies as declared and undeclared genres.
Rather, the sources reveal that in Muslim societies (pre-colonial and colonial)
antagonistic Islamic visions that transcend what is are written and spoken, but that they
are part and parcel o f imaginings that simultaneously legitimate/distort aspects o f what is
31
(at least, when the given reality is defined by the works of South Asianists under the
influence o f such analytical categories as feudalism, as generally defined by anyone from
Montesquieu to Chatteijee).
Armed with this understanding o f Ideology and Utopia, it is argued that a variety o f
Islamic Utopias/Ideologies vied for influence among Muslims in the period o f Great
Mughals, not merely among the elite, but also among the subaltern. It is also shown that
in the period ofLesser Mughals, Muslims o f various classes continued to imagine
community through educations in Islam, rather than being restricted to those communal
idioms introduced by the British or allowed by such authors as Guha and Chatteijee. As
well, one o f the communities included in the evolving Ideologies/Utopias of the Mughal
Era in toto, was a religio-political (though not nationalistic) Muslim India. Ultimately,
the sources lead one to conclude that this notion o f religio-political community - bom in
the elite halls o f Mughal palaces - took various ideal and practical forms over time, finally
being translated into nationalism by a rising Muslim bourgeoisie that then named it
Pakistan at the close o f British Raj.
Chapter One
Reason and Intuition. Sobriety and Intoxication;
The Categories of Islamic Thought
The eminent Islamicist, Marshall G.S. Hodgson, classifies the Mughals, along with the
Ottomans and Safavids, as G/ior/ states and Gunpowder Empires, in effect distinguishing
them on ideological and socio-economic grounds from tiieir Muslim predecessors/ On
intellectual and institutional grounds, however, Hodgson sees the period of Great Mughals
(16* -17* century) as the culmination in a culture long already mature, rather than a period
in which one witnesses the origination of new patterns/
Hodgsons understanding of the M u ^ l era as ideologically and socio-economically
distinct from the previous centuries corroborates the views o f South Asianists. His
understanding of the Mughal era as the culmination, rather than origination of cultural
patterns, also runs parallel to South Asianist views. Indeed, in some important respects it is
only the degree to which the former reads these ideas and institutions as part of Islamdom or
Islamicate Civilization, and the latter interprets them as idiomatically and institutionally
1 The tenn ghazi (lit, raider) dates to pre-Islamic Arabia. By the 14th century, it had coma quite firmly to mean orte who raids in
the service of Islam, particularly înstnraa-Muslims. Hodgson argues that the rise of the Mughal (1526-1858), Ottoman (1325-1924)
and Safevid (1498-1722) states - which together ruled the larger part of Eastern Europe, North Afiica, and West and South Asia - is
rooted in the activities of 14th-15th century Turiticg/wzts, Thus, Hodgson understands the ideologies of the ghazi to have played a great
role in the each states founding.
The reference to gunpowder obviously notes the advent of its military usage among Muslims about the 14th century - another
decisive element in each states founding. Furthennore, Hodgson couples ghazi spirit with gunpowder because the first firmly anchcas the
Mughals, Ottomans and Safevids in Islam, while the latter is one of the developments signalling proximity to modernity. For
Hodgsons entire thesis otmceming the Mughals, Ottomans and Safevids, as well as the rise and development of the Muslim World, see,
Marshall G.S, Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
32
33
Indian that separates Hodôn from South Asianists.
For Islamicists in general, the period preceding Hodgsons Ghazi states and Gunpowder
Empires began with the decline of the Caliphate and laying of the foundations o f Sultanate
about the 10* century. While the advent o f the Mughal era was limited to ideological and
socio-economic change, the 10* century is argued to have also marked the origination of new
cultural patterns.^ In terms o f intellectual history, the new is often illustrated through the
writings of Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 1111). In light of the opinions of some
Islamicists, such as W. Montgomery Watt, the entire expanse of time from the 12* to tiielT*
centuries could be termed a a post-Ghazalian era, given that al-Ghazali is credited with
delivering an already beleaguered Arabic Neo-Platonism... a blow from which it could not
recover, while bringing to fruition the trend of drawing orthodoxy and mysticism closer
together.^Hodgson and more contemporary scholars, however, prefer to conceive of this as
the Middle Period (beginning in the 10* century), thus avoiding the tendency of some to
accredit too much influence to al-Ghazali.
Whatever al-Ghazalis personal influence in shaping the era which culminates in the
16*-17* centuries, his works represent an opportune place to begin a discussion of What is
Islam? - or more precisely, what is Middle Islam? His works afford one a glimpse of the
intellectual characteristics of the period as they have just emerged. One is also made privy to
die personal perspective of a distinguished scholar in 11* century Baghdad, a centuries old hub
2 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 3, p. 15

3 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 2, p. 1. Other standard texts that exhibit this view include, Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and
the Age of the Caliphates: The Islatnc Near East from the 6tfa to the 11th century (Londtm; Longman, 1986); and Ita iapidus, A History of
Islamic Societies (Cambridge: University Press, 1988).
4 W, Montgomery Watt, The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963), p. 15. As Watts enthusiasm
for al-Ghazali suggests, a great deal has been written on the man and his thought A comprehensive view of the mans thought can be
34
of learning. Comparing ai-Ghazalis writing with that of a contemporary Muslim scholar in the
environs of the Indus River Valley - the sole portion of India under Muslim political
domination by the 11* century^ - would thus also begin the discussion of what Islam is in
Mi^hal domains? In Ali ibn Uthman al-Hujwiri (d 1058) and his work entitled, Kashfal-
Mahjub, one has just such a scholar and the ideal literary piece for comparison Beyond
satisfying the geographical component mentioned above, al-Hujwiris work is the earliest
extant Persian work on Sufism. As well, al-Hujwiri lived just prior to al-Ghazali, thus his work
could not have been influenced by al-Ghazali. The differences and similarities in their
intellectual visions, therefore, offer insight on the question of what is
idiomatically/institutionally Indian or Islamic about the Mughal era.
While the discussion of al-Ghazali and al-Hujwiri begins to address a number o f
intellectual concerns, it only partially introduces the topic of social institutions, Utopian or
Ideological. For this, one must consider the ideals of the schools, disciplines and sects to
which al-Ghazali and al-Hujwiri refer. As this intellectual playing field is vast, the works of
Islamicists are employed to guide one to key disciplines and seminal authors from the 11* to
15* centuries. The disciplines considered here - in keeping with a focus on social institutions -
found in F.M. Frank, Ai-fihay,aK and Asharite School (DurSmm: Duke University Press, 1994).
5 Islam Was first introduced to South Asia by Arab traders in the late 7th centoty, but Muslim political history in the region does
not pK^terly begin until the early 8th eentuiy, wdien Baluchistan and Sind (the lower Indus Valley) were annexed by the Umayyads (661 -
750). Govermnent of these Utnayyad provinces was transferred to the Abbasids (750-1517) in 750, but 1^ the end of the century several
anirs were ruling cpite independently of orders frfflii Iraq. By the 10th century, many of these amirs had pledged suzerainty to the
Abbasids Shii rivals, the Fatimids of Egypt (909-1171), thus further distancing themselves from central authority. This independence
was short-lived, however, as the cusp of the lOth-11th centuries marics the rise of the Turkic Ghaznavids (996-1118) in Afghanistan, their
atmexation of Baluchistan and Sind, and extension of Muslim politica! authority into Punjab (the upper Indus Valley and its tributaries).
Ohaznavid authraity was overthrown in the 12th century by the Turidc Gfaurids (1152-1206) of Afghanistan. The latter went on to extend
Muslim political authority eastward, beyond the Indtis Valley, leadiiig to the founding of the Delhi Sultanate in 1206. For a primaiy
account of this period, one widely cited in seormdaiy works, see, Ali ilm Hamid al-Kufi, Falh Nama-i Sind, ed. and trans. N.A. Baloch
(Islamabad.'. Institute of Islamic History, Culture and Civilization, 1983). For a broad secondary survey of this period, see, Andre Wink,
35
are Law {shari a) amd Sufism {tariqa). The jurists and mystics considered will be introduced
below.
Having outlined the basic parameters of Middle Islam, one is positioned to begin
considering another aspect of this studys general discussion: the cultural consequences of
being educated in Middle Islamic Utopias and Ideologies. In general, this study focuses
throughout on notions of community (e.g., ethnic, linguistic, class, vocation-based, etc.)
expressed in the literature. This chapter in particular only begins the discussion by considering
whether, in place of the Islamicist tendency to read the Mughal era in terms of Islam and the
South Asianist tendency to identify it with India, one can speak in terms of cultural
syncreticism This idea is not new, so it is here addressed through the arguments of its
detractors, and in consideration of the discussion of Islamic th o i^ t and institutions that
precedes it.
T: al-Ghazali and al-Huiwiri: Categorizing Islamic Thought in the Middle Period
After four years as a professor at one of the premier institutions of learning in the 11*
century, the Madrasa al-Nizamiyya in Baghdad, al-Ghazali resigned for personal reasons. In his
Mtmqidh min al-Dalal^ written some years later, he speaks o f the disillusionment with
scholastic learning that drove him to seek an alternative approach to Truth. In the process of
relating his conclusions, al-Ghazali lists all the Classes of Seekers he considered on the
journey, thou^ he does not find all are travelling the same road as he.
Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic Wcgld- vol. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990).
6Abtt Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, Munqidh min al-Dalal, ed. and trans. W. Mcmtgomeiy Watt, The Faith and Practice of al-
36
According to al-Ghazali, there are four intellectual classes, one to which he belonged
v ^ le a professor, two that he studied and rejecte4 and the last in which he found reason to
end his search. These are listed as: 1) the mutakallimm - exponents of thought and
intellectual speculation; 2) ftrefalasifa - exponents of logic and demonstration; 3) the
batiniyya - who derive truth from an infallible imam [leader]; and, 4) the sufjyya - who
possess vision and intuitive understanding.În reviewing each, ai-Ghazali explains the
general objectives, and identifies some specific disciplines and schools of each class.
The mutakallimm are specialists in Ulm al-kalam, or scholastic theology. Al-Ghazali
describes their science as the use of systematic argumentation to fffotect the creed
received from the prophetic source against heretical innovations.* In so far as their methods
allow, al-Ghazali suggests that this class has been successful in fulfilling its objectives.
However, methods based on the premises o f their opponents, or which the mutakallimm were
compelled to admit by taqlid [imitation], or ijma [consensus], or bare acceptance of the
Quran and hadith^"'^ are the reason al-Ghazali cites for his own dissatisfaction with this class
of intellectuals.
OhazaE-CLahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963).

7 Ibid., p. 26-7.
8 Ibid., p. 28.
9 Taqlid, ijma saAhaSith ate considered below. For the histray of the Quran, see, C.J. Adams, Quran, The EncvcU
ReligicHi. toL 12 (New Ycrfc: MacMillan, 1987): 156-76. For more in depth study displaying alternative perspecties, see Fazlur Rahman,
Major Themes of the Quran (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994): and, J. Wansborough, Quranic Studies {Oxford: Universi^ Press,
1977).
10 Al-Ghazali, mm al-Dalal, p. 28-9. In general, islamicists concur with al-Ghazalis description of kalcm. The first
foonal 'school' of hakm was known as the Mu'tazila and arose in the 8th century. The Mutazila opposed a number of other groups with
five principles which they held to be internally ccmsistent. All these principles are related to the feet that the Mu'tazila were advocates of
freewill The groups arguing for predestination (jabr) soon after coalesced around the works of al-Ashari and al-Maturidi. Despite
difference over stich issues as fieewill and predestination, all three schools were united in some regards, such as the absolute
transcendence of God The Mutazila, Ashari and Maturidi Schools would define the field of kakm in the Middle Period, among
Sunni and/rar Shii scholars. For an introduction to kaSim, see, M.E. Marmnra, ed. Islamic Theology and Philosoriiv (Albany; SUMY
37
The falasifa are specialists in hikma, or speculative philosophy. Al-Ghazali divides them
into three groups, labeling them: the Dahriyun (Materialists); the Tabi 'yun (Naturalists); and,
the Ilahiym (Theists). *' Each of these groups is described as engaging in one or more of six
philosophical sciences: Mathematics, Logic, Natural Sciences, Metaphysics, Political
Science and Ethics. In each of these sciences al-Ghazali finds nothing inherently
unacceptable. His only objection is their propensity to lead the Muslim away from the creed
received from the prophetic source, not merely as defmed by the mutakallimm, but
particularly by the Ashari School. This is illustrated in that he finds the Dahriym
(Materialists) are ^'zanadiqah" (heretics) because they deny the Creator... and consider that
the world has everlastingly existed.*^The case of die Tabi 'yun (Naturalists) is more subtle.
They are said to acknowledge the Creator through manifold researches into the world of
nature and the marvels o f animals and plants.'* Only fiiose who conclude from this that the
non-existent can not retum to existence, or those who argue that temperament has a role
in constituting the power of animals, are declared heretical. The arîment is that such
beliefs deny the omnipotence of God, not to mention the reward and punishment of Heaven,
Press, 1984); M. Watt, The Fomiative Period of Islamic Thoutfht (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 1973), p. 229; H.A. Wolfson,
The Philosodhv of the Kalam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univarsity Press, 1976). For the Ash'aii school in particular, see, George
Makdisi, Ash'aii and the Ash'arites in Islam Religious History, Studia Islamica 17 (1%2); 37-80; 18 (1963): 19-39. Forthe Mutazila,
see, Richard Frank, Beings and their Attributes : The Teachings of the Bastan School of the Mutazila in the Classical Period (Albany;
SUNY Press, 1978).
11 Al-Ghazali, Munqidh min al~Dalal, p. 30. Islamicists conftnn that Muslims engaged in the range of philosophical activity al-
Ghazali describes, though not his understanding of specific thinkers. For an introduction to the subject, see, Hesiri Corbin, Histwvof
Isiamic Philosoohv. trans. L. Sherraid (London: Kegan Paul, 1993>; Maiid Fakhrv. A History of Islamic Philosophy. 2nd edition (New
Yk; Columbia University Press, 1983).
12 Al-Ghazali,Munqidh mm al-Dalal, pp. 33-43. Al-Ghazalis six philosophical sciences are based on al-Farabis classification in
his lh a aJ-Ulum. Fot a discussion of this work and the physical sciences (i.e., mathematics, astronomy, medicine, ohmistiy, etc.), see,
Sayyid Husain Na-sr. Science, and Civilizatioa in Islam (1.ahore: Suhail Acadany, 1999).
13 M djhazali,M unqidh min al-Dalal, p. 30.
14 Ibid., p. 31.
38
Hell and the Day of Judgement.'^ Similarly, the Ilahiyun (Theists) are attacked primarily for
dieir metaphysics. Al-Ghazali places Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, along with Ibn Sina (d.
1037) and al-Farabi (d. 950) in this group.T he Muslim thinkers are particularly condemned
for their Aristotelian views, which al-Ghazali believes are unable to satisfy the conditions of
proof... in logic.' As well, concepts such as God knowing only universals not particulars,
and spirit not body joumeying to the afterlife, amount to the denial of the same
theological propositions as in the case of the Naturalists.'*
Al-Ghazalis third class of seekers is the batiniyya, whom he describes as followers of
Pythagorian metaphysics and the doctrine of authoritative instruction (to 7iw).' In the latter
regard, al-Ghazali informs one that the batiniyya argue that in searching for the unseen
(batin) - that is, the Truth - not every instructor is adequate, there must be an infallible
instructor {mu'allimy'^^ Al-Ghazalis response is that on metaphysical grounds Aristotle long
ago exposed the weakness and corruption in Pythagorian thought.^' On practical grounds, al-
Ghazali finds the infellible teacher doctrine flawed in that there is no demonstration of
15 Ibid, p. 31.
16Aloog with Abu al-Walid Ibn Rusbd (d. 1098), Abu Ali al-Husain Ibn Sina (d. 1037) and Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-
Farabi (d.950) ate among the most studied Islamic philosophers following in the peripatetic tradition. Apart from the works of H. Coibin,
M. Fakhry, and M.E. Mamiura, cited above, for Ibn Sina, also see, D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1988). For AI-Farabi, see, J. Lsmeer, Al-Farabi and Aristotelian Svllotristics (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994). For Ibn Rushd, see, G. Endless
and J, Aertsen, A v m oes and Ih e A ristoteliaaTraditicMi (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999).
17 Al-Ghazali, Munqidh min al-Dalal, p. 37.
18 Ibid., p. 37.
19 In generaL al-Ghazalis batinyya refers to Shi'ism, but particularly that line (Ismai'ilism) associated with the Fatitnid Imamate
and a group of scholars known as the Brethren of Purity, who are confirmed by Islamicists to have held neo-PythagOTian views. For an
introduction to the subject, see, S.H.M. Jafn, The Origins and Early Development of Shii Islam (LondOTi: Longman, 1979); Bemaid
Lewis, The Origins of Ismailism (Cambridge: W. Heifer, 1940); Majid Momen, An Introduction to Shii Islam (New Haven: Yale Press,
1985); S.M. Stem, Studies in Early Ismailisni (Leiden: E.J. BiilL 1983); and, I.R. Nettoo, Muslim Neo-PiatcaiLsts: An Introduction to the
Thought of the Brethren of Purity (Lond; Allen and Unwin, 1982). The sectarian and political implications of the doctrine of
authoritativB instruction are discussed below.
20 Al-Ghazali, Munqidh min al-Dalal, p. 45,
39
who this person m i^ t be.^ And, on theological grounds he argues that the only infallible
instructor is Muhammad, no one after him.^^
The final class which al-GhazaU considers, ftie siftyya^^ is immediately set apart from the
rest in the very tone ofhis language. In comparing the knowledge gained through this and
other classes, al-Ghazali gushes: What a difference there is between knowing the definition of
health and satiety... and being healthy and satisfied.^^ In many respects, al-Ghazali means this
quite literally, knowledge in the Sufi way {tariqd) ultimately not being apprehended by
study, but by immediate experience (dhawq).^ This experience is not that of sensory
{KTception, which al-Ghazali in any case argues is proved limited by intellectual
apprehension, or reason ( aql). This is supra-intellectual apprehension, or intuition
(kashf), which he argues exposes reasons limits. In al-Ghazalis words: the man to whom He
has granted no immediate experience at all, apprehends no more of what prophetic revelation
21 Ibid.p- 53.
22 Ibid., p. 52.
23 Ibid, p. 45.
24 AlOhazali is himself considered one of the great writers on Sufram, but its origins date further back to the era immediately after
Muhammads death. Although a host of factors are considered, Islamicists generally agree that Sufisms beginning lies with early pious
Muslims, such as Abu Dhair al-Ghiferi (d. 652) and Hudhayfa (d. 657) both companions of the Prophet, who chose the hard ascetic life.
Within fifty years, Hasan al-Basri (d 728) would cany this impulse forward by proposing a spiritual 'method' to achieve inner contentment
{rida), involving reflection (flkr) and self.examination {muhasabah). In the following half century, al-Basris influence would be felt in
many circles. However, Rabi'a al-'Adawiya (d.801) is credited with not cmly followii^ al-Basri's lead but developing out of the concept of
yearning (shawq) for God her own idea of the love Qmbb) of God, In words attributed to her, "a love of passion and a love prompted by
Hiy worthiness as an object of love." Cited in Fakhry, A Histtrrv of Islamic Philosophv. p. 153. Also see, A.J. Arbeny, Sttfism: An
Account of the Mystics of Islam INew York: Harper & Row. 1970V. Fazlur Rahman. Islam (Chicago: Universitv ftess. 1979); J.S.
Trimingham, Tte Sufi Orders in Islam (London: Oxfcsd University Press, 1971); Annemarie Schimmel, Mvstical Dimensions of Islam
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); and V. Baldick, Mvstical Islam: An Introduction to Sufism (London: I.B. Taurus,
1989).
25 Al-Gbazaii, Munqidh min ai-Dalal, p. 55.
26 Ibid, pp. 54-5,
27 Ibid, p. 24.
40
really is than the name.^
Al-Ghasali writes o f two stages o f supra-intellectuai apprehension By means of
various exercises designed to sink the heart completely in the recollection of God, the
individual can experience revelations and visions, and sight angels and the spirits of prophets
while in a waking s t a t e .In the higher stage, one is said to experience annihilation {farm )
in God. Al-Ghazali eschews the task of putting into words a state (/ml) he claims can not be
accurately articulated. However, he criticizes the descriptions of farm articulated by some
Sufis. Those that conceive of the state in terms o f incarnation (hulul), union (ittibad) or
connection {wusul) are declared in error.Although al-Ghazali does not explain his reasons
here, one can infer that his problem is that such terms imply an immanent divinity,
transgressing the mutakallimm's understanding of God as transcendent^^
Although al-Ghazali presents the intellectualism ofhis day in terms o f four classes, it is
clear that other intellectual categories are also inferred. To begin with, there is the division
between advocates of reason and advocates of intuition. Further than this, there is a division
within the advocates of intuition on the issue offarm and the implication of immanence or
28 Ibid., p. 61.
29 Ibid., 60-1.
30 Ibid., p. 61. The origin of the doctrine offm a ' is as obscure as that of Sufism. Interestingly, the likeness bstweeo the ctmcept and
oertaia Hindu and Buddhist jmnciples has prompted some to arpie that the doctriae of 'annihilation in unity' fl'l-tawhid) may
have been introduced by the conversion of Hindus or Buddhists, such as Abu 'All al-Sindi. He is reputed to have been one of Abu Yazid
al-Bastamis (d. 874) teachers, the lattCT of whom, along with Husain ibn Mansur al-Hallaj (d.922), popularized the conc^t with
declaiatirms such as T am Truth {cma l-haqq), an echo of the Vedantic 'That you are' {tat tvam asi), and similar Buddhist concepts. The
most extensive arguments of this kind are made in R.C. Zaehner, Hindu and Muslim Mysticism (Oxford; One World, 1994); and T.
Izutsu, A Comtiarative Study of the Kev Philosophical Concepts in Sufism and Taoism. 2 vols. (Tokyo; KICLS, 1966-67). Islamicists such
as Corbin and Fakhry may not agree with the specifics of Zaehnas aigumsnts, but they do ocmcette the influence of Hindu and Buddhist
thought in Sufism and Islamic thought in general. For example, see, Fakhry, A History of Islamic Hiilosophy. p. 270
31 Al-Bastami (d. 874) and al-Hallaj (4922) ate two of the originators of the line which al-Ghazali finds in error. A sraninal work
on this lias is, L. Massignon, La Passion de Hosavn Ibn Mansur Hallai. 4 vols. (Paris: Gallimard 1975). Ai-Ohazalis line begins with
such individusls as al-Junayd (d. 910), who fffranotrai the cosscept of'subsistence' {baqd) to counter the implication of an immanent
41
transcendence. Underlying this last division, as previously mentioned, is al-Ghazalis
steadfast advocacy o f the mutakallimm^ s reasoning on the creed received from the prophetic
source. The same premise is employed to divide the advocates o f reason. For example, he
states;
The man who verbally professes belief in prophecy, but equates the prescriptions of the
revealed scriptures with philosophic wisdom, really disbelieves in prophecy, and believes
only in a certain judge [i.e., the philosopher].^^
In essence, this implies that apart from the four classes of seekers, alGhazali also alludes to
four categories of th o u ^ t Those who equate the Truth gained through independent
reason and/or intuition with that derived from revelation (wahy), and those who always
place the latter - i.e.. Truth derived from revelation - above conclusions reached through
independent reason and/or intuition. It is in terms of these more abstract categories o f thought
that we begin the discussion of al-Hujwiri.
Between Ghazna and Lahore, far from the intellectual environments ofTus and Baghdad
that nurtured alGhazali, in a time when alGhazali was no more then a boy, al-Hujwiri wrote
the Kashfal-Mahjub. This temporal and geographic distance appears to have had no bearing
on the permeation o f the above categories o f th o u ^ f in al-Hujwiris concepticm o f Islam, as
well as the disciplines of study and schools with which alGhazali illustrated his views. In
terms of the distinction between advocates of reason and intuition, al-Hujwiri writes that
while gnosis (ma rifat) among the mutakallimm is achieved through right cognition (//m)
o f God, among the Sufis it is achieved through right feeling {hal) towards God.^^ In the
same context, he writes disapprovingly of theological schools, such as the Mutazila, who
divinity. See, Fakhry, A HSstory oOslmMS HMloagliy, p. 241-56.

32 Al-GhazaK, Munqidh min al-Dalal, p. 77. Also see, pp. 72-73.
42
argue that gnosis is intellectuai and... only a reasonable person ( aqit) can possibly have it
in effect, denying intuition a role.^"^ Much like al-Ghazali, al-Hujwiri argues that reason and
intuition are not mutually exclusive. In al-Hujwiris words; the exoteric aspect o f Truth
without the esoteric is hypocrisy, and the esoteric without the exoteric is heresy.
Beyond the basic division between reason and intuition, al-Hujwiri also acknowledges
further division in these categories that concur with al-Ghazali. In terms o f intuition,
distinctions are based on descriptions off m a According to al-Hujwiri, these fall into two
categories, intoxication {sukr) and sobriety {sahw). In essence, the premise of the
intoxicated is that the fixity and eqiulibrium ofhuman attributes is the greatest veil
between God and Man, thus must be destroyed in the state o f annihilation. This state is
described as the destruction ofhuman attributes... in God, so that only those faculties survive
in him that do not belong to the human genus.^^ To the sober, the destruction ofhuman
attributes is not so absolute; rather, human attributes subsist in God as if in suspensioa Thus,
the sober describe the state as the vision of subsistence {baqa ) while the attributes are
annihilated.^*Evidently, these are siM e distinctions, but they do express the same division
highlighted by al-Ghazali. In effect, the intoxicated are those whose ideas imply an
immanent divinity, while the sober maintain a transcendent God in line with the
mutakallimm.
In the realm of reason, al-Hujwiri is fer less specific than al-Ghazali. Although he
33 Ali ibn Usman al-Hujwiri, K ashfal-Mahjub, trans. Raiold A. Nidiolscm (Karachi: Dar ul-Ishaat, 1990), p. 267.
34 Ibid, p. 268.
35 Ibid.p. 14.
36 Ibid, p. 185.
37 Ibid, p. 185.
38 Ibid.p. 187.
43
mentions such philosc^hical sciences as astronomy, mathematics and medicine, he makes no
detailed study of the philosophers metaphysics. Yet, he nowhere condemns this class as a
whole. The only school he criticizes is the Sophists (sifista iyun), which he believes hold
that nothing can be known and knowledge itself does not exist He argues against them on
logical grounds, but also describes them as heretics."^ The latter assertion is not argued, but
follows from the fact that the denial of know led^ is not only the denial of revelation and
prophecy, but God - one of whose attributes, according al-Hujwiri, is knowledge that
penetrates what is hidden and comprehends what is manifest** Given al-Hujwiri and al-
Ghazalis emphasis on kalam above hikma, as well as their preference for Ashari or Maturidi
kalam above Mutaziia, one can infer that al-Hujwiri also conceived of the advocates of
reason in terms analogous to al-Ghazali. First the limit o f the Islamic, in al-Hujwiri and al-
Ghazalis opinion, is not necessarily the divide between the classes of mutakallimm and
falasifa, but that between sck)ols who deny revelation/prophecy, and those who accept them
as sources o fknowledge. And second, just as al-Hujwiri understood intuition as either
intoxicated or sober, based on the relationship between it and theological proof, it follows
he grasped reason based on the same criterion. That is, divided figuratively between the
intoxicated, who equate Truth arrived at through reason and revelation, and the sober
who hold revelation to be the prime source ofTruth.
The startling uniformity in alGhazali and al-Hujwiris understanding of Islam, not
merely in terms o f the disciplines and schools to which they refer or commonly adhere, but in
respect of more abstract categories o f thought, obviously sheds light on the question, What is
39 Ibid, p. 13.
40 Ibid, p. 15.
44
Islam? Clearly, unless one is willing to limit Islam to the intellectual and sectarian biases
inherent in al-Ghazalis 'classes of seekers, the underlying 'categories of thought in his
and al-Hujwiris work provide a less prejudicial conception of the totality o f Islam. The
only limits these categories place on the Islamic is with regard to thought that denies
revelation (i.e., the Quran) and prophecy (i.e., Muhammad) as sources of knowledge.
Thus, by adopting these categories for the Islam o f this study, only al-Ghazalis
Materialists and al-Hujwiris Sophists would be considered un-Islamic, falling outside
the common principle of Sober and Intoxicated Intuition as well as sober and
intoxicated Reason. Adding that representatives o f each category can be identified in the
centuries o f concern to this study, while the specific schools mentioned by al-Ghazali and
al-Hujwiri may have ceased to be, the utility o f these categories of thought is beyond
reproach.
Al-Ghazali and al-Hujwiri also begin to illumine the relationship between the
Islamicists Islam and the South Asianists India. On one level they suggests that at least
among Muslim scholarly classes, the categories, disciples and schools o f thought engaged
in, not to mention the idiom of discourse, is uniformly Islamic. As such, the idea that
the history of South Asian Muslims can be wholly addressed within the confines of a
historiography that essentializes die Indian is entirely untenable. On another plane, the
same works imply that geography does play a role, even among the scholarly class. For
example, while al-Ghazali describes the doctrines o f the batiniyya as Pythagorian, al-
Hujwiri likens the same to Hindu and Buddhist ideas.'^^ Furthermore, al-Ghazali writes
41 Ibid., p. 12.
42 Ibid., pp. 262-3.
45
in Arabic, while ai-Hujwiri writes in Persian. To speak o f these thinkers as representatives
of an essential Islamic culture is also not feasible. The question this discussion ultimately
raises is how intellectual uniformity is related to the cultural diversity so apparent? One
can begin to address this issue by turning to some Utopian and Ideological institutions
about which the heirs o f the 11* century wrote.
H: Middle Islam and Society
As mentioned in this studys introduction, if one accepts the Subaltemist definition o f the
Mughal era as categorically feudal, then the Ideological element o f Islamic thought would be
that which legitimizes or distorts the representative institutions, and the Utopian would be
that which transcends them. Running with this premise thus allows one to consider the
limitations of an essential understanding of Mughal political culture - i.e., one dependent on
sheer force of arms, etc. - which underlies much historical writing in South Asian Studies.
Given that law is a prime indicator of social ideals, legal philosophy is therefore a necessary
locus of discussion. In the context of the Mughals, the field of legal thought can be narrowed
to Sunnifiqh (jurisprudence), this being the official creed of the state. On the other \m ^ fiq h
is but one discipline. Thus, along with the shari a (lit, the path) of the fuqaha' (jurists), this
study chooses to discuss the tariqa (lit, the way) o f the Sufis - particularly the Intoxicated
strains furthest from the Sober thinking o f thefuqaha . In effect, this implies a consideration
o f the extremes of Islamic Utopianism and Ideology. Concerning the relationship between the
intellectual and cultural, the aspects o f shari a and tariqa that tend to legitimate local
46
cultural diversity are fwticiilarly noted for discussion in the chapters conclusion.
a) Reason and Shari a: the Sober Path
We have ordained a law

and assigned a path for each of you.
[Quran, 5:48]
The drive to articulate the law referred to in the Quran can be identified as one of
the earliest manifestations of Muslim intellectual life. By the 9* century, four major
schools (pi. madhahiblsing madhhab) of jurisprudence (fiqh) - Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and
Hanbali - had arisen in Sunni circles, while the Jafari school laid the foundations o f two
Imami Shii branches - Akhbari and Usuli - which arose between the 11* and 13'*'
centuries.
As can be inferred from the centrality of fiqh to Muslim intellectual life, this
consideration o f Middle Period legal thought is aided by the availability a host o f primary
and secondary sources. In particular, Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardis (d. 1058) Al-Ahkam al-
Sultaniyyawa al-Wilayat al~Diniyya, and Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Al-
Siyasa al-Shar 'iyya and Al-Hisba ft al-Islam are excellent starting points. Whereas al-
Mawardis perspective is that o f a Shafii jurist writing in Basra and Kufa in the early
Middle Period, under the Abbasid Caliphate, Ibn Taymiyya brings a Hanbali perspective to
the discussion, while also carrying it to the 14*** century environs o f Damascus and Cairo,
just after the Abbasid Caliphate had been moved from a Baghdad which had fallen to the
Mongols in 1258. In comparison, unlike al-Ghazali and ai-Hujwiri, who illustrate
47
differences and similarities in relation to geography, ai-Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyya are
discussed in terms o f the variety o f scholastic ideals apparent even within a given
discipline.
i) Legal Theory: Schools and Doctrines
Theoretically, all fuqaha uphold the Quran as having absolute validity as a source of
the shari a, the body o f law produced throughfiqh.*^ According to the corpus of theory
known as usul al-ftqh (sources of jurisprudence), in cases where the Quran is not explicit,
the madhahib can turn to the concept of sunna (the trodden path), referring to the
example o f the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions (Sahaba). Such examples are
drawn from the literature known to Sunni scholars as hadith, and Imami Shii scholars as
akhbar. The form o f hadith/akhbar appears to have been influenced by the pre-lslamic
Arabian preoccupation with genealogy, and derived from the genre o f khabar (pi. akhbar),
a story or an anecdote which was not so much fixed by any reference to a general time
frame as it was to a particular and unusually remaricable figure or e v e n t . A s well, for
hadith scholars the Qurans reference to Muhammads exemplary conduct meant that
these were not mere historical reports, but each contained the silent or living tradition
of the exemplar, the sunna, a concept mentioned in the Quran.'*^ Thus, a scholar could
claim to have identified a number o f sunna in each hadith. Furthermore, depending on the
43 There are oounfless wraks on fiqh, but two are recognized as the foundations of oontemilwaiy study. Ihese are, J. Schacht, An
Introduction to Islamic I,aw (Oxford; UnivCTsity Press, 1962); and, N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic I.aw (Edinburgh: Univanity Press,
1964),
44 Abdul Kader al-Tayob, The Transformation of a Historical Tradition: From Khabar to Tarikh, in American Journal of Islamic
Social Sciences 5:2 (1988), p. 220, Fcff a broader discussicm of the development of hadith literature, see, James Robson, Hadith,
Encvciopaedia of Islam. voL 3 (Leiden: E.J, Brill, 2nd, Edition), pp. 23-28, [Note: Unless otherwise i
articles are frcsn the 2nd Edition,]
45 Rahman, Islam, p, 57; al-Tayob, The Transformation of a Historical Tradition: From Khabar to Taiikh, p, 226,
48
status one accorded the early Caliphs/Imams, or companions o f Muhammad, their sunna
could also be sought, as could the "^sunna of the ancients and those who came
before(8:38,15:13,17:77, 18:55,35:43), and the swina of God(48:23,35:43,4:85), as
written in the Quran.
The Arabian literary tradition and the import placed on sunna in the growing field of
jurisprudence is quite naturally related to the growth in the ranks o f hadith scholars {ahl al-
hadith) from the earliest date. By the 10* century, hadith had evolved into a formal
science. Six works - namely, those o f Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari (d.869), Muslim
ibn al-Hajjaj (d.815), Ibn Maja (d. 887), Abu Dawud al-Sijistani (d.889), al-Tirmidhi
(d.889), and al-Nasai (d. 915) - came to be acknowledged as the Six Books o f Sunnism,
while the Muwatta' of Malik ibn Anas (d.795) and the Musnad o f Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d.
855) have also been held in high esteem. As well, the collections o f ai-Kulayni (d. 940),
Ibn Babawayh, or Shaykh al-Saduq (d. 991) and Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Tusi (d. 1067)
gained similar status among the Imami Shia.'*^ Theoretically, the soundness of a hadith
would be tested by its isnad (chain o f transmission; lit. support) and the closeness of its
matn (text) to the Quran. However, a number o f contemporary Islamicists have questioned
the authenticity o f large parts of the Islamic account of its early history based, in
particular, on the idea that isnads were fabricated at a later date.'^^
Beyond literary sources, the shari 'a is derived by ijma (the consensus o f the
learned), supplemented by qiyas (analogical reasoning) among some Sunni schools and
46 S. Humphrays, IslgeailfiJffistaiyiAJj^ far laquity (Princeton: University Press, 1991), pp. 22-3.
47 For a discussion of the controversy over isnad and the debate about the beginnings of Islamic history, see, ibid., pp. 69-103.
49
aql (reason) among the Shia.'** The process o f deriving law by this method is known as
ijtihad (independent reasoning) in both sects, and the faqih (jurist) qualified to engage in
ijtihad is called a mujtahid. Divisions between schools are dependent upon which o f the
three sources beyond the Quran {sunna, ijma or qiyas) are assigned a greater (or any)
degree o f influence in the derivation o f shari a. However, within sectarian bounds, all
schools are regarded, and regard one another, as alternative and equally valid
interpretations of the religious law oflslam .^^
One o f the foremost contemporary historians o f fiqh, Joseph Schacht, echoes the
majority o f Islamicists in pointing out that ijtihad has not been continuously employed by
thefuqaha \ He writes:
From the,.9th century...the idea began to gain ground that only the great scholars o f the
past had the right to independent reasoning in law {ijtihad), and in the... 10th century a
consensus gradually established itself in orthodox Islam to the effect that all future
activity would have to be confined to the explanation, application, and, at the most,
interpretation o f the doctrine as it had been laid down once and for all {taqlid)^
The implication is that taqlid, rather than ijtihad, is the over-riding principle of the
Middle Period. However, taqlid should not be read to mean that various degrees of
ijtihad were not called for and exercised by some, or that a rigidly codified law had
arisen. To begin with, one must repeat the fact that as all schools hold the Quran to be
central, they also acknowledge each others interpretations as valid, and extend to the
48 Although diJfere*joes in ShiH and Sunni usul are evident as the application offiqh is laigely analcôus, qtyas and 'aql may be
likaied to each other in this basic context. See, Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, pp. 185-8. For a more specialized study of Shi'i
jurisprudence, see, RM . Tabatabai, M ABMograiAutiaL Stmty (Londwi: Ithaca Press, 1984).
49 J. Schacht "Fikh," Engctopaiediapf Islam, vol. 2, p t 2, p. 890.
50 Ibid., p. 890. Also, J. Schacht An Introducticw to Islamic Law. Another standard work making the point is, N.J. Coulsc, A
History of Islamic Law. It should be noted that in the Shia context ijtihad continued among thejuqaha as a whole until the 18th centiny,
when the conoqjt of m atja' al-taqlid arose to requjre that tmly the opinions of the mujtahid considered most knowledgeable should be
Reprotjucetj with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproctuction prohibitect without permission.
50
litigant the right to request decisions by any school offiqh, including those different from
the one sponsored by the state. As well, a number of contemporary scholars have argued
that various legal concepts were employed by the fuqaha of the Middle Period to address
issues not encountered by previous generations. Prime examples are the concepts of
istihsan and istislah, which empower the jurist to show preference for a particular ruling,
even if not arrived at by qiyas, on the basis o f public interest or equity, Al-Ghazali,
writing on the concept o f istislah described it as allowing the jurist to bring into
consideration what is aimed at for mankind in law.^^ The same must be said in the case
o f juridical provisions for 'urf, ado, and 'amal (local customary law), which all schools
and sects of this period acknowledge to varying degrees. According to such concepts, the
jurist may consider a local custom shar i if it does not contradict the implicit tenets o f
the Quran and sunna.
Many contemporary South Asianists, following the lead o f earlier Islamicists, suggest
that such juridical concepts have meant the supercession o f the shari a by local custom
in the Middle Period.^** A number o f Islamicists, however, have more lately argued that
51 For an introduotmy discussion o fjuristic preference, see, R. Paret, "Istihsan and Istislah," Encvclgroedia ofTslam. vol. 4, pt. 1,
p. 257. For mews detailed discussion, see, John Makdisi, Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law, .^mericwn Journal ofComnarativE Law
33(1985), pp. 63-92; Ahmad Hassan, The Principle of Istihsan in Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic Studies 16 (1977): 347-62; Husain
Kassim, Saiakhsis Doctrine of Juristic Preference (Istihsan) as a Methodological Approach toward World Affairs, American Journal of
Islamic Social Sciences 5 (1899): 181-204; and, W.B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Lestai Theories: An Introductkm to Sunni Usul al-
jS^Camhridge: Univmity Press, 1997), pp. 107-133.
52 Cited in R. Paret, "Istihsan and Istislah," p. 257.
53 See, Mohammad Zain Otfaman, The Status of Urf in Islamic Law. IIUM Law Journal 3:2 (1993): 40-51; ML al-Awa, The
Place of Custom (urf) in Islamic Legal Theory, Islamic Quarterly 17 (1973); 177-82,, and, Ada, Eiscvclopaedia of Islam CD-ROM
Ed., vol. I (Leiden: Kmainklijke Brill, 1999).
54 Examples of later thinkers following this argument, particularly in the South Asian cwitext, include, Aziz Ahmad, An Intellectual
History of Islam in India (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969); and, S.A. A Rizvi A History of Sufism in India. 2 vols. (Delhi:
Munshiram Manoharlal, 1983).
51
such concepts allowed room for legal adaptation o f the shari 'a to changing historical and
cultural conditions.^^ The implications of both arguments are vital to our discussion.^ In
the coming chapters, this study contributes to the debate by discussing a number of
examples of the way in which the shari a was understood to include aspects o f local
custom.
Given the role o f Reason, or rational argumentation, in thefuqaha s derivation o f
shari a, the stipulation o f the Quran being the prime source of law can by no means be
read to mean a static or uniformly codified shari a, even when taqlid is the norm. Rather
than delve deeper into the sources {usul) o f the shari 'a, therefore, it is expedient to
illustrate this point by considering the breadth o f the practical prescriptions implied by
fiqh. The examples chosen, as previously stated, aim to cater to a focus on social
55 For example, Aziz al-Azmeh, Islamic Legal Theory and the A j^ p riatio n of Reality, Islamic Law: Social and Historical
Context, ed. A, al-Azmeh (London: Routlecê, 1988); Richard Antoun, The Islamic Court, &e Islamic Judge, and the accommodation of
Tradition, IJMES 12 (1980): 455-67; R. Stephen Humptaeys, Islamic Law and Islamic Society, Islamic HistOTv: A FramewoA for
Inqutrv (Princeton: Uisiversi^ Press, 1991): pp. 209-227; and, Sally Humptoeys, Law as Discourse, History and Anthropology 1 (1985):
241-64. Also, fora widw discussion of tile relationship between juridical ideals and new circumstance/social realities, see Abraham
Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity (Kew York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society
(Cambridge: Univetsi^ Press, 1984), and, Haim Gerber. State. Society and Law in Islam: Ottoman 1.aw in Comparative Perspective
(Abany: State University of New York Press, 1994).
56 The idea of supercession reflects the influence of an understanding of Islamic law in which the concept of shari 'a is ultimately
definable in the manner of a code. It is exactly this understanding one finds, for example, in the relationship drawn between shari 'a and
customary law in his, From Custom to Crime; The Politics of Drinking in Colonial South Gujarat, Subaltern Studies, vol. 4, pp. 165-
228, In this view, the orthodox Muslim does not drink, while that bound by custom over the shari a does. Similarly, an understanding of
Islamic law as a set of mwa! precepts to be loooslely applied accotxiing to local ciretanstances, as Jalal does in her. Self and Soveriegntv
(Lcmdcm; Routledge, 2(XK>), does not deter fican viewing the shari 'a and customary law as unrelated. Indicating the import of this issue to
the study of Muslim Nationalism, in the context of a discussion of colonial Punjab, she writes: As in the context of the North Western
Frontier where Muslim scribes bad only the vaguest notira of the Islamic sharia, oustmiaty or tribal k w in the Punjab superceded
Muslim and Hindu personal law in matta^ to do with property, marriage and divorce. (p. 145) Accepting that mufiis and qaJis were not
available for craisultation in all localities and instances, as Jakl goes <mto point out, and neglecting like Jalal that juristic minded Sufis
often w as, the Islamicists understanding of Islamic legal theory and practice as one in which fiqh is legitimating customary {ffactioe, <x
one in which local customary is understood to be shar in the reasoning of muftis and qadis, poses serious challenges to Jalals coaclusion
that, Athough classified as members of distinctive communities [by the British], Punjabi Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in their everyday
lives observed social customs which owed nothing to religious doctrines. (p. 146)
52
institutions. Thus, there are no better topics of discussion than war, property, taxes, and
the relationship between state, the individual and community - prominent aspects of most
legal systems.
ii) The Practical Ideals o f Theory I: The Permissible War'
Legal stipulations on the conduct of war illustrate an aspect o f the relationship
between the law and those subject to it that is a fortuitous place to begin a discussion of
the shari a, particularly if the variety of opinion available within a general paradigm is
sought. Al-Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyya agree that there are three basic groups against
whom organized campaigns may be launched by the Islamic state and engaged in by
Muslims in general. The first is bandits, the second is heretics and apostates, and the
third is non-Muslims outside a Muslim states territory.^ In theory, war against all o f the
above groups is equally justified, and one adversary is not deemed more important than
another, but different reasons are cited for confi-onting each and, consequently, the pre
conditions for combat and the rights accorded the enemy vary depending on the class o f
combatant and the scholarly orientation of the jurist.
Beginning with bandits, the main reason al-Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyya give for the
initiation o f hostilities is the disruption bandits cause in society. The punishment for these
offenders, according to both authors, is stipulated in the Quran, involving death and/or
crucifixion, the amputation o f hands and/or feet, and banishment. Al-Mawardi points out.
57 Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, R isalafi al-Siyasa ai-Shar iyya, ed. and trans. Omar Fartukh, Ibn Tavmiwa on Pubiic and
Private Law in Islam (Beirut: Khavat Book and Publishing Co.. 1966), pp. 88-99; Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, At-Ahkam al SulUmiyya wa
al~Wilayat al-Dmyya, ed. and trans. W.H. Wahba, Tl|e Onimanees of Govgmment (Reading; Garnet Publishers, 1996), pp. 60-68; 148-
53. For a general discussicm ofjihad, see, Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Medieval and.Modem.lslam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977).
53
however, there is great debate among and within the madhahib as to who among the
offenders should be accorded which punishment, and whether the state has the right to
decide independent of the fuqaha Ibn Taymiyya, meanwhile, makes no mention of
debate, specifying the Hanbali position to be death, then crucifixion, as the maximum
penalty if murder is committed, amputation if no murder resulted, and banishment if no
murder or theft was committed, but terror was inflicted on society.
The second group to be fought is apostates and heretics. Al-Mawardis primary
justification is that they have left the true faith. The standard al-Mawardi applies to judge
the apostate/heretic from the believer is entirely based on fiq h ^ For example, a believer
pays zakat (alms-tax), but heretics and apostates do not. An apostate is distinguished
from a heretic insofar as the former does not acknowledge zakat as a duty, while the
latter does, but chooses to violate the injunction.^* The punishment for the apostate is
death, without the opportunity of deferment through truce, the payment o f tax, the
forfeiture o f property, or the submission o f oneself to slavery.^^ In the case o f the heretic,
however, the end of fighting is to deter, not to kill. Thus, in opposition to the conduct
deemed legitimate with apostates, he/she cannot be attacked while retreating, the injured
and captives cannot be killed, property carmot be claimed asfay" (a concept addressed
below), women and children cannot be enslaved, and goods cannot be destroyed or
looted.^^ Ibn Taymiyya echoes al-Mawardis understanding of this mode o f combat, but
58 Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam at Sulttmiyya, pp. 68-72.

59 Ibn Taymiyja, Al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya. pp. 88-93.
60 Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al Sultaniyya, pp. 60-64.
61 Ibid., p. 63.
62 Ibid, p. 63.
63 Ibid., pp. 65-67.
54
makes less absolute distinctions between the apostate and the heretic. In his view, one that
accepts the obligation o f prayer {salat), for example, but does not perform it after being
ordered, can be put to death as an apostate.^
A significant distinction between Ibn Taymiyya and al-Mawardis references to
conflict with apostates and heretics, is that the former refers to this type o f warfare as
jihad, while the latter does not.^^ From al-Mawardis Shafii perspective, al-jihad al-
asghar, the lesser struggle, only makes reference to conflict with non-Muslims living
outside o f territory governed by Muslims. These territories are described by both, however,
as dar al-Islam (Land o f Islam) and dar al-harb (Land ofW ar).^ The import of Ibn
Taymiyyas reference to conflict with apostates and heretics as jihad, stems from the fact
that from his Hanbali perspective, not only is the distinction between the heretic and
apostate largely ignored, but those Muslims he judges in error are largely equated with
non-Muslims, and those states they rule identified as dar al-harb. Evidently, one can not
underestimate the divides between schools on the issue o f warfare. Thus, this discussion
turns to a more comprehensive source to further define the concept of al-jihad al-asghar.
In his Bidayat al-M ujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid,_ a 12* century ikhtilaf
(controversy) text that surveys the opinions o f all the Sunni madhahib on the conduct o f al-
jihad al-asghar, Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Rushd (d. 1198) devotes two
64 Ito Taymiyya, Al-Sfyasa al-Shar iyya, pp. 143-4; 147-8.

65 Ibid., pp. 135-61; al-Mawaidi, Al-Ahkam al Sultaniyya, pp. 148-53.
66 These coacqjts are not fouod in the Quran, but are mentioned in the hadith literature. Broadly speaking, by the Middle Period
they referred to areas under the governance of the shari a (dar al-IsUmi), and areas not under the governance of the shari a (dar al-harb).
Fora discussion of the development of these ooDoepts and their ties to the theory ofjihad, see, A. Abel, Dar al-Harb, Encvciopaedia of
Mam, vol. 2, pt l,p. 126; and, Dar al-Islam, Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 127-28.
55
chapters to the subject.^ Scholars agree, writes Ibn Rushd, that the jihad is a collective
not a personal responsibility.... The obligation to participate in the Jihad applies to adult
free men who have the means at their disposal to go to war and who are healthy, that is,
not ill or suffering from chronic diseases.^* Furthermore, the maximum number of
enemies against which one is obliged to stand ones ground is twice the number [of ones
own forces].^The implication is thatjihad is only obligatory on Muslim men when some
chance of success is available. Furthermore, once hostilities have commenced, Malikis and
Hanafis agree that truce is permissible when the aims o f jihad are met, or when the
Muslim leader considers it in the best interest ofhis group.
Ibn Rushd also informs one that there is general agreement on the fact that the aim of
warfare., .is two-fold; either conversion to Islam, or the payment of poll-tax [/Yg/a].^ The
generally agreed prerequisite for war is that the enemy must first have heard the summons
to Islam. In other words, the enemy must have had the opportunity either to accept
conversion or the payment o f jizya before the mujahid can embark on the warpath.
Hanbalis and Shafiis, like Ibn Taymiyya and al-Mawardi, respectively, only extend this
condition to the ahl al-kitab (People o f the Book), but Ibn Rushd points out that Malikis
and Hanafis accept thatjizya may be collected from polytheists, thus legitimating the
categorization o f Hindus, Buddhists and Jains - along with Christians and Jews - as
67 Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Rushd, B0ayat al-Mv^tdhid, trans. Rudolph Peters (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1977), p. 9,
68 Ibid., pp. 9-10,
69 Ibid., p. 21.
70 Ibid, p. 22.
71 Ibid.p. 23.
72 Ibid, p. 19.
56
dhimmis (non-Muslim subjects of the state).
Beyond the fact that two of four Sunni madhahib virtually equate polytheists and
People o f the Book - at least in so far as the states jurisdiction extends - it is important to
note that
in dealing with captives, various policies are open to the Imam [leader]. He may
pardon them, enslave them, kill them, or release them on ransom or as dhimmis, in
which latter case the released captive is obliged to pay jizya [poll-tax].
It is further stipulated that the killing of captives is only sanctioned on the condition that
aman [safe-conduct] has not been granted.^* As well, Ibn Rushd notes that some jurists
taught that captives may never be slain. This disagreement is restricted to the context
o f captives who are able-bodied, unbelieving males. However, there is no disagreement
about the rule that it is forbidden to slay women and children, provided they are not
fighting. To this Malikis and Hanafis add that neither the blind, nor the insane, nor
hermits may be slain and that of their property not all may be carried off, but that enough
should be left for them to be able to survive. Neither is it alio wed... to slay the old and
decrepit.*
When taken together, the three groups to be fought and the legal stipulations
73 Ibid, p. 24.
74 Ibid, p. 12. Literally the protected dhimmi refers to non-Muslim subjects of an Islamic state. The status accorded a non-
Muslim under Islamic governance under the ideals of this ccmoept are addressed fiather below, but for an iatroductoiy survey of the
concept of dhimmi and the actual status of non-Musliins in various Muslim settings, see, Claude Cahen, LSurtnni, Encvciopaedia Islam,
vol. 2, pp. 227-31; also, A-S.Tritton, The Caliphs and ttwir ticn-Muslim Subjects (London: Milford, Oxford University and Cass, 1930);
Bat Yeor, The Dhimmi Jew.s and Christians iinder Islam, trans. D. Maisel, P. Fenton and D. Littman (London: Associated University
Press, 1985); an4 Beajainin Braude and Banard Lewis, eds. Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. 2 vols. (London: Holmes and
Meier, 1982).
75 Ibid., p. 13.
76 Ibid,, p. 12.
77 Ibid., p. 15.
57
circumscribing offensive action indicate that the fuqaha s ideal in legitimating armed
conflict was the maintenance or spread o f the rule o f law, that is, the shari a. It is also
apparent, however, that particularly when speaking o f jihad, significant variations in, for
example, the status of polytheists, or the rights o f a captive, occur from madhhab to
madhhab. As shown below, the same can be said for ideals concerning property and taxes.
iii) The Practical Ideals o f Theory II: Property and Taxes.
In a contempoRuy li^ t, property is generally understood as a holding that may be taxed
by a state, but can only be transferred with the consent or according to the will of the owner.
Islamicists have shown that altfaou^ such a concept was evident in the fuqaha s idealization
of the relationship between land, the state and the individual, the related concepts of
inheritance and endowment, and the fiscal measures imposed on individuals and their goods,
there are instances in which the above notion o f ownership was apparently not upheld.
Furthermore, most of the institutions idealized by the fuqaha , as well as some o f the
institutions employed by the Middle Period, were quite particular to Muslim societies of that
time.
78 Ibid., p. 15.
79 The Islanricist Ali Abd al-Kadir argues that the ncmadic life of the Arabs resulted in the lack of a clearly defined theory of
land ownership in the early Muslim era. As all Arabs were not nomads, this view is suspect but its implication, that Muslim regimes had
to ad<^ the prc-Islamic practices of the conquered territories or evolve new systems of their own. is noteworthy. El-Farangi coimts that
in early Mam all wwlth belonged to the community as it was bestowed to them collectively God. Thus, heargues that the khulafa' al-
rashidun were anti-private prcperty, while the bter Caliphs wavered from the ideal, reviving un-Islamio nomis. A third option, ofered
Kenneth Cuno, is a hierarchy of ownership wherein Caliphs, intennodiates and peasants hold shared rights to land and its produce.
Together, the diveigence of above views illustrates the difficulties &eed by Islamicists concerned vrith concepts of ownership in Islamic
law, not least of which is ftagjnentaiy sources. Sec, Kenneth Cuno, The Origins of Private Ownership of Land in Egypt; A Reaf^naisal,
International Jonmal of Middle East Studies 12 (1980), 245-75; M.S. al-Farangi, La Notion de Propriete en Islam, LEovpt
ContemDoraire 59, n. 331 (1968), 63-77; Baber Johansen, The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent: The Peasants Loss of Property Rights
as Interpreted in the Hanafite Legal Literature of the Mamlufc and Ottoman Periods (London: Groom Helm, 1988); and, AH Abd al-Kadir,
58
Beginning with the relationship between the state and the land, one can return to the
writings o f al-Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyya. Al-Mawardi describes land under Muslim
governance as falling into two categories, that conquered by Muslims and under their
governance or ownership, and that governed by treaty {sidh) and held by non-Muslims
{dhimmi)^ The latter category - lands governed by treaty - is termed fay He defines the
term to mean only the financial spoils acquired from unbelievers or through them,
primarily the taxes levied on non-Muslims, their property and their persons, such as kharaj
(land tax) andjizya (poll-tax).^' In keeping with the general theory o ffay al-Mawardi and
Ibn Taymiyya treat these spoils as if reserved for the benefit o f all Muslims. However,
reflecting a particularly Shafii perspective on what this practically means, four-fifths o f
al-Mawardis f a f revenue goes to the state treasury {bayt al-mal), while one-fifth is to be
distributed among Muslims. This fifth is further divided into five shares, one for the
Caliph, one for Muhammads descendents, one for orphans, one for the destitute and the
last for wayfarers. By way o f contrast, Ibn Taymiyya does not specify portions for
distribution, but argues that shares should go to mujahids, state administrators, judges and
scholars, public works and the needy, thus making no reference to the Caliph or the
descendents of Muhammad.
Al-Mawardi, Ibn Taymiyya and their class of scholars do not exempt Muslims from
taxes, nor do they necessarily give Muslims preferential rates. Al-Mawardi writes o f the
"mhr (land tax on Muslims) and kharaj (land tax on non-Muslims) in one breath when
Lan4 Pnîerty and Land Tenure in Islam, Islamic Quarterly 5 (1959), 4-11.
80 Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam ed Sultaniyya, p. 40.
81 Ibid, p. 40.
82 Ibid., pp. 140-1.
59
describing the inodes o f assessment, making no mention o f whether differential rates are
necessary. After lengthy descriptions o f assessment based on type o f land and crops, as
well as the measures and modes of annual payment required, he concludes that the final
amount is left to the state, but should not exceed that which the farmers and landowners
can endure.^ The lack o f real distinction between ushr and kharaj in al-Mawardis
writing is more forcefully illustrated by Ibn Taymiyya, who makes no mention o f ushr,
but suggests that kharaj was originally on lands belonging to non-Muslims, but that
some Muslims now also pay it.^^ Thus, al-Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyya add credence to
the observation o f various Islamicists that by the Middle Period all lands under Muslim
rule were generally understood to be fa y , ushr was virtually abolished, and Muslim and
non-Muslim landholders paid taxes {kharaj) at the same rate.*^
Beyond land taxes, it was noted above that non-Muslims were also required to pay
jizya (poll tax), generally allowed by the fuqaha to be set by the state. Muslims, on the
other hand, were required to pay the zakat (alms tax). Furthermore, as al-Mawardis
writing illustrates, while jizya was levied on the individual free-man, zakat was to be
levied on property, seen and unseen.* Only such unseen items as jewelry were
outside the jurisdiction o f the fuqaha . Otherwise, calculations were set, down to the
minutiae, by the fuqaha , levied on everything from livestock, fruit trees and field crops, to
83 Ita Tajmiyya, Ai-Siycaa al-Shar 'iyya, pp. 48-9. Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam at-Sultaniyya, p. 211-2.
84 Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultamyya, pp. 163-65.
85 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Siyasa al-Shar 'iyya, p. 49.
86 For example, see, J.B. Simwisen, Studies in the Genesis and Early EteveioPBient.of the Caliphal Taxation .Systero (Copenhagen:
Akademisk Foriag, 1988); and, Kosei Morimoto, The Fiscal Administration of Egypt in the Eariv Islamic Period (Kyoto: Dohosha
Publishers, 1981).
87 Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Stiltaniyya, (Jizya) p. 160; (zeJcat) p. 127.
60
gold and silver.*
As previously mentioned, the manner in which concepts such as fa y ' and the fiscal
system developed (ideally and in practice) has led to great contemporary debate on the
question o f land ownership in fiqh. Al-Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyyas writings implicitly
suggest that the concept offay largely reserved revenue, not the land on which it was
levied, for the benefit of all Muslims. Thus, the state or any other authority sanctioned by
fiqh to assess and collect taxes cannot be said to own the land o f non-Muslims.
Furthermore, if the theory of f a y ' was extended to all land under Muslim governance
during the Middle Period, there could clearly also be Muslim landowners. Both are
confirmed in al-Mawardis writing that dead land, which is revived (through cultivation
or construction), is owned by the person who revives it, and that the state has no rights
other than fiscal to land in which the owner is identified.*^ The Caliphates and Sultanates
were thus not idealized by the fuqaha' as owners o f their domains. Rather, the state was
authorized by fiqh to exact stipulated taxes from landowners. The point is driven home by
the institution o f iqta
Islamicists have described iqta in various ways, including fiefdom .^ Regarding
antecedents, Islamicists have considered various possibilities, including roots in tax-
fmmn^{daman). Whatever its origins, however, Islamicists agree that at its core it is a
88 Ibid., pp. 127-33.

89 Ibid, p. 194; pp. 209-11.
90 The use of such tenns as 'fiefdom to describe iqta' reflects the fact that this type of landholding had no nmtoh in European
history. Furthennore, lack of consensus among Islamicists on exactly what relationship was envisaged between the -holder and the
persOTS woikiag the land can at least partially be explained Satos observation of historical and rîonal variations in Muslim usage
and definitions. See, Tsugitaka Sato. State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam OLeiden: E.J. Brill, 1997); and, Michael Brett, The Way
of the Peasant, Bulletin of the Sdtool of Oriental and African Studies XLVII (1984), pp. 44-56. For a sample of the variety of opinion mi
the institution, also see the works cited in ftL#78.
61
grant of the fiscal revenue of a parcel o f land to an individual by the state, whereby the
grantee must undertake to collect and remit a portion o f the revenue to the state. Confusion
arises in so far as the iqta may or may not be hereditary, the grantee may or may not be a
member of the military, he/she may or may not have to maintain the roads, irrigation
systems, etc,, o f the landholding, and, may or may not have to maintain a certain number
o f troops before deducting a salary from the revenue collected. With respect to
ownership, however, it is clear that the institution o f iqta ultimately granted its holder
few rights, as most types o f iqta were subject to state renewal. Thus, like the state itself,
its iqta -holders were not idealized as landowners, but were empowered by the state to
manage the land. Does this mean the rural peasant and urban artisan being taxed
owned the land on which they lived and worked?
Al-Mawardi indirectly sheds most light on this issue in a discussion of cultivated land
without identified owners, as after an area has been conquered. He says that the state has
a claim to one-fifth of the land, and adds that many jurists argue that the state also has the
right to sell this holding, without specifying whether the absence or presence o f the lands
cultivators is an issue of concem.^ In this light, it would appear that the peasants are not
recognized as the owners o f the land they work. Given that, at least in some respects,
neither the state, nor its officers, or the people working the land can be said to own it,
one can immediately see why Islamicists have had difficulty deciphering who the
landowners mentioned are, and how the various classes involved in working, managing
and profiting from the land are related to it in bonds o f ownership. The issue is only
further complicated when one draws from the ideal institutions governing the transfer o f
52
land and goods between, for example, family members by means o f the laws o f succession
and the institution o f w aqf (endowment).
According to the Middle Period fuqaha s ideals concerning succession, every iota of
a persons holdings was to be distributed according to fractional stipulations derived from
Quran and sunna^^ Although there are differences between madhahib, as well as between
Sunni and Shii stipulations, by focusing on the Hanafi madhhab - the official creed o f
the Mughals - one gains a sense o f the details involved. After deductions from moveable
and immovable property to pay for funeral expenses and debts, one-third o f the estate can
be bequeathed by a w ill However, the heir may only be a family member if other
familial heirs consent. Regarding the remaining two-thirds o f the estate, the deceased
plays no role in determining heirs or the shares they receive. Rather, rights to shares are
accorded relatives as distant as the descendents o f uterine uncles and aunts. In the case o f
such distant relatives, however, receipt o f a share is dependent on the absence o f some or
ail of a primary class o f heirs referred to in the Quran. These include husband/wife,
grandfather and grandmother, fether and mother, brothers and sisters, and sons and
daughters (uterine and consanguine), but individual shares received depend on the
particular composition o f surviving heirs, as well as on the gender o f the recipient (men
generally receiving twice the share o f women). For example, the mother of the deceased
91 Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam alSultantyya, pp. 211-12.

92 A thorough inteoduction to the development of the laws of snecession, see, David Powers, Sfadies in Quran and Hadith: Hie
Frxmation of the Islamic Law of Inheritance (Berkel^: University of California press, 1971); and, N.J. Coulson, Succession in the Muslim
Family (Cambridge: University Press, 1971).
93 For an introduction to Hanafi and Shi'i theory on inheritance in the South Asian context, Mughal, colonial and contetrgxrrary,
see, Imdad Husain Minhas, bhimtaniae in.Islam: HanafLaadShii I.aws (Lahore: Nadeem Law Book House, 1998).
94 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
95 Ibid., pp. 41-56.
Reprotducetd with permission of the copyright owner. Further reprotduction prohibitetd without permission.
63
must always receive a one-third share when there are no surviving brothers and sisters,
children (or the children o f a deceased son) or husband/wife. If any o f these heirs exist, the
share for a mother drops to one-sixth. Only when there is no surviving mother, on the other
hand, is the maternal grandmother due a one-sixth share o f the estate.^ When there are no
legitimate heirs o f any class, the estate is handed to the bayt al-mal (state treasury) to be
employed for the benefit o f all Muslims.^ Thus, according to fiqh , the shari 'a and not
individual choice or the state, determines the manner in which property is to be consigned
upon its owners death. In this case, the concept of ownership is not voided, but is
curtailed. However, it should be noted that it is also shar 'i for the revenue from any
holdings to be bequeathed in perpetuity to individuals or groups o f the holders choice
through the institution of waqf.
Two types o f waqfs (endowments) are particularly important as alternative modes o f
bequeathing assets to the laws of succession; these are the charitable and familial
waqfs. The import of the familial w aqf is immediately apparent. In his The Maliki waqf
according to Wills and waqfiyyaf - a study of the institution o f waqf in century
North Africa - Layish notes there is not one waqfiyya in which the holders mother
received anything, and lists a number in which daughters were sole recipients, quite
contrary to Maliki and, by extension, all the madhahib's laws o f succession. ^ In this light,
succession and family endowment apge&r as mutually exclusive systems, the former
imposing sanctions on the property holder, the latter circumventing them. The same may
96 Ibid. p. 90.
97 Ibid., p. 29.
98 Aharon Layish, The Maliki Waqf According to Wills and Waqfiyyat, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and A&ican Studies
XLVI (1983), pp. 9-10.
64
be said to be the case with the charitable waqf. Studies o f this type of endowment also
show that in theory, as well as in practice, the charitable waqf was widely used to fund (in
perpetuity or for a stipulated period) various types of educational, religious, cultural and
public welfare oriented institutions throughout the Middle Period, rather than subject the
alienated asset to the laws o f succession on the owners death. ^ In this case, property
could also be administered by a custodian o f the owners choice. Yet, in light of the
theory o f fay , the legal avenues of succession and endowment - the first minimizing
choice while maximizing familial beneficiaries, the other maximizing choice while
minimizing at least the number of familial beneficiaries - can be argued (as the fuqaha'
would hope) to serve a single end; the benefit o f all Muslims.
In the final analysis, this discussion of property and taxes illustrates that althou^ the
fuqaha' leave considerable room for concepts o f ownership - in a contemporary vein - they
circumscribe it in a manner peculiar to their discipline. This general observation, as much as
the specifics of the fuqaha s ideal fiscd regime and relationship between die state and
individual, is pertinent to this studys broader understanding o f the role offiqh in legitimating
institutions defined as feurM/communal while simultaneously promoting the construction
of institutions that transcend such categories. This final point, however, is most emphatically
illustrated below in the context of a discussion o f the shari 'a and notions of community.
iv) The Practical Ideals o f Theory III: The 'Community
99 For examples of such studies, as w dl as a historical owsr view of the institutirai in various contexts, see, N.A. Stillman, Waqf
and the Ideolor^ of Charity in Medieval Islam, Studies in Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth. I.R. Netton, ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
2000): 357-72; G. Baer. The Waqf as a Prop for the Social System (16th-20th centuries), Islamic Law and Society 4:3 (1997): 264-97;
and, M.Z. Othmaa, Institution of Waqf, lalamic Culture 58 (1984): 55-62.
65
In many respects, the discussion o f the relationship between the shari 'a and notions of
community has been ongoing since this survey o f the schools and doctrines of the fuqaha
began. The world that the Shafii al-Mawardi, the Hanbaii Ibn Taymiyya and the fuqaha more
generally presuppose is primarily divided into two religious groups, Muslims and non-
Muslims, as already evinced in the context of legal stipulations concerning war, property and
taxes. More specifically, the former are divided between believers, heretics and apostates,
the first class belonging firmly to die umma (Muslim community), the last falling firmly
outside it, and the place ofheretics clearly debated, al-Mawardi refi:aining from declaringyV/wK/
legitimate against them, Ibn Taymiyya not hesitating to do the opposite. Non-Muslims are also
divided, but into People of the Book {aM al-kitab)md Infidels (kafirs). The last group is
further divided between idol-worshippers, polytheists, and so on. What remains is a more
detailed discussion of which social groups each madhhab places in each o f these categories, as
well as the rights and obligations granted one in relation to another group under Islamic
government.
This discussion can begin with the types of non-Muslims according to al-Mawardi and
Ibn Taymiyya. Al-Mawardi includes Jews, Christians, Sabians and Samaritans as People of
the Book, all being followers of the Abrahamic tradition. The very description o f the "kafif
as polytheist, among other things, defines the term while also suggesting that by the
fuqaha s standards Hindus would be considered ^kafirs.' However, as previously noted.
100 The term tmma (lit community) is found in the Quran, employed with a range of meanings, particularly in tefCTmce to
religious ctanmtaiities. In the hadilh litwature, however, the term is used to refer more specifically to the Muslim commtaiity, ideally
without bars of race, gender or the iadividua! Muslims place of abode. A Muslim in dor al-Islam or in dor al-Harb is a inember of the
mnma, the only conditira, according to theJaqaha, being adherence to the shari a. Fot an introductitxi to the coosept, see, F.M. Drainy,
Umma, E ngdqB aikjtO alam , vol. 10, pp. 859-63.
101 Al-Mawatdi, Al~Ahkam a l Sultaniyya, p. 139-60.
66
Hanafi and MalikiJtiqaha regarded People o f the Book and polytheists as dhimmis if they
remitted the appropriate taxes. This does not necessarily mean that polytheists were no
longer considered 'kafirs' by some, but it does allow for the consideration of Hindus as
People o f the Book by others. Thus, it can be said that while adherents of the Abrahamic
and Hindu traditions are set afart as monotheists and polytheists, they are not necessarily
set apart in terms of the fuqaha s practical ideals.
Al-Mawardi writes that dhimmis gaiin the positive protection of the state by paying the
taxes outlined. The only acts that wilt not be tolerated o f dhimmis are defamation o f Islam,
proselytizing, and fornication with Muslim women. However, he adds that wearing different
modes of dress from Muslims, not riding horses and toning-down public displays o f faith are
desirable. Thus, die theoretical sepMateness of Muslims and non-Muslims, already
enshrined in fiscal measures, and so on, is to be echoed in public conduct - with Muslims the
decidedly senior partner in all realms.
If the lives of non-Muslims are circumscribed by the dictates o f thefuqaha , this may be
doubly said in the case o f Muslims. At one extreme, Ibn Taymiyya advocates death for a
Muslim who cannot be persuaded to say the daily prayers {salat). At the other extreme, in
al-Mawardis view, death is only obligatory for apostates, while the above violation is
102 S.AA. Rizvis History of Stifism in India, vol. 2, includes an Milightening discussion of Muslim attitudes towards Hindus in
the Mughal era. It includes a lengthy of discussion of the wiritii^ of the Ultra-Soher Naqshbandiyya-Mu|addidiyya thinkra:, Mirza Jan-i
Jahan (d. 1781), who argued that Hindus should not be considered kefirs' as the V ahs are revealed scripture. Furthermore, the Mirza
argued that the ritual use of idols by Hindus was akin to Sufi meditation rather than the worship of idols fsaoticed in pre-Islamic
Arabia. HSs is one among many arguments suggesting that Hindus vm e widely understood to be aft/ al-kitab by Muslims in the Great
Mu^tal era. See, S.AA. Rizvi, Hiahay.tSufi3tajgxJlld^ vol. 2, pp. 390432.
103 Ibid, pp. 161.
104 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Siyasa alShar 'iyya, p. I l l
67
a p ated with heresy and merits punishment, rather than death. Either way, al-Mawwdi and
Ibn Taymiyya list apostasy, adultery, sodomy, fornication and the consumption of intoxicants
along with theft and murder as facets of criminal law, representing crimes with statutory,
ratha" than discriminatory punishments. That is to say, in the case of these crimes alone
specific penalties {hndud} are prescribed in the Quran. Yet, in al-Mawardi and Ibn
Taymiyyas writings there are differences o f opinion on even these offenses, as already
illustrated in the case o f the penalties for heretics and apostates.
Although both authors extend the death penalty to adultery and view types of murder
analogously, in the case o f sodomy, Ibn Taymiyya relays that opinions vary between death
and lesser penalties, but all agree that both parties are to be punished. Furthermore, in Ibn
Taymiyyas opinion, men flirting or kissing unrelated boys or women, and those eating
forbidden (haram) foods, are due flogging. With regard to fornication, al-Mawndi
informs one that opinion varies between flogging and banishment. Thus, heterosexuality is
firmly preferred to homosexuality, at least among men,'^^ while sex within the institution of
marriage is preferred to unmarried relations, at least as far as firee-women are concerned For
this class o f woman in particular, the fuqaha envision a society in which women are free to
pursue education, employment, and so on, but not if it requires appearing before unrelated
men. Interestingly, neither al-Mawardi nor Ibn Taymiyya discusses punitive measures against
105 Al-Mawardi. Al-Ahkam al Sultaniyya, 238-56.

106 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Siyasat al-Shar iyya, p. 118. For a more thorough discussion o f legal attitudes toward homosexuality, see,
Louis Crompton, Male Love and Islamic Law in Arab Spain, Islamic Homosexualities, eds. S.O. Murray and Rossoe, W. (New Ysxk:
University Press, 1997): 142-60.
107 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Siyasa al-Shar 'iyya, pp. 120-21.
108 Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al Sultaniyya, p. 63; 242-56.
109 Far attitudes toward Lesbianism, see, Woman-Woman Love in Islamic Societies, Islamic Homosexulaties, eds. S.O. Munay
andRoscoe, W. (New York: University Press, 1997): 97-106.
68
women who choose to flaunt gendered segregation.
When it comes to the consumption of intoxicants, opinion varies further than in the case o f
sexual mores. Ibn Taymiyya categorically argues that flogging is due anyone who consumes
miy intoxicant. Al-Mawardi suggests that punishment may not only vary from flogging to
public humiliation, but that some scholars argue inebriation, rather than consumption, is the
crime, while others argue that only wine, or only alcoholic beverages are banned, but
inebriation is not at issue.'' * Similarly, in the case o f theft, Ibn Taymiyya is unequivocal in his
judgement that the right hand must be amputeted for any theft above 3 dirhams,' while al-
Mawardi points out that there are differences of opinion on minimum amounts for amputation,
the nature o f the property that warrants amputation, and the person due amputation if the crime
is committed in a group.'
The above discussion of criminal law leads one back to the beginning of this section and
the issue o f the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim. This realm of legal inquiry
suggests that the line between Muslim and non-Muslim is often as blurred as that between
monotheist and polytheist dhimmis. Of the aive stotutory punishments, with the
exception of the consumption of intoxicants and apostasy, non-Muslims are subject to the
same punishments for the same crimes. One can infer that in the case of discriminatory
punishments the case is similar, just as in fiscal law, Muslims and non-Muslims, monotheists
and polytheists, are subject to kharaj assessed uniformly by the Middle Perio4 and in property
law, all are recognized as owners. Indeed, it is largely in the realm o f personal law - e.g..
110 Iba Taymiyya, Al-Siyasa alSkar'iyya, p. 120.

111 p. 248.
112 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Siyasa al-Shar iyya, pp. 112-14.

113 Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, pp. 245-47.
69
inheritance, marriage, divorce - that Mm^m!dhirrmi distinctions imply the application of a
separate law by a separate set of jurists. As is shown in the following chapters, in this realm the
non-Muslim jurist was granted authority, thus confirming a working relationship between
various le ^ l communities.
In the final analysis, this brief introduction to legal theory a id practical ideals illustrates
that much of what certain Subaltemists and others define as feudal is legitimated by the
fuqaha . In Ranajit Guhas opinion, this includes elite violence organized on
sectarian... lines, private levies, bonded labour, and the punitive measures taken against
women for disobeying patriarchal moral codes.'
The first problem with Guhas characterization of feudal institutions, already suggested
by Chakrabarty, is that in a Muslim context these institutions are not legitimated by Dharma.
The theory of al-jihad al-asghar legitimates the rights of the elite to organize violence on
sectarian lines. The theory offay legitimates the rights of the elite to set and exact taxes.
And finally, the theory o f hudud in general legitimates punitive measures against women.
Thus, Order is not maintained by Dharma, or any other Indian idiom. For thefuqaha \
Order is synonymous with the shari a.
The second problem with Guhas view also extends to other Subaltemists and South
Asianists. While these scholars implicitly acknowledge the legitimative aspect of the shari a, a
number o f ideals that transcend systems o f order circumscribed by feudalism are articulated
70
by the fuqaha but not taken into consideration. These include the right to due p ocess in all
realms of the law, property ri^ ts for men and women, and the criminalization of merchants
and producers who cheat their clients, judicial officials who accept bribes, and individuals who
defame or bare false witness. ^Furthermore, fiscal appropriations are not to exceed the
producers capacity to subsist, and all the above mentioned rights and obligations are extended
to Muslims, men and women, and non-Muslims. As well, in the context o f personal law,
Muslim women have the right to inherit and bequeath property, while non-Muslims are
virtually autonomous, the practice of non-Muslim faiths under Muslim governance being
explicitly guaranteed upon payment o f taxes. Thus, the characterization of the pre-coloniaT
period as feudalVcommunal in an Indian idiom belies the fact that South Asia is
idiomatically and institutionally varied, and that within this variation are embedded alternate
transcendent ideals.
As for the theoretical relationship between the Utopian and Ideological implied by the
Sober Path of thef u q a h a it is clear that some ideas qualify as Utopian while others
exemplify the Ideological. That is to say, the same shari a that guarantees rights that
transcend those enjoyed by Muslims, simultaneously legitimates what is, including
monarchism, slavery, and so on. Turning from the law to mysticism, therefore, attention must
be paid to whether the mingling of the Utopian and Ideological can also be observed in the
Intoxicated Way.
b) Intuition and Tariqa: The Intoxicated Way
114 R. Guha, Dominance without Hegemony and its Historiogmpity p. 273.

1! 5 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Siyasa al-Shar iyya, pp. 120-21.
71
He does not gmdge the secrets o f the unseen...
[Quran, 81:20]
In the context of al-Ghazali and al-Hujwiri, the distinction between Intoxicated and
Sober Sufis was discussed in terms of their proximity to the creed o f the mutakallimun,
particularly concerning the transcendence or immanence of divinity. Included in their
works is reference to a distinction between the same groups in relation to the creed o f the
fuqaha the shari a. Representing the Sober perspective, al-Hujwiri writes:
Shari a cannot possibly be maintained without the existence of haqiqa (Truth), and
haqiqa cannot be maintained without observance o f shari a."
The implication is that the esoteric Truth that Sufis seek through Intuition, complements,
rather than rivals, the exoteric Truth that the fuqaha seek through Reason. Thus, in al-
Hujwiris Sober view, shari 'a and tariqa are like body and spirit. ^ However, al-Hujwiri
also hints at the Intoxicated perspective. He writes that there are some heretics, who hold
that it is possible for one o f these things [i.e, haqiqa and shari 'd\ to subsist without the
other, and declare that when the Truth is revealed the Law is abolished.^ Although al-
Hujwiri associates this antinomian tendency with the Shia alone, al-Ghazali more fairly
admits that there are Sufis who claim the same, those who consider that they have made
such progress in the way that they are above the need for formal worship, while others
move entirely toward iatitudinalism, that is, the argument that all modes of formal
worship (Muslim and non-Muslim) are equivalent.
In their rejection of the shari 'a, the theory and practical ideals of Intoxicated Sufis
116 Al-Hujwiri, K askf al-Mahjub, p. 383.

117 Ibid., p. 383.
118 Ibid, p. 383.
72
clearly represent an alternative Utopia and Ideology to that o f the fuqaha and Sober
scholars more generally {fuqahamutakallimun and Sufi), for whom the shari a is central.
Given that by the Middle Period both Sober and Intoxicated Sufi orders were well
established in South Asia, this alternative requires close consideration.
i) Mystical Theory: Doctrines and Schools
Islamicists write that by the Middle Period, Sufi organization and instruction had
evolved from informal discussions and spiritual exercises, called circles (halaqa), into
formal orders (tariqas) with doctrines that, in Fazlur Rahmans words, would come to
represent a rival growth challenging the formal disciplines [e.g., kalam andfiqh] of
I s l a m . T h e force driving the formation o f orders, is understood by Islamicists to be
the idea that one who had attained the highest level o f consciousness was now the Pole
(qutb) of inner knowledge (a term shared with Shi'i terminology for Imams) and able to
guide others in the way. As the Pole, this individual was not characterized as an hnam,
however, but as a saint (shaykh/walilpir) with whom a close relationship could lead the
initiate to the same degree o f inner knowledge. Thus, a system o f instruction defined by
the relationship between saint and disciple {murid/talib/salik) evolved However, as each
saint did not follow the same way, the formation o f Sufi orders {tariqas) often centred on
khanqahs (hospices), each upholding the name o f the charismatic figure who first trod the
path which later initiates would follow under the guidance o f his/her successors
{khalifas),
119 Al-Ghazali, Munqidh mitt al-Dalal, p. 72.

120 F. Rahman, Islam, p. 133.
73
A brief introduction to six prominent Sunni orders in South Asia is sufficient to
illustrate the variety o f ways available to the initiate.*^' These orders are the
Qalandariyya, Chishtiyya, Qadiriyya, Shattariyya, Suhrawardiyya and Naqshbandiyya, all
active in the Mughal context.
Beginning with the Qalandariyya, it is noteworthy that the orders scholars eschewed
the accumulation o f wealth and association with the state, encouraged incantation (dhikr),
allowed for devotional music (sama ), and lived like wandering Hindu sadhus
(mendicants), often even discarding clothing. The Chishtiyya also balked at wealth and
politics, practiced dhikr and sama \ absorbed the Hindu practice o f breathing exercises and
at times even resorted to the Buddhist practice o f employing a begging bowl, but unlike the
Qalandariyya, were more organized and established k h a n q a h s The Shattariyya
121 A number of Sunni S u i orders have been open to or tended toward Shi' ism, at least in terms of the usage of ootnmon
terminology and the venraation of the Imaim, particularly Ali. However, there have also been Shi i orders such as the Nurbaidishiyya,
which spread fiom Iran to Kashmir. The Ni'inatidlahiyya also spread &om Iran to South Asia, where it flourished under the Bahmani
Sultanate while suffering reversals in Iran only to be revived there by Ma'sum Ali Shah Deecani.
The above may be (XBisideied 'intoxicated' orders, while the sober te n d of mysticism in Shi'ism is lanown as 'Irfan (gnosis). As
Momen states: "It includes many of the ideas and much of the technical vocabulaiy of Sufism but divests itself of the features which the
'ulama find most objectionable; the formal structure of orders, itiitiation, the murshid-murid relationship, dhikr, concepts such as wahdat
%wujud, etc. Typical works in the field of 'irfan deal with tenging out the inner, esoteric meaning of the Quran based cm the process
of to W (Wnging out the spiritual meaning) rather than tqfsir (technical commentaiy) of the verses. See, Momen, An Introduetion to
Sbi!i.Jstem. pp. 208-16.
122 It should also be noted that the descriptions given here are time specific, and that in the eras befijre and after that of the Great
Mughals, the teentations of some of these orders was different A case in point is the Suhrawardiyya, whose shrines I mentioned in the
preface. Early saints of this order are noted for Wghly synretie approach to practice, while by the Mughal e a , thw largely discouraged
this moveniajt, as noted bdow. Furthennoie, individual Sufis were more often than not initiates of more than one order, th o u ^ the
orientation of these orders was usually similar. A number of worics address the activities of these orders, including large parts of the
previously cited work, A. Ahmad, An Intellectual HistOTV of Islam in India, and the previously unmentioned, Annemarie Schimmei, Islam
in the Indian Subcontinent (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980). However, none provides a more emyclopaedic introductions to the orders, their
practical orientation and the lives and works of their nnbers than S.A.A. Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India. 2 vols.
123 See, T. Yazici, Kalatriatiyya, Etaevclopaedia of Islam, vol. 4, pt. 1, pp. 473-74; and, Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, vol.
1, pp. 301-21.
124 See, K.A Nizami, Cishtiyya, Encvclopaedia of Islam, vol. 2, p t 1, f^. 50-56; and Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India vol. 1,
pp. 114-89, vol. 2, pp. 264-320.
14
resembled the Chishtiyya in absorbing much Hindu and Buddhist practice, but eschewed
the formers austerities to allow for the accumulation of wealth. The Suhrawardiyya, on
the other hand, grew to discourage sama and overtly Hindu and Buddhist practices, while
accepting wealth and patronage under the pretext that this allowed their moral influence to
be felt in s t a t e . The Qadiriyya resembled the Suhrawardiyya in their approach to
mysticism, but unlike the former - who organized in khanqahs - they led solitary lives of
wandering the countryside.'^^ Finally, the Naqshbandiyya, were most resolute in the belief
that the shari a was lynch-pin of the Sufi Way. Thus, only in the Naqshbandiyya was
performing daily prayer, fasting, paying of zakat and refraining from sama promoted by
all initiates.
It is interesting and important to note that despite the above variations in the specific
practices o f each order, by the time the Mughals enter the scene, all the above Sober and
Intoxicated orders upheld Muhyi al-Din ibn al-Arabis (d. 1240) doctrine, wahdat al-
wujud (Unity of Being), as affirmation o f either the Intoxicated concept of farm
(annihilation), or the Sober concept of baqa' (subsistence). Thus, Ibn al-Arabis
125 See, K.A. Nizami, Shattariyya, Encvclopaedia of Islam, vol. 9, pp. 369-70; and, Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, vol. 2,
pp. 151-73.
126 See, F. Sobieroj, Suhrawardiyya, Encvclopaedia of Islam, vol. 9, pp. 784-86; and, Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, vol. 1,
pp. 190-240.
127 See, D.S. Margoliouth, Kadariyya, Encvclopaedia of Islam, vol. 4, pt. 1, pp. 380-84; and, Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India.
vol. 2, pp. 55-150.
128 See, K.A. Nizami, Nakshbandiyya, Encvclopaedia of Islam, vol. 7, pp. 934-39; and, Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, vol.
2. pp. 174-263.
129 For a discussion of the influence of -wahdat al-wujud in South Asia, see, W.C. Chittick, Notes on Ibn aI-Arabis Influence in
India. Muslim World 82 (1992); 218-41. The one exception to this rule in the context of the above orders is the Naqshbandiyya. In the
16th century, the Mujaddidiyya branch coalesced about Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindis (d. 1624) doctrine of wahdat al-shuhud (Unity of
Witness), while the mainstream Naqshbandiyya considered it sufficient to argue for Gods transcendence by means of the doctrine of
baqa\ without challenging the veracity of Ihnal-Arabis concept of -wahdat al-wujud. Sirhindi sought to overcome the heated debate
generated over the doctiine offana'w id the implication of Gods immanance,by proposing a systemitized Sober alternative to Ibn al-
75
doctrine is an appropriate place to begin this sections discussion of doctrine.
On the issue o f transcendence, Ibn al-Arabi wrote in his Fusus al-Hikam:
For those who truly know the divine Realities, the doctrine of transcendence imposes a
restriction and a limitation [on the Realityj, for he who asserts that God is [purely]
transcendental is either a fool or a rogue.
In the same breath, he declares:
It is similar in the case of one who professes comparability of God without taking into
consideration His incomparability, so that he also restricts and limits Him.^^'
The truth for Ibn al-Arabi is that:
The Reality is manifest in every created being and in every concept, while he is [at the
same time] hidden from all understanding.
This Reality Ibn al-Arabi refers to in terms of wahdat al-wujud, or the Oneness of
Being, and one can immediately realize why Sober and Intoxicated Sufis argued that Ibn
al-Arabi was their supporter.
In general, Islamicists concur with those Muslim scholars who believed Ibn al-Arabi
to be an advocate o f Gods immanence. However, they do suggest that Ibn al-Arabi
allows the concept of transcendence to inhere in his concept o f immanence. This point can
be clarified by considering Ibn al-Arabis concept o f Reality more closely. He begins the
Arabis doctrine. In Sirhindis conception of things - largely based on the ideas of Ala al-Dawla Simnani (d. 1336) - one experiences
farm ' as a lower stage of union, and baqa at the highest stage. Thus, knowledge of Gods ultimate transcendence is the highest form of
gnosis in the doctrine of wahdat al-shuhud. For an excellent introduction to the life and work and Sirhindi, see, Yohanan Friedmann,
Shavkh Ahmad Sirhindi: An Outhne of his Thought and a Study ofhis Image in the Eves of Posterity tMonlreal: McGill University Press,
1971). For the develoimient, spread and jwaotioes of the Naqshbandiyya, see, M. tjaborieau, A. Popovic and Zarione, T, Nagsfabandis:
Cheminements et Sitttation A fitelle.dtffl Qtdar Mystique Mmulman (Istanbul-Paris: Editions Isis, 1990).
130 Muhyi al-Din ita al-Arabi, Fusus al-Hikam, ed. and trans. R.W.J. Austin, The Bezels of Wisdom (New Pork: Paulist Press,
1980), p. 73. For Ibn al-Arabi, see, William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path to Knowledge: Ibn ai-Aiabis Metaphysics of Imagination
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1989); Henry Cotbin, LlmaginationCreatrica Hans le Soufisme de Ibn Arabi (Paris: Flaumarion, 1988); and,
131 Ihn al-Arabi, Fusus al-Hikam, p. 74.

