Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 481488

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Journal of Criminal Justice

Social ecology and police discretion: The inuence of district crime, cynicism, and
workload on the vigor of police response
James J. Sobol
Buffalo State College, Criminal Justice Department, 1300 Elmwood Ave, Buffalo, New York 14222, United States

a b s t r a c t

This study provided a partial test of Klinger's (1997) postulations on the ecological correlates of police vigor
using data drawn from the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN). Klinger's theory hypothesized that a
form of police behavior he called vigor would vary inversely with district crime levels because ofcers would
be more cynical of residents, view crime as normal, perceive victims as less deserving, and have less time to
devote to calls in high crime districts. Although data limitations precluded a full test, the current study
examined two of the four mediating variables (ofcer cynicism and district workload) and their inuence on
the crime/vigor relationship. Findings revealed variables other than those examined might mediate the effect
of district crime on vigor or the relationship between district crime and vigor might be spurious. Implications
for future research and theoretical development are discussed.
2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction
The understanding of neighborhood effects on police behavior
rests largely on a collection of diverse, and at times, contradictory
empirical associations among neighborhood variables on different
forms of police behavior. To improve this understanding, Klinger
(1997) presented a theoretical model to explain how and why patrol
district crime levels affect police behavior. His theory predicted that
the vigor with which police used their formal authority would vary
inversely with district crime levels because ofcers would be more
cynical of residents, view crime as normal, perceive victims as less
deserving, and have less time to devote to calls in high crime districts
when compared to their colleagues assigned to lower crime districts.1
Klinger's theory highlighted the intersection between police
organizations and ecological environments, and explained why police
behavior might vary. Missing from the current body of research,
however, was any empirical examination that tested Klinger's model.
The absence of research could be attributed to the inability to measure
key constructs at the appropriate levels and the lack of clarity
concerning the appropriate unit of aggregation to study the ecological
inuences on police perceptions and behavior. It is therefore unclear
whether the proposed relationship between district crime and police
vigor are mediated by workload, police cynicism, views of normal
crime and evaluations of a victim's moral worth.
The current study attempted to address these and additional
concerns to provide a partial test of Klinger's postulations on the
This paper was accepted under the Editorship of Kent Joscelyn.
Tel.: +1 716 878 3217; fax: +1 716 878 3240.
E-mail address: soboljj@buffalostate.edu.
ecological correlates of police vigor using data drawn from the Project
on Policing Neighborhoods. This study built on prior studies that
assessed the degree to which the type of neighborhood in which police-
citizen encounters occurred inuenced the manner in which police
functioned.2 The ndings provided preliminary insights into Klinger's
theory and suggested issues that future research ought to consider.
Literature review
Early knowledge about neighborhood effects on police behavior
derived from studies focused on the inuence of neighborhood context
on styles patrol (Brown, 1981; White, 1972; Wilson, 1968). Among the
many questions considered, the most prominent was why the police
selectively enforced the law across different neighborhood contexts
when the behavior of individuals in those areas was virtually the same
(Goldstein, 1960; Rubinstein, 1973; Whyte, 1943). Whyte's (1943)
ethnographic study in Massachusetts had speculated that variation in
police behavior was due to ofcer perceptions of local and societal
standards and their desire to maintain close ties with neighborhood
residents (p. 136). Other studies had reported that neighborhood
settings shaped police priorities and ofcer expectations and, in turn,
accounted for the behavioral differences across physical space (Reiss &
Bordua, 1967; Werthman & Piliavin, 1967).
Using observational and aggregate-level data, additional analyses
empirically examined the neighborhood-police behavior nexus. It had
been reported that the racial and socioeconomic status of neighbor-
hoods as well as levels of reported crime explained police discretionary
actions. For example, using observational data from the Police Services
Study (PSS), Smith (1986) compared ve different measures of police
behavior and eleven neighborhood characteristics. He reported that

0047-2352/$ see front matter 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2010.04.017
482 J.J. Sobol / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 481488
patrol ofcers were more likely to issue citations, make arrests, and
engage in coercive and abusive behavior in minority and racially mixed
neighborhoods. He concluded that the propensity of police to exercise
coercive authority is not inuenced by the race of the individual suspect
per se but rather the racial composition of the area in which the
encounter occurs (p. 332). These results require cautious interpreta-
tion, however, since Smith failed to control for the type and severity of
the offense. His ndings might be spurious because ofcers most likely
arrested, used force, and led a report when the offense was serious and
there was criminal evidence of wrongdoing (e.g., Smith & Klein, 1984;
Smith, Visher, & Davidson, 1984; c.f., Sun, Payne, & Wu, 2008).
