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Mpilitarization
of Marxismn,
1
19m14-i192 ........1.k. .
by Jacob W. Kipp
Kansas State University
CarlvonClausewitz.
LithographbyF. Michelis
afterthe
painting
byW.Wach,1830.(Originalinthepossession
of Professor Peter Paret, Stanford;used with
permission.)
EVEN the most superficialreading of Soviet militarywrit- old regime. On the one hand, reformersand revolutionaries
ings would lead to the conclusion that a close tie exists shared the strong anti-militaristthrust of European Social
between Marxism-Leninismand Clausewitz' studies on war Democracy, whichviewed the militaryelite as the sources of a
and statecraft.Althoughlabeled an "idealist," Clausewitz en- vile and poisonous militarism.The professionalsoldiers' desire
joys a place in the Soviet pantheonof militarytheoristsstrik- forglory,like the capitalists' search for profits,only brought
inglysimilarto thatassigned to pagan philosophersin Dante's sufferingto the workingclass. All socialists shared a com-
Hell. Colonel General I. E. Shavrov, formercommanderof the mitmentto a citizens' militiaas the preferredmeans of national
Soviet General StaffAcademy, has writtenthat Clausewitz' defense. In 1917 the Bolsheviks rode this anti-militarist sen-
methodmarkeda radical departurein the studyof war: timentto power by supportingthe process of militarydisin-
tegration,upholdingthechaos ofthekomitetshchina, and prom-
He, in reality,forthe firsttimein militarytheory,denied ising a governmentthat would bringimmediatepeace.3
the "eternal" and "unchanging" in militaryart, stroveto These Social Democrats were also the heirs of the volumi-
examine the phenomenonof war in its interdependence
and interconditionality, in its movement and develop- nous writingson militaryaffairsofthetwo foundersof scientific
mentin order to postulate theirlaws and principles.' socialism, Karl Marx and FriedrichEngels. As Peter Vigorhas
pointed out, these two life-longcollaboratorsemployed a di-
Soviet authorspoint to the fact that Lenin valued Clausewitz' visionoflabor intheirmilitarywritings.Engels, who considered
workbut refuseto see Lenin's readingof Vom Kriege as having himselfan amateursoldier,dealt withtactics, strategy,and the
anyfundamental consequences forLenin's own views on waror impactof technologyon militaryaffairs.Marx dealt withinter-
militaryaffairs.2Soviet authorstake no note of whenor in what national relations,the impactof war on domestic politics,and
contextLenin read Clausewitz, nor do theyconsiderthe speci- the revolutionarypotentialof a given conflict.4AfterMarx's
ficmannerin whichLenin applied Clausewitz' concepts on war death Engels continued writingabout militaryaffairs,and in
and statecraftto theformationofthemilitarypolicyof his party. 1887penneda chillingpredictionofwhata generalwar would be
It is the purpose of thisarticleto examine the intellectualbond like in capitalist Europe:
between the Prussian officerand the Russian revolutionaryin
This would be a universalwar of unprecedentedscope,
order to understand better the relationshipbetween Soviet unprecedentedforce. From eight to ten millionsoldiers
militaryscience and Marxism-Leninism. willdestroyone anotherand in the course of doingso will
The ideological baggage which Russian Social Democrats stripEurope clean in a way thata swarmof locusts could
carried with them in 1914 would seem to suggest an undying never have done. The devastation caused by the Thirty
distrustof any ideas comingfromprofessionalsoldiers of the Year's War telescoped into3-4 years and spread over the
184 MILITARYAFFAIRS
entire continent,hunger, epidemics, the universal en- i.e., the alienation of labor, the fetishismof the commodity
savagementofbothtroopsand the masses, broughtabout world, surplus value, exploitation,are not akin to sociological
by acute need, the hopeless jumbling of our artificial facts,such as divorces,crimes,shiftsin population,or business
trade, industrial,and creditmechanisms; all this ending cycles. The fundamentalaspects ofMarxiancategoriesdefyany
in generalbankruptcy,the collapse of old states and their
vaunted wisdom . . . the utter impossibility of foreseeing empirical science. i.e., one preoccupied with describingand
how all thiswillend and who will emergevictoriousfrom organizingthe objective phenomenaof society. They appear as
this struggle;only one resultis absolutelybeyond doubt: facts only to a theory that takes them in preview of their
universal exhaustion and the creation of conditions for negation.Correcttheoryis nothingless thana consciousness of
the finalvictoryof the workingclass.' a praxis thataims at changingthe world.7Marx put the prop-
osition succinctlyin his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The
Engels had littleto say about what would follow this crisis. philosophershave only interpretedthe world in various ways;
Its very magnitudepointed towards a general revolutionary the point, however, is to change it."'