132 Ibid., p. 73.
76
Fusus al-Hikam with the following statement about creation and the universe:
The Reality wanted to see the essences o f His Most Beautiful Names, or to put it
another way, to see his own Essence, in an all-inclusive object encompassing the
whole [Divinej Command, which, qualified by existence, would reveal to Him His
own mystery.' ^
In other words, the Reality consists of two parts, the Divine Essence and the all-
inclusive object...qualified by existence, that is, the Cosmos. This transcendence,
however, is described as that between a person and his shadow, the latter being entirely
contingent on the f o r m e r . Furthermore, this contingency is like that of all numbers to the
number one, wherein, all numbers derive from the one.... Thus, the one makes number
possible, and number deploys the one.^^ In Ibn al-Arabis final analysis, therefore, the
transcendent Reality is the relative creature.... All this is One Essence.... There is naught
butHe.^^
In the relationship between the Divine Essence and the Cosmos, Ibn al-Arabi assigns
humanity a distinct place. It is only in humanity that the above polarity is united, thus it is
only humanity that can be aware of Reality as it truly is.'^ Not even angels are so
elevated, comprehending only those Divine names peculiar to them.'^* Within
humanity, however, elevation is a matter o f degree, each aware of only that which is
revealed to him or her. Ibn al-Arabi refers to the most elevated of existing beings as
insan al-kamil, the Perfect Human. Such an individual integrates in himself all Cosmic
133 Ibid., p. 50.

134 Ibid., p. 123.
135 IWd., p. 86.
136 Ibid., p. 87. A thorough discussion of this acpect of Ibn al-Arabis cosmology can be read in, W.C. Chittick. The Self
EhsclQSMffi..o,G[od:J^riDfiipies.QfIlmid-At8bis,,C.Q3mc>lQgy (Albany: Suny Press, 1998).
137 Ibn al-Arabi, Fusus al-Hikam, p. 56.
138 Ibid., pp. 51-2.
77
realities and their individual [manifestation].' The first of this kind was Adam - that
singular spiritual essence from which humanity was created - and a prime example is
Muhammad, Seal of Prophets.
Muhammads distinction as insan al-kamil is not a fimction ofhis prophethood. In
fact, apostles, as transmitters of [Divine] Command, and prophets, as bringers of sacred
law, are both dependent on revelation and are thus portrayed as simple from the
intellectual point of view.''^* Furthermore, these functions are largely legislative and
come to an end with Muhammad, the Seal.''^^ Thus, Muhammad derives his distinction as
insan al-kamil from his share in sainthood (waliyat), that all-inclusive and universal
function that never comes to an end.*'*^ Interestingly, Ibn al-Arabi leaves the concept of
sainthood rather vaguely defined in this work, but one can infer that while knowledge is
revealed to prophets, saints are those who acquire perfect knowledge through direct
experience.
ii) Practical Ideals of Theory I: 'Community
When all Reality is perceived as One, the fuqaha and mutakallimuns believers,
non-believers, and shades in between, would appear difficult to maintain. Ibn al-Arabi
confirms this hypothesis throughout his Fusus al-Hikam, but nowhere more succinctly than
in the following lines:
139 Ibid., p. 85.

140 Ibid., p. 55. Also see, Masataka Takeshita, Ibn al-Aiabis Theory of the Perfect Man and its Place in the History of Islamic
Thought iTokyo: ISCAA, 1987).
141 Ibn al-Arabi, Fusus al-Hikam. For prophets see, p. 66; apostles, p. 117; revelation, p. 166.
142 Ibid., pp. 165-8.
143 Ibid., p. 168.
78
Men may be divided into two groups. The first travel a way they know... which is their
Straight Path. The second group travel a way they do not know... which is their
Straight Path.
Ibn al-Arabi applies this principle to established relgions by placing them in two
categories, the religion o f God, and the religion o f created beings. Both are presented
as in harmony with divine dispensation on the rationale that religion might be called or
interpreted as a custom ['add\, since there befalls [the servant] only that which his own
state demands and necessitates.^**^To the Sufi gnostic, therefore, there is no singular
Path. As Ibn al-Arabi puts it:
The perfect gnostic is one who regards every object of worship as a manifestation of
God in which He is worshipped. They call it a god, although its proper name might be
stone, wood, animal, man, star or angel. Although that might be its particular name.
Divinity presents a level [of reality] that causes the worshipper to imagine that it is his
object of worship.*"*^
Ibn al-Arabis assertion that all religion is for God, certainly contrasts the tendency
of the fuqaha and mutakallimun to judge all others from the standpoint offiqh and kalam.
Nevertheless, Ibn al-Arabi does not dispense with the view o f society as made up of
religious communities. Furthermore, these communities are effectively graded on a
spiritual scale, with the umma ranked highest thanks to its acceptance of Quran and
sunna - that is, the knowledge necessary to fulfil the spiritual needs o f the community on
an exoteric and esoteric level.'* Thus, in the final analysis, the shari 'a is not abolished. In
fact, it is promoted as the highest manifestation o f prophetic legislation. However, this
distinction is subordinate to the idea that the shari a s provisions only represent the
144 Ibid., p. 132.

145 Ibid., pp. 113-16.
146 Ibid., p. 247.
147 Ibid., p. 165.
79
exoteric aspect of Reality, and in this respect charts only one path among many which
God acknowledges.''**
The tendency to view the shari a as a partial truth is apparent among Intoxicated and
Sober Sufis. In the former category, as has already been noted, some view it as so partial
that, in al-Hujwiris words, when the Truth is revealed the Law is abolished. In other
cases, as in the work o f Ibn al-Arabi, the shari a is not abolished, but is interpreted as
custom Cada), making it relative to the customs of other religious communities. Thus,
even among those who acknowledge the necessity for the shari 'a, the approach to legal
practice is rather different than in the case of the fuqaha . A case in point is Sharaf al-Din
ibn Yahya Maneris (d. 13%\) Maktubat al-Sadi, addressed to a disciple who was also a
qadi (ju d g e ).In this work, the author lists three classes of sins. The first is the
abandonment offara 'id (duties of prayer, fasting, etc.). In this matter, in stark contrast to
the fuqaha who tend to advocate punitive measures against such transgressions, Maneri
writes that people ought to perform these duties to the maximum extent possible. In
other words, persuasion, rather than punishment, is the appropriate course of action to be
taken by the upright, while the individuals failure to comply is also considered in light
of circumstantial possibility. The second class o f sins consists o f acts deemed between
creature and God. These include alcohol consumption, usury and music, which Maneri
148 Ibid, p. 113.

149 Sharaf al-Din ibn Yahya Maneri was bom in Maner, Bihar, in the late 13thcentuiy, the son of locally noted Sufi. He
received fwinal education in Bihar, B e i^ i and Delhi, finally studying under a p ir of the Intoxicated Firdawsi rader, before disappearing
into the Rajgir Hills, long associated with the Buddha and countless monks residmt in the area. Many years later, he was compelled to
take up residence at Bihar Sharif as his following grew. T\M aktubat al-Sadi - a collection of Maneris letters - was compiled by a
disciple, Zain Badr al-Arabi, winning the author popularity well beyond Bihar. Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq (d. 1351) conferred the
title olM M m m al-MuIk on Maneri, and endowed a khcmqah in his name. Maneris letters ha-re since been consistently reproduced and
widely circulated. See, Paul JackswL The Way of the Sufi: Sharaf al-Din Maneri (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delhi, 1987).
80
suggests the sinner must strive to avoid. Thus, such sins being between humanity and
god are overtly placed beyond the punitive jurisdiction o f the fuqaha The last class of
sins involves the acts of individuals towards others. These include property disputes,
violations of the body (from rape to backbiting) and leading people astray in faith. In
each of these cases the onus is placed on the sinner to make amends, rather than on the
law to seek restitution.*^^ The overall tenor o f Maneris work is that repentance and
making peace with the aggrieved (man or god) is more important than punishment Nizam
al-Din Awliya (d. 1325) - one o f Maneris most influential contemporaries - puts the
above dictate most succinctly as follows: The penitent is equivalent to the upright.*^^
Maneri and Nizam al-Din Awliya s attitude toward sin confirms that although Sober
Sufis do not necessarily dissolve the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim to the
degree suggested by the Intoxicated, they do reduce the distinctions between Muslims.
Heresy is acknowledged, as in the work of al-Hujwiri, but apostasy is virtually absent
from the discourse when the thinker, school or sect acknowledges revelation (Quran) and
prophecy (Muhammad). In comparison with the ideals of the fuqaha , the above attitude
150 Sharaf al-Din ibn Yahya Maneri, Maktubat al-Sadi, ed. and trans. Syed Hasan Askari (New York: Paulist Press. 1980, p. 18.
151 Ibid., p. 18.
152 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
153 Nizam al-Din Awliya was bom near Delhi in the late 13th century, the son of a civil servant in the employ of the Delhi Sultans.
His mother, Bibi Zulaykha, widowed when Nizam al-Din was an infant, pomoted his education, first in Badaua, then in Delhi, hoping for
his future appointment as a qadi. However, Nizam al-Dins education included study under the brother of Shaykh Farid al-Din Ganj-i
Shakar (d. 1265), one of the early luminaries of the Chishtiyya. This teacher encouraged Niaam al-Din to piusue further study at
Pakpattan, near Lahore, at Shaykh Farid al-Dins khanqah, rather than chase a career in law. Nizam al-Din complied, eventually rising to
the rank ofhis mentors khalifa in 1286. By Nizam al-Dina death in 1325, he had dispatchd 700 khalifas ofhis own to various parts of
South Asia, making the Chishtiyya one of the most influential tariqas in the region. His Fawa 'id al-Fuad - a compilation of Nizam al-
Dins conversations with various personages, high and low - was the work of a devotee, Amir Hasan Sijzi, himself one of the chief poets
of the era, lauded as the Sadi of Hindustan, and vras widely read throughout the era of the Delhi Sultans and the Mughals. See, Nizam al-
Din Awliya, Fawa 'id al-Fuad, ed. and trans. B.B. Lawrence. Morals of the Heart (New Ycsk: Paulist Press, 1992). The above quote is
found on p. 81 of that edition. For an introduction to the authors life and work, see, Muhammad Habib, H azrat Nizam al-Din Awliya:
81
implies that Sufism in general placed far less emphasis on community defined in terms o f
the fuqaha s meticulous definition of shari 'a, than it did on an individual
understanding o f tariqa. For the Intoxicated Sufi, this attitude toward legality could
manifest itself in the form of arguments for the equivalence o f Muslim and non-Muslim
religious customs. To the Sober, it could include the unmitigated acceptance of sectarian
and doctrinal diversity within the umma and extend to the absolution o f the legal impiety
o f the lay Muslim.
iii) Practical Ideals o f Theory II: 'Gender'
The nature o f the distinction that Ibn al-Arabi bestows upon humanity in relationship
to other beings, suggests that sex would not be a barrier to achieving perfect knowledge
o f Reality. Islamicists confirm that not merely in theory, but also in practice, women
played a prominent role in Sufism. For example, Anne Marie Schimmei writes:
Names of women saints are found throughout the world o f Islam, though only a few
have been entered into the official manuals.... Anatolia can boast a large number of
small shrines where more or less historical women are buried - simple village girls and
noble virgins, whose very names often suggest romantic stories. They are visited by
women to express special wishes connected with conjugal life, children and similar
problems. The same is true in Iran. North Africa is also rich in sanctuaries devoted to
women saints; but the area in which women saints flourished most is probably Muslim
India.
While Schimmei affirms the incidence of women saints, her statement also reiterates the
observation that Sufis did not view men and women saints as entirely eq u a l.S a in th o o d
hayat aur ta ttmat (Delhi; Shubah-yi Urdu, Delhi Yimiversiti, 1972).

154 Anne Marie Schimmei, MâtedJlmaisioias.flOsia3B, p. 433.
155 Also see, Netty Bonoiivrie, Female Sufi Saints on the Indian Subcontinent, Religious Traditions, eds. R, Kloppenborg and
Hanegraaf, W.J. (Leiden: E.J, Brill, 1995), p. 114.
82
circumscribed by virginity or serving conjugal life, not to mention saints omitted from
official manuals, does not suggest that patriarchal norms were sublimated. In fact, Ibn al-
Arabis Fusus al-Hikam suggests that underlying gender divisions is a view of women as
ontologically lower than men.
To Ibn al-Arabi, in the manifestation of her essence, woman is part of man.'^^ His
reasoning flows from the premise that Adams consort was nothing other than his
[essential] self.'^ In other words, the male was created before the female. The ternary
o f god, man and woman into which this translates is such that man yearns for god, while
woman yearns for man. Furthermore, when man contemplates Reality in woman, he
recognizes the passive aspect, while in himself he perceives the active aspect.
Clearly, while Ibn al-Arabi emphatically diminishes the import of labeling the individual
according to religious community, he does not extend the implications of wahdat al-wujud
to sex. In fact, he parallels the mutakallimun in his mode of ontological gendering.
The prominence o f women in Sufism cannot be read to imply that Sufis encouraged
women to transgress patriarchal norms. It does suggest that relations between men and
women were understood in a particular manner. In the matter o f sexual relations, for
example, there is no hint that sex outside of marriage is meritorious. However, in Ibn al-
Arabis vision, there is no greater union than that between the sexes, not for the purpose
of procreation or personal gratification, but because annihilation for both is total at the
156 Ibn al-Arabi, Fusus al-Hikam, p. 272.

157 Ibid., p. 87.
158 Ibid., p. 274.
159 Ibid., p. 275.
83
moment o f consummation. As well, although woman is described as representative of
the passive aspect of Reality and man the active, woman, being from man, also
inherits the active. In other words, her essence alone reflects both the active and passive,
while man reflects only the active aspect of Reality. Thus, for a man, contemplation o f
Reality in woman, rather than in himself, is most complete and perfect.^'
The mystification o f gender inherent in Ibn al-Arabis writings and the prominence
of women saints reveals that for Sufis the lower ontological status o f woman does not
necessarily translate into the dependence o f the female on the male. One example is that
man and woman can attain sainthood independent o f each other. A second example, as
Schimmeis above statement suggests, is that the concerns o f women acculturated in
patriarchy could be addressed to women Sufis of some social standing, rather than to a
male dominated judiciary.
As in the case of thefuqaha s practical ideals, it must first be noted that the Sufis
ideals also legitimate institutions that the Subaltemists and others often term feudal.
Sober Sufis always show the propensity to follow the legal patterns set by the fuqaha . The
virtual equivalence that Intoxicated Sufis argue to exist between the shari 'a and the
customs of other religious communities furthers the potential to legitimate as Islamic
virtually any local institution. In the case o f South Asian women, for example, this can
160 Ibid, p. 274. For attitudes toward homosexuality among Sufis, see, Jim Wafer, The Symbolism of Male Love in Islamic
Iv^tical Literature," falame Hmtosaotalifisa, pp. 107-31.
84
include denial of divorce and inheritance rights, besides such strictures as a ban on the
remarriage of widows, these being among the institutions legitimated by Hindu and
Buddhist jurists since pre-Islamic times.
The first problem that Sufi thought poses for Guhas view in particular is the same as
that posed by the fuqaha these feudal institutions are not legitimated in an Indian
idiom. The theory of baqa' and its implications c o n c e r n i n g legitimate the rights o f the
elite to organize violence on sectarian lines, and so on. The Intoxicated version offana'
potentially legitimates patriarchal moral codes. Thus, once again, Order is not
maintained by Danda or Dharma. In the Sufi case. Order is ultimately dependent on the
theory of wahdat al-wujud - coined in these terms by an Andalusian Sufi o f Arab ethnic
stock who never traveled to South Asia.
The second problem with the South Asianist perspective more generally is that it
largely excludes those ideals o f the fuqaha that transcend systems o f Order described as
feudal. Even Sufis who uphold the import o f the shari "a, such as Maneri and Nizam al-
Din Awliya, explicitly extol persuasion in their regard for repentance above punishment
in matters o fcrime. The Intoxicated Sufi, meanwhile, has the potential to eliminate the
coercion of individuals or groups in the name of a specific religious community or
jurisprudencial method. Thus, one must again conclude that the characterization o f the
pre-colonial period as feudal/ communaT in an Indian idiom belies the fact that South
Asia is idiomatically varied. More than this, it must be added that even within the
conception of Muslims as one religious community are embedded alternate or
antagonistic Utopias and Ideologies.
161 Ibid., p. 277.
85
As for the relationship between Utopia and Ideology, the Intoxicated Way of the
Sufis echoes the Sober Path o f the fuqaha by transcending some aspects of what is,
while legitimating others. That is to say, the Intoxicated Utopia, in which the Unity of
Being renders all humanity and its customs equal, is also the Intoxicated Ideology that
legitimates such local customs as, for example, the disinheritance of daughters. Given that
Sufism andfiqh represent two of the most developed intellectual ventures in Islamic
history, it thus seems safe to conclude that in the case o f Middle Period Muslim societies,
Utopia and Ideology cannot be conceived as the sealed compartments Ricoeur supposes in
the European context. The Intoxicated Way and the Sober Path are not exclusively Utopian
or Ideological - they are each Utopian/Ideological.
Conclusion: Islam and India
This chapter has focused on two o f many intellectual disciplines engaged by Muslim
intellectuals during the Middle Period. It has been noted that beyond the polarities o f thought
these disciplines represent, there is also considerable variation within each discipline and
overlap between them - enough, in fact, for qadis to study under Sufis like Maneri. Clearly, an
understanding of Islam as a monolith is untenable. Yet, it is also apparent that no matter the
discipline, school or sect, the individual thinker is involved in an over-arching discourse
involving the same categories o f thou^t, the same disciplinary playing field, analogous
intellectual schools and a common intellectual idiom. This is the case whether speaking of al-
Hujwiri, Maneri and Nizam al-Din Awliya, living in South Asia, al-Ghazali and al-Mawardi
86
living in West Asia, Ibn Taymiyya living in Egypt and Syria, Ibn Rushd living in Muslim Spain
(aI*Andalus) or Ibn ai-Arabi, bom in Seville and dying in Damascus. As well, the variety of
ethnicities represented by these thinkers (not necessarily corresponding to their place of
residence) does not deter them from participation in this larger discourse.
Given the levels on which one can speak o f a Middle Islam, at least among the scholarly
classes, the idea that a Muslim World is negated by geographical distances, ethnic variety
and disciplinary pluralism should be troublesome to the contemporary historian. This
discomfort should only grow when one notes that the disciplines inhering in each category of
thought include intellectual tools that legitimate aspects o f more local institutions. That is to
say, the Ideologies promoted by an education in Middle Islam have the capacity to include
the local customs ofMuslims as Islamic. At the same time, these disciplines include
institutional ideals that transcend the local, particularly if they are defined as
feudal7communal. Thus, unless one argues that the Utopias/Ideologies of Middle Islam
have no impact on Muslims beyond the scholarly classes, Guha and others assertion that the
cultures in which South Asian Muslims participate can be understood in terms of Indian
idioms, such as Danda and Dharma, is patently flawed. Rather, one must take note o f the fact
tiiat the Utopias/Ideologies promoted by Middle Islam involve degrees o f cultural separatism
and syncretism.
The above point is doubly significant when one confirms that Subaltemists like Guha are
not alone among South Asianists in writing ofMiddle Period Muslims as idiomatically
Indian. In fact, those that Prakash refers to as Cambridge historians provide a more subtle
argument for Muslim Mdian-ness than Guha, who openly equates the Indian with the
87
Hindu. In the latter case, the Indian transcends the Hindu and Muslims to the degree that
even the idea of cultural syncretism is argued to be misrepresentative. Barbara Metcalfe
draws from the arguments of Catherine Asher and Peter Brown to make the following point;
A... vexed area in discussion of the precoionial period is that of so-called cultural
syncretism, a term used to describe religious styles and art, for example. The term
implies that the categories Hindu and Muslim are fixed... and that bits o f both in
some sense mix. It encourages what one might call the vertical fallacy, that it is
possible to make lists, even contrasting lists, of what is Hindu in one column and
Muslim in another. It also tends to call Hindu and Muslim elements in the culture
that may be neither or both.... If there is vertical fallacy associated with syncretism,
we might also posit a horizontal fallacy, following Peter Browns identification of
the post-enlightenment two-tier theory o f religion. In this theory, rational
monotheism is a higher form o f religion and therefore maps onto the upper classes and
the educated; superstition and syncretism represent more primitive religion and are
presumed characteristic o f the humble. By this reckoning, the upper classes are good
Muslims; the rural and uneducated Muslims, more immersed in local cultures, are
taken as deviant. If Islam is considered foreign, the lower classes are considered more
Indian.
Based on these criticisms, Metcalfe proposes the term Indic culture in place of
syncretic culture.
The mistake o f mapping rational monotheism according to class is a valid criticism
o f the way in which the term syncretism has been employed by past historians. Thus,
Metcalfes horizontal fallacy is a tendency wfrich one must avoid. Furthermore, the idea
that the lower classes are more Indian as a result o f syncretism is what we are also
arguing against. However, Metcalfes idea o f a vertical fallacy is problematic on a
number o f counts. Ironically, it is the Subaltemist G. Bhadras critique o f the use o f the
term syncretism that draws this out. He has suggested, the type of mutuality o f Hindu
162 Barbara Metcalfe. Presidmtial Address: Too Much, Too Little: Reflections on Muslims in the History of India, .Toiimal of
Asian Studies 54:4 (1995), 959-60. For Catherine Ashers views, seehar. Architecture of Mughal India tCamfaidge: University
ftess, 1992). For Peter Brown, see his. The Cult of Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity (Chicago; University of Chicago
88
and Muslim believed to reside in a culture that transgresses Hinduism and Islam (which
he argues to underlie the concept o f syncretism), does not imply fusion or loss of
separate significations. In fact, a bland theory of tolerance is argued to ignore the
acute intolerance and sectarianism that popular sects sometimes displayed towards each
other.*^^
The implications o f the above critique of syncretism to the concept o f Indicism is
clarified when one closely examines Metcalfes premier textual example o f the inadequacy
o f the categories Hindu and Muslim. She employs a poem written in Awadhi by a
Muslim, Malik Muhammad Jayasi, in about 1540, which tells the story o f Sultan
Alauddin Khiljis conquest o f the Hindu-Rajput city o f Chitaur.^^ Summarising the
analyses o f Richard Davis and Aditya Behl on this occasion, Metcalfe states;
In this poem, the villain to be sure, is the Muslim king, but Islam conquers. In the
poems brilliant closing pun, 'Chitaur' becomes Islam: the town, Chitaur in ashes, but
"chita (mind) and ura (heart), consumed in the fire of love, reach the annihilation of
the Sufis, whose doctrine Jayasi espoused. Islam and Hinduism are, then, not the
binary at all but rather true Islam, in the person of the Rajput hero, and false Islam, in
the person of the conqueror (helped by a Brahmin advisor and a Rajput assassin), who
are all ignorant of the path o f asceticism and love.
Davis and Behls analyses lead Metcalfe to conclude that Jayasis work is:
a story that profoundly enriched Sufi teachings by utilization o f local legends and
histories, the deployment o f new symbols to describe the quest for the beloved, and a
new depth in understanding the ardors o f the Sufi path through the sophisticated
Press, 1981).
163 G. Btedta, The Mentality of Subaltemality: Kantanama <x Rajdhanna, Snbaitem Studies, vol. 6 (Delhi: Osfard University
Press, 1989), p. 66.
164 Ibid, p. 962. For Jayasis poems, see Malik Muhammad Jayasi, Tire Padumawati of Malik Muhymmad JavasL GA. Grierson,
ed andtians. (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1911).
163 Ibid, p. 962. For Aditya Behl, see his, The Landscape ofParadise:Ma!ikMuhammad Jayasi and the Embodied City. Paper
delivered at the 9th Annual South Asia Conference (Berkeley: University r f California, 1995). For Richard Davis, see his. Images.
MiffipkoaL6Jttoa)$..iB Asian Ji,digiQUS.Tradiiltifms (Boulder: West View Press, 1998).
89
theories o f yogic discipline available in the culture at large. In literature, as in
architecture and art, new work [that of Davis, et a l], rooted in diverse social and
political contexts, points us beyond the static dichotomies that have shaped historical
narratives too long.*^
The immediate problem with Metcalfes use of the term Indic in reference to Jayasi
can be inferred when one considers the work of other Muslim writers in general, and Sufis
in particular, while also drawing in a Brahmanical Hindu work. For example, consider the
hagiography of a Sufi woman, Bibi Gauhar Sahiba;
Bibi Gauhar Sahiba was the daughter of a sayyid who lived, together with his his
family, in the city o f king Karan (Uttar Pradesh)....This king had a so-called kamdhenu.
a cow which fulfilled all wishes. Her milk was given to the family gods o f the royal
family. One day, when his family was almost starving to death, the sayyid took the
advise of his daughter Bibi Gauhar Sahiba and killed the cow, to give the meat to his
family to eat When the king heard what had happened, he ordered the sayyid to give
him his daughter as penalty for his crime. Bibi Gauhar Sahiba herself convinced her
father to comply. Having left his daughter with the king, the sayyid went to an imam in
another city and told him his story. On hearing what had happened the imam became
furious. Taking with him his seventy am/rs, he marched several hundred miles to bid
king Karan to embrace Islam. The latter, however, refused. A bloody battle followed,
in which the imam, the king, and the sayyid with his daughter were all killed....
The point of relating this story is that although it is set in the environs in which Jayasi lived
and worked, in this story the Hindu city is not true Islam - this is represented by an imam,
a sayyid and his devoted daughter. Furthermore, the theories available in culture at large,
represented by the kamdhenu (sacred cow) are not sophisticated; they are portrayed as
mere superstition.
Now consider a passage from the Parasurama Caritra, the work o f a Marathi Brahman
166 Ibid., p. 962.

167 This biography was first writtai, with others, in W. Crooke, Notes on Some Muhannnadan Saints and Shrines in the United
Provinces, Tmtiim Antitniary (May 1924): 97-99. The above rendition is Netty Boaonveries, fiom her. Temale Sufi Saints on the Indian
Subcontinent, Religious Traditicais. eds., R. Kloppenbcag andHanegraaf; W.J. (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 114.
90
author:
Kali [a personification of evil] established the san (Muslim era) in the Yavana desa
[i.e., foreign country] and the brought it over to svadesa [i.e., the home country]. Kali,
hoping to destroy dharma, and to usher in great prosperity for the Mlecchas [lit.,
impure], himself went to their country to bring them.... Mahammad [sic] had two
brave sons, Hasan [sic] and Husen [sic]. Both brothers, Hasan and Husen, were the
Shahs of their desas and were o f demonic disposition. Because of Kalis influence,
their minds became afflicted and they began hating all Hindus and fought with them....
Because ofK alis powers they became piravallis (saints) and gave rewards to their
people.'**
In this case, not only does the author acknowledge Muslims (Yavanas) in his history and
current environment, but incorporates Muhammad and two Imams into a Brahmanical
cosmology. Yet, according to this author, not only are Muslims foreign and impure, but
their holy figures are the agents of evil and they are brought to svadesa to destroy the
Brahmanical concept o f dharma. The question these latter works raise is this: if Jayasis
use of the sophisticated theories o f yogic discipline renders his work Indic, how does
one categorise the works not displaying the same hybridity? Might they also be said to
point beyond the static dichotomies which the categories Hindu and Muslim are
said to imply? Or, are the latter works, by virtue of their oppositional tone, to be declared
non-Indic?
These questions are, o f course, rhetorical. All the above works are Indic in so far as
they are composed in South Asia, a regional context that has been the site of shared
experiences for Hindus and Muslims. However, the hagiography of Bibi Gauhar Sahiba
168 This and other hisKaies from the area and era are cited in N.K. Wagle, Tiindu-Muslim Interactions in Medieval Maharashtra,
Hinduism Reconsidered, eds. Gunther-Dietz Sontheimer and Kuke, H. (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1997), 134-52.. Also, for such
histories in Bengal, see, J.T. OConnell, Vaisnava Perceptiom ofMuslims in Sixteenth Century Bengal, Islamic Society and Culture, ed.
Miltoii Israel and N.K. Wagle (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1983): 289-314. Here, one also finds Muslims uniformly portrayed as
"Yavmaa and Mlechhas by Brahmin authors.
91
and the Brahmanical Parasurama Caritra can hardly be ascribed the same cultural
orientation as each others or Jayasis poem. In the above light, Metcalfes vertical
fallacy is no fallacy at all. The true fallacy is the underlying assumption in Metcalfes
statements that if a Muslim acknowledges elements o f the culture at large not found in
the so-called heartlands of Islam, he or she ceases to be Islamic and becomes Indic.
This is no more than a veiled equation o f Islam with Arabia and Hinduism with India,
similar to that drawn by certain Subaltemists and all Orientalists. However, similar charges
can be lodged against Bhadras views, insofar as he too conceives o f local cultures as
transgressing Islam and Hinduism when tolerance is exhibited.
Like Metcalfe, Bhadra writes of Islam as having an essentially official or formal
form whose boundaries are being tran sgressed .T h u s, he and Metcalfe do not address
the fact that the types of works represented by Jayasi and read by both to make their
respective points, are informed by specific Islamic doctrines that promote syncretism,
while others are informed by doctrines that promote cultural separatism. That is to say,
Jayasi, identified by Metcalfe herself as a Chishti Sufi, is necessarily an advocate of
wahdat al-wujud as interpreted by that tariqa. Thus, Jayasis work exhibits a new depth in
understanding the ardors of the specifically Intoxicated, and not generally Sufi path. It is
this education that Jayasi positively expresses in terms o f specific elements o f the
intellectual currents available in the culture at large. On the other hand, the hagiography
o f Bibi Gauhar Sahiba, which also makes reference to the culture at large, clearly
represents a more Sober understanding o f Sufi doctrine. By not incorporating this cmcial
link between theory and practise into his understanding o f Islam and the cultures in which
92
South Asian Muslims participate, Bhadra ultimately echoes Metcalfe and other advocates
of Indicism insofar as he also excludes the reality of an Islam, including the legalistic
variety that all essentialize as true Islam, that legitimates aspects o f the culture at large.
Thus, for works cognizant o f integrative approaches to ideology, such as that articulated
in Ricoeurs concept o f ideology-praxis and employed in this study, the above insights
expose a glaring flaw in views dependent on notions o f a formal or informal Islam that
does not include Intoxicated and Sober perspectives.
These objections should not be read to imply that the concept of Indic culture must
be replaced with that o f Islamic culture. The error in such a categorisation is made
obvious by the differences between the two Muslim views outlined above, each
representing a distinct cultural attitude. Furthermore, Jayasis use o f Awadhi and the
author o f the Parasumara Caritra's use o f Marathi suggests that culture is circumscribed
by far more local factors (including class, ethnicity, etc.) than such terms as Islamic or
Indic can represent. Thus, ultimately the supposed synthesis of Islam and India
wrought by the transgression of Islam by South Asian Muslims, actually appears to result
from the fact that each authors education in either Islam or Hinduism provides the
legitimation for their engagement in aspects o f local cultures, as well as the intellectual
basis for the development o f each culture along syncretic or separatist lines. It is with
this hypothesis and the need for an alternative to the terms Indic and Islamic that one can
turn to the Mughals themselves for validation.
169 G. Bhadra. The Mentality of Subaltemality: Kantawna or Rajdhanna, p. 65.
Chapter Two
Perfect Men and Servants of God
In the Period of Great Mughals
Although Lesser Mughals (1707-1858) would follow the Great (1526-1707), it was in
the early phase that the Mughal regime took shape and extended its authority over
virtually all o f South Asia. Nevertheless, Mughal political authority only extended across
that vast territory for a fraction o f the states history. The rarity o f any semblance o f a
pan-Indian state in South Asian history - occurring only twice before (Buddhist
Mauryas, century BCE/Muslim Tughluqs 14* century CE) - begs the question of
whether the institutionalization o f such a state by Muslims on the cusp o f the colonial era
influenced the rise o f Muslim Nationalism under colonial rule? This study contributes to
the answer by considering specifically whether any aspect o f the Muslim Nationalist
concept of Muslim India is evident in the Utopias/Ideologies o f the Great Mughals.
In the historiography of the Mughal regime (Great and Lesser), one notes a duo of
Great heads of state repeatedly employed to represent the poles o f Mughal political
culture; Jalal al-Din Akbar (r. 1556-1605) and Muhammad Aurangzeb Alamgir (r. 1658-
1707). In the case o f Akbar, Jain, Hindu, Christian and Muslim contemporaries have
claimed that he had ceased to be Muslim, and many Orientalists have argued the same
93
94
based on these accounts and the general complexion of the regime he implemented.
Contemporary South Asianists, it can be inferred from the discussion in chapter one,
understand Akbars intellectual eclecticism and political regime as exemplars o f the
various articulations o f Indic or Indian rulers of the pre-capitalist period. In the case
o f Akbars great grandson, Aurangzeb, there is no debate about Islamic credentials.
Opinion varies on the implications of his preference for the Sunni schools of fiqh, kalam
and Sober Sufism. To Orientalists, this inclination implied so bigoted a creed that it
spelled the demise o f Mughal authority.^ Contemporary South Asianists acknowledge
Aurangzebs creed, but argue that socio-economic changes unleashed primarily by
European expansion and trade accounts for Mughal demise.^ As shown below, the impact
1 The eariiest Orientalist perspectives were of the Indologist variety, expressed in the context of general histories o fIndia.
T h ^ included the periodization of South Asian histwy into Hindu and Muslim eras. For example, see one of the earliest histories of
the Mtighals in the English language: Francis Gladwin, The Histotv of Hindustan (Calcutta: Stuart and Cooper, 1788). Although this and
other Indologist concepts cany into later varieties of Orientalist thought, the Indoltîsts are set apart by most fervently arguing that the
Hindu era represents the regions quintessance and Golden Age, while the Ivftislim is little better than a Dark Age. Influenced in
particular by the rise of Utilitarianism, later Orientalists retorted that the Muslim era represented progress - from polytheism to
monotheism, and so on - on the road to European modes of Modernity. An early lefwssentative of this view is, James Mill, Hie History
of British India (Londrm: Baldwin, Cradock and Jt^, 1817). For a selection of later perspectives on the Great Mugbals (particularly
Akbar) bearing the mark of the above early works, see, W.H. Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb (London: MacMillan, 1923); G.B.
Mallesoo, Akbar and the Rise of the Miiyhal Etnpire (Ox.ord: Clarendon Press, 1890); and, F.C.K.A. Noer, LEmoereur Akbar (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1883). For the history o fIndia more generally, see, Mountstuart Elphinstone, The History of India; the Hindu and Mahometan
Periods (Lonrkm: Murray, 1905).
The SubaltOTi Studies Group does not write extensively on this subject, being more concerned with post-17th century
subaltern history- For a representative perspective from the field of South Asian Studies, therefcffe, s ^ , John F. Richards, The Mughal
Empire (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1996). As well, vrith respect to the formation of the Mughal state, see, Muzaffar Alam,
State Building Under the Mughals; Religion, Culture and Pohtics," C a h te rs dAsie Cenliaie 3-4 (1997): 105-128,; S.P. Blake, The
Patrimonial-Bureacratic Empire of the Mughals, Journal of Asian Studies 39 (1997): 77-94; and, D.E. Streusand, The Formation of the
Mughal Etnpire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
2 For an example of Orientalist perspectives on Aurangzeb in particular, see, Stanley Lane-Poole, Aurangzib and the Decay of
the Mughal. Empire (OxfMd: Clarratdon Press, 1901).
3 This afîroaoh to Mughal decline began widi works such as, Karen Leonard, The Great Firm Theory of the Decline of the
95
of Aurangzebs creed is argued away by stressing the continuity of administrative policy
from Akbar to Aurangzeb, thus including him with Akbar as feudal in the mode of
power he exercised. Yet, at least on an idiomatic level, Aurangzeb poses the same
problem for the general notion of Indicism or India that is implied by the hagiography
ofBibi Gauhar Sahiba, the Sober Sufi. Thus, Akbar and Aurangzeb remain as relevant to
this discussion o f the relationship between Islam and India as they have been to
scholars interested in this issue since the 16-17* centuries.
Here, Mughal political culture is approached by first outlining Islamic political
philosophy in the Middle Period. The intent is to identify the breadth of political
Utopias/Ideologies available to a Muslim political culture in the period, as well as to add
to the variables by which to gauge whether Middle Islam in general represents the
primary education of the Mughal political elite. Quite obviously, this approach relates to
ascertaining the idiom of Mughal political culture. The second angle o f approach is
aimed at addressing institutions directly. Following from the Utopias/Ideologies ofM iddle
Islam discussed in the previous chapter and in the context o f political philosophy, this
chapter considers whether the attempt was made to institute any of the practical ideals o f
Islamic thought that transcend what is. In particular, this discussion not only questions
whether the relationship between elite and subaltern is mediated by no education at all,
as in Guhas feudal model, but whether elite institutions directed at subaltern
education or welfare, should be reduced to charity driven by religious duty and
Mughai Empire, Cwnparati-ve Studies in Society and Histoiv 21.3 (1979); 151. The oonten^xHaiy view is taken up in detaii in the next
chapter, but an example of this line of th o u ^t can be read in, Andrea Hintze, The Muahal Empire and its Deeiine fAldershot: Ashgata,
96
anxiety to forestall greater unrest on the part o f the subalterns and to ensure the safety o f
elite lives and property, as the Subaltemist David Arnold has typically argued.^ The
question here is whether ones understanding o f such institutions can be extended to
include consideration of a greater Utopianism than expediency or duty. Besides
contributing to the broader discussion of this study, the above lines o f inquiry lay bare the
Mughal states Ideological initiatives and the Utopianism of its formally educated elite,
scholarly and political. Thus, one is in position to draw some conclusions concerning the
influence o f Mughal political culture on the rise o f Muslim Nationalism in the colonial
era, particularly conceming the roots o f the idea of a religio-political community
encompassing Muslim India.
I: Tlie Political Philosophy ofMiddle Islam
You have become the best community ever raised upfrom humanity,
enjoining the right andforbidding the wrong,
and having faith in God.
[Quran 3:110]
The state is arguably among the oldest institutional features o f Islam. Muhammad,
on whose example/ i f A partially bases shari a, and Sufism to some extent bases tariqa,
established a state that survived him for decades (at least), even if the legitimacy o f his
immediate successors {khulafa ) was contested.^ Thus, a shift from Caliphate to
1997).
4 David Arnold, Famaie in Peasant Consciousness and Peasant Action: Madras, Subaltern Studies, vol. 3 (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1984), p. 86; 99.
5 fo r the earliest extant biography of Muhammad (8th century), see, Abd al-Malik ita Hisham, Sirat Rasul Allah, trans.
97
Sultanate may mark the advent o f the Middle Period, but the early Caliphate remains the
most appropriate place to begin a discussion o f Islamic political philosophy.^
Based on Muslim sources arising no earlier than the 8th century, most scholars accept
that Muhammads closest Companions (Sahaba), including members o f his own family,
the prominent members of his state (the ansar and muhajirun), as well as the more
recently allied houses o f Mecca, appear not to have questioned the idea that Muhammads
example as political and religious head o f the community (umma) provided the ideal
model for leadership, or that his state remained a valid component o f community life. For
such prominent individuals, it was a matter o f who among them would receive the bay a
(consent) of their class, according to Hijazi/Arab custom, and assume the helm o f the
community, at least in a political sense, if not in religious affairs as well. Islamicists have
thus argued that the candidature of the first four Caliphs was secured by their status in
Arabian society at large, as well as their association with Muhammad by blood, marriage
and/or longstanding association.
Quite obviously, personal association with Muhammad could not be an indefinite
Guillaume, A, (London; Oxford University Press, 1955). For a sample of cmtemporaiy historical works, see, M.A. Cook, Muhammad
(Oxford; University Press. 1983); Martin Lings, Muhammad; His Life Based on the Earliest Sotirces (New York; Inner Traditions Intl.,
1983); W. Montgomeiy Watt, Muhaminad: Prophet and Statesman (Oxford; University Press, 1962).
For examples of socio-econtanic perspectives cm Muhatinnad and the early Caliphate, see, Patricia Crone, Meccan Trade and
the Rise of Islam tPrinceton; University Press, 1987); and, Mahmood Ibrahim, Merchant Capital and Islam (Austin; University of Texas
Press, 1990).
6 For general works on political philosophy, see, A.K.S. Lambttm, State and Government in Medieval Islam; An Introduction
to the study of Islamic Political Tliegtv. the Jurists (Oxford: University Press, 1981); E.l.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval
Islam (Cambridge: University Press, 1958).
For a variety of perspectives cm caliphal authority, see, Patricia Crone and M. Hitids, Ood*s Caliph: Religious Autfaoritv in the
First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Univeisity Press, 1986); F.M. Donner, The Earlv Islamic Ccaiqtiests (Princeton: UniversiQf Press,
1981); and, Wilfred Madehatg, The Succession to Muhammad; A History of Earlv Islam (Cambridge; University Press, 1996).
98
qualification if the Caliphal office was to survive more than a few decades after
Muhammads death. Thus, one can close the discussion of the first four Caliphs (632-661)
- unique in their direct relationships with Muhammad and the election o f three to office
- by stating that the above issue was resolved by acknowledging them as patriarchal
exemplars {khulafa al-rashidun) as Sunni scholars did, or by declaring some o f them
illegitimate, as Shii scholars did. The religious legitimacy o f later Caliphs, therefore,
had to be based on attributes other than association with Muhammad. Furthermore, as the
Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) instituted dynasticism after A lis death (661), pushing
the Arabian custom o f bay 'a into the political background, their political legitimacy also
had to stem from alternative sources than those upon which the first four Caliphs had
depended. These developments and their doctrinal supports are addressed below, but
approached from the perspective of doctrinal opposition to the Umayyad Caliphate.
Doctrinally based opposition to the Umayyad Caliphs rose with their coming to
power. The first definable group actively to oppose the Umayyads formed under the
Caliphate of Ali and, for a time, extended its support to his regime. These were the
Kharijis (Seceeders), also known as the partisans o f justice (ahl al-adf). The Kharijis
generally agreed that as sovereignty belongs to God, its exercise must fall on the entire
Muslim community {umma) and not a few privileged leaders. Thus, no hierarchy was to
be recognized among believers, but most Kharijis upheld the need for a leader to enforce
the law. For example, Najdat ibn Umaymir argued that as inward belief can supercede
7 For example, see, M.G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 1 (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 197.
8 See, Majid IChadduri, The Islamic Ccmception of Justice (BaltinKwe; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
99
discord, authority was only necessary in society until the rule o f law was achieved, at
which point the state would wither away. As this implied that leadership was presently
needed, Kharijis as a whole argued that the leader should be elected and removed by the
will o f the community. Furthermore, the leader should be chosen without regard to race,
tribe, class or, in the opinion ofShabib ibn Yazdd al-Shaybani (d. 697), sex.^ The Khariji
challenge, beginning during the Caliphate o f Ali and leading to his assassination, would
haunt both the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphate, even establishing short-lived and
disassociated states in the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian Plateau and North Africa.
Another source o f opposition to the Umayyads arising early, later dubbed the
Partisans of Ali {Shi at Ali or Shi a), argued that Muhammads descendents through
Ali were the rightful Caliphs, though they used the alternate term Îmams' (leaders). As
Ali was Muhammads son-in-law and nephew, the early stages o f Alid opposition may
be viewed as an attempt by Muhammads family, the Hashimiyya clan, to wrest power
from their rivals, the Umayya clan, who had monopolized power following Alis
assassination (other groups aligning themselves according to their own interests). With the
advent of the Hashimi Abbasid Caliphate (750-1517), the family o f Ali was further
distinguished from the generality o f the Hashimi clan. Eventually, this brought to
prominence the idea that only the descendents of Ali and Fatima (Muhammads daughter)
9 Ibid., pp. 21-2.

10 Hodgson. The Venture of Islam, vol. I, pp. 215-16; 221-22;256;291;30O;313. Although K taijism largely died out in the
Middle Period, one group known as the Ibadiyya, followers of Abd Allah ibn Ibad, survive to this day as the official creed of the
Sultanate of Oman. See, T. Lewicki, Al-lbadiyya, Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 3, fqj. 648-60.
11 Few the Abbasid Califhate, see, Hugh Kennedy, The Earlv Abbasid Caliphate: A Political History INew JersCT; Barnes and
100
were rightful Imams. Apart from the above question of lineage, on which the proto-Shia
differed with supporters o f the Umayyads, the only doctrinal aspect of the early challenge
was the claim that Muhammad had designated Ali his successor. Otherwise, no
opposition was posed to the concept o f combining religious and political power in the
leader. By the 8* century, doctrine developed to enshrine the place o f the Imam above all
others in the community, including the Abbasid Caliphs. According to the Shia, among
whom number al-Ghazalis batiniyya, the leadership of the community became dependent
on one Imams designation {nass) of the next Imam by divine inspiration.'^ In general,
this was justified on the grounds that the Imam is the Proof o f God (Hujjat Allah), the
Pole (Qutb) of the umma, and alone aware o f the inner (batin) meaning o f the Quran,
making him the only sinless {ma sum) guide on the spiritual path available to humanity.'^
When splits within the descendents o f Ali and Fatima occurred on the issue o f who
had been designated the 5* and 7*'Imam - leading to the rise o f the Zaydi and Ismaili
branches, respectively - it had profound effects in the sphere o f Shii political philosophy.
The Zaydi line argued that an unbroken chain o f descendents was available, leading to the
constitution of an Imamate in Yemen. The Ismaili line and those who traced descent
from Musa al-Kazim (d.797/804), known as Imamis {ithna ashariyya), were faced with
Noble, 1981); and, M.A. Shaban, The Abbasid Revolution (Cambridge: University Press, 1970).
12 Momen, An Introducticai to Shi'a Islam, pp. 153-2.
13 Ibid., pp. 154-7. It should be noted that Zaydis, who b n fe with the main body of joto-Shiis in the early 8th century,
stand alone in ascribing the hnam no innate esoteric kaow!e(%e ot traits such as sinlessness Cwma). See, Khadduri, The Islamic
Conception of Jtistke. pp. 67-70.
14 Zaydi political activity began uadar Zayd (d. 740), who promoted himself as the rightful hnam after the death of his
gtand&tba. Imam Iftssayn (d. 680), leading an i^jrising against the Umayyads, only to die on the battlefield in Iraq. The movement was
resumed in Abbasid times by Zayds followers, led by Qasim al-Rassi (d. 860), establishing an hnamate in Yemen. See, R. Strothman,
101
the problem that one o f the founders descendents died without leaving a surviving heir.
Thus, while both streams argued that the last in these lines had gone into occultation
ighaybd), the Ismailis came to argue that there were always a number o f Hidden Imams
present from which Living Imams could arise,'^ while Imamis pressed the idea that the
Hidden Imam would only return (rajaa) as the "Mahdi (Rightly Guided One), who
would lead the righteous against evil a few years before the Second Coming of Christ.'^
With the Imam in occultation, the way was thus opened for these Shii fuqaha and
mutakallimvn to assume the mantle o f spiritual authority. Thus, by the Middle Period the
Imami {ithna ashariyya) line came to argue that the ulam a\ as a class, would guide
temporal authorities in the matter of religious conduct, while the Ismailis held that there
were always Hidden Imams from which a political Imam could arise and the Zaydis
continued to posit the need for a singular living Imam.
Political philosophy in the Sunni context may be said to have grown in opposition to
Umayyad and Abbasid religious authority, though not necessarily those Caliphates
political authority. In the 7* and 8* centuries, a number of prominent proto-Sunni
scholars presented incumbent Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs as the ultimate authority in
matters o f religion, but by the 9* century, growing scholarly claims to religious authority
Zaidiva. Encvctopaedia of Islam, vol. 4, pt. 2 (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1st Editii), pp. 1196-98.
15 Ismailisms association with stale power is best represented by the rise of the Fatimid Caliphate (909-1171) in North
Africa and Egypt, which rivaled the Abbasids in power and indulged in a grand propaganda campaign against them. For the Fatimid
Caliphate, see, Yaocov Lev, State and Society in Fatimid Kyvpt (Leidw: E.J. Brill, 1990); Paul E. Walker, The Isnm ili Dawa and the
Fatimid CalijAate, and Paula A. Sanders, The Fatimid State: 969-1171. The Cambridge Histcav of Eavttt. 640-1517. ed. Carl Petty
(Cambridge: University Press, 1998), pp. 120-50; 151-74, respectively.
17 Ibid., p. 196.
102
would burst forth in spectacular fashion. At this point in time, the Abbasid Caliph al-
Mamun (d, 833) attempted to impose his preferred religious opinion - a penchant for
Mutazili ideas - in the name of his office. In the mihna (inquisition) that ensued, al-
Mamun encountered great resistance, most notably from Ahmad ibn Hanbal, founder o f
one of the Sunni schools of jurisprudence. By the end of the century, al-Mamuns Sunni
successors were turned to Ashari kalam once and for all, while Mutazila kalam began to
closely entwine with Shii thought.'^
While Sunni, Shii and Khariji scholarly classes chipped away the Caliphates
religious authority, the states governors eroded the Caliphates political authority. By the
10*** century, independent regimes govemed former Caliphal domains without the
Caliphs appointment, or were appointed by the Caliph only in name.^ Islamicists agree
that Sunni scholars now sought to legitimate the political authority of the Sultanates,
18 For graieral discussions of the mihna, see, M. Hinds, Mihna.Encvclopaedia of Islam, vol. 7, pp. 2-6; Patricia Crone and
Hinds, M, Gods Califdi: Religiotia Authority in the First Centuries of Islam (chap. 5); andj. Lapidus, The Sqiaration of State and
Religion in the Devek^tmenl of Early Islamic Society, lintcrnational .Toiimal ofMiddle East Studies VI (1975). Fot a closer
consisteation of Ita Hanbals role, see, W.M. Patton, Ahmad ita Hanbal and the Mihna (Leiden: 1897).
19Mutazili kalam is most influential in the development of Zaydi and Imami thought. The Zaydi thinkers Qasim al-Rassi (d.
860) and Yahya ita al-Husayn (d, 911), and the Imamis Ibn Babawayh (d. 991) and Muttahar al-Hilli (d. 1325), are generally understood
to have laid the foimdations of each sub-creed, and their wotks illustrate well the centrality of Mutazilism. Deductive reason in approach
to revelation, Gods justice and human freewill, ail features of Mu'tazali doctrine,appear pnaninently in the above thinkers ideas.
Indeed, if not the preservation ofMutazih ideas in the woiks of particularly Zaydi scholars in Yemen, most of what is knovm of
Mutazilism would be derived frran the works of oritios. For a sample trfprimary wotks, see, Ita Babawavfa. A Shiite Creed, trans. Fyzee
(London: 1942); and, Hasan ibn Muttahar al-Hilli, Al-Bab al-Hadi Ashar, trans. W.W. Miller, A Treatise on the Principles of Shi'ite
Theologv (Lraidon: 1928). For background reading, see, Khadduri. The Islamic Conception of Justice, pp. 64-70; and, G. Anawati, et al.,
line Smtune inedite de theologie Mu'tazilite: le Moghni du qadi Abd al-Jabbar, Kfelange de Iinstitut Dominicain des Etudes
Orientales IV (1957): 281-316; V, pp. 417-24.
20 Aihough discussions of this subject are found in each of the works cited in this section, a focused discussion using the
example of the Buyid Sultans can be rrad in, Roy Mottahedeh, Lovaltv and Leadership in Earlv Islamic Society (ftinceton: University
Press, 1980).
103
redefining the entire function of the Caliphate in the process. A case in point is al-
Mawardi, introduced in the previous chapter.
According to al-Mawardi, the Caliphate is not only necessary for upholding the faith
and managing the affairs of the world on rational grounds, it is obliptory for the
umma according Xofiqh^^ The first qualification an individual must have to hold the
office is that he must be from the Quraysh - that is, a member of the tribe to which both
Umayyad and Abbasid clans belong. Beyond this qualification, the individual must be
endowed with the probity, justice and prudence, knowledge of the shari a and the
military ability necessary to fulfill the duties o f the office. One can rise to the office by
two means, election {baya) or designation {nass). Designation is allowed as the right
o f the Caliph, but he is bound to choose a qualified individual. Thus, al-Mawardi
informs one that many jurists require ratification o f the Caliphs nominee by those in the
umma who possess analytical minds, knowledge o f necessary qualifications, and the
wisdom to choose the most capable candidate. Al-Mawardi does not see the need for
ratification in all cases, but tends towards scholars who argue that it is necessary when the
nominee is a family member of the incumbent Caliph. When the Caliph has no nominee,
the above group o f electors must choose and invest authority in the most qualified
individual available. As eyery member o f the umma does not have the probity, knowledge
and wisdom, nor the physical/institutional means, necessary to participate in the process.
21 Al-Mawaidi, Al-Ahkam al-Sulbmiyya, p. 3.

22 Ibid., p. 4.
23 Ibid, p. 4.
104
al-Mawardi argues that the umma delegates its authority to the electors. Finally, al-
Mawardi relays that scholarly opinion is divided on the minimum number of electors
necessary, ranging from those who argue for the involvement of the general population
with the necessary qualifications and ability, to others, like al-Mawardi, who argue that
mostfuqaha and mutakallimim in Basra and Kufa hold that 3-6 individuals are
sufficient.^* The tenure o f each Caliph is life, unless he is physically disabled or
transgresses the Sunni fuqaha s shari 'a. Although al-Mawardi devotes pages to the types
of physical traits that disqualify an individual from holding office, as well as the types of
transgressions that disqualify the incumbent, he does not establish how this ruling, or any
other, will be enforced.^^
In all the above features of the Caliphal office and its ideal holder, al-Mawardi echoes
the works o f proto-Sunni thinkers that sought to legitimate either the Umayyad or
Abbasid Caliphates. Al-Mawardi can be distinguished as a Middle Period Sunni thinker,
however, in the manner he argues the Caliphal office is aided in its many political
functions by means o f two administrative arms. The first is the wazirate, which is further
divided into two types, the delegated (tqfwid) and executive (jtanfidh).^^ The
delegated wazir (minister) is endowed with full authority to rule in the Caliphs place,
while the executive is only authorized to execute Caliphal instructions. On this basis, the
former is required to be a Muslim, while the latter post may be filled by a non-Muslim,
24 Ibid., pp. 4-9,

25 Ibid. p. 5,
26 Ibid, pp. 17-19.
27 Ibid, p. 23.
105
though not by a woman.
The second administrative arm is the amirate, and the amir (governor) may be
delegated or executive as in the case o f the wazir. However, al-Mawardi also suggests that
governorship may be usurped, rather than recruited. That occurs when the amir
independently acquires by force certain districts over which he is subsequently
appointed by Caliphal decree.In this manner, al-Mawardi argues:
The governor becomes an independent and exclusive controller o f political matters

and administration, while the Caliph... becomes the implementor o f the dictates of
religion, thus transforming unlawfolness into legality and the forbidden into the
legitimate.
In effect, al-Mawardi and the Sunni fuqaha he represents so diminish the Caliphs
religious and political authority that the Caliphate itself is reduced to a symbol o f the
umma, a fact which al-Ghazali confirms in his Iqtisad al-Ptiqad hy arguing, in Lambtons
words, that the caliph remains the symbol o f the shari 'a but the sultan is...recognized as
the holder of coercive power.
The diminished authority of the Caliphate in the Middle Period is best attested to by
the writings of the Hanbaii scholar, Ibn Taymiyya. He writes, those in command are of
28 Ibid., p. 29.
29 Ibid. p. 36.
30 Ibid. p. 36.
31 AJLS. Lambton. "Khalifa; In Political Theoiy," Epcvctopsedia of Islam, vol. 4, p. 949.
32 For the historical setting of Ibn Taymiyya life and tvork, ses, Robert Irwin. Hie Middle East in the lyfiddte.A^.; .'nie Early
1250-1382 iLcndon: Croom Helm, 1986). For Ibn Taymiyyas intellectual place and political activism, see, D.B.
Little, The Historical and Historiographic Significance of the Detention of Ita Taymiyya, International Jotmml ofMiddle East Studies 4
(1973): 311-27.
106
two classes...the 'ulama (jurists/theologians) and the umara ( g o v e r n o r s ) .In other
words, the Caliphate receives little, if any, of the attention paid the institution even by al-
Mawardi.^'* In fact, Ibn Taymiyya argued that the Caliphate is not obligatory for the
Quran makes no clear mention of this stiplation.^^ Rather, Ibn Taymiyya contends that
the relationship most in accord with the Sum a is when the military authority has no
jurisdiction whatever, its function being merely to execute decrees o f the fuqaha His
reasoning in this regard is clear. The Islamic state is to be govemed according to the
precepts o f the Quran m dSunm . However, the responsibility [to govern] is collective,
and the measure o f obligation is ability, and every man is responsible to the extent o f his
a b i l i t y . As such, those best able to interpret the sources are also best suited to
government, at least as far as legislation is concerned. Not surprisingly for a jurist, this
means that the Islamic state is to be govemed by the fuqaha' and their sMri 'a.
Although community role is the ideal, and the legislative role of th^ f u q a h a rather
than the Caliph or Sultan, is argued to best satisfy the condition of ability, Ibn Taymiyya
is about as practical as al-Mawardi when dealing with the military authorities. He
argues that the umma is made up of three types ofMuslims: 1) Those who live entirely by
their own capricious whims; 2) Those who live according to sound religious principles;
33 Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, Al-Hisbaf t al-hlam, trans, M. Holland (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1985), p.
116.
34 Ibn Taymiyya, A lSiyasa atShar 'iyya, pp. 14-15; p. 73.
35 Lambton, Khalifa: In Political Theoiy," Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 4, p. 949. Also see, <
Thought of Ite Taymiwah (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1973).
36 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Hisbaf t al-Islam, p. 25.
37 Ibid, p. 23.
107
and, 3) Those in whom both o f the above co-exist.^* It is the last group that he claims
constitute the majority of the believers.... They sometimes go this way, sometimes that,
and mix right action with wrong.^^This being the inclination o f the community, he
argues that the ideal shar 'i-state, one in which judicial autonomy is sacrosanct, cannot be,
for [t]he affairs o f men in this world can be kept in order with a certain connivance in
sin, better than with pious tyranny.^That is to say, the Sultanate - ruling by fear and
agreement - is necessary, for without it, neither religious nor worldly order can be
established.'** Thus, in the final analysis, although Ibn Taymiyya declares
despotismVTharonicism a sin, he categorically states that sixty years of a despotic
ruler are better than a single night without a ruler.
Beyond the political philosophies o f the fuqaha' and mutakalUmun o f different sects,
the Middle Period is also marked by the writing o f political philosophy by the political
elite. It is Islamic in so far as it incorporates many o f the ideas o f the above scholars,
including their sectarianism. However, Islamicists are agreed that the line of thought it
represents has roots in the Sassanian political tradition.'*^ A proto-example o f this
political philosophy is Ibn al-Muqaffas (d. 757) Risalafi al-Sahaba. Writing in the first
years of Abbasid rule at the behest of the Governor of Basra for the Caliph al-Mansur, Ibn
al-Muqaffa presented the Caliph as divinely appointed. He writes; He [God] has given
38 Ibid., pp. 97-8.

39 Ibid., p. 98.
40Ibid.,p.95.
41 Ibn Tajmiyya, A lSiytaa alShar 'iyya, p. 29; p. 187.
42 Ibid., p. 188.
108
him pure intentions.^ The reason is that a person with a good disposition to accomplish
important acts is necessary [for the profit] of the elite and the masses o f the umma.^^
As government in Ibn al-Muqaffa s opinion must be based on religion (din) and
reason Caql), both the religious sciences and personal opinion (ra y ) must play a
role."^ Given that the Caliphs reason is god-given and the Caliph is therefore
particularly suited to rule, Ibn al-Muqaffa argues that when there is difference in religious
opinion among the mujtahids, the Caliph has the acuity and power to decide among
them.'* In other words, the Caliph is the ultimate political and religious authority. Thus,
he may only be removed if he fails to enforce specifics (e.g.,fara id! hudud) that can be
identified, not vague notions of rectitude.'** In most other regards, Ibn al-Muqaffa
maintains the vision o f the fuqaha
Ibn al-Muqaffas highly centralized vision o f power is the strain in his work that
carries forward into the Middle Period. Thus, in Nizam al-Mulks (d. 1092) Siyasat Nama
- the author being the same wazir who endowed the Madrasa al-Nizamiyya (among others)
and appointed al-Ghazali as a professor - one finds the Caliphs god-given right to rule
transferred to the Sultan. Nizam al-Mulk acknowledges Gods sovereignty, the supremacy
o f the shari'a and delegated authority (Caliphal investiture), but argues that [i]n every
age and time God (be He exulted) chooses one member of the human race and, having
43 example, see Rosenthal, Kfedieval Islamic Political Philosophy (Camlwidge: University Press, 1958).
44 Itsi al-Muqaffl, RisaSaft al-Sahaba, ed. and trans. Charles Pellat (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1976), p. 20.
45 Ibid., p. 22.
46 Ibid., H). 28-30.
47 Ibid., pp. 42-3.
48 Ibid., pp. 25-6.
109
endowed him with goodly virtues, entrusts him with the interests o f the world and the
well-being of His servants....^^This is not the Caliph, but the Sultan, and in matters of
state Nizam al-Mulk declares that the latter has no need o f any counselor or guide. In
other words, political legislation is outside the legislative capacity o f the fuqaha but
sanctioned by God nonetheless. As for religious legislation, Nizam al-Mulk concedes,
[i]t is incumbent upon the king to inquire into religious matters, to be acquainted with
divine precepts and prohibitions and put them into practice, such that kingship and
religion are like two brothers.^' The question is what specifically are the limits o f the
political and the religious?
The realm of political authority reserved for the Sultanate by Nizam al-Mulk and
other writers o f this genre, is described by Diya al-Din Barani (d.l357), a historian and
political philosopher in the court of the Delhi Sultanate. His definition of the Sultans
political authority is important for two reasons. First, Barani echoes Nizam al-Mulks
views on the dimensions o f the states legislative authority. Second, the difference in
Barani and Nizam al-Mulks reasoning illustrates that the genre o f Mirrors literature in
49 Nizam ul-Mulk, Siyasat Nama, trans. H. Dari (Londcm: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 2. For an introductiati to the
Saljuq state, in which Nizam al*Mulk served as wazir, see, A.K.S. Lambton, The Intonal Structure of the Saljuq Period, Cambridge
History of Isiam. vol. 5 (Camtmdge: University Press, 1%8).
50 Ibid., p. 11.
31 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
52 Diya al-Din Barani, Fatawa-i Jahandari, trans. Alsar Khan and ed. Mahammad HaWb, The Political Theory of the Delhi
Sultanate iPelhi: Kitab Mahal, 1962). Barani was intellectually active during the periof of the Tughluqs - the third of five dynasties to
rule from Delhi between 1205-1526. Fot a political histray of the 5 dynasties (Mamiiit, Khalji, Tughluq, Sayyid, Lodi) known as the
Delhi Sultanates, see Peter A. Jackson, The Delhi Suhanate: A Political and Military History (New York; Cambridge University Press,
1999). For more social histories, see Richard Eaton, The Rise of Talam and the Renpal Frontier. 1204-1760 (Berkeley: University of
California ftess, 1993); and Hamida Naqvi, Agricultural. Industrial and Urban Dynamism taKler the Sultans of Delhi. 1206-1555 (Delhi;
110
which both wrote is not without a variety o f opinions. And third: Barani suggests that the
South Asian Muslim political elite, as well as the scholarly elite whom al-Hujwiri
represents, were well educated in Middle Islam.
Barani refers to the Sultans legislative domain as "dawabit, or state laws, a widely
used term in the Middle Period. He considers dawabit in the Delhi Sultanate to be
concerned with three issues: 1 ) court etiquette and conduct, where customary practices
prevail; 2) appointment of state officers; and, 3) apprehension and prosecution o f rebels
and conspirators against the state.H ow ever, while it was shown above that Nizam al-
Mulk assigns this authority to the Sultan in the name of divine decree, as shown below,
Barani relinquishes this authority to the Sultanate in the name o f necessity.
Like Ibn Taymiyya, Barani ascribes neither to the Caliphate nor to the Sultanate any
idealized religious sanction. In fact, Barani views the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates as
no more than Sultanates. Nowhere does he mention the necessity o f Caliphal investiture,
although various Delhi Sultans sought and received their contemporary Abbasid Caliphs
investiture with much fanfare.^ To Barani, only the four Rashidm are miracles of the
Prophet. As for Sultans, even the administrative laws over which they are ascribed
jurisdiction should neither negate the orders o f the shari a, nor interfere with the
Mimshiram Mawharlal Publishers, 1986).

53 Ibid, pp. 64-5.
34 Forprimaiy descriptions of investitures, see, Diyaal-EHn Barani, Tarikk-i Firox Shahi, trans. H.M. Elliot, History of India
in (Delhi; Kitab Mahal, 1964), p. 246; also see, Minhaj al-Siiaj Jmjani, Tabaqat-i Nasir, trans. R Ravetty (Delhi; Oriental Books
Reprint Corp., 1970).
55 Barani, Fatawa-i Jdtandari, p. 40.
Ill
commandments o f religion .B aran i also writes approvingly in Advice HI, titled On the
Blessings of Consultation and Advice, of the fact that wise men have said: No opinion
for kings.E v id e n tly , Baranis underlying ideal is not the Sultanate, but something
more akin to Ibn Taymiyyas al-siyasa al-skar iyya, wherein the fuqaha hold ultimate
legislative authority in all realms.
Sultanate, in Baranis estimation, is royal government, or government following the
ways and means o f pre-Islamic Persian emperors. Barani argues: Now, between the
S m m of the prophet... and the customs o f the Persian emperors... there is complete
contradiction and total opposition.^* The only reason Sultanate exists in Baranis world
is:
just as the eating o f carrion, though prohibited, is yet permitted in time of dire need,
similarly the customs and traditions o f the pagan emperors o f Iran,.. should from the
viewpoint o f truth and correct faith, be considered like the eating o f carrion in time of
dire need.^^
In other words, echoing Ibn Taymiyyas views, Baranis Sultanate and its legislative
authority is a connivance in sin out o f practical necessity. The necessity itself is bom o f
Baranis recognition that character, education, age and class divisions in society imply that
there can be no stability in the affairs of men without justice.^ As [rjeligion and justice
are twins, the explicit need o f society is to enforce the shari a, which Barani deems
impossible without Sultanate for one reason: the call o f the religious scholars does not
56 Ibid, p. 65.
57 Ibid.. p. 9.
58 Ibid., p. 39.
59 Ibid., p. 40.
112
move the people, while fear of the Sultan, his terror and power, and his blood-shedding
sword does.^'
Finally, it can be said that Baranis Sultan bears the distinction o f being the Vice-
Regent {khalifa) o f God, in so far as his government alone can further the popular
acceptance o f the shari a. Simultaneously, given that Sultanate is not sanctioned by
religion in Baranis view, the Sultan is also a sinner. Barani attempts to resolve the
contradiction by arguing:
[t]he policy of the state is distinct from the personal life of the king; it would, of
course, be appropriate for kings to set the example of obeying the laws they impose on
others, but the fact that they are themselves falling into sinfulness is irrelevant to the
functioning of their governments.^^
Thus, Barani legitimates a Sultanate of the same political and legislative scope as Nizam
al-Mulk, but his rationale for it echoes the ideas o f Ibn Taymiyya (i.e, a necessary
connivance in sin). This suggests that Barani, and others of his class in South Asia, were
well educated in Middle Islam.
The first point one may draw from the above discussion o f political philosophy is that,
like the thought considered in the previous chapter, much that the Subaltemists term
feudal - including forms o f divine-kingship, imperialism, and quite explicitly in the
case o f Ibn Taymiyya and Barani, despotism - is legitimated. However, in many cases
this despotism is contrasted with an explicit ideal that transcends it, including forms of
election and judicial process, to the profit o f the elite and the masses. It is the manner
60 Ibid, p. 16.
61 Ibid. p. 16; 40.
62 Ibid, p. 39.
113
in which these Utopian/Ideological concepts manifest themselves in Mughal political
culture that requires address.
II: Jalal al-Din Akbar: Perfect Man
Sultan Humayuns (d. 1556) titles may have passed to his fourteen year old son upon
the formers death, but Jalal al-Din Akbar (d. 1605) did not exercise power until 1560,
when he successfully pushed aside his appointed regent Bayram Khan (d. 1561).^
Contemporary historians are agreed that Akbar assumed the helm o f state with a definite
course in mind. Although Bayram Khan had successfully held internal fissures at bay,
under his regency the boundaries o f the Mughal state remained restricted to a strip of
territory extending from Kabul to Benares. The most potent external threat to these
borders was that posed by the Hindu Rajas ofRajputana, to the south, and Akbars first
concern in 1560 seems to have been neutralizing this threat.
Akbars regime attacked the Rajputs with singular resolve over the next eight years,
culminating in the fall o f Chitaur - the city o f Jayasis poem - in 1568. Although such
military campaigns played a role in the Mughal subjugation ofRajputana, Rajput loyalty
was overwhelmingly won by such persuasive measures as cementing an alliance with the
63 Ibid., p. 3.
64 Two 'Great Mughals preceded Akbar, his father Humayun (d. 1556) and his grandfether Babar (d. 1530). The role each
played in the establishment of the Mughal state, as well as the following introduototy ranarks on Akbars political and intellectual
policies and proclivities can be read in any standard text on the M i^ a ls, including such previously cited worics as: J.F. Riohsrds, The
Mughal Empire, a M.G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 3. Furthennwe, the outstanding features of Akbars regime are
reconfinned in the primary sources consideted below. Thus, specific citations are not always given in these introductory remarks.
114
Raja o f Jaipur by marrying his daughter in 1562, and not requiring her to convert to Islam;
by placing restrictions on the capture of slaves while campaigning, abolishing a tax on
Hindu pilgrims and lifting restrictions on temple building in 1563; and, by abolishing the
collection of jizya in 1564. By 1568, such measures not only co-opted most of the Rajput
elite, they also rendered the Rajas a place among the military commanders and
administrators o f the state in numbers proportionate to those o f Muslim ethnic groups
(e.g., Iranis, Turanis, etc.).^^
With Rajputs firmly among its officers, Akbars regime began a career of expansion
that would continue throughout his reign, with one brief interlude in which to consolidate
gains (1574-82).^ The fall o f Gujarat in 1572 brought the Mughal state to the Arabian
Sea. In 1574, military successes against eastern Sultanates extended Mughal authority to
the Bay o f Bengal. The defeat of the Sultans, Mirzas and Amirs o f Kashmir, Qandahar and
Sind respectively would add their territories between 1586-92, establishing a western
frontier that would outlive Akbar by more than half a century. Between 1592-1600, an
equally long-lived southern frontier would be established with the armexation of the
Sultanates ofBerar, Ahmadnagar and Khandesh. Throughout this period, as well as in the
65 A thorough introduction to the relations between Akbar and the Rajputs can be read in C.M. Agrawal, Akbar and His
Hindu Officers (Jalanhar: ABS Press, 1986). For mens specific case studies of Mughal-Rajput relations, see, Sunita Zaidi, The Mughals
and the Autonomous Rajput Chiefs: Assignments of Jagirs to the Ruling Sisodia Chiefs of Mewar, Islamic Culture 60:4 (1986): 83-94;
A.N. Saxena, Early Relations of Raja Rai Singh of Bikaner with the Mughals, Ouarteriv Review of Etistorical Studies 12 (1972-73):
63-66; and, D.R. Seth, Miiza Raja Jai Singh, a Great Hindu Genaal of the Mughals, Islamic Culture 26:2 (1952): 42-50.). For the
nobility more generally, ses, Absan R. Khan, Chieftains in the Mualial Empire During die Reign of Akbar (Simla: Indian Institute of
Advanced Study, 1977),
66The Mughals mihtaiy successes in general have been most recently and inteiestingiy addressed in, Jos J.L. Gommans,
Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire (Londtm: Routledge, 2002),
115
remainder of the era of Great Mughals, the Rajputs remained one o f perhaps five ethnic
groups sharing military and administrative positions subordinate only to the incumbent
Mughal.
No other largely non-Muslim ethnic group would attain the position and status of the
Rajputs under Akbar or his Great successors, but the Mughal regime would be inclined
to patronize non-Muslims by other means. The most outstanding o f these means were
also established by Akbar and more or less endured the entire Mughal period. On an
institutional level, this involved opening the civil administration and extending the fiscal
and administrative privileges granted the Rajputs to other non-Muslim ethnic groups.^ On
a cultural level, this involved the extension o f patronage to non-Muslim scholars and
artists on a grand scale.^ From the moment Akbar assumed power and forged his alliance
with the Rajputs, Hindu and Sikh scholars began to be invited to present their views and
engage in debate against each other. By 1569, Akbar began the construction ofFatehpur
Sikri, an administrative capital which not only employed non-Muslim artisans, but forged
architectural features previously identified with either Muslim or non-Muslim buildings
67 To view the issue of non-Muslims in the administration frn a couple of perspectives, see, S>ied Giasuddin Ahmad, A
Typological Study of Stats Functionaries Under the Mughals, Asian Profile 10 (1982): 327-45; an4 R adh^ Shyam, Honours, Ranks
and Titles Under the Great Mughals (Akbar), Islamic Culture 47 (1973): 335-353.
68 The most prominent fields of Mughal art are music, calligraphy and painting. For the characteristics of Mughal painting,
including ilhistiations of non-Isiamic subjects, such as scenes fhn Hindu epics, see, M.C. Beach, Mughal and Raipnt Painting
(Cambridge; University Press, 1992); and, M. Goedhuis, Paintings of the Great Mughals, Connoisseur 201:809 (1979): 144-49. For
calligraphy, see, K.M. Yusuf, Muslim Calligrapl^ under the Mughals. Islamic Review48:vii (1960): 19-23. Regarding music, the
grammar o fHindustani classical music was written under Mughal patronage, the raga being systemized in Akbars court, and dhnipad
(a vocal style) arising under Shah Jahaa. For an insightful review of such cultural developments, see, S, 1
Asm ; f f i ^ g,IMigfe.QElcIJ<sai3iroy (London; Routledge, 1999), pp. 35-47.
116
into a new style o f architecture.^^ Around the same time, he initiated a translation
movement, which rendered such Sanskrit classics as the Mahabharata into Urdu and
Persian (1573),^ through the joint effort o f Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. By 1575,
Akbar had built the Îbadat Khana (Hall of Worship) at Fatehpur Sikri for the express
purpose o f comparative intellectual discourse. At first, Akbar invited representatives o f
every category of Islamic thought to present their ideas and engage in debate, but by 1578,
he had extended invitations to Hindu, Sikh, Jain, Zoroastrian and Christian scholars. By
1582, the Ibadat Khana had become the centre of a movement called the Tawhid-i llahi
(Divine Unity), which drew much fi-om the earlier decades o f comparative study. Most o f
its members were Muslims, but the rites enjoined included vegetarianism, cremation and
other injunctions not found in the creed of the mutakallimun or fuqaha Akbar presided
as the saintly head o f the movement until his death in 1605. Most significantly, as
discussed below, the above initiatives (political and intellectual) would remain (more or
69 For an introduction to the subject of Mughal architecture in the context of the Muslim World, see, Sheila Blair and
Jonathan Bloom, The Art and Architecture of Islam 1250-1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). For Mughal architecture in
detail, see, Catherine Asher, Architecture of Mughal India {Cambridge: University Press, 1992). For Fatehpur Sikri, see, Michael Brand
and Glenn Lowrv. Fatehpur Sikri: A Source-book (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 1985).
70 The Mahabharata stands beside the Ramqyana as one of the two great Sanskrit epics in the Brahmanical Hindu canoa
Although the earliest extant copies date from the 4th-5th centuries CE, they are thought to have first been written during the transitional
phase fimn Vedio to Brahnaanioa! Hinduism, a period of tin spanning the 5th-1st centuries BCE. This was a historical juncture in which
Aryan (arya) tribes - arriving fiom Caitral Asia in the 2nd milleoium BCE - had gained politioal supremacy over ihs Indus and
Ganges Valleys, and their non-Aryan (dasu) inhabitants. Thus, the Aryans nomadic, pastoral lifestyles wwe giving way to agricultural
and urban ways, miich influenced by the older, urban Indus Valky Civilization(3500-1500BCE). As well, association alrmg tribal lines
was melting into notions of kingship. Thus, flte Mahabharata is a tale of a kingdom bom of the union between an Aryan king and non-
Aryan goAless descending into tribal cratflict until the kingdom is lestcaed, while the Ramayana relates the conflict between an Aryan
Ood-King, Rama, and the Qraimicsl savage, Kia of the Demons, Ravana. VmMidiabhamta, see, Alf Hiltebeital, Mahabharata,
Encyclopaedia of Religion. vN. 9 (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1987): 118-20; and, (or Ramaytma, see, V. N. Rao, Ramayana,
Encyclopaedia of Religion, vol. 12. pp. 213-15.
117
less) staple features o f Mughal political culture for the entire Mughal period, even if the
Ibadat Khanna was abandoned along with Fatehpur Sikri along the way.
As previously mentioned, debate about Akbars religious credentials and cultural
categorization stretches back to his contemporaries. Among the historians o f Akbars day,
al-Badauni (d. 1605) - a professional secretary and one o f the translators o f the
Mahabharata - writes in his Mmtakhab al-Tawarikh that by the early 1580s a number o f
prominent jurists, including Akbars own Sunni qadi al-qudat o f Bengal and an influential
Shii qadi o f Jaunpur, had issued fatawa declaring Akbar an apostate. This led to their
executions. Furthermore, suchfatawa emboldened segments o f Akbars administrative
and military elite to compel Mirza Hakim, Akbars half-brother and governor o f Kabul, to
overthrow Akbar on religious grounds. Al-Badauni himself refrains from comment on
the validity of their claims, but one can easily gauge from the tone o f his writing that he
71 AM al-Qadir al-Badauni,A/MnloWsafc al-Tawarikh, 3 vols., trans. G.S.A. Ranking [I], W.H. Lowe [II], W. Haig [HI]
(Delhi; Idaiah-I Adabiyat-I Delli, 1973). For hadcground on the al-Badauni and the other historians of Akbars day read and cited here,
as well as a review of their approach to historical writings, see, Haibans Mukhia, Historians and HistorioiziajAv During the Reign of
Akbar (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1976).
The Encvclooaedia of Islam defines the office of qadi (judge) as follows; a repiesentativB of authority, invested with the
power ofjurisdiction {qada ). In fiieory, the head of the comrmimty, the caliph, is the holder of all powers; like all other state officials, the
qadi is therefore a delegate (na ib), direct if afqjointed by the Caliph in person, indirect and in varying degrees according to the situation if
nominated fcy intennediate representatives. But in all cases the delegator retains the power to do justice in person.
"There is a qadi in the capital and a qadi in the leading town of each of the great traitwial divisions. But each of these can
apjKtint direct delegates.
Regarding the office o f qadi al-qudat, the same source writes:
The institution of qada al-qudat... was so to speak the crowning point of the judicial organization of the Islamic state.,.. The
qadi al-qudat is, above aU, a judge. But to him is delegated judicial administration: the ncsnination, control and dismissal of qadis. E.
Tyan, Kadi, Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 4, p t 1, pp. 373-74.
For an introduction to the institution of q a ii in the M u ^ I cwitest specifically, see, Zameeniddm Siddiqqi, The lnstituti(m of
Oazi Under the Mughals. Medieval India 1 (1969): 240-59, and Zsfer Hasan, Qazi, his Positicm and Duties under the Mughals,
Proceedings.of tbe.MPaldstan Historical Conference 1 (1951): 179-83.
118
was as disapproving o f Akbar and his supporters as the executed qadis he takes pains to
mention.
In stark contrast to al-Badauni and his qadis, Muhammad Arif Qandahari (d. 1581/2) -
a mid-level administrator in the offices of Akbars regent Bayram Khan and wazir,
Muzaffar Khan - portrays Akbar as the model Sober Sunni ruler in his Tarikh-i Akbari.^
Although Qandaharis narrative ends in 1580, before the above fatawa were issued, al-
Badauni tells us that enough had occurred by that date for the questioning of Akbars
credentials to begin. Qandahari deals with such issues as Akbars Rajput policy, including
the fiscal, administrative and marital measures it entailed, by not mentioning the details at
all. Instead, the only mention of the Rajput policy is a brief argument in favour of their
induction into the administration based on certain hadith^^ Beyond this, the subject o f
non-Muslims is raised only in the context o f the fall o f the forts ofRathambhore
and Chitaur.Akbars regard for the shari 'a is established through anecdotes of his
disregard for alcohol and propriety in the circumcision o f his sons.^^ As well, his piety is
established by mention o f such acts as the construction o f a mosque at Fatehpur Sikri, the
sponsoring o f large hajj parties and the dispatch o f generous gifts to the Sharifs and the
poor o f Mecca and Medina, as well as by extremely frequent visits to the tombs of
Chishtiyya saints in Ajmir.^^
72 Muhammad Arif Qandahari, Tarikh-i AJAari, tfans. Tasneon Ahmad (Delhi: Pragati Publishers, 1993).
73 Ibid., p. 66.
74 Ibid., pp. 148-54.
75 Ibid., pp. 172-3; 219.
76 For the mosque and ha/j, see, ibid., pp. 276-80. There is mention of many trips to Ajmir, but the most telling account is of
119
The discrepancy between al-Badauni and Qandaharis views of Akbar can be
explained in three ways. First, Akbars ideas and actions became more extreme with the
passage o f time. Second, Qandahari was covering up for Akbars regime for some
personal reason. And third, Qandahari - inclined toward Sober Sufism - did not see Akbar
in the same manner as al-Badauni - inclined toward the disciplines of Sober Reason. It
has already been alluded that Akbars ideas progressed away from the Sober ideal over
time. Thus, there is certainly less in Akbars ideas for Qandahari than for al-Badauni to
find objectionable. Furthermore, Qandaharis clear omission of certain relevant actions, as
well as his own rejection o f a jagir (i.e, iqta ) awarded by Akbar, and preference for the
life o f a Sufi muridj' suggests that he was aware that some o f Akbars ideas and actions,
even before 1580, could be judged objectionable by some Muslims. However, it is also
clear that the categorical divide between al-Badauni and Qandahari plays a role in their
final assessments. For example, al-Badauni writes o f all the scholars whom Akbar
patronized and included in the Ibadat Khanna discussions - with the exception of certain
fuqaha' and mutakallimun - with utter scorn, declaring many kafirun and apostates or
heretics.* Qandahari, on the other hand, uses the same activities to illustrate Akbars
piety, writing that scholars and righteous persons o f all sects and beliefs engage in
Akbars jornmey on foot from Fatehpur Sikri, ilsd., p. 16M Z For broader discussion of Akbar and the Mughal states involvement with
the hajlf and the Chishtiyya shrines and scholars at Ajmir, see, M.N. Pearstm, The Mughals and the Hajj, Jotimai of the Oriental Society
of Australia 18-19 (1986-1987): 164-79, and Rafet Bilgtami, The Ajmir Waqf Under the Mughals, Islamic Culture 52 (1978); 97-103,
For background on tte saints whose shrines are located at Ajmir, as well as the beginning of their inclusion as sites of pilgrimage by
membas of the ujper classes, see, Simcai Digby, Early Pilgrimages to the Graves of Muin al-Din Sijzi arrd other Indian Chishti
Shaykhs, Islamic Society and Culture, pp. 95-100.
77 Qandahari, Tarikh-i Akbari, p. 234.
78 Al-Badauni, Mmtakhab al-Tawarikh, vol. 2, pp. 316-17; 327-8.
120
debate so that the laws of shari "a as well as of reason may be known7^ Qandahari also
includes Akbars patronage o f painting and music - two arts frowned upon by certain
schools offiqh - as further evidence o f Akbars p iety.T h u s, whatever the changes in
Akbars ideas and actions after 1580, or the personal motivations of al-Badauni and
Qandahari to view him as they did, one must also consider whether these authors
penchant for the disciplines and schools o f one or another category o f Islamic thought
ultimately legitimated Akbar and his regimes status as Muslim, heretical or apostate in
the eyes of the scholar. In particular, one must ask how those inclined toward Intoxicated
thought viewed Akbar, even if al-Badauni and his Sunni/Shii qadis saw him as a non-
Muslim.
The answers to these questions are approached through Akbars political and
intellectual initiatives, the latter being the particular realms in which Akbars regime is
regarded innovative.
a) Political Initiatives: Mughal Caliphate
Much of Akbars Rajput policy was legitimated by the political philosophies o f the
fuqaha . It was mentioned in the previous chapter that according to the Hanafi madhhab -
the official school o f the Mughal state - a polytheist could be counted as a dhimmi. In
fact, Hindus and Buddhists had been categorized as dhimmi since 714, when Muhammad
79 Qandahari, Tarikh-i Akbari, p. 89.
121
ibn Qasim (d. 716) was appointed the Umayyad governor o f Sind.** Furthermore, it was
noted that various classes o f dhimmi, including non-Muslim scholars, could be exempted
from certain taxes, including7 /2ya, and this had also been the practice among previous
Muslim states. As well, in the context of al-Mawardis writing above, it was noted that a
dhimmi could serve the state in any position up to the rank o f wazir al-tanfidh, and the
induction of non-Muslims in the apparatus o f various Middle Period Sultanates in South
Asia and beyond is not rare. And finally, the patronage of non-Muslim scholars and artists,
including the translation o f their works, is commonly known to have been the practice
among various Muslim elites in and beyond South Asia. Thus, Akbars patronage of non-
Muslims is primarily innovative with respect to the identity o f the parties and the scope of
their involvement, rather than in regard to permissibility according to the past practice o f
Muslim states or the current theory of the fuqaha
Regarding such specifics of Akbars Rajput policy as marriage to Hindu women
without their conversion, even the Sober-minded concept o f dawabit, illustrated by Barani
above, legitimates the states discretion in these matters, custom being permitted in the
life of the court. However, when it comes to Akbars fiscal measures, there is a clear
80 Ibid, pp. 64-5; 178-9.