Other studies considered the crime rate in areas where ofcers
worked as another predictor of police behavior. Kania and Mackey's
(1977) ecological study reported that greater levels or threats of
violence against the police led to more instances of police force. Two
other studies found a relationship between a jurisdictions level of
violence and police aggressiveness and force (Geller & Karales, 1981;
Worden, 1995). In another study, it had been reported that ofcers who
perceived situations or areas as dangerous might be more aggressive
and likely to use coercive tactics to handle suspects (Fyfe, 1980). Fyfe
observed a signicant correlation between police shootings and a city's
violent crime rate, but in a later study, reported that internal factors,
such as management, administrative policies, and supervisory styles,
accounted for considerable variation in police shootings (Fyfe, 1988).3
Other scholars posited that neighborhoods with more crime and
deviance levels might prompt leniency as opposed to aggression
(Stark, 1987). Stark speculated that patrol ofcers would ignore some
violations in high-crime neighborhoods because of their cynical
perceptions toward citizens and victims who reside there. A number
of studies had presented empirical evidence consistent with Stark's
thesis. For instance, neighborhood crime rates inuenced police non-
recording behaviors for certain offenses in higher-crime neighbor-
hoods when other variables were taken into consideration (Brooks,
1986; Slovak, 1986; Smith, 1986; Warner, 1997; Worden, 1989).
Another study reported that police responded in different ways to
child maltreatment cases, and that the race of the families was a
signicant predictor of police decisions not to invoke the law (Willis &
Wells, 1988). Reports of serious child abuse cases were signicantly
less likely among African American families than they were among
Caucasian families.
An additional study provided evidence of police underreporting.
Liska and Chamlin (1984) reported that arrest rates for non-Whites
decreased if they were residentially segregated into distinct neigh-
borhood (Liska & Chamlin, 1984). Liska and Chamlin (1984) argued
that benign neglect occurred because both Black victims and patrol
ofcers viewed Black-on-Black crimes as a personal matter, thus
ofcers were less inclined to take ofcial action in the form of arresting
or writing a report. In this context, there could be less pressure on
police to address criminal activity because non-White victims might
fail to report crime or follow-up with police investigations.
The contradictory empirical ndings in the literature reviewed are
likely due to several factors, including data limitations, the units of
aggregation studied (e.g., neighborhoods, districts, city) and most
prominently, the lack of systematic theory. Much of the research had
presumed ofcers made decisions based on some neighborhood
characteristic without identifying the causal mechanisms for the
relationship or offering any explicit mention of the nature and
direction of the expected association. Theory guiding the research
was, for the most part, implicit (Bernard & Engel, 2001; Bernard &
Ritti, 1990). Klinger's theory attempted to address this matter by
illuminating the link between district crime, ofcer perception, and
behavior.
Klinger's theory has deep roots in organizational theory and is
grounded in the negotiated-order perspective (Strauss, 1978; Strauss,
Schatzman, Ehrlich, Bucher, & Sabslin, 1963). This perspective
assumes that organizations are comprised of semi-autonomous
subgroups loosely connected to formal organizational rules (e.g., see
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Weick, 1969). Those using the negotiated
order approach to explain behavior of individuals in organizations
perceive behavior as a social rather than a formal rule-driven process.
Klinger maintains that ofcers operate largely unencumbered by
direct outside inuence and devise informal workgroup rules to
negotiate order within their district (p. 286). Within these work-
groups lay informal tacit agreements and unofcial rules that govern
police action, which operate largely outside the realm of police
supervision. One important workgroup goal is to process cases
efciently and to deal with the problems of crime and deviance in a
timely fashion. Variation in levels of crime and deviance across patrol
districts means that ofcers have different work to perform, which
Klinger's theory predicts, leads to differences in four factors that frame
police negotiation of workgroup rules (Klinger, 1997). According to
the theory, ofcers assigned to high crime districts will be less
vigorous than ofcers assigned to lower crime districts because they
would: (1) be more cynical about district residents; (2) view crime as
normal; (3) perceive victims as less deserving; and (4) have less time
to devote to all calls equally.
Police vigor
Klinger had stated that the application of formal legal authority by
police ofcers was similar to Donald Black's (1976, 1980) work and
the notion that law varies in quantity. Klinger conceptualized vigor as
the degree to which police ofcers extend their formal legal
authority in encounters with citizens (p. 279). Vigor and leniency
are opposite ends of the formal authority continuum (Klinger, 1997,
p. 280) and arrests, writing reports and conducting investigations are
examples of formal legal authority. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
the formal legal authority applied by police ofcers could be rank-
ordered, and examined as such.
Police cynicism
According to Klinger's theory, district level deviance is presumed
to affect levels of police cynicism about the utility of a vigorous
response for several reasons. Ofcers become cynical when they
encounter citizens who do not cooperate and when they see the
criminal justice system fail to remedy deviance. The manifestation of
this is when ofcers see previously arrested perpetrators on the street.
With the exception of Sobol (2010), no study directly examined
whether district crime affected levels of police cynicism. He
speculated that cynical ofcers might not devote extensive energy
or time to encounters with citizens in high crime districts, especially
with the perception that those citizens were uncooperative (Sobol,
2010). His research reported a modest positive association between
police cynicism and patrol district violent crime rates. Though his
research contributed to understanding police perceptions of citizens,
it did not examine the direct ecological effects or the mediating effects
of cynicism on police vigor (but see Sobol, 2008).
Normal crime
The concept of normal crime assumes legal actors base their
decisions on the status of the individual as well as on the patrolled
area. According to some studies, cases involving lower status clients
minimal attention because those individuals resided in areas
perceived as having blemished characters, thus less needful of law
enforcement (Sudnow, 1964). If patrol ofcers dened deviant acts as
normal when district deviance increased, only the most serious
deviant acts would garner vigorous police intervention. A loitering
drunk, a group of teenagers congregating on a corner, or loud music
emanating from an apartment or low-income housing might incur
 J.J. Sobol / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 481488
less vigor in high crime areas because those actions were more
normal compared to those same actions in low crime areas.