crisis across Europe and a rapid social transformation from WhatMarxistsacross Europe faced in the Summerand Fall of
capitalism to socialism. Once the exploiting and exploited 1914 was an anomaly so glaringthat realityseemed to negate
social classes had disappeared,the proletarianstatewould have existingtheory. In the face of its proclaimed internationalism
no need forthe militaryas the instrument of the state's monop- and pacifism,the Social Democrats of Europe had to confronta
oly on violence since the state would have neitherexternalnor general European war, which theirtheoryhad held to be an
internalthreatswith which to contend. impossibility.The Second Internationaland workersolidarity
were supposed to preventa general war among the powers.
True, as in the case of analogous circumstanceassociated with
TWENTY-SEVEN years passed between Engels' prediction scientificrevolutions,observers in the decades prior to the
and the onset of thatgreatEuropean war. In the meantime outbreakof WorldWar I had notedanomalies in maturecapital-
the heirs of Marx and Engels had become powerfulpolitical ism, which did not fitthe essential paradigmoutlinedby Marx
forcesin manystatesof Europe. Some parties,mostnotablythe and Engels. But the shock of modernwar, i.e., praxis, set offa
GermanSocial Democratic Party,had abandoned revolutionary deep crisis in theory.9
action, althoughtheycontinuedto mouththe rhetoricof class In Lenin's case, this crisis had a profound,but largelyunac-
confrontation.European socialists had in 1890created the Sec- knowledged consequence, for Soviet militaryscience. For
ond International,and theyexpected it to providethe organiza- Lenin, the committed revolutionary,the ramificationsof a
tional expression for a workers' solidarity,which was to pre- general European war were no abstract concern. On the con-
ventthe outbreakof such a war. But in the Summerand Fall of trary,because he was committedto changingthe world. Lenin
1914 the socialist parties of Europe, withthe exception of the requiredof theorythatit granthim"scientificforesight"- the
Serbian, actively or passively supported their governments' abiltyto foreseethewar's course and outcome. On theone hand.
entryinto the war. To the disgust of Lenin, the majorityof this led Lenin to review the substantialbody of socialist litera-
Russian Social Democrats were willingto defend Russia, no tureon financecapitalismand imperialistrivalries.culminating
matterhow muchtheydespised the tsaristregime.But Engels' in 1916 withhis syntheticwork,Imperialismthe Hi,g4hest State
vision came back to haunt them all. Total war graduallytore oflCapitalism."' On the otherhand. Lenin was concerned with
assunder both socialist ideology and European society in the the problemof theoryreconstruction,a task made essential by
same mannerthat the massed guns tore apart land and men. the apparentfailureof accepted Marxismto predictor prevent
In readingLenin's early writingson militaryaffairs,one must the war. It is most typical of Lenin that in the face of such
be conscious of the extent to which these views have been earth-shakinghistoricalevents, he should returnto philosophy
accepted without deep reflectionor consideration. Lenin's in orderto finda theoreticalframeworkupon whichto analyze
observations on the colonial wars of the late nineteenthand these events and to guide his actions.