81 Muhammad Tariq Awan is one among many historians, including such Orientalists as Lane-Poole, to note that Arabic
sources &om the Sth-lOth centuries refa to Sindhi Hindus and Buddhists as 'dhimmis, not kafirs. Furthermore, the same sources make
it clear that this was not merely a liteiaty trope. The following quote, making this point, is attributed to al-Hajjaj, Governor of Iraq under
the Umayyads, responding to a quay ftom Muhaimnad ibn C^sim: As they [the Hindus and Buddhists] have made submission and
agreed to pay taxes to the Caliph, nothing more can be properly required of them. They have been taken under our protection and we
caisnot, in way, stretch our hands upon their lives or property. Pennission is given to them to worship their gods. Nobody must be
forbidden or prevented fiom following his own religioa See, Muhammad Tariq Awan, The History of India and Pakistan, vol. 1,
(Lahore: Ferozesons, 1991), p. 25. Also, Andre W ink,.^!jaB d..-..teA y3n8 ^jfee.Jng^^ .Wp ty , vol. 1 (Leiden; E.J.. Brill,
1990). Fcff one of the primaiy accounts most often cited in the above works, see, Ali ibn Hamid Kufi, Fath Nama-i Sind, ed. N.A. Baloch
122
transgression o f the fuqaha s jurisdictional ideal for dawabit. Furthermore, al-Badauni
writes that in 1582 the order was given to generally abolish the collection of jizya. In his
Makatabat-i Allami, Abu al-Fadl ibn Mubarak (d. 1602), a favoured wazir in Akbars
administration, includes afirman (edict) that at least limits the goods upon which zakat
can be assessed, although some contemporary historians argue that it calls for the
abolition o f zakat altogether.*^ If not long before the 1580s, then clearly by then, Akbars
regime had ventured far beyond the legislative bounds ascribed to a Sultan by the fuqaha'.
However, as an incident in 1377 illustrates, until that point in time Akbars legislative
transgressions remained in check, and, as Qandaharis attitude suggests, largely legitimate
even among Sober segments of the scholarly elite.
Al-Badauni reports that in 1577, the state appointed qadi o f Mathura laid a complaint
before the sadr ai-sudur,^^ Shaykh Abd al-Nabi, to the effect that a wealthy Hindu of
brahmin caste had carried off materials the qadi had collected to build a mosque and used
them to build a temple.*^ Furthermore, when the qadi attempted to thwart the Hindus
actions, he had in the presence o f witnesses cursed Muhammad and shown contempt for
(Islamabad; Islamic University, 1983).

82 Abu al-Fadl ibn Mubarak, Moiotoftaf-i 'Allami, dajiar I, ed and trans. Mansuia Haidar (Delhi: Munshiiam Manrfiarlal
Pubtishers, 1998), p. 13,
83 This office is definsd in the Encyclopaedia of Islam as follows: The sadr at-sudur was a central minister, who was given
this title when the empire was divided in subahs [provinces] by Akbar in 988/1580. Besides controlling land grants {modal-! ma 'ash)
and cash grants (wazifd), the sadr al-sudur also recommended appointments of qadis or judges and muftis [jurisconsults] or interpreters
of law and customs, though he himself had no judicial functkai. The {-ovincial sadrs were his subradinates, aitd below them were local
sdrfra (sadr-ijuzw) and muttawalis (managers ofland-grants). A. Athar Ali, Sadr, Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 8 (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1985), p. 751.
Given that al-Badauni presents a case in which the sadr al-sudur, Shaykh Abd al-Nabi, did perform a judicial function, it is
clear that the total responsibilities of this office have yet to be completely defined.
84 Al-Badauni,Muntakhab al-Tawarikh, vol. 3., pp. 127-30.
123
Islam. In response, the sadr al-sudur had dispatched a summons to the accused, but he did
not appear. Thus, Akbar ordered that the accused be seized and brought before the sadr al-
sudur. In the proceedings that followed, al-Badauni reports that the issue o f contention
was not the guilt o f the accused on the charge o f blasphemy (which had been established
by previous testimony), but the appropriate punishment. It appears the presiding qadis
were divided into two camps; one favouring the death penalty, the other public
humiliation and a fine. The latter camps arguments rested on hadiths calling for lenience
in capital cases, as well as a specific injimction o f the Hanafi school arguing that:
the cursing o f the Prophet by unbelievers who have submitted to the rule o f Islam gives
no ground for any breach of agreement by Muslims, and in no way absolves Muslims
fi-om their obligation to safeguard infidel subjects.*
Although al-Badauni does not outline any o f the arguments of the opposing camp, he does
suggest that for Malikis the above doctrines do not apply, and that even hadith calling for
lenience in capital cases can be ignored if the purpose o f the death penalty is the closing
o f sedition and the uprooting of the germs o f insolence from the minds o f the common
people.*^
. The arguments seem to have been lengthy, and the case to have drawn much attention,
for al-Badauni writes that Akbars wives pleaded directly to Akbar for leniency, and
Hindu courtiers complained that the "mullas (i.e, the 'ulama ) were thoroughly pampered
and eager to display their own authority by calling for death without Akbars o rd er.In
85 Ibid., p. 129.
86 Ibid, p. 130,
87 Ibid, p. 129.
124
one o f the few instances in which al-Badauni writes approvingly o f Akbar, he relates that
when the sadr al-sudur asked Akbars opinion, the latter replied that punishments for
offences against the shari 'a are the domain of the fuqaha Although the sadr al-sudur
continued to be swayed by both camps a while longer, he finally issued the order to
execute the accused without consulting Akbar. In other words, in this case Akbar acted
perfectly in keeping with thefuqaha s ideal for a Sultan, relinquishing legislative
authority entirely to muftis and qadis, despite personal and political pressure to act
otherwise. However, al-Badauni does conclude this episode by suggesting that when
Akbar heard that death was not viewed as unanimously necessary, the future decline of the
presiding sadr al-sudur became imminent.
Shaykh Abd al-Nabis decline came in the form of his virtual expulsion to Mecca as
head of hajj expeditions sponsored by the state until 1582, but his ruling in this case
underscored the need for greater authority over the judiciary as a whole if a regime
seeking to incorporate the Hindu Rajputs was to be maintained. In response to this need, a
declaration was drawn up, in consultation with the leading mutakallimun andfuqaha of
the court, and promulgated in 1579. It is reproduced by al-Badauni, and a portion reads as
follows;
Abu al-Fath Jalal al-Din Muhammad Akbar, Badshah Ghazi (whose kingdom may God
perpetuate), is a most just, most wise, and a most God-fearing king. Should, therefore,
in foture, a religious question come up, regarding which the opinions o f the mujtahids
are at variance, and his majesty, in his penetrating understanding and clear wisdom, be
inclined to adopt, for the benefit o f the community and as a political expedient, any o f
88 Ibid., p. 128.
89 Ibid., p. 130-31.
125
the conflicting opinions which exist on that point, and issue a decree to that effect, we
do hereby agree that such a decree shall be binding on us and on the whole
community.
Further, we declare that, should his majesty think it fit to issue a new order, we and the
community shall likewise be bound by it, provided always that such order be not only
in accordance with some verse o f the Quran, but also o f real benefit to the community;
and further, that any opposition on the part o f his subjects to such an order passed by
his majesty, shall involve damnation in the world to come, and loss o f property and
religious privileges in this.
The implication of this declaration in terms of the above case o f blasphemy is clear. In
future, it is not the head of the judiciary, but the head o f state who makes the ultimate
judgement in such cases. In other words, the declaration makes Akbar the supreme
mujtahids the ultimate legislative authority, exactly what Ibn al-Muqaffa argued for the
Abbasid Caliphs in the 8* century. The only example o f Middle Period political
philosophy in which a Sultan can legitimately hold such authority is the writing o f Nizam
al-Mulk. However, it must be recalled that even widiin the genre o f Mirrors literature,
Barani acknowledges that any Sultan who wields such power is acting beyond the shari 'a.
Thus, although examples o f Sultans brandishing such authority are not foreign to the
period, they are largely viewed as illegitimate from the perspective o f Sober Sunni
scholars. The only official that could arguably command such authority from a Sober
Sunni perspective is a Caliph.
It should be noted that by the 15*^ century, Sultans in various parts o f the Muslim
World had begun to carry Caliphal titles. As Baranis Fatawa-i Jahandari attests, by the
90 Al-Badauni, Munlakhab al-Tawarikh, vol. 2, pp. 279-80.
126
14* century the title Khalifa-i llahi (Caliph of God) was used in reference to Sultanate in
South Asia. However, the same text also draws a distinction between Caliphate o f the
earlier variety - dominion over all Muslims - and the assumption o f Caliphal titles by
local Sultans. While Akbar could usurp Caliphal titles, any attempt to legitimate his
authority by claiming the Caliphate proper raised a number o f obstacles, including the
stipulations that the Caliph had to be of the Quraysh tribe, and had to be designated by a
previous Caliph or elected by the community. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Akbar
sought to legitimize his assumption of legislative authority by not only adding the title of
Caliph to those of Sultan and Badshah Ghazi, but also by projecting himself as Caliph in
something of the old manner. The first clue is that the declaration o f 1579 is itself drafted
and signed by more than 3-6 members o f the courts mutakallimun and fuqaha , thus
satisfying the criterion of election by qualified representatives of the umma, at least as
far as the Sunni fuqaha s ideals were concerned.
By way of confirming the assumption o f the Caliphal title, there are extant examples
o f Akbars correspondence with officers and afirman (decree) in which he is referred to
as Cali|rfi.^^ Both Qandahari and al-Badauni refer to Akbar as Caliph quite commonly in
their Tarikh-i Akbari and Muntakhab al-Tawarikh, respectively.^^ Other historical works
from the period, not as yet mentioned, also refer to Akbar as Caliph, including Rafi al-
91 Ibn Mubaraks A/otoafoal-j Allami, ineluifa examples of such conespondence and faramin. Two letter to Abd ai-Rahim
ibn Bairam Khan, dated 1586, reference Akbar as Caliph, (pp. 19-24; 27-30) Also, a lengthy dastur al- 'canal, or rader to administrators
(ummal and mutasaddis), dated 1594, references Akbar as (2ali{rfi.(pp. 79-87)
92 For example, in his ofening address on Akbar, al-Badauni refers to him as Caliph of the Age. Al-Badauni, Muntakhab
al-Tawarikh, vol. 2, p. 1. Qaildaharis association of Caliphate with Akbar begins with his description of Akbars birth. Qandahari,
127
Din al-Shirazis Tazkirat al-Mulukmd Nizam al-Din Ahmads (d. 1594) Tabaqat-i
A k b a r i. However, none of these authors explain better than Abu al-Fadl the basis on
which Akbar, o f Turko-Mongol ethnic stock, claimed an office so far reserved for
Qurayshi Arabs. According to Abu al-Fadl, Akbars mother is the rosebush of the rose
garden of the spring o f the Khilafat" and gave birth to the unique pearl o f the
Khilafat.'^* Akbars regents remained loyal to his father, Humayun, and to himself, so that
such a perfect personality, worthy o f the true Khilafat,'" would not be denied his place in
history.^^ And finally, Abu al-Fadl writes that palmists read the words shadow o f God
on the infant Akbars hands, and astrologers employing the methods o f Hindus and
Greeks confirmed Akbar as Caliph.^ That is to say, Akbar was bom to be Caliph, the
declaration of 1579 being no more than the communitys recognition o f his rank.
Qandahari, writing within a year o f the declaration, also suggests that Akbar was bom
to be Caliph, even employing family and science to make his point, as Abu al-Fadl
would later. According to Qandahari, Akbars paternal side represents a line of ralers
stretching back to Adam and chosen by God to rale, while his maternal side links him to a
Tarikh-i Akbari, p.24.

93 Nizam al-Din AiuMad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 3 vols., trans. Brajendranath De (Calcutta; Royal Asiatic Society, 1939); Rafi al-
Din Shirazi. Tazkirat al-Muiuk (British Library, Add. 23883), A portion of the latter work (If. 172b-174b) is included in Shireen Moosvi,
ed and trans. Episodes in the Life.ofMbar: .CpntCTntwmRecoids.3^^ Rgtmisoeoces (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1994), pp. 28-
31.
94 Abu al-Fadl ibn Mubarak,.dihor Noma, 3 vols.. trans. H. Beveridge (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1907), vol. l,p . 57; vol.
3, p. 526.
95 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 413.
96 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 72; 94; 138. Also see, Abu al-Fadl ftm Mubarak, Ain-i Akbari, vol. 1, trans H. Blochmann (Calcutta:
Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1927,170-75.
128
renowned Sufi of Nishapur, Ahmad al-Jami (d. 1141).^'^ The most recent scion of the
paternal line to make his mark, according to Qandahari, is Amir Timur (d.l405), from
whom Akbar is separated by seven generations.^ He declares: In this is enshrined a
mystery of God, for He has also created seven heavens, seven planets, seven seas,
seven days in a week, a Quran in seven parts (lughats), seven circumambulations of the
ka ba at hajj, and so on.^ Qandahari concludes: By all this my object is to convey that
the personality of... Akbar is endowed with infinite superiority.'^
From a polemical perspective, it clear that the first questions that Akbars claim o f
Caliphate by divine design would raise are, why the Mughals and why now? The
answers offered by Akbars supporters are obviously complex, but the first point to note is
that the 16*'^century began with the Ottoman Sultanates capture of Cairo in 1517. This
not only spelled the demise o f the Egyptian Mamluk Sultanate, but also the Abbasid
97 Al<Jandahari, Tarikh-i Akbari, pp. 12-4.

98 This is not a felaication on Qandaharis part. The Mughals are deeended fixm Amir Timur, best known in the English-
speaking world as Tamerlane, and Akbar is conceivably separated fiom him by sevai gmerations. Amir Timur, of course, is
remembered for an outstandingly bloody tenure in power (even given the norms of the era) beginning as the Amir of a Chaghatay
Mongol, but establishing himself as iuIct in Balkh (Badakhshan in oontemporaiy Afghanistan) in 1370. From here began a brutal
campaign against largely Muslim states to his east and west With much of Central Asia under his cfflnmand by 1380, Timur turned
South to Khurasan and Sistan, then cm to Shtaz and Isfahan, perpetrating general massacres in various cites, iKsching as fer west as
Baghdad. In the 1390s, Timur carried his raids northwtird, devastating the Caucasus on his way to doing the same to Mtoscow. In 1398,
however, Timur turned east, destroying the western cities and towns of the Delhi Sultans, before laying Delhi to waste as well. 1400
ushered in conflict with the Ottomans and Egyptian Mamluks, winning the latters alliance, but virtually destroying the Ottomans grip
on Anatolia before it burgeoitsd into empire. Damascus, BagMad Bursa, Ankara and Izmir were sacked along the way. By 1404, Timur
turned his sights on China, but died too soon to leave his mark. His successors were largely unable to maintain central authori^ over the
domains Timur had conquered, but flte descendents of his son Shahrukh (d. 1447) were able to maintain control of much of Khurasan attd
Transoxania until Balw (d. 1330), ruler of no more than the piece of Transoxania known as Farghana, lost even that, but went on to gain
Kabul, the Punjab and Delhi, establishing the Mughal state. An extremely infomiative and contextually rich discussion of Timur and his
descendcMts leading to Babur can be read in, M.G.S. Hodgstm, The Venture of Islam. voL 2, pp. 428-36; 490-3.
99 Al-QaiKlahari, Tarikh-i Akbari, pp. 14-5.
129
Caliphate it had maintained in Cairo since the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258.'
It is unclear whether the Ottomans compelled the last Abbasid to designate the Ottoman
Sultan his successor, but, as the Ottomanist Halil Inalcik has shown, debate over the
legality of the Ottomans assumption o f the Caliphal title began in the time of Sultan
Suleyman (r. 1520-66).'^ In an effort to answer why the Ottomans and why now,
Inalcik argues that the Sultans compensated for their not being Quraysh by asserting the
fact of their dominion over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in addition to most of the
Mediterranean.'"^ Applying Inalciks insights to the Mughals, it appears that while the end
o f the Abbasid Caliphate did open the door for the redefinition o f Caliphal qualifications,
in answering the question of why the Mughals, the requirement o f dominion over Mecca
and Medina was not a possibility. However, that more than one Muslim o f infinite
superiority might exist at the same moment, each basing his claim to the Exalted
Caliphate on separate grounds, remained a possibility, and it is known that the Mughals
and Ottomans sought this option.
Inalcik has shown that around 1725 - 18 years into the era o f Lesser Mughals -
Ottoman thinkers accepted that two Caliphs {imams) coexisted - the Ottoman Sultans and
100 Ibid., p. 15,

101 The Mamluks of Egypt, like the Efelhi Sultana, had accepted the suzerainty of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad since
their rules began in 1250 and 1206, respectively. With the feB of Baghadad before the Mongols eight years after ft rise of the Mamluks,
the Sultan Baybars reestablished the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo in 1261, and many later Delhi Sultans accepted suzettainty, as
previotjsly mentioned. For the debates surrounding the Mamluks motives, etc., in reestablishing the Abbasid Caliphate, see, David
Ayalon, Studies in the Transfer of the Abbasid Caliphate from Baghdad to Cairo, Studies of the Mamluks of Egypt (London: Variorum
Press, 1977): K
102 Halil Inalcik, The Rise of ttte Ottoman Empire, The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 1A, eds. P.M. Holt. A.K.S.
Lambton and Bemaid Lewis (Cambridge: University Press, 1995), pp. 295-323. Also see, N.R. Farooqi, Mughal-Ottomaa Relations.
1-556-1748 (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1989).
130
Mughal Badshahs. This was argued to be licit according to Hanafi fiqh - particularly the
writing of the 15* century faqih, al-Dawani (d.1503) - as a sea separated their domains/^
Thus, the question remaining to be answered is what alternative to dominion over Mecca
and Medina, not to mention the Mediterranean, the Mughals could claim to possess as a
sign of their qualifications?
One can imagine that to support the territorial aspect of Akbars claim, all his
supporters made much use of his vast domains. Nizam al-Din Ahmad argues that his
history is necessary as Akbar, the only individual he refers to as Khalifa-i llahi, has
brought all the Sultans and Rajas of Hindustan (lit, Land o f the Hindus) under
Mughal dominion. He continues, whereas previously historians wrote o f the history of
Delhi, Gujarat, Sind, Bengal, and so on, now that all have been unified into one, a new
history is required.*^ Regarding the holy aspect o f Akbars claim, Nizam al-Din Ahmad
adds that this is a new history for a new era, the Tarikh-i llahi' (Divine Era) that
begins in 1582.*^ The specifics o f the Tarikh-i llahi are fiirther addressed below, but first
with regard to the general notion of this being a new era, it should be emphasized that all
sources echo Nizam al-Din Ahmads mention o f it. However, whereas Nizam al-Din
Ahmad, Abu al-Fadl and others portray this development positively, al-Badauni is
outraged and the qadis previously mentioned begin firing^rawa concerning Akbars
apostasy with this innovation among their ammunition. What then, is this new era
103 H. Inalcik, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 321-23.

104 Ibid., p. 323. For al-Dawani in particular, see, A.K,S. Lambton, al-Dawani, Encyclopaedia of Islam, vd. 2, pt. 1, p.
174.
103 Nizam al-Din Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, vol. 1, p. xii.
131
and how is it related to Akbars claim to Caliphate?
Akbars new era is rooted in the general religious climate of his time. Although
Akbars rule began mid-16* century CE, by the Hijri calendar his rule closes the first
millennium of the Muslim Era. As one might expect, there was an air o f anticipation at the
time and millennial movements were beginning to crop up, including a Mahdist
Movement in South Asia having particular appeal among townspeople and low-ranking
soldiers and familiar to Akbar and his ideologues.*^ Furthermore, al-Badauni reports that
in 1581;
low and mean fellows, who pretended to be learned, but were in reality fools, collected
evidence that his majesty was the Sahib-i Zaman (Lord of the Age), who would
remove all differences of opinion among the seventy-two sects o f Islam and the
Hindus, Sharif (Amuli) brought proofs fiom the writings of Mahmud ofBasakhwan,
that he had said that in the year 990 [1582] a certain person would abolish lies, and
how he had specified all sorts of interpretations o f the expression 'professor o f the true
religion, which came to the sum total 990. And Khwaja Maulana o f Shiraj, the heretic
of Jafrdan, came with a pamphlet by some of the Sharifs of Mecca, in which a
tradition {hadith) was quoted to the effect that the earth would exist for 7,000 years,
and as that time was now over the promised appearance of a Mahdi would
immediately take place.,..The Shia mentioned similar nonsense connected with Ali,
and quoted the following ruba which is said to have been composed by Nasir-i
Khusrau, or according to some by another poet:
In 989, according to the decree o f fate,
106 Ibid., p. xiii.
107 This is a leferenee to H^Mahdawi mownent of Sayyid MuhanBnad Jaunpuri, who claimed to be the Mahdi. On this
movemetit, M.G.S. Hodgson writes: [Sayyid Muhammad] taught that among the Muslims a special band should be dedicated actively to
upholding the Shari'ah law, not as onlinaiy amirg, nor even as tegular muftis and qadis, but as preachers... Tobe firee to ftilfil this
fiinction, the elite should be bound to absolute poverty... From this detached pwspective they could look on the amir and the humblest
Muslim soldier or craftsman as equals... It was peihaps the most thoroughgoing attempt, since the Khariji movement of Marwani
[Umayyad] times, to place Islamic social reponsibility squarely on the shoulders of plain Muslim believras and to strike down all the the
social distortions introduced ly wealth and descent As Hodgson goes on to say, in relation to the shar 7-mindedness of the Mahdawis -
who were active throughout South Asia from the time of Sayyid Muhammad's mission in tbs late 15th century through the period of
Babar, Humayun and Akbar's regimes - Akbar was nwre nwved by the universalist line of thought current at the time. However, the
activies of the Mahdawis in particular illustrate that the turn of a iw millenium was indeed a time in which movements fsomising social
and religious revolutiOT underinspirEdleastasMp were rife. See, M.O.S. HodgsotL The Venture of Islam, vol. 3, pp. 67-71.
132
The stars from al! sides shall meet together.

In the year of Leo, the month o f Leo, the day of Leo,
The Lion o f God shall stand forth from behind the veil.
Clearly, there was an air of anticipation among various schools and sects and Akbars
initiation o f the Tarikh-i llahi represents, at the very least, his regimes ideological
capitalization on this intellectual atmosphere. Al-Badauni reports the Tarikh-i llahi was
publicly announced and stamped on c o i n s . A s well, he states that Akbar ordered that a
history of all the kings o f Islam be written to mark the millennium, and employed
seven persons to undertake the compilation from the date of the death o f the last of the
Prophets...up to the present day and to mention therein the events of the whole world.
Thus, if the Ottoman claim to the Exalted Caliphate was based on dominion over
Mecca and Medina, as Inalcik argues, the Mughal claim is based on the birth o f a person
in a particular family destined for no other purpose than the Caliphate. This Mughal is an
individual whose credentials are confirmed by astrology, palmistry, numerology and
hadith, the declarations offuqaha' and mutakallimun from Sunni and Shii sects, as well
as the exhortations o f Sufis andfalasifa from various orders and schools. This Mughal is a
person who is the divinely appointed Sahib-i Zaman and Mahdi, an individual fit to lead
the whole world into a new millennium. In short, Akbar is an individual who has, in Abu
al-Fadls words, perfect knowledge o f God, that is, Ibn al-Arabis Perfect Man. ^
108 Al-Badawni,MOT/a4fea6 al-Tawarikh, vol. 2, p. 295.

109 Ibid., p. 316
110 Ibid., p. 316; 327-8.
111 Ibn Mubarak, .4fear Vama, vol. l.p . 16,
133
It is quite clear that Akbar and his supporters projected the Mughal Sultan as the one
Caliph, even if Ottoman scholars did the same until they began writing in the 18* century
o f two licit Caliphates. Interestingly, in four official letters included in the Makatabat-i
'Allami that mention them, the Ottomans are referred to as no more than Sultans. In one
addressed to an officer and foster-brother, Azam Khan Kukaltash (1593), Akbar expresses
the hope of dispatching an embassy to Istanbul,'*^ but in the other three, addressed to
neighboring rulers, he assumes a decidedly hostile posture. One letter written in 1586 even
claims that Akbar had decided to lead an army against the Ottomans in Iraq in defense of
the Shii Safavids. "*In none o f the above letters to neighbouring rulers, nor in letters to
the Sharifs of Mecca (1582), to Burhan Nizam al-Mulk of Ahmadnagar (1591), Shah
Abbas Safavi (1594) and Khan Muhammad o f Kashgar (1597) is Caliphate mentioned in
relation to the Mughals. ^Clearly, Akbar and his supporters were aware that Akbars
claims were tenuous. What is significant about Akbar, however, is that his internal use
o f the Caliphal title effectively legitimated what is one of the most top-heavy state models
on the scale o f Middle Period political philosophy discussed earlier in this chapter. What
then, was the Caliphs relationship to his domains?
112 Hm Makatabat-i 'Allami, p. xxiii.

113 Ibid, pp. 72-74.
114 Ibid, Abdullah Khan Uzbek, pp. 32-38 and 42-47; Sultan of Khandesh, 56-60.
115 Ibid, Sharift of Mecca, pp. 1-7; Burhan Nizam al-Mulk, pp. 64-67; Shah Abbas, pp. 93-101; Khan Muhammad,*
pp. 118-22. ForabroaderdiscussionofMughaldiplomacj'with the latter, also see, R.C. Varma, Rdatim s of the Mughals with
Kashgar, Mecca and Turicey Islamic Ouarteriv 10 (1966): 26-39. Fot Mi^hal-Safevid relations, and a disctission of the intellectual and
institutional ties that connect both to the each other and the Ottomans, see, F. Robinson, Ottoman-Safevids-Mu^ls: Shared Knowledge
andCoimectivB Systems, Journal of Islamic Studies 8:ii (1997): 151-84.
134
When Nizam al-Din Ahmad mentioned Akbar bringing together all the Sultans and
Rajas of Hindustan, he was echoing a theme not only found in other histories of the era,
but also in Akbars own correspondence. In the aforementioned letter to Shah Abbas
Safavi (1594), the court writer states on Akbars behalf:
a vast country like India [Hindustan] which had been reckoned by geometricians and
astronomers to be four-sixths of the seven clim es... [and had] [ffor a long time been
shared by so many independent chiefs and martial rulers, who were refractory and
contentious, had with Divine assistance been conquered by the imperial servants. The
subjugation of the different... chiefs and the rulers from the Hindukush to the shores o f
the ocean, ...the shortsighted Afghans o f the hills, desert dwelling nomadic Baluchi
tribesmen, fortress dwellers and the zamindars - had been accomplished. Akbars
unification and peace efforts succeeded with Divine aid, and his dreams came true
even more fully than had been expected by him.
It appears that for Akbar, as for such supporters as Nizam al-Din Ahmad and Abu al-Fadl
(the pen behind the above letter), the unification of Hindustan was part dream, part
reality by the 1590s. In relation to the idea o f being Caliph of the lanma, Akbars
retention of the title of Badshah (Emperor) suggests that while being promoted as the
religious head (Caliph) of the tmma, he was political head (Badshah) of only
Hindustan. In effect, this implies that only in Hindustan would Akbars religious policy
be enforced by the polity.
The Mughal politys apparent awareness of governing a territory it terms Hindustan,
as illustrated by the above works and Akbars aforementioned Rajput policy, suggests that
the idea of unification did not stop at conquest. Part o f the dream was the
acknowledgement o f the Mughals as Caliphs and Badshahs (religious and political heads).
116 Ibn Mubarak, Makatabat-i 'Allami, p. 94.
135
The question thus arises o f whether they were the religious heads of a community
including Muslims and non-Muslims, or only o f the former? In response, as the Mughals
also retained the title Badshah (Emperor), it has already been shown that the patronage
of non-Muslim scholars, artists and institutions, marriage to non-Muslim women without
conversion, and so on, are legitimate by the concept o f dawabit. However, it is Akbars
claim to Caliphate that legitimated his repeal o f jizya. And, more importantly, as
suggested by other initiatives mentioned above - particularly the Tawhid-i llahi - it was as
Caliph that Akbar promulgated an institution that actually attempted to remove all
differences o f opinion among the seventy-two sects o f Islam and the Hindus. This is the
topic addressed below, but in the context of political initiatives all that needs to be
reiterated is that Akbar not only assumed Caliphal titles, he claimed the exalted office
and all the authority it legitimated, no matter the extent of his domains.
b) Intellectual Initiatives: Tawhid-i llahi
When members o f the fuqaha ' and mutakallimun drafted and signed the declaration o f
1579, recall that they wrote that Akbar could enact new laws, provided that they were in
accordance with some verse of the Quran or o f benefit to the community. The
significance is that this suggests that as supreme mujtahid, Akbar did not merely seek the
right to rule over qadis, or even to personally exercise ijtihad within the principles o f fiqh.
He sought absolute ijtihad - that is, the free reign o f Reason or Intuition for purposes o f
136
legislation. Although this study goes on to cite many examples of Akbars concept of
ijtihad, none better encapsulates the degree to which he sought intellectual autonomy from
the fuqaha than the following correspondence, included in Abu al-Fadls Akbar Nama.
Mirza (prince) Murad wrote to Akbar from his governorship in Malwa (1591), requesting
that books be dispatched that might promote intellect and discourage taqlid. Akbar
replied thus;
In the marshy land o f tradition such a book is rarely to be found. But out o f regard for
him [Murad], the translation o f the Mahabharata, which is a strange tale, just now
become available, has been sent."^
Akbars response again illustrates that he can ignore the practical ideals o f the Sober
Sunni disciplines, including those o f kalam,fiqh and Sufism. However, from the
perspective of the Intoxicated disciplines - those that give Reason and/or Intuition equal
standing with revelation in the pursuit o f Truth - Akbars response may be considered
ideal. It is in this context that the Tawhid-i Hahi - also known as the Din-i Ilahi - a
theosophical society very much like a Sufi order, but enjoining rites on its initiates, such
as vegetarianism and cremation, more usually related to Hinduism - is best approached.
The discussion o f Akbars Intoxicated education already began in the context of the
117 This correspondence is not included in the version of the Akhar Nama translated ity Beveridge, and used elsewdiere. It is
found in, .dteorA'twa (British Library, Add. 27247). Aportion(ff. 40Ib-404b) is found in, Shiresn Moosvi, ed. and trans. Episodes in
118 As previously mentioned, Orientalists number among other historians who read Afcbars initiatives as a sign he had
abandoned Islam. In this regard, the Tawhid-i Ilahi is perhaps the most cited example, most arguing that it was Akbars attempt to
construct a new religion for Indians. For a review of the Tawhid-i Dahi from an Orientalist perspective, see, M.R. Choudhury, The
Din-l Ilahi. or the Religion of Akbar (Calcutta: Das Gupta, 1952). Also see, fit.# 1. The altemative view, quite standard in more
contemporary works, is that the Tawhid-i Ilahi is an elite cult bom of Akbars lack of interest in (or outright contempt ft) established
fiutfas, as well as his inclination toward pantheistic {Ailosophies. See, M.A All, Akbar and Islam (1581-1605), Islam ic Society and
137
Caliphate, the Intuitive line represented by his association with Sufis through genealogy
an fervent patronage of the Chishtiyya. It is well known that Fatehpur Sikri is built on the
site of Shaykh Salim Chishtis (d. 1572) burial place - a saint to whom Akbar
successfully appealed for intercession in favour o f bearing an heir - and his tomb is a
central structure o f the palace complex, directly facing the Ibadat Khanna, where the
Tawhid-i Ilahi initiates would meet. ^ The symbolic connection drawn between Akbars
regime and Sufism through the architecture of Fatehpur Sikri is quite literally reaffirmed
by the body o f historians considered here. Qandahari and Abu al-Fadl, for example, refer
to a particular event in 1578'^ - a year before Akbars public declaration o f Caliphate and
his invitations to Jain, Zoroastrian, Christian and other non-Muslim scholars to debate at
the Ibadat Khana. In early summer that year, Akbar and his highest-ranking officers were
on a hunt in the Salt Range on the border of Baluchistan and Sind.'^* They were joined by
local Baluchi chiefs and tribesmen to form a large hunting-ring, but with all preparations
completed, the order to commence the hunt never came. Instead, the order was issued to
break the ring so that no one should be guilty o f killing a sparrow. The hunting party
Culture, pp. 123-34,

119 Fw example, see. Sheik Blair and Jcmathan Blown, Hie Art and Architecture of Islam 1250-1800 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1995). Fw readings on Mughal pakoe architecture in fmitieular, see, R. Nath, Curved-Roof and Bent-Cotnioe Style of
theMughals, Medieval Indk 3 (1975): 198-208; Muhammad A. Ansaii Palaces and Gardens of the Mughak, blamic Culture 33
(1959): 50-72; aitd, H.A. Faruqi, Art and Architecture Under the Mughak, loumal of the Arabic and Persian Society of the Punjab
Um roiaCM ay 1957): 73-78.
120 Qandahari, Tarikh-i Akbari, pp. 272. The most detailed account k given in Ibn Mubarak, Akbar Nama (Br. Lib.,
27247), the a j ^ t ^ a t e potion (f. 2949) of which is reproduced in, Shireen Moosvi, ed. and trans. Episodes in the Life of Akbar. pp. 70-
73. Translated quotes attributed to Abu al-Fadl in this regard are takm from the latter wk.
121 The hunt was a central, thus highly ritualized part of Mughal leisurely activities. See, Muhammad A. Ansati, The Hunt
of the Great Mughak, Tskmic Culture 34 (1960): 19-23. For wider discussions of Mughal liesurely activities, see, Muhammad A
Ansari, Scane Aspects of Social Life at the Court of tie Great Mughals, Islamic Culture 36 (1962): 182-95, and, Amuseanent and
138
was agreed that Akbar had received a divine flash, but different parties offered different
explanations o f how it came to pass. One party argues that Akbar had received the light
o f truth from the wandering ascetics of the forest. Another argues that Akbar had
encountered invisible beings, such as angels orjinn. Another argues that the speechless
animals had in an unspoken tongue or in conventional speech conveyed to him divine
secrets. A final group, with which Qandahari most closely agreed ,argu ed that Akbar
had a session with his own enlightened heart, the seat of the manifestation of divine
light. Abu al-Fadls final word is:
How can its significance be grasped by traditional ones of narrow vision when those
who have the capacity o f perceiving spiritual ecstasy can comprehend only little o f that
condition?
Whether or not all would agree with the assessments o f the elite on the hunt, it is clear that
the Mughal political elite was open to the idea o f knowledge through direct experience
(dhawq), and Akbar was no exception.
The influence o f Intoxicated Sufism, more specifically, is apparent in the actions that
followed the above event. Some six months later, in December 1578, Akbar wrote to the
Portuguese at Goa, requesting that they dispatch scholars knowledgeable in Christianity.'^'*
Games of the Great Mughais. Islamic Culture 35 (1961'!: 21-31.

122 Qandahari, Tarikh-i Akbari. p. 272.
123 Ibn Mubarak, AUtar Nama (Br. Lib., Add. 27247, f. 2949), bans. Moosvi, Episodes in the Life of Akbar. p. 71.
! 24 Although Christianity is said to have been first brought to South Asia by S t Thomas in the early centuries CE, the
religions inflneace was largely' restricted to a southerly portion of the regioa In fact, the arrival of the Portuguese mariner, Vasco da
Gama in 1498, marks tite advent of Christian influence across South Asia, facilitated by European trade and imperialism. British, Dutch
aiKl Fiench traders, imperialists and missionaries would follow the Portuguese over the next century, all ultimately being out-competed by
the British. See, Blair B. Kling and Pearson, M.N., eds.The Age of Partnership: Europeans in Asia before Domimon (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii, 1979); Om Prakash, The Dutch East India ComrMnv and the Economv of Bengal. 1630-1720 (Delhi: Oxfitrd
139
The accounts of Jesuit ambassadors make for interesting reading. Beginning with a
description of the journey from Goa north through Gujarat and Rajputana to Fatehpur
Sikri, Father Antonius Monserrate (d. 1600) describes a land in which various faiths are
practiced, but Islam and Hinduism predominate. He says that countless Sufi shrines - sites
o f vain superstition - are strewn across the land as the religious zeal of earlier
Muslims destroyed the Hindu temples o f the north. However, the carelessness o f current
generations allowed sacrifices to be publicly performed... either among the ruins of these
old temples or everywhere any fragment o f an idol is to be found.*^^He admonishes
Akbar for his tolerance of the Brahmanical Rajput practice of sati (wife immolation), but
is struck by the favour Akbar and his supporters extend the Jesuits, including polemical
support in debates against Muslim scholars, the accommodation of a chapel and school in
Fatehpur Sikri, and Akbars kissing an icon o f Christ on a public occasion.
Such observations clearly lead Monserrate and his Jesuit colleagues to conclude that
Akbar and his supporters, including Abu al-Fadl, his brother Abu al-Faidi and their father
Shaykh Mubarak, had rejected the Quran and the prophethood o f Muhammad. However,
Monserrate records a rather different explanation spoken by Akbar. In a conversation
between the two in which Akbar asks Monserrate to kiss the feet o f the Catholic Pope in
University Press, 1988); M.N. Pearsrm, The Portuguese in India (Cambridge; University press, 1987); and, Colin Mitchell, Sir Thomas
Roe and the Mughal Empire (Karachi: Area Studies Centre for Europe, 2000).
125 The principles accounts considered here are, Antraiious Monserrate, The Cominentarv of Father Monserrate. tians. J.S.
Hoyland (Calcutta: Ordbrd University Press, 1922), written in the 1590s; The conespondenoe of other Jesuit ambassadors acoompanymg
Monserrate, published as, Joim Correia-Afonso, ed. and trans. Letters from the Mughal Cotat: 1580-1583 (Anand: Gujarat Sahitya
Praia A , 1980).
126 Monserrate, T)ie Commmtaiv of Father Monsenate. p. 27.
127 For sati, see, ibid., p. 61. Also, Cotreia-Aftmso, Letters from the Mughal Court: 1580-1583, p. 69. For polemical
140
his stead, and request that the Pope dispatch theses on the nature o f God, Monserrate is
taken aback by Akbars openness. Akbar responds that he is a follower of the ^Sauphif
(Sufis), who call upon one God alone with no rival. This implies that:
[n]othing... should prevent his [Akbar] accepting the (Christian) Law if he should learn
anything which touched his heart and mind, either from the Pope, or fiôm the General
of the Society [i.e, Jesuits], or from the two priests before him, or from any other man,
however poor and humble.
Although such utterances had raised Monserrates hopes o f winning Akbars conversion to
Christianity, Akbar signaled his rejection o f this option at the last Ibadat Khana discussion
that the Jesuit embassy attended in 1583. On this occasion, Monserrate quotes Akbar as
saying:
I perceive that there are varying customs and beliefs of varying religious paths. For the
teachings of the Hindus, the Musalmans [Muslims], Jazdini [Zaorastrians], the Jews
and the Christians are all different. But the followers of each religion regard the
institutions of their own religion as better than those of any other. Not only so, but they
strive to convert the rest to their own way o f belief. If these refuse to be converted,
they not only despise them, but also regard them for this very reason as their enemies.
And this causes me to feel many serious doubts and scruples.
The Jesuits response to this statement, according to Monserrate, was to leave the court,
suspecting that Akbar was intending to found a new religion, with matter taken from all
the existing systems - a line which later Orientalists would echo into the twentieth
century in reference to the aforementioned Tawhid-i Ilahi. This issue is taken up below,
but on the subject of the influence o f Intoxicated Sufism on Akbars cultural initiatives, it
must be said that not only is Akbar related to Sufis by birth, patronage and formal
suf^ral, see,Moaassnrste, pp. 37-40;p. 53;p .65; pp. 100-101. F orthechapei-school.pp. 51-3. Fortiseicon, p.l38, p. 176.
128 W d, p. 173.
129 Ibid, p. 182.
141
education, but also that the very idiom in which this association is made by his
contemporaries echoes that of Ibn Arabis Fusus al-Hikam - from the general
identification o f Akbar as the Perfect Man by Abu al-Fadl, to such specifics as the
equation o f religious Law with custom. In other words, his transgression o f the
shari a and the ire o f the mutakallimun and fuqaha (not to mention the Jesuits), is itself
evidence o f Akbars education in, and preference for, Intoxicated Sufism.
Al-Badauni also berates the Intoxicated Sufis o f Akbars court at one point in his
history, whom he blames for leading Akbar astray, before turning to another segment of
the scholarly elite he considers rife with influential kafirun. This is the g"oup of
physicians (hukama), the 'kafirs being those who indulge in the contemporary
metaphysics o f the falasifa. On this matter, al-Badauni writes, mans reason, not
tradition, was acknowledged as the only basis of religion.*^* Elsewhere he states that
rather than tafsir^ hadith andfiqh, astronomy, physics, medicine, mathematics, poetry,
history and novels were cultivated and thought necessary.^Âs far as Abu al-Fadls
opinion on this matter is concerned, one need say no more than that in the Akbar Nama,
he refers to Akbar as Socrates in wisdom, Plato in perception.^^^
The Makatabat-i Allami contains a letter to the Sharifs o f Mecca, dated 1582, in
which Akbar defends the shar i credentials o f a philosopher {hakim), Muin al-Din
Hashmi o f Shiraz, now attached to the Mughals, but under the attack o f certain scholars in
130 Ibid., p. 184.

131 Al-Badauni,Muntakhab al-Tawarikh, vol. 2, p. 215.
132 Ibid, p. 316; also see, pp. 203-6.
133 Ibn Mubarak, Akbar Nama, p. 22.
142
Mecca. The same work contains a letter to one Chelebi Beg o f Shiraz - a reputed
philosopher of that city - whom Akbar bids to his court and promises patronage, along
with any others he cares to bring along, in 1596.^^^ Abu al-Fadl records that the
philosopher arrived in 1597, as had many others in the years before.A l-B adauni
mentions twenty-six influential hukama at court, while Abu al-Fadls 'Ain-i Akbari
mentions fifteen, though both are agreed that the majority are originally from Isfahan or
S h i r a z . Islamicists inform one that the most prominent school o f philosophy in late 16***
century Shiraz and Isfahan was that rooted in the work of Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi (d.
1191), and termed Ishraqism (Illuminationism) by later exponents. At the dawn of the
17*** century, perhaps no more than two decades after the initiation o f the Tarikh-i Hahi
and Tawhid-i Ilahi at Akbars court, a follower o f the Ishraqi thinkers, Sadr al-Din al-
Shirazi (d. 1641), would carry the line forward with a movement called the 'Hikmat-i
Ilahi' (Divine Philosophy).*^^ This does not mean that Akbars initiatives influenced Sadr
al-Din al-Shirazi, but it does suggest that Ishraqism, among other philosophical schools
arising in Shiraz and Isfahan, was quite influential at Fatehpur Sikri.*'***
134 Ibn Mubarak, Mofaaofta?-/ Allami.

135 Ibid, p. 113.
136 Ibn Mubarak, Akbar Nama, vol. 3, p. II16.
137 Abu al-Fadl ibn Mubarak, A in-i Akbari, vol. 3, trans. H. Blochmann (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of bengal, 1927), pp. 611-
13.
138 Fw example, see, H. Corbin, History of Islamic PhilosofAv. pp. 205-20; and, M. Fakhty, A Historv of Islamic Philosoohv.
pp. 293-311.
139 For Sadr al-Din Shkazi, also known as MuHa Sadra, see, James W. Morris. The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction
tP .the PMosoiJiy ofMuUa Sadra (Princeton; University Press, 1981).
140 For a general discussion of Safavid mfluenoe in South Asia, see, Agha ahdi Husain, Cultural Influence of Safavid Iran
over the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent uider the Mughals, Jountal of the Regional Culture Institute 1:4 (1968): 24-34. For the study of
143
The invaluable contribution that Islamicists make to this discussion o f Intoxicated
Reason at Akbars court is that according to Ishraqis, in Majid Fakhrys words: 1) the
right o f reason to probe the deepest religious mysteries is guaranteed; and, 2 ) religious
and metaphysical truth is united such that it is the duty o f the seeker to seek truth
wherever it can be found: in Greek philosophy, in ancient Persian thought, in Muslim
Neo-Platonism, and in Sufism. *'* In this light, and recalling the identification o f the
influence of such specific doctrines as the Sufis wahdat al-wujud, the institution o f
Tawhid-i Ilahi appears in a rather different form than that cast by Monserrate and other
Orientalists, or al-Badauni and the qadis. Whether the invitations to representatives o f
various schools, sects or faiths, the translation o f Sanskrit works, the mixing o f Hindu,
Zoarastrian, Jain and Sufi rites involved in its rituals - in short, all that contemporary
South Asianists would term Indie or Indian about the Tawhid-i Ilahi - is legitimated by
an education in Middle Islam, albeit only the Intoxicated categories. In fact, it appears
clear the Tawhid-i Ilahi draws its primary inspiration from the Unity (Tawhid) of the
Sufis and the Theism (Ilahi) of the falasifa.
If the Tawhid-i Ilahi was intended as a new religion for all Mughal subjects, Muslim
and non-Muslim, it was a colossal failure. Even in Akbars day, at the peak of its
activities, all the initiates o f the Tawhid-i Ilahi, with the exception o f Akbars Hindu
wives and the Raja Birbal, were Muslims o f the h ip est rank. Based on the sources
Ishraqi and other jMosofdiical schools flnm Iran in Akbars day, see, Riazul Islam, Akbars Intellectual Contacts with ta n , Islamic
Society and Culture, pp. 351-74: and. S.A.A. Rizvi. Religious and Intellectual Historv of Muslims in Akbars Rei^m tNew Deilii: 1975).
144
considered here, one cannot comment on whether it was intended as a new religion (for all
or for some) except to say that none of the Muslim sources suggest that that is so, with the
possible exception o f al-Badauni. Al-Badauni not withstanding, it is noteworthy that in a
dartur al- 'arml (guide on administrative conduct), Akbar enjoins his officers to draw
insight primarily from al-Ghazalis Ihya Ulum al-Din, and other such works, and not
from any work produced by the Tawhid-i Ilahi circle.*'*^ In this regard, the Tawhid-i Ilahi
also continues the Intoxicated tradition o f intellectual elitism. When added to the above
discussion of Akbars regime as whole, the Tawhid-i Ilahi appears no more as a new
religion than the Mughal Caliphate appears as a new polity. That is to say, the Tawhid-i
Ilahi is the intellectual expression o f the Intoxicated doctrines o f the Sufis andfalasifa,
just as the Mughal Caliphate is the political expression of the Sober doctrines o f the
fuqaha' and mutakallimun. To its initiates, including Abu al-Fadl, there appears to be no
contradiction between the Tawhid-i Ilahi and the Quran. To taqlid-mmd&d.fuqaha , it is
the heretical product o f the exercise o f absolute ijtihad by the unqualified.
Akbars political and cultural initiatives, first and foremost, confirm that the Mughal
political elite was highly educated in the disciplines, schools and sects o f Middle Islam.
In fact, unless one is prepared to essentialize Islam in terms o f the doctrines o f the
142 Ita Mubarak, Makalabat-I A llami, pp. 79-88.
145
fuqaha' - as Monserrate and the Orientalists are apt to do - Akbars political and
intellectual initiatives reflect his education in Islam. Thus, Akbars political initiatives
are ultimately legitimated in the idiom of Caliphate, while his intellectual initiatives are
legitimated in the idiom o f Perfect Men. That is to say, Akbars regime suggests Mughal
political culture was largely conducted in variety of idioms, including the Islamic and
the Hindu, but both were legitimated by the thought contained in Islamic categories,
disciplines, schools and sects.
Returning to the larger theme of Muslim Nationalism, Akbars regime suggests that its
elite drew a connection between the Caliphate and Hindustan. First, the dream of
unifying these vast and fractured territories is explicitly expressed in various sources.
Second, the legitimation of the Mughal Caliphate, its expansionist agenda, and the
syncretic Tawhid-i Ilahi is related to the start of a new era largely coinciding with the
new Muslim millennium. And finally, one must consider the overt Utopianism, in Muslim
politics and intellectualism, of the new millennium being marked by the end of sectarian
and religious divides. All one can add is that the germs of a religio-political community
spanning Hindustan are certainly present in the Utopias/Ideologies expressed in Mughal
political culture. As for a community one might describe as India, it should be recalled
that in Mughal polity, the Rajputs alone rose to the highest ranks, and even then were
outnumbered 4 to 1 by Muslims. With regard to religion as well, the limiting factor in the
idiom of Akbars day was that a Caliph had to be recognized as such by the umma (i.e.,
Muslims), even if the ummas customs were equivalent to those o f dhimmis in the eyes
146
and actions of the state.
The final point to make concerns the attitudes of the scholarly and political elite
toward Europeans and Christianity. As the embassy of Portuguese Jesuits suggests, the
elite was generally open to the presence o f Europeans, but while Intoxicated thinkers such
as Akbar and Abu al-Fadl were enthusiastic to learn about Christianity, the Sober
{mutakallimun andfuqaha ) o f the court were more interested in the polemical
delegitimation o f Jesuit theology. At the same time, the non-religious activities o f
Europeans drew criticism from political and scholarly classes. In a letter to Abd Allah
Khan Uzbek ofTuran (1586), Akbar writes o f his intent to undertake the extermination
of the farangi kafirs [lit., infidel Franks] w ho... had created unrest and were harassing and
oppressing traders and pilgrims to Mecca. In a letter to Burhan Nizam al-Mulk of
Ahmadnagar, written five years later (1591), Akbar reiterates the call, arguing that an
alliance between the Mughals and the Sultans ofBijapur and Golkonda would result in a
united effort and subsequent victory over the territories o f the farangis ifarangistan) and
their ports.*^'* Although these campaigns were never launched, it is clear that Akbar was
not merely speaking rhetorically, given that two campaigns against Portuguese forts in
Gujarat had taken place while the Jesuits were at court (1580-83).*^^
In the final analysis, it appears that the activities o f the Portuguese, though noted in a
negative light, were placed low on the list o f Akbars priorities. As for European
143 Ibid, Letter to Abd Allah, p. 44.

144 Ibid., Letter to Burhan Nizam al-Mulk, p. 65.
145 Ibn Mubarak, Akbar Nama, vol. 2, pp. 280-81. Also, Danvers. The Portuguese in India (London. 1894) pp. 42-43.
147
expansion in general, an incident described in the Waqa i of Asad Beg al-Qazwini'^
seems best to symbolize the open yet cautious attitudes of Akbars regime. The subject of
discussion is the recently introduced item o f tobacco, brought to South Asia (directly or
indirectly) by European expansion. Al-Qazwini returned to court with tobacco and a
hookah from Bijapur where he had been on a diplomatic mission in 1604. Akbars foster-
brother, Aziz Kukaltash, informed him that tobacco was widely smoked in Mecca and
Medina, and that some physicians {hukama) consider it medicinal. The pharmacist at
court added that the European physicians had written much about tobacco. Al-Qazwini
defended the European physicians, saying.
Without having tried it and found out all its qualities, how would they prescribe it for
[their] rulers, kings and men, low and high? They must have judged its good or bad
qualities; otherwise they would not have acted thus.*'*
However, Akbars physician, Hakim Ali, argued against Akbar smoking. He stated:
It is not necessary for us to follow the Europeans, and adopt a custom, which is not
sanctioned by our own wise men, without experiment or trial.
Al-Qazwini retorted that every custom is new at some point in time, that they often
spread without the prior examination o f the learned, and the qualities o f a thing can not
always be determined unless it is tried.
Akbar is reported to have been greatly impressed by al-Qazwinis argument, saying.
Truly, we must not reject a thing that has been adopted by the people of the world.
146 Asad Beg al-Qazwini, Waqa i (MS, B riti^ libiaiy. Or. 19%). A portion (f.2Ia-b) is reproduced in Shineen Moosvi, ed.
, pp. 106-8.
147 Ibid, p. 107.
148 Ibid, p. 107.
148
merely because we can not find it in cur books, or how shall we progress?
In the end, Akbar smoked, but although al-Qazwini tells us that subsequently tobacco
became a widely traded commodity, and addiction spread everywhere, he ends the
episode by stating that Akbar never smoked again.
Ill; Muhammad Auranazeb: Servant of God
Akbars son Jahangir (r. 1605-27) was the last Great Mughal to come to power
through the designation o f his predecessor. Shah Jahan (r. 1627-58) won his father
Jahangirs titles after a brutal war o f succession between him and his brothers. Aurangzeb
and his brothers followed in their fathers footsteps, even staking their claims before Shah
Jahan was dead.*^
Aurangzeb not only inherited wars o f succession as a means to power, he was also
bequeathed the tenuous relations with external and internal powers upon which his
predecessors regimes were based. On the external front, Jahangir and Shah Jahans
grants o f trading and territorial privileges to Portuguese, Dutch, French and British
companies (not to mention those granted by other states in the region), had established
Europeans as integral features of the economic, if not political, landscape. As well, the
Safavid annexation of Qandahar (1548) and the Mughals failed attempts (1649-52) to
149 Ibid, p. 108.

150 As ia the case of the above introduction to Akbars regiine, the intellectual and political jaoolivities mentioned below are
well known to scholars of the Mughals, and drawn seoeqdaiy woiks already cited, w primaiy woiks raised below, thus are not
149
recapture it during Shah Jahans regime, indicate a clear shift in relations with the powers
across the western border. Campaigns against the Sultanates of Golkunda (1656) and
Bijapur (1657), also during Shah Jahans regime, confirm that relations with states across
the southern border were also strained. Within Mughal borders as well, Pashtuns (1667-
6 8 ), Jats (1669) and Satnamis (1671-72) raised revolts that continued to flare beyond
initial hostilities. These external and internal pressures confirm that Aurangzeb
inherited a state under threat o f dissolution.
Like Akbar, his great grandson responded to these political dilemmas through his
education in Islam. Historians from the era o f the Great Mughals, like their
contemporary followers, point out that Aurangzebs primary opponent in the war of
succession was his older brother, Dara Shukoh (d. 1658) - an active member of the
Tawhid-i Ilahi circle o f scholars. Even before Daras defeat and execution, Khafi Khan
(d. 1731) - a mid-level administrator in Aurangzebs regime - tells one that this
association legitimized Daras execution on the grounds that he had brought disgrace to
tasawwuf [mysticism] by following some heretics who posed as Sufis, and declared Islam
and unbelief to be twin brothers, on which subject he had written treatises.*^* The same
source also relates that one o f Aurangzebs first acts was to abolish the solar Tarikh-i Ilahi
in favour o f the lunar Hijri ca len d a r.B y 1707, at Aurangzebs death, his regime is
reported by all pertinent sources mentioned in this chapters to have discontinued the
specificafly cited.
151 Among Daras works is the Sirr-i Asrar, a Persian translation of 50 Sanskrit Upmisads. See, Muhammad Khafi Khan,
MmtaUiab al-Lubab, ed. and tram., S. Moiaul Haq, Khafi Khans History of Alamgir (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society Journal,
1975),p.5;92.
150
celebration o f the Zoroastrian nauroz (new year) and the practice of darshan (appearing
before the masses daily in the fashion o f Hindu monarchs). Astrologers were dismissed
from Aurangzebs service. Alcohol and music were banned at court. Prohibitions were
ordered on Hindu festivals and temple construction. Certain temples were demolished. All
Hindus except Rajputs were banned from riding Arabian horses, while permits were
required for riding horses of other breeds. Jizya was re-imposed on Hindus and zakat on
Muslims. And finally, a tiered system of duty was directed at merchants (2.5%
Muslim/5 % Hindu).
Given that Aurangzeb apparently attempted to dismantle cornerstones of a
Utopian/Ideological regime established by Akbar, it is no surprise that historians have
long contrasted the two rulers. As previously mentioned. Orientalists largely viewed
Auranzebs creed as so bigoted that it unraveled the polity Akbar had constructed.
Contemporary historians, however, essentially agree that underlying the progressive shift
in relations with external powers, lay internal socio-economic developments -
particularly the rise of capitalist and petty-landed classes whose means of livelihood
was independent o f state and whose cultural orientation was largely local - that were
conducive to political decentralization.^^'* In Aurangzebs context, a concrete example in
152 W d , p. 83.
153 It should be reiterated that this thesis is also a feature r f Hindu and Indian Nationalist histories, both of which are
represented by such and infltimtial woric as, Jadu Nath Sarkar, A History of Aurangzeb (Bombay: Longjnan, [reprint] 1972).
154 The first majcsr leap from the Orientalist thesis that the revolts under Aurangzeb ate Hindu reactions to his bigotry,
came with such Marxist works as, H an Habib, The Agrarian Svstem of Mughal India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963). Habib
argued that the revolts were peasant uprisings against elite op|Bssi<m. Problems with this views, such as the &ct that elites
participated in the revolts, prcanpted the next leap in the fcam of works such as MtizafFar Alam, The Crisis of F.mpiie in Mughal Ntath
India: Awadh and the Punjab. 1707-1748 (Delhi; Oxford Uitiversity Ftess, 1993). The thesis in this case is that regicma! imlalances in
151
the latters favour is Shiva Bhonsia, a Marathi speaking/agirdar in Bijapur who not only
stopped remitting taxes to Bijapur, but virtually consumed the Sultanate from within, thus
drawing the Mughals into a conflict that ended the Sultanates ofBijapur and Golkunda,
but remained unresolved at Aurangzebs death, after half a century o f combat.
Although contemporary historians do not describe Aurangzebs creed as bigoted, nor
ascribe the demise of the Mughal state to this aspect o f his regime, they do suggest that his
Islam only exacerbated deteriorating inter-ethnic, inter-religious and sectarian relations.
Thus, it is noteworthy that although Akbars initiatives are viewed as responses to the
world over which he ruled, Aurangzebs initiatives are largely viewed as reactionary. For
example, Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal write o f Akbars regime as a sign o f a pragmatic
streak and determination to adapt to the Indian environment, while Aurangzebs regime
represents a partial reversal of the politics o f alliance building and religious
flexibility.*^ Under this pall and given that Aurangzeb sought to implement a Middle
Islamic model at the culmination o f the Middle Period, too often unaddressed are the
ways in which Aurangzebs regime was also a response to the conditions of the day, and
the idea o f this regime as the precursor and foundation of a new Muslim response to
changed socio-economic conditions in the early 18* century.
Here, the above issues are approached by first surveying the ways in which
wealtti undsmaned tbe authority of the centre, giving rise to sub-regional stales.
155 Early in the 18th century, the Marathas would displace Mughal rule throughout central South Asia, and fay the dawn of
the next century would pose the only serious challenge remaining beftue British expansirm across the tegioaFor Shiva Bhonsia, see, J.N.
Sarkar, Shivaji, the Mughals and the Etaopeans - a Study in Diplomacy, Jourrral of Indian Historv S3 (1975): 269-281. For the
Marathas more generally, see, Stewart Gordon, Marathas. Marauders and State Formation in 18th century India (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
152
contemporary scholarship views Aurangzebs regime as a continuation o f his
predecessors, so as to gauge the extent o f his regimes innovations. Then, specific
examples of Aurangzebs innovations are considered, itemizing the context in which they
arose, their efficacy (or lack thereof) and their inter-ethnic, inter-religious and sectarian
implications. In light of this discussion, one can begin to assess the degree to which these
reforms in any way represent a calculated response to the socio-economic changes arising
in the era of the Great Mughals.
a) Political Continuity: Mughal Caliphate
If Akbar was practically bom head of the Mughal state, Aurangzeb Alamgir came to
power with more than twenty years administrative and military experience. By the time of
his ascension in 1658, Aurangzeb was twice subahdar of the Deccan (1636-44/1652-58),
once subahdar o f Gujarat (1645-47) and Multan (1647-52), respectively, and headed
military campaigns in Badakhshan (1647), Qandahar (1649/52), Golkonda (1656) and
Bijapur (1657)
Experience accrued at ascension is one o f innumerable differences between Akbar and
his great grandson. However, contemporary historians wam that one must not read too
much into their religious differences. S.S. Kulshresthas research shows that
Aurangzebs fiscal orders (including the collection of}i2yd) were scarcely followed due to
156S. Bose and Jalal. A. Modstn Soufll Asia, pp. 40-41;
153
the growing independence o f mid-level administrators.'^^ R.C. Hallissey argues that such
measures as the imposition of jizya hardly roused any Hindu elite to revolt, state officers
being exempt. Z. Faruki has argued that restrictions on non-Muslim worship, including
the destruction o f temples, applied to particular localities and times, rather than being
general orders pertinent to all temples at all t im e s . M . L . Bhatia has made the case that
grants (inam) and endowments (waqf) administered by the sadr al-sudur continued as
previously - old grants and endowments being renewed, and new ones issued to Hindus,
Jains and Zoroastrians.'^ C.M. Agrawal and Laiq Ahmad have separately argued that the
wazirate continued to function as previously, Aurangzebs first wazir being the Hindu
Raja Ragunath Khatri, followed by three Shii wazirs in succession, each dying in
office.'^' And finally, M.A. Alis statistical analysis o f the Ma athir al- Umara -
recording the names and designations o f state officers - has shown that while 22,5% of
Akbars officers were Hindu, in Aurangzebs case the figure is 31.6%.'^^
In other words, Orientalists argued that Aurangzebs religion accounts for the
constant warfare under his regime, not to mention the subsequent demise o f the state,
while contemporary historians collectively suggest that his religious orientation did not
alter the complexion o f the Mughal state. Radier, the roots o f Aurangzebs difficulties
158 R.C. Hallisey, The Rftiput Rebellion Under Aurangzeb (Columbia; Universily of Missouri Press, 1977).
159 Z. Farucp, Aurangzeb and His Times (Delhi: Idaiah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1972).
160 MJL Bhatia, Administrative History of Medieval India (Delhi: RadhaPublications, 1992).
161 C.M. Agrawal, Wazirs of Aurangzeb (Bodh-Gaya; Kauchan Publicaticos, 1978); Laiq Ahmad, The Prime Ministers of
Aurangzeb (Allahabad: Chugh Publioations, 1976).
162 M. Atfaar Ali, The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb (London: Asia House Publishing, 1966). Also, Shah Nawaz Khan,
154
with Hindu rebels are evident in the regimes o f his predecessors, and a sign that the
Mughal state was progressively overwhelmed by the socio-economic changes wrought by
European expansion and trade, a fact o f which was the strengthening o f regional identities
along with the rise o f a capitalist class o f merchants, bankers and petty landlords
{zamindars). This reading adds to the contemporary discourse by considering continuity
and change in the Utopian/Ideological initiatives o f Akbar and Aurangzeb.
It was shown above that the crux o f Akbars power over the judiciary came from his
claim, as head o f state, to act as supreme mujtahid.' In the historical writings of
Aurangzebs contemporaries, there are many examples of Aurangzebs exercise of exactly
this right. In a rather routine manner, Hamid al-Din Khan BahadursyIMam-i Alamgiri,
reports a case that arose during the siege o f a fort in 1700. The issue was the
punishment of four Muslim and nine Hindu enemy soldiers captured outside the fort.
Hamid al-Din records how Aurangzeb summoned the qadi al-qudat to investigate with the
help o f muftis and report their findings. The qadi returned with a fatwa that the Muslims
should be imprisoned for three years, while the kafirs" may be offered the choice of
conversion and release, or death. Before returning thefatwa to the qadi, Aurangzeb wrote
across the top:
This decision [is] according to the Hanafi school.... Ours is not the rigid Shia creed,
that there should be only one tree in an entire village. Praise to God) There are four
schools [of Sunni fiqh\ based on truth, [each] according to a particular age and time.
Ma 'athir al- 'Umara, trans. H. Beveridge (Patna: Janaki Prakashan, 1979).

163 Hamid al-Din Kton Bahadur, 'Alamgiri, trans. Jadunath Sarkar, Anecdotes of Aurangzeb (Calcutta: Sarkar and
So ts. 1 9 6 3 ). p . 125-26.
164 Ibid., p . 126.
155
When the qadi returned from further consultations with his associates, Aurangzeb chose a
ruling for the execution of all prisoners, Hindu and Muslim, as a deterrent. What did he
intend to deter? The answer stated is loss o f control over the state. In other words, the
execution o f all served the state better than the execution o f only Hindus.
Clearly, Aurangzeb acted as supreme mujtahid' but was the degree o f his ijtihad
absolute, as had been the case under Akbar? On this occasion, Khafi Khan provides
cases confirming that Aurangzeb followed in his forefathers footsteps to a point. He
writes that before the deposition of the Shii Sultan o f Golkunda, Abu al-Hasan,
Aurangzeb sought the qadi al-qudat's legal opinion, but was denied the legitimation he
sought by the qadi's resignation.^^ The next qadi al-qudat was also approached, but he
declared openly in court that the Sultan was a Muslim, that the war was costing many
Muslim lives on both sides, and that the shari a enjoined peace and m e r c y . W i t h
this qadi's banishment from court, Aurangzebs jihad continued and the Sultan was
deposed on the pretext that he; 1 ) appointed tyrannical infidels to post they were not
entitled by the shari a; and, 2) he made no distinction between infidelity and Islam in
forging an alliance with the chief South Asian threat to Aurangzebs regime: the Hindu
Marathas led by the Bhonsia h o u s e . By ignoring the Tarawa o f two successive qadi al-
qudats, Aurangzeb clearly goes beyond the choice of opinions considered above, to
declaring his own opinion on the matter of Abu al-Hasans Islamic credentials. However,
165 Khafi Khan,Mumtah3b al-Luhab, p. 345.

166 ibid., p. 345.
167 Ibid., p. 300.
156
his choice of charges against the Sultan suggests that Aurangzebs ijtihad remained within
the rhetorical bounds offiqh, while Akbars extended well beyond the principles o f that
discipline. Thus, Aurangzebs ijtihad rmy not have been absolute, but it did represent
absolute legislative authority in relation to the fuqaha.
Evidently, Aurangzebs style o f legislative authority is qualitatively different from
Akbars, but in the quantitative sense o f the head of states authority over the judiciary, it
is identical. Thus, it is not surprising that Aurangzeb legitimated the exercise o f this
authority by continuing the Utopia/Ideology o f Mughal Caliphate. Not only Khafi Khan
and other Muslim authors considered below, but, more significantly, their Hindu colleague
and contemporary, Ishwardas Nagar (b. 1654), in his Futuhat-i 'Alamgiri, refer to
Aurangzeb and the Mughals as Caliphs.'^ In the Ahkam-i 'Alamgiri, mention is made o f
Mirza Muazzam (Aurangzebs son and successor) addressing his father as the Centre of
Faith and Kaba.'^^ A petition from a hi^-ranking commander in the same work
addresses Aurangzeb as the saint and spiritual guide o f the world.* Niccolao Manucci
(d. 1717) - an Italian artillery-man in the Mughal army - also took the time to note the
most commonly used titles applied to Aurangzeb, all o f which confirm his political and
religious authority. These include, qibla-i din va dunia (centre o f faith and the world)
and qibla-i du jahanan (centre o f the two universes). ** Furthermore, Aurangzeb jealously
168 Ishwardas Nagar, Futuhat-i A lamgiri, trans. Tasneem Ahmad (Delhi: Idarab-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1978), pp. 243; 206;
220; 21; 61. Also see, pp. 4; 10; 22; 24; 71.
169 Hamid al-Din Khan, Ahkam-i 'Alamgiri, p. 51.
170 Ibid., p. 88.
171 Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor, vol. 3, trans. W. Irvine (Calcutta: Editions Indian, 1966), p. 323.
1 S7
guarded the religious as much as the political authority these titles implied and
conferred. When his own son, Mirza Muhammad Azam, conspired to have a lower
officers jagir transferred to himself by complaining that the man drinks wine and
engages in many other kinds of bid'a," Aurangzeb reminded Muhammad Azam that
neither being a mirza, nor being a subahdar, makes him a muhtasib (public censor). He
then advised his son to inform the sadr al-sudur to ask the local muhtasib to investigate.*^^
Beyond this continuity in titles and central authority, Aurangzeb also continued to
legitimate his claim to Caliphate through other means previously used by Akbar.
Obviously, the millenarianism o f the Tarikh-i Ilahi, as well as the Intoxicated disciplines
and schools behind the Tawhid-i Ilahi, were replaced by a rejuvenated state judiciary and
legislation according to the principles offiqh - that is to say, by the states alignment with
the shari a. In keeping with this alignment, Intoxicated Sufis and doctrines of Perfect
Men were also replaced. Nevertheless, Manucci does write that Aurangzeb was most
commonly addressed aspir-i dastgir}^ All the aforementioned works, in fact, make
references to Aurangzebs frequent visits to Sufi shrines and the company of Sufis, but in
every case it is a representative o f a Sober order. For example, Khafi Khan names seven
Sufis who were influential at court. Most are explicitly identified as masters of hadith and
tafsir, besides Sufi fields such as suluk. All are identified with respect o f shari 'a to the
extent that sama is only mentioned in the context of one scholar, while two are said to be
172 Hatnid al-Din Khan, Ahkam-i 'Alamgiri, pp. 62-3.

173 Manucci, Storio do Mogor, vol. 3, p. 323.
158
firmly anti-soma As well, due to Aurangzebs hidden inclination (iradat-i batini), he
is said to have been drawn to one of these Sufis, Shaykh Burhan, while preparing for the
war o f succession. The apparent purpose o f the story is to relate that the Shaykh
recognized Aurangzeb as the future sovereign.'^
In whatever manner the endowment o f reputed scholars heightened Akbars prestige, it
clearly also did Aurangzebs. For example, Khafi Khan mentions the bidding o f a scholar
from Mecca, known as Affendi, whose field of specialty was Quranic recitation and who
was appointed khatib and imam o f the capital mosque. Another from Turan, known for
honesty and knowledge of law, won the post o f muhtasib for the army. The same can be
said for the patronage o f great works, such as Akbars or Daras many translations from
Sanskrit literature. In Aurangzebs case one can site the example o f the Fatawa-i
Alamgiri, which the Ma athir al- A lamgiri informs one is a juristic work compiled by the
most teputedfuqaha of Lahore and Delhi and meant to aid in the dispensation o f the
shari'a}^^ Architecture in the style begun by Akbar was also forwarded, Aurangzeb
building a number o f city mosques {jami masjids), even outdoing his predecessors in the
grandeur of the Badshahi Masjid in Lahore.^* As well, these sources continuously employ
the connection to Amir Timur, Khafi Khan opening his account o f Aurangzebs rule with
reference to him as in the eleventh generation from Timur, carrying the bravery and
174 Kiafi Y3asn,MuntMiab aS-Lubab, pp. 541-55.

175 Ibid, p. 13.
176 Ibid, p. 85; p. 449.
177 Saqi Musta'idd Khan, Ma 'athir-i Alamgiri, trans. J.N. Saikar (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society, 1947), p. 316.
178 For the Badshahi and mosque aroWteoture in general, see, Y.K. Bukhati, The Mosque Architecture of the Mughals,
159
courage o f the ancestor.The connection between the Mughals and the unification of
Hindustan is also continued, Khafi Khan variously referring to Aurangzebs governing
and ruling the vast dominion of Hindustan, and Hamid al-Din Khan making frequent
reference to paradise-like Hindustan. As well, a number of episodes show an acute
awareness of this vast dominions diversity, but none better than an incident recorded in
the Ahkam-i Alamgiri, in which a Sunni Turani officer conspired to usurp a Shii Irani
officers post by accusing him of being a heretic. Aurangzeb responded:
What connection have worldly affairs with religion? What right have matters of
religion to enter into bigotry. For you is your religion and for me is mine. [Quranic
quote} If this rule [of excluding Shia] were to be established, it would be my duty to
extricate all the [Hindu] Rajas and their followers. Wise men disapprove o f the
removal from office of able officers.*'
This is no more a secular statement than it is an Intoxicated one, but clearly follows
from the political philosophies with which the discussion of this chapter began,
particularly the notion that the appointment o f officers is under the jurisdiction o f
dawabit. Thus, Aurangzebs regime may be regarded as an example o f continuity from
Akbars day on a number o f planes. In particular, although Aurangzeb shifted the state
firmly from the Intoxicated Way to the Sober Path, his Sobriety, like Akbars
Intoxication, remains rooted in the disciplines, schools and sects ofM iddle Islam.
Regarding the question o f whether the Mughal Caliph represented the religious head o f
all subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim, in Aurangzebs case there is no doubt that his
Indo-lramca 9:ii (1956):67-75; and, M.A. Chagfatai, The Badshahi Masiid (Lahore; Kitab Khana-i Nauras, 1972).
179 Khafi Khan,M untM iab al-Lubab, pp. 1-3.
180 Ibid., p. 473; Hamid sl-Din Khan, Ahkam-i 'Alamgiri, p. 75.
181 Hamid al-Din Khan, Ahkam-i A lamgiri, p. 88.
160
religious authority over non-Muslims extends only as far as they are dhimmis according
to iht fuqaha s definition - that is, protected with payment of specific taxes. This
aspect of the shift from an Intoxicated to a Sober Utopia/Ideology alone suggests that
institutional continuity does not necessarily imply continuity in the realm of
intellectualism. This is the topic o f our next section. The summary point in the context o f
Aurangzebs political initiatives is Mughal politys continued awareness o f governing
Hindustan, and the continuation o f the dream of unification under a Mughal Caliphate
commanding a set o f state institutions that accommodate representatives o f different sects,
religions and ethnicity.
b) Intellectual Divides: al-Siyasa al-Shariyya
Just as Aurangzebs Utopian/Ideological initiatives did not result in great institutional
change, so too did they not result in great intellectual upheaval. Put another way, the
execution ofDara - Aurangzebs brother and head of the Tawhid-i Ilahi - did not mean
the death o f Intoxicated disciplines. On the contrary, Manucci lists 24 physicians at
Aurangzebs court, all of Irani stock. Their titles include, Aflatun al-zaman (Plato o f the
Age), Aristu al-zaman (Aristotle o f the Age), Jalinu al-zaman (Galen o f the Age), Buqrat
al-zaman (Hippocrates o f the Age) and Bn Ali al-zaman (Ibn Sina o f the Age).^*^ Francois
Bernier (d.l688) - a French physician - was employed as a secretary by one o f these
182 Manucci, Storia do Mogor, v d . 2, pp. 332-4.
161
figures, Hakim al-Muik Danishmand Khau, serving as the governor {subahdar) of Delhi.
Bernier writes that astronomy, geography and anatomy are his [Danishmand Khans]
favourite pursuits.*^ In this regard, Bernier translated Harvey (Harveus) and Pequets
works on the circulatory system into Persian at his employers behest.Danishmand
Khan is also identified as acquainted with the doctrines o f the Soufys.'"^^^ Following from
these metaphysical interests, Bernier translated the philosophical works o f Gassendi and
Descartes, while his fellow secretary, a Hindu pandit formerly in the employ of Data,
taught his employer Vedantic philosophy.*^
Aurangzebs patronage of the falasifa and association with such figures as
Danishmand Khan, confirms that his Sobriety did not include the spuming o f all the
disciplines o f Intoxicated Reason. Rather, metaphysics was the prime discipline avoided
by such figures as al-Ghazali and followers like Aurangzeb. Both Bemier and Manucci
report an incident that makes this point most plain. Upon his ascension to power,
Aurangzebs former tutor, Mulla Salih, came to court hoping to win favour. Instead, he
received a verbal flaying and summary dismissal from Aurangzebs presence. The
problem was the education that Aurangzeb had received from the "Mulla' By both
183 Fianeois Bamier. Travafs in the Miiyhat F.mpire trains Archibald Cotistable (Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1972), p. 353.
184 Ibid., pp. 323-5.
185 Ibid., p. 320.
186 Ibid., pp. 323-5.
187 Bemiw, pp. 154-62; Manucoi, Storia do Mogor, vol. 2, k*. 26-9. Interestingly, the Muslim authors of the period do not
mention this inoideEt. One may thus speculate that the ineidsnt did not but occur, but is an attempt by one o f the Eiaxpean authotrs to
place European Renaissance critiques of Muslim clerics in the mouth o f t te CaMpk However, this can be questioned as Bemier teporte
that he was told the tale by Danishniand Khan, who was iMBsent for the exdiange. (Beroier, jy . 154-55.) Manucoi also relates die tale
second hand. (Manuesi, pp. 154-5.) Thus, it appears mcwe likely that the Muslim authors are exaroising self-censorship, probably in an
162
accounts, this included Arabic grammar,/?!?^, kalam and philosophy, but was found
deficient by Aurangzeb for a number o f reasons. First, kalam and philosophy are
dismissed as "idle and foolish fffopositions in Berniers account, and ornaments in
talking to learned men in Manuccis version.** What is lacking, according to Aurangzeb,
is world history, geography, political philosophy and the military arts - that is, an
education that promotes the value of reason and sound argumentation.*^
Furthermore, Aurangzeb is reported in both accounts, though in Manuccis words, to have
declared;
All your purpose and effort was to turn me into a good Arab, making me waste my
time over a language which demands from 10 to 12 years to obtain a little proficiency.
Meanwhile, my youth and my capacity for lofty things had vanished.
Both authors add that Aurangzeb concluded by stating that one would be better served if
not only education, but also the practice o f prayers, law and the sciences, were
conducted in his mother-tongue
Auranêbs criticism of kalam and philosophy, praise o f practical sciences, and
adherence to the shari 'a of the f u q a h a echoes the attitudes o f al-Ghazali, considered in
the previous chapter. As such, one can surmise that in Aurangzebs estimation the
doctrinal aspect o f Sufism in general would fall into the same idle group as kalam and
metaphysics, at best. However, the practical aspect o f Sober Sufism would play an
important part in Aurangzebs Islam. A variety o f incidents illustrate that Aurangzebs
attempt to easine tliat AuEangzBbs Sober ciedentials are act chailenged

188 Bemier, p. 160; Manucci, p. 27.
189 Beroier, p. 160; Manucci, p. 29.
190 Manucci,, p. 29.
163
association with Sober Sufis, mentioned in the previous section, was not merely for state
purposes, but represented a prominent aspect o f Aurangzebs intellectualism. For
example, Hamid al-Din Khan reports that when a high ranking official descended from a
Sufi o f Samarqand used the phase by the karamat bvniad (miraculous/grace-laden)
command in his official orders, Aurangzeb ended the practice by writing that neither his
high rank, nor his descent from a m e a n t the officer possessed k a r a m a t As well,
Manucci tells of how Aurangzeb called to court twelve prominent 'sayyids' (sahides) who
claimed they could perform miracles and intercede with God on the behalf of devotees, by
such claims soliciting sexual favours from women seeking their spiritual services.
Aurangzeb sardonically gave each man three days to perform a miracle in his presence,
failing which the sayyids were imprisoned or banished, but promised restitution should
they be able to perform a miracle in the future. On the other hand, Hamid al-Din Khan
writes that when the amin (collector) o f jizya for Jaunpur was reported to have
misappropriated 40,000 Rupees and given it to charity, Aurangzeb ordered the provincial
diwan (revenue officer) not to seek restitution as the collectors act was ultimately
pious. Evidently, Aurangzeb - or the image ofhim these official historians draw - did
not deny the miraculous powers of saints, but objected strongly to the pretense of
saintliness on the basis o f rank or lineage rather than pious knowledge and action - an
echo o f the Sufi works considered in the previous chapter.
191 Batdec, pp. 158-9; Manucci, pp. 28-9.

