LEOVILLO C.
AGUSTIN seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation
Commissioner;
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, already properly equipped
when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft.
President Marcos issued on December 2, 1974, the assailed Letter of
Instruction No. 229. As provided under this LOI, all owners, users or drivers
of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one
(1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and
40 cms. at the sides. Said LOI was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479
providing that the Land transportation Commissioner shall require every
motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his
vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any
brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle. The Land Transportation
Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order.
Agustins argument: Said LOI is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society; one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and
immoral because they will make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of
the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set.
SC:
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the
police power. Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of
the state.
Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive
redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already
equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,"
3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a
distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or
from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle
which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers
passing traffic.
There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction which
requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early
warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor
vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor
vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question,
procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a
little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can
even personally make or produce this early warning device so long
as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down
in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the
early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive,
onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make
manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly
the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of
road safety signs and devices; It cannot be disputed then that this
Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36
The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate
a commitment to which it had pledged its word.
 BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep.
SATUR OCAMPO vs ALBERTO ROMULO, in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Foreign Affairs,
Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased,
was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary. Rome Statute established the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions. The RP, through Charge d Affaires Enrique
A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute. Then Ambassador Francis J.
Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the DFA proposing the
terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter)
between the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of Notes, then DFA Secretary
Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals. The Agreement provides
that absent the consent of US/PHIL no current or former Government
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals
of US/PHIL shall be surrendered or transferred by any means to any
international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Agreement was contracted validly, which resolves itself
into the question of whether or not respondents gravely abused their
discretion in concluding it;
2. Whether or not the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the
Senate for concurrence, contravenes and undermines the Rome Statute and
other treaties.
SC:
1. Yes. Senate Concurrence Not Required
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of
notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an
internationally accepted form of international agreement. An exchange of
notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting
State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The
signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or
departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently
resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid
the process of legislative approval.
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a
treaty as an international agreement concluded between states in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation. International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that
require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive
agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require
legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower
range of subject matters than treaties.
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and
executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting
states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their powers. Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if
it violates the Constitution. Authorities are, however, agreed that one is
distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-
requirement aspect. As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a
treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its
constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority
of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an
executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.
2. The Agreement Not in Contravention of the Rome Statute
Contrary to petitioners pretense, the Agreement does not contravene
or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going
against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. As aptly
pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the
ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory
states
Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute
declares that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes. This provision indicates that
primary jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes rests, at the first
instance, with the state where the crime was committed; secondarily, with the
ICC in appropriate situations contemplated under Art. 17, par. 1 of the Rome
Statute.
 Of particular note is the application of the principle of ne bis in idem
under par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy
of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC. As far as relevant, the
provision states that no person who has been tried by another court for
conduct x x x [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the
[International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct x x x.
The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively,
argue against the idea of jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as
party to the non-surrender agreement, and the ICC; or the idea of the
Agreement substantially impairing the value of the RPs undertaking under
the Rome Statute. Ignoring for a while the fact that the RP signed the Rome
Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that the Rome
Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP,
over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the
signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
 VINUYA VS ROMULO
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
They claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort
women stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of
the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Issues
(1) WON respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them
SC:
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has
the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims
against Japan.
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions.
One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that
the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. The US Supreme Court has
further cautioned that decisions relating to foreign policy are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by
those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They
are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility.
The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of
its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority
for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the
political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it
is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for
the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination
by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause
would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our
relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region.
For us to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which
authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
 GERARDO vs ZAMORA et al with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of
effective Filipino control of the economy.
President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.)
8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly The Issues Presented
repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from
1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing
engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so
to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and
under four categories:
2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

Category A Less than Exclusively for Filipino

SC:
US$2,500,000.00 citizens and
corporations wholly 1. Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail
owned by Filipino
Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them,
citizens.
Category B US$2,500,000.00 up but For the first two years of either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question
less than R.A. 8762s effectivity, they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional
US$7,500,000.00 foreign ownership is
allowed up to 60%. plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when as in this case
After the two-year the public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance,
period, 100% foreign
equity shall be allowed. of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
Category C US$7,500,000.00 or May be wholly owned
more by foreigners. Foreign
investments for 2. While Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
establishing a store in development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
Categories B and C
shall not be less than controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
the equivalent in monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit
Philippine Pesos of
US$830,000.00. foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and
Category D US$250,000.00 per May be wholly owned ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
store of foreign by foreigners.
enterprises specializing
in high-end or luxury Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the
products
outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the
general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are
Petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection
present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the basis that
of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
RA 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together
Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity
and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition
and trade practices that are unfair.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution

gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national
interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and
when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws
allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open
certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of
reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed
such policy.
 JOSE O. VERA, ET AL vs. JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL
The COMELEC submitted to the President and the Congress of the
Philippines, its report on the national elections(MAY 1946). It stated that by
reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the Provinces of
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did
not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. When the Senate
convened on May 25, 1946, it proceeded with the selection of its officers.
Thereafter, in the course of the session, a resolution was approved referring
to the report and ordering that, pending the termination of the protest lodged
against their election, the herein petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno
and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the sixteen
candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by
the Commission on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members
of the chamber.
Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues
responsible for the resolution. They pray for an order annulling it, and
compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats, and to exercise
their senatorial prerogatives.
SC:
(1) NO JURISDICTION
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its
officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their
character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which
they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect
without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that where a
member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no
power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a
mandate to compel his reinstatement.
As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch of
the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to establish
judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and
balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.
(2) PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE
Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law, prohibition refers only
to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, exercising
functions judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section 2, Rules of Court.) As the
respondents do not exercise such kind of functions, theirs being legislative, it
is clear the dispute falls beyond the scope of such special remedy.
(3) SENATE HAS NOT EXCEEDED POWERS
Independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under
parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any
member and the latter's right to participate in its deliberations. As we have
seen, the assignment by the constitution of the Electoral Tribunal does not
actually negative that power provided the Senate does not cross the
boundary line, deciding an election contest against the member. Which the
respondents at bar never attempted to do. Precisely, their resolution
recognized, and did not impair, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to
decide the contest. To test whether the resolution trenched on the territory of
the last named agency let ask the question: May the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate order that Body to defer the admission of any member whose
election has been contested? Obviously not. Then it must be conceded that
the passage of the disputed resolution meant no invasion of the former's
realm.
The Senate, as a branch of the legislative department, had the constitutional
power to adopt rules for its proceedings(section 10 [3], Article VI of the
Constitution), and by legislative practice it is conceded the power to
promulgate such orders as may be necessary to maintain its prestige and to
preserve its dignity.4 We are advised by the respondents that, after weighing
the propriety or impropriety of the step, the Senate, in the exercise of its
authority and discretion and of its inherent power of self-preservation,
resolved to defer the administration of oath and the sitting of the petitioners
pending determination of the contest
 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ERMITA
On September 28, 2005, then President Arroyo issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule
on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement
the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in
executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution. Further, Republic Act No. 6713
or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or
divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the
public interest.
(b) coverage
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All
public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent
of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to
ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to
the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
The Senate conducts various senate inquiries and investigations in aid of
legislation. It calls for the attendance of officials and employees of executive
dept etc. However, Senate President Drilon received a letter informing him
"that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting
regarding the NorthRail project will not be able to attend the same without the
consent of the President, pursuant to E.O. 464" and that "said officials have
not secured the required consent from the President.
ISSUES:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern; and
SC:
1. Partly. Sec 1- valid; Sec 2a-valid; Secs 2b and 3- not valid
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the
Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of
legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said
Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of
construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a
way that will render it constitutional.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited
as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads
in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless
a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3 To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted
in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures
While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of
the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to
which among them is being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the
included in the phrase "confidential or classified information between the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to
President and the public officers covered by this executive order." their representatives and other government officials through the various legal
means allowed by their freedom of expression.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and
that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration
leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be
classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first
impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more
pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why
the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has
requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose

information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds
teaches:

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b)
is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of
providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O.
464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case.
It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and
Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

2. Yes.

While the Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it

does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of
its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
 KMU VS NEDA entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a
uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,
Executive Order No. 420 was issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents
requiring all government agencies and government-owned and controlled constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any
implementing legislation.
corporations to streamline and harmonize their identification (id) systems,
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive
and authorizing for such purpose the director-general, national economic and branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the
development authority to implement the same, and for other purposes. The independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the
Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to
data to be collected and recorded by the participating agencies shall be
issue voters ID cards.[10] This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a
limited to the following: national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID
system that is compulsory for all branches of government.
Name
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws
Home Address
are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government
Sex
entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public
Picture
services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO
Signature
420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve
Date of Birth
public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing
Place of Birth
the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the
Height
President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in
Weight
issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are
Tax Identification Number (TIN)
faithfully executed.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal

ISSUES:
them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law
1. WON EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President.
but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs,
2. WON EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.
as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in
the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under
SC:
existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act
1. No. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the
of legislation.
government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID
data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
2. No. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government
provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments,
entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental
bureaus and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to
functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Certainly, under this
these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been
constitutional power of control the President can direct all government
no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and
recording of personal identification data.

In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID

systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy.
Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to
complain against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected
and stored for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14
specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The
data collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require
less data collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems
prior to EO 420.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining

the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID
systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the
14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government
entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven
less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even

narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared
to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides
strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast
to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID

systems by government entities. Some one hundred countries have
compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as Spain,
France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other
countries which do not have national ID systems, like the United States,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden,
have sectoral cards for health, social or other public services. Even with EO
420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have
compulsory national ID systems but allow only sectoral cards for social
security, health services, and other specific purposes.
 Grace Poe vs COMELEC
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up
to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay
in the PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been
going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found
as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the
US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18,
2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a
new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed
chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to
satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on
the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological
parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled
her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her
COC.
Issues:
1: WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications
of candidates
2. WON Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen
3. WON Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
4. WON the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for
committing material misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
SC:
1. No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and
functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof
of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals
have sole jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President,
only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of
candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before
elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for
the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the
intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided
on the qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for
cancellation of her COC.
2. Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For
that, she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-
born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her
physical features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as
an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance
that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial
evidence of her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity
in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to
examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born

citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of international
law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it
adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the
country in which the foundling is found.

3. Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled

with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.

Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not
on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the
BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that an aliens stay in the
country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or
reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different
from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently
her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May
24, 2005, it was for good.

4. No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she
misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency because such facts
refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is
suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the
COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false
representations regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now

pronounced qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot
be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and
residency.