early twentiethcenturies,especially the Russo-Japanese War, Unlike the dry and largelyahistoricalexposition of Lenin's
reflectthe preeminentconcernsfoundin the worksof Marx and views to be found in most Soviet works, this process is in-
Engels: the politics of war and the impact of new technology tellectuallyintriguingand highlyrelevantto our concern, the
upon war in capitalist society. development of Soviet militaryscience. This process in-
Withthe outbreakof World War I, Lenin's speculationsand volved a fundamentalrestructuring of Lenin's generaltheory.2
writingsabout war underwenta radical transformation. Ideo- Down to 1914,forall his declarationsabout dialecticalmaterial-
logies, like the paradigms of a scientificdiscipline, begin to ism, Lenin never transcendedthe historicalpre-Marxian,me-
disintegratewhen the exceptions or anomalies startto threaten chanistic materialismof the Enlightenment.In one of his ear-
the verycore of the model. Normal ideological discourse, like liest writings(1894), "What the Friends of the People Are,"
what Thomas Kuhn has called "normal science," becomes Lenin had asserted that "insistence on dialectics . . . is nothing
increasingiydifficult.Lenin's concerns were shared by social- but a relic of Hegelianismout of which scientificsocialism has
ists across Europe. In Marxist terms practice, i.e., objective grown,a relicof its mannerof expression." 13Whilerecognizing
circumstances, had called into question a central point of a need forsome philosophicalunderpinning to Marxism,Lenin
theory.In 1914 Lenin, along withothersocial democrats,con- did not himselfenterintodebate untilpracticalissues of policy,
frontedan anomaly of such scope and power that theirideo- i.e., whetherthe Bolsheviks would take partin the electionsfor
logical assumptionscould not but undergochange.' the Third Duma, broughthim into conflictwith the Bogdano-
Marxism,withits historicalmaterialistanalysis of the world, vitesand theirMachian Empiriomonism.When it appeared that
and itsemphasisupon class conflict,had held out the promiseof Bolshevism was being identifiedwith Machism and suffering
liberatingthe essential potentialitiesof man amid the depriva- Lenin did address the issue
politicallyfromthis identification,
tions of reality.Hegel had placed this philosophicalconcern in in Materialism and Empiriocriticism.14 Lenin's approach, and
the historicalcontextof his timeand so had made manifestthe one to be foundin Soviet worksto thisday, was to postulatea
fact that man's knowledge, activity,and hope were directed strugglebetween philosophical idealism and materialism:
towardsthe establishmentof a rationalsociety. Marx set out to
demonstratetheconcreteforcesand tendenciesthatstood in the The question here is not of this or that formulationof
materialismbut of the antithesisbetweenmaterialismand
path of this goal and those that promised it. This material idealism, of the differencebetween the two fundamental
connectionof his theorywitha definitehistoricalformof praxis lines of philosophy. Are we to proceed fromthingsto
negatednot only philosophy,but sociologyas well. As Herbert sensations and thought? Or are we to proceed from
Marcuse has pointed out, the social facts that Marx analyzed, thoughtand sensation to things?'
Withouta workers'revolutionin several countriesno one Since we became the representativesof a rulingclass,
can win in this war. War is not a toy; war is an unpre- which has begun to organize socialism, we demand from
cedentedthing;war costs millionsof lives, and it is not so everyone a serious relationshipto the defense of the
easy to end it.27 country.To relate seriouslyto the defenseof the country
means to be thoroughlyprepared and to calculate accu-
Lenin intendedhis analysis to provide foresight,and foresight ratelythe correlationof forces. If those forcesare plainly
in turnwas to preparehis partyand the workingclass of Russia inadequatethenthe mostimportantmeans ofdefenseis to
withdrawintothedepthsofthecountry.Those [advocates
for action. While the events of the Summer and Fall of 1917 ofcontinuingthe strugglewithGermanyas a partisanwar]
confirmthat Lenin could not control the social forces acting who would see thisas an attractiveformulain the present
upon the Russian polity, in July he went along with demon- situation can read about the results of the lessons of
strationsthathe could notcontroland faced theirfailureand the historyin thisaccount in old man Clausewitz, one of the
suppressionof his party. Then, in October he could not con- greatestmilitarywriters.3'
vince his own partyelite of the timelinessof preparationsforan
armed insurrectionagainst a bankrupt Provisional Govern- "Old Man Clausewitz" appeared here withoutideological trap-
ment.2' His own synthesisof class analysis, the centralityof pings,and Lenin's remarksdo suggesta carefulreading.Lenin
politicsto war, and an interpretationof the immediatepast that called to his reader's attentionthe three specific conditions
seemed to hold out the prospectof immediate,sweeping,revo- which Clausewitz had cited as being necessary to make such a
lutionarychanges allowed Lenin to speak of "scientific pre- strategicwithdrawalinto the interiorof the countrya proper
diction" and foresight.This, in turn,gave Lenin the confidence course of militaryaction:
to act decisively.