192 Hamid al-Din Khan, Alemgiri, pp. 81-2.
193 Manucoi, Storia do Mogor, vol. 2, pp. 9-10.
194 Hamid al-Din Khan, Ahkam-i 'Alamgiri, p. 93.
164
As part o f Aurangzebs categorical bent, one can also note his sectarianism. Aurangzeb
was a self-professed Sunni. The discussion in the previous section has shown that in
matters o f state, being Sunni neither theoretically nor practically prevented Aurangzebs
regime from including Shiis at the highest ranks o f the administration and military. The
same can be said for non-Muslims. The reservation of the highest judicial posts for
Sunnis, however, confirms that Utopia/Ideology in which the 72 sects o f Islam and
Hindus may be dissolved is not present. In its place, Aurangzebs Sober Utopia/Ideology
offers inclusion, but as firm sectarian and religious communities. The same is also true
for ethnic communities, wliich are recognized and incorporated in Aurangzebs Sober
Path, and also seen to embody particular characteristics.
In his will, Aurangzeb advises his sons that Iranis, though extremely haughty by nature,
make the best administrators {mntasaddis). Turanis, on the other hand, make the best
soldiers as it is in their character to know when to retreat, unlike the crass stupidity o f the
Hindustanis, who would part with their heads but not leave their positions.* A
comparison is also drawn between the Iranis and Hindustanis in a letter to the governor of
Kabul. Aurangzeb writes that as the Sun is the guardian planet o f the Iranis, their
intellectual keenness is four times that ofHindustanis, whose tutelary planet is
Saturn. * The defect in the Iranis is that by reason of the Suns frequent conjunction
with Venus, they are prone to ease-loving. The distinction o f the Hindustanis is that
being governed by Saturn [they] are accustomed to toil. As well, by pointing out that
195 Aurangzebs will is inoliKled in A lamgiri, fy. 47-8.
165
Saturn is more frequently in conjunction with Jupiter than Venus, Aurangzeb suggests that
Hindustanis are more adept at war than Iranis.
The manner in which sources from Aurangzebs era write o f Hindustan, suggests that
it has gone beyond being understood as the vast territories conquered by Akbar, to a well
defined space breeding particular characteristics, whether or not ones ancestry reaches
outside of it. That is to say, whatever ones ethnicity or religion, those bom in Hindustan
are bom under its stars, Aurangzeb included. Hindustan does not, however, refer to all o f
South Asia. In fact, a clear distinction is drawn between it and the Deccan, not formally
annexed until Aurangzebs regime. For example, Khafi Khan refers to the defeat of the
Sultanate of Golkunda as that o f the Deccani army, and the states officers, irrespective
of ethnic stock or religious persuasion, as the Deccanis.^^ Also, the Hindu author Jag
Jivan Das, writing in the reign o f Aurangzebs successor, includes a statement of revenue
compiled at Aurangzebs death in his Mmtakhab al-Tawarikh, dividing the territories
under Mughal governance between the Hindustani and Deccani provinces (subahs)}^
Based on the provinces listed under each region, the border between them is quite clearly
the Vindhya Range. Hindustans other borders include the Himalaya Range to the north,
the Indus river system to west (including Kabul) and the Brahmaputra river system in the
east.
When the notion o f the Hindustani in Mughal literature o f Aurangzebs era is viewed
196 Ibid, p. 105,

197 Khafi OmKM imtakkeA al-Lubab, pp. 305-9.
198 Jag Jivan Daa, Muntakhab al-Tawarikh (British Museum MS; 26,253). The pertinent section (f. 51) is reproduced in W.
Irvines trsnslBtitn of Storia do Mogor, vol. 2, as a means of comparison with Mamiecis revenue assessm sit, pp. 390-1. Inoidently,
166
in light o f the earlier discussion o f Akbars regime, it is clear that Hindustan - as the site
of activity for a religio-political community - is brought about by a number of
contributing factors, not least of which is the Mughal states longevity and the
Utopia/Ideologies it in which it garbed itself. The most prominent Utopian/Ideological
political feature, o f course, is the institution o f Caliphate, and it is important to note that
both Akbars Intoxicated Way and Aurangzebs Sober Path employ this office with similar
effect: the circumvention o f thsfuqaha s claims to legislative authority. Furthermore,
Aurangzeb and his supporters education suggests no conflict between promoting a Sober
Utopia/Ideology and continuing to identify the state with Hindustan. However, this does
leave the question of why Aurangzebs regime would seek to shift away from the
Intoxicated Way that had legitimated the notion o f a regional identity (complimentary
to the regions o f Iran, Turan and the Deccan) in association with the Mughal state?
This studys primary sources offer little more in the way o f a direct response than
Aurangzebs desire to conform to the shari a. The sources do, however, suggest what
Aurangzebs regime, and the Mughal state more generally, gained from the shift. First o f
all it should be noted that a state ideolo^ based on millenarianism could not endure
indefinitely beyond the decades o f Akbars regime, which encompassed the turn of the
Hijri millennium. In this sense, a century having lapsed, change was due. However, one
must add that Aurangzeb ruled over a politically and socio-economically different South
Asia than had Akbar, internally and externally, as recounted in this sections
introduction.
Manucci does not diffoaitiate between Hkdustan and tbs Decc* in his list of provinces. See, Manucoi, pp. 392-405.
167
On the external front, the nature o f the social and economic changes rising in this
period could only promote the place o f religion (Islam) and sect (Siinnism) as a
Utopian/Ideological feature. Christian Europeans were in the region in êater numbers.
Relations with the Shii Sultans o f Iran and the Deccan, as well as a rising power in the
Hindu Marathas, had soured as the interest of all appear to have shifted away from
continued close relations with the Mughals. Clearly, Aurangzebs initiative to bring the
most reputed Sober Sufis, mutakallimtm andfuqaha' on board the Mughal Caliphate by
grantingyi^ft and its exponents a greater role in legislation than Akbar, was at least
partially a response to the above political realities.
As part of this general movement, the rejuvenated judiciary would also have served an
internal function as a balance against the powers o f a restive administrators and military
commanders, while appeasing a powerful class o f 'vlama' and Sober Sufis. At the same
time, the new Utopia/Ideology could cement the support of the powerful Sunni Turani and
Arab houses upon which Aurangzebs regime was founded, without alienating the Shii
Iranis and Hindu Rajputs on whose continued support the state was dependent. Nor did it
close the possibility o f co-opting non-Muslim groups in revolt. In fact, such Hindustani
(Hindu and Muslim) groups as the Baluch, Ghakkars and Pashtuns (Indus area), and the
Jats, Satnamis and Bundelas (Ganges area) - previously noted to have rebelled - were
drawn into close association with the Turanis, Iranis, Arabs and Rajputs long settled in
Hindustan, when the former were added to the administration after their revolts. Given the
counterweight these gains could represent in relation to the political and social forces that
168
Aurangzebs regime faced, it in fact appears as if one o f the reasons that the Mughal state
escaped dissolution in the late 17* century was the Utopian/Ideological shift the regime
made toward Sobriety. At the very least, Aurangzebs shift ensured that the Mughal head
of state retained the Caliphal (i.e., religious and political) authority that Akbar was the
first to claim.
In concluding this discussion of Aurangzebs political initiatives and intellectual leanings,
it must first be stated that the continuity which contemporary scholars identify reaches
beyond the Indian/Indic institutions which South Asianists have considered, and the
patterns of Middle Islam which Islamicists uncover, to include Utopias/Ideologies
particular to Mughal political culture. Embedded in this political culture is a relationship
between Caliphate and Hindustan, and despite the shift in Utopia/Ideology between
Akbar and Aurangzeb, it remains a relationship in which Islam and Muslims are
dominant, but non-Muslims, their intellectualism and rites, are by no means excluded. In
fact, sources from Aurangzebs era suggest that a religio-political identity encompassing
all the Muslims o f Hindustan and including the non-Muslims as dhimmis had reached
beyond dependence on Mughal patronage to form so common a feature o f the eras elite
rhetoric, that it is cited without need o f clarification in the sources consulted
Given the relationship between the Sober and Intoxicated Utopian/Ideological edifices
169
of the Mughal state, the depiction of Akbars regime as responsive and Aurangzebs as
reactionary is clearly underpinned by assumptions about the nature o f Islam,
essentialized as Sober and presumed to be inherently contrary to the politics of
alliance. Recalling that Akbar and Aurangzeb are representatives of an education in
Middle Islam, however, and that both their Utopian/Ideological regimes can be argued to
have benefited the state, both appear best depicted as responsive to the Indian
environment o f their day, within the limits of their intellectual world. Even Bose and
Jalal write that at least the re-impositon o f Jizya by Aurangzeb was a means of taxing the
commercial wealth o f Hindus and Jains.'^ When added to the fact that the 18* century
witnessed A Tide o f Sobriety - the subject o f this studys next chapter - the argument
can certainly be forwarded that Aurangzebs regime does not merely represent the
culmination o f Middle Islam, but is also the incubator of Modem Islam in South Asia.
The final point to address is the relationship between Aurangzebs regime and
Europeans - Sober attitudes towards Christianity having been dealt with in the discussion
of Akbar. Firstly, in Aurangzebs regime, artillery-men such as Manucci and physicians
such as Bemier, were far more common than in Akbars time. Furthermore, while Akbar
invited the Portuguese to send embassies, Aurangzeb received French, Dutch and British
embassies. Clearly, there is no opposition to the presence o f Europeans or their
employment. However, conflict continues with regard to European maritime activities,
culminating in punitive raids on Portuguese (e.g., Daman) and British (e.g., Bombay)
199 Bose and J
170
coastal forts as retribution for the plunder o f Mughal vessels. Ultimately, the cautious yet
open approach to Europeans exhibited by Akbars regime, is a little more cautious under
Aurangzeb. Once again this can be best symbolized by his contemporarys attitudes
toward tobacco.
In Khafi Khans list of prominent Sufis o f the day, he includes one Mir Murtada Waiz
Multani, whose Sober credentials can be established by the fact that he did not even view
sama as legal, though most Sober Sufis outside the Naqshbandiyya did. Multani came to
the attention o f the qadis of Aurangabad because he had been stressing the unlawfulness
of tobacco in his preaching, and criticizing state officials, including qadis, who indulged
the habit. Eventually Multani was summoned to argue his case before an assembly of
qadis. Multanis followers are reported to have wanted to mob the qadis and insult them,
but their pir persuaded them not to. In the debate that followed the qadis argued that
Multani spoke about the prohibition of the use o f tobacco in highly exaggerated terms,
and without the citation o f standard works or the fatawa o f '"mujtahids."^^ Multani
only responded by humoring the qadis, much to the delight o f the thousands of
followers who had accompanied him to the mosque in which the meeting was held.^^*
Needless to say, the debate ended without resolution, but its having taken place leaves one
aware that physicians were no longer alone in viewing tobacco as a custom unsanctioned
by the wise. It also forebodes the rise of Sober Sufis against the tide o f European
influence.
200 Khafi Khan, MuntcMmb al-Lubab, {^. 553-4.
171
IV: Perfect Men. Servants of God and the "Subaltern
As mentioned in this chapters introduction, this section is concerned with whether the
relationship between the elite and the subaltern should be characterized as
feudal/communal according to a variety o f Subaltemist definitions. Recall that the crux
of these definitions is that pre-capitalist polity was ruled by what Chatterjee terms sheer
force o f arms, and Guha puts more succinctly as coercion. In this scheme, the elite
makes no attempt to educate the subaltern in his/her culture, or vice versa, persuasion
only being employed in the interests of class or local community. Thus, as in Arnolds
writing, elite institutions that may be argued to forward subaltern welfare are considered
as no more than charitable acts anchored in class interests and/or religious duties.
Having largely discussed the idiom ofMughal political culture to this point, the
above aspect o f the early Subaltemist thesis requires a turn to that cultures ideals. The
first point to recognize is that ideals can vary, as the contrast of Akbars desire to break
sectarian bonds and Aurangzebs desire to strengthen them suggests. However, just as
institutional continuity underlies Utopian/Ideological contrasts, so does it underlie
attitudes and institutions that transcend the feudal/communal paradigm. This is
particularly so in terms ofMughal political cultures attitudes toward social welfare and
education, and the institutions endowed to support both.
201 Ibid, p,554.
172
a) Welfare
This chapters opening discussion o f political philosophy revealed that in all Middle
Period cases considered, God is sovereign, and the head o f state His representative.
The Islamicist Majid Khadduri observes that this implies that the purpose o f the Islamic
state is to enforce Gods J u stice.In clu d ed in this concept of justice, as considered
below, is the welfare o f the masses, Muslim and non-Muslim.
In the Akbar Nama, Abu al-Fadl reports a meeting (in which he was involved)
convened for no other reason than grants of favours and acts o f welfare. Akbar began
the meeting by emancipating all his thousands of slaves, saying, it is beyond the realm
of justice and good conduct for me to consider as my slaves those whom I have captured
by force. When recommendations from the attendant wazirs, amirs, and so on, were
requested, they included a minimum age for marriage at 12 years for boys or girls; the
abolishment o f the governors right to impose the death penalty without full inquiry and
the endorsement of the head of state; the appointment o f officers to assess the needs o f the
indigent and make them known to the state; price controls at markets; and, the building
o f hospitals and serais (inns).^^ As Islamicists will recognise at once, in each o f the above
cases, the suggestions reflect the attendants education in Middle Islamic ideals.
202 Khadduri, H>- 13-J8,

203 Ihn Mubaiak, Akbm- Nama, vol. 2, pp. 379-80. A fuller account, &oni which we draw, is found in Akbar Nema (British
Library, 27,247/ff 327b), a portion of which is included in Moosvi, Epis
204 Ibid. p. 87.
205 Ibid., 5^. 87-89.
173
particularly those o f Sober disciplines.^^ Furthermore, as the Akbar Nama notes, all
suggestions were passed into law .^
It was previously mentioned that Akbar remitted a number o f taxes, while Aurangzeb
imposedjizya, and others. While most Orientalist and contemporary historians relate the
same, it is often overlooked that upon assumption o f power Aurangzeb remitted more than
80 taxes, in Khafi Khans words, to alleviate suffering caused the people by war and
drought^* Most taxes were judged "\m-shar 7 and, when one considers the examples of
the taxes mentioned, it is clear that they are tax-breaks for herdsmen, cultivators, artisans
and petty-traders; that is, subalterns. They include rahdari (road-toll),pandari (on
commercial real-estate, from the street vendor to the banker), buz-shumari (on goats),
bargadi wa chara 7 (on grazing), banjarah (on petty grain merchants), and, taw 'anah (on
Sufi ''urs and Hindujatra festivities). Concurrently, Aurangzeb endowed 10 additional
soup-kitchens (langar khanna) in Delhi, and 12 more in surrounding towns, while urging
state officers of all ranks to follow suit within their respective means and in the provinces
in which they served.^
To further serve the interests o f the shari a and the people, Khafi Khan records that
Aurangzeb appointed shar'i wakils, officers seated at every provincial capital to hear
206 For Sober ideais coorsiijing skveiy and the fevour accrued by the remission of slaves, see, R. Brunschvig, Abd,
Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 1, pp. 24-40. Positiye attitudes towards price controls can be read in at^r of Barani, Ibn Taymiyya, al-
Mawardi, Ibn Muipiflb or Nittam ul-Mulks wtwks cited in this work. Finally, &r the oraisitroction o f hospitals, inns, and so tm, as well as
the way in which they w a s ftinded, see the discussion of waqf'm Chapter 1.
207 Ibn Mubarak, Akbar Nama, vol. 2, pp. 379-80.
208 Khafi Khan, MunUAhab aI~Lubab, pp. 93-95.
209 Ibid., p. 131.
174
anybody having a legal claim against the Badshah.^Êchoing Khafi Khan, the
Ma athir-i 'Alamgiri states that Aurangzeb paid zakat and besides;
...used to spend so much money in religious alms (khairat), beneficient public works,
(like the building o f public inns (mubarrat), and pensions (idraraf), that the
expenditure o f former rulers had not reached even a hundredth part o f it: In the blessed
month o f Ramzan {Ramadhan) he used to distribute among the needy 60,000 rupees
and in other months smaller amounts than that. Numerous free kitchens {balghur
khanna or langar khanna) for feeding weak and the poor were established in Delhi and
other provinces; wherever there was no inn or serai for accommodation o f travellers
before, they were built.^
And finally, the Futuhat-i 'Alamgiri's report that when Aurangzeb was informed that the
people ofHyderabad (Deccan), on account o f their poverty, were unable to payjiz y a he
ordered thatjizya and other taxes be not collected from them and that they be asked to
remain in their villages and districts (mahals) and engage themselves in cultivation and
their professions.^*^
Beyond general expenditures and remissions, one can also speak o f welfare directed
particularly at women. Monserrate mentions that Akbar banned the Hindu Rajput custom
2 !0 The ciicumstanoesofthe decision to introduesAejr'iM'iiJKii are important in themselves, suggesting the states
resiwnsiveness to the need fi>r orderly admirristtatiQB, particularly in dealings between the state and the influential meohants of such port
cities as Surat I3iafi Khan writes that in the late stages of Shah Jahans reign, whesi one of Aurangzebs rivals (Murad Bakhsh) had
declared his independaice in Oiflaiat, the governor had exacted a Rs,500,000 loan from two Muslim mrachants. Upon Aurangzebs
assumpticm of power, the fiinds and piomisory notes were fijrwaided to the Mughal beyt al-mal, which acknowledged the debt the
basis of a ruling frwn the Faiawa-i 'AJamgiri. Khafi Khan concludes that sh<xr 'i wakils were hatoe forth af^ in ted to sit with the qadis of
every city, subah and the neighbouring territories to ensure that such oases w oe dealt with judiciously, Khafi Kbaa,MunSakhtd> al-
iMbab.p. 251-55,
211Sa<ji MustaiddKhan,A/aodiir-r Alamgiri, p. 315.
212Ishwardas Nagar, Futuhat-i 'Alampri, p, 184, Khafi Khan also reports that certain taxes on agticultuml produce such as
com, permihsd by die Shar , were remitted as a relief measure to lessetr the hardships rxiused by the lisii^ prices of grain, Khafi
Khan, Mmtakhab al-Lubab, pp, 93-4,
175
of sati (widow immolation) upon the Jesuits insistence. It is unclear whether Akbar
actually banned sati, but it is evident that sati was frowned upon by the Muslim elite, and
measures were taken to restrict the practice. In fact, as Jean Baptiste Tavemier (d. 1689) -
a French merchant trading in the region during Shah Jahans and Aurangzebs reigns -
ri^ tly points out when addressing Muslim attitudes on this subject, the reason it could not
be banned is that from the fuqaha s perspective it belongs to personal law - a realm
governed by dhimmis directly.^*"* Nevertheless, Tavemier observed that by Aurangzebs
regime it had been ordered that a woman needed her provincial govemors permission to
commit sati. Tavemier states that where govemors were Hindu, the practice continued
unabated, but where Muslim, govemors commonly reason and make enticing
promises to the women, even sending the latter to their own wives and daughters so that
the effect of their remonstrations may be tried.^^^
Women are also one o f the four classes o f recipients due charitable grants known as
suyurghal, which Rafat Bilgrami has calculated to have represented 2-6% of the gross
revenue collected by the regime under each of the Great Mughals. The only criterion o f
eligibility for the musammati type o f grant (reserved for women) was that the woman had
no means of livelihood. They were usually paid by allotting the revenue o f a portion of
land to the grantee, requiring the recipient to do no more than pray for the everlasting
213 Mcmsetiate, The Commmtarv of Fathg Mtasenrate. p. 61. Also see, Ctaieia-Afonso. Letters frran (he Mufihai Court, p.
69.
214 Jean Baptiste Tawnrier, Les Six Voyqges, VoL 2, tians. V, Ball (Londm: University Press, 1925) pp. 306-7.
215 Ibid, pp. 306-7.
216 Rflfet Bilgrami, Women Grantees in the Mugbal Empire, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Soeietv 36:3 (1988): 207-
176
dominion o f the grantor?^ Tn cases where the grantee died, but the grant was renewed in
favour of the deceased holders family members, elaborate rules were drawn up under
Aurangzebs regime that generally favoured women heirs. As well, although the sadr al-
sudur was the officer ultimately in charge o f endowments and grants, Bilgrami shows that
in Jahangirs regime an officer known as the sadr-i inath was appointed specifically to
consider the needs o f women, and that the office was maintained and held by women for
the duration o f the Great era.^*
Although cognisant o f many primary authors exaggerations, and aware that many
orders were abused or not carried out at all by state officials, one need not tread further to
establish that the institutions providing for subaltern welfare can hardly be grasped
within the rubric of charity, the role o f religion accessed when limited to duty, or
Mughal political culture appreciated in terms of class interests, let alone sheer force o f
arms. Furthermore, as the case of sati suggests, Muslim elites also sought to educate the
people in their culture.
b) Education
Beginning with the work of informal preachers and culminating with colleges of great
scale and number, formal education was a staple feature o f Middle Period Muslim
societies. Islamicists agree that as early as the 7th century, Quranic reciters {qurra) taught
14.
. 217 Ibid., p. 208.
177
in mosques, while story-tellers (qass/rawi) conveyed Islamic moralism to the masses by
means of Quranic verses, hadith and poetry. By the 8th century, mosques increasingly
filled the role o f schools at which reading and writing, penmanship and numbers,
literature, grammar, vocabulary and rhetoric could be taught to children under thirteen
years olds,^*^ Teachers were usually men who specialised in one or another discipline,
while students were generally boys. These institutions may be seen as the basis for the
Middle Period maktab, or Quran school.
From the maktab, some students went on to higher study in order to become imams
(prayer leaders) or to gain employment as jurists, teachers, and so on. At the highest level,
students learned in circles {halqa) ranging in capacity firom the hundreds, at which the
scholar would only lecture, to more intimate groups one can liken to seminars in which
discussion was the norm.^^ Another mode o f higher education was discipleship {muridi)
by which students lived with the scholar, if wealthy, paying a fee, and if not, providing
services as scribes, etc. Most Islamicists agree that scholarly families and the local
community availed of all these modes of higher education, while those o f political or
economic rank were most often educated at home by a private tutor {mu addib) from the
earliest days o f Islam.
By the 11* century, growing numbers o f scholars coincided with further formalisation
218 Ibid, pp. 207-11.

219 For foundational w o ks on educatioii, see, Bayiaid Dodge, Muslim Education in Medieval Times (Baltimore: Garamraid
Press, 1962), p. 3. Also see, George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institiitions and Tearning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh:
University Press, 1981); and, A.L. Tibawi, PhilosojAy of Muslim Educatiai, Tlamic Oiiarterlv 4 (1957); 78-89.
221 Ibid, p. S.
178
of the education system, including the creation o f colleges known as madrasas. As
previously mentioned, a model madrasa was founded at Baghdad by Nizam al-Mulk,
already encountered in the discussion of political philosophy and o f al-Ghazali. The
institution at which al-Ghazali taught was financed by endowments (awqaf), which
provided the salaries for professors, librarians and clerks, and free tuition, room and board
for the students.^^ Courses offered are thought to have included Arabic grammar and
literature (adab), Quranic exegesis {tafsir), theology {kalam), jurisprudence {fiqh), the
principles of jurisprudence {usul al-fiqh), logic (maniiq), rhetoric {balagha) and
mathematics {riyadiyai)^^ That is to say, although there is scant evidence of what exactly
was tau^t, it is argued that the disciplines o f Sober Reason were the madrasa's mainstay.
Philosophy and the major physical sciences (astronomy, medicine, etc.) are not
thought to have been taught at Nizam al-Mulks madrasa, but are known to have been
propagated by private tutelage, thus being largely elite intellectual pursuits. Sufism,
however, often depended on formal institutions {khanqahs) financed in the same manner
as madrasas and maktabs, but teaching some o f the above disciplines as well as the
principles of mysticism (tasawwuf) by means o f the discipleship mode o f instruction.
Scholars ofMuslim education in the Mughal context suggest that the above institutions
and modes o f financing were the models for formal education in South Asia long before
the Mughals. Maktabs, madrasas and khanqahs, as well as the class-based
222 Ibid, p. 20.

223 Ibid., p. 29.
224 See, Hamiuddin Khan, Histwv ofMuslim Education. 2 vols. (Karachi: All Pakistan EduoatiOTi Conference, 1967);
179
qualifications noted about student backgrounds and disciplines studied, are echoed in the
Mughal context. However, three details of note are added. First, even before the era o f
Akbars regime, in response to the fact o f an administration conducted in Persian in an
area where few but the elite spoke or wrote that language, two types o f maktabs arose.
Apart from the Quran school, usually associated with a mosque, schools that taught
Persian language and literature {adab) were also prominent.
Second, by the era of Akbars regime, Fateh Allah al-Shirazi proposed that in addition to
the types of courses thought to have been offered at Nizam al-Mulks madrasas five
centuries earlier, Sufi disciplines {tasawwuf and suluk), philosophy {hikma), medicine
{tibb) and astronomy should be taught at madrasas in Mughal dominions. The most
esteemed institutions are noted to have adopted the suggestion. And finally, although men
comprised the bulk of students at maktabs and madrasas, separate institutions for girls and
women were not rare. For example, the Akbar Nama credits Akbar with establishing a
girls maktab at Fatehpur Sikri, while Aurangzebs obsession with finding the right tutors
for his sons and daughters is recounted in the Ma athir-i Alamgiri.^^^ It is only the
number o f institutions and the implications for literacy that contemporary scholars appear
unable to ascertain, though they suggest that the major cities could host scores o f each
Kiishna Lai Ray, Education in MusMm India (Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corp., 1984); Mujibur Rahman, Histwv of Madrasa Education
(Calcutta: Rais Anwar Rahman, 1977); Mamowuddin Quraishi, Muslim Education and Leaming in Gujarat (Banxla; MSU, 1972); S.M.
Jafifer, Edwcation in Muslim India (Delhi; Idarah-I Adabiyat-I DelK, 1973); and, Kuldip Kaur, | ^ i ag9.M?c4dm.BAisfe..(Chadigarh:
CRRtt), 1990). A1.<m. S.M. Imamuddin. Education Under the Mughals in India. Islamic Ouarterlv 26 (1982): 185-93; and, Kalpana
Dasgupta, How Leaned were the Mughals: Reflections <mMuslim Libraries in India, Joaroal of Library History 10 (1975): 241-53. The
following three* partioulars ofMuslim education in the Mughal era are mentioned in all the above works (with the exception of
Dasguptas look at hbnaies), thus are not specifically cited.
225 Saqi Musta'idd Khan, M a 'athir-i Alemgiri, pp. 318-22.
180
institution at any one time, while the countryside was dotted with mosque-maktabs,
madrasas and khanqahs. Neither the primary nor the secondary sources assist in providing
concrete numbers, but they do suggest the presence and influence of graduates from all
the above institutions among various classes of society, not just the political elite.
Over the period ofTavemiers six voyages o f trade in such commodities as gems, he
not only wrote the Mughals, but also noted that he encountered three classes of
Musalman Fakir (mendicant) in the cities, towns and villages o f their domain. One is
described as consisting of;
those who, being bom o f poor parents, and wishing to know the Law thoroughly, in
order to become Mullas or doctors [i.e., mutakallimmJfuqaha], take up their abode in
mosques, where they live on charity bestowed upon them. They occupy their time in
reading the Koran, which they leam by heart, and when they are able to add to this
study... they become heads o f mosques.^^
One can infer that Tavemier is referring to a mosque imam, known most commonly in
South Asia as a "mawlawi' (teachers) as they gave instruction in Quran and/or Arabic. His
observation is significant for a number o f reasons. First, it confirms that maktabs provided
access to education, at least on the level o f literacy, in areas with no more than an
established mosque in the vicinity. Second, it suggests that that vicinity was also exposed
to an informal education in Islam, given the subsidiary function o f imam/mawlawi as
teacher. And finally, it opens the possibility that men bom of poor parents could rise
beyond the rank and education o f imam/mawlawi to reach the more highly educated ranks
of the mutakallimm orfuqaha.
226 Tavemier, Les Six Voyages, vol. 2,141.
181
Khafi Khan provides an example o f a figure that fits the above bill, rising to the rank
of qadi in Lahore. Although the author says no more o f qadi Akbar Alis parentage than
to mention that he is a man o f the east, this is enough to suggest that he was o f local
stock and humble birth - reference to ethnicity and parentage being common when
western stock or high lineage are in v o lv ed .T h e episode relates how Akbar Ali had
fallen out with the high bom governor {subahdar) o f Lahore for presuming to act on
terms o f equality, despite his lower status as a qadi. After many verbal exchanges, the
governor ordered the qadi's arrest for not appearing before him when summoned,
dispatching the kotwal (commissar) to fetch him at once. The qadi resisted arrest and, in
the ensuing melee, he and some o f his household were killed by the kotwals men. When
news of the qadi *s death spread about the city, Khafi Khan reports the learned, the
illiterate, the weavers and other artisans assembled (to demonstrate) against the
S u b a h d a r . The demonstrations, calling for the trial o f the murderers, continued for
days and are reported to have reached such a pitch that not even the govemors servants
were able to walk the streets and markets. When news reached Delhi, Aurangzeb ordered
the immediate transfer of the govemor, and the trial o f the kotwal. While the latter was
speedily found guilty and sentenced according to the aggrieved familys request o f qisas
(right o f retribution), the govemors departure was blockaded by the masses, allowing the
qadis family time to lodge a request for qisas against him in Delhi. A trial was agreed
upon, but was apparently drawn out long enough for the governor to die before a verdict
227 Kitafi K b m ,M m tM iA al-Lubab, pp. 260-62.
182
was reached?^^
The case o f qadi Akbar Ali and the govemor confiniis that Tow bom local Muslims
could rise in status and influence through a Sober education, and suggests that whether
v\\\&%Q-imam/mawlawi or cit^-qadi, he not only had influence among the people, he had
their active support. The same can be said for another ofTavemiers classes offaqir, on
this occasion identifiable as Sufis. He describes them as travelling bands offaqirs, as
many as 200 strong, clad in long robes, over whom there is a superior who receives
from God... the most important secrets and enjoys the veneration o f the people.^^ The
band arrives in towns and villages with proclamations of the superiors credentials by his
disciples, before settling in some public place, where people bring food and the
superior offers them advice on everything from obtaining children to inducing love.
Clearly these faqirs had influence among the people, urban and rural, but what o f support?
In another context, Tavemier confirms that the offerings made were not restricted to food
and reverence. The city is Burhanpur and, on this occasion, the governor is killed by one
o f his clerks. Fleeing the scene, the clerk runs to his brother, a "deruich (dervish),
and explains that he killed the govemor to prevent him committing a heinous crime,
which Tavemier neglects to record. Upon hearing his brothers account, the dervish rallies
other dervishes,^/r5 and townspeople to march on the govemors mansion and demand
228 ibid.. p. 260.

229 Ibid., 251-62.
230 Tavernia, Les Six Voycês, vol. 2, p. 140,
231 Ibid., vol. 1., pp. 43-44.
232 In Tavemisrs cmtext, tbs dervish is only distinguished from the fekir in so &r as the latter begs for survival, while
the fonner does not
183
that the govemor not be accorded the burial rites of a Muslim. After days o f protest, the
crowd was quieted only when reminded that the govemor was a relative o f Shah Jahan,
the incumbent Mughal, and that the clerk would receive another posting, which he did (at
Shah Jahans order) after the public outcry was voluntarily subdued.^
Tavemiers last class offaqirs is distinguished from the rest not by their lack of
influence or support among the people, but, as far as the author is concerned, because
some are almost naked, like the fakirs o f the i d o l a t e r s .H e describes an encounter
with a band o f these nakedfaqirs' that is most pertinent to our immediate and general
discussion. Near the town o f Sidhpur on the fringes o f Gujarat and Rajputana, Tavemier
dined at the camp of some 57 faqirs, the five leaders of which wore nothing but cloth
about their loins and tiger skins on their shoulders. The rest wore less, and all had long
hair bound in the manner o f a turban on their heads. All were heavily armed, and they
possessed eight fine horses and twelve oxen. Their sole source o f sustenance was the
charity of others. On the night that Tavemier was in their company, the govemor o f the
town paid his respects and sent rice and other edibles and the author informs us that they
divided whatever was gathered equally between them.^^^ One might wonder what such a
group could have to do with the topic o f education in Islam? The answer is that the five
leaders were retired nobles from the regimes o f Jahangir and Shah Jahan, and their
233 Tavrania-, Les Six Voyages, vol. 1., pp. 43-44

234 Ibid., vol. 2.. p. 139.
235 Ibid., voL 1., pp. 67-8.
184
livestock carried nothing other than boxes M i of Arabic and Persian books.^^^
The above anecdotes confirm beyond doubt that representatives o f all categories of
Islamic thought, with the exception oflntoxicated Reason, were not only present, but
influential among the masses, urban and rural. In cities and towns, imams/mawlaw is, qadis
and a spectrum o f Sufi types appear as integral features of mass culture. In the villages,
imams/mawlawis and Sufis are particularly prominent In both cases, as suggested earlier,
the sources do not shed light on the number of formal institutions, and so on, but they do
make it abundantly clear that numbers were large enough for the graduates o f such
institutions to ensure that an informal education in Intoxicated and Sober extremes was
within reach o f most classes. That is to say, distinctions may be drawn between formally
and informally educated Muslims, but there is little basis upon which to speak o f high
and low, or formal and informal Islam when categorical distinctions are considered.
In the final analysis, therefore, deeper research is certainly necessary, but this start is
sufficient to conclude that the idea o f elite and subaltern cultures mediated by idioms
largely designed to further elite class and community interests is almost as reductionist as
the idea that upper and lower classes were mediated by no education at a ll
The fact that Mughal political culture included concepts o f welfare and education -
236 Ibid., p. 68.
185
indeed, that the Mughal political elite financed institutions in keeping with these concepts
- does not eliminate the fact that the same political culture legitimated concepts such as
slavery, and so on. This is certainly not the bourgeois political culture with which the
Subaltemists contrast the feudal/communal However, given that the latter define
Mughal political culture without considering the ideals and institutions o f welfare and
education mentioned above, their concept of feudalism/communalism is not a sufficient
fiamework for analysis. In essence, what this analytical approach lacks is the capacity to
fully integrate the role played by Islamic Utopias/Ideologies in Muslim cultural spaces. No
single incident better drives home this point than one reported by Manucci.
One Friday, a faqir - those wretched pretenders to holiness - was arrested as he tried
to demolish the steps of the jam a' masjid in Delhi, where Aurangzeb was due for prayers
later. When brought to Aurangzebs attention, he asked why a man professing to sen'-e
God would endeavour to destroy a mosque. The faqir's point, it was revealed, was to
draw Aurangzebs attention to the fact that he took notice o f minute trifles, but acted
unjustly toward his father, brothers and subjects. Aurangzeb responded by asking the qadi
in attendance for a ruling on the faqir's punishment. The qadi ruled death for wanting to
destroy the entrance to a mosque and for speaking to the image o f God on earth (i.e.,
Aurangzeb) as he had. Thefaqir was undeterred, questioning the ruling by stating that
though the steps of the mosque could be rebuilt, the qadi knew not how to restore the life
he intended to take. Before the qadi could respond, Aurangzeb ended the discussion by
releasing the faqir, saying, Withdraw; each man has to render his own account for
186
The import of this incident is that Aurangzeb had the qadV% blessing to act as a
despot, but he did not. One can explain this in terms of Aurangzebs whims, or even his
class interest, to be sure. However, when one considers the general uproar raised when a
faqirs brother killed a governor related to the incumbent Mughal, as mentioned above, it
is clear that Aurangzeb had more than personal reasons to act as he did, the qndi had more
than fiqh in mind when issuing the ruling he did, and the faqir had more than vandalism
on his agenda when hammering away at the steps of a mosque. In other words, this
represents an incident in which the relations o f power are laid out boldly in Middle
Islamic rhetoric, and the winner is neither the state nor the judiciary. It is the
mendicants right to protest on behalf o f the people. As such, Mughal political culture is
not one in which religion merely legitimates coercion or acts to persuade the
subaltern to remain subordinate to the elite. Furthermore, the functioning o f the state in
the Mughal context does not resolve itself as a blend o f feudal and communal modes
of power, wherein religious community plays a subordinate role to vocational, ethnic, kin
and, most importantly, elite/subaltern affiliations. Rather, religion - that is, the Sober
Path and the Intoxicated Way - alone provides the common ideals by which the state and
its subjects seek, and in certain instances are able, to transcend the feudal and
communal
237 Ibid., pp. 254-5.
187
Conclusion: Mughal Caliphate and ^Muslim India
If one fact alone emerges from the above discussion, it is that the Mughal authors
sampled, and the Muslims they describe among the political elite, were formally educated
in the disciplines, schools and sects that span all four categories of Islamic thought in the
Middle Period. The difficulty this poses the South Asianist concepts India/Indic is quite
clear. Less apparent is the observation that the same education limits the potential of
understanding Mughal political culture as no more or less than Islamic. Apart from
religious community, Mughal authors and the elite explicitly identify on the basis o f class,
vocation, tribe, clan and a host o f ethnic groupings. The question is, if not Indic/Indian
or Islamic, how does one best represent Mughal political culture?
This study reiterates the value o f the neutral term syncretic in beginning to qualify
Mughal political culture. Syncretic, in this context, ranges from the synthesis o f Islamic
and non-Islamic doctrine, to no more than the legitimation o f thought and institutions also
legitimated by the non-Islamic. These are precisely the relations drawn by much of the
Middle Periodfalasifa, the knowledge o f all communities being equivalent. This is
precisely the relationship represented by the Intoxicated Sufis declaration that the shari a
ofMuslims and the Laws of non-Muslims are equal as custom. And, these are the
precise thrusts of Akbars intellectual and political initiatives. All o f the above promote
cultures in which Utopia/Ideology is the equivalence of Islamic and non-Islamic thought
and institutions - that is, the end of the 72 sects o f Islam and the Hindus, in exchange for
188
the free reign o f class, vocational, tribal and ethnic customs. In this period, cultural
syncretism of this type appears to be the staple outcome of the prominence of Intoxicated
Utopias/Ideologies.
The term separatist is also necessary, as all Muslims are not falasifa and Intoxicated
Sufis, or laypersons partial to their doctrines. Yet, the Sober Sufi, the mutakallim and the
faqih also legitimate non-lslamic customs. As shown in Baranis writings, the customs of
the ethnic group in power are explicitly legitimated as part o f dawabit. As well, the
provisions for customary law in fiqh have been indirectly shown in practice in the case o f
tobacco. In the context o f Akbar, tobacco smoking was approached as a custom foreign
to the works o f Muslim wise men and yet to he subjectedto medical or legal
consideration, at least in Mughal domains. By the time o f Aurangzeb, muftis and qadis had
quite apparently argued tobacco smoking a custom acceptable as shar 'i, telling their
opponent that he could cite no reputed works or mujtahids against smoking. In other
words, separatism does not necessarily imply absolute distinction. It too refers to a range
o f cultural orientations, spanning those in which thought and institutions legitimated by
the non-Islamic are also legitimated by the Islamic, and those that view only particular
schools of thought representative o f true Islam. The ultimate difference between the
syncretic and the separatist is that the latter draws few equivalencies. On the contrary,
the mutakallimun view any doctrine that interprets the Quran to imply an immanent
divinity as bid'a or kufr. Thefuqaha view any individual or community that does not live
within the legal gambit o f acknowledged schools as one engaged in bid'a or a kafir. The
189
Stated ideal o f the Sober Sufis is the equation o f tariqa and shari a. And, these are
precisely the thrusts o f Aurangzebs political and intellectual initiatives. All o f the above
promote cultures that reign in class, vocational, tribal and ethnic customs at the cost o f the
free reign o f only one sect o f 72. Cultural separatism o f this variety is the Sober,
antagonistic other to the syncretism promoted by Intoxicated Utopias/Ideologies.
Given that as far as Muslims are concerned, the Utopias/Ideologies in which they are
acculturated are Islamic, while the institutions being legitimated are often particular to
India, last chapters hypothesis that Mughal political culture should be conceived in
terms other than Islamic or Indie appears to be vindicated. As a syncretic culture,
however, the Utopias/Ideologies most promoted and read do not subsume identification
along lines of religious communities. On the contrary, it is on the basis offiqh, tasawwuf
and hikma that syncretism is legitimated. Thus, the neutrality o f the terms
syncretic/separatist and the localism o f Mughal political culture, does not mean that
people of different religious communities participating in that culture promoted or
accepted identical Utopias/Ideologies. Thus, neither Islamic nor Indie, Mughal
political culture resolves itself best as a Middle Period Indo-Muslim culture. Obviously,
this is not meant in the loose sense o f an Indic/Indian culture in which individuals o f
Muslim faith participated. Rather, an Indo-Muslim culture is the regional expression of
a broader Muslim affiliation based on the education of predominant groups in the
Islam o f the period; that is, education in an evolving complex o f intellectual categories,
disciplines, schools and sects that legitimates and/or transcends cultural identification
190
along lines of religious community and in terms o f local (including Indie)
institutions.
An Utopian/Ideological element o f Mughal political culture reflecting the
Muslim-ness o f the dominant political and scholarly classes is the rhetoric of the
Mughals as Caliphs o f the umma and Badshahs o f Hindustan. Whatever their pretensions,
in effect this implies that the Mughals were political heads o f all Hindustanis, but
religious heads o f only Muslim Hindustanis. In other words, the Mughal regime
ultimately depended on a Utopia/Ideology in which Muslim Hindustanis constituted a
self-sufficient religio-political community. The persistent articulation o f such a concept
o f community, even if limited to a handful of scholars, administrators and military
commanders, is undoubtedly relevant to the colonial eras religio-political Muslim India.
What remains to be learned is whether this idea survived the era of the Lesser Mughals,
noted for the precipitous decline o f the Mughal state and the Muslim political and
scholarly elite more generally.
Chapter Three
A Tide of Sobriety
in the Period of Lesser Mughals
In sixty years following Aurangzebs death in 1707, eight Mughals had assumed his
offices in comparison with only six in the previous two centuries. As well, the last o f
these eight, Shah Alam (d. 1806), died a pensioner o f the English East India Company.'
In fact, o f these eight, only the first, Bahadur Shah (d. 1712), was not installed or
removed according to the interests and whims of his wazirs, nizams (viceroys) and
nawabs (deputies). The rise of British India under the government o f the East India
Company (EIC) between 1765-1858, first assuming power as delegated heads o f Shah
Alams "Diwan (Revenue Ministry) in Bengal, continued the pattern o f puppets by
maintaining another two Mughals.* The question this raises, given that no Mughal
enjoyed political authority over his wazirs, nizams and nawabs after 1712, is why one can
! For a primary woric covering the 18th century, see, Ghulam Husein Khan, Siyar al-Muta kharin, Crans. Haji Muslapha
(Calcutta: X White, 1790). This is a particular pertment work, though by no means the only history by a Muslim of the period, because it
was one of the earliest works translated into English by a South Asian Muslim soon after it was written.
Secondary works include, Muzaf&r Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India. 1707.48 (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1993); Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court. 1707-1740 (Aligarh: Muslim University' Press, 1959); and, R.B.
Bamett, North India Between Empires: Awadh the Mughals and the British. 1720-1801 (Berkeley': University' of California Press,
1980). Also, Z.U. Malik, Religious Perceptions and Attitudes ofLater Mughals, Journal of ObiectiveStudies 6:2 (1994); 50-68; Z.
Malik, The Subah of Kashmir Under the Later Mughals, Medieval India 2 (1972): 249-62; and, B.S. Singh, The North-West Frontier
2 For the most cited works on the East India Company, see, John Keay, The Honorable Company (London; Harper and Collins,
1991); I.E. Roberts, Historv of British India under the Company and the Crown (London: Oxford University Press, 1983); and, P.J.
Marshall, Bengal: The British Bridgehead (Cambridge; University' Press, 1988). For an Orientalist perspective on the role of the British
in South Asia written early in the in the 19th century, see, James Mill, Historv of British India (London: Baldwin, Cradock and Joy,
1817).
191
192
speak o f Lesser Mughals at all? Why were the Mughals not abolished long before 1858,
when the British government began formalizing direct rule over the EICs South Asian
acquisitions?
The answer offered by South Asianists bears close consideration. Recall that in this
studys introduction, the Subaltemist depiction of the colonial state as semi-feudal was
discussed at length. Suffice it to say, by this approach Mughals supplied the feudal
ideals and instituions, while the British supplied the bourgeois. Various South Asiansists
share the basics o f this axiom with the Subaltemists, but rather than concluding that the
colonial state was a place where bourgeois culture found its limits, some like Bayly
argue that it achieved what local Indian rulers had been doing for the last century
The factors underying the fall o f the Mughal state were discussed in the jKevious
chapter, where it was said that South Asiansists focus on the the rise o f various local
elites who either added to the top-heaviness o f the Mughal state, or were generally
reluctant to cooperate with Mughal revenue officials. Burton Stein echoes these
observations in stating that these groups are part o f the most transforming element of all
that led to the ultimate downfall o f the Mughals and shaped the era that succeeded: the
rise of a new class in South Asia, an indigenous capitalist class.^
Two social groups, outside the ranks o f state officials, are argued to have held capital
by the mid-18* century. The first was a landed gentry (including tribe and caste heads)
whose wealth and status was dependent on hereditary ownership o f property and
3 C. Bavlv. Indian Sowetv.atrf the Making of the British. Empire, p. 6. Also see, C. Bavlv. Rulers. Towiuanen and Bazgats:
North Indwn Swietv in the Afo.pf British Exuanaicw. 1770-1870 (Camteitlge: Cambridge Universify Press, 1983); E. Stc&es, Tfeg
Peasant and the Rai fCamfaidge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); S. Bose, Peasant Labour and Colonial Capital (Cambridge:
193
commodity production. The second was a commercial class of bankers and merchants
enriched by growth in domestic and intercontinental trade. These capitalists now rivaled
the fiscal importance o f cultivators, but whether landed gentry, merchants or bankers,
they were less susceptible to state coercion or persuasion. As Mughal power had been
eroded by the inability o f the states institutions to harness the revenue to be derived from
new segments o f the tax-base, the states highest officers yielded to the demand of capital
by fragmenting into more local political entities in which the capitalist played a larger
role. An example o f this new accommodation of power is provided by the fact that the
successor states responded to the lack of Jagirs by turning to tax-farming as the prime
mode of revenue collection; an institution dependent on hankers and entrepreneurs.^
According to Bayly, Stein and others, tax-farming, etc., were innovative measures,
accounting for the longevity of latter-day regimes. Thus, as Bayly puts it, Commercial
growth which had secured the power of Delhi ultimately eroded it.The connection
between these developments and the wider Muslim World is that analogous processes led
to crises of empire throughout the whole central and eastern Islamic world.
The demise of latter-day Muslim polities has its own logic. There is general
concensus among South Asianists that the measures taken by latter-day polities to adjust
to capitaliaation only hastened the development o f the capitalist class as the bankers and
4 B. Stein, A History of India (Oxford; Blackwell, 1998), p. 202.

5 For a close study of fiscal policy in the period, see, Noman Ahmad Siddiqqi, Land Reyenue Administration under the
Mughals. 1700-50 iB<nbav: Aligarh Muslim University, 1970).
7 Ibid, p. 4. Also see, David Washhrook, Soufo Asia, the World System and World Capitalism, South Asia and World
Capitalism. S. Bose, e d (Delhi: Oxford University Piess, 1990). For exanqtle, it is argued that Russian and Balkan uprisings, or the
growing indspsndmos of the Otttsnan states ofiScers in E g p l well as the rise of tribal groups led by Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah
EHmani in the Safevid aajtext, are part of the larger processes of strtKtural change. Fw a brief acoounl, see, Bose and Jalal, Modem
194
entrepreneurs involved in tax-farming not only gained capital, but reinvested it in
manufacturing and property. Bayly adds, Many o f these elements later provided capital,
knowledge and support for the East India Company, thus becoming its uneasy
collaborators in the creation of colonial India *
Aside from the effects of capitalization on the Muslim polity, non-Sunaltemists have
also considered the effect in terms of other Muslim institutions. Stein writes of scribal
groups and ideologues, represented by educated and cultivated Muslims, who
provided the administrative skills and legitimated new rulerships.Ôn the other hand,
Bayly lists various cases in which anti-capitalist and anti-colonial unrest was
expressed in the rhetoric of Islam throughout this period. Both, however, argue that, in
Baylys words, this Peasant millenarianism could not provide a common platform.,..
There were too many representatives o f the old order involved from the start.^ The
notion o f passing from an old to a new order is also echoed in Steins writing on the
Mughals and their successors regimes, both being labeled the culmination o f Indias
medieval age. " Thus, the success o f the colonial state over latter-day Muslim states is
argued to have depended on its ability to formalize the indigenous trends sweeping
away medieval institutions without being bound to the baggage o f the old order. As
such, we are to believe that the Mughals, Safavids and Ottomans, the old order, are
outdone by capitalization, which they encouraged without heed o f consequences, while
their successor Muslim regimes are outplayed at their own game by Europeans, riding the
.g w f t.AaW. BP- 49-52.

8 Bayiy, Indian Society and the Maidnjz of the British Empire, p. 4.
10 Bayly, Indian Society and the Ivfaking of the British Empire, p. 188.
195
crest o f the new order. Furthermore, the people are presented as either collaborators
in the interest of capital, or disgruntled by their exploitation and/or sudden irrelevance to
society, seeking dignity and righteousness in the old order. That is to say, the
longevity o f the Mughals, like the religious rhetoric of popular anti-colonial movements
and pro-colonial classes, represents little more than relics rousing nostalgia for the old
or granting legitimacy to the new.
Although thorough, the above thesis, like that o f Guha and Chatteijee, leaves a
number of questions unanswered by virtually equating European influence through the
EIC regime with the new and by associating Islamic thought through the Mughals and
peasant millenarianism with the old. To begin with, does one assume all Islam to be
old, or can one note new developments in Islamic thought that sought to address
changed socio-economic conditions through reform? Which Islam does the colonial state
integrate, old or new? Were the indigenous capitalists, scribal groups and ideologues
who collaborated with the EICs new regime acting against the current doctrines o f
Islam? Were the disgruntled and the irrelevant merely seeking dignity in the old,
or did the anti-colonial agendas of their leaders include a socio-political alternative that
transcended the colonial and the pre-colonial? In the absence o f direct answers to such
questions, it would appear difKcult to determine whether it is appropriate to view the
colonial state as a fusion in which Islamic thought and institutions represent the
feudal, and the European provides the modem components.
In seeking to address these concerns, this chapter considers the intellectuaiism o f the
period, focusing on the revivalist school o f Shah Wali Allah and his successors. Then
11 Stein, A History of India, p. 199.
196
EIC reforms in the legal and educational departments are surveyed, considering their
relationship with the Muslim institutions of the period. In a third section, focus is placed
on the intellectual and social responses to the institutional changes already noted. In a
final section, the issue considered is whether the rise o f such schools as the Wali Allahis
or the imposition of the EIC regime had greater impact on the cultural orientation of
Muslims more generally. The answer given here is that there were new developments in
Islamic thought already culturally reorienting Muslims before the rise o f the colonial
state. Furthermore, both the old and the new Utopias/Ideologies o f Islam floated socio
political alternatives to the colonial state that suited the interests o f certain classes more
than others. But, that the colonial state was as legitimate in the current Utopias/Ideologies
of Islam as the anti-colonial movements invoking the name o f Islam against it.
Legitimacy in both cases depended on intellectual orientation. In light o f these findings it
is finally argued that the colonial state did not reflect indigenous Muslim developments to
a degree sufficient to conclude that it was what local Indian rulers had been doing over
the past century, any more than it is adequately appreciable as an institution in which
European bourgeois culture found its limit.
The import o f these observations to the larger discussion o f Muslim Nationalism
should be apparent. From them one learns how the idea o f a religio-political community
encompassing the Muslims o f Hindustan and headed by an Exalted Caliph developed
during this period o f far-ranging change. They show that the old Mughal Caliphate, in
which the head of state was the ultimate political and religious authority, is no more. In
its place stands a Caliphate in which the Mughal is symbolic head o f a religio-political
197
community in which political and religious authority is exercised by delegated officials,
including European trading companies. At the same time, reformers like the Wali Allahis
include the idea of a Muslim Indian community in their writings, advocating either a
Mughal or one o f their own ranks as its Imam, and hoping he would act in more than a
symbolic manner. Through both channels, it is finally confirmed that the idea of a
religio-political community one might label Muslim India lived not as a relic o f the
past prolonged by colonial interference, but as an expanding part of the
Utopias/Ideologies relevant to Muslims beyond the influence o f the colonial state.
I: The Wali Allahis and a New Sober Path: Muslim Modernism
Although the significance o f the political changes mentioned above is clearly great,
contemporary scholars observe that representatives o f all categories of Islamic thought
were largely unmoved, particularly the S ob er.F or example, scholars of the period such
as Mulla Nizam al-Din (d. 1775) - a professor at the Madrasa-i Farangi Mahal (Lucknow)
- first endowed by Aurangzeb - revamped madrasa courses only by increasing the number
o f works studied in each field. Nizam al-Dins dars-i nizamiyya included etymology,
syntax, fiqh, usul ul-fiqh, tafsir, hadith, kalam, rhetoric, logic, mathematics and
philosophy, as had al-Shirazis dars}^ However, Nizam al-Din excluded literature.
12 A numbw of Islamicists have wriKaj sm the intellectual developments in the early 18th century. Consentrating on South
A sia, apart from tbs works of A ziz Ahmad, Anne Marie Schimmel and others cited in the previous chapter, see, Muhammad Umar,
Islam in Northern India IDelhi: Munshiram Manctarlal Publishers, 1993); an4 S.AARizvi, Muslim Revivalist Movements in North
India (Agra; Agra Univetsiiy Press, 1955). For developments among the Shii, see, S.A.A Rizvi. The Socio-Intellectual Historv of Isna-
Ashari Shiis in India (Canberra: Marifet Publishing House, 1986).
13 K.L. Ray, Education in Muslim India, pp. 136-7.
198
astronomy and, most significantly, tasawwuf and suluk^ the disciplines o f Sufi
intellectuaiism, to make way for deeper study of the subjects he included.
In comparison with the advocates o f Sober Reason, some advocates of Intuition are
said to have taken a different tack. Among these thinkers one finds emphasis laid on
different disciplines and/or the formulation o f a discipline differently than their school
had previously argued. Such reform, involving no more than a shift in disciplinary
interest, is most significantly witnessed among the Chishtiyya. The leading figures o f this
movement were Shah Kalim Allah (d. 1729) and Mawlana Takhr al-Din (d. 1785).^'^ As
Rizvi points out, both maintained belief in wahdat al-wujud and continued to practice and
propagate sama \ controlled breathing (habs-i nafs) and a number o f Yogic ascetic
practices despite Sober criticism. However, the complexion o f the order was changed as
practices once admittedly derived from Hindu sources were now Justified by Islamic
precedents. For example, Shah Kalim Allah claimed that breathing exercises could be
traced from the well-respected Sufi Khwaja Abd al-Khaliq Ghujduwani (d. 1220) to
Khwaja Khidr. Furthermore, there emerged a deeper interest in the shari 'a derived by
the fuqaha \ In other words, former Intoxicated advocates o f Intuition tended toward the
disciplines and schools o f Sober thinkers.
While the Chishtiyya promoted reforms that emphasized different disciplines than
they had previously, a Naqshbandiyya thinker, Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762), was
14 David Gilnuutiu, Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in Punjab, Modem Asian Studies 13: 3 (1979), p.
489. Also, S.AA. Rizvi, A Histcgv of Sufism. vol. 2, pp. 302-7. Muhammad Umar, Islam in Northem India, p. 58.
15 Rizvi, A Mstorv of Sufism. vol. 2, p. 302. In the larger Islamic context, Khidr refers to theBiblicai prophet Hyas (Elijah).
In Sufism, he is not tasly held up an exemplary saint, but is said to be an immottal and ever-present figure. In the South Asian context,
he also became revered by Hindus due to the activities of Bhakfis, who associated him with the worship o f the Indus River. See, Anne
Marie Schinuael, Islam in the Indian Stibcontineat (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980), p. 5
199
articulating a more comprehensive package of reforms. The school o f thought that Wali
Allah founded is the locus of this sections discussion, as articulated in the founders
writings. The intent is to explore the manner in which Wali Allah can be argued to have
carried Islamic thought beyond the norms of the Middle Period. Something o f his
successors writings is also considered, in this case focuing on the cultural implications of
the Wali Allahi thesis. The aim is to show that Wali Allahi thought represented a new
Sober Way and a school o f thought representative of Muslim Modernism.
a) 1707-1765: Intellectual Foundations
Shah Wali Allahs uncle. Shaikh Abd al-Rida (d. 1690), and his father, Shah Abd
al-Rahim (d. 1719), upheld the veracity of wahdat al-wujud, but, as Naqshbandis,
believed that at no stage on the mystics path could the shari 'a o f the fuqaha be
neglected.'^ As many of the scholars who have studied the work of Shah Abd al-Rahim
attest, his adherence to methods o f the legal schools was so unmoving, that despite a time
of tutelage under Abu al-Qasim Akbarabadi (a Chishti), in which his mentor forbade his
student working on the compilation o f the Fatawa-i Alamgiri, Abd al-Rahim could not
be dissuaded. As w elf these scholars note that Abd al-Rahim believed that the doctrine
of wahdat al-wujud reflected the Quran and hadith literature, but in typical Naqshbandi
16 Apart from Umar and Rizvis general intellectual histories, there are a number of works thorough works specific to Shah
Wali Allah, including, S.A.A. Rizvi, Shah Wali Allah and his Times (Canberra: Mari&t Press, 1980); J.M.S. Balion. Religion and
Thought of Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986); and,, Fazle Mahmu4An Exhaustive Study of the Life of Shah Wali
Allah Dehlavi, Oriental College Magazine 't.l:! (1956): 1-45. For a discussion of the Naqshbandiyyas spiritual attitudes, also see, M.
Chdkiewicz, Quelques aspects des techniques spiriluelles dans la tariqa Nasbandiyya, Naqshbandis: Cheminements et Situation
Actualle dun Order Mvstioue Mn-sulman. pp. 69-82.
200
fashion avoided discussing it with the lay person, contending that only the scholar should
be privy to the doctrines truths. Thus, the fact that Wali Allah studied under his father
and succeeded him as principal of the familys madrasa - called after his father, the
Madrasa-i Rahimiyya (Delhi) - is of significance to his development as a thinker in his
own right.
By the time that Wali Allah performed hajj in 1730, at the age o f 27, he had studied
major works on hadith, fiqh, usul al-fiqh, kalam, rhetoric, medicine, Ishraqi philosophy
and Sufism. In Mecca and Medina, he pursued these .studies under a host o f stellar
scholars and, upon his return to Delhi devoted himself to writing more than 40 works on
most o f the above disciplines, as well as on political and social theory. It is with the latter
aspects of his thought that this discussion o f the Wali Allahis begins.
In his Hujjat Allah al-Baligha, Wali Allah most directly lays out his vision of the
ideal socio-political structure for Muslims in particular and humanity in general. He
writes that social institutions (irtifaqat) are universal and their principles agreed upon
despite variations in the pattern and ramifications of i r t i f a q a t . The primary reason for
social institutions is the sustenance and propagation o f humanity, but Wali Allah adds
that humanity is set apart from other creatures by its God-given comprehensive outlook
(al-ra y al-kulli) and aesthetic sensibility (zarafa), allowing humans to become aware
o f the appropriate supports o f irtifaqat by means o f acquired experience and
17 See, Rizvi, A Historv of Sufism. vol. 2, p. 251; and, Sdiiinmel, Itdain on the Indian SubcontiiMnt p. 153.
18 J.M.S. Baljon, Religion and TTiouyiit of .Shah Wali Allah Oihfawi (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), p. 4. Also, Kabir Khan, A
Select Bibliography ofWritings by and about Shah Wali Allah Dihalvi in English and Urdu, Muslim World Book Review 7:1 (1986):
56-65.
19 Shah Wali Allah, Hujjat Allah al-Baligha, traas. Hennansen, M.K. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 19%), p. 140.
201
revealed s c ie n c e s.T h e four supports which humanity can identify are the nomadic
and village life, the urban life, the city-state and finally, the state which unifies a number
o f city-states under one polity. As Baljon points out, in so doing Wali Allah argues that
cooperation is vital to civilization and to social order, much as Ibn Sina, Ibn Khaldun and
other Muslim philosophers had before him.^*
According to Wali Allah, the first support o f irtifaqat is determined by the rise of
agriculture, but is politically basic (i.e., tribal). Once agriculture and association led to
urbanization, however, more complex problems and a diversity of opinion on how social
transactions should be conducted made it necessary to set up a leader and cabinet to
arbitrate between competing interests within the urban centre, thus giving rise to the
city-state {madina)}^ One can infer that different experiences (i.e., that which is
acquired) and religions (i.e., that which is revealed) give rise to variations in the
complexion of city-states. As well, competing interests imply that conflict between city-
states will arise. Thus, Wali Allah argues that the last support o f irtifaqat is what one may
call, generically, the imperial state. Imperial states arise when the ruler of a city-state
obtains so much power [over other city-states] that it is seen to be impossible that
another man could dispossess him of his kingdom except after many gatherings and the
spending of much wealth - an occurrence which during long periods o f time only one
20 Ibid, pp. 115-17.

21 Baljon, R elipw and Tfaought of Sbab Wali Allah Dihlawi. p. 192. Also, Abdul A zm Islahi, Shah Wali Allahs concept
of al-irtifaqst ( s t a g e s of socio-eccmonuG develofmaitV Journal of Obieetive Studies 2 :1 (1 9 9 0 ): 46-53; and, Muhanunad al-Ohazali,
Universal Social Culture: An Empitioo-Reveiational Paradign of Shah Wali Allah, Amaican Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11 :i
(1 9 9 4 ): 13-24.
22 WaUAUah,ffuj!/atA//aha/-Sa/igfia,p 117,
202
may find possible.^^ As in the case of the city-state, variations between empires are
based on that which is perceived and that which is revealed to its leadership. Thus,
nations of superior virtues are possible within the confines of these universal supports
of irtifaqat and Islam provides humanity a path to superior virtues.
In his Islamic vision o f social institutions, given Wali Allahs intellectual
background, he describes states, city and imperial, in which judicial positions are
filled by those educated in fiqh and the best means by which to promote social order is the
shari a. Thus, the greatest harmony is achieved when the emperor is not an emperor at
all (that is, one whose authority is based on immovable coercive power), but a Caliph or
Imam whose legitimacy is dependent on the shari 'a. In describing the qualifications and
duties of the Imam, Wali Allah repeats every stipulation attached to the Caliph in the
previous chapters discussion of Sunni, juristic political philosophy, except for the
necessity of the the office-holder to be o f the Quraysh. The Imam must be male, learned
in fiqh, kalam, and so on, and capable of undertakingy/7?a<i.^^ The main difference
between the Imam and Caliph is that: among the principles upon which the Imam must
act is... the establishment of the universal Caliphate. In other words, there may be
many Imams, but only one Caliph over them all.
As for the Mughals, although Wali Allah does reference their claims to Caliphate, he
obviously does not legitimate Mughal or Ottoman claims, stipulating that Caliphs must be
Quraysh. As Baljon has already shown, Wali Allah envisions three classes of Caliphs to
23 Ibid., p. 118,
24 Ibid., p. 118. Also see, Abdur Rashid Bhat, Shah Wali Allahs Political Thought in the Context of his irtifaqat, Jotgaal
of Obieetive Studies 3:i (1991); 67-78.
25 WaU Allah, HujjatAUah al-Baligha, r j . 132-36; 343-43.
203
have arisen in history; 1) khass (illustrious), implying the first four Rashidm' Caliphs
whom the author holds were all designated {nass) by the Prophet; 2) amm (ordinary),
those elected (as symbolized by bay'd) by the people, in which category the author
places certain Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs; and, 3) jabir (despotic), those who seize
power or who, once elected, act in a tyrannical manner, in which group he places some
Arab and most ajami (non-Arab) Caliphs.^^ Thus, Wali Allah writes that the decline of
Muslim polity in his lifetime is due to illegal practices such as heavy taxation, prohibition
of divorce and widow remarriage, over indulgence in ritual, misrepresentation of Islam by
unscrupulous sufis, and the sloth of various sections o f the society^ - all practices which
an amm Caliph would prohibit, but which jabir Caliphs have allowed. On the other hand,
Wali Allah writes approvingly of the convention o f having coins stamped with the name
o f the caliph in this time.^^ Wali Allahs challenge to incumbent leadership, therefore, is
not a negation o f the religio-political community that leadership claims to head. This
point is addressed further below, but this opportunity must be taken to point out that by
ignoring Mughal claims to Caliphate, and their acknowledgement as Caliphs/Imams in
18*^century Ottoman sources, Wali Allahs ideas on Caliphate have been read as a
revivalist tendency. Rather, his ideas need to be read in light o f the rapidly waning
ability o f the Mughals to maintain the authority and autonomy Wali Allah believed vital
to the functioning o f the office. In response, he sought to delegitimate their claims to
26 Ibid. p. 343.
27 Baljon, Reljgi and Thought of Shall Wali AIfah 13ililawi. p. 125,
28 Shah Wali Allah, Hujjat Allah al-Baligha, p. 153. For furth reading on Wali Allahs political writmgs, see, Mahmood
Ghazi, Political Letters of Shah Wali Allah: A Critical Review, Joumal of the Pakistan Historical Society 30 (1982): 86-108.
29 Ibid.. p. 139.
30 For a pioniinent example of this assessment by an audior who wrote ptolifically on Shah Wali Allah, see, Aziz Ahmad,
204
Caliphate by calling for its establishment, and political renewal by calling for new,
Sober leadership, from the level o f the city-state up. In this light, Wali Allahs ideas on
social and political theory adds nothing new to Islamic thought or to the political culture
of the Mughal state, except the particular manner in which the term Imam is employed.
The new Sober Path that he articulates is dependent on the version o f Islam according to
which the religio-political community established by the Mughals is to govern society as
a whole.
Evidence o f Wali Allahs new way can first be noted in his views on the Quran.^'
Wali Allah is noted for his Persian translation o f the Quran, which he defended against
the arguments of those who held that the Quran should not be translated. As Baljon
suggests, Wali Allahs understanding o f the Quran is historically based, grounded in the
time and place o f the revelation, yet also relevant to latter-day Muslims o f non-Arab
backgroundIn making this point, Baljon cites the following passage from Wali Allahs
al-Fawz al-Kabir fi Usul ai-Tafsir:
You should be aware that the Quran was sent down for the correction of Arabs as
well as non-Arabs, for townspeople as well as inhabitants o f the desert. Hence divine
wisdom required that.. .what was said about Gods Attributes and Names.. .should be
understandable without a training in metaphysics and scholastics.^"*
In other words, the Quranic narratives speak for themselves and are knowable, on
An Intdiectaat Historv f !sk m in India p. 9.

31 Various aspects of Wali Allahs intopretation of tte Quran are taken up below, but unfortuenatdy a biwtder discussion
of Wali Allahs attitudes toward revelatioii is not feasible in this context, ffowever, for Wali Allahs attitudes towaid revelation as
expressed in Hujjat Allah al-Baligha, especially following the discussion of Wali Allahs awareness of tmiveisals and particulars in
the context of irtifiitpt, see, MJC Hemiansrai, Shah Wali Allah of Delhis Higjat Allah al-Baligha: Tension Between the Universal and
the Particular in an 18th century Islamic Theory of Religious Revelation, Studia Islaiaica 63 (1986): 143-57.
32 Baljon, Religion and Thought of Shah Wah Allah Dihlawi. pp. 8-14.
33 Ibid., p . 137.
34 Shah Wali Allah, Fawz al-Kabirf i Usul al-Ta/sir, team. Jalbani, G.N. (Islamabad: Natioiral Hijra Council, 1985). This
205
some level, without the complex methods o f scholars. The rationale behind Wali Allahs
translation is apparent: first, the text is meant for all irrespective of ethnicity or class and,
second, it is accessible to all irrespective of education.
In the discipline o f fiqh, as in the domain o f exegesis, Wali Allah is critical and
innovative. Firstly, Wali Allah categorically argues for For example, in Hujjat
Allah al-Baligha, he states that one o f the causes behind the distortion he observes in
the shari 'a as it is practiced is taqlid^^ Ijtihad, being an established juristic tool, is not an
innovation, but his repeated calls do suggest the tog/iJ-mindedness o f at least some
among his contemporaries. Aziz Ahmad adds, by means of ijtihad, Wali Allah developed
an inter-juristic eclecticism recommending that on any point of doctrine or ritual a
Muslim could follow the rulings of any one of the four principal juristic schools.^
Putting aside the point o f inter-juristic eclecticism momentarily, Ahmads argument that
this is expressed by allowing for the rulings of any o f the four Sunni madhahib is
misleading, this being less an innovation than a restatement o f established juristic theory.
Wali Allahs compulsion to emphasize this point again hints at the tog/iri-mindedness o f
the fuqaha prevalent in his lifetime. Based on such points, both Baljon and Ahmad agree
that Wali Allah conceived of an evolutionary shari a that would keep pace with
changing social conditions.^* Baljon suggests that as Wali Allah wrote, every age has its
own countless and specific problems, Wali Allahs argument for ijtihad reflects a sense
quote is cited in, Baljon, p. 137.

35 For backgroond on Wali Allahs approach to ijtihad, see, Muitammad Athar Ali, A Critical Ewluation of Shah Wali
Allahs Attitude to ijtihad vis-a-vis the views of the other Jurists, Hamdard lalamkaM 20:i (1997): 19-26.
36 Shah Wali Allah, Hujjat AUah al-Baligha, p. 351.
37Ahmad, An Intellectual History of Islam in India, p. 8.
38Ibid., pp. 127-30.
206
that the shari a is not a static concept/^ Rather, on the one hand, notions of right and
wrong articulated by Quran and sunna are timeless, but, on the other, shar'i rulings
differ with time and place. These rulings, whether expressed by Abraham or the latter-
day prophets, including Muhammad, have always been cognizant o f local environmental
conditions and social customs.'* The image that Wali Allah employs is that of a pure rain
(the unadulterated shari a) falling to earth and mixing with the local soil. Thus, the
question to be tackled here is what shari 'a Wali Allah imagined was best suited to his
Muslim contemporaries?
Returning to the Higjat Allah al-Baligha, note that Wali Allah argues that while
certain pre-Islamic Arabian practices were banned by Muhammad (e.g., usury), such
mainstays of the shari 'a as regulations concerning marriage, divorce, prayer (salah),
fasting (sawm), pilgrimage (hajj), ablution (wudu % and so on, are modified versions of
pre-Islamic Arabian custom As Miraj Muhammad argues, this stems from Wali
Allahs thesis that Muhammad relied on custom as it was a corrupted form o f Abrahams
initial sharia. Arabs, therefore, are argued to follow the shari a because of their belief
in the Prophet and the proximity o f his shari a to their custom. Yet, Wali Allah
acknowledges thst Arab Muslims have been enjoined by the faith to carry this shari a to
the rest of the world. Thus, the non-Arabs acceptance of this Arabian shari a is
dependent in part on its recognition as the natural religion {al-madhahib al-taba /) o f the
3 9 Ib ii,p , 167,
40 Ibid., pp. 160-1.
41 For example, see, Hujjat Allah al-Baligha, 303-9.
42Mkaj Muhammad, Shah Wali Allahs Ccmcqjl of the Shariah, Islamic Perspectrves. eds. Khurshid Ahmad and Ansari,
Z.I. (Jeddah: Saudi PubUshing House, 1980), pp. 343-58
207
civilized world {al-aqalim al-salihahy^^ He urges that even if this is not recognized and
such legislation is difficult, it is necessary as;
There is no way to consider the condition of every people, and deal with each one of
them, so that for each a divine law would be made; since encompassing their
customs and condition according to the differences in their cities and the disparity in
their religions is something impossible.'*^
Thus, Wali Allah ultimately argues that Arabian custom, as modified by Muhammad, is
the model shari 'a of the age for all Muslims.
In order to reform the shari a known to Wali Allah in South Asia, with the
aforementioned ideal in mind, he argues that the decline of the Muslim polity suggests
that the best course o f action is to synthesize the schools o f Abu Hanifa and al-Shafii.'*^
Given the scope o f such an endeavour, Baljons argument that Wali Allah went no further
than recommending the juristic tool o f talfiq, that is, piecing together the doctrines of
more than one school, appears quite correct.'*^ Ijtihad for Wali Allah, therefore, does not
merely imply the use o f qiyas to derive new rulings, but, in effect, seeks to limit the scope
of what may be declared shar i by eliminating anything not in keeping with Prophetic
practice; i.e., Arabian custom as modified by Muhammad. Thus, Wali Allah argues that
thefuqaha s use o f istislah and istihsan (juristic preference),'* the very tools employed
to include non-Arab/local custom in the shari 'a, must be abolished, or at least
circumscribed. Instead emphasis should be placed on hadith. Eight o f Wali Allahs major
works are devoted to the subject. The chapters concerned with this subject in Hujjat Allah
43 Shah Wali Allah, HujjatAUah al-Baligha. pp. 341-43.

44 Ibid, p. 341,
45 Ibid, pp. 427-36; 451-78,
46 Balion. Religion and Tliought of Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi. p. 167.
47 Fw example, see, Shah Wali Allah, HujjatAUah al-Baligha. p. pp. 435-36, p. 349.
208
al-Baligha, outline five ranks o f hadith. In the top rank, one in which most individual
hadith are judged sound (sahih), he includes Maliks M im a tta Bukharis Sahih and
Muslims When the rulings based on qiyas contradict any such hadith, or those
in lesser collections judged sahih by the same criterion, they are to overrule previous
legislation. Thus, in the final analysis, Wali Allahs inter-juristic eclecticism and
evolutionary shari 'a required a unitary law for all (Sunni) Muslims ideally based on a
modified version o f 7*^ century Arabian customary law.
Fiqh is not the only discipline in which Wali Allah sought to rationalize away the
differences between schools of thought. Regarding the wujudi and shuhudi doctrines in
Wali Allah's thought, M. Mujeeb maintains, [Wali Allah] tried to show that wahdat al-
shuhud and wahdat al-wujud were not doctrines in conflict with each other, but stages on
the road to spiritual knowledge, wahdat aZ-ww/W being an earlier and wahdat al-shuhud a
later and more advanced s t a g e . S .A . A . Rizvi disagrees. To Sirhindi, writes Rizvi, the
wahdat al-wujud was only a preliminary stage o f sufic development, but to Shah Wali
Allah it was the final s t a g e . A s Mujeeb does not reference the work upon which he
bases his view, one must tum to Rizvis source, Wali Allahs Lamahat. Here, the author
articulates his theory of Being as follows;
You see both 'Zaid' and Amar, you abstract man from them, and by so doing you
prove the existence of man in both of them. And just as you see the man and the
horse and abstract animal from them...you take notice of all the essences in general
and abstract Being from them.^*
48 Ibid., pp. 387-95.
49 Miijeeb, Indian Muslims, p. 280. For other aspects of Wali Allahs Sufism, see, M.K. Hertnansen, Shah Wali Allahs
Theory of the Subtle Spiritual Centres (lataif): a Sufi Model of Peisonhtwd and Self-TransfonnatMB, Journal of Near Eastern Studies
47(1988); 1-25; and, Fazl Mahmoud Asiri, Shah Wali Allah as a Mystic, Islamic Culture 26:ii (1952): 1-15.
50 Rizvi A History Sufism in India, vol.2. p. 257.
51 Shah Wali Allah, LamediaS, trans. G.N. Jalbani (Ifyderabad; Shah Wali Allah Acadmy, 1970), p. 6. For clarity of
2 09
In addition, Wali Allah argues that the one Being is related to the apparent multiplicity
of the universe as the number one is related to higher numbers. He wrote;
Is it not a fact that a mathematician when desired can bring the cardinal numbers in
his imagination. Thus, he derives from one, one and one by his reconsideration, and
this is how two takes place. Again, when he derives from it one and one and one by
the repetition of his reconsideration, three is formed. In this way, he derives one
number after another, and this is how the units and tens, hundreds and thousands are
made..,. Now let us take this chain which we have invented as a mirror for knowing
the case o f the numerical nature and its inclusion in the one. From this it becomes
clear that this numerical chain implies a hidden secret in the one, so that, it (the one)
may agree to it (the numerical chain) in all its parts.
Both o f the above examples suggest that Rizvi is correct to conclude that Wali Allahs
works are affirmations of wahdat al-wujud. However, the Lamahat, and other works such
as the Sata 'at and Hama at caution against confusing Wali Allahs understanding o f Ibn
al-Arabis concept with that of, for example, the Chishtiyya pirs or their illustrious
predecessors.
In the Sata at, Wali Allah expresses the following views on ma 'rifat (gnosis):
In my opinion, what is established and confirmed is that by the real object [of gnosis]
is meant, the attainment of a certain part o f the plane o f the Holy Fold which the
Divine powers have fixed for him. The path to this real object requires a change of
the bestial qualities, so that, the annihilation o f the dark existence and the survival by
the spiritual existence could be achieved. If the man is one o f the select saints,
another change besides this one, is also desired in this case, so that, the annihilation
o f the spiritual existence and the survival by the reality o f Divinity which means the
prevalence of the existence of the Real (God) upon your existence, is achieved.^^
Such passages lead Baljon to conclude that Wali Allahs annihilation in the Real is not
identical with the Intoxicated Chishtiyya interpretation of the same doctrine, but stands
language, Ihe above ttansktirai is taken from S. Iq ^ l, Islamic Ratioiialism in the Subcontigait (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1984),
pp. 70-71.
52 Shah Wali AUah, Lamahat, pp. 10-11.
53 Shah Wali Allah, Sata a t. tens. Jalbani, G.N. (Hyderabad: Siah Walliyullah Academy, 1970), p. 38.
210
between it and the Sober Shuhudi understanding o f gnosis. Baljon suggests that Wali
Allah viewed the differences between wahdat al-wujud and wahdat al-shuhud to have
arisen as a result of three factors: 1) the misinterpretation of Ibn al-Arabi by the likes of
his disciple, al-Qunawi; 2) difference in the terminology of Ibn al-Arabi and Ahmad
Sirhindi; and,. 3). lack o f recognition that each doctrine articulates direct experience of
different parts o f the same whole. Thus, scholarly debate on whether Wali Allah was a
Wujudi or Shuhudi seems to arise from the fact that Wali Allah aspired to bring about the
reconciliation {tatbiq) o f the Wujudi and Shuhudi doctrines, as he had been trying to
resolve differences between madhhabs.
As Wali Allahs attitudes toward hadith andfiqh suggest, his attempts at
reconciliation were not in the interests o f Intoxicated ideas. Thus, in each of the works
considered here, Wali Allah explicitly reaffirms the truth o f miracles, angels, y /nn.
Judgement Day, and so on. So resolute are Wali Allahs convictions in these matters that
S. Iqbal argues for Wali Allahs affinity to Ibn Taymiyya.^However, this judgement
can not be accepted without qualification. In the Ta 'wil al-Ahadith, Wali Allah clearly
argues that the miraculous is no more than the ordinary. He writes:
Some happenings take place sparingly, they are therefore named as extraordinary. As
a matter o f fact all that is named extraordinary is ordinary, but because their causes
take place rarely, they appear rarely, people do not usually expect them and name
them extraordinary when they occur. ^
R a l ^ Beli|rinn and Thought of Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi. pp. 62-3. Also, J.M.S. Baljon, Two Lists of Propiwts: A
Comfarison between Ito al-Arabis al-Htkam and Shah Wali Allahs Ta'wil ai-Hadith, Nederiands Theologisch Tiidscfarift 22 (1967-
68): 81-89. Incidently, the idea that Itei al-Arabis ideas have largely been vmderstood through the lens of his disciple, al-Qunawi, and
his students, a msHe Intoxioated undastanding than Ibn al-Arabis own attitudes, is also a feature of contetnpofy Islamicists views.
Divine Presences: From al-Qunawi to al-Qaysari, Muslim W-id 72 (1982): 107-28.

55 S. Iqbal, Islamic Ratioaaliam in the Subcontinent pp. 64-65.
56 Shah Wali Allah, Ta Vtf al-Ahadith, trans., G.N. Jalbani (Lahore: Shan Mtthammad Ashraf, 1973), pp. 42-43.
211
In essence, this passage hints that Wali Allahs understanding of miracles is at least as
heavily influenced by the immanent monism o f the Sufis as it is by the transcendental
monotheism of the mutakallimun. Miracles are ordinary rather than extraordinary
events in the same manner that all numbers are knowable by means o f the hidden secret
in the one. Every event, like every number, is an emanation o f The One, even if some
manifestations are frequent and others rare.
The influence o f immanent monism is also apparent in Wali Allahs understanding
of angelSj/OTM and Judgement Day, not to mention Heaven and Hell. Wali Allah views the
individuals life itself as a circle whose beginning and end is pure intellect
Considering only the arc from death back to the beginning, he states that the individual
enters an Intermediary World(a/aw barzakh), in which the body is lost, but one retains
the knowledge, the states and the faculties o f the individual.^* In a state of
consciousness approximating a dream, the natural disposition o f the individual is
turned from the visible world toward the Similitudinary World.^^Depending on the
capability of an individual, this consciousness allows levels o f understanding
corresponding to the various stages o f the Similitude.^ By the Day of Judgement, the
individual will have gone through these stages, thus being prepared for the
Similitudinary faculties to replace those of the visible world, allowing clear vision of
individual deeds and character still perceived.^* At this point, the Great
5 7 a a h Wali Allah, Sata a t, p. 25.

58 Ibid., p. 25.
59 Ibid, p. 26.
60 Ibid., pp. 26-7.
6! Ibid, p. 27.
212
Manifestation will appear in a Similitudinary form... worthy o f its rank.^^ As well, all
the necessary things o f life, like eating, drinking and having intercourse with a woman
will take certain forms... [and] they [the dead] will find pleasure in each of them, each
corresponding to a certain act o f goodness in life.^^ However, this is only the first stage
of the Similitude, and these happy (sa da) souls will undergo many more changes in
states leading to their finally losing themselves in Pure light, or disappearing in this
Manifestation.^ On the other hand, unhappy (shaqiyya) souls, ignorant of the Origin
o f the universe, will have gone through much confusion while in the stages of the
Similitude, and be put in a strange perplexity.
Evidently, Wali Allah did not merely seek the reconciliation o f schools within
disciplines; he sought the reconciliation o f disciplines themselves. Thus, while upholding
the mutakallinCs notions o f an Intermediary World, bodily ressurection on the Day of
Judgement, and the corporeal pleasures and intellectual tortures o f Heaven and Hell
respectively, he frames and interprets them in light of the immanent monism oflshraqi
philosophy and the Sufi doctrine o f wahdat al-wujud. While Wali Allah is not the first
thinker to seek a reconciliation of various Islamic disciplines and much of his thought
conforms to that o f the earlier period, one notes a departure from the thought o f the
earlier period in the disciplines o f tafsir,fiqh, tasawwirf, kalam and hikma. Together, his
ideas attempt to draw together these and other disciplines, not merely to exact intellectual
coherence as he saw it, but with the intent o f allowing all to play a role in a socio-political
62 Ibid. p. 27.
63 Ibid, p. 27.
64 Ibid, pp. 30-1.
65 Ibid, p. 32.
213
environment he viewed as dynamic and in need of Islams guidance in a particular way.
This was effectively to reduce the capacity o f all the doctrines and disciplines he touches
upon to legitimize customs other than those of Muhammad and the Arabian
environment o f his era. When placed in relation to Middle Period disciplines, the
combination of doctrines as well as their focus must lead to the identification o f Wali
Allahs thought as a new Sober Path.
b) 1765-1860: Cultural Expressions
Intellectual historians note that following Shah Wali Allahs death, his sons and
students continued his work, expanding his agenda. One o f Wali Allahs sons, Shah Abd
al-Aziz (d. 1824), laid great emphasis on hadith andfsqh, particularly shirking the use o f
provisions for custom {"urf/'add) where specific injunctions were available in scripture,
as in the case o f inheritance, divorce and matrimony,^ Another o f Wali Allahs sons,
Shah Rafi al-Din (d. 1818), most forcefully defended his fathers ideas on the
reconciliation of wahdat al-wujud and wahdat al-shuhudf^ Rafi al-Din and another o f
the masters sons, Shah Abd al-Qadir (d. 1813), also further implemented Wali Allahs
approach to the Quran by each rendering it into Urdu.^*
As the translations o f the Quran into Urdu suggest, none o f the latter-day Wali
Allahis eschewed their predecessors desire to bring Islam out o f the scholastic closet
66 The most thorough work on Shah Abd ai-Aziz and his generation of Wali Allahis is S.A.A. Rizvi, Shah Abd al-Aziz
(Canberra; Mari&t Publishing House, 1982).
67 Ibid., pp. 100-102.
68 S.A.A. Rizvi, A Higtotv r f Sufism in India, vol. 2, pp. 260-61.
214
directly to laypersons, elite and subaltern. For example, beyond making the Quran
accessible, Abd al-Aziz employed the fatwa to make Wali Allahi legal opinion widely
known. Furthermore, he and his generations students played a far more active role in
publishing works that outlined the Wali Allahi ideal of Muslim conduct in Urdu. One
such scholar was Abd al-Qadirs son, Shah Muhammad Ismail (d. 1831). His Taqwiyat
al-Iman, written in the 1820s, is still widely circulating today and well worth closer
consideration to gauge the cultural implications o f the Wali Allahi perspective on Islam.^^
In essence, Muhammad Ism ails work is a scathing critique o f Middle Islam and
its contemporary advocates, be they falasifa, mutakallimun, fuqaha' or Sufis, by declaring
to the literate Urdu masses that all the customs that the so-called scholars o f Islam had
legitimized were equivalent to hid'a (innovation) and shirk (associationism). In his
introduction, Muhammad Ismail laments the present condition of Islamic scholarship,
which he sees as steeped in the false methodologies o f the Sufis and the free-reasoning
of the "ulama and the falasifa. Rather than follow such thinkers, Muhammad Ismail
urges that it is an obligation for all Muslims to seek knowledge o f the teachings o f the
Quran and Prophet, make an effort to understand them and endeavour to mould ones
life within their framework.He dismisses the idea that Quran and hadith can only be
understood by scholars, and argues that all one has to do is read these sources and accept
those scholarly opinions and local customs that conform to them, while rejecting those
69 Shah Muhammad lamail Shahid, Taqwiyat ai-Im m {Karachi; Nur Muhammad Asah al-Matabi wa Katkhanah Tijarat
Kutub, 1958), Other works by Ismail either written or raidered in Urdu and pertinent to this discussion are: Sirat d-Mustaqim
(Dsoband: Kutab Khanah-i Ashrafiyah Rashid Co., 1960); an4 Daregat-i Imamat (Efelhi: Farangi Press, 1899).
70 Muhammad Ismail, Taqwiyat al-Iman, p. 11.
215
that do not*
A crucial piece o f advice that Muhammad Ismail adds in his introduction clearly
identifies the Taqwiyat al-Iman as the work o f a Wali Allahi, directing the reader toward
an understanding o f Quran and hadith that echoes that school. To avoid falling into the
false methodologies and free reasoning of the scholars, he reminds the reader that iman
(faith) has two parts; recognition o f God and recognition of His prophets missions. In
Muhammad Ismails opinion, the first part points to the concept o f ^Tawhi<T (Unity) and
the second to the ^Surma," derived from hadith. These must be the sole guides as they are
at the heart o f the faith. Thus, as the opposite o f tawhid is shirk and the antonym o f
sunna is bid'a, Muhammad Ismail paints the latter as the greatest threat to the faith. He
implores his readers, unfettered by the false methodologies and free reasoning o f the
scholars, to believe that any actions not literally in the Quran and hadith are shirk and
bid'a. In the chapters of the Taqwiyat al-Iman, Ismail also guides his readers on the
literal path by outlining the shirk in the methodologies of the scholars, and the resulting
b ida in the practices o f South Asian Muslim society at large.
In the introduction to his first volume, Muhammad Isma11 argues that God has no
equal. Thus, it is shirk to attribute any o f His powers to either prophets,/?/, imams,
martyrs or angels. It is also shirk to act towards the latter in a manner God has specified
for Himself, such as in prostration. He concludes that such shirk is rampant in society
because people:
have left the word o f God [Quran] and the Prophet [Sunna] to exercise their own
reason {'aqt), and follow myths and erroneous customs (rasum), even when faced
71 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
72 Ibid., pp. 11-19.
216
with the word o f God and the Prophet/^
In the following chapters, IsmaMl more closely defines the above two types o f shirk.
He refers to that shirk concerned with Gods powers as 'shirk in disposing (tassaruf) and
'shirk in knowledge {'ilm), and that concerned with human behaviour as 'shirk in
worship {'ibada) and 'shirk in customs {'ada).^* Gods power to dispose, discussed in
chapters one and two, includes everything from creating and ordering the universe, to
issuing individual reward and punishment/^ So complete is Gods power that there can be
no intercession (shafa a), whether by pirs or prophets. The idea that someone can
intercede with God on ones behalf is argued in chapter three to be tantamount to making
a slave the master, or the masters partner or believing that the slave has influence over
the master.^ In other words, Gods power to dispose is his alone. His power to know
is similarly comprehensive, but not as exclusive. In chapter two, Gods knowledge is
argued to cover the seen and the unseen (ghayb).^^ Humanity is granted a share in
knowledge of the seen, by virtue o f God-given senses, but none o f Gods power over it.
Similarly, humanity is granted a glimpse o f the unseen, but no power in that realm either.
No human has, for example, knowledge o f the future, despite what astronomers and
soothsayers claim. But, a person can have knowledge o f the unseen when granted through
revelation. The prophets sole distinction is this gift of revelation, and any prophet, p/r,
imam, astrologer or clairvoyant who claims independent knowledge o f the unseen
independent of revelation is described as a liar (jhuta). The main thrust of Muhammad
73 Ibid, p . 13.
74 Ibid., p . 19.
75 Ibid., p p . 20-34.
76 Ibid., pp. 35-43.
217
Ismails discussion of disposing and knowledge is then made clear. As the Quran is
for all and not meant to be wrapped in scholarly platitudes, any imam, mujtahid, qutub,
âlim or pir claiming knowledge, and any ideas and methodologies devised by them to
gain knowledge, not literally upheld by Quran and hadith are mushrik (polytheists).
Having eliminated the Middle Period scholar, not to mention the indirect limitations
thus imposed on the use o f Intuition and Reason themselves in the interpretation o f the
Quran and hadith, Muhammad Ismail turns to the two types o f shirk having to do with
human behaviour. If the cultural implications of Wali Allahs anti-custom shari 'a were
not apparent in the discussion o f his scholastic writings, they are laid bare by his
grandson. With regard to "shirk in worship, the latter includes pilgrimages to any place
but the Ka ba, including graves o f loved ones or the tombs of prophets and saints,
sacrifice in the name o f any but Allah and prostration before any but He. Graves, coffins,
flags, relics, the seats o f saints and the raised platforms o f Imams, are listed as idols
(wathan).^^ "Shirk in customs extends further into the cultural norms o f South Asian
Muslims. Dedicating ones animals or portions o f a harvest to saints is bida. So are
prohibitions against widow remarriage, various customs surrounding marriage and death,
and a number of dietary restrictions assigned according to class, gender or occupation.^
In other words, not only are the scholars and doctrines that support local custom declared
mushrik, but the very fabric of Muslim society legitimated by Middle Period Islam is
found to be bida.
Ismails presentation of tawhid, sunna, shirk and bida illustrates that although the
7 7 IW ., pp. 27-34.
78 Ibid., pp. 44-52.
218
Wali Allahis sought to free the Quran and hadith from the scholastic closet and bring it
to the layperson, they did not mean that the layperson is free to exercise either his/her
Intuition or Reason in interpretation. Scholastically, the one distinction between
Muhammad Ismairs work, meant for laypersons, and Wali Allahs scholastic writings, is
that there is no trace of the latters immanent monism in the formers transcendent
monotheism. This is not a difference of opinion, but reflects the long-time
Naqshbandiyya propensity to keep such doctrines as wahdat al-wujud and its
metaphysical and cultural implications away from the laypersonM uham m ad Tsmai f s
transcendent monotheism thus reconfirms the Wali Allahis lack o f enthusiasm for the
manner in which Middle Islamic scholars. Intoxicated and Sober, had interpreted Quran
and hadith in light of wahdat al-wujud otfiqh to allow for the types o f customs
mentioned above, that is, customs that contradicted the literal word. This was a double-
edged sword. For example, on the one hand, it granted women divorce, inheritance and
property rights that had been overruled by custom in parts o f South Asia. On the other
hand, it sought to undermine the very basis on which cultural syncretism between Muslim
and non-Muslim was legitimized. In the final analysis, the Taqwiyat al-Imam reveals that
the Wali Allahis sought and promoted an extreme form of cultural separatism.
79 Ibid., pp. 52-74.

80 For Isma'il's views on w aU at al-wujtid, which echoes Wali Allahs, see, Shah Muhammad Isma'il, Abaqat (Hyderabad:
219
The Wali Aliahi schools anti-custom brand of Sober Islam was by no means an
isolated intellectual line. Also within the Naqshbandiyya, some segments of the
Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddiyya o f this era forwarded the idea of Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya,
shifting emphasis from identification of shari a with fiqh, to the equation o f shari 'a with
emulation of the example o f the Prophet based on hadith alone. The Tariqa-i
Muhammadiyya, articulated by Shah Wali Allahs contemporaries, Khwaja Muhammad
Nasir Andalib (d. 1759) and his son Khwaja Mir Dard (d. 1785), sought to reform Sufi
ideas and envisaged, in Christian Trolls words, a puritanical retum to the practice o f the
Prophet, thus bringing about an ideal exoteric and esoteric Islam. ** A retum to the
Prophets way, however, implied the rejection o f all four schools o f Muslim
jurispradence*^ in favour of the independent derivation o f law; that is, absolute ijtihad.
The essential trait o f the Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya was to shear jurispmdence of the
very conceptual tools which allowed for the inclusion o f custom in the shari 'a, as is the
case in the Wali Allahi school, but more forcefully yet by restricting acceptable rulings by
past fuqaha' to those o f the Hanafi maddhab alone. The fluidity o f boundaries between
the Wali Allahis and Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya, however, is best illustrated by the letters
influence on Wali Allahis such as Muhammad Ismail, making his legal approach a
particular blend o f Wali Allahi and Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya thought. That is not to say
that all movements forwarding such reforms were so compatible. A case in point is Haji
Al-Lajajiat al'Dmiyah, I960).

SlChristian W, Troll. Sgyyid Ahmad Khan: A RdptmjreteUoa of Vikas Publishing House, 1978),
p. 35. H k x o i^ discussions of die Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya can also be fijond in S.A.A. Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, and
Midiajnmad Umar, Islam in Northern India, but for the most complete review of the life and wcsk of Khwaja Mir Daid, see, Anne Marie
Schimmel, Pam and Grace: A Study of Two Mystical Writers of 18th CgttuQf Mws.liin Iptja (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976).
82 Troll, Sawid Ahmad Khan: A ReinterpietaticMi of Muslim Theoloov. p. 36.
220
Shariat Allahs (d 1840) Faraidi School.
The Faraidi movement began in Bengal when Shariat Allah returned home from 20
years of study in the Hijaz in 1818. He was educated in Arabic, Persian, tafsir and kalam,
but his forte was hadith. All his school permitted as shar i was a version ofHanaftsm
even that declared all manner o f worship involving a Sufi pir to be shirk. This anti-
Sufism suggests the influence of another school o f thou^t on the Faraidis, one arising
beyond the borders of South Asia, the Wahhabiyya o f the Arabian Peninsula. Describing
the ideals of the founder, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1787), W.C. Smith writes
o f the movement:
It rejected the corruption and laxity of the contemporary decline.... It rejected the
introvert warmth and other-worldly piety o f the mystical way. It rejected also the
alien intellectualism not only o f philosophy but also o f theology. It rejected all
dissensions, even the now well-established Shi'a. It insisted solely on the Law...in its
straightest, most rigid, Hanbali version, stripped o f all innovations through the
intervening centuries.... The Wahhabi reform named as authoritative, as the source o f
inspiration, not just the Quran, but the Quran and pure sunnah.... The interpretation
o f Islam against which they were fighting was that which had become dominant...^
Although the rejection o f Sufism proposed by Abd al-Wahhab (as well as the fact that
the Wahhabis adhere to the Hanbali madhhab) distinguishes the Wahhabi and Faraidi
movements from those o f the Wali Allahi and Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya scholars, the
conceptual similarities between all o f the above are quite apparent. In the terminology of
this study, it is the distinction between advocates o f Sober Reason and those o f Sober
Intuition. Thus, when one compares Muhammad Ismails Taqwiyat al-Iman with Abd
al-Wahhabs Kitab al-Tawhid, it is quite clear that Sufism aside, complementary visions
83 See, Rizvi, Shah Ahd al-Aziz for a djscnssion of this issue.

