Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions
of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTCs Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance,
as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the
complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on
the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan
v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party
litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the
said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court
laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which
is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public
respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3,
2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the
subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil
indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that
nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar
Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a
Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4,
2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance
the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings
before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioners Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied
the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following
errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of
injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF

THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID
BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON
THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY
REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF
NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTCS).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A
of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein
petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private
complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by
the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without
the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision
of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the
court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on
September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term
"Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule
provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before
the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been
confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A
should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective
of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34,
Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a
lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from
the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the
issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the
private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and
that therefore, petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality,
flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant
case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil
aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed
instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the
civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay
City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a
private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
 THIRD DIVISION

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St.,Pasay City, G.R. No. 154464

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
TINGA, J.,*
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Acting Chairperson,
Manila, VELASCO, JR.,*
Public Respondent. NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St.,Pasay City,
Private Respondent. Promulgated:

September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the
Resolutions dated May 10, 2002[1] and July 31, 2002[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay
City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and
the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case.
No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on
his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement
of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court[3] that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from
the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty.
Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which
petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had
been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? and
proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,[4] praying for the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent
judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the
pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which
engenders the belief that justice will not be served.[5]

In an Order[6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that
throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary
inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration[7] of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.[8] In the same Order, the trial court
held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his
failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was
denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule
138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to
different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an
Order[10] dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the
following errors:
 I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR
AND IN THE LATTERS BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO
RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF
JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE
PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the
respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from
trying the case.

This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not
exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the
application therefor will be directed.[11] A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of
Appeals.[12] The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of
the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.[13]

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-
A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned
not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised
can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of
the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is
necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the
law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall
be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of
his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioners appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge
in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-
A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized schools clinical legal
education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which
provides:
 Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention
of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he
is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and
that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant
may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the
litigation.[14] Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law,[15] petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the
risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own
instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a
counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must,
therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when
the basis of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a
law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party
representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is
misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student
practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and
was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by
himself and counsel,[16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived.[17] The
rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado,[18] where we declared that even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern
that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil
case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance, effectively
undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges
that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently,
he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer,
before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in
court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and
partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative
demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?
Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of
arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and confidence in the
respondents impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case[19] against the
respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September
15, 2002. We now adopt the Courts findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and
convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,[20] as voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether
she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing
in the case before her.[21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City areMODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City
is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice