[ G.R. No.
666, January 14, 1902 ] the dates fixed in the treaty of Paris as the starting point,
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF J. GARCIA
BOSQUE FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF
LAW IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The cession of the Philippine Archipelago having been
agreed upon by the parties to the treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, the compulsory subjection of the
subjects of the ceding power to the new sovereign followed
as a logical consequence. The status, of these subjects was
not uniform, as in addition to the natives there were others
who were merely residents but who, equally with the
natives, had interests and rights inherent in the nationality
of the territory. With respect to these the special agreement
contained in article 9 was established, by virtue of which it
was agreed to accord them the right of electing to leave the
country, thus freeing themselves of subjection to the new
sovereign, or to continue to reside in the territory, in which
case the expiration of the term of eighteen months without
their making an express declaration of intention to retain
their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the latter,
such persons thereby becoming subjects of the new
sovereign in the same manner as the natives of these
Islands. The period of eighteen months began to run from
the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty
that is to say, from April 11,1899, and expired on the
corresponding day of October, 1900. The petitioner
absented himself from these Islands on May 30, 1899, and
remained absent therefrom during the whole period. It was
in January, 1901, that he returned to these Islands.
From this conduct on the part of the petitioner it
is evident that he elected to take the first of the two courses
open to him under his right of option. Neither the
Government nor the courts can place any other construction
upon the facts above related. Having left the Islands he had
no occasion,to make any declaration of his intention to
preserve his Spanish nationality, which he carried with him
on his departure. This nationality could be forfeited only by
a continued residence in the ceded territory and a failure to
make a declaration of intention to preserve it within the
term fixed therefor. The conditions which gave rise to the
presumptive change of nationality were residence and the
lapse of eighteen months without express declaration to the
contrary; these two conditions not being fulfilled there was
no change of national status. Neither by the Government of
Spain nor by that of the United States could the petitioner
be regarded as a Filipino subject. By absenting himself
from the territory he continued to be a Spaniard.
To native-born subjects of the territory no such
right of option was accorded; it was expressly refused tllem
upon the rejection by the American Commissioners of the
proposition in favor of the inhabitants of the ceded
territories made by the Spanish Commissioners in Annex
No. 1 to the twenty-second protocol. (Conference of
December 10, 1898.) The native subject could not evade
the power of the new sovereign by withdrawing from the
Islands, nor while continuing to reside therein make
declaration of his intention to preserve the Spanish
nationality enjoyed under the former sovereign. Neither the
Government of the United States nor that of Spain can
consider them as other than Filipino subjects. This is
expressly stated by the Spanish Government in article 1 of
its royal decree of May 11, 1901.
The dates fixed by the treaty by which the
sovereignty of one nation is ceded to another are of the
highest importance, they being part of the contract, and are
not within the control of the subjects as are those relating to
their individual rights by reason of the fact that the political
rights of the contracting nations themselves are the subject
of the agreement. It is for this reason that the Government
of Spain in the royal decree above cited has always taken
and, moreover, expressly declares therein that persons who
are natives or residents of the ceded or relinquished
territories cannot, in their relations with the Government or
authorities of such territories, lay claim to Spanish
nationality preserved or recovered by virtue of said decree,
except with the consent of such Government, or under
treaty stipulations. (Art. 5.) The Government and courts of
these Islands should not act with less circumspection in the
matter, and invade the sovereign rights of Spain by giving
the presumptive nationality established by Article IX of the
treaty of Paris an extent not warranted by the conditions
upon which it depends, to wit, residence coupled with
failure to make an express declaration to the contrary. The
ordinary provisions of local laws in their normal operation
with regard to the effect of absence upon the retention of a
residence or domicile cannot therefore be relied upon, nor
the presumption as to the intention of an absentee
recognized by civil codes and international treaties,
although the most general and almost the only proof
allowed by statute as evidence of an intention to preserve a
residence or domicile in a country is the maintenance of a
dwelling or commercial establishment therein, upon which
point, as also upon the fa,ct that the petitioner became a
member of the bar of Barcelona upon his arrival in that city,
we make no decision, not regarding it as of any moment in
view of the conclusions above expressed. The fact is thai
one is not to be regarded as having submitted to the new
sovereign by the mere failure to make an express
declaration, inasmuch as without a residence de facto the
declaration is of no significance, having been established
for the express purpose of overcoming the effect of a
continued residence, an act which in itself implies
subjection to the new sovereign by giving rise to the
presumption of waiver of Spanish nationality and the
adoption of that of the territory.