Victim deservedness
Several studies used the concept of deservedness to explain the way
in which clients were processed in different settings (Bittner, 1967;
Lipsky, 1980; Roth, 1972). Bittner (1967) discussed citizen worthiness
in his study of skid-row, while Lipsky (1980) posited street-level
bureaucrats assessed the moral worth of the clientele with whom
they had contact and might employ worthiness when the end point of
intervention was not clearly dened. Reiss and Bordua (1967) also
observed that police ofcers placed citizens into two categories and
justied their actions based on citizens perceived to be deserving of
punishment and those who were not. Finally, Herbert's (1998)
research argued ofcers might justify force or bias to the extent that
they could claim some people were more (or less) deserving). Such
classications might spill over into particular neighborhoods where
ofcers stereotype particular places as deserving of vigorous enforce-
ment based on their understanding of crime rates and the people who
reside there.
Workload
Some scholars have argued that patrol ofcer behavior is an
inevitable adaptation to situations of excessive demands (Bayley,
1985; Whitaker, 1982). Balancing resources with workload could lead
to variations in the execution of particular tasks (Lipsky, 1980). In a
district with substantial crime and scarce resources, only serious
matters might receive exclusive priority. Therefore, workload is likely
to inuence the workgroup mandate to regulate and control the police
response to criminal and deviant conduct. One might expect more
vigorous police activity in low-workload areas because ofcers may
devote more time, energy, and resources to both minor and major
problems, compared to those ofcers assigned to high-workload areas.
The present research
Although past research provided some guidance on the relation-
ship between neighborhood context and police behavior, the ndings
were inconsistent. As noted earlier, the lack of a systematic theory of
how and why police behavior varied across physical space was the
impetus for Klinger's (1997) theory of social ecology. The intent of the
current study was to provide the rst empirical test of Klinger's
postulations on the ecological correlates of police vigor.
While data limitations precluded a full test of Klinger's model, the
current study measured two of the four mediating variables and their
inuence on vigor, including whether police cynicism and district
workload mediated the crime/vigor relationship.4 The study hypothe-
sized that district workload would lead to greater resource constraints,
and that cynicism and workload, collectively, would create workgroup
rules that promoted less vigor in high crime districts. For this inquiry,
district workgroups consisted of those ofcers working in the same
district who shared many of the same work experiences.
Data and methods
The current study used data from four sources originally collected
by the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN), including system-
atic social observation, in person interviews with ofcers, census data,
and police crime records. The Project on Policing Neighborhoods
(POPN) was conducted in two cities (Indianapolis, Indiana and St.
Petersburg, Florida) in the summers of 1996 and 1997, respectively
(for a detailed description of POPN and the research sites, see
Mastrofski, Parks, Reiss, Worden, DeJong, & Snipes, 1998.) The
Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) and the St. Petersburg Police
483
Department (SPPD) were in the process of implementing community
policing at the time of the study. Ofcers in Indianapolis worked in an
organizational environment that stressed traditional aggressive
enforcement (e.g., trafc and suspicion stops, drug enforcement, and
arrests) to enhance quality of life in the neighborhoods. Ofcers in St.
Petersburg utilized problem solving to improve police service and
citizen satisfaction (DeJong, Mastrofski, & Parks, 2001; Parks,
Mastrofski, DeJong, & Gray, 1999).
Systematic social observation
Trained eld observers accompanied ofcers assigned to selected
beats within particular patrol districts throughout a matched sample of
work shifts (see Parks et al., 1999 for further detail concerning the POPN
sampling strategy). Observations occurred across four districts in
Indianapolis and three districts in St. Petersburg. The POPN study
sample observed areas within districts with higher levels of distress and,
therefore, higher expected levels of police activity. Twelve beats in each
city were selected with reference to their scores on an index of
socioeconomic distress in order to obtain variation in service conditions
for police. Such bias was intentional and consistent with neighborhood
selection in earlier studies (Black & Reiss, 1967; Reiss, 1971; Whitaker,
1982).
A minimum of 28 shifts were observed in each of the 24 study
beats. Altogether, eld researchers observed three hundred twenty-
two different patrol ofcers (194 in Indianapolis and 128 in
St. Petersburg) for nearly 6,000 hours with nearly 12,000 police-
citizen interactions. Citizens were crime victims, witnesses, service
recipients, or suspects. The selection criterion for the current study
included all non-trafc suspects with whom the police had contact.
Interviews
In addition to observation, interviews were completed with nearly
all patrol ofcers in the two departments. The interviews included 398
of 426 patrol ofcers in Indianapolis, and 240 of 246 patrol ofcers in
St. Petersburg. Interviews consisted of mixed questions posed by
trained interviewers not involved in the eld observations. Survey
questions obtained information on ofcers district assignments, the
length of time they were in that district, and personal characteristics
of the ofcers, their occupational outlooks, work experiences, and
perceptions of citizens.