84W.C. Smith, I-slam in M odm History (New Yk: Mentor Books, 1963), pp. 49-50. Also see, M. Cook, On the Origins
of Wahhabism. Journal of the Rovat Asiatic Society 2:2 (1992): 191-201.
221
are at play. In the above works, one finds the identical juxtapositioning o f tawhid and
shirk, and the definition o f each in virtually identical terms. For example, Abd al-
Wahhabs acts of shirk include, amulets and talismans, sacrifice in the name o f any but
Allah, saintly or any other form o f intercession, the visitation of graves, and so on.*^
Furthermore, the defintions o f tawhid and shirk - stemming from an anti-custom
approach to the shari a - found in the works o f Wali Allahis, Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya,
Faraidis and Wahhabis, is echoed in movements farther afield in the Muslim World than
South Asia and the Arabian Peninsula.
In Sufi ranks alone, a number o f movements across the Muslim World called
themselves the Tariqa Muhammadiyya and espoused similar creeds in the 18* and 19*
centuries. A prominent example is the Sanusiyya, which was popular across North Africa
in this period. The Qadiriyya in West Africa, under the headship o f Sidi Mukhtar al-Kunti
and his murid (disciple) Jibrail ibn Umar, also called for a return to the basic sources
o f Islamic jurisprudence; i.e., Quran and hadith?^ This entailed the rejection of
adherence to one madhhab and the rejuvenation of ijtihad. As well, in terms o f Sufi
practice {tasawwuf}, Sidi Mukhtar proposed strict adherence to shari a as the only path to
true knowledge of God.*^ Furthermore, the Qadiriyya and the Sanusiyya later became
embroiled injihad movements, including Uthman dan Fodios movement in Hausaland,
and Ahmad al-Sanusi and Muhammad al-Sanusis movements against the Italians in
85 Muhitmmad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, K ittA al-Tawhid, tons. Compilation and Reseaich Departmaat, Dar al-Salam (Riyadh:
Dar al-Salam Publications, 1996). For passages on the types of shirk wsotiooed, see, pp. 32-34; 46*57; 71-82.
86Ibrahim Suiaiman, A Revoluticw in Historv (Londoffi: Mansell Publishing, 1986), p. 12. Also see, N diania Levitzitm, The
Eighteenth Centiny Background to fte Islamic RevDlHttims in West Africa, Eiahteenth Century Renewal and Reftain in Islam. N.
Levitzion & John Voll, eds. (Syracuse: University Press, 1987), pp. 21-39.
87 Suiaiman, A Revolution in Historv. p. 14.
222
Libya and the British in Egypt.** As shown below, the same was the case with Wali
Allahis and Faraidis in South Asia.
The similarities between these intellectual movements, of course, speaks of
continuity in thought on a grand scale. However, these similarities also allude to
continuity in terms of scholarly networks. John Voll explores this issue in Linking
Groups in the Networks o f Eighteenth-Century Revivalist schools: The Misgaji Family in
Yemen, as does Louis Brenner in, Muslim Thought in 18**^Century West Africa.*^ In
the context o f such scholarly families, Voll and Brenner mention a South Asian
Naqshbandiyya family, the most notable members o f which were Muhammad Hayat al-
Sindi and Abu al-Hasan al-Sindi. Both are noted as hadith scholars whose pupils include
the leaders of various movements mentioned above. Muhammad Hayat was an influential
instructor of Abd al-Wahhab, founder o f the Wahhabiyya,^ while Abu al-Ha.san
instructed Uthman dan Fodios uncle, the latters primary hadith instructor.^ Such work
thus testifies to the feet that the impetus for these movements was neither coincidental
nor uncoordinated. In Volls words, the 18* century Sobriety discussed in the South Asian
arena, like that elsewhere, was more than the dramatic movements and holy war leaders.
It also involves the less visible linking groups who recruit the revivalists and link them to
88 For dan Fodios Jihad, see, Mervyn Hiskett, The Sword of Truth (Evanston; Ndrthwestem University Rress, 1994); Murray
Last, The S<AotQ Caliphate (London; Lmdmaas, Green and Co., 1967); and, Halil Ibrahim Said, Revolution and Reaction (Ann Arbor
University Microfilms Intemationai, 1978). For a discussion ofjihad movements in general, see, Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism:
The Doctrine of Jihad in Modem HisUgy (Paris: Mouton, 1979).
89 J. Voll, Linking Groups n the Networks of 18th Century Revivalist Sohoob: The Mizjaji Family in Yemen, and, Louis
Brenner, Muslim Thought in Eighteenth century West Afiica, Eighteentb Century Muslim Renewal emd Reform in Islam.
90 J. VoB, Linking Groups a the Networks of 18th Century Revivalist Schoob: The Miqaji Family in Yemen, pp. 77-78.
91 Louis Braaiex, Muslim Thought in Eighteenth century West Aftics, p. 61.
223
the tradition o f the ideals oflslam .^^
As the coincidence of goals and the network linking the scholars involved so vividly
displays, the Wali Allahis were not alone. VolFs incidental mention of revivalists also
illustrates the manner in which Islamicists have understood these goals and ties. To be
sure, these scholars are revivalists in so far as they seek to return to the practice of the
Prophet - part o f a line o f thought that had played a role throughout the Middle Period.
However, it is also true that they sought this return by rejecting, in Smiths words, the
interpretation of Islam... which had become dominant. That is to say, the Wali Allahis
and their intellectual kin rejected the doctrines o f Middle Islam, even if their Islam
followed from the Middle Period. In this li^ t, their revivalism is part o f a new
intellectualism, advancing a new Sober Path. Furthermore, although there is great
continuity in thought from the Middle to the Modem, the particulars o f their thought
suggests they were responding to the socio-economic conditions prevalent in their day
and locality, as Shah Wali Allah states so often. Awareness o f the present in the South
Asian context is considered further below, but as it stands, the Wali Allahis appear best
represented as one of many schools across the Muslim World espousing a creed
describableas Sober Modernism.
92 Voll, Litddng Groups n the Networks of ISlli Centuiy Revivalist Schools: The Mizjaji Family in Yemen, p. 91.
93 This characteristio of the above thitikers rhetoric is prime in labeling them cevivalists, as, for example, in the essays on
the subject collected as, Shireen Huntra', ed. The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unitv fBlotaningtCTi: Indiana University
Press, 1988).
94 Modernism in this crmtext makes no tefersnce to Europran concepts of Modanity. Rather, the Sober Path of the Wali
Allahis, et a!., is defined as Modem in relaticm to the Sober Path of the Middle Period. His argunnait has, however, been made that the
so-called puritanism inherent in the movemtmts considered here is less a reaction to Modraniiy than a feature of Modernization, in
the European sense. Although some aspects of this discussion seem to validate this thesis - primarily argued by sociologists like E.
Gdlner and J.B. Tamney - the thesis is not encoiporated into this wcsk fca- cms reason in {wticular. In making their arguments, Gellner
in particular relies on a cottoeptiM of Islam as divided into High and Folk forms. The former is seen as elite, scriptunilist and
224
II: The EIC Regime and Islamic Institutions: the Ascendance o f European Thought.
The precipitous decline of Mughal political authority in the 18* century was
accompanied by significant changes in Muslim institutions more generally, echoing the
larger socio-economic changes that South Asianists have argued. Even where Muslims
continued to exercise political authority, South Asianists have noted that such
institutional mainstays o f the Middle Period as the jagir/iqta system began to fall prey to
alternative forms o f landholdings and revenue collection. As previously noted, even in the
time ofFaruq Siyar (d. 1719), tax-farming was on the rise. Furthermore, former
jagirdars and beneficiaries of waqf, no longer under the firm control of a central
authority, abrogated grants to hold land directly, thus adding to the class o f capitalists.
As such, it is widely held by contemporary South Asianists that local authority
increasingly determined revenue assessment and collection, while negotiated payments,
rather than a systematic fiscal policy, was emerging.
With the collapse o f the Mughals Muslim successor states before the East India
legalistic, the latter as popular, syncretic and anti-legalistic. Thus, om is left to wider whether Islamic philosophy, theosophy and other
such elite disciplines are to he cotisidaed Folk Islam, not being swiptwralist or legalistic as defined 1^ Gellner? Moreover, is the
activity of scripturalist and legalistic Sufi orders arntsig the masses to be viewed as part of High Islam? In other words, does the
above conoeption of Islam adequately address its intellectuai and social scope to justify the adoption of OeUnCT or Tamneys thesis?
Without first considering more closely the mannw in which the above apptxrach to Islam colours the oaiclusions made- a prcject beyond
the scope of this study - it appears best to view Modem Islam atlirely in relation to Middle Islam at this juncture. For Gellner and
Tamney, see, E. Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge: University Press, 1981); and, J.B. Tamney, Modernization and Religious
PurifioatiOT: Islam in Indonesia, Review of Religious Research 22:2 (1980).
95 Such issues are teoadly discussed in the histories cited above. Far mtae detailed studies on more local states and areas,
see, Ridiard Barrott, Nwtfa India Between Empires: Awadh. the Mughals and the British (Bakley: University of California Press,
1980); and, Iqbal Husain, The Rise and Decline of the Ruheia Chieftaincies in 18th Century India (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1994). Also, R.KJ. Singh, Agrarian Policy of the Late Mughals, Journal of the Bihar Research Society 59 (1973): 145-163.
225
Company regime, the end of such institutions as the jagirliqta system was only hastened,
it being formally dismantled by the EIC regime. As early as 1793, the so-called
Permanent Settlement - the principles of which would be extended to all areas falling
under EIC rule - would grant various classes o f landholders property rights subject to
fixed revenue payments due the colonial state. Rates o f local taxation and methods of
collection would be left to the discretion of the new class o f feudal landowners
{zamindars}.^ However, the EICs steady acquisition of territory between 1765-1858
raised further questions than land and fiscal settlements, the most pressing of which was
the civil and criminal law by which the EIC would govern. Education would only become
a concern as far as it related to changes in the ethos o f government. Thus, this discussion
o f EIC legal and educational reforms is focused on the consequences for Islamic thought,
institutions and the people that represented them. The import of this relationship to such
broad questions as the nature of the colonial state should be apparent.
a) Legal Reform: Sidelining the Mufti
Scholars o f British legal reform unanimously declare that from the moment that the
EIC gained footholds in South Asia at Madras, Calcutta, Bombay and Surat, Royal
Charters promoted governance by English civil and criminal law.^^ As Baneijees study
% Bayly, Indian Society and the Makifljjt of the British Bmoire. pp. 64-68. Bose and Jalal add Shat in the raly 19th eentuiy,
colonial fevenue demand was initially pitched very high, leading to many defeultera among the zam indan, as well as to great hardship
among the cultiTOtors. Prdblrais with leveiue coBection then led the colonial slate to arm the zemindars with fonnidible powers of
extra-ecnomic coercion, including distraint and eviction. See, Bose and Jalal, Modem South Asia, 69-70,
97 Given the import of the topic, much has written on the legal reforms implemented by the British colonial regiine,
whether under
2 26
has shown, the Charter of 1726 is important as it empowered the Company with
legislative rights in terms o f bye-laws, rules and ordinances for.. .government, but also
set up a Mayors Court presided over by a non-Company judge and empowered as the
highest court of appeal. With this charter the British government directly entered the legal
processes o f South Asia.^ At the same time, Shah Alams firman o f 1765 - the
document by which the EIC was granted not merely the Diwan (Revenue Ministry), but
also the diwani (revenue) of Bengal^ - called for Muslim and Hindu subjects to be
governed according to Islamic and Hindu law, respectvely.'^ The eventual result o f this
systemic clash o f wills was Anglo-Muhammadan Law. Joseph Schacht describes this
creation as a symbiosis out of which grew a new jurisprudence, the aim o f which, in
contrast with Islamic jurisprudence \fiqh\,,.i% not to evaluate a given body of legal raw
material from the Islamic angle, but to apply, inspired by modem English jurisprudence,
autonomous juridical principles to the definition o f the shari The first move in
this direction was the Hastings Plan o f 1772.
According to the Hastings Plan, which was adopted in 1780, Islam was recognized in
the realm of personal law alone. In the former cases, as Section 27 o f the 1780 regulation
the EIC or the CsHwn. For genesal overviews of the British legal iîiBe, see, A.C, Baneqee, English I .aw in India (Etelhi: Abhinav
Publications, 1984); an4 Abdul Hamid, A Chronicle of Britisl^ Indian I i;gal History (Jaipur; RBSA Publishers, 1991). For a work
i^rseifioally ocemed with the decline of indigraious systems of law, Muslim and Hindu, see, Mare Galanter, Hie Displacement of
Traditional Law in Modem India, Law and Society in Modem India (Delhi: Oford University Press, 1989); 15-36, For works on Islamic
law under coltsiial role in particular, see, K.P. Saksaia, Micslim T.aw as Administered in India and Pkistan (Lucknow: Eastern Book
Co., 1963); and, M.R. Andra-son, Islamic Law and tte Colonial Encounter in British India, Institutions and Ideologies. Amol4 D. and
P. Robb, eds. (Londras: Cmzon Press, 1993)
98 Bancijee, English Law in India, p. 11.
99 Land revenue fiwn Bengal (which inciudjag ccmtetnporaiy Bihar and Chissa) amounted to 3 sniUion pounds in 1765. By
1818, with fermore tenitay acquired, the amount was 22 million pounds. See, Bose and Jalal, Modem South Asia, pp. 70-1.
100 For a discussion of EIC motives, see, A.K_ Dutta, Why did the East India Company Recognise Hindu and Muslim
Law? Western Colonial Policy. N.R. Ray, ed (Calcutta; Institute of Historical Studies, 1981), pp. 173-82.
227
states; In ail suits regarding. Inheritance, Succession, Marriage,. .and Other religious
usages or institutions, the laws o f the Quran with respect to Muhammadans.. .shall be
invariably adhered to.^^ As well, criminal law was added when, by the late 1770s, a
number o f petitions and letters from EIC officers expressed the opinion that English penal
law would not be well received and was, in one authors opinion, a matter o f the most
serious importance, and big with consequences most alarming to the natives of India
In Baneijees words, the result was that the territorial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
[formerly Mayors Court] was cut up into two distinct sectors. In territories outside
Calcutta it would determine only actions for wrongs and trespass - obviously according
to English Law. In Calcutta it would determine all civil and criminal actions according to
English Law, subject to the condition that in suits relating to inheritance, succession and
contract it would apply Muslim Law to the Muslims and Hindu Law to the Hindus ^^ As
well, the Charter of 1781 stipulated that Parliament reserved the power to define the
extent to which native law and usage should be given usage r e c o g n itio n .E x c e p t in
criminal and personal matters, t h e r e f o r e , would play no part under EIC governance.
The partial acceptance of Islamic law did provide room for the employment of muftis
(jurisconsults) as British judges were not acquainted with Islamic statues. On the other
hand, qadis (judges) were rendered redundant, their role being filled by British officers.
Almost as soon as the system was instituted, however, debate arose regarding the efficacy
of including mirftis, or native judges. The prime criticism was issued by the likes o f
101 J. Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, p. 96.

102 This Section of the 1780 Regulation is cited in, K.P. Saksena, j
103 Cited in Baneijee, Etiplish Law ia India, p. 24.
104 Ibid, p. 25.
228
Indologist and judicial officer William Jones as early as 1788, declaring that as British
judges were not learned in Arabic, they relied on the opinions o f native lawyers and
scholars, by whom the British judge could be misled.*^ The remedy, according to
Jones, was to prepare legal digests that would eliminate the need for muftis. The influence
o f such ideas can be seen in the fact that among the earliest published translations from
Arabic or Persian to English, Middle Period works on personal law feature prominently.
The earliest appears to be W. Jones 1782 translation o f a Muhammad ibn Ali al-Rahbi
(d. 1183) work, followed by F. Gladwins 1786 translation o f the Mirat al Masa i l (12*^
century. Persian/author not mentioned) and W. Jones 1792 translation of a 12*century
work (title not given) by Siraj al-Din Muhammad ibn Muhammad Sajawandi/^ Although
these are by no means the only works translated, the paucity o f works - not to the
mention the intent of eliminating native lawyers and scholars - does not speak well o f
the Islamic credentials o f the resulting Cornwallis Code of 1793, or those which
preceded and followed it. At any rate, by the turn of the 19* century, the future removal
o f the rmrfti was set. As the 1815 publication o f EIC judge Alexander Tytler attests, the
mantra of universally corrupt South Asimi officers and too much power in native
105 Saksaia, Muslim Law as Administered in India and Pakistan , p. 41.

106 Baneijee, English Law ia India, jy. 31-2.
107 Jones translation of Sajawandis work was published as, W, Jones, trans. Al-Sire^'fyyah (Calcutta, 1792). The
trauslatiMi of al-Rahbis weak was published as, W. trans. The Mabomedan Law of Sticcession (London; C. Dilly, 1782). The
translation of the Mi rat al-Masa 'il was published as, F. Gladwin, trans. An Epitome of Muhammadan Law tCalcutta: W. Maokay,
1786).
106 It should bs noted that the historical discoutse on the codification of Hindu and Islamic law under colonial rule is not only
larger than the few secondary works cited here, but is part of a larger oonsidaation of the colonial appropriation of TraditiOT, and the
oonstnictitm of commuiial categories, fit the works of Subaltenrists, mote than any other Sotilfa Asianists, this movenKitt is viewed
within a Saidian fiamewmk. Apart from the works ofPaadsy and others peviously cited, osiderati<m of British legal reforms from
this perspective can be read in, Bemand Cohn, Coloniaiisro and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: PrincetMi
2 29
hands was widely chanted in the EIC by the turn of the century. As well, in Tytiers
words, the hope was;
That the time is fast approaching when we shall have justice administered by
Europeans only, as Circuit judges, and when the Mussulman Law, in criminal cases,
shall be altogether disregarded.
In a report issued in 1852, titled The Judicial System of British India, another EIC
j udicial officer writes to Parliament on the resolution of the debate between those who
favoured the participation o f Muslim scholars in the legal process, and those like Jones
and Tytler who did n o t What is clear is that codification beat out the Muslim scholar,
as the latter had hoped. It was not an even transition, but one that occurred at different
rates in each o f the Presidencies. The author records that in Bombay, where criminal law
was concerned, all reference to Mohammedan Law has long since been abrogated in
favour of one extensive Regulation enacted in 1827. In Bengal and Madras, the
process was more gradual. In 1802, mutilation was abolished as a form of punishment
In 181 ^,fiqh rules o f evidence were pushed aside when the highest EIC court {Sadder
[sudur] Court) gained the power to over-rule acquittals byfatwa, and in 1829, the same
105 Alexander F. Tytler, Considerations aa Che Present Poiitical State of India (London; Black, Party and Co., 1815), p. 115.
Also see, R. Giant, A Sketch of the Historv of the East India Cwnpanv fran its Fonmatioa to the Regulation Act of 1773 (London: Black,
Party and Co., 1813). Unless otherwise indicated, tte 19th oentuiy woita of EIC ofiSciais such as Tytler oonsitlered in this sexsticm on law
and education, t^rosent the body of British Libraiy tmterial available on tiiese subjects in the microfilm collection; The Nineteenth
Croturv (Cambridge; Chadwick-Healey, 1986-Present).
110 Tytler, Ccgisidsratkms on the Present Political State of India, p. 114.
111 The Judicial System of British India (Londtm: Pelham Richardson, 1852). Also see. Proposal o f a Plan for Remodelling
tl Government of India (Londcm; Smith, Elder and Co., 1853); IS . Buckingham, Plan for the Future Govemment of India of India
(Ltmdon; Paitiidge and Oakey, 1853); A. Annand, A Brief Outline of the Existing System for the Government of India (London:
Saunders atid Benning, 1832); and IS . Mill,
Years (LcodcB: W.H. Allen, 1858),
112 The Judicial System nfRritish India, pp. 22-3.
230
power was granted the lower court judges (Session Court). The author declares that as
a result, since 1829, English law of evidence is now the guide o f the courts in the trial of
criminal cases. *"*The uniform conclusion for all Presidencies is that by the 1850s, in
the higher court the option of calling for a fatwa seems to be rarely exercised, while in
the lower court the part played by those Muslim legists who remain is that of assessors
rather than of expounders of the law. ^
In the absence o f Islamic laws expounders, under the control o f British jurists and
jurisprudence, a three-tier system resulted, with Supreme Courts, Sudder Courts and
Sessions Courts ruling entirely by English jurisprudence in every realm but personal law.
Furthermore, in the personal realm cases were decided according to hastily drawn codes
or the discretion o f the British judge. Particularly in the lower courts, no training or
experience even in English jurisprudence was required, judges being drawn from the civil
service. Tytler writes that in 1806, official standards were lowered so that the previous
requirements of study in the Law and Regulations o f the EIC, Process in native courts
and Treatises o f Muhammadan Jurisprudence were no more. ^Fifty years later, his
judicial colleague would write that the greatest problem facing the judiciary was a lack of
judges with legal training. ^Clearly, not only the qadi, the mufti and his fatawa, butfiqh
itself was virtually eliminated from the legal process - represented by no more than the
static rulings of a handful of Middle Period legists enshrined in a code drawn up by
British Orientalists like William Jones. An example o f the process that replaced fiqh can
113 Ibid, pp. 25-7.

114 Ibid., p. 27.
115 Ibid., pp. 23&28.
116 Tytler, C(msiderati<ms on the Present Political State of India, pp. 62-5.
231
be found in Erskine Perrys accounts o f the cases he tried as Supreme Court Justice
during the 1840s and 50s."*
During this period. Perry notes that a number of cases involving Muslim women
suing for a share in inheritance arose in the Bombay Presidency, two o f which reached his
court. The first involved women from the Khoja community and the second women
from the Memon community of Gujarat. In both cases, the women claimed that as
Muslims, the Quran guaranteed them a share in their fethers estates, while the
defendants pleaded that in their communities a custom disinheriting daughters had long
been upheld. Perrys first order in deciding these cases was to verify the existence o f such
a custom by means o f each communitys testimony. Thus, it was established that Khojas
and Memons converted from Hinduism under influence of Ismaili and Sunni pirs,
respectively. The Khojas claim to be followers o f the Agha Khan - Imam of an Ismaili
branch - but Perry notes that community members are not educated in Arabic or Persian,
and have no translations o f the Quran in Gujarati. They refer instead to such works as the
Das Avatar - the highly syncretic work of a 15*^ centuiy Ismaili p ir named Sadr al-
Din.*^* The Memons are noted to be far richer than the Khojas, in numbers, finances and,
from Perrys perspective, Islamic learning. He notes that some in this community even
uphold a daughters right to inheritance, but concludes that in both communities the
117 The Judicial system of British .hdiiii. pp. 18-19; 39-42.

118 Peny refera to more than 50 cases tried in his capacity as Suim ne Court Justice in his, Erskine Pray, Cases lllustative of
Oriental Life: the ApDlication of F.nflish Law to India (New Delhi; Asian Educational services, 1988), f o t published in 1854.
119 Those of mtsrest here are, Hitbae and Gwngbae vs. Sonahae, and Rahimathae v.s. Hadji .Tussap and Others, tried
separately ia 1847, but written about together on pages 110-29.
119 F Khojas and Moikbis, see, Asghar Ali Engineer, The Muslim Communities o f Guiarat: An Exploiaticai of the Boigas.
Khoias and Memms (Delhi; Ajanta PuWistes, 1898).
120 Fw Pir Sadr al-Din and the activities oflsma'ili pirs in Sind and Gujarat between the 12th-15tb century, see, Sarah
232
122
custom of disinheriting daughters does overwhelmingly exist.
Having established the custom. Perrys next questions suggest most about the process
that replacedfiqh. First, Perry asks the place o f custom in English jurisprudence. He
concludes that a custom can be recognized as law if the majority of a community have
recognized the practice beyond memory, if it is reasonable, or not injurious to the
public interests, and if it does not conflict with the laws o f the ruling power,^^ The
first condition already established. Perry dismisses the second by writing that the
disinheriting of daughters is not unreasonable or injurious in the eyes of English law
as it accords with universal custom.^"În order to determine the laws o f the ruling
power. Perry next considers the place o f divine law in English juris|Hudence, and the
role ascribed to the Quran by EIC Charter. In the first matter, he concludes;
A jurist 9 wfl jurist has only to deal with human laws: he recognizes the existence o f
divine laws, mid tiieir validity inforo oonscientiae witii those to whom they are
addressed, or who believe in the revelation contained in them; but he does not
recognize them as enforceable in Courts o f justice any further than the secular power
has ordained.
Ansari. Sufi Saints and State Powa- (Lahme: Vanpuard Boefci Ltd.. 1992), pp. 13-17.
121 In general. &e&!scriptionofthe Khojas and MonKms provided Penys witnesses ooncurs with that of caatempoiaiy
historians. These communities, alor^ with the Bohras, oonstitule largely merchaatile Muslim groups from Gujarat. They were tribal
groups adhering to Hindu or Budcfijist beliefs before the adevnt of Islam in the region, alfrioiigh exact dates of ocaversion are obscure,
hike the Khojas, the Bohras ate also Tamailis, the rise of which is attributed to: 1) the activities of Ismaili dais (missionaries) following
the rise ofFatimid suzerainty among the Amirs of Sind about the lOth-11th oaituty; and, 2) the mow ea.stward of lsmaili dais following
the otwquest of the area by Sunni states such as the Ghaznawids and (jhurids between the 1lth-12th centuries. The affiliation between
Khojas, Bohras and the t^tha Khanate, howevw, is more leoent, beginning in the 17th-18th oentusy. when a member of the Safewid elite
acknowledged by .some (Niraris) as the Ismaili Imam, began t gain influence among earlier converts, while also gaining new ones.
When one of this line of Imams was driven from Iian to Sind, having fiillen foul of the Qajar state that eventually t^rfaeed the Safewid,
eventually settling in Bombay, as the Agtei Khan I, he won much influence anxmgst the Isma'iiis of the region, though many Khojas
would convert to Sunnism or Ithna Ashari Shiism when the Agha Khan began to dnand payment of zakat to the hnamate. See, Azim
Nanji, The Ismaili Tradition in the Indn-Pakistan Snheontinent (New York: 1978).
123 Pmv. Cases fllastiative of Oriental Life, p. 121.
124 Ibid., p. 120.
125 Ibid., p. 122.
233
The EIC regime being the secular power, Perry faithfully addresses the issue of charters
providing for Islamic law in the personal realm. In this matter, he concludes;
The effect of the clause in the charter is not to adopt the text of the Koran as law, any
further than it has been adopted in the laws and usages o f the Mahomedans who
came under our sway; and if any class of Mahomedans - Mahomedan dissenters, as
they may be called - are found to be in possession o f any usage which is otherwise
valid as a legal custom, and which does not conflict with any express law of the
English Govemment, they are as much entitled to the protection o f this clause as the
most orthodox Sunniy [.s/c] who can come before Court.
On all these grounds. Perry not only dismisses the womens cases, but adds:
I think that the attempt o f these young women to disturb the course of succession
which has prevailed among their ancestors for many hundred years has failed, and, as
a price for unsuccessful experiment, that their bills must be dismissed with costs, so
far as the defendants seek to recover them.
It is surely not an overstatement to say XhaXfiqh played virtually no role in EIC
legislation, when the Quran had no place in cases o f personal law. The above cases
confirm that in courts where ajurispmdential method was employed, English
jurisprudence alone determined the ralings. Furthermore, it is clear that according to
English jurisprudence, these judges held local custom above divine law in their courts.
The absence of any reference to Muslim scholars and their schools (including the Agha
Khan) suggests that while Anglo-Muhammadan Law may have grown to become a
symbiosis of sorts, before 1858 it was not even a system in which Muslims played more
than a clerical role. As well, in the opinion o f the judges who administered Muslim
personal law, Anglo-Muhammadan Law was English Law. The irony, o f course, is that
while the British were drawing up codes and sidelining the m ufti J they were legitimating
126 Ibid., pp. 124-25.

127 Ibid.. p. 129.
128 The same amolusion is reached by a diiferent route in, Scott Alan Kugle, Framed, Blamed and Renamed; The
234
much the same customary laws the Middle Period mirfti had aided in perpetuating.
b) Educational Reform: the Collapse o f the Madrasa
As the Permanent Settlement o f 1793 reveals, the EIC regime represented a
significant departure from Mughal institutions. Indeed, it spelled the end of the jagir/iqta
system. For Muslims, the results were abysmal. One need not look beyond the writings of
Tytler in 1815, then J.S. Mill in 1858, to gain some sense o f the impact among
cultivators. Tytler argues that by granting property rights to jagirdars, the power o f tax-
farmers had been greatly amplified, as had the arbitrary fiscal authority o f the new
zamindars, many of whom lived in urban centres away from the land.*^^ The result was
ruin for Towers orders, as the state no longer exercised jurisdictional control over the
landlords. As Mill put it, the rights o f the ryot [peasant] have passed away sub silentio,
and they have become... tenants at will.^^*^
The import of this to the topic of education is that much o f the Muslim political elite,
particularly in Bengal and the Gangetic area, was also ruined by EIC fiscal policy. In the
words o f an EIC military officer penned in the 1830s, vast transfers o f landed property
have taken place since the permanent settlement, and:
The Bengal Baboos and persons o f that description, who now appear to be the
principal Zumindars [sic], are as much foreigners in their habits and pursuits to the
cultivated classes as we are. They live in cities and towns, far away from their
Zumindarees [sic], and know less of the people than either our judges or collectors
Recasting of Islamic JorisfmKteace io Colonial South Asia Modem Asian Studies. 35:2 (Jan. 2001): 257-313.
129 Tytler. pp. 313-15, 346-50,399-412.
130 Mill, VfemorariAtm of the Improvgiaents in the Administiatioa of India Puriiig the Last 30 Years, pp. 4-5.
235
who live among them.^
Given that the Muslim political elite was largely responsible for the endowment of
education prior to the above changes, such events meant the fate o f Islamic educational
institutions was as bleak as that of its legal institutions, unless the EIC regime leant its
support.
The earliest institutions patronized by the EIC or its officers were known as Oriental
Colleges, the first being the Muhammadan College o f Calcutta in 1781.^Âs the
reference to Muslims suggests, this was a college opened when former Muslim elites and
scholars from the region approached the EIC to open a madrasa^ being unable to endow
one themselves. As Warren Hastings, Governor o f Bengal at the time, wrote:
After the take-over o f Muslim rule in India by the British, the condition o f Muslims
in general beggars [sic] description. They have gone to such a lower ebb that they
can not afford to send their children to schools...
Hastings was moved enough to fund the madrasa himself, but very little official interest
was shown in these early years. The British govemment did not become involved until the
Charter o f 1813, in which a paultry Rupees 100,000 was alotted to education. A
Committee for Public Instruction was, however, established in 1823, but as late as 1838,
one o f the EICs prime educational reformers, C.E. Trevelyan, reports that only 40
colleges had been opened under the EIC, most by them teaching European learning in
131 J. Sutberiund, Sketches of tte Relations Subsi.stinp Between the British Gtwemment in India and the E^ffamt Native
States (Calcutta: Military Oiphan Press. 1837), p. 14. Fora contemfjojaiy view of the evolving relationship between land endowments
and the EIC regiine, see, G.C. KozlowsM, Muslim Endowmente and Society in British India (Cambridge; University Press, 1986).
132 Histories of the EIC educational regiine include, M.A, Greaves, Education in British India. 1698-1947 (London;
Univwsity ofLonck. 1967); S.N, Sen, M eatificjiad Technical FdHcation in India. 1781-1900 (New Delhi: Indian National Scientific
Academy, 1991); S.C. Dutta, History of Adult Educaticm in India (New Delhi; Indian Adult Education Association, 1986); and, ZJH.
Sharib, Ih s jjgtoty ffld (Bombay: All-India institute of Local Self-Governance, 1982).
133 Mujibur Rahman, Higtwv of Madrasa Education, p. 78.
2 36
English, but including some oriental works in law.*^'*
The paucity o f institutions and funding did not mean lack of debate on the future
form o f education in Britains South Asian possessions. The sole defenders of the
Oriental Colleges were Indologists, such as William Jones, who may have wanted miîs
out of the judicial process, but hoped local learning would continue to inform government
in general through translation.*^^ Furthermore, H.H. Wilson, Secretary o f the Committee
for Public Instruction (1823-33), himself a Sanskritist, added that without the support of
Oriental learning, particularly languages, the British could not win the support of South
Asiass elite intellectuals, nor create the necessary conditions for bringing European
learning (in translation) to the population in general,
In opposition to the funding o f Oriental Colleges espoused by Indologists stood
those informed by Utilitarian and Evangelical ideas To Utilitarians, the issue hinged
on the introduction o f useful knowledge, as expressed in a report dated December 1831
and mentioned by Trevelyan.*^* Thus, in the absence of a judicial or administrative need
for local learning or languages, the premise that Islamic learning was useful could not
easily be d efen d ed .O n the other hand, the idea that European learning was useful
could be argued from the Utilitarian and Evangelical perspectives, as well as by certain
South Asians with a vested interest. Utilitarians like Trevelyan argued that Islamic
134 G.E. Trevelyan, On the Education of the People of India (London: Longman, 1838X P- 17.
135 W. Jones was mentianed in the context of law ftar his translations of Muslim juridicat works. That this did not nMan
Jaies advocated the end of Persian is iBustiated by the fact that the translaticm of a work m Persian gmmmar rannbers among his
earliestcaideavours. See, W. Jones, AGraiMiiM. ^ f e Pers^ (1771), (Menston: Soolar P tes, 1969).
136 H.H. Wilson. Educatirm o f the Natives of India. The Asiatic Journal 19:New Soies (Jan-Apr. 1836): 1-16.
137 For Utilitarians, see, Eric Stdkes, The English Utilitariims and India (Osfotd: Clarendon Press, 1959),
139 Ibid., p. 1-3.
237
learning was equivalent to that o f Europe before Galileo, Copernicus and Bacon. Its
metaphysics was that o f Plato, its logic that o f Aristotle, its astronomy that of Ptolemy
and its medicine that of Galen. It is with this understanding o f Islam and Utilitarian
ideals in mind that Thomas Babington Macaulay declared, a single shelf o f a good
European library was worth the whole native literature o f India and Arabia.'^*^
Echoing MacCaulay in his condemnation, the Evangelist John Murdoch, compiling
the ideas of many other educators, suggested, It is difficult to conceive any education
less adapted to produce a beneficial effect than that imparted by the indigenous schools of
India.*'*^However, his concern differs from the Utilitarians in its focus on the moral
aspect of the indigenous system, rather than its scientific accomplishment. Murdoch
writes that the books used contain maxims which are absurd and groveling; some books
sanction vice o f the worst character; and all indicate the most debasing superstition
Thus, as far as the Evangelicals were concerned, useful knowledge was European
Christianity as well as European sciences. Support for English also came from South
Asians such as the Hindu reformer Ram Mohan Roy (d. 1833), who criticized
Brahmanism, borrowed from Christianity and promoted the study of European languages
and sciences directly.*^ Together the influence of such attitudes is witnessed in the fact
140 Ibid., pp. 57-8.

140 T.B. Macaulay, Minute on Indian EducatioiB (Feb. 2, 1835), Imperialism and Orientalism: A Documentary Source
B oA . Harlow, B. and M. Carter, eds. (Massachussets; Blackwell, 1999), p. 58.
141 J. Murdoch, Hints on Educatitm in M ia with Special Reference to Vernacular Schools (Madras: Scottish Press, 1860),
p. ix. Also see, Thonghts on Education in India (Allahabad: 1856); General Association of Bengal Migsioaaries (Calcutta: Baptist
Mission Press, 1831V. and. Christian Misaiooaries OovBmment Edusationi in India tXondon: Seeley, 1858).
143 J. Murdoch, Hints on Education in India with Special Refaence to Vernacular Scttools. p. x.
144 A letta fiosn Ram M chsa Roy pressing the EIC adaiinistiation for English education after the first meeting of
Ccxmnitlee f Public Instructioo is included in Trevelyans work (r>.65-71). In Indian Nationalist circles. Ram Mobam Roy is often
refrared to as the M k t of Modem India. Bom into an elite Bengali Brahmin femily, he worked in the EIC revenue srevioe w4nle
238
that although the Committee for Public Instruction was first constituted and run by
Indologists like H.HL Wilson, its resolution to open new Oriental Colleges in Delhi and
Agra, and continue translations, was never fulfilled. When Delhi College did open its
doors to students in 1829, Trevelyan declared triumphantly that it was in the interest of
western learning. *'*^ The trend was made policy when the Governor Generals
Resolution of March 1835, required that all funds go toward English education, that no
support be provided students of existing Oriental education, and that funding should be
withdrawn from translation and publishing of Arabic w o r k s-B y 1838, o f the 6,000
students attending the 40 schools under the control of the EIC Committee for Public
Instruction, less than 200 were learning Arabic.^"* By the 1840s, talk had already begun
of charging a fee for the study o f Arabic and Persian where they continued to be taught.
For example, in his report to H.B.E. Frere, Commisioner o f Sind, his field-agent, Ellis,
wrote that Persian should be confined to those who acquire it as an accomplishment,
while Arabic should continue to be taught so as not to offend Muslim sensibilities, but
should be restricted to only three district schools in Sind - a recommendation which
Frere, like many others, passed on his superiors at the centre^"^
dabbling in real-estate and finance, until wealthy enough to retire in his miy forties. At this point, in Calcutta, Roy began work toward
the refonn of Hmduism, such that Hindu scriptures were iatarfaeted in a monothMtio vem, image-based worship was eschewed, as were
sat! and other practices. He also worked to promote European learning among South Asians. The Brahmo Samaj, founded in 1828, was
Roys pim e vehicle for the reformist agenda he articulated, renmining a prominent vehicle for Hindu reform to the dawn of the the 20th
century. Fittingly, Roy was also among the earliest of South Asians to journey to Britain, dying in Bristol in 1833. Much has been
written on Ram MsAan Roy and the intellectual cliaiate in which he woriced, but for an introduction, see, B.M. Sankhdher, Ram Mobam
Rov: The Apostle of Indian Awakening (New Delhi: Navarang Press. 1989).
145 Trevelyan, On the Edtication of the People of India p. 4.
146 Ibid,, pp. 13-14.
147 Ibid., p. 17 & 103.
148H.B.E. Frere, Educatiwi in Sind, Edtication in Sind Before the British Conquest and the Educational Policies of the
British Government (Hyderabad: Uruversity of Sind, 1971), p. 26.
239
While Islamic learning and the primary languages in which it was written (Arabic
and Persian) was being pushed aside by English, English was not to be the lone language
of either education or administration. In place o f Persian, local vernaculars increasingly
served as the language of lower administration and education. This was not an easy
choice, there being so many languages with which to contend. But, more constraining yet
was the fact that none were formalized languages, at least from the British perspective.
This meant that works on grammar, dictionaries, and so forth, were not usually available.
To this one can add an observation shared by Richard Burton, Ellis and Frere, that in Sind
that the vemacular lacked a standarized script and that Muslims use the Arabic script,
while Hindus use as many as eight Sanskrit-based scripts.*'*^ In response., as early as 1788,
Halhed had produced Grammar of the Bengalee Language to close the gap.^ In the 19*
century, grammar manuals and dictionaries would become an industry in themselves, a
long list of vemacular works peppering the period in which EIC dominion extended
inward from the coastal Presidencies.^^ Furthermore, Treleyan numbers among those
who floated the idea that local languages be written in the Roman script.
Despite the obvious difficulties that official recognition of the vemacular
represented, all the sources cited here considered this the best, if not the only option. For
149Rtchatd Buiton, "Muslim Ediwaticm at Schools and Colleges under the Native Rulers and Our Goveimnent, Educatii
in Sind Before the British Conquest and the Educational Poiicies o f the British Government (Hyderabad; University of Sind, 1971), pp.
60-61; Frere, p. 16.
150 C.A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Makinft of the British Einptre. p. 162.
151 The Nineteenth Century: Linguistics Specialist Collection (Chadwyk-Healey, 1986-Present) microfilm collection
contains no less than 30 grammars, dictimaries and instructk manuals published before 1860, covering Besigali, Braimi, Baluchi,
Gujarati, ffindi. Kaniata, Malayalam, Marathi, Naga, Oriya, Punjabi, Pushtu, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu.
151 The Application of the Rtgnan Alphabet to Ail the Oriental Lanamges. Contaiiigd. in..a Seties.of PmeB.Writea_by
Messrs Trevelyan and Tvtlg. Rev. A Duff and Mr. H.T. Prinsep; and Published in various Calcutta Periodicals in the Year 1834
(Calcutta: Setampore Press, 1836).
240
most, the reason is that it is impossible to teach everyone English in an instant, but it is
possible to manage the work necessary to use vemacular languages for EIC
administration and the dissemination o f European lam in g to a select class of locals.
Thus, the education system that the EIC pahronized was as alien to the environment as its
judicial system. As far as Muslims were concerned, the response is clear. Although
willing to work in a judiciary not employing/i^/i, an education system not teaching such
disciplines was met with a virtual boycott. In 1835, when news o f the discontinuation o f
Oriental learning reached the Muslim supporters o f the Calcutta madrasa, H.H. Wilson
observed:
The Mohammedans [sic], to use their own words, were confoimded and beside
themselves at the intelligence; anticipating, in the suppression o f the Madressa [sic],
not only the extinction o f their classical literature, but a preliminary step to an
authoritative interference with their religion. They according addressed a petition to
government, signed by above eight thousand persons, including all the talent and
respectability of the Mohammedan community, in which they stated their fears, in
the most forcible language they could devise, and prayed the Government, from
motives o f justice, philanthropy, and general benevolence, and to ensure its own
stability," to give orders for the continuance o f the Madressa.
In light of this petition, Trevelyan stated the obvious in 1838, when he complained that
EIC institutions had not succeeded in creating among their students the disposition to
preach a crusade against the systems under which they had been brought u p . I n
1851, Richard Burton noted that in Sind, Muslims generally stood aloof from EIC
institutions, stating that people subscribe to the schools o f their princes {an-naso a la '
din-i mulukihim)}^^ And, as late as 1860, the educator Edwin Arnold would confirm that
152 H.H. Wilson, Education of tlie Natives of India, The Asiatic Journal, pp. 1-2. The petition can be found in. The Great
Indian Education Debate, pp. 189-93.
154 Tievetvan. On the Educatitm of the Peorie of India, p. 131.
155 Bialon, "Muslim Education at Schools and Colleges under the Native Rulers and Our Govamment,* Education in Sind
241
Muslims still showed proud contempt for EIC institutions, stating that when he was
principal of Poona College, o f 50 students only 1 was Muslim. He concludes, The
cultivated native... resents the insult which has ignored his knowledge.^^
Despite obvious Muslim preferences, it is clear that without EIC support and a
shrinking Muslim political elite, formal Islamic learning was in trouble. In particular, the
above discussion suggests that the prime institutions o f Muslim intellectual activity -
madrasas and khanqahs - joined such institutions as the qadi'% court and the mufti's
fatwa as endangered species. With no new waqfs o f the rank necessary to support
madrasas and khanqahs, these institutions collapsed. Attesting to this trend, Mujibur
Rahmans study of Muslim educational institutions in this period shows that in Bengal
under the EIC, only 18 madrasas remained by 1820.* This study adds that in William
Adams reports on native education, issued during the 1830s, only one madrasa can be
identified in six districts o f Bengal with a Muslim population of approximately a million
individuals.*^* Finally, Rizvis study estimates that by 1851 the number o f madrasas in all
Bengal had fallen to 7. *
At the other end o f South Asia in Sind, following its annexation in 1843, letters
between H.B.E. Frere, Commissioner in Sind, and C.J. Erskine, Director o f Public
Instruction, as well as an independent report by Richard Burton, suggest the same state o f
affairs. As Burton notes, when a British officer named Captain Hamilton traveled through
Before the British Conquest and the EdocalioDal Policies of ifae British Govieniment pp. 59-60.
157 Mtgibur Rahman, tflstCQLgflfedrssa gdacatipn, {^, 207-8.

158 William Adams, Second Report on the State of Education in Batgal (Calcutta: G.H. Huttman, 1836); and, Third
Rept of the State of BdncaticHi in Bengal (Calcutta: G.H. Huttman, 1838), Qae Teacher. One School. I DiBona, ed. (New Delhi;
BiblialmpexLtd., 1983).
242
the region in 1744, he reported 400 maktabs and madrasas in the provincial capital of
Thatta alone. Burton, on the other hand, writing in 1851 could only report 6 madrasas in
all Sind,'^ vs^le Ellis and Frere find no more than 643 schools o f any description in
1854. Even if all are inaccurate, a downward spiral is implied. Furthermore, the quality o f
education in the remaining madrasas had dropped. Burton notes that Arabic grammar,
syntax, logic, thttJbtic,fiqh, tafsir and hadith comprised the main courses offered,.'^' In
the Rajshahi District o f Bengal, the one madrasa Adams reports taught little more than a
maktab'% courses on Persian and Arabic, while one of the two rntads stated that even on
this level o f instruction, only half the students previously enrolled could now be
suppofted.^^ In relation to the dars-i mzamiyya course load outlined a century earlier and
mentioned above, the fact that even the principles o f law {usul al-fiqh) and scholastic
theology (kalam), mainstays o f Sober Reason, were not being widely taught at the highest
grade o f remaining madrasas represents a substantial decline in disciplines offered.
The reduction o f courses available and enrolment opportunities is clearly a result o f
the same factors that led to the closure of so many madrasas. In the case o f the Rajshahi
madrasa, financing was dependent on a madad-i ma 'ash (charitable endowment) made by
Shah Jahan, yielding the revenue of 42 villages for; a) maintaining the family o f the
founding rntadk, b) keeping a mosque; c) supportingdi^/rs; and, d) funding a madrasa
that would provide tuition, board and lodging to its students. This was apparently not a
grant in peipetuity, a portion o f the land and revenues endowed being resumed by one o f
159 S.A A . Rizvi, Shah Abd al-Aziz. p. 149.

160Ricbard Burton, "Muslim Educati<M at Schools and Colleges under the Native Rulers and Our Govemnsmt," p. 49.
161 Ibid, p . 50.
162 Adams,, Sead Report, pp. 70-4.
243
the pre-EIC Nizam Nawabs of Bengal. However, the endowment had been renewed,
generation by generation, and in 1819, reconfirmed by an EIC regulation concerning
charitable endowments. Nevertheless, the EIC regime, like that o f the nawabs before it,
did have its eyes on the revenue endowed. For one, the endowment was now under the
gaze o f the district Collector, a British official who accused holders o f underestimating
the revenues they collected. Furthermore, Adams writes that confirmation of the
endowment as it stands is objectionable as it grants the ustadhs full authority in the
dispersement of funds, whether for personal (family stipend), religious (mosque),
public (hospital for mendicants), or general {madrasa) expenses. He suggests that the
portion due public and general expenses should be under the control of Government, so
that the institution will be a more useful one.
With madrasas and khanqahs threatened by Muslim political decline and the rise of
the EIC regime, their graduates had few hopes o f working in such institutions, let alone
o f establishing new ones. Thus, scholars from this period appear to have tumed to the
capitalists for patronage, including the zamindars considered below, and merchant
communities like the Khojas and Memons mentioned above. A case in point is the
Mawlawi Ghulam Muktidar, a student from the Calcutta College, and his employer. Dost
Muhammad Khan Chaudhuri, hzamirtdar in Rajshahi District,'^ The mawlawi
(teacher/scholar) was the tutor o f the zamindafs son, a teenager already literate in
Persian, then learning Arabic and being introduced to treatises on mantiq,fiqh and the
fara 'id. The zamindar also built a maktab and maintained a teacher o f Persian and Urdu,
163 Ibid, p. 73.

164 Ibid., p. 69.
244
whose method of instruction involved the reading o f the works o f various Sufi poets, such
as Sadi (d. 1292). Thus, Dost Muhammad stands as an excellent example of the fact that
although these capitalists were not in a position to endow formal madrasas and
khanqahs, they did support scholars and maktabs, often in the most remote villages.
The reports considered here show that in Bengal and Sind, countless Muslim
zamindars like Dost Muhammad supported numerous maktabs teaching Persian through
the vemacular, and Arabic through Persian. Furthermore, in such maktabs what one might
call an Introduction to Islam was included, whether in Persian or Arabic. Adams reports
that in all six Districts under his scmtiny, the highest rank of maktabs - whether housed
in a mosque, a scholar or patrons home, or a school house - taught the poetry o f Hafiz (d.
1391), Firdawsi (d. 1020) and others,^^^ Muslim histories and prose, and works on the
doctrines of Sober Islam in Persian. In Arabic, they introduced the student to the Quran
and treatises on logic, rhetoric, philosophy, astronomy, geometry and the law.'^ The
same was the case with Sind, where Frere (1854) recorded 643 schools attended by 7,443
students (6,750 male/693 female).^ Of these schools, 278 with 1,906 students taught
Arabic; 275 with 4,252 students taught Arabic and Persian; 56 with 321 students taught
Persian.*^ Such institutions are reported to have had as many as 50-100 students at times,
and are said to have been scattered all over the country, not always in the most populous
165 Although many oth poets are mentioned, reference to Firdawsi and Hafiz alone is sufficient to establish that reflectkms
of Mtislim persOTis and places, not to mentiraj fonns, tkaaes and motifs, fer broader than those of South Asia were within the reach of
m<At<A students. Firdawsis Shah Noma and Hafizs Divan, after all, respectively relate the histories and ethos of Warn in the Tmko-
Iranian context Fot translated excerpts firan each of the above works, as well as samples of the writings of Sadi (d 1292) and Rimii
(d. 1273) - also menticBied to have bem studied in maksaba - see, Jrfiaii D. YQhannan, ed. A Tieastgy of Asian Litaatare (New Ycafc
John Day, 1956).
166 Adams Second RepOTt, pp. 69-74; Third Report, pp. 247-55.
167 Frere, "Edueaticm in Sind," p. 31.
245
and best known towns, but often in remote villages, where the preceptor, having acquired
a name by his skill in teaching, or reputation for superior learning, has gathered together
students from distant districts.*^^
The dependence o f such maktabs on the support o f the capitalists, meant that the
presence ofMuslim zamindars and/or merchants determined the number of schools and
rates of literacy (in Arabic and Persian) in any given area. Firstly, Hindu capitalists
largely supported schools in which the local vemacular and Sanskrit were the medium of
instraction, while Muslims supported Persian and Arabic maktabs. Furthermore, although
populations were religiously diverse, except in towns and cities, they rarely lived in areas
of even demographics.'^^ Thus, in Sind, where the majority o f zamindars and villagers
were Muslim, o f the 643 schools mentioned only 23 with 803 students taught Sindhi, and
10 with 85 students taught Sanskrit. On the other hand, in the Rajshahi thana ofNattore,
where the majority of villagers were Muslim (130,000 Muslim:65,000 Hindu), but the
majority of the capitalists were Hindu, there were 422 schools teaching Sanskrit and 25
Bengali, to 122 teaching Arabic or P e r s i a n . This does not mean that Muslims and
Hindus did not support each others institutions, or that Hindus did not study Persian, and
Muslims study the vemacular. However, it does confirm that the presence ofMuslim
capitalists, rather than large numbers o f Muslims, was necessary for Persian and Arabic to
be promoted in the lower classes. Furthermore, it suggests that the distribution o f maktabs
168 Ibid., p. 31.

169 Ibid., p. 9.
170 This demogratnc distiibuti< is noted by South Asiantists based on the writings of such EIC officials such as Adams. In
NattOTE, he iK)tes that the vast tnajOTity of villages are pq>uiatsd by either Hindn at Muslim families, with only smatterings of the other
community. Fully 25% of villages in this thana identified themselves as wholly Muslim or Htndu. All statistics on Nattore, Rajshahi are
drawn from TaMes I, II and HI, in Seccwd Rqxjrt, pp. 104-177.
2 46
and populations educated in these languages was uneven.
In Nattore, Adams found that of the 38,000 Muslim boys and girls o f school-going
age (4-15 yrs.), only 95 boys were studying Arabic or Persian, a ratio o f approximately
380:1. In the district ofMurshidabad, however, that ratio was 10:1, in Birbhum 3:1, in
Burdwan 9:1, in South Bihar 3:1, and in Tirhut 8:1, also represented primarily by boys.^
The same was noted in Sind, where only 10% o f the students at maktabs were girls.
However, this does mean that among boys in the districts o f Bengal considered by Adams,
a ratio of 4.5-1.5:1 was present where Muslim capitalists maintained their wealth. Such a
high ratio ofboys in some districts being educated in Arabic and/or Persian, as well as the
Introduction to Islam which accompanied their study, cautions against the thinking that
the decline of the madrasa meant the end of access to Arabic and Persian instruction, also
recalling that capitalists who could afford it employed private tutors as well.
Furthermore, these maktabs only represent the higher grade of school. Even the low
number o f people studying Arabic and Persian in Nattore does not imply that those
attending the lower grade o f school were not receiving some Introduction to Islam. For
example, in Sind, Frere reports schools o f just one or two students studying Quran and
Arabic with the tutor teaching in charity or for a pittance in grain or money. He
draws the attention o f the reader to two schools in particular, one where a boy and two
girls are taught Arabic and Persian gratuitously by the wife o f a mochee (cobbler), and
another in which two boys are instructed in the Koran by a blind woman In Bengal
171 104-33.
172 Adams, Third RejXfft, Section DC, jp. 243-55.
173 Frere, "Education in Sind," p. 9.
174 Ibid., p. 11.
247
as well, Adams reports various individuals teaching out of their houses, or conducting
classes in maktabs erected at their own expense. Many of these individuals - identified as
either village artisans and cultivators or professional fakirs and Mollas - did not
teach Arabic, but formal recitation o f the Quran, prayers, and so on. Neither received
renumeration for teaching, but the former made their livelihoods from farming, etc.,
while the latter officiated at weddings and other ceremonial occasion.s. Thus, the
uneven distribution of formal maktabs does not mean that Arabic and Persian were not
being learned outside their presence, or that at least some form o f contact with
representatives of Islam was not accessible to virtually all Muslim villagers and
townspeoples - this discussion not even touching on the presence o f Sufi mazhars
(shrines) across the country-side.
It is striking that men and women o f no social standing were teaching, and boys and
girls were learning (albeit at a disproportionate rate) in the most remote areas and for a
pittance. One must ponder what the literacy rates among artisans and cultivators were
when Captain Hamilton passed through Sind in 1744. On the other hand, one must
acknowledge how far these rates would have fallen in the centwy between his visit and
that o f Richard Burton in 1851. In fact, nothing better illustrates how low Muslim
education had fallen than the fact that the madrasas o f Sind, like that in Rajshahi, Bengal,
did not even teach usul al-fiqh or kalam, let alone tasawwuf or hikma. Thus, the formal
disciplines o f Middle Period Reason and Intuition often succumbed with such institutions
as the Madrasa-i Rahimiyya in Delhi, the institutional hub o f the Wali Allahis, abandoned
175 Adsnss, Second Report, pp. 134-51,
248
for lack of funds by its last ustads, Mawlana Mamluk All and Abd al-Ghani, in 1856.*^^
However, the use o f tutors and the partial survival o f the maktab, whether due to the
individual initiative o f the scholar, or the support ofMuslim capitalists, meant that
literacy in Arabic and/or Persian was sustained to a degree. Furthermore, not only was an
Introduction to Islam part o f the course o f study, but the maktab and private tuition
brought the capitalists into close association with the graduates o f the remaining
madrasas - the men they retained as "mawlawis.
There are but few remarks with which to end this discussion o f EIC reforms in law and
education and the impact on Islamic institutions. While Muslims o f various classes found
a viable place in the colonial regime (as discussed in the next section), much o f the
political elite lost their states, manyJagirdars their lands and multitudes o f cultivators
their rights as a result of EIC policy. In some cases for no other reason than negligence, in
others due to acts motivated by the exigencies of state, but always reflecting the
Ideologies and Utopias o f Europe, the EIC then also striped countless muftis, qadis and
other Muslim scholars of a say in the institutions that shape society itself - that is,
institutions o f learning and the law. It has been shown that in these spheres, if any trace o f
Oriental learning was not expunged, it was widely hoped that it would be in the next set
o f reforms. Thus, there is no doubt the EIC employed both European and South Asian
institutions in its regime. What is difficult is the idea that this regime was in opposition to
175 Hamiuddin Khan, History of Muslim EdaatAm. pp. 144-5.
249
European thought, as is implied in the idea that bourgeois culture found its limit in the
colonial state. That is to say, not only is the analytical category bourgeois defined in
Eurocentric terms in Guha and Chatter] ees conceptions, it is done in a selective way,
including only certain bourgeois ideals and not others.
As this sections discussion suggests, the institutionalization of the feudal lord on a
scale previously unheard o f was the work o f EIC officers like Cornwallis acting on
European bourgeois assumptions about private property.*^ Furthermore, the
disinheritance of daughters, a feudal relic, was legitimate by English jurisprudence. By
displacing local institutions that are difficult to label feudal, while introducing
institutions that embody the category, the EIC regime does not suggest a case in which
European bourgeois culture found its limits, but one in which the European viewed
certain so-called feudal institutions as legitimate. If it was otherwise, one would expect
that in the many sources considered above, British authors and EIC officers would have
argued against haste in expelling Islamic learning and its scholars from colonial
institutions, or argued against the colonial state itself.
In the absence of such arguments, not to reiterate the lack o f more thorough attempts
to include aspects o f Muhammadan Law in personal codes or Oriental learning in the
educational system, the mere presence ofMuslim works and fimctionaries in the EIC
legal and educational regime does not even suggest the type o f synthesis implied by the
term semi-feudal. This certainly does not imply that the colonial state is best thought o f
as following from local trends as far as Muslims are concerned. In fact, these legal and
177 .Sfcific8lly rdated to Cornwallis drafting of the Pennanait Settlenjent, Bose and Jalal write that Cornwallis
impiration was the idea of landteds modelled after the estate-hoWers of England. Bose and Jalal, Modem South Asia, p. 70.
250
educational reforms, as well the larger impact of the colonial state in terms ofMuslim
institutions, support the idea that the colonial state flowed almost exclusively from the
body of ideas called European Modernism, paying little heed to any other bodies of
knowledge. That is to say, as far as the British were concerned, the colonial state was not
sutained by sheepishly circumventing European bourgeois ideals, but was legitimate by
the standards o f 19* century European Modemi;m The question to which this leads i$
whether the colonial state was legitimate from the perspective of the body of ideas called
Islam?
Ill: Muslims and Colonial Institutions: Critical Acceptance and Jihad
The Muslim response to the EIC regime was not monolithic or necessarily anti
colonial, from either a social or an intellectual perspective. Tens o f thousands from all
classes and of all intellectual orientations worked with the British in establishing the
colonial state, while as many others actively worked for its overthrow. Yet, there is some
congruence between a Muslims vocation and education and his or her attitudes toward
the EIC and its institutions. Whether pro, anti or oblivious to the colonial state, the
Muslims considered here suggest that all outlooks were legitimated by Islamic
Utopias/Ideologies. That is to say, nowhere in the intellectualism o f Muslims does one
find European Ideologies and Utopias determining the discourse. There are no
movements analogous to that o f the early 19* century Hindu intellectual^ Ram Mohan
Roy, advocating not only the pursuit of European languages and sciences, but also a
251
synthesis of European and Hindu religion and metaphysics. In the case of Muslims,
Middle Islam and Sober Modemism dominate the rhetoric of vemacular discourse,
though European thought is paramount in colonial institutions.
a) Translation, Travel and the Fatwa
S.A.A. Rizvi, the sole contemporary scholar to write at any length on developments
among the philosophically inclined between 1707-1858, suggests that thinkers such as
Tafaz al-Husain Hasani (d. 1801) - a madrasa graduate and, in the later years of his life,
a high-ranking officer in the government o f Oudh - picked up where the likes of
Danishmand Khan had left off, learning Greek, Latin and English, and using them to
produce a Persian translation of Newtons Philosophica Naturalls Principia
Mathematica, among other works.'* Rizvi also writes ofKhwaja Farid al-Din (d. 1818), a
noted mathematician and astronomer and his students The overall tenor o f Rizvis
research suggests that even among the philosophically inclined, the tendency o f the period
was to remain within the bounds o f Middle Period metaphysics, while responding to
European thought by concentrating most heavily on the physical sciences. The closest
anyone came to stepping beyond, in Rizvis estimation, was the writing o f Mawlana
Karamat Ali (d. 1876).
In Karamat Alls Risala fi Ma 'akhidh al- Ulian, Rizvi identifies the first attempt to
address a growing problem with philosophical writings among Muslims. That is, neither
178 Rizvi, Isna Asharis. p. 228.

179 Ibid, p. 364-63.
252
the metaphysics of the falasifa, or of the mutakallimun, appeared to match the findings of
the aforementioned physicists under the influence o f the works o f their European
contemporaries. Something o f this problem, and Karamat Alis response, can be gleaned
from the following passage translated and included in Rizvis writings:
The whole Quran is full of passages containing information on physical and

mathematical sciences. If we would but spend a little reflection over it we should
find wonderous meanings in every word it contains. The Quran has most
satisfactorily confuted all the systems o f ancient philosophy; it plucked up from the
root the physical sciences as prevalent among the ancients. What a strange
coincidence exists between the Quran and the philosophy o f modem Europe.
While this passage may have prompted Rizvi to laud Karamat Ali for forwarding the
spirit of Intoxicated Reason into the mid-19*^ century, Rizvis discussion of the latters
work does not suggest that Karamat Ali went further than arguing that the philosophy of
modem Europe did not contradict the Quran. He did not offer an argument by which to
assimilate (or rationally reject) a Newtonian, rather than a Ptolemaic cosmos, let alone
the soon to arise thesis of Darwinism, on Quranic grounds. No new metaphysic issued
from Karamat Alis pen. Indeed, if Rizvis work is any indication, in this regard Karamat
Ali is in the company o f all Intoxicated intellectuals o f the period,
A case in point is Mirza Abu Talib (d. 1818), a waztr of Oudh and one o f the earliest
travelers from the region to northem Europe.^*' He writes with much praise on the
technological, industrial and scientific accomplishments of Europe, lauding the university
180 Cited in Rizvi, Isna Asharis. p. 367.

181 While in Britain, Abu Talib met up with another Muslim traveller, Saqi Din Muhammad of Patna, who also wrote a
travelogue. The latter work, titled The Travels of Dean Mahomet (1793-4), bears the distinction of being the earliest extant work by a
Muslim in the English language, and its authors one of the first Muslims to settle in Britain, where he lived as an entrepreneur, opening
peihaps the first Indian* restaurant in Europe, among other ventures. The work has recently been reprinted with a biographical essay of
its author, as. Dean Mahomet The Travels of Dean Mahomet. Michael H. Fischer, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
The original publication can be foimd in the microfilm coUeotion, The Eighteenth Centuiv.
253
system on which it is all built, but he has little to say about the metaphysics current at the
time. Barely touching on the subject, he merely comments:
The English have very peculiar opinions on the subject of perfection. They insist that
it is merely an ideal quality, and depends entirely upon comparison; that mankind has
risen, by degrees, from the state o f savages to the exalted dignity o f the great
philosopher Newton; but that, so far from having yet attained perfection, it is
possible that, in future ages, philosophers will look with as much contempt on the
acquirements o f Newton as we now do on the rude state of arts among savages. If
this axiom of theirs be correct, man has yet much to learn, and all his boasted
knowledge is but vanity.
Abu Talibs opinion of the materialism that informs this axiom is only indirectly
commented on in an assessment of British social institutions that he clearly bases on
conversations with men in the classes aware o f Newtonian mechanics. He states that the
first and greatest defect I observed in the English is their want o f faith in religion, and
their great inclination to philosophy [atheism] This want of principle has led to a
society ordered by little more than the honour o f the superior classes, the severity o f
the laws and the fear o f punishment, but totally devoid of honesty. It is also a
society unresponsive to the protestations of people burdened under the great increase of
taxes and high price of provisions. Insurrection is only averted by vigilant magistrates
and the deployment of soldiers to patrol the streets day and night, to disperse all persons
whom they saw assembling together. Clearly, Abu Talibs praise o f European learning
did not include its metaphysics or its political and legal philosophies.
Reflecting on the state of the Muslim World, Abu Talib despaired that his account of
the curiosities and wonders and the manner and customs of the places visited would
182 Abu Talib Khan. Travels of Miiza Abu Taleb Khan, vol. 2, trans. C. Stewart (London: Longman etal., 1814), pp. 165-
66 .
183 Ibid:, pp. 128-31.
254
be in vain due to the want of energy and the indolent disposition of the rich, the
vanity and limited knowledge of the learned, and the difficulty of procuring a
livelihood for the rest.'*^ He also hints at a scholarly bias against European manners and
customs, stating that the indolent elite, too lazy to read a book requiring intellectual
effort, would under the pretense of zeal for religion, entirely abstain and refrain from
perusing it.*^ Yet, when one considers Abu Talibs attitudes it is quite apparent that his
account of the European is as much edited by religion as the attitudes of the Muslims he
criticizes. Indeed, the interest o f all the above scholars in acquiring no more than the
languages and physical sciences o f Europe is firmly rooted in Middle Islam, particularly
of the Sober varieties. That the leading representatives o f Intoxicated Reason reflect this
Sober bias suggests just how far from Akbars Ibadat Khanna the Muslim scholarly elite
had come. In particular, it suggests that the Sober were playing a prominent role in the
legitimation o f interaction between Muslims and Europeans.
Among the Sober, the response is certainly more apprehensive, but by no means
dismissive of the EIC regime. One of Wali Allahs grandsons, Abd al-Hayy (d. 1828),
served as a mufti in the EIC judiciary with Shah Abd al-Azizs blessing Furthermore,
regarding the study o f European sciences, Abd al-Azizs attitude can be gleaned from
his response to the question of the legality of studying logic (mantiq):
The legality o f an instrument depends on the purpose for which it is used.. ..Should
someone learn logic to support an untrue faith and confuse correct beliefs, the sin
would lie in performing those unlawful acts and not in learning logic. The
prohibition on learning logic by ancient jurists seems to have been based on two
reasons. Firstly, people were so deeply devoted to the study o f logic that they ignored
184 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 1.
185 Ibid, p. 6,
186 See, Rizvi, Shah Abd al-Aziz. pp. 239.40.
255
shari 'a knowledge, whose acquisition is the true aim of life. The rule also applies to
excess devotion to grammar and rhetoric. Secondly, it was forbidden in ancient times
because of the fact that logic was used to support beliefs of Mutazila andfalasifa.
Excessive devotion to works of these led to the amalgamation of their false
ideologies with the rightful beliefs o f Islam. The situation has now changed, for logic
has been part of kalam and its acquisition is no longer illegal or sinful.
That is to say, Abd al-Aziz exhibits little antipathy to the study of the philosophical
sciences, as long as that study does not contradict the creed established by the
mutakallimun, very much like al-Ghazali.
Both the employment of Abd al-Hayy and Abd al-Azizs response to the study o f
logic confirm that the Sober, including the Wali Allahis, were not dismissive o f the EIC
legal or educational regimes. However, one can predict that the removal o f the mufti from
the legal process, as well as institutions that encouraged unlawful acts, would elicit a
negative response. Thus, when asked about the conversion of jagirs into private property,
Shah Abd al-Aziz acknowledged the right o f the Mughals as Imams to have made
grants of a permanent (tadib) and temporary { ' a r i y a t ) nature. However, he argued that
these grants were the ultimate arbiters in the status of land. By means of this argument,
Abd al-Aziz suggested that only zamindars with firmans mentioning tadib could be
considered proprietors. The rest, including madad-i ma 'ash holders, could only be
considered as recipients of a loan {ariyat) from the bayt al-mal (treasury), which the
Imam managed in trust for the benefit o f all Muslims
The conflict between the lawful in Abd al-Azizs estimation, and that of the EIC
regimes Permanent Settlement, is quite apparent. The entire issue appears to have come
187 From a letter to the Amir of Bukhara, cited in Rizvi, Shah Ahd al-Aziz. p. 241.
188 Rizvi, Shah Abd al-Aziz. pp. 211-23. Also see, Shalt A
bd al- 'Aziz, Fatawa-i Shah 'Abd at- 'Aziz, vol. 2 (Delhi: n.p.,
1893-94). p. 23.
25 6
to a head in the first years of the 19**^century, when Abd al-Aziz added afatwa to many
others declaring areas under EIC rule to be dar al-harb, as opposed to dar al-Islam. He
wrote:
According to the Kafi [by Hakim al-Shahid (d. 945)], those territories (bilad) where
the orders of the Imams were obeyed and which were under their control were called
dar ul-Islam. In this city (Delhi), the Muslims Imam al-Muslimin [i.e., the
incumbent Mughal] is unable to enforce his orders; instead the Christian officers
orders are openly carried out. The implimentation of the infidels orders means that
they are in foil control of administrative matters. They govern the people, collect
kharaj, baj (road toll), ushr (tithe) on commercial goods, punish thieves and robbers
and decide law-suits according to their own regulations. They (the Christian rulers)
do not interfere with some Islamic ordinances such as those on Friday prayers,
congregational prayers of the two eids, adhan and cow sacrifice only because they do
not value the basic principles of these practices to which they are indifferent. They
unhesitatingly demolish mosques. No Muslim or dhimmi can enter this city or its
suburbs without seeking their protection. In their own interests they do not prohibit
the entry of common visitors, but eminent people.. .can not enter without their
specific permission...
The issuance of such fatawa beginning in the early 19th century is most important
because they raised the issue of jihad against the EIC. The issue appears to have been
debated by Abd al-Azizs contemporaries and latter-day followers, as much as it was by
officers of the EIC. In the former realm, Rizvi recounts a number of fatawa that suggest
that Abd al-Aziz did not advocate hijra orjihad under the conditions he describes in the
above fatwa. In Rizvis words, the Shah wrote that hijra was imperative only from a dar
al-harb in which infidel rulers prohibited their Muslim subjects from preaching Islam,
observing fasts and namaz [salat\ and performing congregational and Friday prayers,
adhan and circumcision.'^ jihad was also argued to be unnecessary as long as
these provisions were observed. However, many others appear to have disagreed with
189 Shah Abd al-Aziz, Fatawa-i Shah "Abd al- Aziz, vol. 1, p. 115. The translation is frcan Rizvi, Shah Abd al-Aziz p.
227.
257
Abd al-Aziz on the content of these provisions, some arguing that they were too lenient
and others finding them too harsh. The aspect of the debate that resounds in the context of
this study is that even among Sober Modernists that viewed British India as dar al-harb,
anti-colonial activity was not unanimously considered a religious obligation. The result
was that for those who found a place in the EIC regime. Intoxicated and Sober scholars
provided ample acceptance, if not legitimation, for participation. At the same time, the
same complex of thought held the most appealing rhetorical and institutional alternatives
to the colonial state, thus also permeating the course of anti-colonial movements among
Muslims.
b) Mughals, Sober Modernists and the Muhammadan Conspiracy'
On January 17,1857 - only months before much of historic Hindustan would rise
against the EIC regime - an A llens India Mail writer in London declared' India is in
the enjoyment of profound internal tranquility.*^^ By February in colonial newspapers,
and March in the British press, reports of native regiments in the EIC Bengal Army
turning their rifles on their European officers, some accusing the British of insulting their
190 Fatawa-i Shah 'Abd al- 'Aziz, vol. 1, pp. 51-2.: Rizvi. Sbah Abd al-Aziz. p. 236,
191 The Uprising of 1857 has been the subject of historical writing since it occurred. The most influential scholarship
includes, C.A. Bayly, ed. The Peasant Armed: Indian Revolt of 1857 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). For a Subaltemist perspective, see,
Oautam Bhadra, Four Rebels of 1857, Selected Subaltern Studies. R. Guha and Spivak, 0 ., eds. (New York; Oxford University Press,
1988). For an excellent account of the event and a critical analysis of Orientalist perspectives, see, S.B. Chaudhuri, Theories of Indian
Mutiny (Calcutta: World Press, 1965).
\97Allen's India Mail (Januaiy 17, 1857), p. 57. Other newspapers considered in this discussion and found in the microfilm
collection. Early English Newspapers, are: The British Indian Advocate', The British Standard; The Colonial Gazette; and. The
Gaurdian. Also consulted, but published separately: The London Times. All papers were read for British India related news in the year
1857.
258
religious sensibilities by greasing their rifles with cow or pig fat, began to surface. Such
sporadic insurrections would continue to be reported until May 11, when the Sepoy (i.e.,
sipahi) regiments at Meerut rose along with many of the townspeople, killed all their
officers, massacred all other Europeans they could lay their hands on, set free all
prisoners in EIC custody, then rode to Delhi and issued proclamations restoring the
authority of the Mughal state under the aging pensioner Bahadur Shah Zafar
As more regiments of the EICs Bengal Army rebelled with townspeople, pastoralists
and cultivators at their side, nawabs, rajas and their zamindars joined the insurrection,
either under the Mughal banner or, as in the case of Oudh, independently. On July 1, the
Bombay Times reported that the Bengal Army had ceased to exist, 56 regiments in
mutiny, the remaining 20 disbanded for fear they would follow their native
c o l l e a g u e s . A wide swath of territory, from East Punjab to West Bengal encompassing
a myriad of states, Muslim and Hindu, was now independent of colonial rule. Wherever
192 Such reports were usually based on the accounts of British officials, either from the military, the judiciary, the civil
service or the clergy, and their femiUes. In the wake of the events of 1857, N.A. Chick, the editor of an English language newspaper in
Lucknow, sought to gather the recollections of as many of these individuals for posterity. The result was Chicks monumental Annals of
the Indian Rebellioa first published in Calcutta in 1859. This work is also consulted here, in the form of an abridged version published
as, N.A. Chick. The Annals o f the Indian Rebellion- David Hutchinson, ed. (London: Charles Knight and Co., 1974). For an account of
events concerning greased cartidges as they unfolded at Banackpore - an oft sighted case of a soldier turning his rifle on his offer in the
secondary literature - see. Chick, pp. 7-17.
194 One proclamation at Delhi read: To all Hindus and Muslims, citizens and servants of Hindustan, the officers of the army
now at Delhi and Meerut send greetings. It is well known that in these days all the English have entertained evil designs: first to destroy
the religion of the whole Hindustan army, and then to make the people by compulsion Christians. Therefore we, solely on account of our
religion, have combined with the people.. .and have reestablished the Delhi dynasty on these term s.. ..It is further necessary that all
Hindus and Muslims unite in this struggle... Cited in Chaudhuri, Theories of Indian Mutiny, pp. 48-9. This was by no means the only
jffoclamation issued. Although most originals have been lost, in the wake o f the Uprising, British officers and agents gathered a great
deal of literature in search of evidence of the Uprisings origins. These were translated and many preserved in the India Office Records of
the British Library. A selectirai o f these, including^hto>a and faramin by religious and political figures, have been published as Salim
al-Din Quraishi, Cry for Freedom: Proclamations ofM uslim Revolutionaries of 1857 (Lahore: Sang-i Meel, 1997). For proclamations
other than the one cited above, see, pp. 1-60; 100-1; 105-8.
195 This article was also published on A iûst 1,1857, Z.oncfon Times, p. 10.
259
the insurrection spread, Europeans were killed, while all signs of the EIC regime, such as
post-offices, barracks, police stations, court houses, and so on, were looted and
destroyed.'^
In the following weeks and months, newspapers in Britain and British India would
feature the recollections of Europeans fleeing the areas where anti-colonial forces held
sway/^^ These included letters from defeated officers, refugees and their relatives calling
for revenge, along side the prayers of Christian clerics that the heathen be smote to
fulfil, as the Bishop of London put it, the destinies of our race and the progress of
Christ and civilization.'^* There were also reports panicked by sporadic regimental
uprisings as far south as Aurangabad and Hyderabad, as far west as Peshawar and east as
Calcutta. Peppered among such letters and reports, and one also finds reassuring
articles pointing out that the Bombay and Madras Armies had remained largely intact, and
the nawabs, rajas and zamindars of these Presidencies mainly l o y a l , a n d many
196 An eye-witness account of the e v ^ ts at Delhi reads:

... the dawk bungalow was burned togther with several houses near it, and the inmates ruthlessly butchered. The treasury and
bank were looted, the Church and the Delhi Gazette Press destroyed, and the college and all public offices set fire to or battered down.
Private houses were entered by troopers (their horses being held at the gates of the gardens), who said they did not come for loot but hfe;
and when they were disappointed in their greed of European blood, they let in the badmashes [scoundrels] of the city, who in the soace of
half and hour cleared out the best regulated houses, from punkah [fan] to to floor cloth. See, Chick, Annals of the Indian Rebellion, p. 79.
197 For the letters of British refugees (men and women) from Delhi, Meerut, Neemuch and Gwalior, see, London Times (July
23,1857), p. 9/(August 18,1857), pp. 3-4; (July 24, 1857), p. 5; (August 7, 1857), p. 12; (August 21. 1857), p. 7.
198 The types of calls for revenge can be gauged from a letter to the London Times from a former EIC officer whose son
was now in service. He wrote that Delhi should be razed to the ground, its puppet k ii^ tried and if found gulity... publicly exectited.
London Times (July 17, 1857), p. 10. For letters from South Asia, a strident example appeared in the London Times on August 3, 1857,
p. 5. Permed in Calcutta on Jime 18, 1857, the author wrote: If our soldiers knockdown every filthy idol they see, and lay every masjid
level to the ground, and if they polute every shrine and plunder every one which is worth plundering, Ishall not be sorry . Also see,
London Times (August 8, 1857), pp. 1l-12/(August 25, 1857), p. 6. For the Bishop of Londons letter, see, London Times (August 6,
1857), p. 8. Also, for a letter from the Bishop of Oxford, see, London Times (Augtist 20, 1857), pp. 10-11; and, for a letter from a
clergyman in South Asia, see, London Times (August 25, 1857), p. 6.
199 See, Allen's India Mail (April 15, 1857), pp. 233-35; (April 29, 1857), p. 266; and, (May 19, 1857), p. 299.
200 Interestingly, the London Times first report of disturbances was published on July 1, 1857, and was itself an example of
260
editorials (taken up below) on why this happened and who was responsible.
In Parliament, those who favoured direct British rule undermined the EIC by blaming
their ineptitude and corruption for driving the people to revolt. Benjamin Disraeli went as
far as to call the Uprising a national movement On the other side of the Hou.se of
Commons, those in favour o f the EIC largely followed the arguments forwarded by EIC
directors that this was no more than a military mutiny, that the Mughals were the
soldiers puppets and the native rabble only in it for a share of l o o t . The reason that
the totality of British responses to the Uprising is important here, is that in the
newspapers, the above theses shared the pages with accounts by EIC officials and pro
colonial South Asians that the Uprising was the result of a Muhammadan Conspiracy.
Contemporary historians have long dismissed the idea o f a conspiracy, as well as that
of a military mutiny and a national movement.^ In seeking to avoid the conspiracy
theorists emphasis on what Bose and Jalal term the religious factor, these and other
South Asianists remind one that even among Muslims in revolt, united action was seldom
achieved, participants dividing along lines of class, ethnicity and sect. Furthermore,
although millenarianism is described as a feature of certain particpants motives, the
reassurance that the rebellion was restricted to the soldiers o f the Bengal Army and would not attract zamindars (p. 9). By way of
contrast, m Allens India Mail, the first report of disturbances appears on April 15 (1857), pp. 233-34, and through May, June and July
(1857), this newspaper makes no attempt to reassure its readers that the sepoys alone are in revolt. Clearly, the location and affiliations
of the specific newspaper played a role in how the Uprising was reported and understood.
201 See, Parliamentary Minutes, London Times (July 18, 1857), p. 5; (July 28, 1857), pp. 6-7. Incidently, the idea of the
1857 Uprising as a national movement was picked up Marx and Engels, in their. The First Indian War of Indeitendence. 1857-59
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, (reprint) 1975). It then became a staple argument among Indian and Hindu Nationalists in the 20th
century, spearheaded by such authors as V.D. Savaikar.
202 London Times (July 18, 1857), p. 6; (July 28, 1857), pp. 6-7.
202 Apart from the works cited above, see, K.K, Datta, Anti-British Plots and Movements Before 1857 (Meerut: Meenakshi
Prakashan, 1970); Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Rai: studies in Asgarian Society and Peasant rebellion in Colonial India
(Cambridge: University Press, 1978); Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insuregencv in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford
261
effects of EIC annexations, land reforms, fiscal policies and army management, rather
than the fanaticism imagined by the conspiracy theorists, are described as the ultimate
motivators of the rebels.
Thus, the fragmentary nature of the 1857 Uprising and the anti-colonial
underpinnings of the calls to jihad heard even before 1857, are well established. In fact,
C. Bayly and others have noted that since the issuance offatawa declaring British India
dar al-harb in the early years of the 19* century, a plethora of movements against the
colonial state and its partners were expressed in terms of j i h a d In the 1806, elements
of the Madras Army rose again in Vellore, proclaiming their struggle a jihad against the
farangi kafirs. Also, in Madras in 1806, there were riots against grain monopolists in the
name of religion. On the Malabar coast, four years earlier, Mapilla cultivators had already
launch ajihad against Hindu landlords and their EIC backers. Moving north, in 1808,
one Abd al-Rahman Mandawi declared himself Imam Mahdi and led a mujahidin force
of weavers and cultivators against zamindars and the British, while one Tipu Sahib was
organizing the hill tribes of eastern Bengal in a struggle against Hindu zamindars and the
British in that locality. In the early 1820s, an Islamic state was founded east of Bengal,
while Haji Shariat Allahs Wahhabi-inspired Faraidi movement was gaining popularity
among the cultivators, weavers and petty zamindars of east Bengal, and would continue
University Press, 1983); and S.B. Chaudhuri. Civil Disturbances durina British Rule in India. 1765-1857 (Calcutta: World Press, 1955).
204 All the movement mentioned here axe featured in, Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire. Also,
Bose and Jalal, Modem South Asia, pp. 85-87.
204 For a more thorough introduction to the M apilks, see, S.F. Dale. Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The
Mapillas of Malabar. 1498-1922 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). For the history of Mapilla insurrection in the 19th century, see,
Conrad Wood, Peasant Revolt: An Interpretation of Moplah Violence in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Peasant Resistance in India.
David Hardimann, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1993): 126-52.
262,
to exert an influence into the 1850s under his son, Muhsin al-Din Ahmad (d. 1860).^^
The Mapillas rose again in the 1830s and early 1850s. There were also demonstrations
against Christian missionary activities in the 1840s and 50s.
In each of the above cases, the local causes and actions of each movement have been
revealed by the historians reviewing them, and the fractured nature of these movements
has been related to the 1857 Uprising such that the latter event was most significantly
different in only scale and duration. Yet, in downplaying uniformity in rhetoric to unveil
local aspirations, the Utopian/Ideological aspect of these movements, including the 1857
Uprising, is overshadowed. As well, the degree to which certain movements sought and
succeeded in bridging local boundaries of class, ethnicity and sect is often overlooked.
Thus, it remains to be asked whether the rhetorical uniformity observed echoes anything
of the ideas of Muslim India already shown to have been circulating among the
scholarly and political elite.
Apart from the identification of the Mughals as Caliphs by much of the Muslim
elite, it was previously mentioned that Wali Allahis had added the idea of an Imam to
the rhetoric o f elite Muslims. The involvement of Mughals and Wali Allahis in the 1857
Uprising, therefore, provides a point at which to begin the discussion of rhetorical
uniformity in terms o f jihad - these groups both having included notions of Muslim
India in their writing, while also being prime suspects as leaders of the Muhammadan
Conspiracy imagined by certain British officers. As early as April 1857, before the
soldiers proclamations at Delhi in May, Allen's India Mail published articles wary of a
205 See, Mir Zohair Husain, Three Preminent Islamic Revivalists in 19th Century Bengal: Titu Mir, Haji Shariat Allah and
Dudu Mian, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society 34:3 (July 1986): 215-20.
263
larger conspiracy behind the sporadic regimental uprisings beginning in March. The
Bombay correspondent reported that ^chapatis" (bread) had been passed from village to
village throughout that month, a reason to worry as the passing of foods in this manner
had previously served as the signal for the commencements of uprisings He concluded
with the observation that an extraordinary system of network... unites together every
town, village and hamlet in Hindustan Tn the next few months, many reports of the
functioning of this network would follow. Allen 's India Mail would report on the ongoing
arrest of "mawlawis preaching jihad to troops, and incidents in which plots to kill
officers and EIC officials were foiled. The London Times offered such fare as a letter
from an official in the court of the Maharaja of Indore - whose territories had been the
site of violence - pleading that the soldiers and townspeople had demanded the heads of
British officers and their collaborators. It added that the mutineers had also [Muslim]
philosophers and historians among them.^ A letter from Bengal warned that in every
station, in every city of the Bengal Presidency, the movers of the present rising have
agents sowing discontent and circulating intelligence.^ Another letter reports that 4
vernacular newspapers around Fatehpur were calling for people to rise in June and July,
and that a native officer in the EIC judiciary was involved. It adds that the
insurrectionists seem to expect a large army from Afghanistan and Muslim lands further
206 A detailed disoription of the passing of chapatis, as well as a report on the subject from a magistrate to an official in
Delhi dated February 19, 1857, is included in. Chick, Aimals of the Indian Revellion. pp. 5-6.
208 Allen's India Mail (April 15,1857), pp. 233-5; (April 29,1857), p. 266.
209 For example, Allens IndiaMail (August 1, 1857), p. 458; p. 463.
210 London Times (August 22, 1857), p. 6.
211 London Times (July 15,1857), p. 5.
264
west to come to their aid.^'^
Mention of preachers and an army from the west leads one to the activities of
certain Wali Allahis during this period, in particular Shah Muhammad Ismail, author of
the previously discussed Taqwiyat al-Iman. Together with Ahmad Barelvi (d. 1831),
fellow student at the Wali Allahi madrasa at Delhi, Muhammad Ismail ranks among the
earliest of South Asias Muslims to have interpreted the fatawa declaring British India
dar al-harb to legitimate jihad. The movement - most often referred to as the Barelvi
jihad - began in 1818, when its leaders began preaching Wali Allahi and Tariqa-i
Muhammadiyya doctrine across the Ganges region.^Âfter Shah Abd al-Azizs death in
1820 and a sojourn for hajj, however, preparations began for an armed struggle in 1824.
Two years later, in 1826, leading disciples were dispatched to Bengal and other parts of
South Asia to preach and rally support for the cause against the British, while Ahmad
Barelvi, Muhammad Ismail and others began a hijra to Durrani territory in
Afghanistan.^^'^ That the movement was ultimately directed against the British, though it
began in Punjab against the Sikhs, is best illustrated by the fact that another disciple, Mir
212 Ijondon Times (August 20, 1857), p. 10.