The petitioner can not, therefore, be considered to
have lost his Spanish nationality by reason of his residence
in the territory after the 11th of October, 1900, and his
failure to make declaration of his intention to preserve it
within the period agreed upon by the high contracting
parties to the treaty of Paris, and to have adopted the
nationality of the native subjects under the presumption
arising from the conditions expressed. He can only acquire
it through voluntary renunciation of his present nationality
by seeking to become naturalized in these Islands; but upon
this matter this court can decide nothing, there having been
no legislation upon the subject up to the present
The status of the petitioner with respect to the
new sovereignty of the territory having been defined, it
remains to determine the question raised as to whether
Spanish subjects resident therein constitute an intermediate
class between other foreign residents and the natives of the
country in whose behalf some specially favorable
conditions have been stipulated. Upon this point no
proposition was made, even incidentally, nor was any
reference made to it in the discussions which preceded the
treaty of Paris. The American Commissioners, referring to
Spanish subjects, natives of Spain, simply said: "Such
persons have the fullest right to dispose of their property
and remove from the territory or remain therein to continue
to be Spanish subjects or elect the nationality of the new
territory." (Memorandum annexed to Protocol No. 22.)
"They shall also have the right to carry on their industry,
commerce, and profession, being subject in respect thereof
to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners." (Art. 9
of the treaty of Paris.) The laws applicable to other
foreigners were, prior to that treaty, the Law of Foreigners
for the Ultramarine Provinces of July 4, 1870, and article
27 of the Civil Code. The first of these laws in its thirty-
ninth article authorized all foreigners to engage in any kind
of industry in the Spanish ultramarine provinces subject to
the laws prevailing therein, and to practice any profession
for which the laws did not require a diploma of proficiency
granted by the Spanish authorities. No one can doubt that
the legal profession is one of those for the practice of which
the law required a diploma of proficiency granted by the
Spanish authorities. The second law cited provides that
foreigners in Spain shall enjoy the rights which the civil
laws accord to Spaniards, subject to the provisions of
article 2 of the constitution of the State. Article 2 of the
constitution of 1876 establishes the same restriction or
limitation as the law of foreigners. Hence if other
foreigners could not then engage in the practice of law, and
by the express prohibition of the Code of Civil Procedure in
force can not do so at the present time, neither can Spanish
subjects do so, they being in every respect upon the same
footing as other foreigners.
If, then, the petitioner upon his departure from
these Islands on May 30,1899, did not take with him the
nationality of the native inhabitants impressed by the treaty
of Paris, which had been in force from the 11th of April of
the same year; if he departed as a Spaniard and continued
to be a Spaniard, by taking the first course left open by the
right of option stipulated in the treaty of Paris, without
being affected by the presumptive nationality of the
territory arising from the fact of residence and the lapse of
the time fixed; if he had not elected to adopt this nationality
of the territory by express declaration within the same
period; if after the expiration of that period it is expressly
provided that the right of option shall no longer be
available, and that the only course is naturalization, as to
which there has been no legislative enactment; if as a
Spanish subject upon equal footing with other foreign
residents he can not practice the legal profession under the
law either prior or subsequent to the treaty of Paris, it is
evident that this court can not regard the petitioner as
possessed of the qualifications alleged.
The new petition presented by him for admission to the bar
of these Islands must therefore be denied, and it is so
ordered.
Petition for Leave to Reclaim Practice of Law of
Benjamin Dacanay
In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek
medical help. In order for him to take advantage of
Canadas free medical aid program he became a Canadian
citizen in 2004. In 2006 however, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In
the same year, he returned to the Philippines and he now
intends to resume his practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still
resume his practice of law.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other
professions in the Philippines are reserved and limited only
to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar. So when Dacanay became a
Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship in accordance with
RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay reacquires his Filipino
citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar
was deemed to have never been terminated.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume
his practice of law right after reacquisition?
No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions
before he can resume his practice of law, to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is especially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good
standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26
FACTS:
Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but
was denied of taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign the
Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide from a hazing incident.
Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the
court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that
he be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Rolls
of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral
character he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen
(15) certifications among others from: two (2) senators,
five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious
order. In addition, he, together with the others who were
convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of
their hazing victim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the
Lawyers Oath, sign the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice
law.
HELD:
YES. Petition granted.
RATIO:
Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent
proof that he possessed the required good moral character
as required before taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign the
Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the
premises that he is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In
giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally
reminded that the Lawyers Oath is not merely a ceremony
or formality before the practice of law, and that the
community assistance he had started is expected to
continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the
society.
A.C. No. 439 April 12, 1961
LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
QUINCIANO VAILOCES, respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as
member of the Philippine bar.
It appears that as member of the bar and in his Capacity as
a notary public, Vailoces, on December 14, 1950,
acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to
be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de
Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned by her
surviving spouse and daughter. Consequently the probate
court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered decision
denying probate to the will. This decision e final. On the
basis of this decision a criminal action for falsification of
public document was filed against Vailoces and the three
attesting witnesses to the will before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental where after trial, they were
found guilty and convicted On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision with regard to Vailocess but modified
it with record to his co-accused. As finally adjudged,
Vailoces was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public document defined and
penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and as
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate Penalty ranging from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor as
maximum, with the accessories of the law, finest and costs.
This sentence having become final, Vailoces began serving
it in the insular penitentiary. As a consequence, the
offended party instituted the present disbarment
proceedings.
In his answer, respondent not only disputes the
judgment of conviction rendered against him in the
criminal case but contends that the same is based on
insufficient and inconclusive evidence, the charge being
merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite
on the part of herein complainant, and that to give course to
this proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in
double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.
Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of
Court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude, as used in this section, includes any act deemed
contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. 1 Among the
examples given of crimes of this nature by former Chief
Justice Moran are the crime of seduction and the crime of
concubinage.2 The crime of which respondent was
convicted is falsification of public document, which is
indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to
justice, honesty and good morals. Hence, such crime
involves moral turpitude. Indeed, it is well-settled that
"embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes
which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all
crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as
involving moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206).
It appearing that respondent has been found
guilty and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude it
is clear that he rendered himself amenable to disbarment
under Section 25, Rule 127, of our Rules of Court. It is
futile on his part, much as we sympathize with him, to
dispute now the sufficiency of his conviction, for this is a
matter which we cannot now look into. That is now a
closed chapter insofar as this proceeding is concerned. The
only issue with which we are concerned is that he was
found guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude. As this Court well said:
The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon
us. The judgment not only has become final but has been
executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction,
the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice. (In the Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No.
229, April 30, 1957).
The plea of respondent that to disbar him now
after his conviction of a crime which resulted in the
deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of the
Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental would be tantamount to
placing him in double jeopardy is untenable, for such
defense can only be availed of when he is placed in the
predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense necessarily included therein, within the
meaning of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is not the case here.
The disbarment of an attorney does not partake of a
criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the
court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court" (In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588), and
its purpose is "to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence" (In repose
confidence"(In re McDougall, 3 Phil. 77).
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his
office as attorney and, to this effect, our Clerk of Court is
enjoined to erase his name from the roll of attorneys.
[A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999]
MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY.
DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as
well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent Atty.
Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.
The facts of this administrative case, as found by the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP),[1] in its Report, are as follows:
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in
November, 1992, she was referred to the respondent who
promised to process all necessary documents required for
complainants trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial
payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester
Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was
issued.
From the period of January 1993 to May 1994
complainant had several conferences with the respondent
regarding the processing of her travel documents. To
facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an
additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos
(P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign
from her job as stenographer with the Commission on
Human Rights.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of
her travel documents complainant issued Planters
Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of
Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty.
D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount,
respondent furnished the complainant copies of
Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of.
156) and a list of questions which would be asked during
interviews.
When complainant inquired about her passport,
Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming
the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer,
employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the
complainant was furnished documents to support her
assumed identity.
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious
documents, the complainant demanded the return of her
money, however she was assured by respondent that there
was nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in the
business for quite sometime; with the promise that her
money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the
payment of the required fee which was paid by
complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to
her.