For analytical purposes, data from the interviews were merged
with observation data of ofcers having had contact with citizens
identied as suspects. Ofcers assigned to the district for less than one
year were eliminated from the analysis in order to concentrate on
ofcers with the greatest familiarity with levels of crime and deviance
and district work rules that developed among ofcers assigned there.
The nal data le consisted of 1,555 suspects with whom 226 ofcers
had contact based on all study variables that had non-missing data
and sufcient variation for multivariate modeling. One hundred sixty
nine cases were omitted from the analysis due to missing ofcer
survey and observational data; another 157 were removed because
ofcer assignments to the district were for less than one year. The
elimination of these cases did not result in any discernible differences
in reported coefcients or signicance levels.
Measures
Dependent variable
The absence of research examining Klinger's (1997) vigor concept
could be the result of lack of a precise denition of vigor on which to
build a clear ranking of police behavior. A single rank structure for vigor
is made complicated because much of the [ecological] theory may well
be applicable for understanding spatial variations in dimensions of
484 J.J. Sobol / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 481488
police behavior besides formal authority [emphasis added] (Klinger,
1997, p. 280). For the purposes of the current study, vigor represented
the degree to which ofcers used their formal legal authority by
responding to the conduct of citizens within the framework of the state.
Borrowing from research in legal sociology (Baumgartner, 1999;
Black, 1976) and studies that quantied police behavior beyond arrest
or force dichotomies (Brown, Novak, & Frank, 2009; Engle, Sobol, &
Worden, 2000; Klinger, 1996; Myers, 2002; Sobol, 2008; Sun & Payne,
2004; Terrill, 2001; Worden & Myers, 1999), ve mutually exclusive
categories of behavior formed the police vigor measure.5 Behaviors
included in the measure sufciently discriminated among various
courses of police action and allowed examination of the amount of
formal legal authority ofcers applied to situations where each decision
they made ranged from more (vigorous) to less (lenient). Ordinally
ranked, the categories included: (1) no action/release; (2) suggest,
persuade, request and negotiate; (3) command and threaten the suspect
to do something; (4) interrogation and search; and (5) arrest. The
higher category of vigor is likely to bring suspects and their conduct to
the attention of other agencies or institutions, which often resulted in
greater legal consequences under the law. The percentage of encounters
in which each action represented the highest level of vigor used by
ofcers was as follows: no action (20.1 percent); suggest/persuade
(6.9 percent); command and threaten (6.8 percent); interrogate and
search (46.0 percent); and arrest (20.1 percent). The information below
offers further explanation and description of these categories.
If an ofcer asked, advised, or attempted to get the suspect to do
something, it was coded as suggested, persuaded, requested, or
negotiated. The denition of a command was a statement by an ofcer
in the form of an order (e.g., wait here, drop the gun, leave her
alone). A threat involved a command followed by a specic
consequence for not complying (e.g., drop the knife or else you are
going to get pepper-sprayed, leave here now, or else you are going to
be arrested). For this study, commands and threats were collapsed into
a single category.
Actions that constituted more vigor than a command or threat were
interrogation and search since the ofcer took the next formal step and
temporarily deprived persons of their liberty by using legal authority to
issue a citation or refer for future prosecution. Unlike a custodial arrest,
however, a citizen detained for search or interrogation was generally
free to go after the ofcer completed those tasks. A non-custodial arrest
was obviously not a consensual police-citizen encounter because no
reasonable person would feel free to decline. In other words, such a
person was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and the
ofcer is exerting more formal authority (e.g., vigor). Ofcers who
interrogate and use search tactics to gather information were formally
intervening in the lives of a suspect to a much greater extent than simply
negotiating or commanding the suspect to do something.
Interrogation included those instances when the ofcer ques-
tioned a suspect in order to gain information that established the
suspects or their colleagues involvement in unlawful activity. Search
included questioning the citizen and searching or frisking the citizen,
the citizen's possessions, or the area immediately around the suspect.
For this study, interrogation and search were collapsed into a single
category since both were common practices utilized by ofcers during
investigations of incidents and might precede a more vigorous
response such as arrest. The study's design excluded trafc cases
and included only suspects with whom the police had contact,
thereby resulting in few instances of citations. For analytical purposes,
citation was merged with arrest simply because there were only
thirty-seven suspects cited in the sample.
Independent variables
District crime levels
For this study, the crime rate measure used Uniform Crime Report
data for the violent crimes of murder and non-negligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault for 1996 in Indianapolis
and 1997 in St. Petersburg. This measure was calculated for each
district based on census data population estimates, standardized by
1,000 residents.6
Police ofcer cynicism
The current study used three Likert items to measure patrol ofcer
attitudes as proxy measures to capture their level of cynicism towards
residents in the district they were assigned. The cynicism scale
summed three items obtained from the POPN survey data set, which
asked ofcers: How many of the citizens in your beat would call the
police if they saw something suspicious; How many of the citizens
in your beat would provide information about a crime if they knew
something and were asked about it by the police; and How many of
the citizens in your beat are willing to work with the police to try to
solve neighborhood problems. The response options for each of these
items were from Most (1) to None (4).7 High scores reected a
perception by ofcers that citizens were uncooperative, representing
a more cynical outlook. Principal component factor analysis conrmed
that these three items loaded on one factor with an Eigenvalue = 1.97
in explaining 65.8 percent of the variance. The Cronbach alpha score
indicated acceptable reliability ( = .74).
