Goldman Sachs Administration Services Co.

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Dear Investor

Re: Eifuku Fund, L.P.

In our capacity as administrator of the fund, we are disseminating the attached correspondence
received from the General Partner at their request. If you have any questions concerning the
information contained in the attached correspondence please contact the General Partner on
011-813-5472-1351.

The information contained in this facsimile message is intended only for the confidential use of the recipient. This material is for your
private information, and we are not soliciting any action based upon it. The information contained in this notice is provided to you at the
request of the investment manager. We do not represent that such information is accurate or complete and it should not be relied upon as
such. In the event of any discrepancy between the information contained herein and the information contained in your monthly account
statements, the latter shall govern. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or person responsible for delivering it to the
intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error, and that any review, dissemination,
distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this in error, please notify the sender
immediately by telephone at the number set forth below and destroy this facsimile message. Thank you
Memorandum
To: Eifuku Investors

From: The Investment Manager

Date: January 15

Re: January 2003 Performance

Jan 2003 Trading Result

It is with deep regret that we inform you that Eifuku Master Fund has experienced substantial trading
losses in the first seven trading days of January that have consumed nearly all of the fund’s capital.
These losses occurred principally in three position groups. The fund’s portfolio is currently under
liquidation with its main prime broker. There are still live positions being sold out/bought back and
the Investment Manager is actively working with the fund’s prime broker to preserve and maximize
any remaining equity in the fund. There is however a strong possibility that there may not be any
equity left at the end of the liquidation.

Positions

The fund came into the year 2003 aggressively positioned in three trade groups. To start, the fund
held a significant position in a “stub” trade. This market-neutral trade consisted of a long position in a
parent company and a short position in a 63%-owned subsidiary of the parent. The two stocks had
exhibited a very high degree of correlation and low level of volatility. We considered the underlying
merits of the position extremely attractive from both a valuation standpoint and a timing standpoint.
In fact, the after-tax 63% position in the subsidiary was approximately equal to the market value of
the entire parent company so that by owning this position, you owned the parent company’s valuable
core business at minimal cost.

The fund’s second position was a relative value position in the Japanese bank sector, which consisted
of long positions in three banks, a short position in one bank and some short index futures as a hedge.
The position was established in late November/December as some of the weaker Japanese banks were
heavily sold off in a market panic late in the year.

Third, the fund held a significant position in a Japanese tech stock that had also been excessively sold
off in the last quarter of the year. We detected not only a large degree of panic selling here, but also
aggressive and large short sales of the stock.

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Timeline

Things got off to a bad start immediately in 2003. In the first two trading days of the year ( i.e. Jan 6
and Jan 7) the fund lost approximately 15% of its capital. This was very concerning to us as it
immediately put us in a precarious margin position and forced us to consider unwinding positions to
raise margin. The other concerning issue was that much of the adverse activity in our positions took
place in the last half hour of trading each day.

Wednesday’s (Jan 8) trading result came as a real shock. While trying to raise cash in some of the
fund’s positions, the fund sustained a loss of an additional 15% of its capital. There were large
adverse moves in the last hour of trading. This loss created a margin call at the fund’s main prime
broker that it could not meet. We held discussions with our prime broker throughout the day and they
agreed to a day’s grace period.

Unfortunately, Thursday (Jan 9) was as bad as Wednesday and the fund lost another 16% of it’s
capital. At the end of the day, we were severely under margin with our main prime broker. Once
again, for the fourth day running, much of this loss occurred in the final hour of trading. After the
close of Thursday, our prime broker decided to exercise their right to supervise further
trading/liquidation in the positions as per the standard prime brokerage agreement.

We worked with the prime broker Friday (Jan 10) in attempting to raise liquidity by selling positions.
We did manage to work out of some size across the various positions, but the liquidation had the
effect of further losses in the fund’s positions. The fund ended the day do wn a further 12% and the
week with a loss of approximately 58% of its capital. Additionally, the fund was now significantly
under margin at its prime broker.

Over the long weekend (Monday Jan 13 having been a trading holiday in Japan), we had numerous
discussions with our prime broker concerning strategy going forward. Eventually, they decided in
accordance with the prime brokerage agreement that they needed to liquidate the fund’s two largest
positions, the stub trade and the long tech position, as soon as possible. They went into the market
and arranged several large block trades with their various customers around the world over the course
of Tuesday (Jan 14). These various block trades cleared most of the exposure to the two positions but
came at a dear cost and left the fund with a loss for the day of approximately 40%. Equity in the fund
was now hovering at the 3% level.

On Wednesday (Jan 15) we continued to sell out the relative value bank trade and clean up some
smaller less liquid positions. At the end of Wednesday, we are left with very little equity in the fund,
somewhere around 2% of start of year capital.

Where the fund is now

The fund still has positions that total approximately $80 million long and $117 million short. Of the
long positions, approximately $15 million is held in lower liquidity stocks that may take some time to
properly liquidate. We are still working hard with the prime broker to trade out of the remaining
positions in as clean a fashion as possible. We will let you know as soon as possible what the likely
outcome will be.

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John Koonmen will try to contact each investor individually by phone in the next few days to further
explain these unfortunate events and answer all direct questions. In particular, if any investors have
questions concerning the logic and analysis behind the positions, John would be happy to answer
these questions during those calls.

John Koonmen’s email address is jkoonmen@ctjapan.com if any investor would like to contact him
directly through email to arrange a call at the investor’s convenience.

This letter has been very hard to write. I am sure that it has been equally difficult for you to read. We
will be in contact soon.

Eifuku Investment Management Limited