213 Although a great deal has been written on Ahmad Barelvi and the jihad he launched with Muhammad Ismail,
Muhammad Hedayetullahs Sawid Ahmad (Lahore: Shan Muhammad Ashraf, 1970) remains an outstanding singular source on Ahmad
Barelvis intellectual background and orientation. For a consideration of Ahmad Barelvis specific relationship with Shah Wali Allahs
thought, however, see, Ghulam Muhammad Jalfar, Teachings of Shah Wali Allah and the Movement o f Sayyid Ahmad Shahid of
Bareilly, Hamdard Islamicus 16:4 (1993): 69-80.
214There has been some debate about whether Ahmad Barelvi, et al., directed their jihad at the British, mostly caused by the
apologetics of late-19th and early 20th century Muslim authors. In the next diapter, we focus on one such author in Sayyid Ahmad Khan,
atid mention others such as Siddiq Hasan Khan, who argued that the jihad was merely against the Sikhs to primarily lessen the blows of
British reprisals for the 1857 Uprising. A thorough discussion of the issue is available in a series o f articles by Shafi Ali Khan, The
Nationalist Ulamas Interpretation of Shah Wali Allahs Thought and Movement, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society 37:3
(1989): 209-48; The Nationalist Ulamas Interpretation of Shah Wali Allahs Thought and Movement: the Post-Jihad Period, Journal
of the Pakistan Historical Society 38:1 (1990): 35-75; and, The Nationalist Ulamas Interpretation of Shah Wali Allahs Thought and
Movement: Some Ideological and Intellectual Deviations of Deoband Dar ul-Ulam from the Fundamentals o f Wali Allahi Philosophy,
265
Nithar Ali (d. 1831), was killed by British forces in Bengal the same year that the leaders
o f the movement were slain at the other end o f South Asia in Punjab Tn other words,
Ahmad Barelvi and Muhammad Ismails hijra was one in the legal sense, from dar al-
harb to dar al-Islam, and scholars agree that troops for ajihad were to be recruited along
the way.
In Sind and Baluchistan, the Barelvi mujahidin were cordially received, but local
zamindars did not show any enthusiasm for their cause. Among the Sufis of Sind,
however, the cause won somewhat more substantial support. For example, the influential
Qadiriyya line of Fir Pagaro even dispatched a number o f their own militia, the Hurrs,
usually sworn to protect the foundingp i f s revered descendents alone The same
pattern of recruitment was continued in Afghanistan, with 270 "ulama joining the cause
in Qandahar, but the Durranis of Ghazna pledging no troops. In Peshawar too, only the
Yusufzai tribe provided limited support. Ahmad Barelvi also dispatched letters (in
vain) to various Amirs in Central Asia, stating that the wicked Christians... harass the
Muslims in general and their leaders in particular. They have extended their hands of
tyranny over the mosques and Islamic places of worship. The shari a laws have been
obliterated and the laws of infidelity introduced.^'* Clearly, although the Sikh state in
Punjab was the movements first target, the colonial state was the movements ultimate
Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society 38:3 (1990): 192-219.

214 Mir Zohair Husain, Three Preminent Islamic Revivalists in 19th Century Bengal: Titu Mir, Haji Shari'at Allah and
Dudu Mian, p. 216.
215 For the line of Qadiriyya p in known as the Pagaros - one of the most influential figures in Sinds religious and political
life since the early 19lh craitury, see, Sarah Ansaii, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Piis of Sind (Lahore: Vangaurd Books, 1992). For a
primary account of the mujahidin's visit to Sind, see, J. Bumes, A Visit to the Court of Sinde fsicl (Bombay : a p ., 1829), p. 100.
217 Rizvi, Shah AM al-Azi?.. p. 487.
218 Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi, Makaiih-i Sayyid Ahmad (Lahore: Photolitho., ad), f. 18a. Cited in ibid., p. 491. For the
266
quarry. As for the Sikhs, they were branded polytheists, while local Hindus were invited
to make common cause with the mujahidin and limited numbers are known to have
responded affirmatively.^'^
Although Ahmad Barelvi and Muhammad Ism ail were killed in battle against the
Sikhs in 1831, only five years after setting out for Peshawar,^^ leaving the movement
splintered, by all accounts it was by no means over. After the deaths of its founders, the
movement split into a number of factions. In Peshawar, a disciple named Shaykh Wali
Muhammad continued the struggle, receiving bay a as the new Amir al-Mu 'minin. In
Patna, the struggle was continued by Mawlawi Wilayat Ali (d. 1858). In Delhi, Shah
Muhammad Ishaq (d. 1846) - successor of Shah Abd al-Aziz as head of the Madras-i
Rahimiyya - eventually shifted to Mecca in 1842, hoping to elicit Ottoman support to
drive British from South Asia (obviously without success). Recalling that conspiracy
theorists reported the expectation of an army from the west, both the jihad out of
Peshawar and this last development are particularly pertinent. Indeed, one can tie the
Barelvi mujahidin to this idea by means of more than the circumstantial evidence of
Muhammad Ishaqs mission, for no less than Shah Muhammad lsmail participated in
propagating the prophecy that British rule over Hindustan would last one hundred
years, until a figure often described in the literature of the 1857 Uprising as Shah
movements insistence on the legality of jihad, see, Muhammad Ismail, Siral-i Mustaqim, cited fully above.
213 S. Ali Khan, The Nationahst Ulamas Interpretation O f Shah Wali Allahs Thought and Movement: The Post-Jihad
Period, p. 37.
220 In those five years, support firom the Durranis and local Pashtun tribes would largely depend on the mujahidins military
successes, which were few. Furthermore, the anti-custom Sober Modernist creed that the movements leaders sought to propogate soon
alientated them ftom the local scholarly elite as w ell Shafi Ali Khan, The Nationalist 'Ulam as Interpretation of Shah Wali Allahs
Thought and Movement, pp. 243-44.
220 Shafi Ali Khan, The Nationalist Ulamas Interpretation of Shah Wali Allahs Thought and Movement: The Post-Jihad .
267
Gharhf (King of the West) would defeat them.^ Thus, the evidence that the Barelvi
mujahidin played an important part in shaping the rhetoric of the 1857 Uprising is quite
apparent. The issue that bears further consideration is whether this rhetoric won popular
support, as well as what type of infrastructure was erected to continue the struggle for
decades.
Returning to the conspiracy theory, one finds the writing of Captain J. Sutherland of
the Bombay Army, recalling that before the deaths of Ahmad Barelvi and Muhammad
Ismail, funds were flowing to Peshawar from Delhi, Lucknow, Calcutta and Hyderabad,
donated by Sunni and Shii, rich and poor; and, hundreds of men would be seen
assembling in Delhi from neighbouring regions, then setting off to join the Jihad More
importantly, he noted that the movements moulavee [sic] instructors - that is, teachers
{mawlawis) and village imams - still preached throughout British India and the native
states at the time he was writing in the 1850s. The evidence he adds is a series of events
in which the measures of our Government had led to civil unrest on religious grounds
and involving the instigation of mawlawis. For example, he records that the decrees of a
Commissioner in Mysore had cancelled grants of land and money, left 8,000 families
destitute and roused much resentment in that area. In this heated atmosphere, people had
Phase, pp. 38-39.

221 In all the South Asian version-s o f this prophecy, the author is said to be the Persian poet, Nimat Allah Wali (d. 1430).
N imat Allah did, in fact, compose a divan bemoaning the state of the world and prophecying the coming of the Mahdi, but the events of
the South Asian versions - including that of Shah Muhammad Isma'il in his, Al-Araba infi Ahwal al-Mahdiyin - bear little resemblance
to N i'm at Allahs work. As for the connection with 1857, it is significant to note that Muhammad IsmaiPs is one of many versions in
circulation, his even appearing in print by 1851. For a brief discussion of the above background, two versions o f the poem circulating in
1857 an various official British correspondence on the significance of these poems and the identity of Shah Gharbi, see, Quraishi, ed.
Crv for Freedom, pp. xvi-xvii; 86-108. Also, there is mention of the prophecy in one of the proclamations issued by the army at Delhi in
1857. See, p. 2; 28.
223 J. Sutherland, Sketches of the Relations Subsisting Between the British Govemment in India and the Different Native
268
begun to slaughter pigs at mosques (Sunni and Shii) and proclaim that the mosque was
defiled by Christians across the Deccan He associates both fakirs and sepoys with
such protests, and the killing of British officers in which both of the above, and local
people, are found to be involved, thus concluding that they must ultimately be to blame
for the same occuring in 1857.
After the Uprising, judicial proceedings and the reports of officially directed
investigators would add volumes to EIC knowledge of the activities of the Barelvi
mujahidin on the home-front. In essence, they would confirm that by 1858, the mujahidin
included a vast network of mawlawis and village imams that acted as propagandists and
fundraisers, enjoining and receiving the support of urban and rural Muslim capitalists,
as well as artisans and cultivators. The extent of the network uncovered warranted a
number of trials, convictions, transportations and confiscations throughout the 1860s.^^^
As far as EIC authorities were concerned, seditious Wahhabis were to be found
particularly in Bengal, Bihar, Hindustan and Punjab, though adherents of the sect were
also noted in the Deccan, but observed to be acquiescent to British rule. It is to Bengal,
States, pp. 3-9.

224 The defilement o f a religious communitys sacred site seems to have been a widespread and longstanding mode of
protest. For example, Mir Nithar Ali, previously mentioned as a disciple of Ahmad Barelvi active in Bengal, is noted to have defiled a
Hindu temple with cows blood when local Hindu zamindars and EIC courts tailed to redress his grievances - a tax cm beards. If
Sutherlands account is accurate, it appears that the defilement of ones own sacred space in the name of an enemy was a means of
public insightment employed by anti-colonial forces. For Nishtar Ali, see, Mir Zohair Husain, Three Preminent Islamic Revivalists in
19th Century Bengal: Titu Mir, Haji Shari'at Allah and Dudu Mian, p. 216. The roots of this method of protest/instigation are argued
by C.A. Bayly to lie in notions of soveriegnty and the sacred space, as well as in the contestation for local authority spurred by the
decline of Muslims elites before the rise of largely Hndu landed and commercial elites and middle-classes, as well as the introduction of
new Muslim elements into the enviroiunent, such as Afghanis and Arabs, in large numbers. See, C.A. Bayly, The Pre-History of
Commimalism? Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860, pp. 186-201.
225 Fifty-four police reports and administrative documents relating to five sets of trials, as well as the judicial proceeding and
depositions of two trials, are published as: Muinuddin Ahmad Khan, ed. Selections from Bengal Government Records on Wahhabi
Trials 11863-18701 iDaeca: Asiatic Society ofPakistan, 1961). For a secondary account, also see, Rafiuddin Ahmad, The Bengal
269
therefore, that attention must be drawn - the site of heated activity for which
documentation is plentiful.
In the Maldah and Rajmahal districts, beginning in 1868, the British investigated and
prosecuted a number of scholars and associates suspected of preaching against the
govemment. The magistrate in the Maldah case concluded;
The depositions show that during many years past the Wahabees have pursued a
system in raising supplies for the support of the fanatics livin|^beyond the North-
West Frontier, who are waging war against the Govemment.
The same magistrate identifies four types of subscriptions collected: Motee (muti),
Phetera ifitra), Zekat {zakat) and private donations of cash or commodities.^* The
first refers to the voluntary contribution of two handfuls of rice per day for the support of
the jehad [sic], which is then sold and the proceeds added to the fund.** Fitra and zakat
were collected annually, on "Id al-Fitr, in cash or produce. Private donations could be
made at any time. The funds are said to have been gathered and regularly passed, in sums
of a few thousand mpees, through many hands, forwarded to the north-west through Patna
and Delhi.
The depositions of scores of men from the villages of Maldah on which the
magistrates conclusions relied, relate a number of details on fundraising and the message
preached. Donations made ranged from a few "annas' (1/16 mpee) to a few mpees and
were gathered from various segments of rural society, zamindars, artisans and
iVtiLslims: A Quest for Identity iDelhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).

226 From J. O Kinealy, Esq., Offioiatmg Magistrate of Maldah, to the Officiating Under-Secretaiy to the Government of
Bengal (20th October 1868), Wahhabi Trials, p. 276.
227 Ibid., p. 277.
228 Ibid., p. 277.
229 Ibid., p. 279.
270
cultivators. Most depositions confirmed that the donors were aware the funds were to
be used against the EIC regime, but some clai m to have had no knowledge of whom the
jihad was directed a gai ns t . The villagers also stated that the activities of fund-raising
had been undertaken in Maldah for somewhere between five and eight years.
Although the collection of such subscriptions as zakat is in keeping with the
functions of mawlawis, the use of these funds forjihad, instead of mosque renovations,
education, etc., had to be justified. The persons offering depositions to British officers
explain that they were instructed that the object of the jihad was to overthrow the "kafif
govemment, and institute a unitary Muslim govemment in India.^^^ In aiding the
endeavour, both religious and social salvation would be accraed. Rent would be
exempted, land would be redistributed, and Heaven would await the Muslim in the next
Iife.^^^
The message was spread by means of preaching at mosques, touring villages, letter
writing and the publication of books and pamphlets in the local vernacular (a new
development we will consider further in the next chapter). One such Bengali language
work is mentioned by the officiating magistrate of the Maldah case.^^^ It is co-authored by
two mawlawis from Dacca and presents its subject in verse. The authors provide a history
230 For the depositions! of cultivators, see, From H.J. Reilly, Esq., Deputy Inspector<jeneral, Special Bengal Police, to
Inspector-General ofPolice, Lower Provinces lEnclosure no. 2] (Dated 16th April, 1869), Wahhabi Trials, pp. 355-64. For weavers,
see, From J.O Kinealy..., Wahhabi Trials, pp. 294-5. Zamindars are considered below,
231For examples of those claiming knowledge, see the depositions ofPaloo Shiek and Asmatoolla Shiek, in From J.O
Kineily..., Wahhabi Trials, pp. 288-89. For those disclaiming knowledge, see the depositions o f Bheekoo and Mortaza, in From H.J.
Reily..., pp. 354-55.
232For the lower figure, see the deposition of Etwari Shiek, and for the higher figure the deposition of Hari Shaha, in From
J. O K in e ily ...p p . 282; 294-95.
233 Ibid, pp. 288-89; 298.
234 Ibid., pp. 285; 288; 295-96; 298.
271
of Ahmad Barelvi and Muhammad Ismails jihad, acknowledging the former as the
Imam of the age. Thus, obedience to Ahmad Barelvi is enjoined and the colonial state
argued to be the work of faa/ira. Jihad and hijra are declared incumbent on all Muslims,
and the saints and teachers who preach otherwise are labeled enemies of the
SunnaJ^^^
The mention of scholarly opposition to the jihad, confirms that the Islam promoted
by the mujahidin was not universally appreciated by Muslims in Peshawar, where Ahmad
Barelvi had preached, nor in Bengal where his followers continued to function after his
death. One Jameer Shiek stated that a local mawlawi not associated with the mujahidin
had informed him that the jihad was against the British and ordered him not to pay.^^
Etwari Shiek said that the same mawlawi, who Etwari refers to as his instructed him
not to contribute also.^^* Clearly, the mujahidin did not have unanimous support from
their colleagues of other schools. The irony is that this not only limited the success of
their canvassing, but nullified the coordination of efforts with other mujahidin groups,
such as the Faraidi Movement contemporaneously active in Bengal. The problem in
relations between the Barelvi mujahidin and the Faraidis, in fact, was no more the
limited scope afforded Sufism by the former, and its absolute condemnation by the latter.
The mawlawiipir referred to by the above witnesses were not Faraidis, but their
opposition nonetheless suggests the social impact of differing doctrines, at least as far as
235 A translated extract fixrm the work, tilted, Tutwa, is included as Appendix B in, From J.O Kineily..., pp. 301-303.
236 Ibid., pp. 301-303.
237 Ibid., p. 281.
238 Ibid., p. 294.
272
the relationship between scholars, cultivators and artisans are concerned. The Wahhabi
trials also suggest the influence of the mawlawi among the soldiers in the employ of the
EIC, the so-called sepoys.
Mawlawi Khan was arrested in 1865, reports the Inspector General of Police in a
memorandum to the govemment of the Madras Presidency, under the belief that he
habitually inculcates sedition and jehad [sic] amongst his adherents in native
regiments.^"' A second report recording Mawlawi Khans interrogation and statement,
records that he was a Pathan, the son of a deceased water carrier, and the grand-nephew
of two cavalrymen in the EIC army.^"^^ Mawlawi Khan was raised by his father in barracks
and himself enlisted in 1844.^'*^ His officers from that period testified that his discharge
after five years was related to a troublesome nature. Mawlawi Khan contended that he
sought discharge to pursue formal education Whichever the case, the mawlawi
proceeded to a madrasa in Hyderabad upon discharge, remaining under tuition until 1852.
This individuals aptitude and education appear to have been well matched.
Although the inspector believed beyond doubt that this was a seditious Wahhabi, he
qualified the statement with the observation that there is nothing of fanaticism about
the mawlawi. He is described as an intelligent and fair-spoken man, evidently
239 Also see, Rafiuddin Ahmad, Islamic Debate on Europe in Colonial Bengal: Jihad Against the "Infidels? Ideas from
the National Humanities Center 8:1 (2001): 8-19.
240 From the Acting Agent to the Government of the Saint George in Ganjam, and from the Inspector General ofPolice, to
the Chief Secretary to Govemment, Fort Saint George, (dated 11th December 1865), Wahhabi Trials, pp. 140-42.
241 From the Inspector General ofPolice, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Fort Saint George, (dated 28th Fetanaiy
1866i. Wahhabi Trials, p. 143.
242 Ibid., p. 143.
243 Ibid., p. 143.
273
accustomed to argument, and of reputed eloquence... The mawlawi counters the
claim of being seditious or Wahhabi by professing himself to be of the '^Sunnat
Jama He pleads that he only preaches against the corruption of the faith prevalent
among the Muslim races in general, and the loose manners of the Bidatee [sic]... He
also refers to his followers as 'miirids' rather than Jaliban,' betraying an association
with Sufism. As such, although wrong to identify the mawlawi as a Wahhabi, the
inspector is quite right to identify him with the group waging ajihad against the British in
the north-west.
The mawlawi denies preachingJihad, but his record of prior arrests suggests
otherwise. Directly upon graduation from a Hyderabad madrasa, the mawlawi attached
himself to his former regiment as its chaplain. After only a few months, the
commanding officer had him barred from the sepoys for preaching sedition, and
transported from the town in which the regiment was stationed. For the next five years,
however, the mawlawis association with the EIC army continued as Moulvi [sic] of the
Veterans in the town in which he settled.
At the start of the 1857 Uprising in the north, Mawlawi Khan is accused of joining
the call forjihad, leading to arrest in July 1857, the circumstances of which again suggest
friction between the new Sober Utopians and other Muslim scholars. A qadi, a mufti
and other respectable Muslims of Guntoor town reported his activities to the
244 Ibid., p 148.

245 Ibid., p 148.
246 Ibid., p 148.
247 Ibid, p 144.
248 Ibid, p 144.
27 4
authorities.The Assistant Magistrate hearing the case, however, acquitted the mawlawi
for unstated reasons. Upon release on this occasion, the mawlawi secured passage to
Burma on a locally owned ship, where he again attached himself to the Madras Army. In
1858, he was again arrested for his activities and transported, on this occasion to
Calcutta.^^ The magistrate hearing the case released him on condition that he return to
his own Presidency, Madras. The mawlawi returned to Guntoor and established a
mosque with money donated by his adherents in the 3 U* and 24*^ Regiments of the
Native I n f a n t r y . H e confirmed that since 1858, he had been preaching among various
regiments, leading to his present arrest in 1865.
The fate of Mawlawi Khan beyond 1865 is not known, but his life thus far confirms
that mawlawis espousing various lines of thought, particularly the new Sober Way, had
been active among EIC regiments and the soldiers families for years. Thus, their
activities suggest that Sober scholars, particularly Sober Modernists, had great say in the
network observed by the conspiracy theorists. Furthermore, it was not one network,
but an overlapping array of them that bridged various localities of class and ethnicity.
This does not mean that the Muslims were the main rebels and the 1857 Uprising or its
predecessors no more than the acts of Muslim fanatics. The example of the Barelvi
jihad confirms that the very muftis, qadis, ustads, mawlawis and pirs disenfranchised by
the colonial regime not only participated in, but played a prominent role in the
organization o f anti-colonial activity, beginning in the early 19* century. As well, at least
among Wali Allahis, notions of Muslim India played a part in the anti-colonial rhetoric
249 Ibid.. p. 144,

250 Ibid., pp. 147-48.
275
of 1857 and the decades leading up to it.
Armed with the above evidence, it is obvious that the conspiracy theorists would
bend the ears of various readers. Recall, however, that when the sepoys rebelled at
Meerut, they marched to Delhi and pledged their alliegence to Bahadar Shah Zafar. Thus,
the conspiracy theorists had more weapons in their arsenal than fanatical Wahhabis.
Soon after the sepoys arrived in Delhi, the Mughals also began issuing proclamations,
some in favour of Bahadur Shah, others in favour younger relatives.^^^ Sounding very
much like the soldiers, one of Bahadur Shah Zafars grandsons declared, in this age the
people of Hindustan, both Hindus and Muslims, are being ruined under the tyranny and
oppression of the infidel and treacherous Rnglish .^^^ This being the case, the author
relates that several Mughal princes have long been working outside South Asia to fulfil
their duty to raise an army, remove the EIC and restore the Mughal Badshahi . He
reassures his readers that one prince is on his way from Afghanistan with forces and
reminds the elite that they, as the pastors and masters of the people, are also obligated
to join. However, more than the satisfaction of doing ones duty is offered in urging the
capitalists and lower classes to join. Zamindars are promised the settlements of
disputes according to shari a and shastras,' overthrowing EIC fiscal institutions and
high-handedness, but promising to retain the zamindafs, right to absolute rule - that is,
property rights. Merchants are promised an end to EIC monopolies and fiscal measures,
251 Ibid.. p. 146.

232 A proclamation in fevonr of Bahadar Shah Zafar is considered below. For one issued by and in favour of a lesser member
of the family, Feroz Shah - a prominent leader of the rebels who had to flee South Asia upon defeat in 1858-9 to die in obscurity soon
after - see, Quraishi, ed. Crv for Freedom, pp. 77-83. Also, for a secondary account of Feroz Shahs involvement, as well as other
prominent leaders ftom various backgrounds, see, S.N. Chanda, 1857: Some Untold Stories (Delhi: Sterlii^ Publishers, 1976).
253 Azamgarh Proclamation, Source of Indian Tradition II. ed., Stephen Hay (New York; Columbia University Press,
27 6
capital loans from the state treasury, and access to steam-vessels and carriages which
will fall imder Mughal control. Bureaucrats and soldiers are promised employment at
high ranks, and payment by inam and jagir. Artisans are promised renewed markets and
the control of imports. And finally, "pandits, faqirs and other learned persons are vowed
renewed endowments.
Clearly, the above proclamation does not promise a new Utopia/Ideology upon
victory. Rather, the Badshahi resembles the Mughal state of the 18* century, including
such innovations as feudal landlordism and technology introduced by the EIC.
Furthermore, it is a Badshahi that includes the Mughals as religious heads, for the
Azamgarh proclamation is not a call to rebellion or revolution, but an inducement to
"jihad."^^^ The Mughal rebels are referred to as mujahidin^ and it is the standard of
Muhammad that they are raising, while imploring the Hindus to raise the standard of
Mahavir. That is to say, although writing in tenns of Badshahi, the Mughals were acting
as Caliphs/lmams, religio-political heads of a holy war. In fact, there is even a tract of
unknown authorship among the incendiary literature circulating in 1857 that outlines the
arguments of the ulama on the issue of Caliphate in a decided Wali Allahi manner, but
legitimates a non-Qurayshi Caliph. Having explained the arguments for Quraysh
descent, the author o f the tract argued:
1988), p. 177.
254 Ibid., pp. 177-80. Also see, Firoz Shahs Proclamation and others, cited in their entirety in S.N. Chanda, 1857: Some
Untold Stories (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1976), pp. 112-15.
255 As well, Feroz Shahs proclamation ends with the exhortation: The people of all grades should regard themselves as
equals, for in religious matters all brothers should equally defend the faith. It is not my object to wage this war for worldly gain, and
therefore having reliance in the precepts of religion, I gird myself with bravery and enthusiasm, and having wrapped around my head the
cerements of the grave (Jmfjun), and haring armed myself with the sword of jihad I rise repeating the holy Bismiilah-.. See, Quraishi,
ed. Cry for Freedom, p. 82. As well, the proclamations of local rulers that acted imder the Mughal banner, such Khan Bahadur Khan of
2 77
... if at the time when infidels become paramount in power, a Koreshee [sic] be not
found, any Mahomedan [sic] Chief endowed even with a few of the qualities of a
leader and observing the tenets of Mahomedan [sic] Law can, as a matter of necessity
be selected as Chief. This leader will be called Imam-i Akbar and great benefits will
be derived from him in the cause of our faith... In short, it is held lawful, even by the
religious books, that the order of a Mahomedan [sic] Chief, of whatever description
he may be, should be obeyed. Common sense and a regard for faith point out that
servitude under the Mahomedan [sic] Chiefs and such [Hindu] Rajahs as are
dependents of the Mahomedan Kings is infinitely better than that under the infidel
Victoria and the English, the enemies of our faith.
A few pages on, the author advocates the selection of an Tmam-i Akbar. Thus, he does
not appear to be endorsing the Mughals. However, his legal reasoning illustrates that the
idea of the Mughals as Caliphs - even being non-Quraysh - was not beyond those with
obviously Sober views. Furthermore, in the case of conspiracy theorists who considered
the Mughals, rather than fanatical Wahhbis, as the ultimate authority behind a seditious
network, the most prominent argument is the observation that the native troops
disserted en masse and hasten to join the Great Moghul while others observed that
the Delhi Raj has a powerful hold over the people still...from the Himalayas to Cape
Cormorin.^^* Thus, the very participation of the Mughals appears to have echoed the
idea of Muslim India.
In correctly seeking to steer clear of the conspiracy theorists emphasis on what
Bose and Jalal call the religious factor, the same historians point out that these
Wahhabi movements, like other movements employing the rhetoric of jihad in 1857,
had more to do with class interests than religion. Although millenarianism is
acknowledged, the Uprising is argued to have had more to do with taxes and army
Rohiikund, also eal! forjihad, assuring Heaven to any martyred in the struggle.' See, ibid., pp. 84-5.
256 Quraishi, ed. Crv for Freedom, pp. 117-20.
256 This was the first reference to the Mughals as primary instigators to appear in Allen's IndiaMail (July 15, 1857), p. 426.
278
management, like previous local revolts mentioned to have employed the rhetoric of
jihad^^'^ In fact, some prominent contemporary historians argue that the prime objects of
British charges of fanaticism, the Sober Modernists considered above, were largely
ambivalent in their attitude towards colonial rule since they believed that internal
strengthening had to precede any assertion of Islamic power. However, in so
downplaying the role o f religious thought, these scholars do not fully explore the direct
connections between the political and scholarly elite, millenarianism and the 1857
Uprising, as well as elites and subalterns from various geographic localities that was
characteristic of the activities of Wali Allahis in this era, beginning with Shah
Muhammad Ismail and Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi. Furthermore, in contrast to Bose and
Jalals understanding, these scholars attitude is that internal strengthening cannot
proceed without an assertion of Islamic power, colonial institutions not being
conducive.
As previously mentioned, the involvement of the Mughals is painted by
contemporary historians as the nostalgia of various classes for the institutions of the
past; that is, feudal/communal institutions. Apart from the difficulties raised in the
258 London Times {August 1, 1857), pp. 9- 10; also see, (A iûst 24, 1857), p. 5.
259 All the proclamations included in Quraishis compilation suggest that religion provided the rhetoric, but was not the
cause of the 1857 Uprising, although religious grievances numbered among the complaints. A case in point is a sepoy proclamation from
Delhi that lists 16 evils' perpetrated against the state of Oudh (annexed 1856), including the hypocrisy of subsidiary alliance, the
falseness of charges o f incompetence against its govemment and counter-charges of EIC negligence in administration. Reflecting wider
grievances, examples of British maladmmistration include, indiscriminate taxation, lack of civic policing, abuse of authority over non-
British subordinates, fees for the education of the youth, the burning of legal texts, and finally, acting without consultation.
Religious grier'ances are primarily concemed with; 1) government involvement in the propagation of Christianity at the expense of
Islam, Hinduism and their scholars and institutions; and 2) Govemment regulations that threaten the institution oipurdah (seclusion).
Ultimately, such grievances lead the author to conclude that the British are tyrants and religious fanatics. Thus, while rising in the
name of God, it is clear that political, economic, social and cultural factors prompted the Uprising, as most contemporary South
Asianists have argued. See, Quraishi, ed. Crv for Freedom, pp. 1-65. .
279
previous chapter of conceiving of Mughal political culture in such terms, the idea of
either the Mughals (now espousing landlordism and steamships along with jihad) or
the Sober Modernists (now promting a Sober Path different from that of the Middle
Period) as representatives of the past is, no doubt, a qualitative j udgement. Thus, the
role of the Mughals and Sober Modernism is best approached from the perspective of
alternative Utopias/Ideologies promising significant, but distinct institutional changes in
relation to the colonial state. In this light, what the British read as a Muhammadan
Conspiracy is as much the echo of a vernacular rhetoric that resounded with the
doctrines of scholars such as the multitude of mawlawis whose names occur in sources
from the period, as it is a reflection of the assumptions about Islam and Muslims which
the British carried with them from Europe. These mawlawis include men such as Ahmad
Allah, who died in the fighting of 1857, but who was arrested before any regiments
mutinied, or any Mughals claimed leadership, for posting placards that read as follows;
Countrymen and faithful adherents of your religion, rise, rise ye one and all, to drive
out the farangi kafirsl They have trampled under-foot the very elements of justice,
they have robbed us of swaraJ. .. .There is only one remedy now, to free Hindustan
from the insufferable tyranny of the kafir farangis, and that remedy is to urge a
bloody war. This is a jihad for independence! This is a religious war for justice.'^
Within the call of jihad, the call for a religious war, lay not only a rhetorical weapon for
anti-colonial activity, but also the myriad alternatives to the colonial state in which
Muslims were educated.
260 S. Bose and Jalal, Modem South Asia, p. 85.

26! Cited in S.B. Chaudhuri, Theories of Indian Mutiny, p. 31. For an excellent account of Moulvi Ahmad Allahs activities,
see, S.N. Chanda, 1857: Some Untold Stories. Ahmad Allah is also one of the four rebels discussed by Bhadra in his previously cited,
Four Rebels of 1857, Selected Subaltern Studies.
28 0
In the previous section it was noted that EIC efforts to forward English in place of
Arabic and Persian as the medium of learning were met with a virtual boycott. The
discussion of Muslim intellectuals above showed that even Muslims associated with the
EIC continued writing primarily in Arabic and Persian. Similarly, while the EIC planned
to forward European learning through local vernaculars, Muslim intellectuals employed
these languages as stepping-stones to Arabic and Persian. In other words, as the EIC tried
to control what aspects of Islamic learning had a place in colonial institutions, Muslims
attempted to control the aspects of European leaming that had a place among Muslims. In
this light, if EIC leadership, strategy and arms won every territorial and jurisdictional
battle waged, European thought gained institutional empowerment, but nothing near
influence over the knowledge through which South Asian Muslims saw the world.
The virtual exclusion of European thought from South Asian Muslim leaming, with
the exception of certain physical sciences among the elite, did not mean that the colonial
state was necessarily illegitimate from the perspective of Islamic thought. Indeed, Abd
al-Azizz fatwa attests that even Sober Modemists who viewed the colonial state as ^dar
al-harb" did not consider it illegitimate for Muslims to live and work under its
administration, so long as the most basic freedom of religion was allowed. What the
lack of European influence meant is that for the colonial state to be viewed as legitimate
by Muslims, it had to be argued as such in terms of Islamic thought. Thus, even the
British maintained the Mughals. This rhetoric was entwined in the way that pro-colonial
281
Muslims legitimated the colonial state. However, the same body o f thought also
legitimated Muslims organizing behind a righteous leader, a Caliph or an Imam, to
overthrow the un-Islamic in favour of the Islamic. Hence, the rhetoric ofjihad
dominated anti-colonial movements among Muslims, whether adherents of Sober
Modernism or not.
The calls forjihad in this context do not proclaim Islams antipathy to rule by non-
Muslims. Beyond the rhetorical, they indicate Muslim difficulties with the socio-political
consequences of the colonial state in particular: the human displacement caused by
annexation, legal and educational policies, and land and fiscal measures. They also
illustrate the Utopian/Ideological alternatives to the colonial state offered by Islamic
thought. These include fiqh in the place of English jurisprudence; the jagir/iqta system
instead of English estates; Arabic and Persian in the place of English; and, madrasas,
maktabs and khanqahs, not colleges. That is to say, what was called for by Muslim
intellectuals was not the British India taking shape, but a Muslim India either headed
by the still incumbent Mughal Caliph, a long conspiring Wali Allahi Imam, or existing
as patchwork of Muslim states and leaders (political and scholarly) constituted along
more local lines. Thus, the defeat of the 1857 Uprising with the aid, or acquiesence, of
Muslims does not imply that Islamic Utopias/Ideologies had waned in popularity before
European influence. Quite the contrary, the relationship between the pro- and anti
colonial rhetoric o f the 1857 Uprising suggests that outside British circles, the popularity
of the Sober Path (in various forms) was on the rise. The question to which this leads is to
what extent beyond the Muslim political and scholarly elite had the Sober Tide had an
282
effect? Did cultural separatism on religious lines accompany the reformist thought and
calls for jihad among the subaltern? The possible answers are the subject of discussion
in this chapters final section.
IV: Identity in the Vernacular: Cultural Separatism in 19^ century Punjabi Oral
Literature
The greatest problem in addressing the above questions, as is the case with most
issues concerning the urban and rural masses, is availability of appropriate sources, the
culture o f these segments of society being largely expressed orally. Yet, thanks to the
efforts of an Orientalist, R.C. Temple, a glimpse of exactly this segment of society is
available for consideration. In the I870s, Temple compiled the poems, songs and plays
performed across the Punjab, committing to paper (in their original Punjabi vernacular)
the legends relayed by traveling musicians, story-tellers, theatrical players and village
bards. His work was first published in three volumes as. The Legends of the Punjab, in
1885. ^
Punjab is an excellent arena to consider for more reasons than Temples work. By
the time that Temple set about his task, Punjab was set to be judged a Muslim majority
region by the ensuing colonial census. Furthermore, Punjab had been under Muslim
governance (with the exception of Ranjit Singhs short-lived Sikh kingdom [1799-1846])
centuries longer than Delhi or regions further east. And finally, virtually from the moment
262This work has recently been reprinted, including the Punjabi and English translations, as, R.C. Temple, ed. and trans,.
The Legends of the Punjab. 3 vols. (Islamabad: Institute of Folk Heritage, 1981).
283
that a discemable Punjabi vernacular came into being, Muslims had made no small
contribution to the vast written literature composed in that language As a result, such
staples of Arabic and Persian literature as Layla and Majnun and Yusuf and Zulaykha
form part of the canon. As well, tales from regional Muslim cultures, such as the Sindhi
Sassi and Pannun and Sohini and Mahival, are common. Beginning with the
Pakpattani Shaykh Farid al-Din (d. 1265) - mentioned in the context of Nizam al-Din
Awliya in chapter one - one can catalogue droves of prominent Sufi poets, including
Shah Husayn (d. 1601), Sultan Bahu (d. 1691), Bulleh Shah (d. 1758) and Ali Haydar (d.
1785), who together represent the Chishtiyya, Qadariyya and Suhrawardiyya orders. To
this one can add the works of various "ulama , including translations of the Quran and
the writing of tafsir (exegesis), hikayat (anecdotes of the Prophet), yang nama (Shia
eulogies), hara maha (elegies of Caliphs, etc.), ma ani-i namaz (expositions on the
meaning of prayer), tawhid nama (expositions on Gods unity), nur nama (expositions
on Gods light), naza a nama (expositions on death), akhbarat al-akhirat (expositions
on the Last Judgment) andfara 'id (expositions on holy ordinances). Clearly, if there
are any vernacular-speaking populations in which the Sober reformers orientation could
have reached the oral literature of the masses, the studies of Punjabi literature cited here
suggest that the Muslims of the Punjab must number among them.
Reflecting his interest in universal and Indian themes and motifs. Temple divided
the tales he collected into three categories; epic, heroic and hagiographic. Although
263 Thorough accounts of the histoiy of written Punjabi Literature can be found in, Surindar Singh Kohli, History of Fhmiabi
Literature (Delhi: National bo<& Shop, 1993); S.A. Naranga, History of Punjabi Literature (Delhi: National book Shop, 1989); and, Sant
S i r ^ Sekhon. A History of Punjabi Literature. 2 vols. (Patiala: Punjab University Publishing Bureau, 1996). The following details on
the subject are drawn ftom these works.
284
Temple does recognize Muslim, Hindu and Sikh hagiographies, his epic and heroic
categories do not consider literary variations dependent on the performers personal
background, that of his/her audience, or the underlying ramifications of these variations in
terms of identity. Thus, each category of Temples tales is revisited here in search of
reflections of the categories of Islamic thought in individual works. It is argued that
dependent on these reflections, one is in a position to ascertain whether the artisans and
cultivators who sang and heard these tales could have identified beyond local
communities to imagine themselves members of the umma, and/or a religio-political
community encompassing Hindustan, besides more local affiliations.
Beginning with the epic category, it is striking to note virtually no evidence of
Muslims beyond the use of Arabic and Persian vocabulary standard in Punjabi or Urdu.
All tales are drawn from classical Sanskrit literature, particularly the Mahabharata and
Puranas^^ reflecting Brahmanical themes and motifs, whether played in Ambala, sung
in Jalandhar or recited in Merath.^^^ Only two of the ten epics include, any Islamic
motifs, both told by non-professional bards, one an inhabitant of a village and the
other a scavenger about a rural town.^^ In the first case, only passing reference is made
to Sufi icon Khwaja Khidr, as the god of water. In the second, Khidr is mentioned in
263 Pimmas, lit. ancient lore, refers to a body of epic tales of gods and heroes following, historically and in literary stature,
the two great epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana. Generally thought to have been written between the 1st-6th centuries, the Puranas
fall into two classes: ]} Mahapuranas (Great Puranas), of which there are 18; and, 2) Upapuranas (Minor Puranas), which are
considerably more numerous. See, Catrina Conio, Puranas, Encyclopaedia of Religion, vol. 17, pp. 86-90.
265There are 10 tales of this genre. See, Temple. Legends of the Punjab, vol. 1: The Legend of Safidon (XV), pp. 414-17;
and, Princess Niwal Dai (XVI), pp. 418-528. in vol. 2: Raja Gopi Chand (XVIII), pp. 1-77; Raja Chandarbhan (XIX), pp. 78-98;
and, Raja N al (XXX), pp. 204-75. In vol. 3: Hari Chand (XLH), pp. 53-88; Raja Dhru (XLVI), pp. 126-57; Sispal and Parduman
(LVI), pp. 332-47; Sispal and Krishna (LVII), pp. 349-63; and, Banasur (LVIII), pp. 364-84.
266The Legend of Safidon (XV), vol. 1, pp. 414-17; and, Princess Niwal Dai (XVI), vol. 1, pp. 418-528.
267 The Legend of Safidon (XV), vol. 1, p. 416.
285
similar vein, the Quran is mentioned in the context of sacred works, and a Muslim
character is innocuously included in an otherwise uniformly pre-Islamic literary
environment/^* In both cases, therefore, Islamic motifs are employed to forward
Hindu themes. That even such syncretism is in the statistical minority suggests that the
epics were largely understood by reciters and their audiences as Brahmanical/Hindu
works set in a pre-Islamic era.
The widespread recognition of religious difference along with historical
periodization is further confirmed by the heroic category. Numbering among the
mainstays of Punjabi literature are the series of tales from the cycle of Raja Rasalu, a pre-
Islamic king of Sialkot. In one of the six tales from this cycle included in Temples
collection, a bard from Rawalpindi specifies that the action relayed took place in the
year of Christ 80^În four of the six, no Islamic motif or mention of Muslims is
util i zed. Most significantly, one of the bards identified as Muslim numbers among
those making no reference to Islam, In two of the six, however, much the same type of
syncretism noted in the case of the epics can be noted. One bard makes passing reference
to Khwaja Khidr, this time in relation to a specific river.Another makes literary
allusion to Shams al-Din Tabriz, a Sufi associated with Multan, and the Four Pirs
{Cham Biran), that is, four illustrious figures thought of as the founders of Sufism in
the region."^ In other words, with the exception of a passing reference and a literary
268 Princess Niwal Dai (XVI), vol. 1, pp. 449-50; 485; 519,
269 The Adventures of Raja Rasalu (I), vol. 1, p. 1.
270 In vol. 1: Princess Adhik Anup Dai (DO, pp. 225-42; and, The Legend of Sila Dai (X), pp. 243-366. In vol. 3: Two
Songs about Raja Rasalu (XLVUI), pp. 218-226; and, The Legend of Rani Kokilan (XLIX), pp. 227-41.
271 The Adventures of Raja Rasalu, vol. 1, P 4 L
272 Puran Bhagat (XXXIV), vol. 2, p. 377; 404.
286
illusion. Raja Rasalu and his cast of characters are as firmly rooted in the pre-Islamic
history of the Punjab, as the heroes and heroines o f the epics are rooted in the same era
of South Asian history.
Turning to tales with Muslim characters one finds a vastly altered literary
landscape, both thematically and in motif. Hir and Ranjha, Mirza and Sahiban and
Sassi and Pannun - standards of Indus Valley vernacular literatures - are thematically
related in that they involve Muslims whose love for each other transcends tribal/ethnic
lines.^^^ Not only does this theme echo a genre known more widely in Muslim literature,
it is directly tied to Islam by the bards reciting them in Punjab. For example, in The
Marriage of Hir and Ranjha, their liason is sanctioned not merely by the /agir under
whom Ranjha studies, but mystically by the holiness of Mecca and Medina. In fact,
their marriage across tribal bounds is so meritorious that it earns saintshin for both.^^
In Mirza and Sahiban, the hero and heroine, while eloping, are slain by members of both
their tribes. Sahibans last words to her dying beloved are:
Mirza, barken to my prayer.

Fate came on the prophets (pagambaran): fate hath come on thee.
The brethren Hasan and Husayn, sons of Ali,
Were destroyed in fights with the Jew.
At the door wept Bibi Fatima: They will come not back to me.
Mirza, when [fate] slew such prophets, shalt thou escape?^^
In Sassi and Pannun, the heroine, Sassi, dies in the company of a herder in the desert
273 In vol. 2: The M aniage of Hir and Ranjha (XXXVIII), pp. 507-80. In vol. 3; Mirza and Sahiban' (XXXIX), pp. 1-23;
and, Sassi and Purmun (XL), pp. 24-37.
274 The Marriage of Hir and Ranjha, vol. 2, p. 554.
275 Ibid., p. 554. As well, there are tales of individual piety related to the saintship of Hir and Ranjha. In each, pilgrimage to
their tombs, or their appearance in a dream, lead to the lead characters spiritual or material fulfilment. See, vol. 2: Abd Allah Shah of
Samin (XX'VTIl), pp. 177-82; Ismail Khans Grandmother (XXXVI), pp. 494-98; and, The Bracelet Maker of Jhang (XXXVII), pp.
499-506.
287
while en route to finding Paimim. The story she tells the latter of how she came to be
wandering in the wastes in search of Pannun prompts the man to leave his goods, his
daughters, his sons and his home. Seeing Sassis beauty he became afaqir.''^^^ The only
words he shares with Pannun upon the heros arrival, before relating the death of Sassi
are: One thing I know - the world is perishable.^^*
The above heroic romances show that not only Islamic themes (e.g., anti
tribalism) are advanced, but that these themes are most often expressed with Muslim
motifs, ranging from the sanctity of Mecca and Medina, to the battle at Karbala, to the
process of becoming afaqir. The infusion of such motifs, in fact, goes much further. In
Hir and Ranjha, the reciter invokes Prophet Muhammad, Caliph/Imam Ali, the
Prophets daughter and Alis wife, Fatima, their sons and Shii Imams, Hasan and
Husayn, as well as the famous Sufis al-Hallaj and Shams al-Din Tabriz. Besides this,
Islamic institutions are incorporated. A discussion between Ranjha, himself a potential
saint, and a qualified qadi even illustrates the antipathy between the Sober and the
Intoxicated. In Mirza and Sahiban, Moses, Fatima, Ali, Hasan and Husayn are
referenced, while it is said that the heroic pair of Mirza and Sahiban first fell in love
while studying together as children at a mosque maktab, their teacher described as a stem
and unforgiving qadi. Sassi and Pannun also makes reference to prophetic figures,
including Noah (Nuh).^^^ Such references imply that accounts of the deeds of Noah and
Muhammad, Ali and al-Hallaj, were also well-known to the bards and their audiences.
276 Mirza and Sahiban, vol. 3, p. 22.

277 Sassi and Punmin, vol. 3, p. 37.
278 Ibid.. p. 37.
279 Ibid., p. 34.
28 8
Furthermore, the ^mti-qadi'Tpm-faqir' bias of the tales clearly illustrates that Intoxicated
Intuition provided much of the average Punjabis education in Islam.
When Intoxicated Intuition figures prominently, it has been observed that cultural
syncretism accompanies education. This is reconfirmed by the very tales considered
above. In Hir and Ranjha, the concept of transmigration, Rama and Sita (hero and
heroine of the Ramayana), Brahma and Durga (Hindu gods). Brahman pandits and the
Bhakti gurus are employed as literary devices or invoked as features of a multi-faith
environment. For example, transmigration is employed in a metaphor of Ranjhas
eternal love for Hir, while Hirs troubles are likened to Rama and Sitas. A brahmin
astrologer is engaged, but a qadi is employed to perform Hirs marriage. Guru
Gorakhnath (renouned 15* century Bhakti thinker) is acknowledged as a saintly figure,
but his level of saintship is below that gained by Hir and Ranjha on account of their
relationship, a love one must recall that is sanctioned directly by the grace of Mecca
and Medina. Thus, the tale cautions that the inclusion of the non-Islamic does not
necessarily imply the sublimation of the Islamic, Hindu or Sikh. Rather, it employs
the non-Islamic in the service of larger Islamic themes, much as some of the epics employ
the Islamic in the service ofBrahmanical themes. When confronted with a work involving
Muslim and non-Muslim motifs, therefore, one must be aware of grades of syncretism,
each reflecting the grades of Sufi tariqas active in the region. The point is driven home by
the version of Sassi and Pannun told by a bard at Hoshiarpur. In comparison with the
above rendition of Hir and Ranjha, this version o f Sassi and Pannun relays less a
syncretic than a separatist ideal, A solitary literary allusion is made to the non-Islamic,
289
and that only involving figures who, had they been present, could not have saved Sassi
from a fate likened to Noahs deluge. Thus, if there is evidence of Intoxicated
Intuitions influence in these tales, the same can certainly be said for Sober Intuition.
A gradation in syncretic elements, as well as evidence of a separatist cultural
ideal, can be further noted in Temples hagiographic category of tales. The majority of
works in this category involve the lives of Sufis, particularly one Sayyid Ahmad ibn Zain
al-Abidin, revered across Punjab as Sakhi Sarwar.^* In a song related by bards in
Jalandhar, the audience is provided a stunningly detailed account of this figures early
life. Sarwars story begins in Arabia {mulk arah) of the late 4*/early 5* century A.H.
( 1 0 * /1 ith century CE), described as a time o fy itn a "and general upheaval. Under these
conditions, Sarwars father, a Husayni Sayyid, emigrated to Shahkot, near Multan,
where he married one of his daughters to the ^"muqaddam a Brahmin named Pheru, and
the other into the local Khor {Khokhar) tribe. His son Sarwar, however, traveled west
again, to Baghdad, where he is said to have studied under Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi (d.
1232) and Mawdud Chishti (d. 1153).^*' Although sitting at the feet of both these teachers
is a historical impossibility, it does identify Sarwar with the Suhrawardiyya and
Chishtiyya orders so prominent in Pimjab, the land to which he returned to win renown as
a miracle-working pir.
Despite this largely Intoxicated pedigree, in The Marriage of Sakhi Sarwar, one
is immersed in a thoroughly Muslim literary environment through the mention of such
280 There are six hagiographic tales associaed with Sakhi Sarwar. In vol. 1; Sakhi Sarwar and Dani Jatti (I(), pp. 66-81;
and, Three Fragments about Sakhi Sarwar (TV), pp. 91-7. In vol. 2: Sarwar and Jatti (XXI), pp. 104-15; and, The Marriage of Sakhi
Sarwar (XXII), pp. 116-82. In vol. 3: The Miracles of Sakhi Sarwar (LIII),pp. 301-26.
281 The Miracles of Sakhi Sarwar, vol.3, pp. 302-21.
290
concepts as "umma directly, and such figures as Adam and Hawa [Eve], besides
various Sufi pirs of Punjab. Furthermore, the people of Multan are described as either
Hindu or Muslim, and their festivals are acknowledged as different. In the same tale,
however, concessions are made to Hindu Gods, placing them on par with Muslim
S a in ts.B h a ir o n and Hanuman (Hindu gods) are incorporated in the action, joining
Shaykh Farid al-Din, among other prominent Sufis, in Sarwars wedding procession, but
unlike the latter, the former are described as children, eating during Ramadan and on
the Brahmanical ekadshi (turn of the moon),^*^ And finally, the marriage itself is
officiated by a qadi, but the ceremony is imbued with acts drawn from marriages among
Hindus, including placing the red spot on the forehead, circling a cup of water around
the heads of the betroved and drinking it, putting the ring into milk and water, and
holding boiled millet in their kerchiefs,^*^
The manner in which Muslim and non-Muslim elements are incorporated in the
above tale confirm that even among Intoxicated orders, syncretism does not necessarily
mean the sublimation of the Islamic or Hindu. First, non-Islamic deities are not
incorporated as facets or equivalents of Allah, nor are they excluded. Rather, they are
only acknowledged as pirs. Second, the elements of non-Islamic ritual incorporated in
Sarwars wedding do not exceed what is allowed by Middle Period fiqh and its provisions
for custom {'urf), while representing exactly the bida (innovation) which the Sober
Modernists of the era wished to eliminate. Considering Sarwars Chishtiyya lineage,
however, the syncretic nature of these tales does not suggest that the Sufi reformers had
282 The Marriage of Sakhi Sarwar, vol. 2, p. 127.

283 Ibid., p. 127.
291
great headway among the masses of Punjab by the mid-19'^ century.
The stamp of Middle Period Intuition is on all of the eleven songs and tales
concerning Sakhi Sarwar. A more Sober perspective is found in A Hymn to Abd al-
Qadir al-Jilani [d. 1166], founder of the Qadiriyya, as well as in Jalali, the
Blacksmiths Daughter, involving a Punjabi devotee of a l-J ila n i.T h e latter is set in
Baghdad and bears no trace of non-Islamic literary themes or non-Muslim motifs, let
alone the imposition of local customary practices on the non-Punjabi characters
portrayed. In the former, there is absolutely no infusion of non-Muslim motifs, the only
inadvertent mention occurring in the context of marriage customs, as in The Marriage of
Sakhi Sarwar. Together, the above song and tale represent the firmest evidence that
Middle Period Sober Intuition was indeed represented in the oral literature of the Punjab,
and that its advocates and adherents understood their cultural ideal as separate
The entire spectrum of cultural ideals, from syncretism to separatism as far as
Middle Islam sanctioned, is not merely identifiable in works involving widely
acknowledged pirs from established tariqas. In the case of Lai Beg - a figure of great
obscurity venerated by the lowest classes of eastern Punjab - the entire spectrum can be
noted in relation to one figure. Temple includes four genealogies of Lai Beg, told by
various individuals in Ambala and Kamal districts.*^ Regarding tJie profusion of themes
and motifs, Temple commented, in the religion of the scavenger castes the tenets o f the
284 Ibid, p. 131.

285 Both are in vol. 2. A Hymn to Abd al-Qadir Jilani (XXVI), pp. 153-62; and, Jalali, the Blacksmiths Daughter
(XXVII), pp. 163-76.
286 In vol. 3, also see, The Saints of Jalandhar (XLVII), pp. 158-217; Basti Shiekh Darvesh (LIV), pp. 322-26; and,
Sayyid Asmim (LV), pp. 327-31.
287 Genealogies o f Lai Beg (XVII), vol. 1, pp. 529-44.
292
Hindus, the Mussulmans [i.e., Muslims] and the Sikhs are thrown together in the most
hopeless confusion, and the monotheism taught by the medieval [Bhakti] reformers
underlies all their superstitions.^^* Interestingly, this 19* century Orientalist states what
Metcalfe, et a l, were shown to have essentially concluded in a different context a century
later: that the culture and religious affiliation of the majority transcended Hindu,
Muslim and Sikh categorization, resting on local variants of an Indic culture. Lai Begs
genealogies read rather differently, however, when placed in the light of an entire
spectrum of cultural ideals legitimated by Middle Period Intuition, a light in which Lai
Beg represents different things to different communities of Lai Begis.
The first genealogy in the series represents Lai Begs intellectual legacy by
outlining the lineage of his gwrw, named as Balnik and identified by Temple as
Valmiki, the traditionally ascribed author of the Ramayana^^"^ The previous ten
incarnations {das avatar) o f Balnik given include nothing but Brahmanical figures,
including Mahadeo (Shiva) and characters from the Puranas^'^ In stark contrast to this
Hindu work, the second genealogy includes no mention of any Brahmanical figure. In
stead, Muhammad and such figures as Isa (Jesus), Khwaja Khidr, Idris (Enoch) and
Jibrail, not to mention the concept of wmma, are invoked in the context of Lai Begs
birth. Putting the third genealogy aside for the moment, the fourth differs from both the
above in that Muslim and non-Muslim motifs are employed. However, it is clear that the
Muslim references are far more numerous than the non-Muslim, and that the relationship
288 Ibid., p. 529.

289 Ibid., p. 529.
290 Ibid., pp. 530-31.
29IIbid.,pp. 531-33.
293
between them echoes something of the Sakhi Sarwar cycles syncretic ideals. Gaurja
(wife of Shiva) is said to have placed a robe and cap on Lai Beg at his birth, thus being
inteijected in the action along side a host of Sufi pirs. Otherwise, only literary reference is
made to the Golden Age (kritayuga) as well as two figures from Sanskrit literature
The third genealogy is the only one difficult to categorize as syncretic or separatist.
Here, the motifs do not match those of any strain in the broader literature of the region,
relying on local figures, or very local terms for more widely recognizable entities. Temple
speculates that Kumba is Mecca, and Gordhan is Gautama (Buddha), but with any
certainty one can only note the inclusion o f Valmiki, Ganesha (Hindu god) and Khwaja
K h id r .I t is not so much a syncretic tale, as one in which every religious tradition is
sublimated in a local cult of Lai Beg.
The weighted representation of various grades of syncretic and separatist
cultural ideals based on religious affiliations does not mean that other modes of identity
did not intersect the religious. Indeed, the strong anti-tribal rhetoric of certain heroic
tales itself suggests the importance placed on clan and tribal affiliations. Among the
heroic tales not yet mentioned, some convey no more than the honour o f one or another
side in an inter-clan or tribal feud. A point of additional interest is that many other tales
honour local rajas (kings) rather than tribal chiefs. This is particularly well represented by
4 tales from Kyonthal, near Simla in eastern Punjab.^^"* All are recorded in Junga, capital
of the Kyonthali Rajas, and attributed to inhabitants identified as members of the Koli
292 Ibid., pp. 535-44.

293 Ibid, pp. 533-34.
294 All are found in vol. 1. Raja Mahi Prakash of Saimor (XI), pp. 367-79; The Story of Syama (XII), pp. 380-99; The
Song of Negi Bahadur (XIII), pp. 400-3; and, Madana the Brave (XI'V), pp. 404-13.
294
(weaver) community.^^^ The first tells of a conflict between the Raja of Kyonthal and the
neighbouring state of Sarmor; the next of the battles and feuding that followed a local
jagirdar's assertion of independence from the Kyonthali state; the third is a love-song
whose hero is a Kyonthali military commander (negi); and, the fourth relates the virtual
press-ganging of a local 'sardaf into the military service of the Kyonthali state. In each
case, the hero is the Raja of Kyonthals opponent, be he rajajagirdar, negi or sardar.
In other words, from the perspective of the Koli bards, it is not elites in general, but
specifically the Kyonthali state that is unsympathetically portrayed.
While the Koli bards did not identify with the local state, other bards promoted the
identification of locals with local governmental institutions. In the ballad of Sansar
Chand ofKangra, another of the hill states around Simla, the professional bards (mirasis)
are decidedly partisan toward Kangra in its battle w ith neighbouring Sarmor In Raja
Jagat Singh ofNurpur, the raja is lauded for his military feats and economic
successes. The same tale, told in prose and verse by mirasis^ illustrates another means
by which local bards aggrandized local authorities, such as rajas and sardars: by
attaching them to the personages of larger governmental structures, such as Badshahs. In
particular, association with the Mughal state is employed as a means by which to further
exalt the stature of its hero. The same is the case in the ballad of Raja Jagdeo, recorded
from bards in Montgomery District, as well as The Adventures of Mir Chakur.^^^ The
same effect - of exalting local rulers by drawing in the Mughals - is also apparent in
295 Ibid, p. 367.

296 Sansar Chand ofKangra (XXIV), vol. 2, pp. 144-47.
297 Raja Jagat Singh of Nuipur (XXV), pp. 148-53.
298 Raja Jagdeo (XXIX), vol. 2, pp. 183-204; and The Adventures of Mir Chakur (XXXV), vol. 2, pp. 457-94.
295
Other tales, but with a different spin. In these cases, the Mughals are the greater
authority defied or degraded by the local hero, as we see below. Taken as a whole, tales
related to local rulers suggest that the artisns and cultivators that they represent,
recognized and resisted local states and rulers on an individual basis, but consistently
viewed the system of rajas, jagirdars and badshahs as the legitimate mode of
government.
Given that local rajas dating back two thousand years to Raja Rasalu are current
in this body of late 19* century oral literature, it is striking that of the myriad empires
that engulfed local states over that time, only the Mughal Badshahs find significant
mention, Delhi Sultans coming in second. Interestingly, although there is reference to a
^farangi' character in one tale, the British Empire is barely represented at all.^^ This is
true for Hindu, Sikh and Muslim bards. As well, while Muslims paint their Badshahs in
largely complimentary light, both Hindu and Sikh are as prone to employ the Mughal
motif in a complimentary as in the negative light. It is significant, however, that in the
case of the negative, the Mughals and Delhi Sultans do not merely represent a generic
external aggressor, but a specifically Muslim other against whom any mode of
dissension is of religious merit. Worthy of note is Raja Rattan Sain of Chittaur, a bardic
version of Rajput Chitaurs fall to Ala al-Din Khilji, the same story written in verse in
Awadhi by Jayasi, and used as an exemplar of Indicism by Metcalfe, et a l } ^ In this
Hindu version, no trace of Jayasis Love can be located, the driving theme being the
299 'rhree Versions of Sarwan and Farijan' (XXXIII), vol. 2, pp. 365-74. These stories, told widely in eastern Punjab by the
mid-19th century, are decidedly anti-British in tone. They concern the assassination of the ETC Resident at Delhi, William Fraser
(Farijan) by a nawab in 1835, and the nawabs subsequent execution. Although the substance of the affair is olotidy, in these studies, the
assasination is portrayed as a reprisal for Frasers indiscretions with a zamindars wife, SarWan.
296
need for caste propriety and female sacrifice in the face of conquest. The conquest itself
is symbolized by the call to prayer {adhan) forcing millions of Chitaurs gaurdian
goddesses (deota) from a city fallen primarily due to the treachery of a ""haniyd" (lit.,
merchant), or Tow-caste wazir.^^^
In Raja Amar Singh of Garh Mehta in Bikaner, and Raja Pirthi Singh of
Jodhpur, the Mughals Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb are respectively characterized in much
the same light as Ala al-Din Khilji.^^ The first tale is related by a bard from Kapurthala
state and the latter in Ambala cantonment, but both involve a Hindu Rajput family that
served at the highest ranks of the Mughal state during the tenure of the aforementioned.
The focus of both stories is the minor members of this family. Amar Singh, for example,
was the brother of Jaswant Singh, one of the highest ranking officers imder Aurangzeb.
Amar Singh, however, was skipped in succession and banished from his own homeland
by the nobles of Marwar. In this bardic version, Amar Singh is characterized as
contemplative, trusting, faithful to Ram and a great warrior. His wife is the self-
sacrificing ideal, killing herself rather than risk being seized and forcibly converted to
Islam upon her husbands death. Shah Jahan, on the other hand, is a tyrarmical emperor
{zulmi badshah), a bigot who values his Muslim courtiers above the Hindu Amar Singh,
whom he and other Muslim courtiers view as a boor (ganwariar) and unjustly
m u r d e r .Pirthi Singh of Jodhpur tells the story of the above mentioned Jaswant
Singhs son and heir, who died suddenly in Delhi while his father was campaigning on
300 Raja Rattan Sain of Chittaur (XXXII), vol. 2, pp. 350-65.

301 Ibid., pp. 363-5.
302 Raja Amar Singh of Garh Mehta in Bikaner (L), vol. 3, pp. 242-51; and Raja Pirthi Singh o f Jodhpur (LI), vol. 3, pp.
252-60.
297
Aurangzebs behalf in Kabul. Prithi Singh is shown to have much the same character as
the above bards Amar Singh, including the Hindu religious credentials, characteristics
which make Aurangzeb wary of him to the point of viewing all Rajputs with great
enmity from then on, besides having Prithi Singh murdered the same day they mct.^^"*
Together, the above tales certainly suggest historical Rajput-Mughal rivalries, but in
transcending ethnic and political divides to include religious difference as a source of
individual character and political friction, they also imply that by the mid-19^ century,
when these tales were current, the concept of absolute Hindu-Muslim separatism was
not foreign to the masses of Punjab, the Rajputs and the Mughals being employed to
represent larger opposing communities.
Viewed as a whole. Temples sample of Punjabi oral literature is sufficient to
confirm that many educated in such tales would be local in their cultural orientation,
as South Asianists have argued. Strong clan, tribal and ethnic bonds are evident. Caste
affiliations are also prominent. Beyond these bonds, one can also consider a sense of
belonging, willingly or unwillingly, to a local state. Indeed, in light of the fact that a
governmental structure, ranging from the local ^zamindaf to the "badshah in Delhi,
appears to have been viewed as legitimate in most quarters, it must be said that politically
the local could see him/herself as part of communities transcending clan, tribe, ethnicity
and class. As well, the broad spectrum of religious ideals, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh,
reflected in the literature, obviously intersects the facets of identity mentioned above, in
places adding another dimension to those facets, as in the case of the Rajput-Mughal
303 Raja Amar S in g h ...p p . 249-51.

304 Raja Pirthi Singh.... pp. 252-60.
298
tales, in others cutting across those facets, as in the case of the scavenger caste Lai
Begis. The most striking feature of religious influence, however, is not the syncretism
that one is conditioned to expect, but the degree to which a separatist ideal is
represented in these tales. Hinduism and Sikhism, as well as many practices associated
with them, are certainly legitimated by tales concerning Muslims, but the appreciation of
pre and post-Islamic historical periods, the preponderance of tales forwarding exclusively
Hindu, Sikh or Islamic themes and the broad use of literary motifs common to the canons
of larger literary traditions than that of the Punjab, confirm that inclusiveness, and even
syncretism, do not necessarily mean the sublimation of a particular religious identity,
whether Muslim, Hindu or Sikh.
Considering that it is the political and religious influences on Punjabi oral
literature that appear to promote notions of larger identity, the manner in which these
intersect best illuminates the influence (or lack thereof) of Sober reformers and their
religio-political agendas. Recall, the Mughals are everywhere referred to as 'badshahs
and umma is nowhere expressed in terms of caliphate. However, it must be recalled that
in 1857, the use of Badshah in relation to the Mughals did not mean that they refrained
from acting and being acknowledged as Caliphs/Imams. Thus, although one can not write
with certainty, one can speculate that one point at which the religious and the political
met in some locals o f Punjab was the incumbent Mughal.
As well, in this collection of Punjabi oral literature there is no mention of the type
of Imams defined in the writings of Wali Allahis. Thus, the concept of umma and the
recognition o f levels of government reaching to empire certainly does not correspond to
299
Sober Modernist ideals. Nevertheless, they do shed light on why Sober scholars and the
Mughals could rally crowds in urban and rural areas with chants of "jihad. The literary
themes and motifs of this body of literature decidedly reflect Middle Islam, but with an
emphasis on the Sober. The very structure of authority imbedded in the oral literary
landscape of Punjab acknowledges the religious authority of Sufi and "alim, alongside
the political authority of local zamindar and Mughal badshah. Thus, when these
together legitimated anti-colonial action, any with an interest in removing the EIC were
encouraged to rise. In the case of Punjab, less than 10 years under ETC rule in 1857 after
40 under the Sikhs, that was not many. In lands further east, where the EIC regime,
Mughals and Sober Modernists had a more intimate history, the numbers have already
been noted to have been more significant. In either case, it is quite clear that in the 150
years since the first Sober Sufi reformers were bom, including Shah Wali Allah, a
culturally separatist orientation had made gains against the syncretic from the lofty
heights of Calcutta at which Mirza Abu Talib wrote, to the lowly fringes occupied by the
Lai Begi scavengers of rural Punjab.
Conclusion: Muslim India and British India
With intellectuals like Shah Wali Allah, a new Sober Path was conceived and
echoed across the Muslim World in the 18* century. As had long been the case with
Sober scholars, the umma's unity lay in the uniform application of the shari a,
symbolized by a Caliph, rather than a singular polity. However, whereas the Middle
300
VQiiodfuqaha gave great latitude to custom in the application of the law - thus
encouraging local cultural affliliations - the Sober Modernists generally called for
absolute ijtihad, setting aside the schools of fiqh to appeal directly to Quran and hadith.
In terms of inter-faith relations, these scholars argued that although Muslims and non-
Muslims could continue to live and work together, they would form decidedly separate
communities, even when individual members were bound by ethnicity, class, vocation
and family ties. Muslims would share less of the culture of non-Muslims, and such
common practices as marriage and birth rites, astrology, shrine-based and pir orientated
worship, etc., would now be judged shirk or hid'a. Indeed, they would share less even
among themselves as certain Shii customs were equated with idols, while popular
Sufism itself was basically exorcised from Sunnism. Within Sunnism, tasawwuf, kalam,
fiqh, hikma, and other scholastic disciplines would be reserved for the highest study,
lower concentration being on hadith studies. Furthermore, Quran, hadith and Sober
treatises would be translated into local vernaculars, just as the latter languages would be
employed to introduce students to Persian and Arabic. In other words, while economic
clout was passing from an overarching political elite to more locally alligned capitalists.
Sober Modernists embarked on a program that undermined local cultural affiliations (in
all classes) in favour of a transcendent Sunni norm - one made particularly accessible to
any individual literate in local vernaculars.
The transcendent mission of Sober Modernists is also reflected in their political
platforms. Although many of the jihad movements mentioned above were headed by
persons terming themselves Imams, Mahdis, and so on - that is, persons claiming
301
leadership of the umma - their movements were often local affairs. Thus, although the
cause may have been local, such movements suggest that transcendence was sought
through formal practice and law, rather than political unification. Yet, religio-political
unification on the level of Muslim India can not be said to have been as far removed
from the titles claimed by leaders. In fact, it is in Shah Wali Allah and Muhammad
Ismails writings that one finds the Wali Allahis in particular adopted the Mughal idea of
a religio-political community encompassing the Muslims of Hindustan.
Although Wali Allah took up the Mughal idea of Muslim India, his sectarianism
not only viewed Shiis as largely non-Muslims, he also disqualified the Mughals as
Exalted Caliphs because they were not Quraysh, only delegitimating their claims to
Imamateas jahir (despotic) and ineffectual. However, Wali Allah left the door ajar for
more qualified individuals, including other Mughals, to serve as religio-political Imams
of Muslim India. When Muhammad Ismail and so many others gave haya to Ahmad
Barelvi, they stepped through that door to acknowledge an alternative to the incumbent
Mughal as the ultimate Imam of Muslim India, with no claims to being Caliph of the
entire umma. That is to say, Muslim India was certainly one among many levels of
religio-political affiliation availed of in the rhetoric of the period.
Although British India did not play a part in the inception of the new Sober
Path, as authority passed from local elites to the British officers of the EIC, Sober
Modernists and the new power were not bound to clash. In fact, the EIC served as head of
the Mughals "diwan," it was the military advisor of numerous local political elites and
the trading partner of still more local capitalists. However, the EIC did not act as such
302
from the outset. First, it restricted the jurisdiction of Islamic law to the personal realms.
Then it reduced the personal to codes and began exterpating the mufti andfiqh from the
legal process even in the limited realm still open to them. At this point, it also began
promoting English education above Arabic and Persian, allowing the madrasa to collapse.
Thus, although segments of society whose interests lay with the colonial state could hold
up the fatawa of no less an authority than Shah Abd al-Aziz to argue that although the
EIC regime was un-Islamic, it was legitimate to live and work under it as long as it
allowed some basic religious freedoms^ as the 19**^century progressed^ those of any class
whose interests were not seen to lie with the colonial state had a ready supply offatawa
from no less esteemed figures than Haji Shariat Allah, declaring that as the Imam no
longer exercised direct authority, prayers could not be legally recited and jihad was
necessary. Whether pro or anti-colonial. Sober Modernists - let alone Islam - could
legitimate each course of action. However, given that even the EICs capitalist
collaborators prefered Persian and Arabic to English, a crisis of legitimacy clearly grew
with the colonial state.
As the 1857 Uprising illustrates, the majority of South Asian Muslims would opt
for Shah Abd al-Azizs route. In the areas around Delhi and Lucknow, however,
segments of the Muslim and Hindu political elite, scholars, soldiers, artisans and
cultivators together rose to eliminate the colonial state. Despite the broad use of the
rhetoric of jihad among Muslims, the type of polity that would replace that of the farangi
kafirs' could not have been identical in their minds. For some, the option was a Mughal
Caliphate, at least of the symbolic variety. For others, such as the supporters of the
303
Shahs of Oudh or the Ranis of Jhansi, more local and sectarian politics would hold
premium. And finally, among others the Sober Modernists scholarly Imamate provided
a third model. Here too, there were inherent options. For some, Imamates were local, or
made no reference to Muslim India. For the Wali Allahi mujahidin, the scholarly Imam
would at least symbolize and at best lead the larger community once headed by the
Mughals.
In light of the direction and implications of EIC legal and educational reforms, as
well as the rhetorcally Islamic reponse to them, whether pro or anti-colonial, the rubric
of what local Indian rulers had been doing for the last century, does not seem
sufficinent to explain the nature of the colonial state, or what had been taking place
outside the British sphere of influence. In particular, the idea that everything Islamic or
Muslim was old or feudal, while European influence subscribed the new or the
modem, does not hold. Pursuant to this point, instances in which Sober Modernism
insisted on the new or modem, such as inheritance rights for women, while such old
and feudal practices as disinheritance were explicity legitimated by European
Modemism, have been noted. One can also critique the concept of new and old by the
route of similarities between Sober Modemists and 19* century European Modemists
This includes the elevation of vemacular languages in relation to classical tongues; a
jurispmdencial method that seeks types of codification in law; and, last but not least, a
view of the Orient as primarily divided into religious communities.
Whether depicted as following from indigenous trends, or representing the limits
of bourgeois culture, a vision of the colonial state in 1860 as a symbiosis or synthesis
304
of European and non-European thought is also difficult to resolve. Certainly similarities,
whether between 19* European Modernism and Middle Islam or Sober Modernism,
would have reinforced each others assumptions. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that
in the same case of inheritance mentioned above, although feudal//^/? and modem
English jurispradence both allowed for customary law, Erskine Perry did not make his
decisions based on a synthetic (/i^/z-English) jurisprudence, but on the basis of English
jurispmdence alone. Similarly, but on a grander scale, the entire EIC regime was
legitimate or illegitimate in the eyes o f Europeans through the lens of European thought,
while for South Asian Muslims that lens was Islamic thought, with few bridges between
them and their exponents. In the final analysis, the colonial state is syncretic, insofar as
European and Islamic thought legitmate the same institutions in some instances, but this
does not imply the type of symbiosis that Joseph Schacht reads into Anglo-
Muhammadan Law, or that many South Asianists see in the social history of the 18* and
early 19* centuries.
Why did the Mughals last until 1858? The answer is that for many they still
symbolized a religio-political community encompassing the Muslims of Hindustan,
including non-Muslims as dhimmis. Attesting to this are the nizams, nawabs and wazirs
(Muslim and non-Muslim) who did not assume more sovereign titles; various segments
of the population, including Sober scholars, that rose in their name in 1857; and finally,
the EIC itself. However, the success of the Great Mughals attempt to bring Sober
scholars on board their community, also bred competition for its leadership once the
Muslim political elite was replaced by the EIC. The Wali Allahis scholarly Imam stood
305
in an antagonistic stance before the Mughals and their Muslim successors, as much as
the British. Thus, entering the final chapter of this discussion on Muslim Nationalism,
this chapter adds the realization that at the very moment the British government was
removing the Mughals along with other Islamic institutions representative of Muslim
India, the idea of such a religio-political community was an expanding part of the
Utopias/Ideologies current among South Asian Muslims. Furthermore, this community
was not an old idea. In fact, it was newer than the use of gunpowder among Muslims,
that is, more modem than Hodgsons signpost of approaching Modemity. Nor was this
idea carried from the era of Great Mughals to that of the Lesser by nostalgia. Its
longevity was a calculated response to capitalization, the localization of power and its
centralization under the EIC - one forwarded by the EICs local allies and their
adversaries. In the initatives of the anti-colonial class, from 1707-1858, one witnesses a
fractured attempt to draw together Muslim political elites, capitalists, artisans and
cultivators under either a Caliphal or an Imami banner. Together, these rhetorical and
institutional altematives to the colonial state were either part of, or benefited most from,
the Sober Tide that began to sweep across South Asias many Muslim localities before
and beyond the British and EIC institutions.
Chapter Four
Muslim Moderns and Modern Muslims:
Re-Printing Islam in Period of British Ral
Although the reformist thought discussed in the previous chapter is the intellectual basis
for the developments to be addressed here, the proponents of these trends employ rather
different strategies to disseminate their ideas by 1858. Prime among the strategies
employed by the folding of the East India Company regime is the unanimous use of
print-media, that is, journals and newspapers, by Muslims.' When added to the
capitalism and English education that South Asianists argue accompanied the rise of the
British Raj, the late-19* century represents the first period in which the traditional
1 As mentioned in the context o f the 1857 Uprising, the British Parliament was divided on the issue of the EICs continued
governance o f South Asian possessions, indeed, as discussions of the legal and educational reforms implemented by the EIC revealed
in the last chapter, the British government became increasingly involved in South Asian gov'emance from the late 18th century to the
1857 Uprising. Thus, it is largely argued that the end, not only o f the EIC regime, but o f the EIC itself, was in the ofluig, the Uprising
of 1857 and charges of EIC incompetence merely proinding the pretext. This rietv is also validated by the fact that Direct Rule by
the British Government largely continued the pattern of government set by the EIC, maintaining subsidiary alliances with more than
500 Princely States, employing .South Asian troops in the British Army and the colonial administration, while also discriminating
against the South Asians in their employ. Otherwise, the EICs gowmor-general was replaced with a tioeroy appointed by the
Crown, and Court o f Directors relinquished control of government to the new post cabinet post o f Secretary' of State for India. That
is not to say'that substantial changes in the institutions and ideologies o f government were not already visible in the !860s-1870s.
Rather, the point being emphasized here is that there is continuity between these two phases of colonial rule. See, Sarvepalli Gopal,
British Policy in India. 1858-1905 (Cambridge: University Press, 1965); and, Thomas R. M etcalf The Aftennath o f Revolt: India
1857-70 (Princeton: University Press, 1964).
2 The first vernacular presses were established by Jesuit missionaries in the Deccan in the late 16th century. The first
newspapers were published by the British, commencing in the 1760s. The first book in the vernacular was published in Bengali in
1778. 'the first vernacular newspaper was published in 1816, by Ram Mohan Roy. The first independent press owned and operated by
Muslims was established in 1812, and the first Urdu newspaper appeared in 1822. By 1850, all major towns had newspapers, though
circulation was small. See, P. A. Mohanrajan, Glimpses o f early Printing and Publishing in India (Madras: Mohanaralli Publishers,
1990).
306
307
ingredients of not only modernity, but according to Benedict Anderson, such
particulars as nationalism were within the imaginations of South Asians.^
Among the most insightful observations on the rise of nationalism in South Asia,
are those of the Subaltemist, Partha Chatterjee. While concurring with Andersons idea
of nations as imagined communities, the thesis of his The Nation and its Fragments
stems from the question, if the nation is imagined in Europe, as Anderson argues, what
is left for the colonial subject to imagine? His answer is as astute as the question, for it
includes an explanation of the means by which the imaginings of the colonial subject
were able to influence the nations to arise out of a colonial environment Subaltemists
generally describe as non-representative, or semi-feudal. He argues that the urban
bourgeoisie carved an Inner domain of cultural sovereignty, including religion, gender,
family, and so on, leaving the Outer domain, including the state, economy, technology,
and so on, open to European instruction. He concludes that if the nation is an imagined
community, then this [Inner domain] is where it is brought into being.**
Sandria Freitags Collective Action and Community, echoes Chatteqees concerns
in various ways, but focuses more consciously on religious community than
nationalism. It is her thesis that the rise of print-media, capitalism, etc., ushered the
birth of a public arena, analogous to Habermas public sphere. Here, alternative ideals
to those of the colonial regime were available and self-consciously chosen by
participants in the definition of their own communities and the o th er.B y means of this
process, according to Freitag, the phenomenon long referred to as Communalisra - that
3 See, Benedict Anderson, Imayiaed Communities (London: Verso, 1995).

4 Pariha Chaltejjee, Nation and its Fragments, p. 6.
308
is, religiously conditioned political identities - came to dominate the social fabric
of colonial South Asia. The obvious tie between Freitag and Chatteijee is the existence of
an Inner or alternative domain where ideals were not necessarily those of Europe or
its colonial representatives in South Asia. This raises the questions; what was the Islam
of the Inner domain, and what role did it play in the public arena?
As previously mentioned, this is not the first study to suggest that Mughal
political culture played a part in the rise of Muslim Nationalism. Thus, it behooves one
to consider more closely how other works have accommodated Islam. Early works in
this genre, such as David Lelyvelds Aligarhs First Generation, showed that aspects of
Mughal political culture, such as the concept of ashraf (nobility) and the biraderi
(endogamous kinshup) system promoted identification with the ruling power and the idea
that Muslims were part of a superior race requiring deference.* As well, Lelyveld and
Barbara Metcalfe have argued that concepts of consultative government promoted by
Muslim leaders were rooted in the Mughal concept of society.^ By far the most
thorough consideration of the influence of Mughal political culture as a representative of
an Indo-Muslim polity, however, appeared later, in Farzana Shaikhs Community and
Consensus in Islam. The author showed how specific legal concepts, such as ijma and
dhimmi, or political concepts such as Caliphate and Sultanate, influenced Muslim
5 See, Sandria B. Freitag Collective Action and Commimitv: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North
India (Berkley: University of California Press, 1989).
6 David Leh'veld, Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Soiidaritv in British India (Princeton; Princeton University Press,
1978), pp. 20-34; 311-12-
7 Ibid., p. 344; and, Barbara Metcalfe, Islamic Revival in Bntish India (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1882)., p.
319. Also see, Sheila McDonough. The Authoritv of the Past (Chambersburg; American Academy of Religion, 1970).
309
attitudes towards community and political action.*^ More recently, in her Self and
Sovereignty. Ayesha Jalal has added consideration of the role of such Sufi concepts as
khudi (self) in charting the relationship between Muslim notions of the individual in
relation to various communities.^
Although it is clearly established that Islam - particularly as practiced in South
Asia - played a part in the rise of Muslim Nationalism in the late 19* century, the above
works also suggest that much remains to answered on how the vast intellectual and
institutional world considered in the previous chapters is specifically tied to the thought
and institutions of the colonial era. First and foremost, although Shaikh and others have
illuminated certain facets of legal philosophy, for example, that influenced notions of
political representation, they have not considered how the legal philosophy of the late
19* century is related to that of the earlier periods, assuming a certain stasis in the
development of thought. Furthermore, the influence of disciplines other thanfiqh or
political philosophy, such as mysticism or speculative philosophy, are rarely addressed
and if mentioned, viewed from the perspective of specific concepts, such as ijma or
khudi, rather than disciplines and schools. Thus, this study approaches the issue of the
ties between the colonial and Mughal eras, by first considering the Muslim schools that
employ print, etc., thus having a direct influence in the public arena. It will be shown
that the most influential of these were organizations promoting Sober Utopias/Ideologies
of the Modem and Middle Period varieties. It is also argued that during this period
Intoxicated Modernism rose to challenge all the above. The most significant cultural
8 Fatzana ShaikJi, Commurutv and Concen.sus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India. 1860-1947 (Bombay;
Orient Longman, 1991).
310
aspect of this new Intoxicated Way is that although it is culturally syncretic in
terms of European thought and institutions, it is separatist in relation to Hindu thought
and institutions.
Turning to the public arena, consideration sways toward the issue of how
rhetoric is related to the Utopias/Ideologies of the above schools. This studys primary
leads are again the works of Lelyveld, Metcalfe, Shaikh and Jalal. They have shown that
although inclusive of various types of identification (including European nationalism),
the two main levels o f identity the Muslim schools of thought of the late 19^^ century
promoted are umma (already addressed at length) and qawm - a longstanding notion of
community in the Muslim context not as yet discussed.Furthermore, the above
authors emphasize the importance of the concept of qawm as it is the word used in
reference to a South Asian Muslim nation beginning in the late 19* century.
Following the above historians focus on umma and qawm, this chapter draws the
concept of the Mughal Caliphate, as well as the distinctions between the Islam of the
Great Mughals and that of the late 19* century, into the discussion. In this manner, it is
argued that it was the decline of the Mughal Caliphate - representative more generally of
Muslim power in South Asia - before the EIC regime that led to the rise of the currency
o f Ottoman Caliphate in South Asia. Furthermore, the decline of the symbol of a religio-
political community headed by the Mughals, did not imply the end of identification on
that basis; i.e., Muslim India. Rather, the Mughals and their successors Muslim
9 Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty in Islam: Individual and Commumt^ m South Asian Islam Since 1850 (London;
Routledge, 2000).
10 Like the term umma, the proliferation of the term qawm among Muslims stems from its use in the Quran. However, in
contrast to umma - which came to refer to the Muslim community as a whole, without reference to geographic, sectarian or political
311
India is argued to be one of the prime notions of religio-political community in the
late 19^^ century. Thus, of the variety of ethnic, regional, religious and sectarian
communities referred to as qawm by Muslim authors, it is in reference to Muslim
India that the word is ultimately and most widely translated as nation.
In terms of the historiographical framework outlined above, the findings of this
chapter firmly identify with Andersons notion o f imagined communities, Chatteijees
observation that much to do with nationalism in South Asia was imagined in the Inner
domain, andFreitags recognition that much of the altemative to the colonial regime in
the public arena was religiously conditioned. Here, detail is added to the intellectual
influences acting upon this class of Muslims in the Inner domain, as well as the
rhetorical influences acting in the alternative public arena. From the intellectual
perspective, this suggests that culturally separatist Utopias/Ideologies were dominant.
From the rhetorical perspective, neither advocates of Caliphate nor the Muslim Nation
would exclude political action in league with each other or with non-Muslims (including
the British). However, throughout the late 19* century, it would become more apparent
that political affiliation would revolve around the accommodation of umma and the
qawm. This not only means that the Muslim Nation is imagined beyond Europe, it
suggests that among Muslims the Inner domain was not exactly transformed by
nationalism, as Chattel)ee argues. Rather, the Inner domains qawm was translated
as nation. Furthermore, instead of viewing the communal aspect of these identities as
the result of Orientalist assumptions, colonial construction, the birth of Freitags
divisions - the term qawm applied and continued to apply primarily to communities (within the umma or outside of it) divided along
various social lines. See, F. Siiaikh, Community and Concensus in Islam, pp. 10-48.
11 C'hatteijee, Nation and its Fratanents, p. 6.
312
public arena or Andersons modernity, the continuity in thought and rhetoric makes
a case for adding an understanding o f this phenomenon as the re-printing of
Utopias/Ideologies that preceded the rise of British rule in South Asia.
I: The New Sobriety; Deoband and Company
Although some mujahidin groups continued to fight into the 1860s, after the
defeat of 1857-58, most South Asians were aware that some form o f British rule was
there to stay indefinitely. As Metcalfe has aptly put it, under these circumstances Sufi
reformers and Sober Modernists turned their attention to the establishment of
educational institutions and the training of men to teach and guide Muslims of all
backgrounds and classes of society.'^ In this period, schools growing in influence even
today would rise to continue the flow of a Sober Tide.*^ All they would ultimately share,
however, was the fact that their founders were from the class o f petty gentry {ra 'is)
12 B.D. Metcalfe, Islamic Revival in Bntish India: Deoband. 1860-1900 (Pnnoeton; Pnnceton University Press, 1982), p.
86 ,
13 All three Sober schools mentioned here are among the most prominent exponents of Islam in contemporaiy Pakistan,
India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. In Pakistan particularly, representatives of each school have gained influence m society at large
througli the medium of the madrasa, and in polity througli a nimtber of parties. Deobandis liave been socio-politioally organized most
centrally under the umbrella of the .Tamaat-i Ulama-i Islam since 1942, although there are a number of other Deobandi parties. As
the name of the primary Ahl-i Sunnat (Barelvi) religio-political organ in Pakistan suggests, it was formed post-independence, being
the Jamaat-i Ulama-i Pakistan. As for the AH-i Hadith, the leading organization of many active in Pakistan is the Jamaat-i Ah!-i
Hadith. Under the auspices of these parties and their adjuncts or sympatizers, the Islamabad Institute of Policy Studies reported in
2001 that 6.761 madrasa were operating in Pakistan, though the Intenor Ministry reported a total nearer 20,000, Estimates of student
populations ranges from 1,000,000-3,000,000 at any given time. The Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadith parties in particular have also been
involved in a number of Jihad movements, 'fhe Afghani Taliban movement was bom in the Deobandi madrasas of Pakistan. As w'cll,
a number of outfits active in A^hanistan against the Soviets, or in Kashmir against the Indians, have roots in either the Jamaat-i
Ulama-i Islam or the Jama"at-i Ahl-i Hadith. And finally, under the united umbrella of the Majlis-i Muttahida-i Amal, the above
Deobandi, Ahl-i Sunnat and Ahl-i Hadith parties Joined the leading Shii group to contest the 2002-03 general elections, taking power
in two of four provinces, and establishing themselves as the third largest party in the National Legislature. For background on these
313
often hurt by the institutional collapse discussed in the previous chapter, but surviving
in their ancestral towns in the countryside around Delhi.
Sufi reformers of the Qadiriyya found voice through the Ahl-i Sunnat, centred on
the rural town of Bareilly and the writings of Ahmad Rida Barelvi (d.). The Ahl-i Sunnat
would emphasize the import of taqlid in Hanafi fiqh, but of the Middle Period variety,
thus legitimating custom on a grand scale. As Usha Sanyals fine studies of the Ahl-i
Sunnat have shown, Ahmad Rida was bom into a scholarly family. His father was a
respected/aî/a and Qadiriyya Sufi, as was his grandfather.^'^ In and around Bareilly, this
and other scholarly families had fostered the study of fiqh, kalam, hikma and adjunct
disciplines, and had debated with the followers of the Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya on the
condemnation o f such practices as the celebration of milad al-nahi in the works of Shah
Muhammad Ismail, particularly the Taqwiyat al-Iman^^ As Ahmad Rida was primarily
educated by his father and grandfather and was the murid of the Qadiriyya Shah Al-i
R asul,Sanyal confirms that an intellectual propensity to oppose the reduced Sobriety
of the Sober Modernists was part of Ahmad Ridas intellectual heritage and a feature of
the Ahl-i Sunnat.
Bom o f the same class as Ahmad Rida and the Ahl-i Sunnat scholars. Sober
Modernists of Wahhabi-inspired schools coalesced into a school known as the Ahl-i
schools and parties in Pakistani politics, see, Asghar Khan, ed. Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience (London; Zed
Books, ! 985); and Khaled Ahmad, The Power of the Ahle Hadith, The Friday Times (July 17, 2002),
14 Usha Sany-al, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 51; 69-72
15 Ibid., p. 55.
16 Ibid., p.p. 129-31.
17 Ahmad Ridas writings, including fatawa, argue for taqlid in Hanafi fiqh on the grounds that there were no mujtahids in
his day. See, Ahmad Rida dxm.,Al-Atayali-Nabawiyyafi'lFatawaal-Rizwiyya, vol. 6 (Mubarakpur: Sunni Darai-Isaat, 1981).
Also, he argues in favour of prophetic and saintly intercession, thus legitimating shrine-based worship. See, Ahmad Rida Khan,
314
Hadith.'^ Representatives of the Wali Allahi school, meanwhile, most particularly
became known as Deobandis, after the town in which three Wali Allahi scholars among
the last students at the Madrasa-i Rahimiyya founded a madrasa like no other in its day.
The backgrounds of the founding coterie of the madrasa (later Dar al- Ulum) at
Deoband speak volumes of their interests and the schools agenda. Muhammad Qasim
Nanawtawi (d. 1877), Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d.l905) and Imdad Allah Thanawi
(d. 1899) all hailed from the Upper Doabs scholarly families, travelling to Delhi for
further education when of age. Their familial and scholarly pedigrees are intimately
connected with the Wali Allahis. Muhammad Qasims biography will suffice to illustrate
the point. He was the nephew of Mamluk Ali (d. 1850), a scholar from the
Naqshbandiyya-Wali Allahi line. At the latters arrangement, Muhammad Qasim was a
student at Delhi College, where he studied geometry and arithmetic, but did not write the
annual ex a m s.H e also continued his study of hikma, mantiq and kalam under Mamluk
Ali, and took up hadith studies under Abd al-Ghani, the incumbent principle of the
Wali Allahi Madrasa-i Rahimiyya. It was in this period that Muhammad Qasim met
Maljuzat-iA 'laliazrat, 4 vols. (Gujarat: Fazl-i Academy, n.d.). Such sources reveal the author to have intellectually represented the
model of the Middle Period Sufi-afei.
18 Like the Ahl-i Sunnat, the AM-i Hadith scholars such as Sayyid Nazir Hussam and Siddiq Hasan Khan, were from
landed scholarly families associated with the Mughals and their successor states. As Metcalfe suggests, they too had fallen on hard
times. They claimed the pedigree and lived up to a number of aspects of Wahhabi thought, 'fhey called for absolute ijtihad, but
emphasized hadith over qfyas in the deriratioii of law, just as Wali MltthHTariqa-iMuhammadiyya scholars did. However, the Ahl-i
Hadith rejected Sufism in tolo, \irtually eliminating Intuition as a valid category of Islamic thought. Metcalfe, Islamic Revival in
British India., pp. 268-96. Also, Khaled Ahmad, The Power of the Ahle Hadith, The Friday Times {My 17, 2002).
19 For backgrottnd reading on the founders of Deoband beyond Metcalfe, Islamic Revival in British India, the foremost
secondary work on Deoband in English, also see, A. S. Khan, A Critical Appraisal of Dar ul-Ulum Deobtind and its Leadership,
'loumal of the Research Society of Pakistan 31:4 (1994): 21-28; and, S.H.H. Nadvi, The Role of Resurgent Ulama and Sufi-Sheikhs
in the Reconstruction of Islamic Education: the Foundation of Deoband (1867) andNadw'a (1893), Muslim Education Ouaiterlv 3:2
(1986): 37-56.
20 Muhammad Yaqub Nanawtawi, Saveahn-i Oasimi (Delhi: Mujtaba-i Press, 1894), p. 4.
21 Sawid Mahbub Rizvi, Tarikh-i Dar al-Ulum Deobaaid (Delhi: Idara-i ihtemam, 1980), p. 80
315
Rashid Ahmad, another of Mamluk Alls students from a family long associated with
the Wali Allahi school. Both also studied Sufi principles and practice under Imdad Allah,
another student of Mamluk Ali and of Shah Rafi al-Dins grandson, the successor of
Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi as Imam of the Barelwi mujahidin. When Muhammad Qasim
completed his studies about 1850, he took up employment at the Matba-i Ahmadi Press,
established about 1845 by another of Mamluk Alls students with the express intent of
publishing hadith collections. Before Muhammad Qasim joined the press, al-Tirmizis
collection had already been rendered in print, the maiden printed rendition of hadith in
South Asia. The Sahih Bukhari (1853) and Mishkat al-Masahih (1854) were published
with Muhammad Qasims participation.^^
There is some debate about the participation of this coterie of scholars in the
conflagration of 1857. Metcalfe argues that neither of the three was involved, and that
mention of their involvement is only made in post-1920, nationalist biographies
published by Deobandis. Based on her analysis, all that can be concluded is that
Muhammad Qasim was never arrested, Rashid Ahmad was arrested but released after six
months, and Imdad Allah was in Mecca at the time.^This would appear to be validated
in the case of Muhammad Qasim by a more recent official history that makes no
mention of involvement in the conflict. Rather, it points out that the Matba-i Ahmadi
was relocated to Meerut by 1859, leaving Muhammad Qasim to find employment at the
Matba-i Mujtabai, which was relocated from Meerut to Delhi at the same time.
Muhammad Qasim, the employee of one influential press, was now an editor at another
that would publish the Quran, the works of Wali Allahi scholars and the texts of the
22 ibid., til- 2&3, p. 80.
316
dars-i nizamiyya^^ Rashid Ahmad and Imdad Allah, however, are said to have fought
against the British at Shamli, as in the case of the nationalist biographies mentioned by
Metcalfe, thus explaining the formers arrest and implying the latters earlier return from
Mecca. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the exclusion of these scholars from mention
of participation in the Uprising in pre-1920 biographies may provide less evidence of the
Deobandi distance from the Uprising, than of promoting the perception of distance in its
wake. This point is addressed further below, beginning with an exploration of these
scholars intellectual orientation further.
Late scholars from Deoband accredit the founding of their school to the
inspiration of Imdad Allah, whose purpose was to protect the Muslims of South Asia
against the atheist world-views introduced by the British.*^ The eight principles upon
which the madrasa was to run were articulated by Muhammad Qasim."^ As Metcalfe has
shown, these principles illustrate the manner in which the new madrasa differed from
those of the past. First, the majority o f principles are concerned with securing funding in
the absence o f the Muslim political elite and their waqfs, without having to rely on the
colonial state. The solution was to employ a network of private annual donations, which
could include cash grants, books, food and furnishings. In order to persuade the people to
donate, as the first principle stipulates, their convenience was assured by use of the
23 Metcalfe, Islamic R e\ival in British India, p. 82.