Workload
Greater workload could lead to limited resources, which, in turn,
might compel ofcers to nd ways to allocate and prioritize their time
more efciently. The measure of workload for this study considered
the amount of time ofcers had available during their observed shifts
by assessing the percentage of their time that was directed activity
(e.g., assigned time) versus non-directed activity (e.g., unassigned
time). For this study, workload was another deviance driven indicator
of behavior because patrol district workgroup rules prioritized calls
for service as levels of deviance rose and resources became scarce.
Since any activity or encounter turns on how it began (e.g., at the
prompting of a dispatcher or supervisor or self-initiated by the
ofcer), the percentage of time when the ofcers activity and
encounter was assigned or directed across different shifts during the
course of the observational period reected how much work there
was in the district. One might infer that ofcers with less time to
themselves (e.g., unassigned time) had more work to do.
Derived in large part from two studies (DeJong et al., 2001; Engel &
Worden, 2003), the present study created the workload measure
(percentage of assigned time) by summing the total activity and
encounter time, the total assigned activity and assigned encounter
time, and computing the quotient. The resulting measure reected the
percentage of time that ofcers had unassigned during their observed
shift. A higher percentage of unassigned time indicated less work.
Control variables
This analysis included a number of control variables consistently
found to be predictors of various forms of police behavior in prior
studies (e.g., Engel & Silver, 2001; Engle, Sobol, & Worden, 2000;
Mastrofski, Reisig, & McCluskey 2002; Smith & Visher, 1981; Weitzer,
2000; Worden & Shepard, 1996; Terrill, 2005; Terrill & Mastrofski,
2002). Variables used in the analysis included suspect characteristics,
such as gender, race, approximate age, and approximate wealth;
whether the suspect was under the inuence of drugs or alcohol the
suspect's emotional state and whether the suspect was disrespectful
to the responding ofcer.
The analysis included the length of time the ofcer was in one
particular district since it likely inuenced perceptions of citizens and
district problems. Analysis also incorporated the level of concentrated
disadvantage in the districts where the encounter occurred due to
the likely effect neighborhood structural characteristics might have
on police behavior. Borrowing from Sun et al. (2008), a four-item
weighted factor score, including the percent poor, percent unemployed,
 J.J. Sobol / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 481488 485

Table 1
Descriptive statistics for study variables

Variable Hypothesized Effect Denition

Vigor Level of Vigor: 1 = no action; 2 = suggest, persuade, negotiate; 3 = command and threaten; 4 = interrogate and
search; 5 = cite and arrest.
District Crime - Violent crime rate per 1,000 District residents
Discretionary Time + Time free of assignments from dispatch or supervisors (percentage)
Police Cynicism - Scale ranging between 3-12. Created by summing 3 separate items (1 = most; 2 = some; 3 = few; 4 = none)
How many of the citizens in beat would call the police if they saw something suspicious.
How many of the citizens in beat would provide information about a crime if they knew something and were
asked about it by the police.
How many of the citizens in beat are willing to work with the police to try to solve neighborhood problems
Years in District +/- Number of years observed ofcer has worked in district
Concentrated Disadvantage +/- Percentage unemployed plus percentage below 50 percent poverty plus percent female-headed households plus
percent Black
Site + 1 = Indianapolis; 0 = St. Petersburg
Suspect Characteristics
Gender + 1 = male, 0 = female
Race + 1 = non-White, 0 = White
Age - 0 = not elderly, below 60, 1 = elderly, 60 and above
Wealth - 1 = chronic poverty, 2 = low, 3 = middle, 4 = above middle
Determined by the citizen's appearance and dress, property and possessions, as well as the information provided
by the citizen about his or her possessions (e.g., job, home, other resources)
Drug/Alcohol + 1 = yes, 0 = no
Citizen displays indication of alcohol or drug use, including the smell of alcohol on the breath, slurred speech,
impaired motor skills, or unconsciousness
Emotional + 1 = yes, 0 = no
Citizen unable to perceive situations as a reasonable person would or to control one's emotions and actions
Disrespect + 1 = yes, 0 = no
Citizen displays disrespect to the individual or authority of the police ofcer
Seriousness + 1 = no crime or disorder, 2 = public disorders and victimless crimes, 3 = minor property crime and other
misdemeanors, 4 = major property crime and minor violence, 5 = major violent crime
Conict + 1 = none, 2 = calm verbal, 3 = agitated verbal, 4 = threatened assault, 5 = assault.
Level of conict between disputing parties
Flee + 1 = yes, suspect ees; 0 = all other
Did the suspect ee the scene of the encounter?
Weapon + 1 = yes, 0 = no
Did citizen have any sort of weapon on his or her person or within jump and reach?
Expects Violence + 1 = yes, 0 = all other
Was there any indication of anticipated violence before the encounter began?

percent female-headed families, and percent Black, made up the violent crime rate) should relate to the mediating variables (cynicism
concentrated disadvantage measure (e.g., Sampson, Raudenbush, & and district workload). Second, the independent variable (district
Earls, 1997). The city in which the incidents occurred were controlled violent crime) should relate to the dependent variable (vigor). Third,
because Indianapolis ofcers stressed aggressiveness and a get-tough there should be a relationship between the mediator and the
policy; whereas, St. Petersburg's approach to crime emphasized solving dependent variable. Fourth, the signicant relationship observed
problems and community organizing. Thus, it was expected that between the independent variable and the dependent variable under
Indianapolis ofcers should be more vigorous compared to St.