Upon coming to power Lenin had to confrontthe starkre- a. When our physicaland psychologicalsituationlvisa lvis
the enemy rules out the possibility of successful
alities of the social. political, and economic disintegration resistance at or near the frontier
which had transpiredin Russia in 1917, and to which the Bol- b. When our main objective is to gain time
sheviks had contributedthemselves.Lenin and the Bolsheviks c. When the condition of the countryis favorable to it
found themselves the nominal rulers of a vast countryin the 32
L
they grossly underestimatedthe positive role that v'oenspetsy
ENIN not onlygot the Partyto accept Brest-Litovsk,butin could play, failedto appreciate the value of bourgeoismilitary
the monthsfollowingthe ratificationof the treatyas civil science, and overestimated the value of partisan warfare.4
war erupted across Russia, Lenin and Trotsky directed the Under conditionsof dire emergencyand withappropriatepo-
creationof a powerfulstandingarmy. In this process, the two litical controls to guarantee theirloyalty,they saw the voen-
men played an instrumental role in shapinga series of decisions spetsy and bourgeois specialists in general as critical to the
that would affect the institutionalrelationship between the survival of Soviet power. The regimeneeded professionalex-
Partyand the militaryand the ideological relationshipbetween pertisefromany source that could provide it:
Marxism-Leninismand militaryscience. One of the most im- But although our party is thoroughlyand inseparably
portantinitialdecisions was the acceptance of the mobilization linkedwiththe workingclass, it neverwas and nevercan
of formertsarist officersas militaryspecialists, voenspetsy. become the simplebooster of the workingclass, whichis
Colonel 1. A. Korotkov has creditedthese "spetsy" with"the content with all that the workers do . . . The proletariat
firststeps of Soviet militaryscience.''4 and even morethe peasant masses have onlyjust emerged
Two elementsseemed to have shaped Lenin's attitudeon this frommany centuriesof slavery and carryin themselves
question. The firstwas his general respect for professional all the consequences of oppression,ignorance,and dark-
competence. At the core of Lenin's theoryof the partywas the ness. The seizure of power in and of itselfhas not at all
transformed the workingclass and has not attiredit with
concept of leadership by professional revolutionariesas out- all the necessary merits and qualities: the seizure of
lined in WliatIs To Be Done? so manyyears before. Lenin had power has only opened before it the possibilityto really
little use for amateurs in politics, culture, or the military. learn, develop and purge itselfof its own historicaldefi-
Second, Lenin's realismmade himacutelyaware oftheneed for ciencies.42
professionallycompetentstrategicleadership,ifthe regimewas
to survive.3sAlthoughSoviet authors still vilifyTrotskyfor a The spetsy became the instrumentsthroughwhich a future
policy of "capitulation" before the so-called professionalcre- generationof Communistcadre would be created. The iowen-
dentials of the voenspetsy, his views in 1918 were close to sp)etsyplayed a crucial role in the formationof the Soviet staff
Lenin's. Afterthe decision had been made to recruitbourgeois and officer-education systemsduringthe Civil War and in the
specialistsforthe Red Armyon 31 March 1918. Trotskywrote postwar decade.43On 8 May 1918,the Soviet governmentcre-
the followingcomments,explaininghis support for the mea- ated the All-Russian Main Staff,and subordinatedit to the
sure. which he considered essential to the survival of the RevolutionaryMilitarySoviet of the Republic (RVSR). In June
regime: the firstnumberof Voennoc delo (MilitaryAffairs),the Red
Army's firstmilitary-theoretical journal appeared. The pres-
We need a real armed force,constructedon the basis of tigious Voennaia mysl' of the modern Soviet Armed Forces
militaryscience. The active and systematicparticipation
in all our work of the militaryspecialists is thereforea can trace its originsthrougha series of succeedingjournals to
matterof vital importance.The militaryspecialists must that publication.44In August 1918, the RVSR authorizedthe
have guaranteedto themthe possibilityof exertingtheir creationof the Military-Historical Commissionforthe Writing
powers honestlyand honorablyin the matterof the cre- of the History of World War I.4' Those developments,when
ation of the army.3" combined with the effortsto restore discipline, end the ko-
mitetshchina,and begin conscription,confirmthe accuracy of
Neither he nor Lenin had any blind faithin the political re- Bukharin's assessment of Lenin's militarypolicy directed
liabilityof formertsarist officersdrawn from the privileged towardsthe creationof a professionalmilitaryestablishment.If
classes of the old regime.On 18 April 1918. withintheNarkom further evidence of thisdirectionwas needed, Lenin providedit