When complainant demanded for her passport,
respondent assured the complainant that it will be given to
her on her departure which was scheduled on September 6,
1994. On said date complainant was given her passport and
visa issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant
left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who
were also recruits of the respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport,
complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel were
apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying
spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted the
respondent through overseas telephone call and informed
him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994,
complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was
deported back to the Philippines and respondent fetched her
from the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A
Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took
complainants passport with a promise that he will secure
new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant
opted not to pursue with her travel, she demanded for the
return of her money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent
made partial refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and
P5,000.00.
On December 19, 1996 the complainant through
counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for the refund
of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand
Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the
respondent, however his wife informed her that the
respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters.
In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the
respondent however she found out that the respondent had
transferred to an unknown residence apparently with
intentions to evade responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts
for the amount paid by complainant, applications for
U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during
interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees
paid by the complainant together with demand letter for the
remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand
Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by the
respondent.[2]
Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an
answer to or comment on the complaint, there was no
response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the
scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever
was made by the respondent.[3] As a result of the
inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the
respondent to comply with the orders of the Commission,
the investigation against him proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline
issued its Report on the case, finding that:
It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged
for the purpose of securing a visa for a U.S.A. travel of
complainant. There was no mention of job placement or
employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the
respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.
The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A.
visa for the complainant under an assumed name was
accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the
part of the respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds
made by the respondent of the fees paid by the
complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a
forwarding address indicates his attempt to escape
responsibility.
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is
guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTY.
DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as a member of
the bar until he fully refunds the fees paid to him by
complainant and comply with the order of the Commission
on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the
Rules of Court.[4]
Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
this administrative case was elevated to the IBP Board of
Governors for review. The Board in a Resolution[5] dated
December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with
amendment the recommendation of the Commission. The
Resolution of the Board states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decisions as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that
Respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis be DISBARRED for
having been found guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the
IBP recommendation contained in its Resolution dated
December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of the records
in this case, we find the resolution passed by the Board of
Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the finding of
the Commission that the charge of illegal recruitment was
not established because complainant failed to substantiate
her allegation on the matter. In fact she did not mention any
particular job or employment promised to her by the
respondent. The only service of the respondent mentioned
by the complainant was that of securing a visa for the
United States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution, that herein respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived
the complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa
and travel documents; that despite spurious documents
nothing untoward would happen; that he guarantees her
arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees
and expenses already paid, in case something went
wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are
disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers
relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is
the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not
mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
must be upheld and keep inviolable.[6] The nature of the
office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of
good moral character. [7] This requisite is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. [8] We have sternly warned that any gross
misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or
private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt
as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue
in the practice of law.[9]
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly
jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he
made her travel with spurious documents. How often have
victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters
been imprisoned in foreign lands because they were
provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally
disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he
sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are
respondents acts illegal, they are also detestable from the
moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and
scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration of
justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege.[10] We must stress that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only
during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.[11]
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of
respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his
total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are
contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional
conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing
respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for
his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct
toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the
recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is in
order.[12] Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return
the complainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly
persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the hardship and
humiliation suffered by the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be
spread on the personal records of respondent. Respondent
is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately
the amount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand
(P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount he collected
from her.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF
BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002
BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez
(Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling)
from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on
him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not
disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City,
namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for
Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which
occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front
of media practitioners and other people. Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife
causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using
the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to
the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an
indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the
appellation and appears on its face to have been received by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution dated December 3,
2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the
criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because
retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor,
advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be
settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, he being their former professor in the College of
Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose
from a single incident and involving the same parties as
closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the
charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve
moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits
that some of his communications really contained the word
Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the
office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8,
2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure
against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases
filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that
only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases,
not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases
filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed,
he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the
Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be
taken lightly by an applicant.
Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling is proper and shall subsequently barred
him from taking his lawyers oath and signing on the Roll
of Attorneys
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the
imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling
as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia
Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking
the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.
Rationale:
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia
Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the
law but who are also known to possess good moral
character. The requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to
determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court
in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence
of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness
even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of
the applicant.