Petersburg ofcers.
The multivariate analysis included several legal controls presumed
to inuence vigor. The severity of the alleged citizen behavior that Table 2
Descriptive statistics of study variables
prompted the encounter, the level of conict between the victim and
the suspect, whether the suspect ed the scene, whether there existed Variables Range Mean Standard Deviation
potential for danger (weapon present), and whether the ofcer Vigor 1-5 3.38 1.40
expected violence prior to encountering the suspect might all be District Crime 12.50-25.68 20.76 3.31
considered possible inuences on police vigor. Table 1 provides an Discretionary Time 0.10-0.49 0.24 0.50
overview of each of the study variables, how those variables were Police Cynicism 3-12 6.05 1.87
Years in District 1-25 5.74 3.85
coded as well as the hypothesized relationship to vigor (+, -, +/- signs Concentrated Disadvantage -1.19-2.17 0.36 0.93
denote positive, negative and underdetermined directions of inu- Site 0-1 0.46 0.49
ence, respectively). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each of Suspect Characteristics
the variables used in the analysis. Gender 0-1 0.75 0.43
Race 0-1 0.63 0.48
Age 0-1 5.08 1.45
Analysis and ndings Wealth 1-4 2.26 0.56
Drug/Alcohol 0-1 0.27 0.45
Both bivariate and multivariate analyses were conducted in this Emotional 0-1 0.04 0.19
Disrespect 0-1 0.11 0.31
research. The former focused on the relationships between ofcer
Legal
cynicism, workload, district violent crime rate and police vigor. Seriousness 1-5 2.30 2.17
Multivariate analyses were performed following Baron and Kenny's Conict 1-5 1.22 0.67
(1986) recommendation to test for mediation (e.g., see also Murphy & Flee 0-1 0.03 0.18
Tyler, 2008 for use of this strategy). In order to have mediation, four Weapon 0-1 0.03 0.19
Expects Violence 0-1 0.09 0.28
conditions should exist. First, the independent variable (district
486 J.J. Sobol / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 481488

Table 3 Table 4
Correlation matrix for study variables (n= 1,555) Ordered logistic regression predicting vigor and testing mediating effects of cynicism
and district workload
Variable Vigor District Crime Police Cynicism Workload
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Vigor 1.00
District Crime 0.09** 1.00 Variable Coef Odds Coef Odds Coef Odds
Police Cynicism -0.19 0.15** 1.00 Ratio Ratio Ratio
Workload -0.04 -0.16** 0.38 1.00
District Crime 0.04** 1.04 0.04** 1.04 0.03 1.03
* p b .05, ** p b .01 (two-tailed test). (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Discretionary -- -1.14 0.32 -0.89 0.41
Time (0.66) (0.71)
Police Cynicism -- -0.01 0.98 -0.03 0.97
study should disappear after controlling for the mediator if, in fact, (0.03) (0.02)
there was a mediating effect (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Years in District -- -- 0.00 1.00
Table 3 reports the bivariate correlations between study variables (0.07)
and shows that vigor signicantly correlated with district crime Concentrated -- -- -0.01 0.98
Disadvantage (0.05)
(r = .09) and district crime signicantly correlated with ofcer cynicism
Site -- -- -0.37** 0.69
(r = .15) and workload (r = -.16). In separate analyses controlling for (0.10)
city, (results not shown in Table 3) the data indicated signicant Gender -- -- -0.16 0.85
organizational differences. Indianapolis ofcers were signicantly more (0.11)
vigorous in high crime districts (r = .09). Vigor also signicantly Race -- -- 0.06 1.06
(0.11)
correlated with workload (r = -.11), while district crime signicantly Age -- -- -0.35 0.70
correlated with cynicism (r = .37). In contrast, only workload and (0.29)
district crime were correlated in St. Petersburg (r = -.26). Such Wealth -- -- 0.04 1.04
differences are rather signicant and point to the likely role of different (0.08)
Drug/Alcohol -- -- 0.15 1.16
enforcement policies in both departments and the manner in which
(0.09)
organizational factors differentially affect vigor. The inter-correlations Emotional -- -- 0.18 1.19
among the remaining independent variables were examined (results (0.13)
not shown). None of the correlation coefcients exceeded .50. Disrespect -- -- 0.60*** 1.82
The dependent variable is a ve level ordinal measure of police (0.15)
Seriousness -- -- 0.29*** 1.34
behavior ranging from no action to arrest. Ordered logistic regression
(0.04)
is appropriate when the dependent variable is ordinal and the effects Conict -- -- 0.01 1.01
of the independent variable are constant across all levels of the (0.07)
dependent variable (Agresti, 2002; Long & Freese, 2006; McKelvey & Flee -- -- 1.98*** 7.24
(0.30)
Zavoina, 1975; Scott, Goldberg, & Mayo, 1997). The parallel lines
Weapon -- -- 0.58** 1.79
assumption is not violated in all estimated models, thereby making (0.26)
ordered logistic the correct estimation technique. Long (1997) Expects -- -- 0.28 1.32
suggested that reporting signicance levels of the logit coefcients Violence (0.19)
offered little, and a better approach was to interpret the ways in which Chi Square 9.15** 11.13** 208.08***
Pseudo R2 .002 .002 .048
the parameters corresponded to changes in probabilities or odds
ratios. An odds ratio greater than one denoted a positive effect on the * p b .05, ** p b .01, *** p b .001, n = 1,555. Table entries include ordered logistic
regression coefcients and standard errors in parentheses.
odds of a more vigorous response, and an odds ratio of less than one
indicated the odds of a vigorous police response declining.