po l'oennymdclam (People's Commissariat for MilitaryAf- by arguingfor the creation of the MilitaryAcademy of the
fairs),theSoviet statecreatedtheCommissarBureau to oversee General StaffoftheRed Armyand callingfortheuse ofthemost
the recruitmentand assignmentof the political commissarsas qualified members of the teaching staffof the tsaristgeneral
watchdogs over the wOenspetsv."3The question of the loyalty staffacademy to man the new academy in October 1918withits
and value of the iowenspetsy became one of the most volatile firstclasses being held in December.46
issues of militarypolicy for the Party duringthe Civil War. To those socialists who accused him of revisionism and
Some Bolsheviks/Communistsobjected to the specialists on militarism,Lenin repliedthatthe Soviet government'sdecision
ideological grounds; others questioned their utilityon the flowed fromthe events, i.e. fromthe demands of praxis. In
groundsof theirtechnical competency. Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," written
'XProletarian
Initially,theoppositionto the voenspevtsyhad come fromLeft in 1918, Lenin stated that a new social class upon coming to
Communistswho favoreda guerrillawarfarefoughtalong class power could do nothingelse but disband the old army. But in
lines. This iMilitary Opposition" demanded that the Party orderto stayin power withthe threatof civil war mounting,the
by David Kahn
CARLISLE Barracks, Pa. - Intellectualfisticuffsbroke out so they can't withstandany changes on technology.On Wair
on 25 and 26 Aprilat the firstconferenceever held in the doesn't tell you how to cook. It says what cooking is and what
United States on Carl von Clausewitz, widely regardedas the does it serve. Clausewitz is useful because he is not useful.
world's greatestphilosopherof war. Everybodyelse has triedto be useful- and that's whythey're
Militaryhistoriansand majors and colonels who are students outdatedby the next weapons systemthathas come aroundthe
at the U.S. ArmyWar College here disputed whetherClause- corner.Clausewitz deals withideas, not reality,and thisis why
witz' classic work,On War, whichis requiredreadingat many he is eternal."
militaryacademies, has been outdated by moderntechnology. RetortedHandel: "What happens in theoryisn't as important
Clausewitz, a Prussiangeneralstaffofficerwho foughtin the in war as what happens in reality."
Napoleonic wars, died in 1831. While early militarywriters Voices were occasionally raised in the wood-paneled con-
had concentratedon such mattersas lines ofapproachto a battle ferenceroom,and therewere plentyof interruptions and tough-
or encirclingstrategies,Clausewitz emphasized the psycho- soundingremarks. "I want to drop a bomb on Martin," said
logicalaspects ofwar, such as the need fora generalto be firmof WilliamsonMurray,professorof historyat Ohio State. But the
purpose, and the political aspects. His most famous dictum participantssaid the remarkswere just part of academic give-
describes war as the continuationof politics by other means. and-take.
Michael Handel, a professorat the War College and organizer During a free-wheelingdiscussion on politics in war, John
oftheconference,pointedout areas in whichnew weapons have Gooch, a professorat the Universityof Lancaster in England,
affectedClausewitz' theories. "Strategic surprise, which he said he had been told the Soviets were pickingtheirtargetsfora
thoughtnot possible, is now feasible," said Handel. "This also conventional war in Europe not on militarybut on political
makes intelligencemuch more importantthan he saw it as." grounds. When someone contradictedthat, Gooch responded,
Unity of command has also become much more complex, "If you reallythinkthat,that's whyyou're goingto lose thenext
Handel said. war against the Russians - if there is one."
Martinvan Creveld, a professorat the Hebrew Universityin Creveld contendedthatthe Prussian regardedintelligenceas
Jerusalem,declared of Handel's presentation,"I don't agree essential, but other participantsobserved that the problemof
witha singleword he said. If Michael is correct,you'd have to uncertaintyin intelligence,whichClausewitz stressed,remains
add a new dimensionto whatClausewitz wroteevery 10 or 20 or serious,despitemodern-daysatellitephotographyand electron-
25 years, and thiswould mean he'd have a hundreddimensions ic intercepti9n.They pointed to such intelligencefailuresas
and would be entirelyout-of-date,and we wouldn't be sitting Pearl Harbor,theTet offensivein Vietnam,theoverthrowofthe
here today." Shah of Iran, and the Arab surpriseattackon Israel thatstarted
In his own remarks,Creveld said, "Justas cookbooks tellyou the Yom Kippur war in 1973 as demonstratingthat in intelli-
how to cook a chicken,mostbooks on war tell you how to fight, gence as in othermatters,Clausewitz still has much to teach.
OCTOBER 1985 191