Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO,respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now intermediate
Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the devise in
favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will on
page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro
Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the
presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo
Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.

In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his
estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate
children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with
petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs,
namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof
to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:

Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son,
Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly
entitled to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I
cannot deny that I was legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for
reasons and justifications known fully well by them:

Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I
declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and
in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport and represent
myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in
the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;

On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.

On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the
execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage
with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her.

On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to
cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle
exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.

The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.

On June 2, 1982, the COURT OF APPEALS set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the
will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant
to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid except the devise in
favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in
intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.

On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word
"appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The properties so
devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was
granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.

On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated
December 28, 1982.

The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the
probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively
as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to
execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a separate action brought
by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of
the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.

The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on
its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the
presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to
present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449)
and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al.(G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the
admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise.

SUPREME COURT: We agree with the respondents.

The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of
the petitioner null and void.

The general rule is that in

probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:

xxx xxx xxx

... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of
whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba,21
SCRA 428)

The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions
presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.

xxx xxx xxx

 True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the
validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the
testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21
SCRA 1369)

xxx xxx xxx

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all,

the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required
by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will,
is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for
the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings determines and can
determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made
in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. ...
(Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the
testator instituted the petitioner as universal
heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter
how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter
proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.

Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity
of its intrinsic provisions.

Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling
on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed
to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December
26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).

There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin
Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. The
petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the question of whether or not the probate
court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:

This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)

On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in toto.

The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the
petitioner as null and void.

We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):

 We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in the event
of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us
on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste
of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to
a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.
(Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.

We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to
the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a
will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those
made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or
donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter

vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before the testator's death on July 16, 1974,
Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He
also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been
living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection.
He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could
not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo
lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.

It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice of the
Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in
good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.

The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private
respondents:

First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship
between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.

Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status
of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.
****/In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of
the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the
start of the proceedings.

Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife, as
already married, was
an important and specific issue brought by the parties
before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.

Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of

the will, it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her
alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of
August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).

Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the testimony of petitioner on the point.

Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the meretricious relationship of
his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975).

Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a
decisive issue right at the inception of the case.

Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.

When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of adultery
or concubinage',
it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman
she pretended to be.

xxx xxx xxx

3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents respectfully offer the
following analysis:

FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where neither
she nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of course, it maybe
argued that the marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy.
But it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would seem
that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was brought
concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)

SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both single. That would be
in 1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married
the testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30 years in between. During those 30
years, could it be believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her
anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her groom before she married him in
secrecy, especially so when she was already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.

THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration that she
new that the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with already two
children.

FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she
would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom?
That is un-Filipino.

FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, is it possible that
she would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was
respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for
many years) and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?
 Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say the least, inherently
improbable, for they are against the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings
of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to marry whether
or not he was already married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that
would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in
view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to
break off with the deceased during their younger years.

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation
between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very
wordings of the Will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person
with whom he had been living in concubinage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court,
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.

Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes
and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the
will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the
institution is void.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
preterition.

On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss. 1w ph1.t

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this
stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
therein.1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the
meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But
petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted.
And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again
before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a
study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and
bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In
witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein
copied, thus

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not
inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no
se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito
de su derecho a legitima.

Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a
quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada
reciba en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the
word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce
to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35).
Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132. 7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell,
123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus
received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento
referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing
more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid
died intestate. Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se aade limitacion alguna, como
en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado
Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con
preferencia al 817. 10

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta,
es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos
los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad
del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire
inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for
inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the
"Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:

... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna
favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa,
porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto
procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos
forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados,
siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la
jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho
positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad
del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus
terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho
constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el
legislador quiere establecer. 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests
that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to
him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and
separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition
annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas
otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and
void. And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the
conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving
any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima
constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that
disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the
same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil
Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the
form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of
heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive
language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso.23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not
invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited,viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated
as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete
abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution,
would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article
concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817.
Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments,
and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it
must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they
are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in themselves
different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by
a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of
heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the
same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.