Table 4 displays the results from the ordered logistic regression compared to the odds against those not eeing. The odds of a
equations estimated following Baron and Kenny's (1986) recommen- vigorous police response was 79 percent greater if the suspect had a
dation. Step 1 shows a signicant relationship between violent crime weapon within jump and reach (odds ratio = 1.79), and 34 percent
rate and vigor, while step 2 shows that this direct effect is not mediated greater if the offense was serious (odds ratio = 1.34). Such ndings
by ofcer cynicism and district workload since district crime still has a were consistent with studies reporting that ofcers were more
signicant and positive effect on vigor. This nding directly contrasted inclined to invoke their formal legal authority when there was an
the theory tested. Whereas the theory predicted an inverse relationship ofcer safety issue (Fyfe, Klinger, & Flavin, 1997; Sun et al., 2008).
between district crime and vigor, the ndings revealed the relationship The ndings presented here involved district-level variables (crime
as positive and signicant. Once seriousness of the offense and other and workload) in a citizen-level analysis. Since there are many citizens
controls entered into the model, however, the signicant district crime encountered in each of the seven study districts, the sample size of
effect on vigor disappeared. One interpretation could be that other district-level predictors inated to the sample size of the citizen-level
variables (other than ofcer cynicism and district workload) might variables, making it easier to reject the null hypothesis. That is, the
mediate the effect of district crime on vigor, or the relationship may be signicance of the variables may be overestimated and the results of
spurious.8 the study should be interpreted with caution.
Several situational and suspect control variables were signicantly
related to vigor in the direction hypothesized. As shown in Table 4, the Discussion and conclusion
odds of a vigorous police response increased by 82 percent (odds
ratio = 1.82) if the suspect was disrespectful to ofcers compared to Prior research showed that police behavior varied across different
being deferential. This nding was consistent with others who neighborhood contexts. Much of this research was not guided by any a
reported disrespectful suspects were signicantly more likely to priori theoretical expectation of why particular neighborhood ecolog-
have action taken against them (Engle et al., 2000; Worden & Shepard, ical variables were analyzed, nor what the signicant neighborhood
1996; but see Klinger, 1994). As previous scholarship indicated effects might mean. The main purpose of this study was to provide the
(Micucci & Gomme, 2005; Smith et al., 1984; Smith & Visher, 1981; rst empirical test of Klinger's (1997) theory of social ecology that
Worden, 1989), suspects who ed the scene saw the odds of a identied district crime levels as a vital precursor of how police
vigorous police response increase by more than 600 percent ofcer's perceive citizens and how formal legal authority applied.
 J.J. Sobol / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 481488
It was hypothesized that police would be less vigorous in districts
with higher levels of crime because ofcers would be more cynical
about the effectiveness of vigorous police action. Workload and
greater resource constrains were also predicted to reduce the capacity
of the workgroup to deal with problems equally, thereby leading to
more leniency as district crime levels increased.
Consistent with the theory, the bivariate results indicated that ofcers
were more cynical in high crime districts, although contrary to
theoretical expectations, the bivariate ndings also showed that vigor
increased with district crime rate. Interestingly, departmental differences
suggested that different enforcement priorities in both departments
might affect the vigor with which police used their formal authority.
Perhaps reecting their more aggressive and get-tough police strategy
(DeJong et al., 2001; Parks et al., 1999), bivariate results indicated that
Indianapolis ofcers were signicantly more vigorous and cynical in high
crime areas (see also Fyfe, 1988; White, 2001).
In order to test the meditating effect of cynicism and district
workload, a series of multivariate regression equations analyzed the
entire sample (n = 1,555). Controlling for relevant factors, the ndings
showed little support for the mediating effect of cynicism and district
workload on the crime/vigor relationship. One possible explanation is
that other variables could mediate the direct effect of district crime on
vigor, although it is also possible that the results are spurious.
Although this was the rst systematic empirical analysis of
Klinger's theory of social ecology, several limitations existed. As
mentioned, one of the primary limitations dealt with the unit of
aggregation for this study. The patrol district was the focus of police
cynicism levels, workload, and level of crime and deviance. Although
Klinger provided several reasons why police behavior might not vary
markedly across patrol districts in lower spatial levels (e.g., beats,
rather than districts), some of the null ndings reported here might be
due to the large district ecological measures. Future research might
explore patrol beats, census tract areas, or block levels. Since crime
hot spot locations exist in many neighborhoods, the unique crime
patterns within these locations might inuence ofcer attitudes and
behavior. Simply presuming the district is the fulcrum for the
development of ofcer work rules ignores the impact that intra-
district variation in crime and deviance may have on police
perceptions and their approach to the job. Disaggregating ecological
level correlates down to the smaller spatial unit may provide
information on whether ecological conditions within those locations
differentially inuence ofcer attitudes and behavior. Future research
might also consider additional aggregates across multiple jurisdic-
tions to provide a better test of the theory and provide more variation
across critical ecological measures.