24 S.M, R izti, Tarikh~i Dar al-Ulimi Deoband, &. 2, p. 83.
25 Ibid., p. 97.
26 Muhammad. Xa5 7 ib, Introduction, Twikh-i Dar al-Vlum Deoband, p. 28.
27 Tliese principles are reprinted in S.M. R \Z \i, Tarikh-i Dar al-Ulum Deoband pp. i 16-17.
Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
317
colonial postal service and money orders, while gratification was provided by the
printed lists of donors, no matter the size of their donation."*
Muhammad Qasims principles also touch upon the administration of the
madrasa, again suggesting a substantive change from the past. Apart from the post of
sarparast (rector), muhtamim (chancellor) and sadr mudarris (principle), a Majlis-i
Shura (Consultative Council) was established. Muhammad Qasims principles clearly
enunciate that the administration cannot act without the consent of the Majlis, and that it
is this body, not the individual administrator or instructor, that decides the course of
study to be followed in each class. As Metcalfe concludes, the aim of the founders in
agreeing to these terms was to avoid position or seniority determining the future course
of administration and instruction.^'^
With these principles in mind, the first c l^ s was offered at a local mosque in 1866
and the number of students in attendance was 21."'' What is most clear about the
institution that grew from here, is the influence of European institutions of higher
learning on its founders through their association with Delhi College. Most pertinent to
our discussion, however, is the fact that the fixed curriculum they prescribed, the annual
exams they required of students for accreditation, the mass convocations at which they
awarded graduates and the affiliated madrasas which followed their lead were designed
for the propagation of Sober Modernism.
Although the Deobandis are justifiably noted for their Wali Allahi backgrounds
by South Asianists and Islamicists, it must be clarified that there is only one major
28 Metcalfe, Islamic Revival In British M i a , p. 97,

29 .See Principles 3, 4 and 5, in S.M. Riz\r, Tarikh-i Tiar al-Vlum Deoband, pp. i !6-i 7.
30 Metcalfs, Islamic ReMval In British India.op cit., p. 96.
318
discipline in which the Deobandis are identical to their Wali Allahi predecessors. The
discipline is lasawwuf, and for this continuity one must credit the senior partner of the
trio, Imdad Allah. His Tahqiq-i Wahdat al-Wujud wa al-Shuhud, perfectly continues the
Wali Allahi propensity to consider the distinctions between these two doctrines and their
authors to be a matter of terminology or approach, rather than the conclusion that fana is
absolute, or baqa a lower stage of consciousness, as Intoxicated Wujudis argued.^' He
also upholds the more general Naqshbandiyya notion of equating tariqa with shari 'a,
nowhere more stridently than in his Faisalah-i Haft Mas 'aiah.^^ However, whereas Wali
Allahis simultaneously inclined toward hikma, kalam, fiqh and other disciplines
employing Reason, Imdad Allahs students and co-founders of Deoband, followed their
personal teachers lead to further restrict their study.
Beginning with hikma and kalam, Deobandis exhibit little of the propensity for
speculation shown by Wali Allah. I.H. Siddiqi notes that Muhammad Qasim neglected
courses on logic {mantiq) and all philosophy {hikma) was later excluded from the
curriculum by Rashid Ahmad. This lack of interest in propagating philosophy and its
adjunct disciplines is echoed in the writings of the most philosophically inclined of the
above scholars. At Muhammad Qasims most metaphysical, one finds little beyond
polemical works like the Qibla Niima, which is a detailed response to the charge that
Muslims are idolaters(/>u/parast) as they worship(.sayat/a) the Kaba, which he
31 "Rudad-i sal-i Awwal, 1283 AH, in S.M. Rizvi, Tmikii-i Dar al-Ulum Deoband, pp. 120-22.
32 Imdad Alialj Umiiawii, Taltqiq-i IVahdat al-lVuJud wa al-Shuhud (Karaohi: Pak-i Akademi, 1963). For odier instances
o f fmdad Aiiah s views on wahdat al-wujudand tasawwu/m Urdu, see his, Ziâ al-Quiuh (Delhi: Matbai Mujtaba'i, 1877). For
compilations of Imdad Allahs pertment writings, see, KuUiyal-i fmrfadiVpa (Kanpur: Matba-I f}ayyumi, 1943); and, Marqumat-i
Imdadiwa (Delhi: Maktabah-yi Burhan, 1979).
33 Imdad Allah Thanawi, Faisalah-i Haft .Mas alah (Kanpur: Matbai Majidi, 1960)
319
attaches to Swami Dayananda (d.l883), founder ofthe influential Hindu revivalist
Arya Samaj (1875).'^ It employs the arguments of Middle Periodfalasifa and
mutakallimm to define the metaphysical plane represented by the Kaba in the concept of
As for Muhammad Qasims attitude toward contemporary European thought,
one need not step further than his Tahzir al-Nas, another polemical work, on this
occasion defending the position of Muhammad as the Seal of Prophets. It begins with a
hadith that states that God created seven earths (ardin), each with its own Adam, Noah
and Abraham. This, Muhammad Qasim declares, is sufficient for him to believe that
there are seven stratum (fahaqat), each created {mukhluq) by God. It is this belief, he
34 I.H. Sidditji, Musiim Educational Movements in North India, Journal ofthe Institute ol~ Islamic Studies 9 ()972), p.
I2i.
35 Muhammad Qasim Nanasvtawi, Qibla Numa (Deijbaiid: MajJis M aarif al-Quran. i 969). p. 30. Swami Dayananda
Saraswati (d. 1883) and his Ar>-a Samaj, or Society- of Aryans (f. 1875), have been hugely influential in contnbuting to the militancy
o f Hindu Nationalism. The founder is termsd a retivalisf for his firm contiotion that the only trae faith is that contamed in the four
Vedas and practices by tlie Vedic Arya. Theologically, Swami Dayananda argued that the Vedas tlid not sanction image-worship,
caste, child marriage or the subjugation of women. Politically, this rerivalism involved a pro-active campaign to reform 'Hindu
society , yvliiie also 'protecting' it from the abuses of others, particularly Muslims. Apart from leading to vigorous debate with
representatives of Brahmanical Hinduism, tlie Arya Samajs aims involved the organization in various campaigns that would put them
at odds with Muslims, including cow-proteotion, which sought to restrict the slaughter of cows by Muslims, particular on id al-
adlia, and shuddi. which aggressively endeavoured to re-convcit Muslims to Hinduism, both contributing to Hindu-Muslim violence
from the 1880s on. For an introduction to Dayanandas ideas, see, Sw amai Dayananda Saraswati, Autobiography of Swami Davanand
Saraswati. ed. K.C. Yadav (New Delhi: Manohar, 1976); and. The Light o f Troth, trans. G.P. Upadhyaya (Allahabad: Kala Press.
1960). Also see, Kenneth W. Jones, Arva Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th Century Punjab (Berkeley: University of CaUfomia
Press, 1976).
36 Tlie Qibla is the direction in which Muslims oriejit themselves during prayer - that is, the direction of K a'ba in Mecca.
This direction was set during Muhammads time, shifting the previous oncntation of his followers toward .lerusalem. As Muhammad
Qasims work suggests, however, the concept is also understood on a metaphysical plane. See, C. Schoy, Kibla, Encyclopaedia of
Islam, vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1st Edition), pp. 985-89.
Muhammad Qasim makes many explicit references to Muslim philosophers and theologians, as well as to Greek
(Yunani) philosophy, drawing trom this large body o f thought what makes his point that the concept o f Qibla is not idolatrous. In
other words, where metaphysics plays a part it is largely Neo-Platonic in orientation, but only as tar as kalam's notions of
transcendence allow.
37 Muhantmad Qasim Nanawtawi, Tahzir al-Nas (Delhi; Matba Mujtabai 1891), p. 1 Other Urdu wttrks by Muhammad
Qasim that suggest the same intellectual orientation as the Oibla Ntmia and Tahzir-i Nas, including the polemical mode o f discourse,
are; Mmiazarah-i .ytbah (Muradabad: Matba Gulzar-i Tbrahim, 1890); and, Tqfsiyat al- A qa 'id (Delhi; Matba-1 Mujtabai, reprint
19.34).
320
ends, that determines the difference between ahJ-i sunna wa jama 'a (Sunni Muslims)
and kafirs,fasiqs (heretics) and kharijis (apostates).^*
Muhammad Qasims ultimate reference to hadith is reflected in Rashid Ahmads
intellectual strength, though the latter most often expressed this tendency through
jurisprudence and Xh&fatwa. This leads to the second difference between Deobandis and
Wali Allahis. In terms of legalism, Wali Allahis passionately pleaded for ijtihad, but
Deobandi fatawa literature makes clear the schools insistence on taqlid in Yimafifiqh.
As Rashid Ahmad states in one fatwa, "'taqlid is confirmed by the Quran.^^ In another
fatwa, when asked what the proof of the necessity for taqlid is, Rashid Ahmad responds
that only taqlid can insure the peoples organization {intizam)"^^ However, when
confronted with the question of Muhammad Ismails legal method, Rashid Ahmad
betrays his familiarity by quite accurately describing the approach of the Tariqa-i
Muhammadiyya, stating that when the former scholar found sound hadith that
contradict Hanafi rulings, he practiced the letter of hadith. When no such hadith was
available, he practiced taqlid in Hanafi /igh. " When compared with Rashid Ahmads
own approach, one finds that the method of ruling is similar. Asked about the
permissibility of dhikr jahr (spoken incantation) in the Hanafi madhhab, Rashid Ahmad
admits that there are discordant opinions on the subject, and adds that the reason behind
38 ITie same reliance on Ptolemaic cosmology is found m the theological' writings of Rashid Ahmad, For example, in his
Luta 'if-i Rashidiyya. the authors tafsir of a Quranic verse (18:86) fliat mentions tlie sun settmg in a pool of hot water, takes as a
starting point the understandii^ o f the cosmos in terms of seven skies (sathun asman).
The f Ufa 'if-i Rashidiyya is published with passages from other works as, Rashid Ahmad, Gangohi, Tafsir-i Rashidi
(Bijmaur: Madni Dar al-Ta!if, 1970), The cited discussion is on pp, 56-7,
39 Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Falawa-i Rmhidiyya, no. 1020 (Karachi: Saeed Company, reprint 1967), p, 508. For a
secondary study of Deobandi legal opinion, see, M,K, Masud, Trends in the Interpretation o f Islamic I,aw in the Fatawa Literature of
Deoband School, (MA Thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill, 1969), pp, 26-27; 79,
40RashidAhm ad, Fatavm-//?a:s/i/a'iXra, no, 1019, p, 508,
321
contrary opinions cannot be decided. Rather than admit ambiguity on the subject, or
argue for permissibility on the basis of Intuition (which he acknowledges as valid in the
fatwa), he concludes, the proof o f permissibility is in certain Quranic verses that call for
the spoken.^" In other words, Muhammad Ism ails ijtihad and Rashid Ahmads taqlid
are virtually identical in their preferred dependence on literal readings of Quran and
hadith above the opinions of scholars of the Hanafi school. That is to say, Rashid
Ahmads daqlid in Rmafi fiqh is more accurately described as ijtihad in the Tariqa-i
Muhammadiyya, a type of Sober Modernist jurisprudence, but exactly not that of Wali
Allah.
The narrowness of Deobandi specialization, together with the version of
jurisprudence they forwarded, has obvious consequences in tenns of the Deobandis
cultural outlook, the ultimate manner in which they differ from Wali Allahis. If the Wali
Allahis were extreme cultural separatists, the Deobandis - by neglecting hikma, kalam
andfiqh, while promoting the Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya jurisprudential method as the
^shari a that equaled dariqa - took the trend up a notch. The proof is in the types of
customs the Deobandis believed were shirk and hida. Like Wali Allahis, Rashid
Ahmad and Imdad Allah declared staple aspects of the Muslim ritual to date, such as the
celebration of milad al-nabi and the urs (death anniversaries) of pirs - let alone regional
festivals like Shab-e Barat or Shii Muharram festivals - beyond the shari Their
students and successors as leaders of Deoband went further. In his hugely influential
4 1 roiA,iio. 1028, p. 511 .

42 ibid., DO. 1042, p. 523.
43 For Imdad Allahs views on miiad al-nahi, which he terms "mawlidsharij, as vv'eli as on Suti urs, see his, Faisalah-i
Haft Mas 'alah (Kanpur: Matbai Majidi, i960). For Rashid Ahmad views on bid'a as it pertains to milad al-nahi, see his, Fataa-a-i
322
Bihishti Zewar, the second generation Deobandi, AshrafAli Thanawi (d. 1943) goes
far beyond the reform of Muslim worship in line with a literal reading ot the Quran
and hadith, to generally view what is not mentioned in these as either wasteful,
urmecessary or distracting, and thus a sin (guna). In this light, mere participation in
Hindu festivals like Diwali and Holi, in song or dance, in the keeping of dogs as pets, the
decorating of ones home with pictures, playing card games or chess, and flying kites or
setting off fireworks, are viewed as bida In other words, according to the Deobandi
version of taqlid in Umafifiqh, customs apparently not regarded as bida by Middle
Period Hanafi scholars or their intellectual heirs among the Ahl-i Sunnat, were to be
added to the list of the m-shar i.
The Bihisthi Zewar is also an excellent work to consider in this context, as it is
written with women in particular in mind. Metcalfes study of this work observes that it
aims to firmly plant women in domesticity.^^ One cannot help but agree, large portions of
the work being devoted to nothing more public than making mango pickles.'*^ In fact,
despite their anti-custom rhetoric in other regards concerning women (e.g., inheritance,
widow remarriage, etc.), the custom o f purdah"" (segregation) is not even an issue of
debate among Deobandis. Rather, they proceed further than their predecessors in
Rashidiyya (Karachi: Saeed Co., 1967), pp. 409-29. For Rashid Ahmad's riew s on the Slii'a, see, Hidayat al-Shi 'ah (Karachi: Kutub
Khanah-i Haqqaniyah, 1%3).
44 Ashraf Ali Thanawi, Bihishti Zcsvar (Karachi: Karkhanah-i Tirajat-i Kutub. reprint 1914), chap. 6, pp. 3-7. For a
siinikr discourse by Ashraf Aii, see his, Hayat al-Mmlimin (Xtelhi: limi Kilab Khanah, reprint 1962). though the latter work focuses
less on the status of women.
45 B.D. Metcalfe, Islamic Reform and Islamic Woman: Maulana Thanawis .lewelry of Paradise, in Moral Conduct and
Moral Authority in South Asian Islam (Berkley: University of Califorrua Press. 1984), pp. 184-95. Also, Susie Tharu and K. Laiita,
eds. Women Writing in India: 600BC to Early Twerrtieth Cerrturv (New York: The Feminist Press, 1991), p. 165.
46 Chapter 10 o f the Bihishti Zewar is particularly devoted to house-hold tips and recipes. Among them is reference to the
making of English Ink (p. 28). but otherw ise there is little evidence of European influence. Chapter 9, also littered with household
323
circumscribing this realm as well. As part of his condemnation of various modes of
religious gathering, a persistent theme is Ashraf Alls dismay at the social visiting that
goes on between women, whether it be in the context of weddings, births, funerals, /tiv,
rnilads or any other of the festive occasions declared bida One of his reasons for
objecting to these occasions is the fact that, as a result, women are too prone to consort
with non-household men, thus breaking purdah. So stern is Ashraf Alls concept of
purdah, that even women gathering on specific nights in Ramadan in the company of a
Hafiz to hear Quranic recitation is viewed as a violation. He adds that this visiting also
leads women to take out loans for luxuries like brocades and jewelry, and spend too
much on betel-nut and tobacco, all of which are not shar
The Deobandis emphasis on purdah and domesticity, does not mean that women
are not to be provided education or have a role in society beyond the home. The Bihishti
Zewar argues that women may secure their economic independence through a number of
occupations outside the household responsibilities of marriage (but not at their expense).
These occupations fall into three classes related to partisanship, commerce and
scholarship. Chapter 5 is wholly devoted to such matters as sale and purchase of lands
and commodities, partnerships and loans, wages and contracts, and the trading of
manufactured goods. Of course, interest {sud} is emphatically discouraged in all
dealings.'*'* In terms of scholarship, literacy in Urdu is obviously required to read the
Bihishti Zewar itself, but letter writing, arithmetic and accounting are identified as the
minimum requirements of womens education for the proper management of domestic
tips, concentrates on medical treatments that make as little reference to European medicine, as there was reference to Newtonian
physics in the works of the founders of Deoband.
4?Ib!d., chapter 6, pp. 1.1-62.
324
responsibilities, as well as business and property. The final option is to study Persian
and Arabic like men and become mawlawis providing primary education, or qadis
offering legal services to the women of the com m unity.In other words, womans
domain is private, but she is privy to the public activities of men in some spheres. The
upper echelons o f the political and judicial spheres (i.e., women acting as Imams or
muftis), however, are firmly closed to her.
Although the Deobandis anti-custom, hadith-centred Islam is quite clearly Wali
Allahi inspired, the intellectual and institutional distinctions between these schools, as
well as between the Deobandis and their Sober contemporaries, is equally significant.
Like Deobandis, the Ahl-i Sunnat and Ahl-i Hadith used printing presses to further their
readership and funded madrasas by establishing networks of small private donations not
unlike those employed by an earlier generation of scholars to fundjihad. However, the
Deobandis reform o f the madrasa, applying various principles learned from the
organization o f Oriental Colleges, meant that although they could not supercede the
influence of Middle Period Sobriety, carried forward by schools like the Ahl-i Sunnat in
Middle Period madrasas, they could dominate the niche open and being opened to the
Modem. From another perspective, that is to say if Sober Modernism in general
promotes cultural separatism to the extreme, then at Deoband its outer rim formed a
network of reformed madrasas best equipped to teach and guide Muslims of all
backgrounds and classes in society, but lead them to a Utopia/Ideology in which
Muslims and non-Muslims shared little to nothing culturally.
48 ibi4., chapler 5, p. <6-22.
325
11: Intoxication Revived: Aligarh Alone
Sayyid Ahmad Khan was another of the scholars who turned to the rural towns
around Delhi in the wake of the 1857 Uprising with a mission to educate Muslims. His
route and the circumstances of his arrival in Aligarh, however, are hugely different from
the Deobandis considered above.
Like the Deobandis and Ahl-i Hadith, Ahmad Khan was imbued with an
education in the new Utopias/Ideologies of Sober Modernism. As his contemporaries,
AltafHusayn Hali (d. 1914) and G.F. Graham relate, Ahmad Khans father was related to
Khwaja Mir Dard, writer of the Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya. His parents were initiates of
the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya under Shah Ghulam Ali (d.l824). He was himself
initiated into the Naqshbandiyya-Muj addidiyya and made pilgrimages to Ahmad
Sirhindis tomb until his dying day. This background attests to the fact that Sober
Modernism did not necessarily mean anti-colonialism, given Ahmad Khan and his
familys longstanding association with the ETC regime.
Ahmads Khans education is well known to have begun at home with Quran
reading under a woman teacher. From here he went on to a maktab to study Arabic,
Persian and Urdu. He also studied mathematics and geometry under his uncle Zain al-
49 ibid, p. J57; 375.

50 The earliest biographies of Sayyid Ahmad Khan were written by two o f his contemporaries and remain the most
detailed sources of Ahmad Khans early life. The first, appearing during Ahmad Khans lifetime (1885), was written by a colleague
and Director of Public Education for the N. W. Pror'inces ( Hindustan), G.F.I. Graham. The second, appearing shortly after Ahmad
Khans death, was flie work of a ftiend and renowned Urdu poet, Altaf Husayn Hah. Both ha ve been consulted here. G .F.I Graham,
The Life and Work o f Sir Savvid i\hmad Khan (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiya!-i Delli, 1974): A.H. Hali, Hayat-i Javed, (rans K.H. Qadari
& Matthew's, D. J. (Delhi: Tdarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1979). For a more contemporary and scholarly account o f Ahmad Khans place in
!9fh century' British India, see, David Lelyweid, Aligarhs First Generation (Pricetou: University Press. 1977).
326
Abidins^' instruction and tibb (medicine) under a leading Delhi hakim. His formal
education then took a hiatus at the age of 18, in the year 1835. For the next three years
Ahmad Khan circulated among the poets and intellectuals resident in Delhi, attached to
Delhi College and the Mughal court like his own family. When his father died in 1838
and his immediate family was left with no source of income other than his mothers
pension from the impoverished Mughal Bahadar Shah Zafar, he returned to study in the
pursuit of work. His paternal uncle, Khalil Allah Khan, a sadr-amin in the ETCs Delhi
court, took him on as a legal apprentice. In the process Ahmad Khan was educated in ETC
law, civil and criminal. At the same time, he also studied hadith m d fiqh under various
well-known Delhi u l a m a While a clerk in his uncles court, he wrote the standard
examination for the post of munsif and was appointed to the post in 1841, rising by 1855
to the rank of sadr-amin, the highest post available to a South Asian in the ETC judiciary.
Ahmad Khans writing career began soon after 1838. His first works were
manuals and compendiums of ETC legal presidents and procedures, written between 1838
and 1841. In the same period, he also began writing on Islam. Between 1841 and 1860,
he would produce six religious works. The first had to do with events in the life of the
Prophet Muhammad and the proper means to celebrate his birth. The second was a
translation of an anti-Shia work from Persian. The third was an attack on the pir's role in
Sufism. The fourth was a defense of the groups the British referred to as Wahhabis. The
51 On ihe matemal side ol'Ahmad Khans fiuniiy, his grandialher was Khwaja Farid al-Din, noted in the last chapter for
ius ivorks m mathematics and astronomy. His son Zain ai-Abidin, Ahmad Khan's uncie, was aiso a renowned mathematician.
52 Hail lists the works o f fiqh and hadith undertaken, as well as the mstructors under whom Ahmad Khan studied. Hah,
Hayat-i Javed. p. $3.
^27
fifth is an exposition on the proper role of the pir in Sufism. The last is a defense of a
geocentric cosmos.
As the last of the above works suggests, Ahmad Khan also had an interest in
Intoxicated thought, but only as far as it did not transgress Sober Modernist bounds. In
1844, he translated one of Ibn Sinas works on mechanics and engineering into Urdu. He
also translated some of the work of his grandfather, Farid al-Din, into Urdu.'' However,
his prime occupation was with an old favourite of Sober scholars, history. First he
published a work on the historical buildings and personalities of Delhi, then compiled a
list of monarchs associated with Delhi beginning with Pandava rulers of the Hindu epics
and ending with Queen Victoria, respectively published in 1847 and 1852. He then wrote
a history of Bijnor and produced a revised Persian edition of Abu al-Fadls A in-i Akhari,
both appearing in 1855.'^
In the works Ahmad Khan produced before 1860, the overwhelming influence can
be narrowed to that of Sober Modernism. Christian Trolls analysis of Ahmad Khans
early writings reveals the influence of the Naqshbandiyya in terms of two recurring
themes; obedience to the prescriptions of the shari a... and love and veneration for the
53 In the order mentioned, these works arc: \)Jiia al-Qulub ISizikr al-Mahbub (1838); 2) Tuhfa-i Hascm (1839); Kalimat
al-Haqq Rah-i Sunnat dar Radd-i Bid'at and, Xamiqa dar Bayan-i Masala-i Tasawur-i Shaikh (J852). The
'astronomicaF w a k h Oaul-i Matin dar fbtal-i Harkat-i 'Lamin (1848). See, H ali,/ravo/-/Jcvecf, pp. 31-32; 37-58.
54 In the orderinentioned, these works are: Tashilfi Jarr al-Saqil Fawa'id al-Afkarfi A 'mat al-Farjar (n.d.), Hali
names the author of the first work is gicen as Bu AIL but the name of the original text is not mentioned. One presumes Bu Ali the
physicist refers to Ibn Sina, as tve saw him referred to as such in the titles of Great. Mughal' physicians. The other possibilib," is Ibn
al-Haifliam, It is difficult to confim as tliese worlcs are no longer available in print. See, Hali, Hayat-i Javed, pp. 32-37.
55 In order of mention, these works are: Asar al-Sanadid (1847); Silsilat al-Mulk (1852); 7Jla-i Bijnaur Tarikh (1855).
See, Hali, Hayat-i Javed. p. 32-41. For further coitsideration on these early historical works, see, C.W. Troll. A Note on an Early
Topographical Work o f Sayyid Alimad Klian: Asar al-Sanadid, .loumal o f (he Royal Asiatic Society (1972): 135-46.
328
Prophet as the living embodiment of this law on e a r t h .M o r e specifically in keeping
with Wali Allahi formulas, Ahmad Khan criticizes taqlid and conceptualizes the Prophet
as the T /r of Pirs, while writing approvingly of Shah Muhammad Ismail.'^
Considering the totality of his works, the Intoxicated line of thought is sparing,
concentrated on the practical sciences, leaving little room for metaphysics. As such,
when faced with the idea of a solar-centric planetary system, he viewed it as an assault on
Quranic truth. The intellectual course he would take after 1860 would insure that the
issue of a solar-centric planetary system would not so easily be laid to rest.
After 1860, Ahmad Khan continued to write works in support of Sober thought in
general, and Sober Modernism in particular. His rebuttals of W.W. Hunters Indian
Muhammadans and W. Muirs Life of Mohamet, contain spirited explication and defense
of the schools which Hunter, like other British authors, termed Wahhabi.^* Also in this
period, he translated into Urdu and added commentary to certain works by al-Ghazali,
appearing in 1879. These would be followed in the 1880s by two works on salat, the
first outlining Hanafi opinion on the object and conduct of daily prayer, the second a
more theosophical treatise on the meaning of salat. However, given Ahmad Khans
intellectual background, as early as 1860 he would have been aware of three things about
which most other Sober Modernists were not, and these would dominate the rest of his
writings.
56 Chnstiao TroU, Sayyid Ahmad Khaa: A Remleipretation o f Masiim Theology (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978),
p. 42.
57 Ibid., pp. 42-57.
58 For example, see, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Review o f Dr. Hunter's Indian Musaimans; are they bound by conscience to
rebel against the Oueen** (Lahore: Premier Book House, n.d,). Also, illustrating his public concerns in 1871, Ahmad Khan wrote a
letter to the Pioneer - a leading newspaper of its day - expressing his concerns about die misconceptions held by the British about
329
Due in some part to his familial association with the likes of Zain al-Abidin
and other intellectuals associated with Delhi College, including British civil servants,
Ahmad Khan was first and foremost aware that European intellectuals had vastly
furthered the fields of astronomy, mathematics, medicine, and so on. In response, he
would form a Scientific Society in 1864, with a number of British and South Asian
colleagues, funded by donations and membership subscriptions. In the Bye-Laws of the
society, the objects are stated as: 1) the translation of English and other European
language works on arts and sciences; 2 ) to publish rare and valuable oriental works -
No religious works will come under the notice of the Society; 3) to publish newspapers,
journals and magazines, which may be calculated to improve the native mind; and, 4)
to hold lectures on scientific or other useful subjects.^^
In the time that the Scientific Society would remain active (1864-1889), it would
found an Institute at Aligarh with its own library and press. In 1866, it would begin
publishing the Aligarh Institute Gazette, a bilingual (English/Urdu) newspaper edited by
Ahmad Khan and issued weekly until his death in 1898.^ The society would also
translate and publish various English works, twenty-five in total by 1885.^ Of these
works, fifteen are mathematical (including Trigonometry, Geometry, Arithmetic and
Calculus), five are histories and two concern political philosophy. The remaining include
Wahhabism. See, Pioneer (March 31,1871), in Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Writings and Speeches of Sit Sved Ahmad Khan. Shan
Muhammad, ed. (Bombay; Nachiketa Publications, 1972), pp. 237-39.
59 Proceeding o f the First Meeting o f the Scientific Society, dated Januarvy 1864, in Yusuf Husain, ed. Selected
Documents from the Aligarh Archives (Bombay Asia Publishing House, 1966.), p. ! 6. Note: the latter two points were added in
1867.
60 Hali, Hayat-i .taxed, pp. 91-94.
61 Graham catalogues al! the translated works published by the time he published his biography of Ahmad Khan. in. 1885.
See, Graham, The Life and Work o f Sir Savr id Aimiad Khaa. p. 83
330
62
a work on Modem Farming/ ' one on electricity and another on geography. The
predominance of mathematics fulfils the Societys scientific objective, pursuing the
language of the sciences before their direct study, but it also confirms that Ahmads
Khans translations did not transgress disciplines legitimated by Sober thought in general
The emphasis on history, second only to mathematics, is another instance in which
Ahmad Khan continues a personal interest and a Sober staple. The choice of histories is
also informative. Three of the five works are related to the Muslim World, one to Europe
and one to East Asia.'În other words, works like the aforementioned Indian
Muhammadans, are scrupulously avoided. Lastly, the dearth of metaphysics, ethics, and
so on, again confirms a trend noted among earlier Sober thinkers; the restriction of
interest in European learning to the physical sciences.
The language chosen for the societys publications, as in the case of the
Deobandis, et al., was Urdu.'^ As previously mentioned, Persian had been phased out by
62 Tbs Socieiv would also e.vperimeiil with vanous Etiropoan agnculiurai techniques on land made over by the state, and
coaduct a survey o f techiuques employed in cue vicinity o f Aligarh. See correspondence regarding tliese projects ui. Selected
Pocument.s. pp. 1-1S9.
63 Rollins Ancient History o f Egypt: Malcolms liistorv o f Persia; Elphmstones History o f India: Rollms Ancient
History' o f Greece: and, Exoos (?) Histon' of China. See, Graham, 'fhe Life and Work of Sir Sayyid .Ahmad Khan, p. 83.
64 Although rooted in Sanskritic-prufTlfa (vernaculars) rising by the 7th-10th century CE, contemporary Urdu, like
Punjabi (the vernacular con.sidered in the previous chapter), vva.s a language boin o f the interaction between the various peoples
brought together by the rise of Muslim states after the 12th century. Tills is reflected in the fact that Urdu employs Sanskritic syntax,
but Arabic, Persian, Turkic and Sanskritic vocabulary. The word VnitT itself means the camp o f an anny in Turkic languages.
However, the language was first employed for literary purposes by Sufi poets, providing a means of propagating their message among
tlie people o f (lie camp and beyond, al least in the area where the language was then spoken, between Lahore and Patna. By the
Mughal period, Urdu was already being employed for higher literary purposes, as al-Badawnis translation of the Mahahharata
(mentioned in Chapter 2) attests. By the !8th centiiiy, the translation.s o f the Quran referred to in Chapter 3, reveal that Urdus use
was becoming more widespread and more formal. British preferences for the vernacular only further formalized the Urdu language
and gave a boost to its official use in the 19th century. Simultaneously, authors such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan and AltafHusayn Hali
developed, a style of Urdu that defines its ooiitemporary literary usage. See, M. Geijbels, The Rise and Development o f the Urdu
I^mguage, -T(-A/!rsWr 27 (1985): 71-85; Abdul Halim, Growth ofthe Urdu Language and Literature During the Sayyid-Lodi
Period, Journal of the .Asiatic Society of Pakistan 3 (1958); 43-66; and, Ymsuf Husain Khan, The Origin and Growth of the Urdu
Language in Medieval Times, Islamic Culture 30 (1956): 351-64.
331
the rise of the colonial regime, which promoted English and the local vernaculars
beginning in the early 19* century. Urdu was the dominant vernacular of Delhi and its
environs, and so, it was the natural choice for a scientific society wishing to disseminate
knowledge in the area. However, it was also the right choice for a society hoping to stay
on the right side of the British sympathies, official preference being shown to vernacular
language in general in relation to Persian. Nevertheless, as noted in the case of other
vernaculars, these languages posed their own problems, not least of which was the
question of script. As a Muslim, Ahmad Khans Urdu writings employed the Arabic
script. But no sooner had he begun translating European works into Urdu than his
preference was questioned.
In 1867, a Hindu literary society began agitating for the discontinuance of the
lower courts use of the Arabic script and its replacement with Devanagari.^^ The claim
was made on the basis that Hindi was a distinct language from Urdu, not only in its
indigenous script, but also vocabulary, and that it more than Urdu represented the
national language of Hindustan.^^ A representative of the same literary society wrote to
Ahmad Khan asking his opinion, leading to a polemical exchange published in various
newspapers, including the Aligarh Institute Gazette. Ahmad Khan replied that the mixed
language of Hindustan, and the issue of script is open to experiment, though his own
mere conception is that the Arabic script is best suited.^^ With this, Ahmad Khan
65 Hali. Hayat-i Javed, pp. 99-100. For a secondary discussion of the distinction between Hindi and Urdu, see, H. van
Olphen, Religion and Language Varieties: The Case of Hindi-Urdu, Languages and Cultures. M.A. .fazayery' and Winter W., eds.
{Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 741-47; and, Francis Robinson, Separatsm Among Indian Mu.slinis: The Politics o f the United
Provinces (Cambridge: Cambridge Univwsily Press, 1974), pp. 69-75.
66 See, Letter form Saroda Prosad SandeL Aligarh ImtHute Gazette (27 Nov. 1868), in The Aligarh Movement: Basic
Documents. 3 vols., Shan Muhammad, ed. (Delhi: M!eenakshi Prakashan, 1978), vol. 2, p. 325-6.
67 .Aligarh Institute Gazette (27 Nov. 1868), Aligarh Movement vol. 2, pp.327-29.
332
departed for England, but the Hindi agitation continued. In particular, the association
of Devanagari with indigeneous Hinduism and the majority of Hindustanis, and
Arabic with foreign Islam and the minority Muslims, were radically highlighted by
the pro-Hindi g r o u p . The success of this strategy is evinced by the group winning the
adoption of Devanagari script in certain districts on 14* September 1872.^'^
Although Ahmad Khan admits to only the conception of Arabic script as best
suited, the work of the Scientific Society and his own writings illustrate that the choice of
this script was made early in his life and was not open to compromise. In other words, the
choice of the Arabic script was based on cultural assumptions, such as the historical
link between the Arabic script and Muslim cultures, and the longstanding use of the
vernacular as a steppingstone to Arabic and Persian. This leads to the second point about
which Ahmad Khan, above other Sober Modernists, would have been aware and taken
action to address. Due to his association with the aforementioned Delhi scholars, as well
as his education and employment as an EIC judicial officer, by 1860 Ahmad Khan would
also have been aware that in Europe, institutions of higher learning employed vernacular
languages to teach the practical sciences he was translating into Urdu.
Besides the work of the Scientific Society in promoting European thought in
Urdu, Ahmad Khan began simultaneously advocating formal Urdu institutions beginning
in the 1860s. In 1867, he wrote to the Viceroy that an Urdu medium university should
be established in the north-west and/or an Urdu department established at the British
Calcutta University. The plan did not materialize, most specifically for the lack of
68 See, The Views o f Raja .Sheoraj Singh of K.ashipur, Gazette (2 July 1869), Aliearh Movement, vol.
2, pp. 530-332
69 See, Letter from Kashee Nath, Aiigarh Institute Gazette (3 Jan. 1873), Aiigarh Movement, vol. 2, p. 333-34.
333
appropriate Urdu translations of European works at the time. '^ However, in raising the
issue Ahmad Khan reconfirms the desire to propagate Urdu for more reasons than British
policy concerning vernaculars, or the Hindu labeling of Urdu a Muslim language.
During his travels in 1869-71, he enthusiastically notes that Urdu is spoken in towns and
villages and by people of all classes from Allahabad to Bombay.^ He also emphasizes
that Urdu is written in the Arabic script and spoken by more than Muslims, referencing a
Zoroastrian (Parsi) from Poona who was fully literate. The same man also turns Ahmad
Khan toward the similarities between Gujarati and Urdu, both relying to large measure on
Arabic and Persian vocabulary - a point that Ahmad Khan further investigates and finds
to be accurate.^' And finally, Ahmad Khan praises Allah, for he finds that Urdu is even
spoken by the merchants of Aden, in Yemen.That is to say, at least among his class,
Ahmad Khan wished Urdu to replace Persian as the literary language of Greater
Hindustan. As the pro-Devanagari Hindu agitation confirms, however, Urdu written in
the Arabic script meant that it would be regarded as a Muslim language by all parties
concerned, and none but Muslims were enthusiastic to adopt it on those grounds.
The prime example of Ahmad Khans desire to see Urdu as Persians replacement
is his work in the field of education. The school he would establish would resemble the
old madrasa even less than Dar al- 'Ulum Deoband, but in a similar vein, it would aim to
be financed independently of the colonial state, offer Arabic, P e r s i a n , a n d kalam, and
70 ibiii, p. 97.
71 Savyid Aiunad Kiian, jKiusafiran-i Landan, p. 38.
72 Ibid., pp. 68-73.
73 Ibid.. p. 90.
334
be administered on a fixed curriculum with exams and awards/'^ If the Deobandis'
Dar al- 'Ulum borrowed structures from the Delhi College, or other colonial institutions
of higher learning, then so did the school established by Ahmad Khan and his Scientific
Society coterie. However, these Aligarhis had the added influence of Ahmad Khans visit
to Cambridge.
The 1860s ended with Ahmad Khans son, Sayyid Mahmud, winning a
scholarship to Cambridge University, and the elder liquidating his assets to accompany
him to England. In fact, Ahmad Khan had promoted travel to Europe as part of the
agenda of the Scientific Society. Ahmad Khans account of his own travels (1871) would
be the first of his many future writings to draw marked criticism . Yet, Ahmad Khan does
not say much more than Mirza Abu Talib had some 70 years earlier. Like his
predecessor, Ahmad Khan writes approvingly of the Industrial Revolution, advances in
the practical sciences and in the education of the people. He even despairs that his
words will fall on deaf ears, writing a stem warning of the disaster that would result from
not heeding them.^^ However, there are also differences between the two travelers.
Although Ahmad Khan, like Abu Talib, finds his Muslim fellows indolent and
decadent, but Ahmad Khans criticism is most particularly directed at South Asian
Muslims. Egypt and Turkey are found far advanced (laraqqi) in manner and education,
while Hindus and Parsis also outshine Muslims at home.^^ In terms of travel and study in
Europe as well, Ahmad Khan laments that two Hindus from Bombay had arrived to study
74 For lla founding of Aligarh, its objectives and outriculum, see, Talip K.ucukcan, '"An Analytic Comparison o f the
Aligarh and the Deobandi Scoois, Isiamic Quarterly 38:1 (1994): 48-58; K. Kaur, 'Traditional Madrasas and Secular Education in
Colonial India." Social Action 4 9 :1 (1999): 63-78; and, D. Leij'veld, "Disenchantment at Aligarh: Islam and the Realm ofth e Secular
in Late 19th centuiy India, Welt des Isiams 22 (1982): 85-102.
75 Ibid., p. 288-89.
335
with his son, and four from Bengal had already graduated, His judgement of South
Asian Muslims in relation to Europeans is also far harsher than Abu Talib. Whereas Abu
Talib criticized the British political system and its wards as materialistic, Ahmad Khan
only praises the system, finding that the Badshahs, Amirs, Sultans and members of
parliament respect the rights {huquq) of the people {ra y a) like nowhere else.^*
Furthermore, he makes a concerted effort to dispel the idea of the British as materialists
and atheists, beginning with a description of a Christian service on board the ship from
Bombay to Aden.^^ Ahmad Khans greatest problem with Europe is negative British
perceptions o f Islam and Muslims, to which he devotes a great deal of pages and
thought.'*
It is evident that Europe impressed Ahmad Khan greatly and that his being
shunned for it by his community, or his community being misrepresented by the British,
did not dissuade him from his thinking. In fact, the influence of European thought and
institutions was magnified by his witnessing firsthand the material prosperity he
perceived them to have delivered England and France. In essence, everything he saw
convinced him that Muslims could not afford to stand aloof from European thought and
educational reform that reflected it. One of the most lasting impressions was the idea of
education in ones own language, which, in Ahmad Khans case, was Urdu.* His first act
76 Md., p- ! 89-94.
77 Ibid., p. 22!.
78 Ibid., pp. 228-9; 28.?-85.
79 ibid.. p. 88.
80 An encountet with an Englishman shipboard, who expressed the opinion that Hindustanis were ungrateful and
heartless, begins the discussion o f the issue, leading Ahmad Khan to counter that this perception was wrought by lack of contact, (pp.
119-20). The issue distresses him to the point that much of his time in London is spent researching a rebuttal to William Muirs Life
ofMuhammad- and other Orientalists. (pp. 221-2.)
81 ibid., pp. 111.
336
on return, therefore, was to constitute a committee within the Scientific Society to
study the root causes of Muslim distance from colonial schools and European sciences.
The Committee for the Diffusion and Advancement of Learning among Muhammadans
of India, solicited essays and awarded prizes to the most noteworthy two years later, in
1872. That June, Ahmad Khan wrote to colonial authorities informing them of the
committees activities and advising them that an English or vernacular medium version
o f Oxford or Cambridge funded by the government was not needed. Rather, Ahmad
Khan and his Scientific Society associates would found their own institution. As for the
question of which language to employ for secular instruction, two options were
presented: English or Urdu. The letter also implies that the institution is to be named the
Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, and that a fund raising committee had been
constituted.*^"
Although a decision does not appear to have been immediately made by the
committee on language, it was a foregone conclusion that English would play a large
part, first because the necessary translations were not available, and second because it
was the language of colonial administration. Thus, the college that opened its doors in
1875, at the same rural town of Aligarh where the Scientific Society had founded its
Institute in the 1860s, taught a curriculum of European sciences in English, and
Islam in Urdu. Although Ahmad Khans understanding of Islam is discussed further
below, it should be noted that at Aligarh, his ideas were not taught. Rather, graduates of
Deobandi, Ahl-i Hadith and Ahl-i Sunnat madrasas (including Ahmad Khans most
82 Letter from Sa^-jid Ahmad Khan to C.A. Elliot [Sec\. to G ovti.,NU'T] / Selected Documents, pp. 149-51, Also,
Letter trom Sayyid Ahmad Khan to the Muhammadan Chiefs of the Native States of India, tdated 20th July, 1872), Selected
Document- pp. 162-64.
337
fervent critics), taught Arabic and Islamic sciences in keeping with their Sober
outlooks.^
Although open to Muslims and Hindus, the MAO College was a boys institute
largely catering to capitalists. Of the 32 essays submitted to the Committee for the
Diffusion and Advancement of Learning among Muhammadans of India, only two were
concerned with womens education in English, and one of those was against it. However,
pressure had been rising to address the gender issue, if not that of elitism. South Asianists
have shown that beginning in the 1860s, various anjumans (literary societies) around
South Asia considered the issue and girls schools were opening.^ The problems facing
these organizations would be brought to the fore when the Aligarhis promoted the
formations of an umbrella organization for these anjumans and various segments of the
scholarly classes in the 1880s. The Muhammadan Educational Conference, which
would host annual meetings for decades to come, was intended to include the Muslims of
Greater Hindustan,but would expand to include the participation of Muslims from
across British India. Importantly, the use of Urdu as the lingua franca of the
organization posed few problems, but the two major themes of the meetings, the
education of women and the masses, did not proceed as smoothly.
At the first meeting (1886), it was decided that the best means of addressing both
concerns was reform of the maktab system.*^^ This would overcome the difficulty of
83 Metcalfe, Islamic Revival in British India, pp. 328-333,

84 For examples examples of anjumans invoioved in womens education, see, Tahera Aftab, "Reform Societies and
Women's Education in Northern India. Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society 35:2 (Apr. 1987): 121-35.; and, Gail Minault,
Secluded Scholars: Womens Education and Social Reform in Colonial India (New York: Oxford Universitv Press, 1998).
85 AUgai-h Institute Gazette (4 May 1886), Aligarh Movement, vol. 2. pp. 767-69.
86 Aligarh Institute Gazette (1 .Tan. 1887), Aligarh Movement, vol. 2, pp. 772-3.
338
purdah making colonial schools unacceptable,^ while circumventing the lack of non-
Christian missionary private tutors. It would also sidestep the need for a new
infrastructure for the education of the poor. At the second meeting, however, after a year
long census of maktabs, it was found that the infrastructure sought had crumbled, mostly
due to the general poverty of Muslims. It was also argued that literacy rates were lower
than ever among middle-class women and the masses. Thus, at the third meeting it was
resolved that girls maktabs must be revived, and scholarships must be provided for poor
boys to study at the MAO College and colonial institutions - a course that would be
pursued by the growing number of associated anjumans in the remaining years of the 19*^
century. 89
Ahmad Khans deep involvement in the promotion of English and European
thought leads to the third and last point about his intellectual pursuits after 1860, one
about which he would have been made aware by the same coterie of Delhi scholars. All
their translations and works in education were exposing Muslims to ideas often in
contravention of Middle Islamic and Sober Modernist metaphysical tenets. Islamicists
87 It should be noted that the Anjumans involved are not anti-purdaii, in the least. On the contiaiv', their general attitude
toward womens education echoes that of the Deobandls down to tire idea that educated women make better householders and can
serve the needs of their own .sex on a community' level. The basic difference between Deobandis and Aligarhis is that while the foimer
promote education in vernacular and Arabic, the latter promote the vernacular and English. As Muhammad Ismail Khan, one of the
core Aligarhis, put it in 1894, English is necessart' because our English educated youth are desirous of marrying wives who may be
instructed in the same language; and if this intention of theirs be overlooked, there is great fear of their taking wives from other
communities. Another difference between the Deobandis tind Aligarhis illustrated by Ismail Khan's ideas, is that while the latter
thought of womens most influential positions in serving their community as mcmiawis and qadis, the latter thought of them primarily
as teachers and doctors of European thought. The same is the case in the most influential work addressed to women by an Aligarhi,
Altaf Husayn Halts Majalis at-Nissa (1874V, a work one can liken to Ashiaf Alt Thanawis Bihisbti Zewar in content and influence.
See, Haji Muhammad Ismail Khan, OnFemale Education AligarehInstitute Gazette (13 March 1894), Aligarh Movement, vol. 2,
pp. 571-72; Altaf I lusiiy-nl lali.l fo/afo al-Nissa (New Delhi; Maktaba-i .lamia, 1971); and, Gail Minault, Kalis A/a/afc un-Nissa:
Purdah and Wonran Power in !9th Century India, Islamic Society' and Culture, pp. 39-50.
88 The Pioner (29-30 Dec. 1887). Aligarh Movement, vol. 2, p. 774-77.
89 Aligarh Insiiiuie Gazette (15 .Ian. 1889), AJigarh Movement, vol. 2, pp. 778-84.
339
familiar with Ahmad Khans post-1860 writings point out that he lost no time
addressing the above c o n c e r n .As Troll, Baljon, Dar and others argue, and various
letters and articles by Ahmad Khan attest, he would progressively come to the conclusion
that the only two attributes of God that humanity can know are that He is the First
Cause and the Creator; that Heaven and Hell, like satan, angels andjinn, are
representations of pleasure and sorrow, or good and evil, rather than corporeal places and
beings; that belief in miracles is due to lexicographical errors or metaphoric language,
rather than their mention in the Quran; and, of course, that the Ptolemaic cosmos is not
upheld by the Quran. In fact, all of these ideas would ultimately be contained in Ahmad
Khans largest single exegetical writing, Tafsir al-Qur an, published in six volumes
between 1880-98.
Evidently, the European thought that Ahmad Khan was so involved in translating
and promoting did not fail to impact his ideas. In Tafsir al-Qur an, Ahmad Khan
acknowledges this influence, referring to European thought as the new arts and
sciences ( 'ulum wafunun Jadida)^^ He also declares that some of European thought is
in contravention of what the madhhabr say, whether Christian, Hindu or Muslim, and
that they have in turn declared it wrong (ghalal). Nevertheless, Ahmad Khan urges that
this does not mean any contradiction between the new arts and sciences and the Quran.
The contradiction is between the new arts and sciences and the Greek philosophers
>0 A number of e.xemplary works have been wxitten on yUunad Klians religious thought, lead by, the aformentioned,
Chnsdan Troll, Sawid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology. Other works include, J.M.S. Baljon, The Reforms and
Religious Ideas of Sir Savwid Ahmad Khan ILahore: .Sh. Muhammad Ashiaf, 1964); and, Bashir A. Dar, Religious Thought of Sir
Sved Ahmad Khan (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1957). Pertinent articles from the Aligarh Institute Gazette and the Tahzib
al-Akhlaq by Ahmad Khan can he found in Sajyid Ahmad Khan, Inthikkab-i Mazamin-i Aligarh Institiyiit Gazat (I.uckno'.v; Uttar
Pradesh Akademi, 1982), and Tahzih al-Akhlaq, 2 vols. (Lahore; Tajiran Kutub Qawmi, n.d.). Also see, Sa>yid Ahmad Khan,
Maqalat-i Sar Sayyid, !6vo!s. (I..ahore: Ma,iiis-i Taraqqi-vi Adab, 1962).
340
(Jalasifa Yunani), whose ideas long ago became jumbled with madhhabi principles
{usul) and tenets {aqa 'id )^~ Thus, Ahmad Khan not only approaches the Quran in light
of the new arts and sciences, he also begins by establishing new usul, which he claims
issue from the Quran a l o n e .I n fact, the principles {usul) upon which Ahmad Khan
built the above interpretation stem as roundly from Islam (often of the same school) as
those of the scholars whom he was opposing.
Included in the introduction to the edition of Tafsir al-Qur 'an used here is a set of
correspondence between Ahmad Khan and his Aligarhi associate, Muhsin al-Mulk Mahdi
Ali Khan, in which the author defends his 15 principles by reducing them to 4 that he
considers most crucial against his associates criticism. The first is one which all
Islamic thought acknowledges, that God is true and the Quran His Word.^"* The rest,
however, needs to be spelled out before their intellectual context can be considered. The
second principle is that two things are apparent to humanity, one being Gods Word
(kalam), implying revelation, and the other being Gods Work (kam), implying the
created universe. This leads to the argument that Gods Word and Gods Work, or, the
Quran and the created universe, cannot be contradictory {mukhtalif). In fact, the test of
claims to be Gods Word is their conformity to Gods Work.^^ The third principle is that
Gods Work and Natural Laws {qanun qudrat) are one practical contract, thus there
can also be no contradiction between them.^^ The fourth principle is that humanity is
distinguished from animals by human reason Qaql insani). Thus, in Islam and the
91 Aliimd Khan, Tafsir al-Qurm, 6vols. (Lahore: Dost Associates, 1998), p. 1.

92 Ibid., p. 1,
93 Ibid., p. 2.
94 Ibid., p. 6.
95 Ibid., p. 6.
341
Quran, there is no matter above human reason, whether concerned with Gods
Word, Work, or the Natural Laws by which all are joined to the Creator.^^
Islamicists have noted a strong affiliation between the Mutazila school of kalam
and Ahmad Khans metaphysics, some even calling him a Neo-Mutazili.^* This is
often based on the close relationship between Ahmad Khans 15 usul and the MuTazilas
5 usul, sharing in particular an understanding on Reason, and the conception of God as
uncompromisingly Transcendent^^However, Ahmad Khan differed with the latter
insofar as he held there was no abrogation (nasikh) and nothing has been abrogated
{mansukh) in the Quran, contrary to Middle Period kalam in general.Specifically
regarding the Mutazila, Ahmad Khan compromised Gods transcendence in that he
96 Ibid., p. 6.
97 Ibid., p. 8.
98 For example, in his. Die Reforms and Religious Ideas ot Sir Sawid Ahmad Khan, p. 124-25, Baljon concludes that as
early as his Tabyin ai-Kalwn (1862), Ahmad Khans notion of God resembled that of the Mutazili .school. Also, for an outstanding
account of Mu'tazilism, oia-ssical and modem, see, Richard Martin and Mark Woodward w/D. Atmaia. Defenders of Reason in
Islam: Mu tazili.sm from Medieval School to Modem Symbol fOxford: One World Publications, 1997).
99 In conteraporarv scholarship, the Mutazt!a are often set apart from other schools of Icalani as the 'rationalists of (he
field. However, this does not mean that one should conclude that they alone acknowledged Reason as a source of knowledge about
Gods existence or even aspects of Gods nature. In fact, the Mu'tazda are only set apart for the extent to which they viewed Reason
as equivalent to Rev'elation as a source of knowledge. For the Mu'tazila, not only can one become aware of Gods existence through
Reason alone, Revelation can only confirm the facts established by Reason. The implications of this Intoxicated approach to Reason
and Revelation are abundantly clear in the Mutazilas 5 usul. The first usul is tawhid, Gods Unity, The Asha'ri and Maturidi
schools argue that God has attributes (sifat) of the essence (dhat) (e.g., knowledge, power, etc.) and attributes of the act (Ji tf' (e.g.,
knowing, powerful, etc.). The Mutazila generally allow for llie latter, but argue that the former deny Gods Unity, which requires
His essence be undivided. Thus, even the Quran, which is viewed as an uncreated or substantive attribute of God by Asharis.
etc., is argued to be created by the Mutazi!a. The second nsn/is ad!, Gods .Tustice. The Asharis, etc., argue that God is just no
matter how He acts, thus allowing for God to bring suffering, for example, on a pious person or innocent child. In other words, that
person or childs suffering is predestined. The Mn'tazila counter that this amounts to injustice, for the person is innocent. Thus, they
argue tliat Gods Laws must be constant, particular and knovvable through human Reason, while people have the freetvill to act upon
what they know. The third, forth and fifth usuis follow from the above and need to be mentioned only briefly. Usul 3: The Promise
and the Threat of Gods punishment and reward according to ones deeds. Usul 4: The Intermediate .State, in which a Muslim
sinner is neither a believ'er, nor an infidel, but a malefactor {fasiq). Usul 5: To Command the Good and Forbid the Evil, that
is, to intervene in public affairs in favour of the Law. See, D. Gimaret, Mutazila. Encvcloiiaedia of Islam, vol. 7: 783-9.3.
100 Sayyid .Ahmad Khan, Tafsir al-Qurcm, on abrogation nstil 12, pp. 28-29. .Also see, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, The
Controversy over Abrogation (in the Quran), ti'ans. E. Hahn, in Muslim World 64 (1974): 124-33.
342
argued the Quran was uncreated. Thus, it is interesting to note that Ahinad Khan
did not attribute his ideas to any MuTazili, but often referenced Shah Wali Allah. In fact,
the most prominent scholarly citation in his main discussion of usul al-tafsir is Wali
Allah.Pertaining to his concept of God, on such central issues as the relationship
between creative attributes {sifat hari) and essence {dhat), Ahmad Khan defers to
Wali Allah. Focusing on the Quran, Ahmad Khan attaches his views on the various
aspects of revelation - including those pertaining to his final conclusions about angels -
to Wali Allah. And most importantly, his idea that in the Quran there is no command
that contradicts natural law - even as it pertains to his final conclusions on miracles - is
wholly attributed to Wali Allahs conception.
101 ibid., p. 19. In usul 3, the author describes the Quran as a portion' {salmi) of God, implying uncreatedness.
102 Ibid., pp. 19-36, Shah Wali Allah is referred to in his introductory address (p, 2), as well as in the discussion of
various usul, such as 7, 9, 11 and 1.3 (p. 21; 26; 28; 29), always as a source of inspiration or doctrinal insiglit. The only exception is an
instance in risw/7, in which Ahmad Khan disagrees with Wali Allahs argument that only the ideas of the Quran flowed from the
unseen to Muhammad, so that the words and language were the Prophets. This argument has obvious bearing on Wali Allahs drive
to translate the Quran into Muslim vernaculars. Ahmad Khan, however, writes that the above idea is in opposition to reason, for no
idea can be expressed to or apprehended by a person without words. Thus, Ahmad Khan conc!ude.s that the Quran entered the
Prophets heart in the Arabic words contained in the written Quran {mushaj). In usul 10 and 11, Ahmad Khan goes on to say tlrat the
extant Quran is exactly as it was sent down, to the extent that even the arrangement of the verses of each Sura is authentic
{mcmsus). (See, usul 10/11, p. 28.) Nothing in Ahmad Khans life or work suggests that he took this position against Wali Allah
because he was opposed to die translation of the Quran or its diffusion among laypersons. However, when added to usul !2s idea
that there is no abrogation {nasikh) in the cyiran (that is, one verse can not be said to over rule another), and usul 5s idea that the
verity of the Quran can not be disproved by mention in it of things, beliefs or acts contrary' to reality, it appears that Ahmad Khan
could not allow for ideas alone to have been revealed to Muhammad as this would not serve him in his polemics with, in particular,
British Evangelicals, who dismissed the Qurans claims to revelation. As W'ell, regarding Sober scholars, Ahmad Khans position
represents an intennediate position on the issue, one characteristic of his approach to other matters as well. (See, usul 5, p. 2Q\usul 12,
pp. 28-9.)
103 Ibid., p. 21.
104 See usul 11 and 13, pp. 28-30.
105 Ibid., 25-28. That this is not just a polemical reference is supported by the fact that Ahmad Khan includes a quote from
Wali Allah that implies miracles are not supematural - the type of quote we read in the previous chapter. As well, Ahmad Khan had
begun arguing the point long before he wrote the tafsir, implying that it was not an idea recently concocted, but stemmed from
education in Islam. As early as 1866, he had argued that no religious laws revealed to us by God can be at variance with rational
laws. See, Tire Aligarh Movement, vol. 1 , p. 232.
343
This reference to Wali Allah can obviously be explained by the influence and
reputation of that scholar among Ahmad Khans opponents and intended audience. The
lack of reference to Mutazilism as well reflects historical and contemporary biases of
Sunni schools against MuTazilism. However, this configuration of references also
suggests how Ahmad Khan understood Wali Allahs thought and approximated Mutazili
conclusions in the process. Consider for example, Ahmad Khans usul on the relationship
between divine attributes and essence. In usul 7, he states that the "'mutakallimun
hold that creative attributes {sifat hari) are neither identical to essence {dhat), nor other
than it, while the falasifd argue that these attributes are identical to essence and that
their manifestation {zuhur) is necessarily required by the essence.'^^ He warns that
these are matters of scholarly debate, but closes with a quote from Wali Allah that
enunciates his own position:
The dispute between the falasifa and the mutakallimun over whether God creates
voluntarily or positively is not a dispute over meaning, [given that] for the falasifa
[the mutakallimuns concept of Gods] will is identical to essence and [the
mutakallimuns concept of] origination is necessary causation.
In other words, he approximates the Mutazili position on essence and attributes - one in
which God creates positively - but approaches the issue from a synthetic Wali Allahi
perspective.
106 ibid., p. 21.

107 Ibid., p. 21. Also, in his Sata 'at, Wali Allah wrote: God possesses a power other than the one which thefalasifa terai
the ver5' essence of Divinitj', and also different trom the power which the mutakallimun make out as equal to human faculties. Shah
Wali Allah, Sata at, p. 13.
108 The proximitj' of Ahmad Khans position to that of the Mu tazila can also be gauged from usul 6. He states that the
creative essence {dhat barf), referring to what the Mu tazila referred to as attributes of the essence, exists, but is beyond human
reason. Thus, he concludes, all that can be known of these attributes is there infinitive sense (ma'na masdari): Urn (knowing), ijad
(creating)... In other words, all that can be known are the attributes the Mu'tazila referred to as attributes of the act See, usul 6, pp.
20- 21.
344
As shown in the previous chapter, Wali Allah was not a Mutazili. However, he
did write kalam, hikma and tasawwuf with an eye to thei r reconciliation. If Deobandis are
differentiated from Wali Allahis by increasingly ignoring this aspect of Wali Allahs
thought, then Ahmad Khan can be distinguished from both by his focusing in particular
on aspects of Wali Allahi thought that echoes Mutazili conclusions. However, Ahmad
Khan does not appear to have been directly inspired by Mutazilism itself. Thus, the
opinion he attaches to the "mutakallimun" referred to in the above context is generic, not
differentiating between Mutazili, Ashari and Maturidi kalam. Meanwhile, as a non-
"alim or Sufi himself, Ahmad Khans Tafsir al-Qur 'an must itself be first approached as
the result of the Wali Allahi idea that the Quran should be accessible to all without
scholarly intercession. The same can be said for the call on complete ijtihad by Wali
Allahis, empowering the scholar to consider the Quran afresh. As such, as early as 1873,
Ahmad Khan had written to the Deobandi affiliated scholars at Shaharanpur that ""taqlid
is not incumbent.'^
This does not mean that Ahmad Khan remains a Wali Allahi. Indeed, the defining
quality of his Neo-Mutazilism is the lack of space he allows Intuition - a source of
knowledge even upheld by Deoband. Although he personally visited Sufi shrines all his
life, in his tafsir only human reason is cited as a source of knowledge. Thus, while
Ahmad Khan quotes Wali Allahs opinion in usul 9 to make the point that the Quran
makes no mention o f miracles, in explaining instances that appear to be miraculous he
does not in any way reflect the immanent monism which the latter drew from Wujudi
and Ishraqi thought, and upon which he based his explanation o f miracles. Ahmad
345
Khans causal relations are not likened to the relation of all numbers to one,
Rather, Ahmad Khans interpretation of Wali Allah stops at the idea that miracles
conform to Natural Laws. In other words, Ahmad Khans maintains that the causes of
all acts may be apprehended through Reason, and that God transcends the causal
relations of the natural world, like the Mutazilis.
Furthermore, within the tafsir itself, Ahmad Khans attitude toward hadith, for
example, is also attached to Wali Allah, but employed to defend a different end. In
volume 6, Ahmad Khan tackles the topic of isra' and mi 'raj, or Muhammads journey to
Jerusalem and ascension to Heaven. On his way to arguing that the entire event was a
dream (khawab), Ahmad Khan sets the scene of the event by first drawing from the
works of noted mutakallimun. He shows that there is difference of opinion on every
detail, from its duration to the relationship between episodes of the journey. This, he
argues, is due to the scholars approach to hadith, one that does not follow Wali Allahs
maxim that one should depend on hadith until discrepancy (tanaquz) arises. He then
goes on to show that hadith from all the major collections differ on such particulars as
where Muhammad was when the event began, whether he was awake or asleep, whether
Jibrail was alone or with others, and so on.'^^ This, he explains, is essentially due to the
subjectivi ty of hadith literature - that is, the role of the narrator, his interpretation of
events and choice of words. Thus, although anchoring himself in a Wali Allahi
approach to hadith, he dismisses the reliability of a genre of literature that is the
109 Sayyid Ahinad Khan, Translation of Texts Related to Sayyid Ahmads Creed, in Troll,, Sawid Alimad Khan: A
Reinterpretation ofMtisiim Iheologv. p. 275.
110 Sayy'id Ahmad Khan, Tafsir al-Our'att, pp. 25-7.
111 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Tafsir al-Qur 'an, \ oL 5, p. 11.
n : Ibid., pp. 14-65..
346
cornerstone of Sober Modernism. For those who would continue to employ hadith
nonetheless, he adds that when the events mentioned are contradictory to Reason, and the
ulama' holds differing opinions, one takes heed o f those verses that are not in
contravention o f reason.'W h a t the influence o f Wali Allahs thought suggests is that it
was through his education in Sober Modernism that Ahmad Khan accessed the broader
intellectual world of Middle Period Reason. Evidence that this world continued to exert
an influence is even found in the manner in which Ahmad Khans Sober opponents
labeled his metaphysics.
Ahmad Khans opponents largely based their judgements o f his apostasy on the
ruling that his metaphysics made him a naturalist {nechariyya)}^^ Recall that al-Ghazali
described naturalists as those who acknowledge the Creator through manifold
researches into the world of nature. His chief criticism was the inclination toward
materialism that this approach fostered by limiting the power of God over the natural
Given that Ahmad Khans principles fit al-Ghazalis definition quite precisely, the
condemnation of Muslim thinkers illustrates that they continued to view Islam in terms
o f the schools and categories of the Middle Period. In pointing out how closely Ahmad
Khans metaphysics resemble that of scholars already judged bordering on heretical by
the Sober in al-Ghazalis day, they also lead one back to his ties with the broader world
of Middle Period Reason, particularly of the Intoxicated variety. Even the context in
113 Ibid, pp. 65-6.

U4Ibid,,p. 91,
115 For example, Ahmad Rida of the Ahl-i Sunnat wrote that by denying the z.aruriyat-i din, despite accepting Quran
and Muhammads prophethood, these nechartyya are murtadds" and kafirs. Ahmad Rida Khan, Fatwa al-Haramain bi-Rajf
Nadwat al-Main (Bareilly; Matba-i Ahl-i Sunnat wa Jamaat, 1900), p. 29. Ahl-i Hadith and Deobandis were equally condemnatory',
and in similar language. See, Metcalfe, Islamic Rerdval in British India, pp. 325-29.. also see, C.W. Troll, Sir Sayy'id Ahinad Khan
and his Theological Critics; the Accusations o fAli Bakhsh and Sir Sayyids Rejoinder, Islamic Culture 52 (1978); 1-18.
347
which Ahmad Khan wrote his tafsir illustrates that the disciplines o f Intoxicated
Reason exerted an influence upon him. Of the three interrelated pursuits that consumed
the last forty years of Ahmad Khans life - the translation of European works into Urdu,
the founding of a school teaching European thought, and the writing of works that
synthesized European and Islamic thought - all have some president in the works of
Intoxicated scholars of the Middle Period. As has been noted in previous chapters, the
translation of non-Muslim works into Persian, including European writings, began in
earnest in the time of Akbar and continued through to the 19'^ century. Ahmad Khan
focused this inclination on European works and substituted Urdu for Persian. Talk of
reforming the education of at least the elite to include more practical knowledge in the
mother tongue had been a feature of Aurangzebs court, Ahmad Khan established a
"madrasd that accomplished this task, but drew all its practical knowledge from
European sources and employed the languages of his maternal court; English and Urdu.
And finally, Danishraand Khan, also from Aurangzebs regime and a supporter of
educational reform, is the first instance cited here o f comparative study between Islamic
and European metaphysics, while Mamluk Ali represents the first sign of movement
towards synthesis. Ahmad Khan continues that comparative study and writes the first
attempt at synthesis. That is to say, Ahmad Khans approach to Reason and the
relationship he draws between God and his Work reflects that o f European thought, but is
rooted in principles particular to Wali Allahi and, given that Ahmad Khan makes no
mention of any Mutazili or Shii thinker, not simply Mutazili kalam, but the general
milieu of Middle Period Intoxicated Reason. This raises the question: is Ahmad Khans
metaphysic the sign of a new Intoxicated Utopia/Ideology?
348
Insofar as Ahmad Khans principles and many of the conclusions he derives on
their basis are tied to the Intoxicated aspects of Middle Islam, largely viewed through
Wali Allahi thought, he is more a revivalist, than the author o f a new Utopia/Ideology.
The latter qualification is earned by the fact that Ahmad Khan wrote his metaphysics in
light o f Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology and Utilitarianism, rather than Hellenic,
Zoroastrian, Hindu or Buddhist thought. Thus, the immanent monism that was central
to Middle Period Intoxicated thought, particularly o f the Ishraqi and Wujudi schools
popular among South Asian Muslim scholars, no longer exerted an influence.
Furthermore, rather than an education in Middle Period Sobriety alone, Ahmad Khan
worked under the influence of Sober Modernism, thus eroding the ties between Reason
and Intuition, and further excluding concepts o f God based on immanent monism, while
raising those of transcendent monotheism. Thus, the synthesis Ahmad Khan affects is
most specifically between aspects o f European Modernism, Sober Modernism and
Middle Period lines o f Intoxicated Reason. In particular, he emphasizes those lines of
thought that promote the concept of divinitys transcendence to the degree that divine
intercession in the lives of humanity is largely limited to the fixing of Natural Laws,
while human interaction with the divine consists o f no more than applying Reason to
revelation and the natural world so those laws may be known. The combination of
influences, if not the idea, certainly implies a new Intoxicated Utopia/ideology. But, is
this evidence of the rise of Intoxicated Modernism?
Although Ahmad Khans new Intoxicated Utopia/Ideology was widely published
and read, as previously mentioned, such works as the Tafsir al-Qur 'an were not even
taught at Aligarh. Thus, one cannot speak of schools of Intoxicated Modernism in the
349
same way one can of Sober Modernism. Ahmad Khan also worked in virtual isolation,
while wide, deep and abiding ties between the scholars of Sober Modernism have been
discussed. However, Islamicists have shown that Ahmad Khan was not the only Muslim
author of the day to seek and attempt a synthesis of aspects of European and Islamic
thought. Most noteworthy among Ahmad Khans Neo-Mutazili contemporaries is the
Egyptian, Muhammad Abdu (d. 1906), while many more are noted by Islamicists to
have followed in the wake of these pioneers. Âs such, although by no means as
formally established as Sober Modernism, these thinkers together suggest the first
stirrings of Intoxicated Modernism.
Finally, as Ahmad Khans Intoxicated Modernism was not formally taught, one
cannot gauge the cultural orientation his ideas would specifically breed except in terms of
Ahmad Khan himself However, one can explore the cultural orientation of the Aligarhis
who benefitted from the legitimization his ideas provided their study of European
thought. In fact, the cultural orientation o f the Aligarhis, being educated in the new arts
and sciences and Sober Islam alone, is perfectly analogous to Chatteijees Bengali
hhadralok, or bourgeoisie. The difference is that the Aligarhis Inner domain is
dominated by Sober Islam - a large category bounded by generally separatist
Utopias/Ideologies. Whether in relation to Europeans or non-Muslim South Asians, one
would expect Aligarhis to identify strongly as Muslim, though attitudes could range
from the anti-customary leanings of Sober Modernists like the Deobandis and Ahl-i
Hadith, to the highly composite pro-custom leanings o f the Middle Period Sobriety
represented by the Ahl-i Sunnat. Among Muslims, however, the influence of such
350
schools also means the heightening of sectarian bounds, despite the greater
identification as one. It would not be a great exaggeration, in fact, to suggest that the
only area in which Muslims appear to have been as one is in their general attitudes
toward women and purdah. Furthermore, given the absence in the above influences of a
creed like Ahmad Khans to synthesize the Inner and the Outer domains, this is
necessarily an unstable entity, its components often unable to accommodate each other,
as in the case of Deobandis and the solar-centric planetary system, or purdah and the
attitudes of some English educated Muslim men and women arising toward the end o f the
19* century.'^Thus, although open to European worldly ideas and institutions,
including those that enjoin political syncretism (whether in the form o f the colonial
state or nationalism), the degree to which either could be achieved was limited by the
influence of Sober, rather than Intoxicated Islam.
This new type of cultural orientation is considered further below, but this section
ends with the understanding that if Ahmad Khan was intellectually an Intoxicated
Modem, his Aligarhi students and colleagues were not. In the latter case, European
thought and institutions feature most prominently in the Outer domain and Sober
thought and institutions define the Inner domain. Thus, Aligarhis in general must be
differentiated from Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the Muslim Modem. Aligarhis are best
represented as Modem Muslims.
116 All ill depth discussion of tiiis topic can be read in, R.C. Martin, M.R. Woodward w/D.S. Atmaja, Defenders of Reason
in Islam: Mn'tazilism irom Medieval School to Modem Symbol pp. 128-136.
117 The same year Ashraf Aii Thanawis Bihishti Zewar was published (, 1905), a Muslim woman named Rokeya Hussain
(1880-1932), the daughter of a Sober scholar whose sons and daughter were educated in English, published a satirical nore! titled
351
III: Defining Umma and Translating Oawm: The Reconstruction of Muslim India
In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that Mawlawi Ahmad Allah was
arrested in 1857 after being spotted in Madras posting placards calling for Hindustan to
rise in jihad. Evidently, by the mid-19* century, the area that the word referred to had
expanded south o f the Vindhya Range with the EIC regime. The conspiracy theorists of
Ahmad Allahs day, as well as other primary and secondary authors considered above,
also attest to the fact the area had simultaneously shrunk with the Mughals to refer only
to the region from Delhi to Lucknow, where Urdu was the local vernacular. The first
question this raises, therefore, is which Hindustan, Greater or Lesser, would play a part
in Muslim political activity, both having had a place in Deobandi and Aligarhi
intellectual and educational activities? The last question of this study is how these
Hindustans were related to Muslim Nationalism.
The above, final questions o f this study are tackled in two sub-sections, the first of
which considers whether political activity from 1860-1880 under direct rule included
the rhetoric of Muslim India. In the second section, covering the final two decades of
the 19* century, the locus o f consideration is the relationship between this religio-
political communitys advocates and the political rhetoric of the 20* century, including
nationalism.
a) Muslim India as the Qawm.-1860-1880.
SultaiMs Dreami, m which men are confined to the house and women run the WCTld. R okâ Husain, Siiltanas Dream and Selections
352
Aziz Ahmad has suggested that to those Muslims whose interests lay firmly
with British India, the greatest stumbling blocks to amicable political relations between
rulers and subjects after the 1857 Uprising were the Muslim communitys anti
colonialism and intellectual isolationism, and British attitudes towards Muslims based on
Orientalist scholarship and the writings of conspiracy theorists. Ît was in the interest
of overcomi ng both these barriers that Ahmad Khan included political writing and
organization in his repertoire of activities after 1860. Interestingly, Ahmad Khan did not
address each audience separately, but wrote in Urdu and translated into English works
that addressed both the British and Muslims at once.
Ahmad Khans earliest works in this vein include two on the Uprising that
appeared before 1860. One was the Sarkashi-i Zila Bijnor (History of the Bijnor Revolt),
published in 1858; the other was the Asbab-i Baghawat-i Hind (Causes of the Indian
Revolt), presented to the colonial government in 1859."^ The first is a detailed account
of political unrest in the town to which he was posted as sadr-amin, emphasizing the
Toyalism o f Muslims such as himself. In the second work, he lays the blame for the
general Uprising squarely on the shoulders of the British. He states;
from the Secluded Ones, ed. andtrans. R. Jahan (New York; Feminist Press, 1981).
118 See. Aziz Ahmad. Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan <1.ondon: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 31-34.
119 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Sarkashi-i Zila Bijnor (Karachi: Salman Akademi, 1962); Asbah-i Baghawat-i Hind (Delhi:
Kutub Khanah-yi Anjuman-i Taraggi, 1971). A third work in this vein appeared in 1851, titled the Loyal Muhammadans of India.
This was series o f three pamphets, the first and second providing accounts of Muslims who had been killed by the rebels or aided the
British, the second and third using Quran, hadith and fiqh to counter the general perceptions which he feared the British and Muslims
held of each other. The short duration of publication attests to lack of popularity.. See, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, An Account of the
Loyal Mohamedans of India, in Political Profile of Sir Sved Ahmad Khan: A Documentary Record. Hafeez Malik, ed. (Islamabad:
Islamic University, 1982), pp. 193-268.
353
The primary causes o f rebellion are, I fancy, everywhere the same. It invariably
results from the existence of a policy obnoxious to the dispositions, aims, habits, and
views of those by whom the rebefrion is brought about.
He identifies the policy most obnoxious as the lack o f representation afforded the
natives in colonial government. Ahmad Khans argument is that unless the people
have a voice in government, government can not learn whether its projects are likely to
be well received.Furtherm ore, when rulers are foreigners, the security of
government can only be founded on its knowledge o f the character of the governed, as
well as its careful observance of their rights and privileges.'^^ This could not be
achieved, and government could not be aware o f the discontent its policies were inciting,
as:
... there was no real communication between the govemors and governed, no living
together or near one another, as had always been the custom o f the Muslims in
countries that they subjected to their rule.'^^
Had they followed Muslim custom, Ahmad Khan contends, British officers would have
been aware of grievances and able to avert the need for revolt. As it was, they allowed
grievances to fester.
Ahmad Khan goes on to identify two grievances, beginning with the matter of
religion. He complains in particular about Christian missionaries:
The missionaries... introduced a new system o f preaching. They took to printing and
circulating controversial tracts, in the shape o f questions and answers. Men of
different faith were spoken to in those tracts in the most offensive and irritating way.
In Hindustan these things have always been managed differently.^'*
120 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Causes of the Indian Revolt, in Political Profile of Sir Sved Ahinad Khan, p. 134. The Urdu
version consulted is Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Asbab-i Baghawat-i Hind (Delhi: Kutub Khanah-i Anjuman-i Taraqqi, 1971).
121 Ibid., p. 141.
122 Ibid., p. 141-2.
123 Ibid., p. 158.
124 Ibid., p. 146.
354
As we have seen above, the same methods were arising among Hindustani Muslims
as Sayyid Ahmad Khan wrote this treatise. That these methods were new or the
message Christianity, therefore, is less at issue than the tone taken by missionaries. The
only fault Ahmad Khan places on the EIC in this regard is that the company allowed the
perception to persist that the government was interested in converting the population to
Christianity. This perception was spread by government officers proselytizing and
associating with missionaries and their schools.
The education system instituted by the government itself is another source of
religious ire. Ahmad Khan points out that when the first government colleges were
opened, Shah Abd al-Aziz issued afatwa conditionally permitting Muslim enrolment,
which Ahmad says they did. He adds that at that time, Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit were
taught, hadith was read, there were exams in fiqh and eminent scholars were employed.
Since then, these subjects have been dropped or neglected, and scholars o f weight are
no longer hired, raising suspicions that these schools were the instrument o f a
government that wished to wipe out the religions it found in Hindustan.^
The second grievance has to do with fiscal policy and property rights. As noted in
the previous chapter, the Permanent Zamindari Settlement of the 1790s was the first in
series o f reforms initiated by the EIC overturning the system o f jagirliqta and waqf
property. Ahmad Khan argues that beside religion, these reforms alone account for the
distrust and animosity between the rulers and ruled, encouraging money-lenders and
causing ruin among zamindars, particularly the Muslims among them.
125 Ibid., pp. 146-7.

126 Ibid.. p. 148.
127 Ibid., R). 151-4.
355
Ahmad Khan concludes that as these grievances had no room for hearing,
people misunderstood the views and the intentions of the government, while the
government could never know the inadvisability o f the laws and regulations it
passed.'^* From a legal perspective, therefore, the problem is that colonial laws must be
adapted to the thought and... custom of the ruled, for the ruled can not be adapted to
the laws.^^^Thus, in Ahmad Khans opinion, the security o f the government rests in
allowing representation, most immediately through the Viceroys Legislative Council.
Despite the criticism and call for redress which Ahmad Khan directs at the British,
he insists that the EIC government does not interfere with the Muslims religious
practices, the perception it does being a misunderstanding on the part of Muslims blamed
on the injudicious acts of certain officers. ^ This apparently contradictory statement is
substantiated by reference to none other than Shah Muhammad IsmaTl, ideologue of the
Barelvi mujahidin. According to Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Ismarils jihad was directed
at the Sikhs alone and its leaders explicitly excluded British governed regions from
action.^^He does not deny calls forjihad in 1857, but argues that they offer no evidence
of a Muslim conspiracy or the legality of jihad against the British. Rather, as his call for
representation suggests, Ahmad Khan proposes that cooperative action was and remains
overwhelmingly the Islamic way, if both parties are willing to cooperate.
Whatever Ahmad Khans personal motives for an ultimately pro-colonial stance,
his intellectual position is primarily conditioned by an education in Sober Modernism.
128 Ibid., p. 143.

129 Ibid., p.,142.
130 Ibid., p. 144.
131 Ibid., p. 146-7.
1.32 Ibid., p. 1.38.
356
The only two Muslim scholars he employs in his argument are the Wali Allahis, Shah
Abd al-Aziz and Muhammad Ismail. Abd al-Aziz did allow for accommodation, if
the shari a was not transgressed. The mujahidin of Muhammad Ismails time did wage
war against the Sikhs alone, even if they and their successors were hostile to the British.
Ahmad Khans own list of grievances leading to the Uprising appeals to and echoes the
proclamations forjihad issued at that time. He is cognizant o f missionary attacks on
Islam, reticent about the overthrow o f the jagirliqta and waqf systems, and appalled by
the decline of Arabic, Persian and the study o f hadith andfiqh}^^ Part o f his intention in
calling for representation is the aligning o f colonial law with Muslim thought and
custom. And finally, his call for representation is made on the basis of Muslim custom
in government. However, this in no way precludes Ahmad Khans writing for and
identification with a Hindustan equated with ^Hindt or All India (tamam Hindustan),
inclusive o f Muslims and Hindus. The same Sobriety and inclusiveness is also apparent
in Ahmad Khans first overtly political organization, the British Indian Association
(BIA), convened in 1866.
In the first public address at which Ahmad Khan proposed the association, he
offered this to the mixed, British-South Asian audience;
It was ordained by a higher power than any on earth, that the destinies of India
should be placed in the hands o f an enlightened nation, whose principles of
government were in accordance with those o f intellect, justice and reason. Yes, my
friends, the great God above. He who is equally the God o f the Jew, the Hindu, the
Christian, and the Mohammedan, placed the British over the people o f India....
133 In Asbab-i Baghawat-i Hind, Ahmad Khan most specifically refers to fiscal measures such as the resumptioti of
revenue-free (jna'jl) lands, the forced sale of property by individuals in arrears, indiscriiiiinate taxation the abolition of Oudhs
lahiqdars and the general demise of jagirdari. Ibid.,i^,, 151-8.
134 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Speech (Aligarh, 10th May, 1866), Aliigarh Movement, vol. 1, p. 232
357
In particular, Ahmad Khan went on to explain, he was referring to the direct rule of
the British Parliament, which had removed the prime obstacle between the people and
Parliament, that is, the merchant princes of the East India Company. He points out
that what this means is that it is necessary that the requirements and wishes of that
portion o f mankind on whose behalf they [members of parliament] are to exert
themselves, be made clearly known to them.'^^ For this purpose, an association with a
branch in London must be organized.
Embedded in the exhortation to organize, beside ingratiating praise of British
government, including that of the EIC, he also offers this veiled argument to his British
audience, a quote from the Utilitarian thinker J.S. Mill, with an attached comment of his
own:
Quote. The rights and interests of every or of any person are only secure from being
disregarded when the person interested is himself able and habitually disposed to
stand up for them. The second is that the general propensity attains a greater height,
and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the personal energies enlisted in
promoting it. These principles, my friends, are as applicable to the people o f India
as they are to those of any other nation.
To the South Asians in his audience, Ahmad Khan offered an Islamic or Hindu
government that promised to serve their interests, while to the British he pointed out that
this organization was sanctioned and would abide by the English book.
The activities o f the BIA (consisting mostly o f forwarding the Scientific Societys
idea o f a vemacular university and travel to Europe) are not as interesting as the
principles upon which the association was founded. Whereas in the aforementioned
works Ahmad Khans unit of community identity is decidedly All-Indian, defending
135 ibid., p. 232.