Second, the ndings presented here may be a product of the way in
which key theoretical variables were operationalized. The cynicism
variable might be less than optimal for a test of Klinger's theory
because the items used to construct this measure were adapted from
the POPN survey data set that asked general questions about ofcer
perceptions of residents willingness to work with them to solve
neighborhood problems. These measures might not adequately
characterize cynicism and alternative measures might yield different
results. It would be advantageous for future research to consider
ofcer perceptions of criminal justice system failings since Klinger
contended that indicators of criminal justice system failure caused
cynicism.
A third limitation was the problem of unmeasured mediating
variables. Measures of ofcer perceptions of victim deservedness and
normal crime were not available in the POPN data set, thereby making
this a partial test of Klinger's theory. While difcult to measure, the
inclusion of such concepts would provide a more complete test of
Klinger's theory and the mediators presumed to affect the crime and
police vigor relationship.
To summarize, attention should be given to four primary research
areas: (1) multi-level modeling to estimate ecological measures in
487
combination with individual level data more appropriately; (2) the
renement of occupational outlook and outcome measures; (3) the
examination of and comparison between different ecological corre-
lates from smaller units of aggregation; and (4) the use of a research
design with data collection intended to measure key theoretical
constructs across multiple departments with different ecological and
organizational conditions. Recent research has begun to consider the
ecological correlates on police attitudes (Sobol, 2010), and various
forms of police behavior (Terrill & Reisig, 2003). The line of inquiry
established here will hopefully stimulate improved empirical tests and
theoretical advancements in future studies that examine the complex
relationship between neighborhood context and police behavior.
Acknowledgements
Grant No. 95-IJ-CX-0071 from the National Institute of Justice
supported data for this analysis. Opinions or points of view expressed
in the article do not necessarily represent the ofcial positions or
policies of the National Institute of Justice or the U.S. Department of
Justice. The author wishes to thank Scott W. Phillips and Ivan Y. Sun
for their helpful and insightful comments and suggestions during the
preparation of this manuscript.
Notes
1. There are some qualications, however, since the theory mainly applies to
patrol ofcers and may not apply accurately to supervisors (e.g., Lieutenants and
Sergeants). The theory may also be less applicable to nonurban, state and federal
police ofcers due mainly to the emphasis on geographic location and the manner in
which police work is organizationally structured.
2. One of the limitations of Klinger's (1997) theory is that it does not specify the
size of an area that makes up the ecological environment that affects police behavior. It
is possible, however, that a police district is too large adequately to examine the
important social process that might inuence police activity. Data limitations for this
study do not allow one to test the theory at a smaller level of aggregation. This partial
test of Klinger and the role of district level correlates still contributed to our
understanding of police behavior and established an empirical foundation from upon
which future research might build.
3. See also White (2001) who examined the impact of administrative policy on
police shootings using interrupted time series analyses and twenty-three years of
shooting data. He reported that formal administrative policy might be a more
signicant control over deadly force compared to the personal philosophies of the
Chief or Commissioner.
4. From a theoretical point of view, X (district violent crime rate) is hypothesized
to be causally prior to Z (police cynicism and district workload), which is hypothesized
to be causally prior to Y (police vigor).
5. It is important to note that this measurement approach assumes that an ofcer
also considers such actions to range along a continuum, with each action representing
more or less in terms of the amount of formal authority which is invoked. It is plausible
that this measure imposes ordinality on the measurement of vigor when in fact,
ofcers might not view it as such.
6. Two matters are relevant and worth considering about this particular measure.
First, the homicide rate might be a better measure of a district's level of crime because
ofcial crime rates (UCR data) measure police behavior in the form of taking reports
(Black, 1970, 1971). Since the dependent variable in this study is a measure of police
behavior (e.g., vigor), and the independent variable is violent crime rate, conation
between the independent and dependent variable is possible. However, because there
were so few homicides across the seven districts in both cities, this study opted to use
the violent crime rate. Second, using crime data for only one year might present an
inaccurate image of district crime levels and that an average of the violent crime rate
over a period might be a more powerful indicator of how the crime rate contributed to
police cynicism. Data limitations precluded using previous years crime data, though
such a concern may be inconsequential since crime patterns have been reported to be
relatively stable and constant (Bursik, 1986; Stark, 1987; Whyte, 1943).
7. Paoline (2001) used the same items in his analysis examining whether
occupational attitudes are representative of the traditional police culture or more
fragmented. While he calls his index cooperation, it is a measure that assessed
whether ofcers perceive citizens in a favorable light, with implications for inuencing
ofcer conduct.
8. Other multivariate models (not shown) were examined and were not able to
improve on the model displayed in the text. Slight differences were uncovered with
alternative model specications, although, no appreciable increase in the amount of
variation explained is obtained, nor were any of the variables markedly different in
terms of strength and signicance.
488 J.J. Sobol / Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010) 481488
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