136 ibid., p. 232.
358
South Asias Muslims but not restricting the dialogue to them and the British, the
BIAs membership was restricted to Hindustanis on a provincial (i.e.. Lesser) level,
though having no bars o f race or creed, like the Scientific Society. The most pressing
problem with fiiis approach at the time was its ability to challenge Hindu separatist
agitation, mentioned above in the context o f the Hindi-Urdu debate o f the late 1860s. A
second problem would rise in the 1870s, on this occasion issuing firom within Muslim
India.
Between the 1857 Uprising and the end o f the 19* century, two political
developments firmly entered the rhetoric o f Sober Muslim activism. One was the
assumption of direct rule by the British government, to which all the above mentioned
Sober schools responded with fatwas declaring Jihad unnecessary or even haram, based
on similar criterion as that set forth by Shah Abd al-Aziz in 1803.^^* The other was the
consistent ebb o f the faraway Ottoman state, the incumbent Sultan being identified by
various Muslim schools as the Caliph of the umma, and consequently o f the South Asian
Muslims after the demise o f the Mughals, or the end of hopes to establish new
Imamates. Particularly toward the end of his life, Ahmad Khan wrote a great deal on the
concept o f Caliphate and the interest in it shown by South Asia Muslims. In one essay, he
reports that after the time o f Shah Alam (d. 1806), in mosques as far flung as Delhi,
137 Ibid., p. 232.

138 The Ahl-i Sramat leader, Ahmad Rida, argued that as Muslims are free to hold oongr^tional prayers, celebrate their
festivals and exercise personal laws, British India is Dar al-lslam. See, Ahmad Rida Khan, DoAhamm Fatwe (Lahore: Maktaba
Rizwiyya, 1977). The Ahl-i Hadith scholar, Siddiq Hasan Khan, wrote a work similar to those of Sayyid Ahmad Khan arguing for
Muslim loyalty, titled, Tarjuman-i Wahhabiyya (I.ahore: n.p., 1895), while his colleague, Sayyid Nazir Hussain, issued fatw'as to the
effect that jihad was 'haram under British rule. See, Fatawa-i Naziriyya, 4 vols. (Delhi; Printing Works, 1915), vol. 4, p. 472.
Deobandi opinion, represented by Rashid Ahmad Gangohis fatawa, is more ambivalent, retaining Shah Abd a!-Azizs understanding
of British India as dar al-harb, but not calling for jihad, and allovring for education in English, employment under Christians and the
use of colonial institutions. Rashid Ahmad Gaiôhi, i'atowo-r Rash/dryvtr, vol. 1, p. 76, 81, 90; vol. 3 ,p. 20.
359
Calcutta and Bombay, the incumbent Mughals name was dropped from the khutba
(Friday sermon) and replaced with that o f the Ottoman Sultan. In others that dropped the
Mughals, a statement to the following effect was offered, O God, help the Muslim with
a just ruler, help them to be virtuous and obedient to thyself, and to follow the example of
the Prophet, the Sayyid of the Universe.^^^
Ahmad Kbans observation is significant in that it reconfirms that the Mughal
name in the khutba was widely due to their positions as Caliphs, and that their absence
had not diminished the place of Caliphate in the political rhetoric of South Asian
Muslims. It also confirms that the Ottomans assumed this status among South Asian
Muslims at exactly the time that scholars such as Shah Abd al-Aziz began issuing
fatwas declaring British India dar al-harb. It also suggests that reference to the Ottomans
swelled with the onset o f direct rule. N.M. Qureishi, A. Ozcan, and other Islamicists
have shown that during the Russo-Ottoman war o f 1876-78, large public rallies were held
in urban centres across South Asia. Muslim anjumans collected funds and, according to
Ottoman registers, above Rs. 1 million was dispatched to Turkey through the Ottoman
consulate in Bombay. There was also concern recorded among Muslim soldiers in the
British Indian Army, and calls to volunteer for the Ottomans were heard and heeded. The
vemacular press was decidedly pro-Ottoman from the 1850s, during the Crimean War,
and by the 1870s was augmented by literary activity extolling the Ottomans, such as
139 A series of Ahmad Khans articles from the Aligarh Institute of the late 1890s, and two articles from Tahzib al-
Akhlaq iaibe 1880s, address frte issue of Caliphate and were compiled in 1916, at the height of pro-Caliphate agitiation, byQadi
Shiraj al-Din Ahinad. The work is published as, Sayyid Ahinad Khan, Haqiqat-i Khilafat /The Truth about the KhiJafet (Lahore:
Ripon Press, 1916). The jMesent article (VI) is originally from the Tahzib al-Akhlaq, and is found on pp. 18-21.
140 N.M. Qureishi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement (Leiden; .E.J. Brill, 1999):
Azmi Ozcan, Pan-Islamism. Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and British (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997); and, Gail Minault, The Khilafat
360
plays and prose plotted around the Russo-Ottoman Wars. Turkish works were also
translated into Urdu, while travel was encouraged and numerous travelogues appeared.
To British observers, budding relations between Istanbul and the cities and towns
o f South Asia was not a matter o f concern until the 1870s. English newspapers and
monographs from that decade suggest that two camps o f opinion had evolved; one seeing
cordial relations with the Ottomans as important to British interests in South Asia, the
other arguing that British foreign policy need not concern itself with the activities
mentioned above. In both cases, however, some viewed this conspiracy as the work of
40,000,000 Muslims, while others judged it the labour o f the fanatical Wahhabi.*'*
Although pro-Ottoman sentiment was evidently widespread among urban middle-class
and elite Muslims, it was clearly not the kind o f mass movement that some of the above
imagined it to be. As well, although there is direct evidence that Sober Modernists were
involved, given that all the Sober schools mentioned above had issued fatawa
delegitimatingjihad against the British, it was evidently not the fanatical plot preceding
ajihad that others feared. This raises the issue of intent. Was the concern merely
Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). The details of
this paragraph are drawn from these works.
141 For the \iew of Muslims as a homogeneously antagonistic entity, see, James Long, The Position of Turkey in Relation
to British Interests in India (London: East India Association, 1876); and, A. K, Connell, Discontent and Danger in India (London: C.
KeganPaul, 1880). For the emphasis on a fimatical element, see, S. (An Indian Civil Service Officer), Ttnkev and India or Our
Indian Muslims (London: W. Ridgeway, 1876). For further examples of British opitiion on the so-called Eastern (Question in
general, see, T. Sinclair, A Defence of Russia and the Christians o f Turkey (London: Chapman and Hall, 1877); M. Maccoll, Three
Years of the Eastern Ouestion (London: Chatto and Wyndus, 1878); and, G.D.C. Argyll, The Eastern Question from the Treaty o f
Paris 1856 to the Treaty of Berlin 1878 (London: n.p., 1879).
142 For example, in the 1870's, Deobandi students deferred the cost of their book-prizes to a fund for Ottoman soldiers
wounded in the Russo-Ottoman War. S.M. Rizvi, Tarikh-i Dar ul-Ulum Deoband, p. 144.. Also, recall that in Chapter 3s discussion
of the Barelwiy/^flci, it was mentioned that one of the last principals of the Madrasa-i Rahimiyya where all the Deobandi founders
studied, beagn formal contacts with the Ottomans in 1842.
361
religious, representing the pious activities o f those considering Caliphate incumbent
on Muslims? Or, was there a political motive from the start?
During the Crimean War (1854-56), in which the British and Ottomans were
allied against the Russians, a discussion between a British officer and Muslims on the
subject is most revealing. Published in the London Times during the Russo-Ottoman War
o f the 1870s, this letter to the editor recalls that its author was approached by a group of
Muslim men smoking on a verandah in an unnamed city, and asked to relate how the
Crimean War was proceeding. The British officer informed them, and pointed out the
obligation they were under to our country for having aided the head of the Muhammadan
faith in the hour of p e r i l . T o his surprise, the Muslims were not particularly grateful,
stating that England engaged in the war because she was summoned by the Sultan to his
standard as one of his vassals.'^
By the 1870s, the idea o f the British as vassals of the Ottomans was widespread
enough for those in the know to be insulted, rather than surprised. The author o f the
above letter, in fact, employs this aspect o f Muslim rhetoric as one o f the features of his
argument against attaching British-Ottoman relations to the sentiments of British Indias
Muslims in the present context. Given that the Uprising o f 1857 occurred only months
after the British withdrew from Crimea, a third author quips, Surely, if such ingratitude
be a return for our support of the Sultan of Rum, we may rather expect favour than
dislike for pursuing a contrary c o u r s e A London Times correspondent shares his
views, having previously written o f British silence before Ottoman atrocities in Bulgaria
143 London Times (Sept. 19,1876), p. 9

144 ibid., p. 9
145 London Times (Sept. 20, 1876), p. 6
362
being read by Muslims not as a sign o f British-Ottoman friendship, but of the
formers fear of the latters prowess. Indeed, such opinions, along with a decidedly anti-
Ottoman rhetoric emphasizing atrocities committed by Ottoman troops, were daily fare in
such newspapers as the London Times.
In 1875, another British commentator went as far as to say that the time has come
for Britain to stop propping up the Muslim sick man of Europe, and allow the
Christian Russians to take Istanbul, helping the despotic Ottomans to go the way of
the Mughals.^'^ He argues that this serves British interests by allowing Russia to expand
toward the Mediterranean, rather than through Central Asia toward South Asia.
Furthermore, he points out that since Britain had recently acquired the Khedive of
Egypts shares in the Suez Canal, British-Ottoman relations need not be dependent on
Ottoman control of land routes toward South Asia. As for the views o f South Asian
Muslims, like others arguing against paying them heed, he points out that sectarian
bittemess isolates the Indian Moslems [sic] from the Turks, as much as it does from
each other, and that the majority of South Asias population is Hindu and that they are
not concerned with the Ottomans, but are impressed by Russias growing p restig e.A n d
finally, he echoes others in arguing that Moslem [sic] pride and fanaticism has been the
greatest bamer before the advancement of European civilization, and that the only
remedy is to teach them...that the shadow of the Kaliphate [sic] is going down, as the
shadow of the Great Mogul has gone down in D e l h i . H e adds a fitting quote from the
146 James Long, llie Position of Turkey in Relation to British Interests in India, pp. 5-12.
147 Ibid., p. 9. Also see. S., Turkey and India or O ut Indian Muslims, pp. 19-30.
148 Ibid., p. 9.
363
Russian General Kauffinann: Their pride must first be humbled before the light of
Christianity and civilization can penetrate.'''^
The vassal idea raises at least one political aspect o f Caliphal rhetoric. It was a
back-handed slap at European pride. This suggests it was not a means by which to
legitimate British India, as the ETC regime had been legitimated by the Mughal
Caliphate. In both cases, the British were 'nawabs, or vassals to whom authority was
delegated by a Caliph, but in this case the British had not participated in the negotiation
of this contract. Rather, though not overtly anti-colonial, it would appear that for such
schools as Deoband, with its anti-colonial Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya pedigree,
encouraging students to view the Ottomans as their Caliphs, rather than the Mughals or a
local scholarly Imam, provided a means by which to satisfy their Wali Allahi doctrinal
leanings toward the idea o f Caliphate, while also employing a tried means of exerting
influence in colonial politics. That political influence was gained through the rhetoric o f
Caliphate is evinced by the fact that it was a topic o f concern at all, let alone one that
bore on the course of British foreign policy by the 1870s. The burgeoning resistance
among the British to this influence and identification, however, forebodes the coming
disentanglement ofBritish and Ottoman interests, and the conversion o f Caliphate into an
overtly anti-colonial symbolism. Precisely this realization led those with pro-colonial
interests to respond to the infusion o f the Ottomans into Muslim political rhetoric with
even greater alarm than the British commentators cited above.
If Hindu separatism threatened the provincial platform of the BIA, Muslim
separatism in the rhetoric o f Caliphate threatened to undermine the very basis of a
149 Ibid, p. 9.
364
tenuously regenerating amity between the British and South Asian Muslims as a
whole. Although Ahmad Khan had emphasized political identification in terms of
province and British India in his writings and activism to date, this did not mean that
he conceived of India in secular terms any more than the Sober advocating Caliphate or
the Hindu separatists involved in the Hindi-Urdu debate. Indeed, in Musafiran-i Landan,
Ahmad Khan identifies a variety o f communities based on various social criteria,
including ethnicity and religion. India {"HincTrtamam Hindustan') is equated with
Europe, both made up of many communities, or qawms, for whom these larger spaces
are their homeland, or watan}^^ Among the groups that Ahmad Khan identifies as
qawm,' the largest are such supra-Iocal identities as Europeans, Arabs or Indians
(Hindus/Hindustanis). The two largest qawms o f India are the Muslim Indians
{Hindu Musalmans) and our compatriot {ham watan) Hindu brothers.'^ Ethnic qawms
of the world include the English, French, Egyptians {Misri), Somalis and Bengalis.
Religious qaums include the Zoroastrians (parsis), and sectarian/tribal qawms include the
Memons o f Gujarat.
In one instance, Ahmad Khan translates the term qawm, in reference to
Hindustan in the Greater sense, as nation. Given that this level of identity is otherwise
equated with Europeans or Arabs, it is clear that Ahmad Khan did not understand the
term nation as defined by European political theorists o f his day. This nation was
dependent on the joint political action of Hindustans various ethnic and religious qawms,
rather than being an ethno-religious community in i t s e l f .T h e rise of Muslim separatist
150 Sajyid Ahmad Khan, Musafiran-i Landrm, pp. 183-90.

151 Ibid., p. 160.
152 Also see, Farzana Shaiidi, rinmrnimity and Consensus in Islam, pp. 106-18.
365
rhetoric in the Caliphate, on the other hand, politically separated Muslims from the
British and Hindus. In the interests of keeping open the doors of cooperation between
these various qawm, therefore, Ahmad Khan and the Aligarhis entered the debate on
Caliphate, seeking to depoliticize the institution, while promoting the Muslim Indian
and Indian qawms as appropriate levels o f political activities.
The most compelling definition o f the qawm is not found in the writings of
Ahmad Khan, but in that of his biographer and fellow Aligarhi, Altaf Husain Hali. His
Madd-o Jazr-i Islam, the Ebb and Flow o f Islam, is the Aligarh movements first and
most public response to growing Hindu and Muslim separatism, first published in
lg 7 9 153 vehicle for a complete articulation of Aligarh ideology was an extended
poem, known ever since for the six-line verses in which it is composed, called
"Musaddas.' When Ahmad Khan received the first edition, he wrote to Hali, I was the
cause of this book, and I consider that my finest deed. When God asks me what I have
done, I will say: nothing, but I had Hali write the Musaddas.'^^^' In Halis introduction
(1879), the author confirms Ahmads Khans role in inspiring the work, adding that his
purpose is to employ his art to raise his ruined community by making them aware of the
new patterns o f the age made known to him by Ahmad Khan, the servant o f God.^^^
The 294 verses of the Musaddas touch on every aspect o f Aligarhi doctrine,
intellectual and political . Beginning with political content, one notes that the centre of the
153 There are many published versions of this work. Used here; C. Shackle and Majeed, J., ed. and trans. Halis Musaddas
(Delhi; Oxford University Press, 1997). It includes two editions of the Urdu original (1879 and 1886), as well as a translation. Thus,
rather than cite page numbers, reference is mads to verse numbers in citing this work. For secondary studies of Halis writing and his
place in the history of Urdu literature, see, Muhammad Sadiq, A HLstorv of Urdu Literature (Delhi: Oxford University Press, i9g4). For
an infoimative account of the historiography and development of Urdu literature, also see, R. Russel. Hotv Not to Write the Histors' of
Urdu Literature, and Other Essays on Urdu and Islam (Delhi; Oxford Univei>ity Press, 1999).
154 Ibid , p. 36.
366
work is the Aligarhi history, present and future of Halis 'qawm,' the Muslims of
British India. In the prologue (tamhid), Hali introduces the community as the crew of a
ship that has entered a whirlpool of arrogance, degradation and irreligiousness,
but which is asleep and unconscious.'^^ This ship and crew, are juxtaposed with other
notions of community throughout the poem, in the process identifying Halis qawm as a
community apart from Muslims beyond South Asia, while also separate from the non-
Muslims of South Asia, Hindu and Christian.
When Hali refers to the generality o f Muslims world wide, he employs the
standard term umma}^^ Yet, nowhere does he suggest that Caliphate is incumbent on this
community. The only Caliphs Hali associates with the umma are those who followed the
death of Muhammad, representing an idyllic time devoid of social divisions, when the
entire community was drunk with the intoxicating wine o f truth.'^* Interestingly, Hali
names no names nor mentions any specific events, except to say that although there was
dispute, there was no viciousness in the their disputes - clear reference to disputes over
succession, yet muted to subsume Surmi-Shia divides among his contemporaries. The
only other context in which Caliphate is mentioned is in terms of the rulers of Andalus
and Baghdad, placed in an era definitively distanced from the idyllic Age of the
Caliphate. Here again, it is interesting to note that the Umayyads o f Damascus are not
referenced, another attempt to defuse Shii-Sunni sensibilities. Instead, Arab rule is raised
above all, the umma itself being described as the garden o f the Arabs.'^^ Yet, the praise
155 Hali, First Introduction,, Malis Musaddas. pp. 90-1.

156 Ibid., verses 3/6.
157 Ibid., verses 54/59.
158 Ibid., verse 55.
159 Ibid, verse, 104.
367
paid the latter Caliphs is less for otherworldly piety than for the worldly spread of
tawhid and shari a, the revival of Hellenic learning, advances in astronomy and
medicine, the development of art and architecture, the promotion of economic prosperity,
and so on.' The only points of convergence when considering the idyllic and the
mundane varieties of Caliph, is that both sets were Arabs and that their day is done. As
Hali puts it in one verse, the Umayyad Caliphs of Spain represent the token of the Arabs
in that land.^^ Three verses later he laments that the Tartars flood washed away
Abbasid B a g h d a d .In essence, Hali informs his reader that only the Rashidun and
Imams o f the earliest Muslim community could live up to Caliphal ideals, while the
Umayyads and Abbasids represented the heads o f governments ruling only portions of
the umma, no matter their pedigree or accomplishments. Identifying the non-Arab
Ottomans as Caliphs in any ideal sense is thus delegitimated, their rank reduced to that of
one among many historical Tartar governments claiming Caliphal authority.
In place o f Caliphate as the institutional representative of umma, Hali offers
Quran and hadith, as interpreted by Aligarhis. Following his prologue, Hali goes on to
describe pre-lslamic Arabia according to pattern established in Islamic sira literature,
representing an era o f tribalism and civil strife, infanticide and gambling, shamanism and
idol worship in A rab ia.O ver the rest of the world lay the shadow of decline, which
had caused them to fall from the heights.'^ Hindus, Hebrews, Christians, Greeks,
S60 Ibid., verses 69-85.

162 Ibid, verse 85.
163 Ibid., verses 8-20.
164 Ibid., ver.se 62.
368
Sassanians and Romans had all declined. It was at this point, Hali concludes that
Gods sense of justice was stirred and Prophet Muhammad was bom.^^ As such, Hali
establishes the enduring motifs of his work a universal cycle, that of communities in
troubled waters, people asleep to the dangers, their only guide the attention of God
through the message o f his prophet(s). Thus, for the umma ultimate definition is sought
by adherence to the message conveyed by Muhammad, irrespective of tribe.
The depoliticization of umma in Halis verses does not lead the author to
depoliticize Islam altogether. Firstly, as Shackle and Majeed suggest in their study o f
the poem, Halis tone encourages pan-Islamic consciousness.^^^The unit of Muslim
political unity, however, is referenced as the qawm, whether in its own interest, that of
the umma or o f All-India. Halis qawm is juxtaposed with references to the
communities {qawms) of the Hindus, which he admires for their prosperity and
recognition of the circumstances of the age.'^* He also lauds the nations o f Europe -
the former a term he employs interchangeably with the Urdu term 'watan, much as
Ahmad Khan in Musafiran-i Landan.^^"^ Clearly then, Halis qawm is a community apart
from the concept o f nation and distinct from the Hindu communities o f the region.
Yet, it is more than a religious identification, as Hali never equates his qawm with the
concept of 'millat the latter being employed elsewhere to connote a religious
community without political undertones. Halis qawm is roundly judged in reiigio-
political terms. He argues that the purpose o f government (hukuma) among Muslims is to

167 Ibid.. p. 67.
168 Ibid, verses 134-40.
169 Ibid., verses 113-14/131-33/171-74.
369
spread the rule o f law {shari 'a), and that once accomplished, Islam has no need for
[government] ieft.^' However, the loss of political power among Muslims in general
(awamm ki umma), proved that humanity departed together with it, and this was
particularly so for his own qawm}^^
Despite contemporary historians straggle to establish the dimension and character
o f Halis qawm, it is noteworthy that he makes no attempt at direct definition. It is taken
for granted that the members of the qawm he is addressing are aware o f this level of
identification. It can certainly be argued, as Shackle and Majeed acknowledge, that this
reflects the influence o f the colonial paradigm, particularly such measures as the
categorization of Muslims as a single community provincial populations censuses
beginning in the 1850s, and the more comprehensive Population Census o f India
initiated in 1871.^^However, Halis nonchalance toward definition, coupled with the
prominent placement of qawm between nation and "millaf discussed above, suggests
that the only religio-political bounds Hali could be referring to was a Muslim India
whose dimensions had been established by the Mughal Caliphate, whose legal
distinctness was required by the Shah Alamsyirwan of 1765, and whose character had
been hotly contested from within since the death o f Aurangzeb in 1707, even serving as a
focal point for anti-colonial uprising as late as 1857.
The point of political note is that the loss of political authority impli ed that in
current circumstances, loyalty to the British Empire, which Hali refers to simply as the
government (hukuma), was deemed the way forward. Having established the various

172 Ibid, verses 117-30
370
blessings {barakat) o f the colonial state, including the room to observe the
shari he exhorts;
Enough! Do not think your friends wish you ill now.

Do not make out your guides to be robbers.
Blame those who give you counsel later.
First carefully examine your own houses.
And see whether your store rooms are empty or full o f goods.
And whether your ways are evil or good.' ^
Clearly, the qawm's political future is bound with that of the colonial state, while
responsibility for its current degradation, including the abandonment o f what Hali
considers shari a, rest on internal flaws, rather than external threat.
Much of Halis poem is devoted to examining his own house. According to Hali,
the distance between the Arabs achievements and his own qawm's failures could only
have come to pass if the practice o f the religion of right guidance was forsaken.'În
one verse the author rants:
That fearless fleet of the religion of the Hijaz,

Whose mark reached the extreme limits of the world.
Which no apprehension could obstruct.
Which did not hesitate in the Gulf o f Oman or falter in the Red Sea,
Which traversed the Seven Seas
Sank when it came to the mouth of the Ganges.
The description o f how far the qawm had sunk is perhaps the most powerful aspect of
the work and best singular source o f the entirety of Aligarhi opinion on the problems
facing the community. That is to say, while political impotence is identified as the order
173 ibid., p. 66.

174 Ibid, verses 282-83.
371
o f the day, Hali projects intellectual ineptitude - a fall to sleep - as the root means by
which the religion o f right guidance has been forsaken.
In Halis umma and qawm there are no intellectuals to be found. He declares;
The umma has no refuge o f asylum left, no qadi or miî, no Sufi or mulla' Those
who claim such titles, he describes as either charlatans accumulating wealth by
robbing their disciples,^^ self-aggrandizers bent on leaving no room for discourse,
unbending mimics wishing only to propagate established works of philosophy,
medicine, law, and so on, leaving no room for Reason or Intuition,*' or bigots
(to asib) whose only intellectual strategy is to Think of everything in the opposite way
to your opponent. Think of whatever he calls night as day.*^ The first two categories
tell of rampant corruption, but the latter two are certainly Halis most pointed barb at the
Sober scholars considered above, the very schools most vocally anti-Aligarh and pro-
Ottoman. The unbending mimics he describes make reference to schools propagating
Middle Period thought. Sober and Intoxicated. Far more verses, however, are devoted to
enumerating the bigoted agendas of the Sober Modernists, the final category. A few
lines from some o f these verses are worth quoting in pastiche. The Sober Modernists
make speeches through which hate may be enflamed; they brand their Muslim brother
infidels; they over-stress external commandments; and, The whole basis o f their
practice lies in fatwas./Their every opinion an excellent substitute for the Quran.'*^ The

18! Ibid., verses 208/232-48.
372
result is that it has become impossible to find ten Muslims who will be happy to see
one another.'*^
In response to this sorry state of affairs, Hali offers an Aligarhi alternative. He
begins by employing a plethora of Quranic quotes and hadiths to make the point that
shari a and the doctrine of tawhid form the intellectual core of the Prophets Islam.
Issuing from these doctrines, Hali continues the use of hadith to illuminate their
implications in terms o f the temporal. The value and worth and time, of good works,
o f kindness to humanity and o f earning a livelihood, as well as the vices of
fanaticism and selfish pleasure-seeking, are argued on the basis o f hadith alone.
The difference between his reading of Quran and hadith, as well as the concepts of
tawhid and shari a, and that of the Sober Modernists, is made most apparent in the
following verse:
Let those who so please turn the Prophet into God.

Let them exalt the Imams above the Prophet in rank.
Let them make offerings day and night at the shrines.
Let them keep going to offer their prayers to the martyrs.
Not the slightest injury will result to the belief in Gods oneness.
Their Islam will not be spoiled nor will their faith leave them.**
Clearly, Hali and the Aligarh school aimed to promote Quranic and prophetic ethics
undisputed by Muslims, above the external commandments so hotly contested among
the Sober, a move already shown to be most typical o f the advocates of Middle Islam,
including the Ahl-i Sunnat.
Together, the political and intellectual approach promoted by Hali and the
Aligarhis suggests that although by no means closing the door to umma, or to joint

373
identification with non-Muslims as Indians, the prime religio-political identity was
to be the qawm defined as Muslim India. The degree to which this strategy was
successful in offsetting Hindu and Muslim cultural separatism is evinced by the
sensation Halis Musaddas proved to be. Hali himself comments on the poems
popularity in the introduction to a subsequent edition (1886). He writes o f criticism from
the bigoted, but adulation on a mass level. In the seven years since its initial
publication, Hali reports it has been read across the subcontinent, particularly in the
north. Here, he suggests that seven or eight further editions have appeared, sections are
taught in community and government schools, it is being recited at milads, some
preachers read it to their congregations, certain themes are being acted out in local
theatrical performances, it has been reviewed repeatedly and many poets have employed
its style and m etre.Although much of Halis report is confirmed by Ahmad Khan, in
his Safarnama-i Punjab 1884,*^ the best contemporary evidence of the poems influence
is provided by what Shackle and Majeed refer to as the numerous parodies, imitations
and parallel exercises which it inspired.'*^ According to these scholars, both pro- and
djAi-Musaddas poems were authored for a quarter century hence, including versions
addressed to the Hindu qawm by Hindu authors, including at least one 400 verse work
extolling the Hindu separatism of Swami Dayanandas Arya Samaj.^^ Apart from
Pashtu, Gujarati and Punjabi translations, therefore, one may conclude it was the Urdu-

187 Altaf Hussain Hali, Second Introduction, Halis Mussadas. p. 99.
188 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Safamama-i Punjab, p. 253-4.
189 Ibid., p. .37.
190 Ibid., pp. 43-4.
374
Speaking community o f South Asia which most clearly heard his message, and the
Muslims among them who most intimately took to heart its political message.
In conclusion, the fact that the majority of Muslim intellectuals greeted direct
rule with legitimization does not mean that this was a period o f political quietude or the
end o f the political rhetoric of the EIC period. Caliphate continued to play a central role
in political rhetoric, and umma and qawm (defined as Muslim India) continued to
represent primary levels o f identity, at least among the class of Aligarhis and their
students and readers. However, whereas under the EIC the rhetorical symbol o f
community, whether Mughal or scholarly Imam, was a local figure, under direct rule
the turn to the Ottomans separated umma from the qawm in a manner not witnessed since
the days of the Delhi Sultans. This also added to the potential for Caliphate to continue to
represent an anti-colonial expression. It was in response to this development, rather than
an inherently anti-Caliphal intellectualism, that pro-colonial intellectuals like Ahmad
Khan and Hali sought to disassociate umma from CaUphate, depoliticizing that level o f
identity altogether. In its place, they sought to re-establish the qawm as the prime unit o f
political identification among Muslims without the idea of Caliphate, responding to both
the Hindu and Muslim separatism that doomed the BIAs provincialism to failure, and
the fact that Britains relations with the Ottomans were steadily headed toward a clash. In
the absence of a local symbolic head, this meant establishing the qawm as one of many
constituencies of the British Empire.
Clearly, a religio-political community encompassing the Muslims of a Greater
Hindustan played at least as much a part in the rhetoric of the two decades following the
191 Ibid., p. 45.
375
1857 Uprising, as it had in the decades leading up to it. This leads to the question of
how this qawm is related to the rhetoric of the present, including nationalism.
b) Translating Qawm into Nation: 1880-1900
In 1885, just as the Aligarhis anti-Caliphate agenda was beginning to win
support, seventy-two men ofBritish and English educated backgrounds assembled in
Bombay for the first conference of the Indian National Congress (INC).^^^ Its early
leadership, though deferential to British rule and eager for political representation within
the Empire, differed from the Aligarhis in adding the demand that this should be secured
through a limited electoral system at certain levels of government. Furthermore, its
political outlook was secular, its demands political and economic, and its activism
legitimated by the ideology of an India - a nation argued on the basis of the 19^
century European definition o f the term, leaving little room for qawm.
At the first meeting o f the Congress, only two o f the delegates were Muslim (3%).
By the forth Congress, the number had risen to 219 o f 1248 delegates (17.5%).^^^ Early
Muslim Congress leaders, like the non-Muslims, were products o f English education,
hence Modem Muslims. The first organized response to the INC came from Aligarh in
192 The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 by a group of English and South Asian men seeking political
reform in South Asia. Until the turn of the century, the organization would be led by individuals who remained emphatically ToyaT to
the colonial state, but lobbied for a say in the running of affairs. Their ideology was firmly secular. These were called the Moderates.
By the turn of the century', however, more strident calls for reforms, leading to early calls for self-rule when rebuffed, as well as the
introduction of Hindu Nationalist elements imder the leadership of such men B, Tilak (d. 1920), had changed the complexion of the
INC, See, S.R. Mehrotra, The Emergence of the Indian National Congress (New York: Bames and Noble, 1971). For a history of the
development of the INC through excerpts of the writings of its leadership. Moderate and Extremist, see, Stephen Hay, ed. Sources of
Indian Tradition, vol. 2 (New Yoik: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 84-172.
193 Sharif al-Mujahid, ed. Muslim League Documents (Karachi: Quaid-i Azam Academy, 1990), p. 456.
376
the late 1880s. It came in the shape o f the largest gathering of elite and middle-class
Muslims at the time, the annual Muhammadan Educational Conference. On the
sidelines o f the 1887 conference, Aligarhis and their supporters discussed the appropriate
political response to the INCs proposals, culminating in an address by Ahmad Khan to a
large group of lawyers and joumalists, fuqaha and Sufis, zamindars and British officers.
In the speech, Ahmad Khan spelled out the policy that Muslim India had adopted
toward the British Raj, and the appropriateness o f its continuation, rather than joining in
the INCs dem ands.R egarding the existing state affairs, he argues that as subjects of
the Empire, no one has the right to interfere in matters of foreign policy or military
affairs. In the case o f internal policy, he argues that it is the duty of government... to
preserve peace, to give personal freedom, to protect life and property, to punish criminals
and to decide civil disputes. The point he wishes to make is that the colonial state lives
up to its duties. He explains that government has included some zamindars on council.
He goes on to clarify that the consultative process by which the members o f the council
promulgate law, then argues that this implies that the opinions o f the people are already
represented in legislation. If people have objections to colonial laws, this is not the fault
ofBritish rule. The great misfortune o f Muslims, he concludes, is that these zamindars do
not possess appropriate training to articulate useful laws.
From the above point, Ahmad Khan launches into the main subject of his
address, the INC, considering its ideology and objectives in turn. Most significantly,
Ahmad Khan declares that India is not a nation, as evinced by the official
194 This speech is found in various publications. An English translation was first published in 1888, by the UIPA, in
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, The Present State of Indian Politics: Speeche.s and Letters, ed. Theodore Beck (Lahore: Sang-i Mee!
Publications, reprint 1982), pp. 2-23.
571
translations of the Urdu speech. Instead, he reminds his audience of the number of
nationalities one must acknowledge:
Consider the Hindus alone. The Hindus o f our province, the Bengalis of the east, and
the Marattas of the Deccan, do not form one nation.
Furthermore, not all the nations of India are equal in education, temperament or
demographics. The INC, in Ahmad Khans opinion, is the work of the more advanced
Bengali Hindus, and represents only their interests. For non-Bengalis, therefore, the
agenda o f the INC is argued to be less than beneficial. For Muslims in particular, the
point being made was that any electoral system implied the certainty o f being entirely
shut out of political office, Muslims out-voted by Hindus 4 to 1 by sheer demographics.
Thus, Ahmad Khan concludes that for all but the Bengalis, pursuing education and
cooperation with the British government is the best course of action.
As the above speech suggests, the issue o f the INC is pursued in purely political
terms. Indian nationalism is dismissed as a flawed ideology in the South Asian context,
while electoral politics are argued against on the basis of their incapacity to represent the
socio-economic interests of the real India - one that recognizes the various nations o f
South Asia. Thus, it is significant that the word being translated as nation, and the word
employed to refer specifically to Muslim India, is qawm. Driven on this realism, in
March 1888, Ahmad Khan argued that a political organization to counter the INCs
agitation was required.
On this occasion, upon the invitation of Meerut based anjumans, Ahmad Khan
more forcefully spelled out the course of action necessary. He stated that the notion that
the Muslims of Hindustan (in a local sense) agree with the opinion o f Bengalis had to
378
be dispelled and that INCs pressure on Muslims to join had to be countered/^ In
particular, he accused the INC of approaching the poor and ignorant with bribes,
saying that the Muslims who participated in the INC were hired men. He explained that
the Hindus of Hindustan were joining the Bengalis because both were Hindus. Thus,
some believed that by joining the INC their religious objectives (e.g., cow protection or
the elimination of certain Muslim rites) may be furthered. However, Ahmad Khan
cautions that such Hindus are better off cultivating friendship with the Muslims
because neither their [Bengali] disposition nor their general condition resembles that of
the people of this country [Hindustan].^^ As for Muslims, Ahmad Khan points out that
half the Bengalis are also Muslim, and so, INC initiatives are also practically
inexpedient for a country inhabited by two different nations.^* He adds the grim
prediction that if the British were to be dislodged from power, as is the ultimate aim o f
the INC, the leading two nations - Hindu and Muslim - would descend upon each
other, meanwhile, the French or Germans or Russians would replace the British without
any means of defense available to the warring communities of South Asia.
From here, Ahmad Khan turns to the issue of the colonial states legitimacy from
the perspective o f Islamic thought. He explains that the British government is, after all,
an Empire, the rulers and ruled are not one nation, and so election... is opposed to
the principles of government upon which the state is founded.^ He asks, Is it then
consonant with the principles of empire that they should ask us whether they should fight
195 Ibid., p. 10.

196 Speech of Sir Sayyid Ahmad at Meerut (15 Mar. 1888), The Present State of Indian Politics: Speeches and Wiitings.
pp. 54-77.
197 Ibid., p. 60.
198 Ibid., p. 61.
379
Burma or not, thus ridiculing INC demands in this regard. As in his earlier
arguments, the point is that foreign policy and the army are out o f bounds for the
subject o f an empire. Furthermore, empire is again argued to be consonant with the
principles of Islamic government. Firstly, as God holds sovereignty in Islamic
political thought, God has made them [the British] rulers over us.^^
The speech caused a great stir, initiating a flurry of polemics between Aligarhis
and the INC, particularly between Ahmad Khan and the leading Muslim member of the
INC in the era, Badr al-Din Tyabji, a lawyer from B o m b a y . A s these writings suggest,
Ahmad Khans problem was not the INC call for Hindu-Muslim political cooperation and
representation in government, both o f which he had long advocated. Rather, the problem
was the INCs identification o f India without cognizance of qawm, and representation
by means of electoral politics. Both points are illustrated in the fact that such speeches
created the impetus for the formation of the United Indian Patriotic Association (UIPA)
in 1888. Although Ahmad Khan had previously advocated provincial politics, the UIPAs
objectives included publishing information for parliament and the people o f Britain to
show that all the nations o f India are not represented by the INC agenda, without bar of
race or creed.N evertheless, o f the 102 founding members named, 86 were Muslim, the
majority from Hindustan and the Punjab. Of these, the families o f the former Shahs of
199 Ibid., pp. 64-71.

200 Ibid., p. 65.
201 Ibid., p. 50.
202 In an open letter first published in the Pioneer (April 2,1888), Tj'abji defended the INC, saying that its principle was
to agitate for issue in the general public interest on which there was absolute or partial unanimity on the part of Hindus and
Muslims. Ahmad Khan retorts that this is a political Congress, that the objectives of its various parts are not identical, that there is
no mechanism for dealing with such differences as Hindus out voting Muslims 4 to 1. Both documents are also published in Sayyid
Ahmad Khan, The Present State, of Indian Politics: Speeches and Letters, pp. 78-86.
380
Oudh and the incumbent Nizam o f Hyderabad account for 4 members, and officials
ranking as wazirs another 6. The vast majority, accounting for all Hindu and 60 Muslims,
are local zamindars. The remainder, numbering 16 individuals, comprises scholars,
joumalists and members of the colonial bureaucracy. In other words, the agenda of the
UIPA was primarily heard and attracted urban and rural Muslim elites and capitalists,
but primarily among Urdu-speaking Muslim zamindars or taluqdars.
This proved to be a large and influential enough base o f support to broaden the
audience. The strategy developed by core members was not restricted to the types of
publications mentioned above, but also involved a pro-active campaign to educate all
segments of the population in the ideology o f the UIPA. A circular was issued to
numerous Muslim anjumans, professional, literary or scholarly, highlighting the UIPAs
arguments against the INC, and winning the affiliation o f Muslim anjumans across South
Asia. O f the 53 anjumans publicly named by the UIPA, 17 were urban based,
representing Lahore, Karachi, Bombay, Bangalore, Madras, Calcutta, Dacca, Patna,
Lucknow and Delhi. The remainder was based in the raral 'qasbahs o f Punjab,
Hindustan and Bengal. If the core is Hindustani and rural, the affiliates clearly represent
the attraction o f the urban middle-class as well, particularly those exposed to colonial
education. Furthermore, various scholars o f Sober Modem thought also lent their support
to movement.
Among the affiliated anjumans, the Anjuman-i Islamia Bareilly, comprising the
very segment of the rural zamindars later associated with the Ahl-i Sunnat of Ahmad
Rida, wrote in support o f the UIPA initiative. Furthermore, a public meeting o f scholars,
203 The official Rules and Objectives, as "well as lists of founding members and donors, can be found in. The Present
381
regardless of school or sect, was held in Delhi, attended by 5,000 Muslims. One o f the
surviving Mughal princes chaired the session and prominent Ahl-i Hadith and Farangi
Mahal scholars made speeches against the INC and resolved as a body that they were
opposed to the INCs agenda. Several other public meetings were held at mosques and
Sufi shrines. Significantly, a meeting o f4,000 persons was held at the shrine o f Muin al-
Din Chishti at Ajmer (Rajputana), presided over by a qadi and sajjada nashin
(descendent) of the revered Chishtiyya pir. The same scene was enacted at the tomb o f
Ala al-Din Sabir in Roorkee (Hindustan) before a crowd o f 15,000. So effective and
broad based was this agitation that after showing a steady increase in Muslim attendance
of INC annual moots before 1888, peaking at 17.5% o f delegates; after the formation of
the UIPA, Muslim attendance plummeted to its lowest in colonial history, less than 1%,
by the mid-1890s.^^
Ironically, The UIPAs pro-colonial ^mvmi-Indian national response to the INC,
only proved that Muslim India did not just claim to be one political unit, but rallied a
broad enough base of elite and middle-class support to re-establish the place o f the qawm
as a viable and accepted religio-political community in the post-1860 colonial context.
This did not mean that INC initiatives brooked no favour among other segments o f the
population (including various Muslims), or a hearing from the British. In fact, the
exceptionally low attendance of Muslims at Congress meetings in 1894-95, can at least
partially be explained by an INC victory, and the UIPAs concerted response. At this
time, the INCs efforts at campaigning in Britain had won the support o f a member of
parliament, Charles Bradlaugh, a staunch republican, journalist and acquaintance o f the
State of Indian Politics, pp. 227-34.
382
British anti-coloniar activist Annie Besant. He attended the 1889 INC session while
visiting South Asia, and upon return to Britain presented an Indian Council Bill to
Parliament, calling for half the members on Legislative Councils to be elected and the
number o f members on Provincial and Viceroys Council increased. In response the
UIPA reactivated the anjumans, large rallies were again fielded and a petition signed by
50,000 literate Muslims, wrote the Pioneer, was presented to the House of Commons
against...governing India on democratic principles.
The above Pioneer article attributed the above quoted words to Theodore Beck,
principle of the MAOC at Aligarh, uttered in the context of a meeting held at Ahmad
Khans house on the 30* December, 1894.^^ The purpose o f this small meeting of
Aligarhis, was to discuss the formation o f a new political organization to be named The
Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Defense Association of Upper India. The reason for a
new organization, rather than developing the agenda o f the UIPA was, in Becks words,
that the latter did not definitely represent Muhammadan interests, though it was mainly
Muhammadan, and because the UIPA employs popular agitation. The political
options between Muslims were discussed as being either to join the Hindu agitations,
set up counter agitations, do nothing or adopt a modified line of political activity.
The modifications implied and evident in the organizations rules are to represent only
204 Muslim League Documents, p. 456.

205 Pioneer (January 1895), Aligarh Movement, vol. 3, pp. 1033-43.
206 Although it is well-known that Europeans administered and taught at the MAOC, Becks participation in the
proceedings under discussion have led to some scholarly speculation that British Aligarhis, rather than Muslims, had the ultimate say
in shaping the initiatives of the movement. The broad context in which Beck is mentioned here, as well as the fact that he is the only
British Aligarhi mentioned, provides the strongest evidence for the problems with the above thesis. For a through discussion of this
issue in specific, see, Muhammad Ahmad, Aligarhs Muslim College and the European S taff- Masters or Subordinates, Journal of
the Pakistan Historical Society 42:1 (1994): 5-22.
207 Ibid., p. 1038.
383
the interests o f Muslims without popular agitation.^^ These interests would be
pursued, as suggested by the 1^resolution passed by organization at its first general
meeting in December 1894, by petitioning the government for adequate representation
and protection of Muhammadans in Upper India (i.e., Punjab and Hindustan/Oudh) at
all council levels with a scheme by which the previously derided electoral system can be
employed.
The turn to gawm/-provinciar politics does not mean that the schemes being
discussed were meant for local Muslims alone. At a meeting of the MAO Defense
Association in December 1895, the issue o f representation was again discussed by 12
men, mostly Aligarhis and lawyers. Theodore Beck and Sayyid Mahmud had previously
been charged with researching the scheme. To date, their work had established, in Becks
words, All authorities on Representative Government agree that adequate representation
ought to be secured for minorities. This obviously strengthened their case. One o f the
difficulties identified, however, was that the same authorities did not recognize the
Muhammadan community^'^ as a political unit, with its own interests and
sentiments. In other words, the root of problem was understood to be a secular
ideology, its flower no mechanism to accommodate the religio-political qawm in
representative political institutions. The need to express the political aspect of the qawm
so central to Aligarhi writings and rhetoric suggests the reason why, from this point on,
officially translated Aligarhi publications, such as the speeches and writings o f Ahmad
208 Ibid, p. 1033.

209 Ibid., 1042.
210 MAO Defense Associations Resolution I, Aligarh Movement vol. 3, pp. 1044-46.
211 Aligarh Movement vol. 3, pp. 1059.
212 Ibid., p. 1059.
384
Khan cited at various points in this discussion, translate qawm as nation. This was
either deemed the best English approximation o f the idea conveyed by qawm, or merely
the only English term referring to a non-imperial political community in the secular
vocabulary of late 19* century British government and Indian Nationalism.
By the following year, the MAO Defense Association completed its scheme and
published it through the press, the Pioneer referring to it as A Mohammedan
M a n i f e s t o . T h e document itself warrants close consideration. It begins by stating that
the time to agitate against elective principles has passed, the opposition of
enfranchised Hindus and sentiment in England being overwhelming. This being the
case, in the interests o f fulfilling the principle o f securing the representation o f
minorities, it goes on to consider the pitfell o f the tyranny of the majority and the
manner in which the case of Muhammadans fall victim to the amplification o f this
tendency in the Indian context. The essential difficulty identified is that as the electors
are majority Hindu, even if Muslims are elected, the essence of representation is that the
man elected should represent the e l e c t o r s . T h e argument continues:
Consequently, if they [Hindus] were compelled by law to elect Muhammadans, these

Muhammadans would represent not Muhammadan but Hindu constituencies and the
Muhammadan community would remain almost as much underrepresented as before,
in fact there is more likelihood they will be misrepresented, for inasmuch as so large
a body of Muhammadans will necessarily contain persons holding a variety of
opinions, the Hindu electors will, if they are intelligent, choose persons whose views
approximate to their own and who are not in agreement with the majority o f the
Muhammadans.... The case was illustrated a hundred times over in the National
Congress agitations, in which the favourite devise was adopted of choosing a
Muhammadan as chairman of a meeting, even if he were the only one in the
room.... 215
213 Pioneer (22 December 1895), Alieaifa Movement vol. 3, pp., 1063-66.
214 Ibid., p. 1065.
215 Ibid., p. 1065.
385
The solution in keeping with the [ejlementary principles of representative
institutions, the Manifesto surmises, is that the electors of the Muhammadan
members should consist of Muhammadans and the electors o f the Hindu members o f
Hindus, at all levels o f government.
The Muslim right to separate electorates is pressed on the basis of the
argument that Muhammadans are for political purposes a community with separate
traditions, interests, political convictions and religion, more distinct than the Liberals
and Conservatives of England, or the Catholics and Protestants of Ireland.^*^ Whether
acknowledged as a nation or not, therefore, the Manifesto closes with the appeal:
It is not a question whether Muhammadans are right or wrong.... The point is they
have different views [from the INC], and any rational system o f representation
should provide for their expression. **
While the MAO Defense Association developed and canvassed their Manifesto,
the organization also spent the closing years o f the 19* century seeking to address such
consistent issues of concern as Hindu separatism, including the Hindi-Urdu debate and
cow-protection agitation, and the INC proposal for reforms in the colonial military and
civil services. It would also be a venue for continued efforts to suppress pro-Caliphate
sentiment, the need for which was again highlighted during the Greco-Ottoman war of
1897-98.
As previously mentioned, after the Russo-Ottoman conflict o f the 1870s, the
vernacular press had begun translating articles directly from Turkish and Arabic
216 ibid., p. 1065.

217 Ibid., p. 1066.
218 Ibid, p. 1066.
386
newspapers.În the 1880s, the Ottomans pursued the support o f South Asian
Muslims by establishing an Istanbul-based Urdu journal, the Paik-i Islam, while the pro-
Ottoman Anjuman-i Islam, with offices in London, British India and elsewhere, began
operating in 1886. Such continuous activities meant that the Armenian Uprising of the
1890s was followed with concern by South Asian Muslims with access to such Urdu
journals as Lahores Paisa Akhbar, Delhis Akmal al-Akhbar or Amritsars Vakil. As
well, Ottoman military success in the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897-98, was met with
great enthusiasm. One vernacular newspaper declared; Once more on the soil of
Christian Europe the sword of Islam has smitten the unbelievers and has been sheathed in
victory, expressing a widespread sentiment among the elite and middle classes. Most
significantly, even prominent Aligarh graduates, such as Shibli Numani, visited Istanbul
and contributed to the pro-Ottoman literature of the 1890s, suggesting the Modem
Muslim was as prone to Caliphal rhetoric as the influence of Sober scholars allowed.^^^
At the same time, in 1897, the Lieutenant-Governor o f the NWP reported to the
government:
There is no doubt that there is great sympathy with Turkey, and that the prevalent
feeling partakes of the nature of an Islamic revival. It is, I believe, partly due to
incitements from outside India and partly spontaneous, and I think it has been
growing for some time, and is fostered in Muhammadan schools. The Commissioner
of Agra tells me that many more people than formerly have taken to wearing the
219 N.M. Qureishii. G. Minault, et al., continue their discussiom of the birth oftheKhUafat Movement through this period's activities. For
example, see, N.M. Qureishi, The Khiiafat Movement, PP. 40-50.
220 Cited in N.M. Qureishi, The Khilafat Movement, p. 44.
221 Shibli Numani, Safar Nama-i Rum vaMisrvaSham (Lahore; M. Sana Allah Khan, reprint 1961). Another Aligarhi
with pro-Ottoman views is Muhsin al-Mulk. See, Muhsin al-Mulk Mahdi Ali Khan, Tahzib al-Akhlag (Lahore: Allah Vale ki Qaumi
Dukan, 1934). It should also be recalled that the Ottoman fez had been a part of the uniform of Aligarh College since its founding for
precisely pan-lslamic reasons, a discussion of which is included in Grahams biography of Ahmad Khan.
387
Turkish Fez; and this is perhaps a straw indicating how the wind is beginning to
blow;^^^ .
Qureishis study o f pro-Ottoman activity in the period, in which the above quote is cited,
concludes that South Asian Muslims
began to perceive that their prestige in India was dependent on the maintenance of
Ottoman Turkey and if that Empire ceased to exist, as a Muslim journal had feared
almost a year before the war, the Muhammadans will at once fall into
insignificance.
While such warnings were issuing from South Asia, the British press and
Parliamentarians took a decidedly anti-Ottoman stance at this point. Even Ahmad Khan
wrote negatively o f these two institutions;
In my opinion much of the outcry raised by the Mussalmans was solely due to the
tone of the British Press. Mr. Gladstone and the English newspapers denounced
Mussulmans and strongly condemned the Turks. This was very irritating and painful
to the Mussalmans in general and particularly to the Turks... .Now after the Turkish
victory the Mussalmans, as a reaction from that state o f atmoyance, have indulged in
excessive rejoicing...
Despite his understating the level of pro-Ottoman agitation, even laying blame on the
British, the great attention Ahmad Khan paid the issue o f Caliphate in his final years
attests to the depth of Muslim attachment to and employment of the symbol, the
arguments forwarded in its favour, and the alarm this raised among the British. In
essence, however, Ahmad Khan does not go beyond reliance on Middle Period political
philosophy to delegitimate the Caliphate. Thus, the Ottomans are not Caliphs because
they are not Quraysh. Furthermore, the Qurayshi Umayyads, Abbasids and Fatimids are
demoted to the ranks of Sultans acting as Caliphs out of vanity. Ahmad Khan even
222 Cited in N.M. Qureishi, p. 45. For other British perspectives, see, G.H. Penis, The Eastern Crisis of 1897 and British
Poiicv in the Near East (London: n.p., 1897); H.W. Nevison, Scenes in the Thirtt' Days War between Greece and Turkey (London:
J.M, Dent, 1898); and, A.R. Colquhoun, Russia Against India (London: Harper and Brothers, 1900).
223 Ibid., pp. 34-5.
388
suggests that hadiths confirms that the Caliphate would end 30 years after
Muhammads death, thus further disqualifying all but the Rashidun from the Caliphate.
Even in terms of the Rashidun, he argues that religious authority was never assumed.
To attach religious significance to the Ottomans, therefore, is wrong, while the Islamic
course of action, also supported by hadith (among other sources), is to show loyalty and
patience towards the government that insures all our rights relating to marriage, divorce,
inheritance, etc., are regulated according to Islamic laws.^^^
Ahmad Khans attempt to keep allegiance to the Ottomans and the British from
conflicting was definitely aided by the Ottoman victory of the 1890s and British
neutrality. However, the policy of abrogating all recognition o f the Caliphate, which
Ahmad Khan attempted, had become virtually impossible by the time he and others, like
Hali, attended to it. By the close o f the 19* century, the stage was set for the institution o f
Caliphate to maintain a resonant place in the political rhetoric of the twentieth century,
particularly as the an anti-colonial counter to the pro-colonial nationalism o f the qawm.
In all the political developments of the late 19* century, however, the greatest extent to
which European political philosophy would extend into Muslim rhetoric was the
translation of the Arabic/Persian/Urdu word qawm into the English nation. In other
words, the religio-political bounds o f the qawm were not transformed into the ethno-
political dimensions o f European nationalism. Only the institution by which the
leadership of the qawm would arise and govern was transformed.
224 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Haqigal-i Khilafat, pp. 6-7.

225 Ibid., pp. pp. 1-21.
226 Ibid., p. 11.
389
In arguing for separate electorates, the Aligarhis did not merely delegitimate
the Caliphate and its designatory succession, they challenged the very notion o f
political dynasticism. As shown in previous chapters, this idea was not new to the
Utopias/Ideologies o f Middle or Modem Islam, even the idea of mle by the community
being a feature of Islamic thought. However, the ideological white-washing of these
ideals by Middle Period political theorists meant that the proposal o f even limited
electoral politics as the mode by which leadership should be chosen was traly innovative.
Thus, such pivotal questions as the legislative bounds o f an elected legislature, the place
offiqh and/or the Sober Modernist shari a in legislation, and so on, remained to be
answered. However, it is interesting to note Farzana Shaikhs observation that the very
idea of Muslim representation on the basis o f the qawm was supported, directly or tacitly,
by virtually all segments o f Muslim intellectual classes.^^^ Also, Muslim provincial
politicians did not widely object. Rather, they too would pursue the course o f separatist
politics by agitating for the separation o f Muslim majority areas from Hindu majority
areas, as in the case of Sind and Bengal.^ The British too would not have great
objections, as far as separate electorates slowed the growth of Indian nationalism
without necessarily alienating Indian nationalists. Thus, there can be no doubt that the
'qawmf idea would pose the greatest problems to one political group above all others:
Indian Nationalists (Hindu and Muslim), whose political philosophies ultimately did not
227 Farzaoa Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam, pp. J07-118. For attitudes toward separate electorates in
particular, which mimic those weighted' or qawmi-'based representation in the support of various intellectual classes, see, pp. 119-59.
228 Bengal was partitioned by the Viceroyalty in 1905 for administrative purposes, creating a pre-dominantly Hindi
western province and a pre-dominantly Muslim western province. Although largely supported by Muslims, the move was vehemently
opposed by Hindus, winning the support of the INC under its extremist leader, Tilak, and the eventual repeal of the partition in 1911.
The anti-partition movement was decidedly Hindu in rhetoric, establishing such terms as swaraf (self-rule) and swadeshi (self-
390
include the idea of separate electorates, either because they conflicted with the
secular India envisioned by its members, or because Hindu India did not need to
afford the Muslims in its midst such political recognition.
It is quite apparent that the idea o f a religio-political community encompassing the
Muslims o f South Asia was a firm part o f the rhetoric o f first 40 years of direct rule.
This was not an idea constructed by the British regime or contrived by Muslim elites
under its sway, but one that shared the field with a host of other notions of community
acknowledged by the Muslim political and scholarly elite in particular since well before
1860. Furthermore, it was not an idea that was fixed to a particular intellectual or
institutional orientation, and by no means was political separatism a dominant feature.
Non-Muslims could also acknowledge the Caliphate, thus legitimating joint action with
Muslims, while Muslims could also live under non-Muslim rule, provided certain
religious freedoms were provided. As well, for Muslims who did not acknowledge
Caliphate, the concept o f India as two qawms - the Hindu and Muslim - coupled with
separate electorates even opened an avenue for political cooperation with the INC,
should the latter choose to accept the concept in future.
The political elasticity of Muslim India means that it was a community to which
Muslims could relate without contradicting their ties to either the Caliphate, the British or
non-Muslim South Asians on a provincial or All-India level. However, its greatest
reliance) as features of Indian Nationalist rhetoric before M.K. Gandhi carried them to new heights after 1919. For an introduction to
391
appeal appears to have been to Muslims like Ahmad Khan, who, through years of
political activity on a provincial level came to believe that joint Muslim-Hindu action on
an INC platform spelled disaster for Muslims. The failure o f the BIA due to Hindu and
Muslim cultural separatism, as well as the loss o f the Hindi-Urdu debate on the basis of
Hindu separatist arguments made in the name o f the religious majority, meant that such
individuals as Ahmad Khan would be wary of the idea of duplicating provincial politics
on an All-India level. Thus, Muslim India was partly a feature of late 19^ politics due
to the alternative it offered Muslims facing further political decline in minority
provinces under British electoral reforms. However, Muslim India also held the
potential o f offering Muslims in majority provinces an option to the spectre of political
marginalization on an All-India level under the rule o f the INCs secular and/or
Hindu stalwarts. As such, by the end of the 19* century, with the re-alignment of
"wnma with the Ottoman Caliphate in progress, the translation o f qawm as nation
ongoing, the adoption o f electoral politics under consideration, the challenge of All-
Indian and provincial nationalisms in full swing, and Hindu cultural separatism
transforming under the unmoving shadow o f European empire, the Muslim political
rhetoric of the present was forged.
Conclusion: Muslim India and India
There can be no doubt that British initiative, such as the census and the
codification o f tradition, or European innovation, such as the use o f print-media - not to
the subject, see, Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movemeat in Bengal (DeiM; people's Publishing House, 1973).
392
mention education in English on an All-India scale - did much to forward
religiously particular notions o f identity in the colonial era. Furthermore, Muslims from
various classes and locals had a variety o f social interests conducive to identification
along religious lines. However, attempting to explain the late 19* century tendency o f
South Asian Muslims to identify as a religio-political community o f All-India
dimensions as a colonial construction, is to ignore centuries o f Islamic thought and
Muslim institution building in South Asia, not to mention the influence o f Islam and
Muslims on British views o f India. Far from running to define a new community in
keeping with the categories o f colonial census, or lining up to protest those same
categories, the definition of the qawm as just such a religio-political community is taken
for granted. The only rush among Muslim advocates is to translate qawm into terms that
other centres o f power would comprehend and appreciate.
While the concept of qawm, implicitly and explicitly upheld by various Muslim
schools, overlaps with the European concept o f nation as a historic territorial, religio-
political and economic community, it differs in terms of ethnic/racial and linguistic
homogeneity. The manner in which Hali employs the term implicitly acknowledges that
more than one vernacular nation is represented in explicitly rejecting tribalism, or
excessive identification on ethnic/race lines. The only reference to nations in the
European sense is made in reference to Europeans, while the only religio-ethnic "qawms
are mentioned in the context o f Hindus. Ahmad Khan does the same in his writings,
although he concedes that there may also be a unitary Hindu India beside Muslim
India, giving rise to the Two-Nation Theory. Political communities based on linguistic
homogeneity, similar to ethnic identification, are nowhere promoted. Rather, a layered
393
linguistic playing field, including Arabic, Urdu, English and local vernaculars, is taken
for granted; the first as the language of the umma, Urdu and English as the languages of
the qawm (replacing Persian), and local vernaculars as the languages of the nations/wafan
they had always been among the classes to which Hali and Ahmad Khan belonged. The
"qawms which Hali and Ahmad Khan wrote for and on, therefore, were never intended
to be synonymous with European definitions o f nation. Rather, this translation was the
means by which to inform the British/English educated reader that political identity
among Muslims in South Asia must be based on the unit of the qawm, defined
territorially on an All-India level.
Evidence that the community now referred to in English as the nation is less
construct than translation lies in the degree to which the intellectual activity and
political rhetoric o f the late 19* century is that o f earlier times, only re-printed. In
political terms, apart from umma and qawm, there is continuity in that mostly Middle
Period political philosophy and legal treatises were employed in the legitimization of
colonial rule, while its delegitimation continued to sound (if muted for the time being)
from the ranks of Sober Modernists. Furthermore, the institution o f Caliphate, despite the
need for reorientation, remained the ultimate symbol of umma. As for the intellectual,
among Sober intellectuals, including the scholars ofDeoband and the Ahl-i Hadith, the
new hadith-h&SQd, anti-custom brand of Modernism initiated in the early 18* century
was further articulated and propagated through structurally Westernized madrasas. As
well, no more than a reformed version o f Middle Period legalism (i.e., pro-custom) was
furthered by such schools as the Ahl-i Sunnat, even if in the printed word.
394
Simultaneously, the Intoxicated advocates of Reason, primarily represented by
the Aligarhis, did little more than revive Middle Period arguments for the validity of
Reason as a source of knowledge equal to Revelation in their bid to legitimate the study
and conclusions o f European sciences - developments in which had been followed since
the 17* century. And fmally, all advocated the education of women in keeping with
Middle Period standards, and none transgressed the custom o fpurdah. In this light,
Communalism or Muslim Nationalism in South Asia refers to little other than
growing affiliation to a religio-political identity that, until 1860, was primarily
symbolized by the Mughal Caliphate, and until the mid-18* century, more tangibly
institutionalized by the same regime. As in the past, the influence o f Islam did not mean
the exclusion o f political cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims, but the
influence of Sober Islam alone meant that political cooperation was increasingly
legitimated only along religious lines - that is, as a federation o f religio-political
communities, whether in terms of British India, India or on a vernacular level. Thus,
the ability and willingness o f the British Government, the Indian National Congress, or
any number o f vernacular nationalists, to accommodate this type o f federation,
determined and would continue to determine their capacity to bridge Hindu-Muslim
divides and govem. Simultaneously, the ability and willingness o f Muslims to overcome
their own Antagonistic Utopias and identify as Muslim India, determined and would
continue to determine their and Islams capacity to command representation at any level
o f government.
Conclusion;
A Post-Orientalist History of Muslim Nationalism?
When separate electorates were included in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909,
the British Government formally recognized a religio-political community first
imagined by the inner-circle o f Akbars regime. In the same stroke o f the pen,
represented by the distinction between electoral government in the early 20* century
and imperial government in the 16* century, one can also see that over the centuries
the intellectual and institutional underpinnings o f this community were variously defined
and redefined.
From the handful o f elite. Intoxicated scholarly and political figures of Akbars
regime, the idea o f the Mughals as the Caliphs of the umma and the Badshahs of
Hindustan, spread more thoroughly through elite circles, including influential Sober
scholars by the time o f Aurangzeb. In the tumultuous 60 years after Aurangzebs death,
the idea also assumed a place in the new Sober Path. However, rather than speaking of
the Mughals as the Caliphs of the umma, they were how perceived by some as the
Imams and Badshahs of Hindustan, western Muslims lands being under the dominion
o f the Ottoman Imams. As well, these Imams represented more the symbolic heads
o f Muslim Hindustan, than its actual political or religious authorities. Obviously in
abeyance of the widespread appeal of this symbolism, latter-day Muslim and Hindu
states, the EIC regime and its supporters acted under its cloak for nearly a centuiy.
Meanwhile, given the Mughals attachment to the EIC regime, anti-EIC Muslims from
the scholarly classes most negatively affected by EIC legal and educational reforms -
395
396
that is, qadis, muftis,pirs, etc. - began proposing themselves as alternative Imams.
By 1857, Mughal and scholarly Imams symbolizing a Muslim India were as central
to the anti-colonial rhetoric of the Uprising, as the Rajas and Shahs speaking for more
local communities. Indeed, in the areas around Delhi, by now also known as
Hindustan, the Mughals appear to have been wrenched from slumber by the scholars,
soldiers and people o f the area, rather than attempting to reclaim authority on their own.
While the idea of Muslim India under a Caliph/Imam was spreading from elite
to subaltern in certain localities, so too was the influence of Sober thought and of
culturally separatist Utopias/Ideologies. In fact, although the era of the Great
Mughals was the culmination o f the Middle Period, it was in Akbars time that debate
over fana and baqa among Wujudis led the Naqshbandi, Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, to
pen the doctrine o f wahdat al-shuhud in defense of the Sober position. By the time that
Aurangzeb came to power, it is apparent that the Middle Period Sober line was already
gaining greater influence among all classes o f Muslims than it had enjoyed in previous
generations. Thus, thanks in part to rising elite patronage, by the early 18* century.
Sober Sufis were prepared to move beyond the reform o f their own ranks within the
discourse of the Middle Period, to seek to rewrite the disciplines of Sober Reason,
particularlyfiqh.
The Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya of Ahmad Sirhindis Shuhudi heirs, like Shah Wali
Allahs juristic eclecticism, was the result. What both shared was an aversion to
Middle Periodfiqh"s. allowances for custom, and a propensity to prefer the literal
word o f Quran and hadith above rulings based on qiyas. Furthermore, these Sober
Modernists were interested in bringing their reforms to every segment of Muslim
591
society. By the end of the 18* century, however, their biggest stumbling blocks were
the decline of wealthy patrons and the rise in their place of a regime whose own reforms
had little place for Islamic law in any form but a personal code concerning marriage,
inheritance, and so on. Furthermore, the employment o f English j urisprudence and its
provisions for the allowance o f customary practices was diametrically opposed to the
legal agenda of the Sober Modemists. Thus, Sober scholars in general appear to have
turned to Muslim capitalists, cultivators and artisans to support themselves, their
reforms and the Imams andjihad movements that opposed the EIC regime. Although the
appeal o f their reformist agenda was clearly widespread (Imamates rising all over South
Asia), individual Imams were only able to rally and maintain support on local levels. The
cultural effect of all this activity, nevertheless, is evinced in the mid-19* century oral
literature of Punjab, where Sufi-reformist schools, like the Qadiriyya and Chishtiyya,
were active. A sense of cuJtural separatism, rather than syncretism, overwhelms the
discussion, even permeating the lowest ranks o f landless peasantry.
While a Tide o f Sobriety swept simultaneously with the colonial state across early
19* century South Asia, both undermined the formal study of Intoxicated Islam. As long
as Muslims remained dominant in the political elite. Intoxicated Islam was widely
studied, particularly in the form o f Ishraqi and Wujudi metaphysics, and various adjunct
schools and disciplines included among the philosophical sciences. As well, the era of
Great Mughals witnessed the birth o f new trends; the translation o f post-Renaissance
European works into Persian, talk o f reform in education that reflects the practical and
is conducted in the mother tongue, and the beginnings of comparative analysis between
European and Islamic thought and institutions. Although these trends were carried into
398
the early phase o f the era o f Lesser Mughals, in which political power was localizing,
the disintegration of the political elite before the EIC meant that the number of Muslims
studying Intoxicated thought could only have declined. As well, the collapse of the
madrasa meant that the number of institutions still teaching Intoxicated thought had
dropped. And finally, among those who were still inclined or could still afford to study
Intoxicated thought, greater exposure to European thought challenged the very
metaphysical foundations o f hikma, tasawwuf, kalam and associated disciplines. Thus,
by the mid-19* century. Intoxicated Reason was reduced to either Ahmad Khans early
defense of a geo-centric cosmos, or Mamluk Alis apologetics on the Quran.
Meanwhile, the growing influence o f Sufi-reformers and Sober Modemists would insure
that Intoxicated Sufism was virtually abandoned by the elite/capitalists, and severely
delegitimated among the people at large. In other words, the ebb o f Middle Period
Intoxication accompanied a rising Sober Tide. With the former retreated most doctrinal
means by which to legitimate cultural syncretism, particularly between Muslims and
Hindus.
This growth of cultural separatism does not mean political separatism between
Muslims and non-Muslims, as the Uprising of 1857 illustrates, finding Muslims on both
sides of the conflict allied with non-Muslims, their actions legitimated by various
Islamic Utopias/Ideologies. However, in competition with the recently fallen Marathas
or the rising British regime, it does mean that the appeal of Mughal government, even of
a symbolic variety, let alone that o f scholarly Imams, was diminished in the eyes of
non-Muslim elites in particular. Thus, as one enters the late 19* century and direct rule,
the currency o f Sober Utopias/Ideologies was rising among Muslims, but Islam was no
399
longer influential among the British or Hindus. Muslim elites had not only lost their
political authority and the institutions it supported, they, Muslim capitalists and various
segments of the Muslim masses were more culturally isolated from the British who now
ruled them directly, and the Hindus among whom they still lived, than at any previous
point in this discussion. It is in this context that one must consider the intellectualism
and political activism o f the late 19*^ century.
The first forty years o f direct rule was a period o f reconstruction for Muslims,
but the blue prints used had largely been laid before the EIC regime assumed authority.
As noted, Sober scholars began adopting European methods in the dissemination of
information, such as the printing press, in the early 19*^ century. This culminated in the
Sober Modernist Deobandis even adopting administrative models from Oriental
Colleges. The information being disseminated by Deobandis, however, was entirely
rooted in the works o f Wali Allahi and Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya schools first written in
the early 18*^ century. The Ahl-i Hadith leaned toward the Wahhabi school, also arising
in the early 18* century, while the Ahl-i Sunnat was anchored in the Sufi reform
travelling in the direction of Middle Period Sobriety, also arising in the early 18*
century. Given this intellectual continuity and change, it is no wonder that one of the
prime rhetorical emblems o f Sober Modemists and reformers, the Caliph/Imam, was
translated from Mughal to Ottoman and continued to play a role in late 19* century
political activism.
Also noted was the observation that in following the three trends in Intoxicated
thought that began in the era o f the Great Mughals, Ahmad Khan wrote a new
Intoxicated Utopia/Ideology that not only legitimated European technology and
400
administrative methods, but actively promoted the study o f European arts and
sciences. The metaphysics that underlies this accommodation, however, virtually denies
Intuition as a source o f knowledge, while entirely eliminating the concept of
immanent monism so central to Middle Period Intoxication. While the concept of
Reason as equivalent to Revelation, not to mention transcendental monotheism, is
nothing new to Islamic thought, the turn from immanent monism does imply that the
very hinge upon which Hindu-Muslim syncretism had been legitimated in the Middle
Period was absent in Intoxicated Modernism. Thus, while cultural syncretism vis-a-vis
the European could now be more easily legitimated, that with Hindus could not.
Furthermore, Ahmad Khans Intoxication gave birth to many more Modem
Muslims than Intoxicated Modemists. Educated in European thought and Sober Islam,
their syncretism vis-a-vis Europeans was based on the bifurcation of knowledge into
Outer and Inner domains, rather than their synthesis. Thus, the altematives to the
European inspired colonial regime and the INCs secular and Hindu national
ideologies in the vemacular public arena, are umma and qawm (including, but not
restricted to Muslim India).
The gravitation of Modem Muslims toward the expression of umma in the
rhetoric o f Caliphate, and qawm in that o f the nation of Muslim India, comes not
from an aversion to political cooperation on the level of British India, or just India.
Nor is it an imposition of the British regime, intentional or circumstantial. Certainly, it
stems from the fact that without Caliphate and Muslim India in the late 19th century,
broader elite and middle class interests were perceived to be unattainable. Without
Muslim India, British Indias plans to follow through on INC proposals to introduce
401
limited electoral government, meant that on a provincial level for those in majority
Hindu provinces, and on an All-India level for Muslims in toto, Muslim votes would
be insufficient to secure Muslim representatives - a chilling prospect given the rise and
influence of groups like the Arya Samaj. As well, there is no doubt that aspects of
Mughal political culture (intellectual and institutional) predisposed or were employed to
encourage elite and middle-class Muslims to identify as a religio-political community.
However, in light o f the fact that Mughal political culture is most heavily informed by
Islamic Utopias/Ideologies and those best educated in them exhibited an unflinching
resolve to ensure Islam continued to influence social institutions under the EIC regime,
it must be added that being Muslim itself implied a need to re-print identification
along religio-political lines under Direct Rule, even when joint action between
Muslims and Hindus was engaged. Thus, by the close of the 19*^ century, the rhetoric of
the present - including 'umma and Caliphate, 'qawm and nation, India and
separate electorates - was set.
When placed beside the narratives of South Asianists, it is clear that the above
account both concurs and diverges from previous theses. Beginning with the early
Subaltemist understanding of Mughal political culture as feudal/communal, this study
confirms that many aspects of Mughal polity reflect the types of attitudes and institutions
to which the Subaltemists refer. However, it is added that certain attitudes and
institutions, such as the support o f welfare and education, are not accounted for in the
feudal/communal model. Furthermore, it has been shown that in this culture there are a
host o f ideas that transcend the attitudes and institutions mentioned above. Included are
notions o f elected government and a rule o f law that allows for religious pluralism,
402
womens rights, the distribution o f wealth, and other such ideals more usually
considered in terms o f bourgeois culture. Thus, elite and subaltern realms are certainly
intertwined, but not in the manner described by Guha and Chatteijee.
Regarding elite attitudes toward and institutional ties with the subaltern, the
Utopias/Ideologies current among the elite illustrate that merely allowing for coercion
and persuasion in ones understanding o f the relationship o f power between elites and
subalterns does not address the influence of political, legal, etc., philosophies that seek
more than to persuade subalterns to remain subordinate. On the other hand, regarding
subaltern attitudes toward and institutional ties with the elite, the Utopias/Ideologies
current among the subaltern show that communal relations do not stop at caste, tribe or
the nation, bounded by shared language and literary tradition. They include political
and religious identities that intersect and transcend the local, tying the subaltern to the
elite in ways that do not make a notion of resistance to elite domination an invariant
feature o f subaltern ideology.
Turning to the variety of South Asianist concepts that view South Asian cultures
as idiomatically Indian/Indic, the above Utopias/Ideologies also reveal that the very
basis upon which cultural syncretism is legitimated issues, in the case o f Muslims,
from an education in the disciplines, schools and categories of Middle Islam, and
furthermore, that there are degrees of syncretism, and that such ideas are always in
competition with degrees of cultural separatism. Hence, in the Utopias/Ideologies
issuing from the elite, the Mughals are Badshahs o f Hindustan and Caliphs of the umma.
Hence, in the anti-elite and anti-colonial Utopias/Ideologies current among the subaltern,
Imamate is so often the alternative. In this light, Mughal political culture resolves best
403
as a Middle Period Muslim culture evolving into a Muslim Modem culture - both
legitimating the local in a definable manner. Given that this cultures geographical
local is South Asian, the only further qualification to make is that it is Indo-Muslim -
that is to say, its dominant groups are primarily educated in the Utopias/Ideologies of
Islam as particularized in South Asia.
Considering South Asianist notions o f the colonial state, it should be clear that
the early Subaltemist idea of a semi-feudal political culture is problematic for more
reasons than the flaws in the concept o f feudalism. Viewing colonial polity as a space
in which bourgeois culture found its limits, belies the fact that supposedly non
bourgeois elements of colonial political culture were legitimated by the imported
intellectualism o f the European bourgeoisie that ran the EIC and govemed South Asia.
That is to say, racism, sexism, sectarianism, classism, landlordism, and empire itself, is
part of 19* century European bourgeois culture, not its limit. Even if one allows for the
Eurocentricity of the definition of the bourgeois mode of power, therefore, one must
wonder why so much of European bourgeois culture is not included in the definition o f
this analytical category and how this in itself skews ones understanding of the period.
This does not mean that the colonial state was what local Indian kings had been
doing for the past centuiy, as other prominent South Asianists have argued, for more
reasons than the flaws in the concept of the Indian. The virtual boycott o f colonial
education (including missionary schools) by Muslims of all classes before 1858 - in
contrast to non-Muslims - does not suggest that local Muslim kings had as little
interest in the madrasa, maktab or khanqah as the British. Furthermore, the jihad
movements involving artisans and cultivators led by scholarly Imams were not directed
404
at local Muslim kings, but at colonial institutions. It is true that the Mughals
Muslim successors, like the Mughals before them, also faced local insurrections.
However, they did not inspire movements that sought to overthrow the very system of
government in place - one that not only showed little interest in Muslim educational
institutions, but spumed Islamic thought to the point that even mirftis and qadis no longer
had a place in the states legislative regime.
As neither the limit o f European bourgeois culture, nor the front row of
contemporary Indian trends, colonial political culture, like Mughal political culture
before it, is best approached as syncretic. Before 1858, European and Islamic thought
legitimated the EIC regime, though there was no synthesis on the level o f thought.
After 1858, primarily represented by Sayyid Ahmad Khans metaphysics, synthesis does
occur, but his unpopularity implies that for most Muslims the colonial state ultimately
remained syncretic only as it had been before 1858. Thus, European physical sciences
alone were actively sought by Muslim intellectuals, while metaphysics and ethics were
largely ignored and legal and political philosophy pursued to advance within the colonial
context. As such, although electoral politics were adopted, they were only legitimated in
so far as they accommodated an electorate organized as qawms. From this perspective,
the colonial state not only stands where British and local capitalist interests converge, as
South Asianists argue, but where European bourgeois culture and contemporary South
Asian capitalist cultures overlap. That is, cultures circumscribed by the legitimation of
local custom, vemacular languages, patriarchy and religious community, not to repeat
the imperial institutions suggested above. Where they do not overlap, one locates the
rhetorical altematives to the colonial state, and the classes and groups with an interest
405
in their promotion. That is, notions of community that either negate the above
institutions, or employ them in an idiom particular to Islam or Hinduism.
The implications of the above differences between this and other South
Asianists understandings of Mughal and colonial political culture are many when
considering the rise o f Muslim Nationalism. Most significantly, they imply that a view
o f Muslim Nationalism as a construct of the colonial regime, including the influences
o f Orientalism on the colonizer and the colonized, the birth o f a public arena, and so
on, explains only one aspect o f the movement. To be sure, the very hybridity o f the term
Muslim Nation illustrates that without the colonial regime there might have been no
Muslim Nationalism. However, the idea o f Muslim India central to the Muslim
Nationalist project is less a construct than a translation of a religio-political community
that pre-dates the colonial regime, being central to the Utopias/Ideologies o f Muslim
Modernism beginning to develop under the Great Mughals. Indeed, Muslim Nationalism
is only the tip o f a movement toward cultural separatism that accompanied the rise of
indigenous capitalists. In this light, the British are educated in Muslim India by South
Asians - Hindu and Muslim, elite and subaltern - rather than the other way around, even
if the British construct their own version o f Muslim India in the writings of Orientalists
or the institutional initiatives of the colonial state.
This leaves the question of whether this is a Post-Orientalist perspective?
Ultimately, the answer depends on ones judgement o f an approach cognizant of the
categories of Islamic thought and the Utopias/Ideologies their authors generate.
Recalling the ten wings imagined in Chaudhuri Rahmat Alis Muslim India, and
Muhammad Ali Jinnahs disappointment at the ultimate dimensions o f his two-winged
406
Pakistan, this study closes by reiterating that such an approach is ideally suited to
the study of Mughal political culture and Muslim Nationalism. This is because the
Utopias/Ideologies represented by these figures and their Muslim Indias are most
comfortably grasped as the truncated and moth-eaten reconstruction of the Mughal
Caliphate - no longer able to persuade or coerce many non-Muslims to join after 1858,
but well-equipped to convince Muslims of various localities that reconstruction is not
only feasible, but also desirable in the future.
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Glossary
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, ail terms are common to Arabic, Persian and Urdu,
but are given in the Arabic form.
ads. custom
abl al-kitab. People of the Book; followers o f the Abrahamic tradition.
alim (pi. ulami): learned in the religious sciences.
aimri^l. umara): governor or ruler.
anjumm. Urdu term for society or organization.
aqh reason
baqa\ abiding or subsisting in God.
batin. inner or esoteric meaning of scripture/doctrine.
bay's, consent, as in the oath o f allegiance to a Caliph.
bid's, innovation, usually implying heresy, although there are also positive types
{bid'a basana)
dar al-lslam. Land oflslam ; areas under Muslim govemance.
dar al-barh Land of War; areas under non-Muslim govemance.
dbikr. mentioning God, as in a meditative exercise.
dhimmt protected; non-Muslim subject of Muslim govemance granted certain rights

in exchange for payment of taxes. Dbiiimu status is generally extended to the abl al-
Jdtab, but in the South Asian context has included Zoroastrians, Hindus, Buddhists,
Jains and Sikhs, though not necessarily recognizing the latter as People of the Book.
falsafs. philosophy.
fana-. annihilation in God.
faqlb (pi. fuqaba"): an expert in Gqt, a jurist.

432
433
faqlr. mendicant.
fatwa (pi. fatawa)'. the legal opinion of a mvffi (jurisconsult).
Gqt. jurisprudence.
finnan (pi. faramin): Persian/Urdu term for official edict of state.
baditb (pi. abadltM): report, particularly of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.
baMmi^l. bnkamS)'. physician or philosopher.
ijnfd'. consensus; one of the sources of the sbana according to Gqb.
istibsam juristic preference in Sqb.
ijtlbad. independent legal reasoning in Sqb.
ibn (pi. ulum): knowledge or science.
imam, leader, usually in congregational prayer; teacher. In Shiism, the sinless head of
the community/in Sunnism, often used interchangeably with kbalifa.
insan al-kamib Perfect Human; Sufi concept of one at the apex of the hierarchy of
gnostic knowledge.
iqfa: grant of land revenue. The holder is an iq ta i. Also SQQ,jaglr.
jaglr. Persian/Urdu term for iqfa. The holder o f the grant is ajaglrdar.
jibad. struggle or striving for religion. In Sqb, this includes the jibad al-akbar(great
struggle) for personal purification, and the jibad al-asgbartj\\Xi\Q struggle) in favour of
spreading or maintaining the sbana.
Jizya. poll-tax on adult, male dbimmis,.
kaSr. infidel or unbeliever.
kalam. theology
kasbf. intuition.
kbanqat. hospice for Siifk.
434
kbutba. sermon delivered at congregational prayers.
madbbabipl. m adb^b): school, particularly employed in regard of fiqb.
madrasa. college; formal institution o f higher Islamic learning.
maktak school; formal institution of primary Islamic learning, often associated with a
mosque.
mawlawT. preacher or teacher of religious subjects, especially the Quran.
mufff. jurisconsult empowered to issue fatawa.
mujabid (pi. mujabidln): participant in jibad.
mutakallim (pi. mutakallimim): an expert in kalam. a theologian.
nawab. Urdu term for a state official of high rank, derived from the Arabic nai ti
deputy.
plr. Persian/Urdu term for a Sufi saint.
qadr. judge.
qawm. community.
qibla. the direction toward which Muslims orient themselves during salat (i.e, the Ka ba
in Mecca).
qiyas. legal argumentation based on analogy; one of the sources of the sbana
according to fiqb.
salat formal prayer performed five times daily.
sarnd'. ecstatic music recital in Sufism.
sbana. Law, usually in reference to the legal corpus of the fiiqabi.
sbirk. association of partners with God; polytheism.
simna. custom, usually of Prophet Muhammad, transmitted by means of baditb, one of

the sources o f the sban'a according to Sqb.
tafslr. exegesis o f the Quran.
435
taqlid. imitation, as in the acceptance of a legal position without independent
consideration.
tanqar. the way; a Sufi order, or the method of a particular adept.
tawbld. Gods Unity.
inmnac. the Muslim community.
usuJ (sing, asl): roots or principles, as in usul al-Gqb (principles o f jurisprudence).
urf. customary law.
wabdat al-sbiibud. Unity o f Witness; Ahmad SirhincGs doctrinal expression o f Sufi

notions of Gods ultimate transcendence.
wabdat al-wujud. Unity of Being; Ibn al-Arabis doctrinal expression o f Sufi notions
of Gods ultimate immanence.
waby. inspiration or revelation.
waqfi^l, awqa^: trust or endowment.
wazZr(pi. wuzafd): minister in government.
zabir. outer or exoteric meaning of scripture or doctrine.
zakat obligatory alms-tax, calculated on basis of personal holdings.
zaaundar. Urdu terms for landlord, including various classes of larger landholdings.

Antagonistic Utopias Mughal Polity and Muslim Nationalism

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Antagonistic Utopias Mughal Polity and Muslim Nationalism

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ANTAGONISTIC UTOPIAS:

A CULTURAL APPROACH TO MUGHAL POLITY

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements

Copyright by Reza Pirbhai, 2004.

Acquisitions and Acquisisitons et

395 W ellington Street 395, rue W ellington

Your file Votre reference

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriete du

In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires

Antagonistic Utopias; A Cultural Approach to Mughal Polity and

Doctorate of Philosophy, 2004

This is a history of the idea of Muslim India. It is anchored in a growing body of

whether the idea of a religio-political community encompassing the Muslims of South

bureaucratic records and Orientalist scholarship.

underlying Mughal ideological and institutional initiatives. Given this regimes

conjured under British Raj.

work and I immensely in his debt.

field is at the beginning of graduate study, before Professor Rutherfords tutelage

Ricoeurs understanding of the relationship between Ideology and Utopia, as well as

academic interests. It is a great privilege to include Professor Rutherford and Professor

Northrup among my acknowledgements.

Having been a fixture at the Department of History, University of Toronto, for

incorporate her evaluation.

University of Toronto. However, I am equally indebted to the administrative staff at

I am most grateful that she held my hand.

sisterly chores of listening to my gripes or pulling up my socks, while she herself

displacement, as her confidence and support have provided inspiration.

of such outsiders nothing seems possible.

phonetic differences less immediately apparent. For example, phonetic differences

o f Middle East Studies. As the majority of terms transliterated are by no means

only included in the Glossary.

Punjab provinces, Pakistan, followed by visits to similar institutions in Cairo, Egypt,

between October-December 2000.1 was also fortunate enough to be able to conduct

worshippers associated with the above variety of institutions.

import to the historical investigation of Muslim societies can be sufficiently gleaned

the shrine of a Naqshbandiyya saint between prayer times, one is ensconced in

shrine of a Suhrawardiyya saint, there is no mosque attached, no Arabic instruction.

the type of worship exhibited at each tomb is equally vociferously defended by

attendants as Islamic. As for the worshippers, something of their attitude can be

irrespective of the form of worship, as part of their pilgrimage to Makli, literally,

customary worship are Islamicized. At the shrine of a Suhrawardiyya saint known as

plethora of patently local customary forms of worship legitimated and viewed as

in defining Islam in a Muslim social space, it seemed necessary to challenge the

explicitly normative approach to Islam employed by many South Asianists concerned

with Mughal polity and Muslim Nationalism. Then, 1 went to Egypt...

of similarity, illustrating a different aspect of Islam in both countries, occurred on

commemorations at the shrine of the Suhrawardiyya saint, Lai Shahbaz Qalandar, in

unity in Islams diversity.

influenced by their prominence in conversations with contemporary Islamic scholars

remaining confined to the essentializing typologies so often imposed on Muslim

societies. Simultaneously, this approach seeks to illustrate that assumptions of

disconnectedness between segments o f the Muslim World, particularly when based on

Transliteration Note vii

Introduction: History and Muslim Nationalism 1

Chapter One: Reason and Intuition, Sobriety and Intoxication:

I: Al-Ghazali and Al-Hujwiri: Categorizing Thought in the Middle Period 35

Conclusion: Islam and India 85

I: The Political Philosophy of Middle Islam 96

Conclusion: Mughal Caliphate and Muslim India 187

Chapter Three: A Tide o f Sobriety in the Period o f Lesser Mughals 191

Chapter Four: Muslim Moderns and Modern Muslims:

I: The New Sobriety: Deoband and Company 312

Conclusion: Muslim India and India 391